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THE ETERNAL SUNS OF MANKIND:
PORTRAITURE, SPACE, AND THE JUCHE GRAND NARRATIVE
A 65>(, A Thesis submitted to the faculty of
j r San Francisco State UniversityIn partial fulfillment of
the requirements tor * ^ 3 5 the Degree
Master of Arts
In
Humanities
by
Vickie L. Hall
San Francisco, California
May 2015
Copyright by Vickie L. Hall
2015
CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL
I certify that I have read The Eternal Suns of Mankind: Portraiture, Space, and the Juche
Grand Narrative by Vickie L. Hall, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for
approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree
Master of Arts in the Humanities at San Francisco State University.
OilCristina Ruotolo Ph.D. Professor of Humanities
' f o t i A M . XtJcMary Scott Ph.D. Professor of Humanities
Saul Steier Ph.D.Associate Professor of Humanities
THE ETERNAL SUNS OF MANKIND:
PORTRAITURE, SPACE, AND THE JUCHE GRAND NARRATIVE
Vickie L. Hall San Francisco, California
2015
The DPRK’s cultural forms are embedded in DPRK political doctrine. They join together
imagery and devotional forms, and reverence for other Marxist-Communist predecessors (Russia, China, etc.). These systems of thought make portraiture of the Kim family one of the most important parts of what I am calling the Juche Grand Narrative of the country. Through portraiture the leadership exercises continuous communication of its philosophical goals with the population. The presence of these portraits within the public space plays an integral part in how North Korean citizens act, react, and interact with their fellow citizens. The formal elements of these portraits wordlessly represent and repeat what the Kim dynasty would like the masses to believe about their lives and legacy. They are a visual cue to North Korean citizens exclusively, as foreigners may purchase other forms of North Korean art but not these portraits.
I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis.
socialist realism, traditional Confucian values, borrowings from Christian monotheistic
Chair, Thesis Committee Date
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank all members of the Humanities Undergraduate Graduate Study Programs at San Francisco State University. It is with assistance from all that I have gained the tools to enable me to create and research the work contained within this thesis. My special thanks goes out to Dr. Mary Scott. Without her help and guidance, I might not have thought to focused my energies toward North Korea and the cultural forms of the DPRK. It has been under her tutelage that I was presented with the opportunity to develop my knowledge of this “elusive” nation. I would also like to thank Dr. Robert Thomas for his support and encouragement during my time at San Francisco State. As his Teachers Assistant, I was able to learn valuable skills that have led to my ability to become a Graduate Teaching Associate, and have also broadened my knowledge of theoretical works that I might have otherwise missed. Last, but not least, I would like to thank Dr. Cristina Ruotolo for assisting me in the development of this thesis, and providing me with the invaluable opportunity to teach at San Francisco State. Her guidance has provided me with the ability to pursue my goals of becoming an instructor of the highest caliber.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures........................................................................................................................ viii
Introduction................................................................................................................................ 1
Chapter 1: The Juche Grand Narrative.......................................................................7
The Feudal System......................................................................................... 10
Confucianism..................................................................................................11
Sovereign- Subject............................................................................ 13
Christianity......................................................................................................17
Japanese Imperialism.....................................................................................18
Juche and Chajusong.................................................................................... 20
Chapter 2: DPRK Socialist Realism and Its Influences...........................................23
Terminology: Realism vs. Socialist Realism...............................................25
Soviet Influence................................................................................ 27
Chinese Influence.............................................................................. 33
Chapter 3: The Studio System and Ideological Purity in Creation.........................38
Artist Discovery and Studio Education........................................................ 39
Inside and Outside Consumption of A rt......................................................41
Reading the Outside..........................................................................44
Discovering the Inside......................................................................50
TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED
Chapter 4: The Portrait: Juche Symbolism and Communication...........................53
Motifs in Large Portraiture........................................................................... 54
Reading Profile Portraiture........................................................................... 57
The Narrative of the Portrait.........................................................................60
Chapter 5: City and Portraiture Collide....................................................................65
Pyongyang...................................................................................................... 66
Space as communication............................................................................... 68
Monuments and communication...................................................................71
Juche Expression............................................................................................74
Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 77
References................................................................................................................... 80
vii
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figures Page
1. Roses for Stalin............................................................................................................30
2. Stonebreakers.............................................................................................................. 30
3. Embrace of the Great General.....................................................................................34
4. Mao with Citizens.........................................................................................................34
5. Confrontation............................................................................................................... 45
6. Sunflower...................................................................................................................... 45
7. We are the Happiest Children in the World............................................................... 51
8. Leader and a Peasant................................................................................................... 56
9. Kim portraits in metro car...........................................................................................59
10. Pyongyang map............................................................................................................66
11. Arch of Triumph at night.............................................................................................70
12. Juche Tower..................................................................................................................70
13. View of Kim Il-Sung Square from Juche Tower....................................................... 72
1
On January 29th 2002, President George Walker Bush gave a monumental address
to the nation. Reeling from the recent September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the
Pentagon and World Trade Center, the United States was in a haze of uncertainty and fear
for its future. This State of the Union speech was one that would rally the American
public and offer comfort to the nation with its assured and purposeful tone. Providing the
US with a sense of hope and strength in this time of adversity, the speech was impressive
from even from the most skeptical of viewpoints. The address was clear and concise with
its message: We are a nation that will persevere and will overcome in spite of those that
seek to attack our sensibilities. As Bush stated five minutes into the address, “You will
not escape the justice of this nation.. .’’'which alludes to the swift retaliation that those
attackers will meet. We were also introduced those believed to threaten our freedoms;
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, which Bush labeled the “Axis of Evil”.
