The effect of behavioral response on affective evaluation

Acta Psychologica 135 (2010) 343–348

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Acta Psychologica

j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r.com/ locate /actpsy

The effect of behavioral response on affective evaluation

Daniel R. Buttaccio, Sowon Hahn ⁎Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, OK, United States

⁎ Corresponding author. Department of Psychology,West Lindsey St., Norman, OK 73072, United States. Tel.:325 4737.

E-mail address: [email protected] (S. Hahn).

0001-6918/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. Aldoi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.09.004

a b s t r a c t
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:Received 17 May 2010Received in revised form 6 September 2010Accepted 7 September 2010

PsycINFO classificaion:2340 Cognitive Processes

Keywords:Selective attentionActionAffective evaluation

In the present research we investigated how action influences affective evaluation. In three experiments,participants conducted a sequence of go/no-go tasks, then evaluated the pleasantness of a novel shape. Theresults of Experiments 1 and 2 show that participants evaluated the shapes that appeared in the go trials morepositively than the shapes that appeared in the no-go trials. In Experiment 3, the go/no-go task was conductedwithout the to-be-evaluated shapes present in the display. The results show that the shape stimuli followingthe go trials were evaluated more positively than the shape stimuli following the no-go trials, even when theshapes were not directly associated with the go/no-go task. Based on the present study, we suggest thatactivating or inhibiting a motoric action may play a critical role in modifying one's affective evaluation.Additionally, the present results suggest that effortful and non-default responses can negatively modulateaffective evaluation by taxing an individual's cognitive load. Furthermore, we argue that individuals canpotentially control their affective states through behavioral activation and inhibition.

University of Oklahoma, 455+1 405 325 1620; fax: +1 405

l rights reserved.

© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Affective evaluation is one of the most immediate responses wemake when encountering a stimulus in the environment. This abilityis highly advantageous because it allows us to react instinctivelytowards rewards and threats. Research has shown that affectiveevaluation not only can be formed rapidly and efficiently (de Gelder,2006; Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996), but it is also fairly independentof perceptual and cognitive operations (Zajonc, 1980). According tothe idea of automatic evaluation, an individual can evaluate anobject's goodness, pleasantness, or trustworthiness without fullyprocessing the perceptual or functional features of the object.However, research has also supported that the affective value of astimulus can bemodified by visual attention and perceptual inhibition(Fenske, Raymond, & Kunar, 2004; Raymond, Fenske, & Tavassoli,2003), suggesting that the individual's interaction with a stimulus caninfluence evaluative processes.

The broad question of the present study concerns whetherindividuals can actively control evaluative processes. In other words,can we control what we like and dislike? The line of researchsupporting automatic evaluation (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, &Chaiken, 2002; Ferguson & Zayas, 2009) also suggests that affectiveevaluation is outside one's control. For instance, stronger affectivepriming was observed with suboptimal (i.e., reduced consciousness)than with optimal (i.e., full consciousness) prime presentation,suggesting that nonconscious processes play an important role informing affective evaluations (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). However,

recent studies demonstrate that selective attention also modulatesaffective evaluation (Fenske & Raymond, 2006; Raymond et al., 2003;Veling, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2007), suggesting a potentialtop-down control over evaluative processes.

Research further supports a close relationship of evaluative processwith certain behavioral tendencies. For instance, positive stimuliactivate approach responses while negative stimuli activate avoidanceresponses (Chen & Bargh, 1999), and the mere presence of negativestimuli can slow down subsequent motor behavior (Wilkowski &Robinson, 2006). Neumann, Förster, & Strack (2003) proposed thatovert behavior along the approach-avoidance dimension hinges on twostages of processing: an automatic affective component and a controlledcomponent. They suggested that affective processes immediatelytrigger the representation of approach-avoidance behavior, whiledeliberate motor control determines whether the activated represen-tation results in overt behavior.

