The Economic Eﬀects of the Aboli2on of Serfdom: Evidence ...chairgovreg.fondation-dauphine.fr/sites/chairgovreg.fondation-dauphine.fr/files/... · • Living standards: the height

TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom:

EvidencefromtheRussianEmpire

AndreiMarkevich(NES)and

EkaterinaZhuravskaya(PSE-EHESS)

Mo2va2on•  The effect of slavery and serfdom on economic efficiency and

growth has been a subject of a long-lasting debate

–  Many scholars view both slavery and serfdom as inefficient production systems with distorted incentives and suboptimal resource allocation

•  Cairnes 1862, Williams 1944, North and Thomas 1973, Anderson and Gallman 1977, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Ogilvie 2013

–  However, there is no clear theoretical argument why slave and landowners failed to provide efficient incentives to their workers

Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”

Examples-world•  Empiricalexamplesofefficientslavesystemsabound:

–  Theaboli2onofslaveryintheUSsawadeclineinoutputperpersonintheSouthandthestagna2onofthesoutherneconomy

–  SlavelaborintheUSin1850wasmoreefficientatproducingcoPonthanfreelaborinIndia,China,andEgypt

–  Hai2inthe18thcenturywasrichwith90%oflaborcomprisedofslaves,butfreeHai2didnotretainthatprosperity

»  the causal interpretation of some of these examples is contested, however (Fogel 1989 vs. Omstead and Rhode 2008 and 2010)

Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom” Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”

Examples-Russia•  Russiahasbeentakenbymanyobserversasanexamplethatpropertyinpeoplewasnotacrucialdeterminingfactorofbackwardness– RussiaremainedabackwardagrariansocietyrightuptotheRussianRevolu2ondespitetheaboli2onofserfdomonehalfacenturybefore(Gerschenrkon1965)

– LiPlesystema2cevidenceexistedonthis,however,beforeourpaper


Researchques2on

•  Whataretheeconomiceffectsoftheaboli2onofserfdom?– Agriculturalproduc2vity– Livingstandardsofpeasants–  Industrialdevelopment


SerfdominRussia

•  Oneofthekeyins2tu2onsinRussianhistory:1649to1861,i.e.,212years

•  Fullusageandtransferownershiprightsoflandlordsovertheirserfs–  Propertyoftheirestateswhichbelongedtolandlords– Obliga2ontofulfillandlord’sorders

•  Theamountandtypesofobliga2onswereatalmostfulldiscre2onofthelandlord

6AndreiMarkevichandEkaterinaZhuravskaya"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”6/57

Theemancipa2onofserfs

1861:Personalfreedomwasgrantedtoserfs•  Freeofchargeandinstantaneously•  Landlordslosttherighttosell,buy,lease,punish,orimprisonpeasantsandtochangethelevelofpeasantobliga2ons– Formerserfsbecameagriculturalentrepreneurs

•  fullownersoftheirlaborandhumancapitalwithcivilrights

• withfixedlandleaseobliga2onstolandlordsbeforethelandreformtookplace

7Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”

Macrodynamics

AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 8Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”

23

45

67

Aver

age

grai

n ye

ild, R

ussi

an e

mpi

re

1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920Year

Agricultural productivity and the 1861 emancipation reform

Didcontemporariesno2ceanything?

1.  Intellectualswereunhappyaboutthereform–  E.g.,LevTolstoy–however,theymighthavehadwrong

expecta2ons

2.  Technocratsno2cedmajorimprovements–  Fromthereportofroyalcommissionofagriculture,1873:

“Thesitua+onofpeasantsrecentlyhasimprovedconsiderablybecause,havingreceivedtheirplots,peasantstrytoimprovethelandasmuchaspossible,fer+lizeitandtakecareofit,sothelandproducesmorethaneverbefore.”(p.28)


InthispaperWeexploitgeographicvaria2onintheprevalenceofserfdominImperialRussiaandover2mevaria2oninemancipa2onofserfsinadiff-in-diffpanelseing:•  Documentverylargeandimmediateincreasesinagricultural

produc2vity,industrialdevelopment,andpeasants’livingstandardsasaresultoftheaboli2onofserfdom

•  Wealsodisentanglethe2componentsofthereform:emancipa2onvs.landreform–  theposi2veeffectsareen2relyduetoemancipa2on

•  Explorethemechanism–  Peasants’incen2ves


Previewoftheresults

•  Oures2matesimplythattheemancipa2onledtoanincreaseintotalvalueaddedofatleast12%acrossthreesectors(ourpreferredes2mateis29%)–  15.5%increaseingrainyieldinanaverageprovincethatiscomparableto