While it is true that the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) makes
no apologies for its anti-American stance, there had not been a significant confrontation
or incident between the two countries since 1994, when we had reportedly been seconds
away from sending nuclear warheads in their direction.2 This left many to wonder “Why
North Korea and why now?” When re-visiting the address, we can see that there may
have been significant reasons to mention North Korea among the other “dangerous” or
“belligerent” nations we sought to counter in the war on terror. If we are to look at the
' Frum, David. "State o f the Union Address." Transcript o f Presidential State o f the Union Address. January 29, 2002.2 Sigal, Leon V. "Arms Control Today." The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding The Failure of the 'Crime-and-Punishment' Strategy. Arms Control Association, 1 May 1997. Web. 25 Mar. 2015.
2
timetables for the proliferation of nuclear arms and provocations between North and
South Korea, we can see that a nuclear DPRK is in direct conflict with what can be
thought of as the best interests of the US.
The political realities aside, there were two unintended consequences in George
Bush’s mention of North Korea. It both ignited the public interest in the long forgotten
“communist” nation, and elicited questions as to why such an aura of mystery surrounds
it. We wanted to know more about them. This State of the Union address was also
predictably rife with Orientalist overtones that most citizens of the US did not even
notice, showing that Orientalist perspectives, especially in regards to our collective
attitude toward the DPRK, still remain deeply imbedded within our cultural mindset. As
Edward Said wrote, Orientalism, “is a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as
against all ‘those’ non-Europeans”.3It was a conscious effort to differentiate the US,
thereby labeling the DPRK as “undesirable”, “backwards”, and “obsolete” in the scope of
the 21st century. Essentially, the “Axis of Evil” speech is an example of the systems of
thought that have been in place for centuries when the developed countries of the West
consider a country (or specific people) undesirable and alien. Our individual outlooks
concerning the countries of the “Axis of Evil” list (along with the others) are especially
influenced by this Western frame of mind. This thinking is so deeply engrained within
our cultural discourses surrounding “backward” nations that we succumb to this thought
process with little knowledge or understanding that we are doing so. But, if we are so
3Said, Edward W. "Introduction." Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979. Print.
3
different by comparison and North Korea is so “obsolete”, why do we still feel threatened
by them?
While we are more curious now about the DPRK (the massive publishing market
for all things DPRK is remarkable)4, we seemed to have little call to truly engage
intellectually with North Korea as we have in recent decades with the other “Axis”
partners. Though some of the popular discourse of the Iranian or Iraqi people and culture
do not wander far from classic Orientalist frameworks, there has at least been a shift in
the discussion of cultural form to recognize this, which continues to be missing in
discussions or scholarship concerning the DPRK. We have decided that the mystery
we’ve asserted is somehow not worth truly unraveling. This speaks volumes in relation
to the US global perspective, and highlights our own particular brand of Orientalism,
which still includes all of the specter and mystery of the Cold War era, the previous fears
of the Yellow Peril, and the stereotypes of the “barbaric, savage automatons” from tales
of the Far East which spilled from the 19th to the 20th centuries. It is as though we fought
the Korean War and have suspended any further study of North Korea since that time,
also leaving our perspectives in this strange time warp. Though there are many
intellectuals who tackle the political, economic, and historical issues of this country, there
are few who are interested in the ability of cultural forms to communicate a North Korean
4 One need only think in terms o f the large market surrounding insider testimonials, such as This is Paradise by Hyok Kang, Escape from Camp 14 by Shin Dong-Hyuk, or Without You, There Is No Us: My Time with the Sons o f North Korea's Elite, by Suki Kim, just to name a few. Of course some of these testimonials have been proven to contain exaggerations o f life in North Korea, such as Shin Dong-Hyuk’s story, where he stated that he had escaped a “total control zone”. When his statements came under fire, he admitted to exaggerating his claims in February of this year (2015). Illustrating Edward Said’s assertion of the East as a career, as well as the contribution of these stories to Western misconceptions o f the country.
4
perspective removed from Western misconceptions.5 While DPRK scholarship has grown
in recent decades, it is suspended somewhere between completely discounting all cultural
forms, considering them as part of the propaganda machine with nothing to speak to other
than the regime’s monstrous nature6, or engaging propagandist art of the regime and
using it as a platform for Western political views about the DPRK.7 As Scott Snyder and
Kyung-Ae Park state, . .analysis of North Korea too often becomes a Rorschach testO
that reveals more about the observer than about North Korea”. We have been more
interested in differentiating ourselves from North Korea altogether, or blatantly
dismissing them and their culture.