Based on the strong correlation between action and emotion, wehypothesized that one can control his/her affective evaluation bycontrolling one's bodily movements towards stimuli. Previous re-search shows that approachmovements and positive affect are closelyrelated, as are avoidance movements and negative affect (Carver,Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). Further-more, theories of embodied emotion underscore the influence thatbodily interaction with the environment has on emotional evaluation(Cacioppo, Priester, & Bernston, 1993; Neumann & Strack, 2000;Niedenthal, 2007), indicating that the twoprocesses are bi-directional.

The key issues in our research program concern howmuch controlwe have over our affective evaluation, and identifying the controlmechanisms in evaluative processes. In the present study, we focusedon how activating and inhibiting behavioral responses can influence

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.09.004

mailto:[email protected]

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.09.004

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00016918

344 D.R. Buttaccio, S. Hahn / Acta Psychologica 135 (2010) 343–348

affective evaluation. There are several potential mechanisms that caninfluence the interaction between action and evaluation. First, actingupon a stimulusmay increase the familiarity and perceptual fluency ofthat object, which would contribute positively to the affectiveevaluation of a stimulus (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwartz, 1998).Second, response actionmay increase the attentional bias towards theobject, leading to attentional activation and inhibition (Fenske et al.,2004; Raymond et al., 2003). Third, inhibiting an action can place loadon an individual's cognitive resource, thus reducing one's capacity foremotional control. In addition, conducting a non-default, effortfulaction can tax an individual's capacity for emotional control. Thisprediction is based on the idea that the lack of an available resourcemay result in negative evaluations.

Previous research suggests that all volitional behaviors use acommon resource and thus, one type of volitional behaviormay depletethe limited capacity for another (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, &Tice, 1998). Baumeister et al. demonstrated that participants werequicker to give up in solving a puzzle or anagram after suppressing anemotional expression or resisting eating chocolate. More recently,Pashler, Harris, and Nuechterlein (2008) found that the centralbottleneck occurs between a perceptual discrimination task andhedonically based voluntary choices, suggesting that even emotion-based tasks require central resources. These studies provide a potentialconnection between conscious, willful behavior and affective evalua-tion. Althoughprevious researchdirectly examiningaffective evaluationendorses automatic evaluation (Ferguson & Zayas, 2009), it is plausibleto suppose that emotional control shares a central resource with othervolitional behavior and depleting the resource can result in a negativeevaluation of a stimulus.

In everyday life, it is widely believed that getting up and movingone's body is an effective way to get out of a negative emotional state.However, moving one's body involves more than simply activatingmotoric responses; it can also change environmental input, socialinteraction, and attentional orientation. In 3 experiments, weexplored how activating and inhibiting an action would influenceone's affective state. We aim to provide empirical evidence to supportthe direct correlation between action and affective state.

1. Experiment 1

In Experiment 1, we investigated whether a response action couldmodify the affective evaluation of a novel stimulus. For each trial,participants viewed two target digits and conducted 4 sets of go/no-go tasks. Each go/no-go task display contained a probe digit,presented in a novel geometric shape. After conducting the 4 sets ofgo/no-go tasks, participants evaluated the pleasantness of a shapeselected from the previous trial. We hypothesized that the no-go taskwould require inhibitory processing, which draws off the cognitiveresource for emotional control, thus leading to a negative evaluationof that stimulus. Participants evaluated the pleasantness of a shapethat was selected from either the 2nd or 4th sequence display. Wehypothesized that the shapes from the go trial would be evaluatedmore pleasantly than for those from the no-go trial, and the shapes inthe 2nd order no-go sequence evaluated more pleasantly than thosein the 4th order.

1.1. Method

1.1.1. ParticipantsTwenty seven University of Oklahoma students participated in the

experiment for course credit. Participants ranged from 17 to 27 in age(mean age=20.5), and 17 were female.