37yearsofaggregatedevelopment–  48%increaseinindustrialproduc2on

•  Acounterfactualscenario:Russiawouldhavebeen40-60%richerby1913haditabolishedserfdom40yearsearlieraswasconsideredbyAlexanderI

•  Livingstandards:theheightofdrajeeswas1.35cen2metershigherforcohortsbornajertheemancipa2oncomparedtocohortsbornbefore–  comparabletotheincreaseinheightofmalesperdecadeinthe19th

centuryWesternEurope(HaPonandBray2010)


RelatedLiterature1.  Ins2tu2onsandeconomicdevelopment

–  AcemogluandJohnson2005,BanerjeeandIyer2005,Nunn2009,Acemogluetal.2010,Tabellini2010,BruhnandGallego2012,MichalopoulosandPapaioannou,Ogilvie2013,2014

2.  Efficiencyofforcedlaboranditseffectsoneconomicdevelopment–  Acemogluetal.2012,Nunn2008,Miller2009,Dell2010,Nunnand

Wantchekon2011andBertocchiandDimicio2014

3.  DebateontheefficiencyofserfdomintheRussianEmpire1.  Gerschenkron(1962,1965),Koval’chenko(1967)2.  Moon(1996),Mironov(2010),Dennison(2006,2011)andStanziani(2014a

and2014b)


Hypotheses(1)•  Theeffectoftheaboli2onofserfdomoneconomicdevelopmentand

livingstandardsisaprioriambiguous:1.  Agriculture:

–  Theaboli2onofserfdomcouldleadtobePerincen2vesforformerserfsprovidedthatlandlordsdidnotcrediblycommitnottorevisepeasants’obliga2onsunderserfdom

•  Anecdotalevidence:somelandlordswereabletocommit,however,thiswasnotacommonprac2ce(Dennison2011)

•  Theemancipa2oninstantaneouslysolvedtheratcheteffectproblembyfixingthelevelofquitrentforallformerserfs

–  Serfdomcouldhavehadefficiencyadvantagesoverpost-emancipa2onproduc2onduetoeconomiesofscale,bePeraccesstofinance,andbePeraccesstonewtechnologiesforlandlords


Hypotheses(2)2.  Nutri2on:

–  Serfswereavaluableinputintoproduc2onforgentry=>incen2vestofeedthemwell

–  However,theasymmetryofinforma2onmayhaveledtomalnutri2onofserfsinequilibrium,asgentrywereconcernedthatpeasantswerehidingtheproceedsoftheirproduc2on

–  Inaddi2on,peasantsmayhavehadlowerincen2vestofeedchildrenunderserfdom,aspeasants’childrenbelongedtothegentry

3.  Industrialdevelopment:–  Theratcheteffectproblemalsoappliedtoar2san(industrial)ac2vi2esofserfsastheseac2vi2eswerealsosubjecttoratcheteffect

–  Restric2onsonmigra2onwerelijed,butonlypar2allyduetocommunes


Data:outcomesProvince-levelpanelofthe19thcenturyEuropeanRussia:– Agriculturalproduc2vitybyprovincexyear

•  yield-to-seedra2oofmaincrops(rye,oat,wheat,barley,buckwheat)•  41snapshotsover2me

–  Industrialoutput(in1895rubles)byprovincexyear•  8snapshotsover2me

– Livingstandards:Heightofdrajees•  byprovincexbirthcohort(nutri2on)

–  15snapshotsover2me

•  bydistrictxbirthcohort(nutri2on)–  10snapshotsover2me

– 46provincesand467districts


Data:sources•  Thedatasetiscomprisedfromvariouspublishedandarchivalsources

•  Outcomevariables:–  governorreportsfortheyearsbefore1883–  officialsta2s2csforthelateryears

•  Thedistribu2onofruralpopula2onbystatus:1858policedata(Bushen1863)

•  Thelandreformprogress:Vilson(1878)


17

EuropeanprovincesoftheRussianEmpire

20E65E40E 60E25E

55E

30E 50E35E

45E

60N

40N

45N

50N

55N

65N

Arkhangelsk

Perm

Vologda

Don

Orenburg

Vyatka

Olonets

Samara

Astrakhan

Tver

Minsk

Novgorod

Volyn

Kiev

Kazan

Orel

Saratov

Kostroma

Vilno

Tambov

Pskov

Kursk

Kherson

TulaKovno

Voronezh

Penza

VitebskVladimir

Mogilev

Poltava

RyazanSmolensk

Simbirsk

Grodno

Chernigov

Podolsk

Kaluga

Liflyandiya Yaroslavl

Moscow

Tavrida

Kharkov

N-Novgorod

Ekaterinoslav

Saint-Petersburg

Bessarabiya

Kurlyandiya

Estlyandiya

LegendProvinces of the Russian Empire

In the sample

Not in the sample

latutude - longidute


TypesofpeasantsinEuropeanRussia•  Serfs:43%ofruralpopula2onin1858

–  Thelandlordshad(almost)fulldiscre2onovertheamountandtheformofobliga2onsoftheirserfs:theycouldsell,buy,leaseserfs