In an effort to understand this “elusive” nation, which is really not elusive at all,
this thesis will focus specifically on the crucial Korean regime portraiture: its production,
historical development, and its messages to the citizens of the DPRK. This analysis will
begin to dismantle the framework of previous discussions and our innate desire to project
our own views on the DPRK. We will confront these images head-on in hopes of gaining
5 Victor Cha’s The Impossible State and the recently released compendium North Korea in Transition, edited by Scott Snyder and Kyung-Ae Park, both of which deal only with economic and political realities, even when speaking about art produced by the DPRK.6 Brian Myer’s recent essay “Knocking on the Gate” comes to mind, due to its assertion that more traditional forms o f North Korean art are merely “pseudo-apolitical high art”, and that scholars addressing these forms are “pretending to overlook the more revolting aspects o f official culture”(Frank, p73).7 Aiden Foster-Carter and Kate Hext’s “DPRKrazy, Sexy, Cool: The Art of Engaging North Korea” is one such article that begins strong, but in its interpretation o f Kwon Kyong Su’s Sunflower, tends to “jump the shark” by suggesting that faint images in the painting are “spectral” and denote the North Korean awareness o f starving children and the concentration camps, further perpetuating the Western media stereotype o f the regime through projection. As I will discuss, it is unlikely that artists o f the state would insert such charged statements about the political state o f North Korea. As we know, the consequences could be dire for the artist and their family.8 Park, Kyung-Ae, and Scott Snyder. North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. 279. Print.
5
a more grounded and critical perspective of the DPRK. These portraits communicate
much more than meets the eye to both North Korean citizen and outsider alike.
To begin, I will explore the development of what I will call the Juche Grand
Narrative: the pervasive narrative of ruler and subject in North Korea. With its long
historical roots, we will see that Confucianism, the previous feudal systems of Korea, and
the subsequent Japanese imperial rule have uniquely colored Koreans’ cultural
experience, constructing their system of values and their population’s relationship with its
governing body. North Korea’s cultural exchange with China and the Soviet Union has
contributed to Korea’s distinctive use and adaptation of Socialist Realism, which also
shapes DPRK portraiture. The “studio systems” in place to develop cultural forms such as
art, literature, and film, also enjoy distinctive communicative properties, granting us
further insight into the collective character of the DPRK. Lastly, we will explore the
portraiture of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il and its position in public space, to discover
how this particular form expresses the Juche Grand Narrative and sheds light on what
being a citizen of the country means, and the ways in which North Koreans are
encouraged to engage publically with their fellow citizens and leaders.
As we will see, North Korean art functions as a window into their society. Its
cultural forms, developed and shaped through the writings of Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-
Sung, serve as a lens that the viewer can use to understand North Korea’s political
attitude. We can determine the work of art’s value in North Korean society by applying a
critical lens, which is difficult, yet possible as long as we recognize that there is a
6
Western invention of the DPRK. We should approach DPRK art not according to what
we want it to say, but by what is actually there. Doing this will show us how North Korea
sees itself, as well as how it projects itself abroad. Essentially, we will discover that all
art, even propaganda, has aesthetic value even if we may not agree with its ideology.
Art’s real value lies in its ability to communicate the experience of different cultures and
modes of thought.
7
Chapter 1: The Juche Grand Narrative
“The consciousness o f independence plays the decisive role in the masses revolutionary movement for independence. All revolutionary movements are conscious movements. A revolutionary movement begins with awakening people to an advanced idea and emerges victorious on the strength o f the masses o f the people who are armed with the advanced idea. ” -On the Juche Idea, Treatise Sent to the National Seminar on the Juche Idea Held to Mark the 70th Birthday o f the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-Sung, March 31, 1982
Exploring North Korea is no simple task, though the Western narrative gives us
the sense that everything concerning the country can be boiled down to a brainwashed
populace and a crazy, tyrannical, dynastic leadership seeking legitimacy through nuclear
armament. While we may be encouraged to believe this as fact, upon closer examination
we can begin to understand the intricacies behind these two overgeneralizations. The
questions we should first ask is how the Kim dynasty maintains its validity among its
people, and why they still embrace it as strongly as they have since the DPRK’s
foundation September 9th 1948.