1.1.2. Stimuli and apparatusStimuli were presented on a 17″ monitor, controlled by a Dell

computer with 3 GHz Pentium 4 processor. Stimulus presentation and

data recording were controlled via E-Prime 2 by PST, Inc. The stimulifor the go/no-go task were selected from integers 1 to 9. The shapesfor the evaluation task were created using a template with 10 pointsin polar coordinates with 3 distances (2 cm, 4 cm, or 6 cm) combinedwith 10 fixed angles (0°, 36°, 72°, 108°, 144°, 180°, 216°, 252°, 288°,and 324°). These 10 points were connected and filled to form ageometric shape. Different geometric shapes were used for each trialand a total of 126 shapes were included in this experiment.

1.1.3. ProcedureEach trial beganwith the presentation of two target digits. The two

target digits were randomly chosen from the integers 1–9. After2000 ms, four stimulus displays were presented in sequence, eachcontaining a single digit and a placeholder shape. The shapes werepresented in the center of the screen with the digits in the center ofthe shapes. If the probe digit matched one of the targets, theparticipant pressed the space bar as quickly as possible. If the probedigit did not match any of the targets, participants did not respond.Four probe digit displays were presented in sequence, and eachdisplay was separated by a fixation display of 125 ms. At the end ofeach trial, participants evaluated the pleasantness of the shape thatwas used as a placeholder for the probe digit.

Each trial set was fit into one of three categories: all-go sequences,no-go occurred at the 2nd sequence, or no-go occurred at the 4thsequence. Half of the trials were all-go sequences. The other half of thetrials included a no-go sequence at either the 2nd or 4th position. Tosimplify the experimental conditions, the to-be-evaluated shapeswere selected from only the 2nd or 4th sequence of the preceding go/no-go task. For the all-go trials, the evaluated shape was randomlyselected from the 2nd or 4th sequence, and for the trials including ano-go sequence, the to-be-evaluated shape was selected from the no-go sequence. Each participant completed 72 trials including 8 practicetrials. The schematic illustration of the procedure is presented inFig. 1.

1.1.4. ResultsThe average error rates during the go/no-go sequences are

presented in Table 1. The no-go tasks show higher error rates thanthe go tasks. The error trials were excluded from the pleasantnessevaluation analysis. We submitted the mean pleasantness ratings to atwo-way repeated measures ANOVA with the trial type (go andno-go) and the sequence of the shape to be evaluated (2nd and 4th) aswithin subject variables. A significant main effect was found for thetrial type, indicating that go trial shapes were evaluated morepositively than no-go trial shapes (F(1, 26)=9.2, pb .01, η2

p=.26).The temporal sequence of the evaluation shape did not show asignificant effect (F(1, 26)=.2, p=.68, η2

p=.007). The interactionbetween the trial type and the sequence of the shape was also notsignificant (F(1,26)=1.9, p=.18, η2

p=.069). The mean pleasantnessrating from each of the conditions is presented in Fig. 2.

1.1.5. DiscussionExperiment 1 provides evidence that behavioral interaction with a

stimulus modulates how the stimulus will be affectively evaluated.Consistent with our prediction, shapes from the go sequences wereevaluated more positively than the shapes from no-go sequences. Inother words, executing an external action led to a more positiveevaluation of a stimulus while inhibition led to a more negativeevaluation of a stimulus. We suggest that when a stimulus is associatedwith an action or inhibition of action, the load on the cognitive systemcan modulate the affective evaluation of a stimulus.

When we were designing the experiment, we predicted thatbehavioral activation would build-up over the series of repeatedactions, and a stronger inhibition would be required to stop therepeated pattern of responses. Thus, we expected to find a differencebetween the 2nd and 4th sequence no-go task conditions, presumably

Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the procedure used in Experiment 1.

3.2

3.4

ing ple

asan

t -->

Sequence 2Sequence 4

345D.R. Buttaccio, S. Hahn / Acta Psychologica 135 (2010) 343–348

because the stronger inhibition would be connected with a morenegative affective evaluation. However, the present results did notsupport any difference between the 2nd and 4th sequence shapeevaluations. This result suggests that the behavioral inhibition-relateddevaluation is stable enough to remain at least until the end of the trial.Alternatively, the cognitive load of conducting the no-go task would betaxing on the resource for volitional control without the build-up ofbehavioral activation or inhibition over the sequence of trials.