–  0.1%inArkhangelskprovinceto83%inMogilevprovince

•  Statepeasants:40.4%in1858–  Formallyfreelandlessindividualslivingandworkingonthelandbelongingtothestate

–  Fixedbylawland-leasepaymentstothestate(inaformofquitrent)

•  Freepopula/on:12.6%in1858(withorwithoutland2tles)–  Cossacks,Colonists,localnon-Russians

•  Royalpeasants:4%in1858–  Withafixedquitrent,managedbythespecialministry


GeographyofSerfdom:Serfsin1858asaShareofRuralPopula2on

19

LegendShare of serfs, 1858 (deciles)

0% - 1,7%

1,8% - 7,8%

7,9% - 25,7%

25,8% - 40,3%

40,4% - 44,8%

44,9% - 54,4%

54,5% - 57,2%

57,3% - 61,7%

61,8% - 73,7%

73,8% - 83,3%


NeedtocontrolfordistancetoMoscowandlandquality

20

Coef:-0.0005;SE=0.00009;R2=0.36.

Arkhangelsk

Vologda

Olonets

Saint-Petersburg

Novgorod

Pskov

SmolenskVitebsk

Mogilev

KovnoMoscowVladimir N-NovgorodKostromaYaroslavl

Tver

Kaluga

Tula

Ryazan

Orel

TambovKursk

Kazan

Penza

ChernigovPoltava

Kiev Podolsk

Volyn

Bessarabiya

Kherson

EkaterinoslavDon

Samara

Vyatka

Perm

Minsk

GrodnoVilno

Voronezh

Simbirsk

Kharkov

Tavrida

Saratov

Astrakhan0.2

.4.6

.8

0 500 1000 1500Distance to Moscow from the centeroid of the province (km)

Share of serfs Fitted values


Mainspecifica2on:diff-in-diff

•  i–province;t–2meperiod(yearordecade);Y–outcome•  ShareSerfs–shareofserfsin1858•  PostEmacipa+on–1forpost1861yearsand0otherwise•  ψiandϬt–provinceandyearfixedeffects•  tδ–province-specificlineartrends•  X–landqualityanddistancetoMoscowXPostEmancipa+on•  Clustererrortermswithineachprovinceseparatelybeforeand

ajertheemancipa2onof1861

•  Similaranalysiswithdistrict-levelpaneldatawithdistrictandyearfixedeffectsandprovince-specificlinertrends

21

19

grain productivity as the grain yield to grain seed ratio – a measure widely used as a proxy for

productivity in Russian agriculture before the late-19th century as well as in medieval European

agriculture.17 Yield to seed ratio for grain was 3.95 in an average province in an average year,

increasing from about 3.5 to 4.5 over the century. Potato was a more labor-intensive crop than

grain, with a higher yield to seed ratio (about 4.4 on average). Animal husbandry had secondary

importance. There was on average one head of cattle per two inhabitants in the empire. The mean

height of a draftee was 164.5 centimeters.18 Tables 1 and A1 also provide summary statistics and

sources for all control variables.

5. Empirical methodology

We use cross-province variation in the shares of different types of peasantry and over-time variation

in the emancipation to estimate the effect of the abolition of serfdom on agricultural productivity,

peasants’ wellbeing, and industrial development. Our main specification is as follows:

Yit = α ShareSerfsi ×PostEmancipationt + Xit’γ + ψi + Ϭt + tδi + εit, (1)

Subscripts i and t index provinces and time periods. Time periods are either years or decades,

depending on data availability for a particular outcome. We consider the following outcomes,

denoted by Y: grain yield (harvest/seed ratio), height of draftees in centimeters, mortality (ratio of

the number of deaths to provincial population) and fertility (ratio of the number of births to

provincial population), log(population), log(industrial employment), and log(industrial output).