It is hard for outsiders to relate to North Korean culture and values. It is not just
the constant stream of misinformation from less than reputable foreign sources that flows
unchecked through western media at the heart of western misconceptions, but the modes
of communication between the DPRK and other nations that have shifted since the World
War II and Cold War eras which act as a barrier between the west and North Korea. This
miscommunication stems from our Western belief that we are somehow superior to other
cultures, North Korea being a prime example. Essentially, during the first half of the
8
twentieth century the world remained in an era that was a product of what Jean-Francois
Lyotard describes as “The Grand Narrative”.9 This “Grand Narrative” or “meta
narrative” was a tradition of storytelling that was prevalent in the centuries leading up to
the “post-modern” era. As is stated in Lyotard’s work “The Post Modem Condition”,
“[An] incredulity towards meta-narratives” has developed, creating a gap in the ability to
process a frame of thought that corresponds with what equates to an “antiquated” mode
of thinking from the western perspective.10
As the West entered the “post-modern” era of the twentieth century, the “grand
tradition of storytelling” that Lyotard mentions has disintegrated in the West, or at least
many people think it has. This has had the tendency to distort our understanding of those
that we see as subscribing to “older traditional views”. In other words, our sense of
superiority, which stems from the post-Enlightenment meta-narrative and is a foundation
of Orientalist thought, actually presents us with the fact that the West (no matter how
advanced we believe ourselves to be) also continue previous meta-narrative tradition as
well. Dismissing other cultural perspectives on the grounds that we are modem and they
are not, is not a sustainable view, and does little to truly advance our knowledge of other
countries and circumstances. Instead of dismissing societies that we see as subscribing to
9 Lyotard, Jean-Francois. "The Post Modem Condition: A Report on the Post Modem Condition." Manchester University Press (1979). Print.10 For us to better understand the meta-narrative framework, examples can be seen in many ancient cultures, such as the belief o f the Egyptians in the resurrection o f Osiris. This narrative instilled belief in the afterlife, and has since become a common trope adapted by many institutionalized religions. Grand Narratives often functioned as legitimizations o f the structure of power in societies to regulate and ensure the populations consent to those in positions o f leadership. It goes without saying that these legitimizations could result in disastrous consequences for the societies that indebted themselves to Kings and religious figures.
9
“antiquated” Grand Narratives, these societies can also provide us with a different
perspective. Our critical engagement with North Korea must be looked at by discarding
our need to categorize the DPRK’s collective mindset as “backward.” We should instead
recognize that their culture stems from unique circumstances, and that they are no less
modem than we are. The countries issues are distinct and stem from various earlier
narratives that have merged in the creation of the Juche Grand Narrative, and that initial
development of this specific Grand Narrative continues to influence the regime’s
behavior to the present day. We should also approach this with the knowledge that the US
is not completely detached from many of our own older Grand Narratives: the modernist
faith in material progress through science and technology, Christianity, Orientalism, faith
in capitalism, anti-Marxism being the main examples. These still remain dominant in the
Western world, and still influence our political system in the US, and our engagement
with other nations. This is also not a question of a long forgotten, or “backward” mode of
thinking. It has only been within the last 30 to 40 years that our discourse has shifted
from the “good vs. evil” or black and white thinking of the Cold-war era, to a more
complex awareness of the world around us. Though it still tends to present itself, Bush’s
“Axis of Evil” discourse being a good example, once we realize that our cultures are still
speaking the same language as far as the Grand Narrative goes, the easier it will be for us
to move on to more substantial analysis of North Korean culture.
The DPRK’s Grand Narrative remains as intact as it had been in its development
in 1948, and is still currently evolving within the framework of Marxist modernity, as it
10
did for their allies China and the USSR. This Marxist structure is concerned with class
struggle and the need for the masses to revolt and eliminate oppressive political systems
by ownership of the means of production. It is also founded in the ideas that the
collective can achieve significantly more than the individual, and that in order for
mankind to excel, the collective is the next logical step. This resonated with Koreans at
the beginning of the twentieth century, as the long held feudal structure and its eventual
collusion with Japanese imperial forces during their colonization of Korea from 1910 to
1945 had wreaked havoc on Korea and its cultural identity. Not only had the feudal
system exploited long held Confucian values, the elite within the positions of power in
the Chosun era abandoned the very people they should have served.
The feudal system in Korea spanned centuries, comprising of oppression at the
hands of the yangban (elite landowners). This and the subsequent history of imperial
Japanese rule continues to influence North Korea’s meta-narrative and the population’s
understanding of continuing social issues facing the DPRK. The older issues of this
feudal class system are constantly compared North Korea’s current Marxist framework
through regime propaganda. Popular films like The Flower Girl11 and many other popular
works of literature, art, and architecture establish the connection between the North
Koreans’ modem reality, and their historical, feudal and imperial past. These cultural
11 The Flower Girl tells the story o f a young girl who sells flowers in hopes o f improving her families situation under an unforgiving and elitist landowner that conspires with the corrupt Japanese imperial forces that have subjugated the Koreans to servitude. Ultimately, it stands as an example o f what tenacity and courage can accomplish in the face o f adversity. It is one of only 9 films to receive the People’s Prize in North Korea, and still enjoys critical attention within the country, even a banknote with the image of Kkot-bun (the Flower Girl) as explained in Suk-Young Kim’s recent work: Illusive Utopia: Theater, Film, and Everyday Performance in North Korea. Ann Arbor: U o f Michigan, 2010. 51. Print.
