The Elites have chosen Putin

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH No.8, March 15, 2000

Graham T. Allison, Director

Writer, Editor: Henry E. Hale

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project

Production Director: Melissa C. Carr

John F. Kennedy School of Government

Assistants: Emily Van Buskirk, Ben Dunlap

Harvard University

Production Assistant: Emily Goodhue

TOP NEWS OF FEBRUARY-MARCH

· Russia to vote for president on March 26, Putin overwhelming favorite

· Official presidential campaigning begins uneventfully, continues without surprises

· Putin’s “uncampaign” unveils abstract “open letter” in lieu of specific platform

· Putin’s KGB aura, tough talk and popularity cow opposition, chill media

· Federal forces consolidating control over most of Chechnya, but ambush near Grozny foreshadows long low-intensity conflict

· Communist candidate Zyuganov calls for debate, but Putin unwilling

· Yavlinsky blasts Chechnya war tactics, remains in low single-digits

· Putin says Russia “could join NATO”

· Putin weeps at televised funeral for mentor Anatoly Sobchak, dead of heart attack

· Russian economy stable, growing; London Club reschedules debt; Russia looks to

international capital markets

· Putin targets St. Petersburg governor for defeat in May elections

TRACKING THE POLLS

PUTIN (59%)

ZYUGANOV (22%)

YAVLINSKY (4%)

Numbers cited are from March 3-5, 2000. All other candidates received 2% support or less (Zhirinovsky was not included as he was not yet on the ballot). Data are from the Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM). December data were taken from www.russiavotes.org,

SEE INSIDE

· WHO IS PUTIN? Insights into Putin’s philosophy, diagnosis of Russia’s problems, and his cure (p.2). Putin on the campaign trail (p.2). Putin in his own words (p.6). Putin in the words of others (p.6).

· Putin’s Floundering Rivals p.5.

· St. Petersburg Showdown p.4.

· Building a 2-Party System in Russia? p.4.

· Kovalev: Twilight of Russian Freedom? p.7

· Spin Control: The parties with the three leading candidates assess Putin’s campaign (p.8).

· Insider Information: Some of Russia’s best political analysts from across the political spectrum examine the presidential race and its implications, starting on p.9.

· PLUS: Latest polls; key dates (p.1).

BACK ISSUES AVAILABLE ON THE WEB AT:

http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/russianelectionwatch

KEY DATESMarch 26Presidential election

April 16Runoff presidential election (if no one gets 50% on March 26)

WHO IS PUTIN? HIS PHILOSOPHY, DIAGNOSIS, AND CURE

Today’s Putin is first and foremost a clever, ruthless, popular political candidate engaged in a “no-holds-barred” drive to win the March 26 election. He openly admits hiding his platform: “Once you make it public, it will begin to be gnawed and torn into pieces” (Vremya MN 2/9). His operating style evokes adjectives like: tough, decisive, laconic, efficient, effective, frank, loyal, secretive and flexible. His image is also one of youthful vigor (see the January and February issues of Russian Election Watch).

Putin has now made several major statements as acting President and candidate, allowing us to draw some early inferences about the views of the “real Putin” that will emerge on March 27.

Philosophy: Patriotic Realism. Putin’s starting point is the Russian state; territorial integrity and domestic order are his top priorities. He chooses not to see the world through the rose-colored lenses of past imperial glory, instead frankly stating that “great Russia” lags not only behind the US but even second-tier powers like Portugal. As much as the West may have wronged Russia in the past, he says, it would be “stupid” for Russia not to cooperate because its feelings have been hurt. If the West treats Russia well, he defies popular opinion and holds out the possibility that Russia might one day join NATO, as he said in a March 5 BBC interview. But if the West treats it badly? “Those who treat us badly won’t stay alive for three days” (ORT 2/7). Pragmatism, proceeding from Russian national interests, is the essence of Putin's Patriotic Realism.

Diagnosis: Russia’s survival is in peril. While most European state leaders can take territorial integrity and domestic order for granted, Putin staunchly argues that Russia cannot. Chechnya is not merely a rebellious province, but the harbinger of state collapse: “Contagion may go up the Volga and spread to other republics. And then we would face either the total Yugoslavization of Russia or one would have to agree that this territory will be divided up into several independent states” (ORT 2/7). Poverty also poses a major threat to Russia: “For the first time in the past 200-300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states” (Millennial statement).

The Cure: Rationalize the state, internationalize the economy. Putin declares: “There will be no large-scale investment until we have a stable political system, stability and a strong state that protects market institutions and creates good, favorable conditions for investment” (ORT 2/7). This means enforcing Russian laws in the provinces, cracking down on local strongmen, and eliminating slack and corruption in the bureaucracy. While Russia’s past two leaders have failed to do this, Putin enjoys an important initial advantage: the fear inspired by his KGB past and ruthlessness in Chechnya. Indeed, for Putin, establishing the rule of law also means crushing the Chechen rebellion. This, in turn, will set a major precedent against the disintegration of Russia. While Russia could grow in isolation of the world market, he argues, without it “we will not rise to the high level of economic and social progress that has been attained in the industrialized countries” (Millenium statement). So long as the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization genuinely work to promote international economic integration, Putin says, Russia must be part of them.

PUTIN’S PERSONAL WEALTH

· Income 1998-99: $9,200

· Real Estate: two plots of land and a dacha in Leningrad Oblast, one plot of land in Moscow

· Bank Accounts: a total of nearly $14,000 in Sberbank, Promstroibank and Baltiisky Bank

PUTIN’S CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH

· Forms “Uncampaign” Team. Putin has named thirty-something Dmitry Medvedev, his former assistant in St. Petersburg Mayor Sobchak’s administration, to be campaign chairman. Aleksandr Abramov, currently Putin’s deputy chief of staff for regional affairs, serves as the campaign’s number two man. Putin, already enjoying massive favorable coverage on two of Russia’s “big three” television networks, disparagingly rejects the idea of conducting traditional campaign advertising. “These videos, their advertising,” he said. “I will not be trying to find out in the course of my election campaign which is more important, Tampax or Snickers” (NYT 3/8).

· Media Chill. Spooked by Putin’s KGB past and a determined Kremlin effort to manage coverage of the Chechnya military operation, many media representatives have begun to censor themselves, never a good omen for democracy. This “media chill” has been sparked by a number of worrisome incidents. First, in an effort to prevent the popular demoralization that undermined the 1994-96 Chechen war, Russian officials have aggressively sought to control coverage coming out of the region.

Most media, especially powerful television, are restricted to “guided tours” that avoid the most harrowing scenes. Even when they do find carnage, even Russia’s independently minded media (such as NTV) have been reluctant to broadcast the footage. “We shot it but did not show it,” admitted one NTV correspondent to the New York Times (2/4). “If we broadcast it the next NTV crew to come here might not be accredited.”

Journalists who avoid the guided tours and the accreditation process have been punished.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

In the most dramatic case, the Russian military arrested and then “traded” a Radio Liberty reporter, Aleksandr Babitsky, to unknown Chechen warlords for a couple Russian soldiers. For weeks, Babitsky was not heard from and observers feared the worst, although he finally turned up at a police station in Dagestan and is now facing charges not only of abetting the Chechen rebels, but of travelling on a false passport, with which he says his captors left him. Westerners are also not immune; Boston Globe reporter David Filipov was among several Western correspondents sent home from Russia after reporting the dark side of the conflict.

In response to these and other incidents, many journalists banded together to publish a special issue of Obshchaya Gazeta on February 16, in which they warned that freedom of the press was in peril. In his public pronouncements, however, Putin continues to place press freedom among his highest priorities. For instance, in his February 8 interview on ORT he declared: “I am deeply convinced that we won't have any development and the country will have no future if we suppress civil freedoms and the media.”

THREAT TO PUTIN’S ELECTION: LOW TURNOUT

With Putin running nearly 40 percentage points ahead of his closest rival, observers have noted only one real threat to his election prospects: low turnout. According to Russian law, if turnout is below 50% in the first round, presidential elections are invalid and new elections must be held within four months. And four months is an eternity in Russian politics. For this reason, Putin’s team and the Central Election Commission plan a massive get-out-the-vote drive to ensure that Putin can win on March 26.