ShareSerfs denotes the share of privately owned serfs in a province in 1858. PostEmancipation

denotes a dummy indicating the time after the emancipation of serfs. Our baseline sample excludes

Baltic provinces, and therefore, PostEmancipation dummy switches on in 1861 in all provinces.19

17 There are no data on labor inputs in agriculture in the 19th century. Employment in agriculture is known only for the 1897 population census year. In addition, figures on population with rural legal status are known only for tax census years (1795, 1811, 1816, 1851, and 1858). Arable land data are available for 1800, 1858, 1871, and 1877. There are no data on investments into land. 18 All height data are on soldiers drafted after the 1874 military reform, i.e., collected under the same procedure. Draft occurred at the age of 21, i.e., those who were drafted before 1881 were born during the serfdom period. 19 To study the robustness of our results to inclusion of Baltic provinces, we use the interaction ShareSerfsi PostEmancipationit as our main variable of interest, where PostEmancipationit varies both over time and across provinces. PostEmancipationit switches on in 1819 in three Baltic provinces and in 1861 in all other provinces. ShareSerfsi for Baltic provinces is equal to the share of former serfs in 1858 according to Bushen (1863). Alternatively,


Theeffectoftheaboli2onofserfdomonagriculturalproduc2vity(OLS)

Grain productivity Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 0.86*** 0.80*** 1.06***

[0.233] [0.289] [0.302] Demeaned log distance to Moscow X

Post-emancipation -1.02** -0.95**

[0.443] [0.439] Demeaned crop suitability X

Post-emancipation 0.044 0.035 [0.046] [0.044]

Share of state peasants X Post-1866, Share of royal peasants X Post-1859

NO NO YES

Province-specific trends NO YES YES

Province and Time fixed effects YES YES YES Observations 1,777 1,756 1,756

R-squared 0.361 0.398 0.399 22


Pre-trends?The2mingoftheeffect


-10

12

34

Coef

ficie

nt

40s 50-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 Post 95Time

(relative to years 1795-1829)Grain productivity

1764Na2onaliza2onofmonasteriallandsandtheprevalenceofserfdom

24

•  Remainingchallengestoiden2fica2onare:–  Measurementerror=>possible–  Otherunrelatedtoserfdomfactorsthatchangetrendsin1861inprovinceswith

largenumberofserfs=>unlikely,butnotimpossible,duetodefeatinCrimeanwar

–  Spa2alcorrela2on•  Therewerenoprivateserfsinformerlymonasteriallandsajer

CatherinetheGreatna2onalizedthemin1764:–  astheselandswerenotgrantedtonoblestoavoidconflictwiththechurch

•  Usetheshareofmonasterialserfspriorna2onaliza2onasasourceofexogenousvaria2onintheshareofserfsin1858–  SimilartoBuggleandNafziger(2015),butunderaweakeriden2fica2on

assump2onofpanelseing


Formermonasterialserfsandtheprevalenceofserfdomin1858:province-level


-.4-.2

0.2

.4Sh

are

of s

erfs

in 1

858

-.1 0 .1 .2 .3Share of monasterial serfs before the 1764 nationalization

coef = -1.2560534, (robust) se = .40873615, t = -3.07

Controls: log distance to Moscow and land suitabilityConditional scatter plot and fitted line

Formermonasterialserfsandtheprevalenceofserfdomin1858:district-level


-.50

.5Sh

are

of s

erfs

in 1

858

by d

istric

t

-.2 0 .2 .4 .6Share of monasterial serfs before the 1764 nationalization by district

coef = -.55964074, (robust) se = .07319432, t = -7.65

Full sampleScatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow

Isthenumberofmonasterialserfsexcludable?


Nodifferencebetweenmonasterialserfsandprivately-ownedserfsin:•  produc2ontechnologiesbefore1764(Zakharova1982)•  thequalityofland(andwecontrolforlandquality)•  literacyrates

•  Hadmonasterialserfsaffecteddevelopmentdirectly,whywouldsuchaneffectberealizedonlyajer1861?

•  Iden2fica2onassump2on:thedistribu2onofchurchlandsacenturybeforetheemancipa2onwasorthogonaltothechangesineconomicfundamentalsaroundemancipa2on

Similar-sizees2matewithIV

Instrumental variables estimation Share of serfs X Post-emancipation

Grain productivity

1st stage 2nd stage Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 1.21**

[0.551] Share of nationalized monasterial serfs X

Post-emancipation -1.25*** [0.299]

Demeaned Log distance to Moscow X Post-emancipation

YES

YES

Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation YES YES Province-specific linear trends YES YES