11
forms, along with the belief that Korea is and has always been a proud, culturally
advanced nation contributes heavily to the message that North Korea must drive out those
seeking to dominate and contaminate it. The purity and homogeneity of the Korean
people is also a large portion of this meta-narrative, and one that has its roots in long held
Confucian values and beliefs.
The quotation at the beginning of this chapter encapsulates all the complicated
and somewhat contradictory facets of Kim Il-Sung’s political formation o f Juche, which
is a further reworking of the Marxist Grand Narrative. Juche can be loosely translated
into “master of oneself.” This may be somewhat confusing to the Western outsider, as it
refers to collective self-mastery by the inclusion of “the masses” in the process of
achieving independence. The collective element is quite counter to western
individualism, but makes much more sense when see what exactly constitutes a Juche
mindset, and how the collective mindset has been adapted from Confucian values long
held in Korean culture.
Confucianism involves a five tiered model of moral relations. These relations are
a social guideline to interaction with your surrounding community as advocated by
Confucius and his disciples, especially Mencius (Mengzi), during the Warring States
period (481-221 BC). According to Dr. Irene Bloom in her “Introduction to Confucian
Thought”,
12
[Confucianism holds] that there was a basic order in the universe and a natural
harmony linking man, nature, and the cosmos (heaven); it also held that man was
by nature a social being, and that the natural order of the universe should be
reflected in human relations. The family unit was seen as the primary social unit;
relationships within the family were fundamental to all others and comprised
three of the "five relationships" that were the models for all others: sovereign-
subject; husband-wife; parent-child; elder brother-younger brother; friend-
friend.12
Of these relationships, the one that is most important in Confucian values is that of the
parent to child, as it is the first relationship that children have as an example of social
order. Confucianism also places much of the individual’s moral and ethical cultivation in
relation to the family due to this critical interaction for the child. It has everything to do
with becoming a “good person,” which means that one begins to learn that thinking of
others in relation to oneself is key to the path of achieving “the Way”. In what Bryan Van
Norden categorizes as part of “Family and Differentiated Caring” [T]he doctrine that
one has stronger moral obligations toward, and should have stronger emotional
attachment to, those who are bound to oneself by community, friendship, and especially
kinship.”13 Family structure is foundational to all other relationships in the five tiered
model, even in the sovereign to subject model. The relationship of parent to child and
12 Bloom, Irene. "Introduction to Confucian Thought." Columbia University- Asia for Educators, 2009. Web. 25 Feb. 2015. <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1000bce_confucius_intro.htm>.
Van Norden, Bryan. Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy, fndianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2011.21-29. Print.
13
sovereign to subject are also linked within the Juche Grand Narrative, as I will explain
later.
Equally fundamental as the parent to child relationship in achieving “the Way” is
the relationship of sovereign and subject (or ruler and minister). Regarding this, Mengzi
wrote:
The distinction between ruler and minister is as the distinction between
Heaven and Earth; there is that which should be looked up to and honored, and
there is that which is lowly and humble... When ruler and minister join together,
each exerts himself to fulfill his proper way.. .Indeed, [for the minister] to say that
one’s ruler is unable is to rob him [of his goodness]... (Mencius 2B:2)14
By honoring your sovereign (who you should also see as “Heavenly”, or above that of
yourself, “the lowly”) you are also entering into a relationship much like that of parent
and child, or that of the dominant and the subservient. If one were to break this chain of
relations in any way, one would not be seen as a good subject, and therefore not worthy
of achieving “the Way”.
The ruler-minister/sovereign-subject relationship tends to present itself
throughout Korean doctrines, especially during historical periods of reform, where the
elite ruling class (yangban) and Confucian scholars (neo-Confucians) believed that
channeling and reintroducing “pure” Confucian doctrine was the only way to alleviate
14 Lee, Peter H., De Bary William Theodore, and Y6ng-ho Ch‘oe. "Middle and Late Chosun." Sources o f Korean Tradition. Vol. 2. New York: Columbia UP, 2000. 39-41. Print.
14
tensions and strife within society. During the Late Chosun era, disputes between these
two groups concerning corruption (on the part of the yangban, in this era) and the neo-
Confucians (also part of the upper echelon of Korean society) erupted, and the call to
reform was spearheaded by the neo-Confucians to return to a society that was not based
upon the bureaucracy and civil service exams that had developed, but to emphasize “right
scholarship” and “true Confucian philosophy”. One of the most outspoken of these
reformers was Chong Yagyong, who believed that civil service examinations should be
redesigned with “ .. .those with the best understanding of ritual, music, and law so that
they could be appointed to responsible positions in government” in mind.15 The split
between these two predominant social forces created a system which became unfavorable
to the yangban and their corrupt ways, as the neo-Confucians ascended the ranks of the
government. As Brian Myers states, “Confucianism sanctioned rebellion against
tyrannical rule”16, in this case, those that had exploited Confucian values to profit from
them and subjugate others. Much of the current DPRK discourse concerning corruption
illustrates continued Neo-Confucian influence on the present political and social climate
of the DPRK. But, in the case of North Korea, the idea of dynastic rule “ordained by
Heaven” tends to eclipse rebellion against the rulers, and remains as much a fixture now
as it was in antiquity. This rebellious aspect tends to now represent itself as rebellion
15 Lee, Peter H., De Bary William Theodore, and Yong-ho Ch‘oe. "Politics." Sources o f Korean Tradition. Vol. 2. New York: Columbia UP, 2000. 23. Print.16 Myers, B. R. "Han and Korea's Proletarian Culture Movement." Han Sorya and North Korean Literature: The Failure o f Socialist Realism in the DPRK. Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell U, 1994. 15. Print.