· Personalizing Putin. In early February, Putin gave a series of interviews designed to “humanize” the longtime spy-bureaucrat. In one particularly notable appearance on ORT on February 7, his little white poodle, named Chiapa (which means “pooch” in Russian), playfully scampered across his lap, winning loving words from its master. As one Russian political consultant put it, “They’re trying to make him white and fluffy, like his dog” (The Times 2/11).

· Economic policy statements. While his campaign has been careful to avoid controversial stands, Putin did come out in favor of a referendum on the private ownership of land, an issue hotly contested by the Communists and some others in Russian society. “Farmers should not have any fears that someone could take away their land,” he declared (Reuters 2/9).

· Keeping Oligarchs on their Toes. Just two months after Chubais loudly endorsed Putin for president and proclaimed the second coming of the liberals to power, he found that he is not immune to tough criticism from the new acting President. Putin called Unified Electrical Systems, the energy giant Chubais runs, “an unstable and disorderly state mechanism” and blamed it for rate hikes, triggering a drop in its stock. Soon thereafter, however, Putin made sure to issue some words of praise. Similar patterns of ominous Kremlin statements followed by kind words have befallen Berezovsky and other lesser oligarchs.

· Denying vodka price hike. In what appeared to be a gross political miscalculation, Putin’s Economics Ministry announced that the minimum price of vodka would rise by 11% before the March 26 election. Putin wasted little time disavowing this announcement, declaring that no price hike was ever approved, noting that prices were set by the market and stating that the scandal surrounding the incident was linked to efforts to discredit the government.

· Improving foreign economic relations. On February 11, Putin’s negotiators reached a deal with the London Club (private) creditors to write off 36.5% of Russia’s $32 billion Soviet-era debt and to reschedule payments over 30 years following a seven-year grace period. Putin publicly applauded the deal. (RFE/RL Newsline 2/14).

· Calling for restoring some “capital city” functions to St. Petersburg. In an interview on Russia’s major TV network, Putin said that it might be a good idea to transfer some (but not all) central government functions from Moscow to his native St. Petersburg. Germany, for example, spreads some ministries throughout the country, including the Central Bank which is in Frankfurt, he said. He has also declared the need to disrupt the Moscow clans’ hold on Russian politics by injecting new blood from St. Petersburg into the country’s senior leadership, although he said his top criterion for hiring was competence. (ORT 2/8)

· Returning Chechnya to “Normalcy.” Having successfully occupied the Chechen capital of Grozny (city pictured left), Kremlin forces are actively promoting the idea that the war is essentially won and that things will soon return to normal. Putin issued an order calling for spring planting in Chechnya and it was reported that several schools have even reopened in the embattled republic. Nevertheless, Chechen rebels managed to ambush a Russian convoy on March 2 killing 37, reminding the world that the separatist fighters intend to keep the region unstable even if they cannot defeat Russia in direct combat.

BUILDING A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN RUSSIA

On February 27, delegates from the Unity electoral bloc met in Moscow and voted to become a “political movement.” At this “founding congress,” movement leader Sergei Shoigu (also Russia’s Minister for Emergency Situations) declared that Russia needed a maximum of three-four parties and that Unity and the Communist Party would be the “system-forming” structures. Shoigu further declared that Putin should lead Unity, turning it into a real party of power. While not openly accepting the invitation, Putin did not disappoint the Unity delegates, agreeing with Shoigu that Russia needed a two-party system, “or maybe three or four.” He further declared that the time for presidents remaining aloof from political parties are gone, strongly suggesting he will officially join Unity after the elections. Amongst current parties, Shoigu said that only the Union of Right-Wing Forces had a future, relegating Yabloko and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia to the dustbin of history. Shoigu said that Unity will take further steps towards turning itself into a full-fledged party, complete with regional structures and an ideology, after the elections. Its next congress is planned for late April or early May.

ST. PETERSBURG: PUTIN’S FIRST STEP TO REIN IN THE REGIONS?

Putin has repeatedly called for rationalizing relations between Russia’s central government and wayward regions, the leaders of which frequently flout federal law. He is likely to want to find one region soon that he can make an example, frightening other governors into obedience. His first major opportunity to do some muscle flexing may be the gubernatorial elections in St. Petersburg, now slated for May 14. Governor Vladimir Yakovlev (pictured) would appear to be a particularly attractive target, and not only because he was one of the top three leaders of the anti-Kremlin Fatherland-All Russia bloc, having joined before realizing that it was not going to become the new party of power. Yakovlev was originally deputy to Anatoly Sobchak, Putin’s political mentor, but betrayed him by running against him, and winning, in the 1996 gubernatorial elections. While Yakovlev reportedly offered Putin a top post in his administration, Putin remained loyal to Sobchak, ultimately moving to Moscow.

Yakovlev’s administration then hounded Sobchak on corruption charges, prompting Sobchak to leave Russia to be treated for a heart ailment, only to return last fall. While many thought the health problems were simply an excuse to flee the country, Sobchak died of a heart attack during the night of February 19-20. Putin, openly weeping at the funeral, called Sobchak’s tragedy the result of a “witchhunt,” although he did not blame Yakovlev by name. Within a few days, a senior member of Putin’s government, the popular St. Petersburg native Valentina Matvienko (currently deputy prime minister for social issues), announced her candidacy for the governorship and quickly won the endorsement of Putin allies, including former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, who had himself flirted with a run for the governorship. If Putin shows his team can easily dispatch of the governor of Russia’s second city, having already demonstrated his capacity to use brute force in Chechnya, Russia’s 87 other regional leaders will certainly be quicker to fall in line. They might also remember that Putin takes politics personally.

__________________________________________________________________

PUTIN’S RIVALS FLOUNDER

· On February 21, the Central Election Commission (CEC) finished registering candidates for the Russian presidency. The only wrinkle in the process: the CEC denied Vladimir Zhirinovsky the chance to participate in his third presidential race on the grounds that his son had failed to report ownership of a two-room apartment in Moscow. Zhirinovsky soon won his appeal, however, arguing that this oversight was trivial compared to the vast real estate holdings that he did report and represented no intentional hiding of assets. With Zhirinovsky’s inclusion, a total of 12 candidates are challenging Putin for Russia’s top job. While few give any of them a chance to win, if something tragic happens to Putin in the next two weeks, one of these people could still hope to wind up Russia’s next president.

· Gennady Zyuganov. Leader, Communist Party (KPRF). The only other real contender with his core of 22% in the polls, this second-time presidential candidate supports Putin’s efforts in Chechnya but wants a much stronger social safety net in Russia’s struggling economy. In his appearances, he regularly promises a higher minimum wage: $105 per month for doctors and teachers and $35 for others, compared to a current minimum wage of just $14. Suggesting a curious bow to Reaganomics that underscores how Western left-right labels don’t fit Russian political reality, he also calls for halving taxes on domestic industry and cuts in energy, transport and communications tariffs. He would, however, create a state monopoly on alcohol and tobacco. His chief economist, Sergei Glaziev, promises 10% annual growth under Zyuganov.

· Grigory Yavlinsky. Leader, Yabloko Party. With his popularity at a record low, Yavlinsky is struggling to regain a modicum of the respect he lost during the autumn Duma campaign by waffling on the Chechnya war and stumbling in widely televised debates. While he is campaigning to be the candidate of Russia’s broad democratic forces, taking a stand against the brutality of the Chechnya war, he is having a hard time retaining even Yabloko’s reliable core 5%.

· Vladimir Zhirinovsky (pictured). Leader, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). While no reputable observer gives Russia’s infamous “political clown” any chance to win, he enjoys a core following of 3-5% of the electorate. Drawing support from his zany antics, common touch, nationalistic rhetoric and tough law-and-order message, he has never missed a chance to give his team of campaign technicians experience in a national political race, having run in both of Russia’s two previous presidential elections.