The present results can also be explained via the effect of selectiveattention such that shapes associated with the target are evaluatedmore positively than the shapes associated with the distractor. Anincreasing number of recent studies support that the feature-basedattentional inhibition leads to emotional devaluation of the stimulus(Fenske et al., 2004; Raymond et al., 2003; Veling et al., 2007). InExperiment 1, we found that the shapes selected from the go trialswere evaluated more positively than shapes selected from the no-gotrials. This result can be interpreted that shapes from the go trial couldbe associated with the target and draw selective attention, whileshapes from the no-go trial could be associatedwith the distractor andactivate feature-based inhibition.

In Experiment 1, we compared the affective evaluation of theshapes connected with the go tasks and the shapes connected withthe no-go tasks. However, Experiment 1 does not include a baselinecondition that would allow us to investigate whether the affectivemodulation is based on devaluation of shapes that are relatedwith theno-go tasks or enhanced evaluation of the shapes that are related withthe go tasks. To further examine the mechanism of the affectivemodulation, we decided to include a baseline condition by using anew shape for evaluation. In Experiment 2, participants conducted thego/no-go task based on the probe digit, then evaluated either a shapeselected from the previous trial set, or a new shape.

2.8

3.0

Ple

asan

tnes

s R

atea

sant

m

ore

2. Experiment 2

In Experiment 2, we employed the same experimental procedureas Experiment 1 except for the following. The to-be evaluated shape

Table 1Go/no-go task error rates from Experiment 1.

Trial sequence

Go 1 Go 2 Go 3 Go 4 No-go 2 No-go 4

Error rate (%) 1.3 .2 .1 .2 17.8 6.7

Note: The number after go or no-go indicates the sequence within a trial.

was selected from the previous trial set or was selected from shapesthat were never used during the go/no-go tasks. The new shapeserved as a baseline to understand the direction of the affectivemodulation. Because we did not obtain any significant differencesbetween the 2nd and 4th order sequence of no-go tasks on theaffective modulation in Experiment 1, we dropped the 2nd sequenceno-go condition. Instead, we only included the 4th sequence no-gocondition, and focused on the comparison between shapes from thego/no-go tasks and the new shapes. As a result, participants evaluatedeither the 4th shape in the previous sequence or a novel shape.

2.1. Method

2.1.1. ParticipantsEighteen University of Oklahoma students participated in the


2.1.2. Stimuli and apparatusThe same stimuli and apparatus as those in Experiments 1 were

used in Experiment 2.

2.1.3. ProcedureThe same procedure in Experiment 1 was used in Experiment 2,

with the following exceptions. For half of the trials, all the sequences

No-goGoTrial Type

2.4

2.6

<--

less

pl

Fig. 2. Pleasantness evaluation rating results for each of the conditions in Experiment 1.Error bars indicate standard errors.

image of Fig.�2

Sequence 4New

3.2

3.4

ting

re p

leas

ant -

->


were valid (all-go trials). For the other half of trials, the 4th sequencewas invalid (4th sequence no-go trial). Participants evaluated eitherthe shape from the 4th sequence or a new shape. Participants wentthrough 4 practice trials and 60 experimental trials. Thus, there were15 trials experimental trials per condition.

2.4

2.6

2.8

3.0

Ple

asan

tnes

s R

a<

-- le

ss p

leas

ant

mo

No-goGoTrial Type


2.1.4. ResultsThe average error rate for each of the conditions is presented in

Table 2. The no-go trials reveal higher error rates than the go trials. Theerror trials were excluded from the pleasantness evaluation analysis.We submitted the mean pleasantness ratings to a two-way repeatedmeasures ANOVAwith the trial type (go and no-go) and the shape to beevaluated (4th and new) as within subject variables. The trial typeindicateswhether the trial includes all-go sequences or includes oneno-go sequence. A significant main effect was found for the trial type,such that shapes evaluated after a go trial were rated more positivelythan shapes evaluated after a no-go trial, F(1,17)=11.6, pb .01,η2

p=.41. The shape type effect (F(1,17)=1.1, p=.32, η2p=.06), and

interaction (F(1,17)=2.0, p=.18, η2p=.11) were not significant. Post-

hoc analyses with Bonferroni test reveal that both the go/4th shapeand the go/new shape were evaluated more positively than the no-go/4th shape. But the no-go/new shape evaluation was not significantlydifferent from the other conditions (Fig. 3).