15
against other states, and the idea that North Korea would fall prey to tyranny as a result of
the outsiders.
Although the North Koreans reject the Chosun dynasty as backward, feudal, and
the underlying source of problems on the peninsula, monarchical rule remains a central
Confucian value in the DPRK. We can still witness the continued influence of the ruler
and subject relationship (though it is not outwardly acknowledged), such as benevolence
and filial piety as dictated by the Five Moral Relations. It is complicated to understand,
but idea of ruler and subject as dictated by these practices has filtered into most of
“modem” life for the North. Bradley K. Martin describes the acceptance of monarchical
rule with a section on the transition of power between Kim-il-Sung and Kim Jong-il, in
which the dynastic rule of the past periods was reformed and integrated within the
DPRK, providing a kind of continuity for Koreans regarding leadership. Martin writes:
First, it was necessary to have a successor to Kim il-Sung because “the
struggle of the working class and the masses of people is too prolonged and too
complicated to be completed in one generation.” Second, the heir must be
someone endowed with “boundless loyalty to the Great Leader which takes the
form of a complete knowledge and understanding of the revolutionary thought of
the Leader; dedication to the working-class and peoples interests; and complete
16
inheritance of the Great Leader’s illustrious leadership and a full embodiment of
17his lofty moral virtues.
As Martin continues, “Kim il-Sung played Confucian ethics for all they were worth to
18justify the hereditary elite he established and his plans for dynastic rule of the country”.
This conflation of the Kim dynasty with traditional Confucian relations has gone a long
way in cementing their “subjects” acceptance of the Kim’s succession. As we will see,
Juche also reinforces the population’s role as subjects, as “children of the nation”.
It is difficult to determine exactly how “pure” the adapted version of
Confucianism is within the Juche Grand Narrative, but we do see that the Confucian and
Marxist meta-narrative intersect in their one shared subject: celebrating the peasantry and
working class as an integral part of society. A religious perspective such as this may seem
to conflict with Marxist ideology, but both are founded in the ideas that the “the people”
are of the utmost importance. For Marxism, the proletariat should own the means of
production, and therefore no longer be exploited by the ruling class. Though the
Confucian model seems to stand diametrically opposed to that idea in its relations
between ruler and subject as between “one ordained by Heaven” and “the lowly”, the
Stalinist revision of Marxism may have a closer connection to both in its idea of
bureaucratic leadership as guiding force for the proletariat, which should have at least
some guidance in order to advance as a collective toward a system of collective rule, but
17 Martin, Bradley K. "Dazzling Ray o f Guidance." Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty. New York: Thomas Dunne, 2004. 320-21. Print.18 Ibid
17
consolidating the power ultimately in one leader. We can see the influence of Stalinism
within Kim Il-Sung’s own Juche doctrine, and we can also see how Confucianism can be
compatible with it.
Another, yet mostly unrecognized, influence within the Juche Grand Narrative is
Christianity. Though not as pronounced as the Confucian element in the Juche amalgam
of narratives, viewers of cultural forms, especially regime portraiture, can see it in the
deification of the Kims, especially Kim Il-Sung, bom Kim Song-ju in 1912 to a middle
class Christian family near Pyongyang. As Andrei Lankov states, “Kim’s father, the
graduate of a Protestant school, made a modest living through teaching and practicing
herbal medicine while remaining a prominent Christian activist.”19 While it may be a
stretch to state that Christianity was a large influence on Kim Il-Sung as he was growing
up, it was something that he had obvious exposure to, and he could possibly have
incorporated it consciously or sub-consciously into the Juche Grand Narrative, at least in
its communication through portraiture, which I will discuss at length in following
chapters. Christianity had also had a long history on the Korean peninsula, beginning
with the first Spanish Jesuit landing in Korea during one of the Japanese invasions of
Korea in 1590. Though this missionary’s presence was brief, there were many more
Christian missionaries to follow, and their subsequent spread during the next few
19 Lankov, Andrei. The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia. New York: Oxford UP, 2013. 5. Print.
18
centuries eventually led to the conversion of over 10,000 Koreans.20 This was considered
problematic by the rulers of Korea at the time, and there were efforts to suppress the
influence of western religions and to drive out western influences altogether. This move
was only moderately successful, and during the mid-19th century, there was an increasing
presence of American missionaries operating schools and churches, Protestants being the
predominant group.21 This may explain Kim Il-Sung’s fathers affiliation with
Protestantism and his eventual work as a Christian activist. The missionary presence is
recorded in North Korean socialist-realist literature during the development of the North
Korean state, KFLA (Korean Federation of Literature and Art) chair Han Sorya’s work
99Jackals being among the most notable examples.