Province and Time fixed effects YES YES Observations 1,756 1,756

R-squared 0.525 F stat 17.45


Conley(1999)correc2onforspa2alcorrela2on–agriculture


-.08

.15

-.45

.21

-.1

.21

.42

-.06

.07

-.19

.05

-.21

.36

-.01.02

.06

-.04-.03

0.010

-.010

00.01

.01

-.01

-.02

0

.05

-.010

-.04-.03

.03

-.06-.12

.23

-.06

.13

-.03 -.08-.2

.19

-.3

-1.5

-1-.5

0.5

1C

hang

e in

det

rend

ed g

ain

yiel

d, b

efor

e-af

ter 1

861

-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4Share of serfs in 1858

DFBeta presented for each observation

Scatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow and suitabilityChange in grain yield

The change in detrended grain yield b/w pre- and post-emancipation full |DFBeta|<0.3

Share of serfs 0.90*** 0.75*** [0.259] [0.197]

Log distance to Moscow, crop suitability Yes Yes Observations 46 43

Adj R-squared 0.255 0.344

Themagnitudeislarge

•  Aleapforwardof37years:

– A15.5%increaseingrainproduc2vityontopoftheoveralldevelopmenttrendforanaverageprovincewith45%ofserfsandwiththemeandistancetoMoscow•  comparedtoanaverageincreaseby4percentbydecadeinthe19thcentury


Thelandreform•  Mandatorylandbuyoutsbyformerserfsleadingtocommunalland

tenure–  PossiblebePerincen2vestoinvestinland,butonlyinhereditarycommunes

–  Forre-par22oncommune:lowincen2vestoinvestinland

•  Gradualrealiza2onover1862-1881withvaryingspeed–  Nego2a2onsonpreciseterms

•  price,sizeofplots,theexact2mingofbuyoutsineachestate–  immediateobligatorylandbuy-outinwesternprovincesin1863asaresponsetothePolishrebellion

•  Usetheshareofserfswhosignedlandbuyoutcontractinagivenyearasameasureoflandreformprogress AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 31


OLS:Emancipa2onvs.landreformGrain productivity

Share of serfs X Post-emancipation

1.04** [0.407]

Share of serfs with signed buyout contracts

-0.44* [0.255]

Demeaned Log distance to Moscow and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation

YES

Share of state peasants X Post 1863, share of royal peasants X Post 1859

NO

Province-specific linear trends YES Time and province fixed effects YES

Observations 1,701 R-squared 0.396


Gentryindebtednessandlandreform

33

•  Theprogressoflandreformwascertainlyendogenous

•  Oursourceofexogenousvaria2onisasfollows:Indebtedlandlordshadafinancialincen2vetopostponelandreformimplementa2on–  thefixed(temporary)quitrentwashigherthantheinteresttheyhadtopay

fortheirdebtstothestate

•  Constructasynthe2cinstrumentforlandreformwithlinearschedulesofreformimplementa2on,withspeedvaryingdependingonex-anteindebtedness


Landreformprogressandthesynthe2cinstrumentin1872


-.50

.5Sh

are

of p

easa

nts

with

buy

out c

ontra

ct s

igne

d in

187

2

-.05 0 .05Non-indebtedness instrument in 1872

coef = 3.1986224, (robust) se = 1.3878267, t = 2.3

Controls: log distance to Moscow and land suitabilityConditional scatter plot and fitted line

Isgentryindebtednessexcludable?

35

•  Theprimaryreasontoobtainloansforgentrywasthestatusconsump2onratherthanproduc2veinvestments

•  Loanswereissuedbynon-marketstateins2tu2onswhichgrantedloansforpoli2calratherthaneconomicreasons


Emancipa2onvs.landreform:IVes2matesShare of

serfs Signed buyout

contract

Grain productivity

1st stage 1st stage 2nd stage Share of serfs X

Post-emancipation 2.78*** [0.706]


-1.26*** [0.334]

Share of nationalized monasterial serfs X Post-emancipation

-1.28*** -1.33*** [0.305] [0.296]

Interpolation b/w (1-indebtedness) and 1 in the interval 1862-1882 0.09 2.78***

[0.150] [0.231] Province-specific linear trends, FEs, Demeaned Log distance to

Moscow and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation

YES YES YES

Observations 1,701 1,701 1,701 R-squared 0.531

F, monastierial serfs 17.85 20.28 F, indebtedness instrument 0.421 136.8


Themagnitudeoftheeffectofthelandreform

•  Theeffectoftheaboli2onofserfdomonagriculturalproduc2vitywouldhavebeen84%largerwithoutthelandreform

–  Afullimplementa2onofthelandreform(fromaffec2ngzerotoaffec2ngallformerserfs)inanaverageprovinceledtoadecreaseingrainproduc2vityby0.57or16.2%fromthemean1858level