2.1.5. DiscussionThe significant main effect of the trial type obtained in Experiment

2 confirmed our main hypothesis: affective evaluation can bemodified by the preceding behavioral activation and inhibition.There was not a significant difference in pleasantness ratings betweenthe shapes from go trials and the new shapes, suggesting that affectivemodulation may not depend on the positive facilitation associatedwith the go tasks. However, the post-hoc analyses reveal that the no-go/4th shape was evaluated more negatively than the evaluationfollowing the go tasks, while the no-go/new shape evaluation was notdifferent from the other conditions. Although the direct comparisonbetween the no-go/4th and no-go/new shape evaluations did notreveal any significance, the present results show the tendency ofnegative evaluation associated with the no-go stimuli as opposed tonew stimuli.

The current results can be related to the previous research inwhich distractors were evaluated less positively through theinhibition-induced devaluation mechanism (Fenske et al., 2004;Raymond et al., 2003; Veling et al., 2007). This line of literatureemphasizes the spatial selective attention as a major mechanism ofaffective modulation. In our study, the go and no-go trials weretemporally separated and there was only a single stimulus presentedfor each trial sequence. The stimulus for each trial could easily beassociated with the motoric action at a given moment, instead ofdrawing a spatial selective attention mechanism. In the presentparadigm, the most critical affective modulation mechanism is thebehavioral inhibition-based affective devaluation. We argue that thecognitive loads of inhibition put a restraint on the subsequentaffective evaluation task.


Trial sequnece

Go 1 Go 2 Go 3 Go 4 No-go 4

Error rate (%) 1.0 .3 .3 .4 7.4

Note: In Experiment 2, no-go could occur only at the 4th sequence.

3. Experiment 3

In Experiment 3, we explored the effect of action on the evaluationof a stimulus without a specific stimulus–response association. Weemployed the same procedure as that of Experiments 1 and 2, withthe exception that the evaluation shapes were not presented duringthe trial sequence. Consequently, participants did not have a previousinteraction with the stimuli when they had to evaluate the stimuli. Inthis fashion, we would be able to determine whether responses solelydetermine how a stimulus will be evaluated or if the particularresponse in relation to a stimulus determines how a stimulus will beevaluated. We hypothesized that go or no-go trial types woulddetermine the evaluation of the stimuli participants encounterafterwards.

3.1. Method

3.1.1. ParticipantsThirty-two University of Oklahoma students participated in the


3.1.2. Stimuli and apparatusThe same stimuli and apparatus used in Experiment 2 were used in

Experiment 3.

3.1.3. ProcedureThe procedure of Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 1

except that the stimulus sequences within a trial did not include aplaceholder shape. At the end of each trial, participants made apleasantness evaluation to a novel geometric shape. The schematicillustration of the procedure of Experiment 3 is presented in Fig. 4.

3.1.4. ResultsIf participants did not press the key for the go trial or pressed the

key for the no-go trial, it was considered as an error trial and wasexcluded from the pleasantness rating analyses. The error rates foreach of the trial sequences are presented in Table 3. As expected, theerror rates were much higher during the no-go trials than during gotrials. We designed the experiment so that no-go trials would be lessfrequent than go trials, making the experiment similar to the stopparadigm. Presumably, no-go trials require more cognitive load sincego trials can be activated more during the trial, and inhibitoryprocesses must operate during the no-go trials. As in previousexperiments, we focused on the pleasantness rating data for ouranalyses. We submitted the mean pleasantness ratings to a repeated

Fig. 4. Schematic illustration of the procedure used in Experiment 3.