Other foreign invasions have figured into the Juche Grand Narrative as well. The
late Chosun period, Koreas relationship with China was changed considerably. After a
series of “boy kings” occupied the throne in Korea, Taewongun was granted authority by
his son, King Kojong, to take the reins of power and restore order to the country. After a
period of eight years (1864-1873), Kojong once again took control of Korea. Where
Taewongun had adopted an anti-western stance after many foreign incursions on the
20 Choe, Yongho, Peter Lee, and Thodore De Bary. Sources o f Korean Tradition. 2. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000. 221.Print.
21 Yung Ryu, Dea. "Understanding Early American Missionaries in Korea (1884-1910): Capitalist Middle- Class Values and the Weber Thesis." Archives De Sciences Sociales Des Religions 46.113 (2001): 93-117. JSTOR. EHESS. Web.22 While Jackals confirms the presence of American missionaries in Korea, it shows them in a very unfavorable light. Essentially, they are depicted as crude, vulpine, barbarians, that plot to kill a young Korean boy regarding an incident where he is thought to have stolen the ball belonging to one o f the missionaries sons.
19
peninsula, King Kojong believed that Meiji Japans success regarding modernization and
trade with the west was good reason to strengthen relations with Japan. During this
period, positions of power began to fall from the hands of Neo-Confucian reformers, and
into those who wanted to modernize Korea in the western fashion. Though China and
Korea had always been “like lips and teeth” in their relationship, China was defeated by
Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), further solidifying the vision of Japan as the
dominant force in Asia that should be emulated.23
The unfortunate outcome of this was the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. In
the next thirty-five years of Japanese rule, laws were enacted that sought to eliminate
Korea’s culture and replace it with Japan’s. This process of subjugation including
reforming the educational structure, combining Japanese and Korean schools, and
eliminating the Korean curriculum entirely. Banks and other businesses were forced to
keep their records in Japanese, and it was made mandatory that all citizenry, regardless of
religious affiliation, were to worship at Shinto shrines. In the late 1930’s, Koreans were
also to be recruited into the war effort. The Japanese eliminated all Korean political
organizations, replacing them with Japanese mass organizations. There was also one final
blow to the Korean identity, The Name Order, which effectively erased Koreans’ given
first and last names and replaced them with Japanese versions. The “Population
Hemorrhage” was the end result of such horrendous colonial policies. In 1944, it was
~3 Lee, Peter H., De Bary William Theodore, and Yong-ho Ch‘oe. "The Modem Period." Sources of Korean Tradition. Vol. 2. New York: Columbia UP, 2000. 208-211. Print.
20
thought that over four million Koreans had now left the nation, and began life in other
countries.24
In North Korean propaganda, ties between corrupt landowners and government
officials are constantly equated with the imperial rule of the Japanese and the occupation
of the South by US forces as a historical reminder that North Korea must remain
ideologically pure from this kind of outside force. The Japanese and the US are often the
target of motivational posters, film and other media. Revolutionary films such as Choe
Hashkin’s Family (1966), Sea o f Blood (1969), and The Flower Girl (1972) all highlight
this tie between anti-imperialism and the promotion of Juche. Sea o f Blood and The
Flower Girl have also transcended the screen to appear in the form of portraiture and
mosaics that surround the capital city of Pyongyang as constant reminder of the suffering
that has occurred at the hands of foreign invaders, and the ability to persevere when
adhering to the collective mindset of Juche.
Kim Il-Sung believed his Juche ideology was essential in order for the communist
model to work for Korea. As he wrote:
To establish Juche is a question of special importance for us in the light of our
country’s geographical situation and environments, of the peculiarities of its
historical development, and the complex and arduous nature of our revolution25
24 Eckert, Carter J. Korea, Old And New, A History. Seoul: Harvard Univ Pr, 1990. 322. Print.25 Yuk-Sa Li, ed. Juche! The Speeches and Writings o f Kim Il-Sung (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972), 157, cited in Lee, Grace. "The Political Philosophy of Juche." Stanford Journal of East Asian
21
Among the central tenets of collective independence of the Korean people, “ Juche argues
that history is the process of the masses enhancing their position and role to realize
Chajusong.”26 Chajusong is the creative component that results from the application of
Juche ideology, essentially “recreating the world” by harnessing one’s “creative
consciousness” in order to manipulate the environment, thereby dominating nature, and
mastering it to suit his needs27. Juche is a process of enlightening the masses to
cooperatively and creatively achieve their independence from other nations. It promotes
the idea that the Korean people as a nation can master themselves, by “accepting] the
organization required to imbue them with the philosophy of revolutionary struggle.”28
Principally, the efforts to educate the masses should produce passion within them, which
requires “good leadership from the party and its leader...which is the brain to the body of
masses and its supreme representative...so devotion to leader is the highest
representation of revolutionary zeal.”29
The perfect candidates for the process of enlightenment through Juche are those
with purity of consciousness and action. This purity is highly regarded in the writings of
Kim Il-Sung, at least conceptually. The neo-Confucian school of thought asserts that
corrupt ways are infectious and should be countered with a return to ideological purity.