–  Emancipa2onledtoanincreaseby1.25or35.7%


Landreformhadnega2veeffectonlyinre-par22oncommunes

Grain productivity

OLS Share of serfs X

Post-emancipation 0.80*

[0.416] Share of serfs with signed buyout contracts 0.18

[0.298] Share of serfs with signed buyout contracts

X re-partition commune -0.82** [0.351]

Demeaned Log distance to Moscow and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation

YES

FEs, Province-specific linear trends YES Observations 1,701

R-squared 0.397 38


Mechanismbehindposi2veeffectofemancipa2on

•  Alargeandimmediateeffectrulesoutmechanisms,realiza2onofwhichtakes2me,suchasinvestmentinlandandhumancapital

•  Theelimina2onofratcheteffectwasimmediate–  IflandlordscrediblycommiPedtofixedobliga2ons,expectnogainsinproduc2vityajeremancipa2on

– Wemeasureimplicitcontractsunderserfdombywhetherpeasantsandlandlordsagreedonthetermsoftemporarylandleasebeforethelandreform


Amechanism:incen2vesProxiedbyimplicitcontractsunderserfdom

Grain productivity

OLS Share of serfs X

Post-emancipation 1.91*** [0.489]

Share of serfs X Post-emancipation X Implicit contracts

-1.89*** [0.598]


-0.60** [0.258]

Demeaned Log distance to Moscow, Demeaned Land suitability X Post emancipation YES

Time and province FEs, Province specific linear trends YES Observations 1,648

R-squared 0.415


Amechanism:adjustmentstothechoiceofcropstoseeddependingontheclima2candmarketcondi2ons

41

Share of winter crops seeded in total winter and summer crops seeded during production cycle

Share of serfs X -0.13*** -0.04** -0.15*** Post-emancipation [0.037] [0.019] [0.048]

Temperature (t-1) 0.007** 0.005

[0.004] [0.004] Share of serfs X 0.013*** 0.014**

Post-emancipation X Temperature (t-1) [0.005] [0.005] Share of serfs X Post-emancipation X -0.34*** -0.30**

Rye-to-wheat world price ratio (t-1) [0.121] [0.117] Demeaned ln distance to Moscow X Post-emancipation Yes Yes Yes

Demeaned crop suitability X Post-emancipation Yes Yes Yes Year and province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes

Province-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Observations 629 592 589

R-squared 0.789 0.770 0.780


Drajees’height:provinceleveldata(birthcohorts:1853-1860vs.1861-1875)

Draftees’ height

OLS

IV

OLS 2nd stage Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 0.99*** 1.35** 0.98***

[0.354] [0.631] [0.350] Demeaned Log distance to Moscow

and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation YES YES YES

Share of state peasants X Post 1863, share of royal peasants X Post 1859 NO NO YES

Province-specific linear trends YES YES YES

Province and birth cohorts fixed effects YES YES YES

Observations 690 690 690 R-squared 0,761 0.761 0.761

F stat 15,47 42


Pre-trends?Drajees’height(province-level)


-10

12

3C

oeffi

cien

t

55-56 57-58 59-60 61-62 63-64 65-66 75Birth cohorts

(relative to cohorts of 1853-1854)Draftees' height by province, cohorts 1853-1866 and 1875

Conley(1999)correc2onforspa2alcorrela2on:heightatprovince-level


.04

-.32

.37.43

-.12-.15

.12.12

-.22-.2

.01

.07

-.2

.02

-.1

.01.04

-.04

.04

0.01

0

00

0

0

.02

-.02

0

.06

-.06

-.05

0

.08

-.09

.02

-.1

.09

-.09

.2

.42

-.07

.07.12

-.27

-.18

-1-.5

0.5

1C

hang

e in

det

rend

ed h

eigh

t by

prov

ince

, bef

ore-

afte

r 186

1

-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4Share of serfs in 1858


Scatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow and suitabilityChange in draftees' height, by province

The change in detrended height by province b/w pre- and post-emancipation cohorts

full |DFBeta|<0.3 Share of serfs 0.92*** 0.66***

[0.202] [0.147] Log distance to Moscow, crop suitability Yes Yes

Observations 46 42 Adj R-squared 0,354 0,391

Drajees’height:districtleveldata(birthcohorts1853-1860vs.1861-1862):

Draftees’ height

OLS

IV

2nd stage Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 0.35** 0.96***

[0.175] [0.348] Demeaned Log distance to Moscow

and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation YES YES

Share of state peasants X Post 1863, share of royal peasants X Post 1859 NO NO

Province-specific linear trends YES YES

District and birth cohort fixed effects YES YES Observations 4,670 4,580

R-squared 0,606 0,589 F stat 95,85


Pre-trends?Drajees’height(district-level)