· Aman Tuleev. Governor, Kemerovo Region. The Harold Stassen of Russian presidential elections, Tuleev now opposes his fellow Communist Zyuganov, for whom he withdrew his candidacy while running in 1996. He has also proposed a radical restructuring of Russian politics, calling for reducing the number of Russian regio

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

ns from 89 to 35 and for appointing, rather than electing, these regions’ first chief executives. His charisma could get him 5% but he has little hope of more.

· Konstantin Titov (pictured). Governor, Samara Region. This ambitious co-leader of the Union of Right-Wing Forces failed to win even its endorsement. Most likely, he hopes that the attention he gets on the federal stage will help him overcome a challenge from a rebellious mayor in his upcoming gubernatorial reelection bid.

· The remaining candidates that will appear on the ballot are not on the political map, although they may hope that a presidential bid may be the first step to getting there in future years. These candidates are: Aleksei Podberezkin, Yuri Skuratov (forcibly ousted General Prosecutor), Stanislav Govorukhin, Ella Pamfilova, G. Khrustalev, Umar Dzhabrailov, and Yevgeny Savostyanov.

PUTIN IN HIS OWN WORDS

On strengthening the state: “People are tired of the laxness of power. When the first steps to strengthen the state became apparent it was vital and people reacted positively….For me this reaction was very important, like getting a signal back.” (Reuters 2/9)

On critics of the Chechnya war: “We should not allow the idea about excessive casualties on our side with the aim of causing moral damage to society. This is the pitch that some quarters are making to the public consciousness. And this is really dangerous….We may recall the "defeatism" of the Bolsheviks. They wanted Russia to be defeated in World War I hoping that the regime would fall and they would come to power.” (ORT 2/7)

On death threats made against him by Chechen soldiers: “One should never fear such threats. Its like with dogs, you know. A dog feels when somebody is afraid of it, and bites. The same applies here. If you become jittery, they will think that they are the mightiest. Only one thing can be effective in such circumstances—to go on the offensive. You must hit first, and hit so hard that your opponent will not rise to his feet.” (Kommersant, 3/10)

On Russian troops in Chechnya: “Few expected that military servicemen and the Armed Forces and internal troops would so precisely, so professionally and with such manliness fulfill the tasks posted by the political leadership of the country. A big bow to them for this.” (Polit.Ru 2/22)

On US-Russian relations: “Russian-American relations have a global nature and Russia views the United States as its main partner.” (FT 2/3)

On the oligarchs: “They are more interested than anyone else in working out common rules that are understandable and acceptable to all the participants in the market, so that these rules should be observed by everyone. And the state would guarantee compliance with these rules, without offering any advantages or privileges or preferences to anyone regardless of political leanings and the scale of their activities.” (ORT 2/8)

On holding a grudge: “I am not a malicious person and I am not inclined to think that the people who were your opponents yesterday are your enemies for life. It is important to understand what their motives were when they opposed you. It is often the case that people, especially if they follow certain moral rules and pursue certain goals, at a certain stage they become your most reliable allies because in their work they are not guided by expediency but certain ideals and principles for which they are prepared to make a stand, an even stronger stand than you yourself. And such people should be sought out and brought into government.” (ORT 2/8)

On his career in the secret service: “As to whether it is of help or a hindrance, I think that it more often helps because one has certain horizons. In effect, what is intelligence service about? It is information service. It is primarily information work.” (ORT 2/8)

THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON PUTIN: IN THEIR OWN WORDS

· Tatyana Malkina: “From the point of view of the mentality of the public at large, candidate Putin’s conceptual ideas look impeccable: order, legality and prosperity of an integral and powerful country.” (Vremya MN 2/9)

· Grigory Yavlinsky: “Those who talk of a good Pinochet in Russia aren't fighting for the "good" Putin, but for their own political survival. They realize that what they need is someone who isn't a professional when it comes to the economy, so they can pull the wool over his eyes like they did with Yeltsin, making fabulous money on the side and developing further the system of corrupt, criminal-nomenklatura capitalism in Russia.” (The Russia Journal, 2/14-20)

· Anatoly Sobchak: “As democratic institutions are solidified in Russia, Western apprehensions about Mr. Putin will disappear. He is familiar with the West. He is too careful to make any wrong moves that might lead to irreparable damage in this relationship. That would be out of the question. (Posthumously published, LA Times 2/22)

· Grigory Yavlinsky (candidate registration card pictured): “I intend to fight Putin for the post of Russian president. I will fight the man under whose half year in power the dirtiest and most repulsive campaign tactics in the history of Russia have been used. It is under Putin that an anti-terrorist operation gave way to total war with huge numbers of victims. It is under Putin that an open union between the Kremlin, Communists and nationalists has been formed. It is under Putin that an assault on freedom of the press has begun.” (The Russia Journal, 2/14-20)

· Sobchak: “People from Putin’s circle do not drink and the majority of them do not smoke. I think that Yeltsin has not read a single novel in his whole life – not Cervantes nor Pushkin. Putin and his team have. They go to the theater or to exhibitions, not to the sauna to get drunk.” (Posthumously published, Polit.Ru 2/21)

ELECTION-RELATED WEBSITES

Central Election Commission: www.fci.ru

Yabloko: www.yabloko.ru

International Foundation for Election Systems: www.ifes.ru

Union of Right-Wing Forces: www.prav.ru

RFE/RL Russian Election Report: www.rferl.org/elections/russia99reportZhirinovsky: www.ldpr.ru

Russia Votes (polls): www.RussiaVotes.org

Communist Party: www.kprf.ru

VTsIOM (polls): www.wciom.ru

Vladimir Putin: www.putin2000.ru

ROMIR (polls): www.romir.ru

Konstantin Titov: www.titov2000.ru

Public Opinion Foundation (polls): www.fom.ru

Russian Government: www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru

EWI Regional Reports: www.iews.org/rrrabout.nsf

Carnegie Endowment: www.ceip.org

KOVALEV: THE TWILIGHT OF RUSSIAN FREEDOM

In a must-read essay in the February 10 New York Review of Books, Russia's most respected human rights advocate, Sergei Kovalev, offers a hard-hitting analysis of Putin, the war in Chechnya, the presidential elections, and the consequences for Russian democracy. Some key points include:

· Chechnya's leaders are no innocent victims, having let their republic descend into a source of lawlessness, including thefts of livestock and kidnappings of people in neighboring regions of Russia. The warlords Basaev and Khattab are even worse, launching an invasion of the Russian region of Dagestan.

· As the Russian army successfully freed Dagestan in Russia's first real liberation operation since World War II, Kremlin plotters conceived a plan to use these events to unleash a new war in Chechnya. For the military, this was revenge for its 1996 defeat. For Yeltsin's team, it was a political lifeboat.

· The deadly nighttime apartment bombings in Moscow were pivotal: “It turned out that we were living in an entirely different country, in which almost no one dared to talk about a peaceful, political resolution of the crisis with Chechnya.” In two words, this was “war hysteria.” While Kovalev does not claim Putin deliberately organized the bombings, he “cynically and shamefully” used it.

· As a result, human rights activists in Russia are considered a “fifth” column, agents of Western secret services working against Russia.

· The Kremlin plan, finalized as early as mid-summer, calls for the presidential elections to usher in a Pinochet-style dictatorship, autocracy with some formal aspects of democracy and market-oriented policies.

· While Russia will likely win the war, the Russian army will also likely move to a campaign of “ethnic genocide” in order to wipe out the guerillas.

· What burdens Kovalev most is his judgement that “what is new this time around is that Russian society as a whole is prepared to carry out genocide. Cruelty and violence are no longer rejected.” Concluding, he laments that the year 2000 may one day be called the twilight of Russian freedom.

SPIN CONTROL: IN THE PARTIES’ OWN WORDS

SDI posed the following question to official representatives of three major parties: “Which of Putin’s actions during the last month (February) will most influence the outcome of the elections and why?”