2.8

3.0

3.2

3.4

Ple

asan

tnes

s R

atin

gle

asan

t

m

ore

plea

sant

-->

347D.R. Buttaccio, S. Hahn / Acta Psychologica 135 (2010) 343–348

measures ANOVA with the trial type (go, no-go2, and no-go4) as awithin subject variable. A significant main effect was found for thetrial type (F(2, 62)=3.6, pb .05, η2

p=.10). The post-hoc analysis withBonferroni test supported that the pleasantness evaluation after thego trial were significantly higher than the evaluation after the no-go 4trial. The mean pleasantness ratings from the go trials and no-go trialsare presented in Fig. 5.

3.1.5. DiscussionThe results from Experiment 3 suggest that the impact of

behavioral inhibition and activation on the affective evaluation maynot be stimulus-specific. At the end of each trial including 4 sets of go/no-go task, participants evaluated the pleasantness of a geometricshape. We found that participants evaluated shape stimuli morepositively after they conducted all-go tasks compared to when theyconducted one no-go task and three go tasks during the trialsequence. The post-hoc analysis supported that the differencebetween all-go trial and the 4th position no-go trial was significant.However, the affective evaluation following the 2nd position no-gotrial was not significantly different from either the evaluationfollowing the all-go trial or the 4th sequence no-go trial. We suggestthat the affective modulation following the activation or inhibition ofaction may be transient, particularly without the direct connectionwith to-be-evaluated stimuli.

Most interestingly, our findings in Experiment 3 provide evidencethat inhibiting a response action canmodify an individual's temporaryaffective state, leading to devaluation of a subsequently encounteredstimulus. The present result leads to an interesting conjecture of howwe evaluate our surroundings. Simple behavioral actions of our dailylives may result in affective changes, influencing our emotionalevaluation of stimuli.

4. General discussion

By using the go/no-go task followed by the pleasantnessevaluation of a novel stimulus, we investigated whether the affective


Trial sequence

Go 1 Go 2 Go 3 Go 4 No-go 2 No-go 4

Error rate (%) .5 .2 .2 .2 18.3 8.8

Note: The number after go or no-go indicates the sequence within a trial.

evaluation can be modulated by response action. It was shown thatinhibiting an action, presumably loading on individuals’ cognitivecapacity, leads participants to evaluate novel stimuli to be lesspleasant. Interestingly, we observed that participants evaluated shapestimuli more positively after executing a response action, even whenthere was no specific connection between the stimulus and the action.Similarly, they evaluated shape stimuli more negatively after inhibit-ing a response action, while the shape stimulus was not directlyrelated with the inhibitory response action. These results reveal thatmaking a motoric response can generate change in the affect ofindividuals. We suggest that the cognitive load elicited from theinhibiting response action contributed to the modulation of theaffective evaluation.

Related with the load-related-affective modulation, we alsoconsider that non-default responses may be connected with thenegative affect. In the present study, the no-go trials were lessfrequent, thus required more effortful responses. It is possible thatmore effortful, resource-depleting response would lead to thenegative evaluation of a stimulus. Previous literature suggests thatall volitional behaviors including the emotional control share thecentral resource, and exercising one can deplete the resource forothers (Baumeister et al., 1998). The no-go response could havecontributed to the affective modulation not only because it requires

go

Trial Type

nogo2 nogo4

2.4

2.6

<--

less

p


image of Fig.�5


inhibition of action, but also because it requires a non-defaultresponse.

Note that there are alternative accounts that may be able toexplain the affective modulation. For instance, studies suggest thatpoor task performance may be connected with the negative affect(Fisher, 2008). In our study, participants showed lower accuracy forthe no-go trials than for go-trials; thus the impoverished performanceduring the no-go trials may be connected with the negative affect. Inthe present study, however, we only included the trials in whichparticipants made correct responses during the go/no-go task. Assuch, it is unlikely that the poor performance during the no-go trialswas a significant cause of affective modulation.