-.50

.51

Coe

ffici

ent

55-56 57-58 59-60 61-62Birth cohorts

(relative to cohorts of 1853-1854)Draftees' height by district, cohorts 1853-1862

Conley(1999)correc2onforspa2alcorrela2on:heightatdistrictlevel


.03

-.14

.02

-.07

.03

-.06-.11

-.01.01-.02.04-.01

.08

-.04

-.15-.17

.08

.01.03.01.06.05

-.06

.040

.07

-.06-.08-.07-.05

.07

-.05

.08

.04.04

-.06

.01.02

-.07

0-.02-.01.02-.03

.040

.1

.05.01

-.06-.02-.01

.07

.04.010

.16.12

.01

-.13

-.02

-.07

-.02-.05

.04

.01

-.05

-.01-.04-.01

.04

-.06

.07

-.03

.06.040

.1

.04

.08

0

.19

-.06-.05

.07

-.1

.06.08

.02-.01-.03-.04

.02

-.02-.04

.04

.01

-.03

.02

-.1

-.03

.02.030

.07

-.05-.02

.05.05

0.02.02

-.02

.02

-.05

0.01-.02-.04

.01-.02-.02

.03.01.01.02.02.02.01

-.02-.020-.02

.03

-.03

.09

-.03

.01.01-.01

.03.02.02

-.05

.02

.01-.01-.03

.03

.01.01.01

.09

.02.0300-.0100-.02

.04

-.01-.02-.02-.01

-.04

-.02

.05

.01-.01

.04

.01.01

-.03

-.01-.01-.01-.02-.01-.02

.01.010.01

-.02

00.01.01

-.01-.02

0

.01

-.010000

-.02

0.01

000

-.01

000

.01

00

-.01

-.03

00000

0000

000000000

0

0

0

0

0

00

0

.01

.01

00000

00

-.01

00

0

0

.01

0

.01000.01.010000-.01

.03

-.02

0

0

-.02

0

-.0100

-.03

.03.02.02.01.01

.03

0

-.02-.03

.01

.05

0-.01

.01000-.02

.02

.06

.02

.01.01.01.010.01.02

-.01.01000

-.04

-.01

.02

-.02-.03

.02

-.01

-.04

.01.01

-.020

.03

0

.03

0-.01-.01-.01.01-.01-.01-.01-.01-.03

-.07

.03

.02

.05

.01-.01

-.03

0-.01.01

-.02

.03.02

-.06

0-.01

.06

-.02-.03-.04-.010-.01-.01

.02

.17

.02

-.01-.02-.03-.03-.02-.010-.02

.02-.01-.01-.02-.01-.02-.030

.16

.02

-.020-.010-.01.03

.09

.16

-.06-.04

.01

-.06

.02

-.09-.07

.02

-.05-.08

-.01-.02

-.15

.11

-.01-.03

.09.07

-.08

-.02

-.14

.15

.01

.15

-.02-.06

.07.04

-.04-.05-.04-.03-.06-.01-.03

.03

-.03

.05

-.02-.04

.06.04

-.03-.07

-.15

-.02-.03.02

-.12

-.05

.11

-.02.04.04.05

-.06-.04-.08

.04

-.03-.1-.05

.21

-.05-.09

.06

-.08

0.04

-.04-.07

.14

-.02

.22

-.12

.06-.02.05

-4-2

02

4C

hang

e in

det

rend

ed h

eigh

t by

dist

rict,

befo

re-a

fter 1

861

-.5 0 .5Share of serfs in 1858


Scatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow and suitabilityChange in draftees' height, by district

The change in detrended height by district b/w pre- and post-emancipation cohorts

full |DFBeta|<0.15 Share of serfs 0.62*** 0.45***

[0.204] [0.136] Log distance to Moscow, crop suitability Yes Yes

Observations 466 457 Adj R-squared 0,043 0,041

Industrialdevelopment

Log industrial output

OLS IV: 2nd stage OLS Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 0.88** 2.27* 1.84***

[0.365] [1.243] [0.334] Demeaned Log distance to Moscow

and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation

YES YES YES

Share of state peasants X Post 1863, share of royal peasants X Post 1859 NO NO YES