Here are their answers:

COMMUNIST PARTY

None of the Acting President’s concrete actions can now influence his pre-election rating or the outcome of the elections in any feasible way. His electoral game was played out earlier—with the start of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya. Public opinion reacted to this operation with a burst of positive emotion. Putin’s subsequent actions—both the successful and the unsuccessful ones—have had little influence on public opinion. The enthusiasm of public opinion, just as any irrational emotion, does not need to be nourished. Real events have almost no influence on it. This situation will continue until the moment when the enthusiasm, which resembles political hysteria, dies down. That will probably happen at once: an immediate, sudden death. It is not at all necessary to expect such an outcome to be caused by any of Putin’s actions. The main concern of Russian politics in general, and the electoral campaign in particular, comes down to one question: when—before or after election day—will public enthusiasm fall?

-- Viktor Peshkov, Deputy of the State Duma, KPRF

UNITY

In February, Vladimir Putin’s most effective, though not the most noticed, action influencing his electoral prospects was a tactful but fairly obvious demonstration of affection for Yevgeny Primakov, who had to respond by saying that he, as well, likes Putin. Since Unity’s leaders had earlier given their regional structures the right to ally themselves independently at the presidential elections, the compliment exchange between Putin and Primakov will certainly be taken as Primakov giving Putin his blessing (which also corresponds to the wishes and interests of Unity activists, who are generally allied with local governments). Putin’s potential gain from this action is at least half of Unity’s electorate, that is 5% to 6% of Russian voters.

-- Sergei Golovkov, head of Unity Analytical Center

YABLOKO

If, in January, many democratically-minded voters considered the possibility that Vladimir Putin would take a number of actions that would make his candidacy acceptable for a broad range of non-Communist forces, their convictions were shaken in February. During this time, Vladimir Putin and Unity, having made an alliance with the Communist Party, demonstrated that the Soviet style of politics, which has now become so prominent in the Kremlin’s actions, would not let our country come out of the crisis. This alliance, as the result of which one of the Communist leaders, G. Seleznev, became the Speaker of the State Duma, key parliamentary committees were distributed among the Communists and Unity, and the Duma’s international politics was handed over to the nationalists, was a great shock to society. Many people began to fear that this would be the model for government formation if Putin wins in the presidential elections. The Yabloko faction of the Duma has received many letters where people wrote: “We voted for Unity, but did not realize that our votes would be given to the Communists, and that Putin’s main ally would be Seleznev.” Society witnessed decrees by the Acting President that were aimed at militarization and a return to the political function of some special services: military instruction in schools, which goes against the Russian Constitution; eliminating military departments in many colleges that teach military officers, thus drafting students before the completion of their education; reinstituting special army departments for political intelligence; the power-yielding organs’ persecution of correspondent Andrei Babitsky, etc. There are no significant advances in the economy, while prices are rising. Raising the price of vodka was another awkward step taken by the government. The oligarchic system in Russia continues to be reinforced, as demonstrated by the latest transaction in the aluminum industry. The last month revealed that more and more people consider stopping the war in Chechnya a necessity. The latest events show that Chechnya is embarking on guerrilla warfare, which will last many years unless a political solution is found. The Kremlin has not yet really tackled this problem. All these developments undermine people’s former readiness to support such politics, while during this pre-election period, many should also feel that they are being manipulated. Even the pro-Kremlin sociologists’ “loaded” opinion polls note a decline in Putin’s popularity. Meanwhile, many independent observers think that publishing these incredible ratings is aimed at preparing society for the announcement of official election results, which are still often achieved according to Stalin’s principle: “It matters not how people vote, but how the votes are counted.”

-- Vladimir Braginsky, EPI Center

INSIDER INFORMATION

Analysis of the Russian election campaign by leading Russian specialists

Section Editor: Emily Van Buskirk

THE ELITES HAVE CHOSEN PUTIN, BUT WILL HE CHOOSE THEM?

HOW DIFFERENT ELITES WOULD DIRECT RUSSIA’S FUTURE

Vladimir Boxer, Fellow

SDI Project, Harvard University

KEY POINTS:

*The Russian public desires order and stability, and the different elites are struggling to define what this means, in order to capitalize on the demand. However, the elites’ stability is what will hurt Russia’s stable development.

*Between 1996 and 2000, 40% of the governors were defeated in their attempts at reelection. This is why they’re ready to make a deal with Putin so they can consolidate and hold on to their power.

*The future of the elites matters more in predicting where Russia is headed than do individual appointments.

Save a few, Russian elites have decided whom they will support in the presidential elections: Putin. Yet, various groupings within the elite may have very different answers to the question of what kind of candidate (i.e., which Putin) they support.

The fight is under way for the privilege to influence the political discourse and economic strategy to be advocated by the unquestionable favorite of the electoral race. Even groupings that until recently have opposed Putin, have joined or are ready to join this fight.

The pre-election period in Russia is that brief time when the elite attempts to understand (or adjust to its understanding) the demands of the electorate.

After the August crisis, many representatives of the elite believed that the dominant tendency among the voters was a conservative protest (conservative in its Soviet meaning). The secret of preserving and extending power seemed simple: to criticize and impair the Kremlin regime as much as possible. The message of Fatherland-All Russia (FAR), for example, emerged from this understanding.

Yet, the lessons of the Duma elections have demonstrated that this strategy was leading to a dead end: the voter was oriented not towards confrontation, but towards stability and order. This demand is now understood by the elite. However, the interpretation of this demand is a different matter.

The pre-election period in Russia is that brief time where the elite tries to understand what the electorate wants.

The leading “Kremlin” oligarchic groups are inclined to see public opinion as an absolutely passive product, elastic and open to manipulations. They are confident that an orientation towards order and stability is not something intrinsically characteristic of Russian society at its current stage, but rather has been externally embedded by the oligarch-controlled media.

From this stems their belief that the interpretation of the “stability and order concepts advantageous for them can also be spoon-fed to the Russian people from their TV screens.

And what kind of interpretation it would be is rather obvious: in the systemic context to leave everything at its current stage, i.e. no re-distributions of property unsanctioned by the oligarchs themselves; domination of the monopolistic groups coupled with the authorities and suppression of any internal competition; and hard protectionism aiming to fence off external competition.

These processes have to take place under the guise of a more authoritarian—in comparison to Yeltsin’s—regime, and be accompanied by the controlled heating up of the isolationist mood in society. That is to say that the demand for stability is being replaced by the stagnation useful for the currently (or still) dominant groupings, while the demand for order is replaced by a “strong hand” guarding these groups’ interests.

However, this model is in fact unstable and risky even for the oligarchs themselves.

In the absence of real institutional constraints on the strong executive hand, the elimination of this or that grouping’s monopoly over the media is only a technicality. Afterwards one can quickly explain to the voters where a substantial part of the national wealth has been disappearing, the reasons for non-payment of salaries, and why the state could not find resources for social expenditures.

The narrowness of the social basis of the oligarchs, even when you take into account that some regions are within the sphere of their influence, will not allow them to stay in their positions as influential players.

That part of the elite that is supporting Putin, that is both opposed to the oligarchs and market oriented, and that calls itself “liberal,” has a different interpretation of stability and order.

Stability is understood as providing conditions for stable development and advancement to a modern society based on the principles of free-market competition. Order is perceived as a crucial part of these conditions, in the form of the law enforcement necessary for stable development.

This group of the elite is represented, foremost, by those businessmen who have not been allowed to share the budget pie, do not control any influential media, and therefore are not interested in maintaining the dictate of the monopolies.

It also includes liberal technocrats from the federal government structures, and reform-minded politicians and economists who left the government - Gaidar, Kirienko, Nemtsov and their close associates.

The “liberal” elite thinks a freer Russian market will weaken the oligarchic groups.

The locomotive of this elite group is represented by the duet of Chubais and aluminum magnate Deripasko. These two, although themselves heading giant holdings, have been involved in a strategic fight with the leading oligarchs, and therefore with the oligarchic system as a whole.

In this context, they consider the openness of the Russian economy as a natural asset in weakening the dictate of the oligarchic groups.

However, even the liberals themselves realize that in today’s Russia they do not command sufficient social or lobbying power to secure a purely liberal course of reform. Therefore, they tend to see their role as the one of an influential, but junior partner in the informal governing coalition.