The present study has implications on how individuals canvoluntarily control their affective evaluations. It is plausible that thecognitive system is involved in evaluative processes, through indirector implicit route. The present study suggests that bodily movementscan play a critical role in one's affective state and that there is a tightconnection between behavioral activation/inhibition and individuals’affective state. Our study further supports that behavioral inhibition ofan individual leads to negative evaluation towards the stimuli he/sheencounters afterwards. In our study, inhibiting an action may depletethe common resource that is needed for the subsequent evaluationresponses, and using the depleted resource may elicit negativeevaluations.

References

Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is theactive self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,1252−1265.

Cacioppo, J. T., Priester, J. R., & Bernston, G. G. (1993). Rudimentary determination ofattitudes: II. Arm flexion and extension have differential effects on attitudes.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 5−17.

Carver, C. S., Sutton, S. K., & Scheier, M. F. (2000). Action, emotion and personality:Emerging conceptual integration. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26,741−751.

Chen, M., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediatebehavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus. Personality and SocialPsychology Bulletin, 25, 215−224.

Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York:Putnam.

de Gelder, B. (2006). Towards the neurobiology of emotional body language. NatureReviews Neuroscience, 7, 242−249.

Duckworth, K. L., Bargh, J. A., Garcia, M., & Chaiken, S. (2002). The automatic evaluationof novel stimuli. Psychological Science, 13, 513−519.

Fenske, M. J., & Raymond, J. E. (2006). Affective influences of selective attention. CurrentDirections in Psychological Science, 15, 312−316.

Fenske, M. J., Raymond, J. E., & Kunar, M. A. (2004). The affective consequences of visualattention in preview search. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11, 1055−1061.

Ferguson, M. J., & Zayas, V. (2009). Automatic evaluation. Current Directions inPsychological Science, 18, 362−366.

Fisher, C. (2008). Emotions in and around performance: The thrill of victory, the agonyof defeat. Research companion to emotion in organizations (pp. 120−135). North-ampton, MA US: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1990). Emotion, attention, and the startlereflex. Psychological Review, 97, 377−395.

LeDoux, J. E. (1996). The emotional brain : The mysterious underpinnings of emotional life.New York: Simon and Schuster.

Murphy, S., & Zajonc, R. (1993). Affect, cognition, and awareness: Affective primingwith optimal and suboptimal stimulus exposures. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 64, 723−739.

Neumann, R., & Strack, F. (2000). Approach and avoidance: The influence ofproprioceptive and exteroceptive cues on encoding of affective information.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 39−48.

Neumann, R., Förster, J., & Strack, F. (2003). Motor compatibility: The bidirectional linkbetween behavior and evaluation. The psychology of evaluation: Affective processesin cognition and emotion (pp. 371-391). Mahwah, NJ US: Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates Publishers.

Niedenthal, P. M. (2007). Embodying emotion. Science, 316, 1002−1005.Pashler, H., Harris, C. R., & Nuechterlein, K. H. (2008). Does the central bottleneck

encompass voluntary selection of hedonically based choices? ExperimentalPsychology, 55, 313−321.

Raymond, J. E., Fenske, M. J., & Tavassoli, N. T. (2003). Selective attention determinesemotional responses to novel visual stimuli. Psychological Science, 14, 537−542.

Reber, R., Winkielman, P., & Schwartz, N. (1998). Effects of perceptual fluency onaffective judgments. Psychological Science, 9, 45−48.

Veling, H., Holland, R. W., & van Knippenberg, A. (2007). Devaluation of distractingstimuli. Cognition & Emotion, 21, 442−448.

Wilkowski, B., & Robinson, M. (2006). Stopping dead in one's tracks: Motor inhibitionfollowing incidental evaluations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42,479−490.

Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. AmericanPsychologist, 35(2), 151−175.

Documents

The effect of behavioral response on affective evaluation