FEs, Region-specific linear trends YES YES YES Observations 341 341 341

R-squared 0.896 0.936 0.899 F-stat 20.45


Pre-trends?Industrialoutput


-10

12

34

Coef

ficien

t

1849 56,58 82,83 85 1897Time

(relative to the year 1795)Log industrial output

Conley(1999)correc2onforspa2alcorrela2on:industrialoutput


.38

-.2

-.46

.04-.03-.11

.24

.03

-.11

.09

-.15

-.03

.06.07.05

-.01-.02

0 0.01.01

.01

-.01

0

00

-.02-.02

-.01

.02

-.02

-.08

-.07

-.04

.31

-.02

.26

-.19

.08.02

-.14

-.09

.3

-.11

0

-10

12

Cha

nge

in lo

g in

dust

rial o

utpu

t, be

fore

-afte

r 186

1

-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4Share of serfs in 1858


Scatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow and suitabilityChange in log industrial output

The change in detrended industrial output b/w pre- and post-

emancipation Sample: full |DFBeta|<0.3

Share of serfs 1.92*** 1.70*** [0.37] [0.37]

Log distance to Moscow, crop suitability Yes Yes Observations 45 41

Adj R-squared 0.29 0.28

Themagnitudeoftheeffectonindustrialdevelopment:LATE

51

•  Asubstan2aldifferencebetweenOLSandIVpointes2mates:48%vs.170%–  Themostlikelyreasonistheheterogeneouseffectoftheaboli2onofserfdomonindustrialdevelopment

•  IVes2matesLATE:theeffectinthoseprovinces,whereintheabsenceofmonasteries,thelandswouldhavebeentransferredintoprivateownership,whichisbiggerthaninprovinceswherethelandswouldhavestayedinstateownershipanyway(intheperipheryofempire)

•  Thebigeffectisconsistentwiththeevidenceonsubstan2alleveloflabormigra2onoutofvillagesinthe2ndhalfofthe19thcentury(Nafziger2010)–  Mobilitywouldhavebeenevenlargeriftherewerenocommunes

(Gerschenkron1965)


Sensi2vitytests•  Controlsforpoten2ally-confoundingfactors

–  Thelengthofrailwaynetworkinaprovinceinayear–  Historicaltemperaturebyyearandprovince–  Thecourtreform–  The1864zemstvoreformandexpenditures

•  Controlsforlandreformimplementa2on–  TheGreatRussiaprovincesonly–  Thelandredistribu2onb/wpeasantsandlandlordsasaresultofthereform:landcuts

•  Alterna2vedataonthecomposi2onofruralpopula2onandalterna2vesamples–  1857taxcensusratherthan1858policedata–  Sub-samplewithgovernorreportsdataonly,i.e.pre-1883–  Sub-sampleexcludingMoscowandSaint-Petersburgprovinces–  ExtendedsamplewithBal2cprovinceswhere(abitdifferent)emancipa2onreform

happenedaround1820–  WLSbypopula2on

•  Placebo:changedthedateoftheaboli2onofserfdom52


Anoveralleffectandcounterfactualexercise


Agriculture Industry Service

All sectors

scenario: services were not

affected by the emacipation

scenario: services grew as demand (weight.

average of industry and agriculture

GDP per capita in 1820 from Maddison (2007) 688 Sectorial shares in value added in 1860 from Goldsmith (1961) 59.3 5.1 35.6

Value added in 1820 22343 1922 13413 37678 The multiplier effect due to the abolition of serfdom 1.16 1.48 range: 1-1.19 1.12 1.19

Counter-factual estimates of value added in 1820 (mln USD 1990) 25918 2844 range: 13413-15899 42175 44661

Counter-factual estimates of GDP per capita in 1820 770 (112%) 816 (119%)

Counter-factual estimate of GDP per capita in 1913 (scenario: average growth rate in Russia 1820-1913 ) 1660 (112%) 1758 (119%)

Counter-factual estimate of GDP per capita in 1913 (scenario: average growth rate in Russia 1870-1913) 2052 (137%) 2173 (146%)

Counter-factual estimate of GDP per capita in 1913 (scenario: East-European average growth rate 1820-1913) 2220 (149%) 2351 (157%)

Actual GDP per capita in 1913 from Maddison (2007) 1488

Conclusion•  Theemancipa2onofserfscausedaverylargeincreaseinthe

agriculturalproduc2vity,industrialoutputandlivingstandards

•  Theins2tu2onofserfdomsubstan2allysloweddownRussia’seconomicdevelopmentbecauseofpoorincen2vesforserfs

•  SerfdomwasanimportantreasonofdivergenceineconomicdevelopmentbetweenWesternandEasternEurope


Documents

The Economic Eﬀects of the Aboli2on of Serfdom: Evidence ...chairgovreg.fondation-dauphine.fr/sites/chairgovreg.fondation-dauphine.fr/files/... · • Living standards: the height