The third interpretation of stability and order is advocated by the very same groups which recently have been advocating conservative protest. These are the representatives of the elite which earlier supported FAR but is now moving to Putin, and also the lobbying groupings aligned with them—agrarians, several sector lobbyists, and so on.

By “order and stability,” they have in mind a course towards partial restoration (labeling it “Centrism”), i.e., towards the strengthening of state monopoly capitalism. For the society at large, the difference between the state-capitalist and the oligarchic monopoly in general means that in the first case the bureaucrat appoints the oligarch, and in the second - the oligarch appoints the bureaucrat.

However, for the proponents of these models the difference is of a principal nature: they belong to different social and cultural strata. Besides, the proponents of the oligarchic model are concentrated primarily in the elite of natural resources and banking businesses, while the proponents of pure state capitalism have somewhat stronger influence (which has started to shrink) in the elite of the manufacturing, high-tech and military-industrial complex.

It is interesting that these three orientations - oligarchic, liberal and state capitalistic - along with the elites supporting them - have been essentially inherited by Putin from Yeltsin. Basically, the concept of any of Yeltsin’s governments was based on the mixture of these models (combined in different times at different proportions), and was called the system of checks and balances.

The results of its implementation are obvious. Not even Dorenko can convince TV viewers that this concept of balance is the essence of order and stability.

It is clear that, while Putin can currently maneuver between differing demands of these three varieties of elites (oligarchic, liberal, and state capitalistic) in the pre-election period, Putin will have to select and stick to a more certain line after his victory. A lot will depend not only on his own sympathies and antipathies, but also on social capital, including, first of all, the level of mobilization of the elite which will support the selected line.

The stability of existing regional elites is the main obstacle to Russia’s stable development.

Yet, the most recent political experience of Russia has demonstrated, taken separately, that none of the described political-economic models secure the necessary consolidation of elites. A solution could be found in building an alliance with the influential groups for whom the value of the alliance will be determined not only by the content of the models discussed.

One of the candidates for such a collective ally has, it seems, already volunteered its services. These are the governors who speak in the name of the regional elites controlled by them or controlling them.

The majority of these regional bosses are proponents of the state capitalism model, although a number of them (particularly in the regions rich with natural resources) are supporters of the oligarchic model. There are few proponents of the liberal model. Some governors fill the intermediary position, similar to that of Yeltsin’s governments. But practically all regional leaders (regardless of their political-economic preferences) have realized society's demand for stability and order.

But in their interpretation, this means locking in the stability of regional elites and hierarchies that have emerged on regional levels.

Contrary to widespread opinion, elections in Russian regions have not always been an easy and formal exercise for the incumbents. Between 1996 and 2000 40% of the governors were defeated in their attempts at

reelection.

Many of them paid a dear price for their failures, facing repression, and, frequently, criminal prosecution which was organized by their successors. Moreover, the inauguration of a new regional leader usually leads to a shake-up not only in the bureaucratic apparatus, but also in the financial and industrial groups dominant at local levels.

The constraint the governors’ plan would place on Putin: “frozen” regional elites.

This is why a group of governors has started to push for a change in their status from being elected to appointed from “above,” in exchange for the conservation of “their” regional elites.

A set of measures proposed as guarantees includes: the appointment of governors by the President, with the consent of regional legislative councils, membership in which is easily controlled by the regional elites; a lengthening of the governor’s term in office; the abolition of party-list elections which cannot be tightly controlled at the regional level; and the liquidation of local self-governance. The latter, in essence, means the subordination of all city mayors to governors (including the mayors of regional capitals, who now often enjoy control not only of bigger financial flows than the governors, but are also their most dangerous competitors in the elections).

Thus, the governors propose to Putin a recipe to achieve the necessary consolidation of elites in favor of the political-economic model he will choose. And this recipe is to dismantle the current quasi-feudalism and to restore the hierarchical system of administration with only one constraint, and a very strong one: “frozen” regional elites.

However, this permanence of the elites represents the cornerstone of what limits Putin’s freedom to choose the political-economic model of development. With a few exceptions, the composition, including age composition, of the pro-governors’ regional elites, their experience, life views, and their level of corruption make any liberal reforms, as well as any determined economic advancement, virtually impossible under their control.

That is, this gubernatorial model, ideal for conquering and probably also for strengthening presidential power, in the long run can be acceptable only if Putin decidedly opts for the oligarchic or state-capitalistic model without any “impurities.”

The stability of the existing regional elites is the main obstacle to Russia’s stable development. Actually, this is the paradox of any Thermidor.

If stability, and not only the desire to keep power, becomes the main goal of the President (and it seems that Putin is indeed determined to make Russia spring forward), he is bound to gradually renew or change the dominant regional elites. At the end of the day, all previous attempts to carry forward Russian reforms have not resulted in decisive success due partly to the fact that instead of 89 regional teams of reformers carrying out reforms, each time just one team, the federal one, was attempting to implement them .

But the course for the systemic renovation of elites demands a high-precision strategy for selecting the adequate “raw materials” and institutional framework, being very separate from that suggested by the governors.

Who will be attracted as allies on regional levels and what will be the mechanism of their involvement and promotion? The answers to these questions will determine the long-term future of Russian reforms to a much greater extent than will the appointment of specific figures to the key posts in the Federal government.

Activity or passivity in this direction is the main indicator of the strategic direction of Russia that the new power will select.

THE COMPETITORS ACCEPT DEFEAT

CAN PUTIN EXPECT A FIRST-ROUND VICTORY?

Grigory Golosov, Professor

European University at St. Petersburg

KEY POINTS:

*The Communists (Zyuganov) seem ready to accept second place in the elections, with the consolation that they will remain as one of 2 or 3 parties in the stable party system envisioned by Putin.

*Chances that the elections will fail due to low voter turnout are negligible, because Putin has a broad electoral base.

*Putin is likely to win in the first round.

Less than a month is left until the elections. Thus, the presidential campaign is in full bloom. However, absent are events like those that we remember from the elections of 1996: trips of the candidates to the regions, mass political actions, rock concerts, and so on. It seems that elections are failing to attract public attention.

This situation is very beneficial for one of the candidates – Vladimir Putin. Being an acting president he appears on TV screens “on duty” and gets his share of favorable attention outside of the campaign. It looks like this is the strategy of his election task force. The slogan “Trust only in deeds” was created for Primakov, but it is Putin who follows it. The main deed, military victory in Chechnya, is close to achievement and there is no doubt that complete success of the operation will be reported by the time of elections. There is no time left for any other deeds, but one can trust in them in advance.

The slogan “Trust only in deeds” was created for Primakov, but it is Putin who follows it.

The text accompanying the display of Putin’s activities on state TV channels as well as the video material is not ideologically neutral at all.

In public rhetoric the leading candidate for the presidency declares his loyalty to liberal principles, and looking at the electorate from the TV screens there appears a strong leader capable of making effective decisions and maintaining order with an iron fist. This kind of image of the “party of power” began to be formed already in the course of the Duma election campaign. It turned out to be attractive for the voters.

We can note that the possibility of an ideological choice in favor of statesmanship with a strong nationalistic flavor was not alien to Yeltsin (one of the now extinct government parties “Reforms- a New Course” was created with such an ideology), but due to some circumstances of his career Yeltsin was not well-suited for the role of bearer of such an ideology.

Putin is free from such limitations: he bears personal responsibility neither for the disintegration of the USSR, nor for market reforms. For the greater part of the former opposition electorate, this fact seems more important than political declarations.

Putin’s main competitor, Zyuganov, looks even less persuasive than in 1996. It looks as if the role of the (second) “system-forming party” promised by the acting president suits the leader of the KPRF quite well. Second place in elections will serve as an illustration of this role, and it seems that the Communists are ready to give up the real fight for first place.

It seems that the Communists are ready to give up the real fight for first place.

Indeed, the KPRF campaign is being conducted so weakly that doubts in its sincerity appear quite naturally. There is a candidate for the third position – Grigory Yavlinsky; he cannot count on more than this even if he gets public support from Primakov and Luzhkov, which might not actually happen. Participation in the elections by other candidates can be explained by motives not related to the fight for the position of President, and which are sometimes very far from politics.

In these circumstances the perception that the results of the elections are already evident is spreading wider. Is it worth considering the possibility of election failure due to low attendance?( I think not. Such a threat (in the Russian constitutional context it is certainly a threat) would exist if Putin were a candidate oriented solely towards the urban, educated and comparatively well-off electorate, which served as a traditional base for the democrats but which very often refuses to participate in the elections.

But for Putin (in comparison to, say, Yavlinsky) this base is secondary. The Duma elections showed that the “party of power” made a decisive step towards the rural, less educated and poor electorate that served earlier as the base for the Communist party and that always comes to the elections. There is also no doubt that the local authorities, in their natural desire to please the future president, will see to it that the election polling places are not empty.

The local authorities will no doubt see to it that the polling places are not empty.

Finally, the voters who want to express their principal protest against the whole set of candidates have the option of voting “against all.” Although the number of those voting “against all” would not exceed ten percent in any case, it will help to raise the attendance up to a necessary minimum.

The only question that is still open is whether there will be a need for a second round.

It is most important that Putin (according to the polls) will get the votes of those who supported the Communists in 1995-1996. Thus, Putin’s victory in the first round seems a quite possible result, although not guaranteed.

Certainly, in order to achieve this result Putin will need to avoid obvious mistakes, not letting the public have doubts about victory in Chechnya, and avoiding loud scandals in the course of the campaign.

Putin’s competitors don’t want to complicate their life in Putin’s Russia.

All this is quite achievable at least because Putin’s competitors look to be accepting the idea of defeat, and not wanting to complicate their life in the future Russia—Putin’s Russia.

FOR THE LOSERS, WHAT’S LEFT TO WIN?

WHY ZYUGANOV AND YAVLINSKY ARE RUNNING IN THIS

PREDETERMINED RACE

Sergei Markov

Director, Institute of Political Studies, Moscow

Professor, Moscow State University

KEY POINTS:

*Putin will win this election, Zyuganov will take second place, and Yavlinsky third. Fighting for fourth place are Konstantin Titov and Aman Tuleev.

* Putin surpasses his competitors in all regions. The narrowest gap today, according to the latest VTsIOM polls, is 12% in the Lipetsk Region (Putin 41%, Zyuganov 29%).

*The only threat to Putin’s victory is the possibility that voter turnout will drop from the usual 65-68% to 45-48%.

*Zyuganov’s main goal is to confirm the KPRF’s status as the chief opposition party and his own position as leader of the left-patriotic coalition.

The presidential elections of the year 2000 are unique in many ways. The date itself is unique, and the fact that the winner is obvious. The principle that “the most important thing is not to win, but to participate” is maintained by the majority of the participants in the election race, in as much as they are all convinced of Vladimir Putin’s victory.

It also appears obvious who will take the other prize places: Gennady Zyuganov in second place, and Grigory Yavlinsky in third.

However, in the process of participating in the presidential campaign, every one of the candidates is resolving his own very difficult political problems.

What are the tasks of the participants in the presidential race?

Vladimir Putin

Vladimir Putin is not struggling for victory as such; he is sure of it. He needs a victory in the first round. This kind of powerful popular support will give Vladimir Putin and his team a carte-blanche on decisive changes in the political system and laws of the economic game. The problems which Vladimir Putin will need to resolve after the election are difficult and diverse.

Putin needs a first-round

victory.

It will be imperative to effectively create functioning state institutions (governance and public administration), and for that Vladimir Putin will have to destroy the numerous financial and bureaucratic groups, which in fact privatized state institutions and rendered them unable to work. The de-privatization of the state presents itself as the most difficult political challenge, a fierce battle indeed, for which Putin will require a demonstration of total support from the people.

For Putin it will be imperative to sew together the economic, political, and legal spaces of the Russian Federation, which already is turning de-facto into a confederation. The constitutions and regulations of the majority of the subjects of the Federation contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

In many regions, essentially authoritarian political regimes have formed, with which Moscow has been able to do nothing up until this time. Kalmykia, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan are only the most vivid examples. More and more governors are crushing enterprises located in their regions, creating unbearable conditions for independent subjects.

For the subjugation of the governors and the national presidents to the federal center, Putin again needs a demonstration of the people’s universal support.

The most desirable victory for this would be one in which Putin won in each of the 89 regions separately. So far public opinion polls show that this is entirely possible.

Putin surpasses his competitors in all regions. The narrowest gap today, according to the latest VTsIOM polls, is 12% in the Lipetsk Region (Putin 41%, Zyuganov 29%).

The danger has arisen that voter turnout will fall to the critical level.

According to the estimation of the election headquarters, the majority of voters’ confidence in Putin’s victory may work against him: the danger has arisen that voter turnout will fall to the critical level—lower than 50%, which would invalidate the elections.

Some of the voters may reason, “Why vote, if the results are known beforehand?” and with that the turnout may fall from the usual 65-68% to 45-48%. The most important strategic “line of attack” against Putin, according to his own expression, is to lower the voter turnout.

In connection with that it would not be fitting for Putin’s supporters to relax and consider the election already won. They are now trying to take measures which would raise the voter turnout chiefly by drawing attention to the pre-election campaigns, possibly through staged conflicts.

Voters will see neither television advertisements, nor posters, nor fliers with a call to vote for Putin.

One more challenge for Putin is to beat his opponents cleanly from a legal standpoint. Future critics should not have a basis to de-legitimize the power of the President by relying on the facts of his or his supporters’ violations of the election codes.

That is made more difficult by the fact that all the participants in the election process traditionally violate the election code. It is true that most of the serious contenders have a volume of financial means exceeding the maximum, as set by the election code. However, the peculiarities of Russian business lead to the fact that many financial operations in the process of elections take place not on paper, but with cash.

Vladimir Putin’s headquarters, it appears, will try to solve this problem by minimizing its own election campaign. I predict that voters will see neither television advertisements, nor posters, nor fliers with a call to vote for him.

Putin’s team will go along the line of turning the presidential elections into a routine referendum, where the voter is asked: “Do you think that the young, energetic and long-term acting President should continue to fulfill those obligations for the next four years with the full rights of the presidency?” In leading his election campaign Putin does not canvass or campaign—he simply governs the country.

Thus, in the process of the election campaign Vladimir Putin needs to confront four problems:

· provide voter turnout;

· win in the first round;

· win in every region of Russia;

· win cleanly from a legal standpoint.

Gennady Zyuganov

The campaign of Gennady Zyuganov is also running on the minimalist scenario. That is not connected with the fact that the results of the elections are of no consequence to Zyuganov, but with the fact that for the achievement of his aims he does not need a full scale election utilizing all resources.

Zyuganov’s main goal is to confirm the status of his party as the chief opposition force, and his own status as the universally recognized leader of the left-patriotic opposition.

For that he must: offer his voters the chance to repeat their traditional behavior and vote for the leader of the Communist Party; and once more to run the departments of the Communist Party and its allies through the millstone of the election campaign, as it is well known that the party lives by the elections and dies without them. But the golden dream of Zyuganov is his qualification to the second round.

If one looks at these aims it is apparent that in order to succeed Zyuganov need not waste any effort on the organs of mass information. His voters know him well. He needs only to remind them that they should go and vote for their leader.

In the absence of political advertisements in the organs of mass information it will be even easier to concentrate energy entirely on the work of the party organizations. Whether or not there will be a second round does not depend on Zyuganov’s results, but on whether or not Vladimir Putin is successful at getting more than 50% of the vote in the first round.

Still one more important goal of Gennady Zyuganov is to lead a serious, although not completely open internal party discussion, in order to determine the positions of the party in reaction to the regime of Vladimir Putin and his proposed reforms.

The Communists find themselves in a state of bewilderment: what should the party line be?

The point is that Putin, with his rigid and effective policies in the North Caucasus and patriotic rhetoric has put the Communists into a difficult position. He has practically taken away their chance to criticize the government for its weakness, its inability to address the most important problems, and for its subjugating the interests of the country to external forces. These were the most important grounds of criticism from the side of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Zyuganov in relation to the Kremlin.

As a result the Communists find themselves in a state of bewilderment: what should the party line be? Zyuganov, as the acknowledged leader and ideologue of the party, should formulate it, but for that he must understand the opinion of the party organizations.

Thus, in the course of the campaign, several of the most important political aims that stand before Zyuganov are:

· enter into a second round-- this is the most important goal;

· confirm the status of the Communist Party as the chief opposition force;

· confirm his own status as the only leader of the left-patriotic coalition;

· strengthen the party structure of the Communist Party and its allies by participating in the election campaign;

· formulate a new political line of the party in the new conditions of the regime of Vladimir Putin, and the expected reforms based on the ideological roots of liberal patriotism.

Grigory Yavlinsky

Yavlinsky’s campaign, on the contrary, should be of the maximum intensity. The reason being that the Kremlin is not hiding its intention to transform the political party system with the purpose of leaving 3-4 parties in the arena, or even better only two parties: the party of power founded on Unity and the Communist Party as an obvious, but not dangerous, opposition. The electorate of the Communists is too inert and cannot, according to numerous analyses, significantly increase its numbers.

Yavlinsky’s campaign, on the contrary, should be of the maximum intensity.

Yavlinsky in the course of bitter polemics with these two political forces should prove to the voters his cardinal distinctions from them, and at the same time defend his niche from destruction by simultaneous attack from the party of power and the Communist Party.

Yavlinsky must also stand up for his niche in the confrontation with the other influential political bloc of liberal leaning, the Union of Right-Wing Forces, which makes claims to “swallow Yabloko (or ‘eat the apple’)” in due time. For that reason Yavlinsky must, in conducting the campaign, strengthen his territorial party structures, activate them and create an immunization against the Union of Right-Wing Forces’ possible “ingestion” of them by means of their regional party structures, which not long ago very unexpectedly (for everyone) surpassed Yabloko in the parliamentary elections.

If Putin and Zyuganov do not very much desire to lead full-scale campaigns in the organs of mass media, then Yavlinsky wants to, but is unable; he lacks the money, and only the media empire friendly to him (the political/informational holding of Vladimir Gusinsky) can help.

This insufficiency of resources before the necessity of activating the campaign prompts Yavlinsky to use popular methods uncharacteristic of himself. In particular, he (unexpectedly for many) began to draw attention to the increase in vodka prices, as if Vladimir Putin promoted the measure.

Thus Yavlinsky has several basic goals:

· maintain his status as the leader of the main liberal opposition;

· save the party by not allowing the formation of a two-party system;

· defeat his competitors from the liberal camp: the pro-government Union of Right-Wing Forces, Konstantin Titov;

· strengthen the party structures of Yabloko through the election campaign.

A few words on the hopefuls for fourth place and their tasks:

Konstantin Titov strives to:

· strengthen the party structures of the Union of Right-Wing Forces;

· emphasize that the Union of Right-Wing Forces is not fusing with the party of power, and has its own party position, ideology, and leaders;

· raise Konstantin Titov to a level of politics on the federal scale;

· achieve the status of the chief liberal political force, and for this he must

· defeat Grigory Yavlinsky, his most important opponent in the liberal camp.

Aman Tuleev hopes to:

· confirm himself as a political figure on the common federal level;

· strengthen his electorate’s tradition of voting;

· strengthen his position in the Kemerovo Region.

WHY PUTIN?

PUTIN’S A WINNER, WHICH IS WHAT MATTERS MOST

Vyacheslav Nikonov, Director

“Politika” Foundation, Moscow

KEY POINTS:

*A key to Putin’s popularity is that he’s Yeltsin’s antithesis: young, energetic, and tough.

*Research shows that voters want a smart leader, but not too smart. Putin seems to fit the bill.

*Russians will elect Putin because he appears as a winner amidst a group of losers and non-contestants.

The phenomenon of Vladimir Putin, who is still seen as the future president by the majority of Russians, is based not only on what he does and says (there is nothing all that unusual about it), but on the perception of his personality. And this perception resonates with the public’s desire for a new leader.

First and foremost, Putin wins in people’s eyes as the antithesis of Boris Yeltsin, who by the end of his presidency made everybody allergic to his illnesses and work disability. Putin, on the contrary, is young, energetic, resolute and able to “take care of business.” It is obvious he is winning thanks to the fact that he forms an easy contrast with his predecessor.

Of course, there are other young and energetic ones besides Putin. There are, for example, the young generals who are “taking care of business” in Chechnya. There is also Chubais, who is more energetic than anyone. So, there is something to Putin that neither the generals nor Chubais have.

Putin is the bearer of the mystery of supreme power, which many Russians have always held in holy adoration.

This something is the magic of power. The power which the generals who follow the orders of their Supreme Commander-in-Chief are lacking. Putin is practically already leader of the state, the bearer of the mystery of supreme power, which many Russians have always held in holy adoration. According to public opinion research, a minimum of ten percent of Russians is ready to vote for any leader as long as he is the boss.

Unlike Chubais, Putin has not been in power for a long time. The fact that his past is unknown is a big plus. Actually all the elite of the `90s either burnt out by themselves, or were burnt out by Yeltsin, oligarchs and political competitors.

By the end of the decade, all the leading politicians have had their dirty laundry revealed (whether deservedly or not) and lost their attractive image. Chubais is associated with predatory capitalism, Zyuganov with obsolete, rusting ideology, Yavlinsky with pointless talk, Primakov with old age. Putin, as a rather new personality, doesn’t have negative associations.

Voters want the next president to be smart. They think Putin is smart. Perhaps there are smarter people in the country: academicians, professors. But they are not elected to be president, nor even to be Duma deputies (and this is true not only in Russia).

According to research results, a candidate who is counting on peoples’ sympathy should be smarter than the average voter, but not by much. He shouldn’t say a lot of abstruse things; this is what let Gaidar, Kirienko and all the picks of the Russian elite down.

Putin says clear things using correct Russian language, which is very untypical for Russian leaders in the 20th century. Lenin had a speech impediment, Stalin was Georgian, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev spoke something more like Ukrainian than Russian. Yeltsin used a specific dialect of the Urals. The only exception before Putin was Andropov.

By the end of the decade, all the leading politicians have had their dirty laundry revealed.

The Chechen war, which was the reason for Putin’s high rating in many analysts’ opinion, was important first of all for the formation of Putin’s image as a “defender.” With the existing chaos, poor living conditions, and wild outburst of crime and terrorism, people have been waiting for a leader who will be able to restore order and to defend the country.

It is impossible to go to the district Communist Party committee with your complaints, because these committees do not exist any more. The fact that Putin used drastic measures against Chechen fighters was a signal for his voters that he can “take care of business” and defend.

Putin says clear things using correct Russian language, which is very atypical of Russian leaders in the 20th century.

This component of his image became even stronger once he showed his empathy for the weaker members of society. And although he raised salaries and pensions by only a little, it fit very well with Putin’s image as the “defender.”

Finally, it is well known: nothing leads faster to success than success itself. Putin has the image of a winner.

His real and imaginary enemies are becoming his allies. The opponents look unconvincing (thanks to the help of Kremlin-friendly TV channels). The “Evil Chechen” is running away and hiding in the mountains. There are no real competitors in the presidential elections.

This means it is obvious who should be voted for. People do not like to squander their only vote being fully aware that the person is not going to win.

Putin’s image as a young, resolute, energetic, unsullied, smart defender and winner with the halo of power becomes more important in people’s eyes than the fact that he has no political agenda, nor any governmental experience.

That’s why he will be elected. We will find out about his plans for the presidency after his inauguration. For now, even he does not know the answer to the question: “Who is Mr. Putin?”

“DON’T TREAT THE PUTIN PUPPET

BETTER THAN THE REST!”

WHAT THE PUBLIC LIKES ABOUT PUTIN

Viktor Peshkov

Deputy of the Russian State Duma, Communist Party faction

Secretary of the Central Committee, KPRF

KEY POINTS:

*New polls show that 54% of Russians think the country needs a “strong hand” to lead it.

*However, Putin’s “strong hand” is not what most voters are attracted to. Rather, more voters cite “steadfastness and likeability” (22%) as his most important attributes, and secondly the fight against terrorism in Chechnya (21%).

*In Russian eyes, Putin is so far only weakly linked with government actions.

This article uses data from an express-poll conducted by the Center for the Research of Russian Political Culture

February 20 – 27, 2000 in 44 regions of Russia (81 polling centers, 1500 respondents, 4% margin of error)

The chart of voter attitudes to two primary Presidential candidates is similar to the chart of an oscillatory process: up – down, up – down. The February stage of the campaign was completed with these numbers: 21% for Zyuganov, 46% for Putin..

Unclear image on the crest of the rating

A paradox: with such a high stated readiness on the part of the population to vote for Putin, concrete characteristics of his image in the public mind don’t take on any firm identities.

Take, for example, Russian society’s celebrated attraction to a “strong hand”. This was, until recently, absent. Now this attraction has appeared. For the first time, a majority – 54% -- spoke of its necessity. Only 32% believe that the country does not need a “strong hand.” “Strict execution of laws and the will of the authorities to action” are absolutely necessary. It’s symptomatic that the portion of the population predicting a turning of a “strong hand” into outright dictatorship is equally as small as the portion of the population which sees no danger in contemporary Russia of such a “strong hand-dictatorship”: no more than 3-4% in either case.

Table 1.

Today’s phenomenon – Vladimir Putin. What about him attracts people, in your opinion?

Opinion

%

1.His actions.

3

2.His ideas.

5

3.An as yet hidden devotion to Soviet imperial traditions.

1

4.The fight against terrorism in Chechnya.

21

5.His position on economic and social issues.

3

6.His behavior in international affairs.

3

7.Personal qualities: steadfastness, likeability, style.

22

8.Ability to find a common language with the opposition (Communists).

4

9.The fact that he was able to put Yabloko, Union of Right Forces, and Fatherland “in their places” in the Duma.

0

10.The ability of a “strong hand” to bring order to the country.

10

11.His patriotism, service to the ideals of “Great Russia”

2

12.He was able to give hope to the people.

11

13.Other opinion.

10

14.No opinion, didn’t answer

5

However, this factor – the rising attraction to “strong hand” policies – has only a weak effect on the image of acting Kremlin chief Putin (see table 1) and plays a tertiary role.

Two long-known aspects can be singled out (although only weakly) in the structure of his image. First, the aura of “steadfastness and likeability” of the acting President and his “style.” For the most part these are traits understood emotionally, as a matter of taste. Second, the fight against Chechen terrorism. This trait, we note, has clearly begun to lose its long-standing obvious charm. This time it was noted by only one in six respondents. Then more subjective characteristics follow: the sense that hope for a better future has sprouted. And only then do we see that “strong hand,” which 10% of the population finds in Putin. That is less than one-sixth of all those who connect a “strong hand” with bringing order to the country.

Those parts of Putin’s image which are understood rationally, with a logical basis (policy aims in the economic and social spheres, in international relations, and in the structure of the state) remain on the periphery. These traits are singled out by only 2-5% of respondents. The perception of Putin among Russian citizens is not as a receiver of historical tradition or a champion of Great Russia.

The Chechnya factor has begun to lose its longstanding charm.

The rise in ratings by way of emotion does not ensure its durability. However, the weak correlation between Putin’s image and the state’s principle tasks does have a plus: Putin himself is thus far weakly connected with any particular actions of the executive branch. The public’s reaction to Russia’s signing an agreement with the London Club (see Chart 1), by which Soviet debts became Russian sovereign debt is telling. About half of those polled weren’t able to define their attitude toward this concrete action of the Putin government.

Chart 1.

Putin’s government has signed an agreement with the London Club, and now the debt of [the Soviet] External Economic Bank has become Russian state debt. Your opinion?

1

15%

2

16%

3

21%

4

8%

5

40%

Notes:

1. Everything was done correctly: with this step Russia has improved its relations with the West as well as its external economic position

2. This is an ordinary affair which doesn’t change anything of importance for Russia.

3. Putin has enslaved Russia even more to the West, that is, gone the way of Yeltsin, Gaidar, and Chubais.

4. Other opinion.

5. No opinion, didn’t answer.

And no televised debates…

There is no clearly outlined image of Putin in the public mind. Yet another paradox: it’s not clear what the public wants that image to be.

February readings of the public mood show that barely half of all voters display interest in a possible televised debate between Putin and Zyuganov. About 10-12% would like to see a discussion between Putin and Yavlinsky or between Yavlinsky and Zyuganov. All other televised “gatherings” generate no interest among Russians.

Everyone’s equal

February’s poll brought out one interesting feature regarding Putin.

A minor scandal occurred surrounding the popular television show “Kukly” (“Puppets”). The scandal was caused by a petition from a group of well-known cultural figures, among whom were designated and trusted agents of Putin. The essence of their petition was to call for a ban on the use of a puppet of the acting President in what, in their opinion, is a frivolous show.

It’s as if the puppet has whispered, “The public’s political love affair with Putin has a limit.”

Russian society suddenly turned rather united and strict. (see Table 2)

The verdict…

Everything should be left as it is: you can’t make an exception for Putin and treat his puppet better than others.” Very few called for giving the puppet the qualities of “likeability, wisdom, significance.”

It’s as if the puppet has whispered, “The public’s political love affair with Putin has a limit.”

High ratings. An unformed image. No call for forming any particular image. Attempts to polish the image are rejected. In some hidden way, somewhere in the unconscious, V.V. Putin is putting Russians on guard.

Table 2.

A group of well-known cultural figures have signed a petition demanding an end to the use of the image and name of V. Putin in the television program “Puppets”. Your opinion?

Opinion

%

1.They are absolutely right: such a disrespectful attitude toward Putin is unacceptable.

9

2.It’s not worth it to remove the Putin puppet from the production, however they should make the puppet much more attractive (more likeable, wise, significant).

9

3.No, everything should be left as it is: you can’t make an exception for Putin and treat his puppet better than others.

46

4.“Puppets” ennobles Putin’s image too much, it should be shown more truthfully (more critically, even frighteningly).

4

5.Other opinion.

12

6.No opinion, didn’t answer.

20

REW’S SPECIAL THANKS TO: Vladimir Boxer, John Reppert, Anya Schmemann

TRANSLATORS: Elena Chesheva , Katherine Foshko, Olesia Jefferson, Matthew Lyberg , Terence Meehan, Oxana Shevel

SOURCES FOR IMAGES USED IN RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH No.8: Putin: bbc.uk 2/10, putin2000.ru,www01.excite.lt.photo. Babitsky: bbc.uk 2/3. Vodka label: gazeta.ru 2/29. Grozny: bbc.uk 2/18. Yakovlev: gazeta.ru 2/24. Zyuganov: Russia Journal 2/7 ISI EM. Zhirinovsky: gazeta.ru 2/14. Konstantin Titov: Russia Journal 2/7 ISI EM. Yavlinsky: yabloko.ru.

The Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project works to catalyze support for three great transformations underway in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union: to sustainable democracies, free market economies, and cooperative international relations. The Project seeks to understand Western stakes in these transformations, identify strategies for advancing Western interests, and encourage initiatives that increase the likelihood of success. It provides targeted intellectual and technical assistance to governments, international agencies, private institutions, and individuals seeking to facilitate these three great transformations.

SDI PROJECT, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JFK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

79 JFK STREET CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138

Phone: (617) 496-1565 Fax: (617) 496-8779

Website: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/sdi

Email: SDIJFK@harvard.edu

� EMBED MSPhotoEd.3 ���

� EMBED MSGraph.Chart.8 \s ���

( According to Russian Law, presidential elections are invalid if turnout is below 50%.

� The Russian expression Nikonov uses, “замочить,” is also slang for ‘to kill,’ and is the word Putin used in his now famous statement, “We will be following terrorists everywhere. If we catch them on the toilet, we’ll rub them out in the john.” (ITAR-TASS, 9/24/99)

8

5

_1014124250.bin

_1014283563.

_981821162.