Affairs. 1st ed. Vol. 3. N.p.: Stanford UP, 2003. N. pag. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs. Stanford University. Web. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/>.26 Willoughby, Robert. Brandt Travel Guides: North Korea. 2nd. Guilford Connecticut: Brandt Travel Guides, 2003. 24-25. Print.27 Ibid
22
Sobak ham, or “[the] benevolently] naive, innocent, and spontaneous]” masses are the
desirable subject in the Confucian ruler-subject relationship, which in turn confirms Kim
Il-Sung’s adaptation of this Confucian doctrine to justify his leadership as “ordained by
Heaven”. By channeling these Confucian and Marxist narratives, he has provided his own
(and his successors) legitimacy. But, even within this adaptation, lies another layer to the
Confucian model: the equation of the “benevolently naive” with being childlike, and
therefore the children of the nation. As we will see, Kim Il-Sung and those who
perpetuate the Juche Grand Narrative strongly emphasize his paternal position, even
going as far as abrogating the traditional family structure and considering him father to
all. This trope is very common in literature, film, and above all, art in the architectural
layout of North Korea’s showcase city of Pyongyang. The work of art, especially
portraiture in the socialist realist style, and the use and recreation of space has provided a
visual manifestation of the Juche Grand Narrative that ensures that its most ideologically
pure citizens are in a constant conversation with Kim Il-Sung and the Juche Grand
Narrative. As we will see, this conversation is largely indebted to both Soviet and
Chinese models of socialist realism.
30Myers, Brian. Han Sorya and North Korean Literature: The Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK.
1st. Ithica: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1994. 95. Print.
23
Chapter 2: DPRK Socialist Realism and Its Influences
“The principle o f loyalty to the Party, to the working class and to the people is the fundamental principle for creating works o f literature and art”.—Kim il-Sung, December 10th 1964 Speech to the Workers in the Field o f Literature and Art
The development of socialist realism in the DPRK began with the country’s
foundation following the dissolution of the Japanese occupation in 1945 at the end of
World War II. During this period, and after much hesitation, the Soviets entered the war
to counter Japanese forces by aligning with the US and allied forces, breaking the
previously signed neutrality pact with Japan. This event would become a catalyst for the
development of the North Korean state in 1948, and the Korean War in June 25th of 1950.
The Soviet Union began occupation of the Northern half of the Korean peninsula in 1945,
the United States occupied the Southern half, and this became the line between the two
Koreas at the 38th parallel, which stands as its division to this day. The Soviet occupation
also installed Kim Il-Sung as leader of the North. Contrary to popular belief, Kim was not
handpicked by Stalin, but had ascended the ranks of the power structure in the North after
having been promoted to deputy “komendant of Pyongyang”.31 Regardless, he was
backed by Stalin, and the North’s communist regime developed under the close watch
and influence of the Soviets. This includes everything from party structure to the literary
and artistic models of Socialist Realism. China has also played a significant role as a big
brother to North Korea.
31 Cumings, Bruce. North Korea. New York: The New Press, 2004. 122-123. Print.
24
China’s presence on the Korean peninsula began as early as the Han dynasty,
when Pyongyang was a Chinese commandery. In the fourteenth century Japanese troops
were sent to protect Korea against a Chinese invasion. Throughout the following
centuries, interaction and cultural transmission between Korea and China heavily
influenced the current governing structure of the DPRK. Chinese influence on Korean art
and literature is also unquestionable, and became even more pronounced during the
development of the communist regime in North Korea. These influences, along with
traditional Korean art, converged to produce the art that we see today for domestic as
well as overseas consumption.
Socialist Realism has been adopted and adapted to become the major factor in the
DPRK’s system for artistic production. The term “Socialist Realism” was coined by Ivan
Gronsky, Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the Soviet Writers Union, in an
article for Literturnania Gazeta in May 1932. He wrote, “The basic demand that we make
on the writer is: write the truth, portray truthfully our reality that is in itself dialectic.
Therefore the basic method of Soviet literature is the method of socialist realism.”32 This
term made its debut in a 1932 speech, and the tenets were finalized in 1934 at a writer’s
conference:
[Socialist realism] is the basic method of Soviet literature and literary criticism. It
demands of the artist the truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in
32Morris, Paul. Representation and the Twentieth Century Novel:Studies in Gorky, Joyce and Pynchon.
Germany: Koenigshausen- Neumann, 2005. p. 90. Print.
25
its revolutionary development. Moreover, the truthfulness and historical
concreteness of the artistic representation of reality must be linked with the task of
33ideological transformation and education of workers in the spirit of socialism.
This statement was also applied to art and film in the Soviet Union, as well as China and
the DPRK. Principally, it is an argument that any cultural work should be conceived to
enhance the revolutionary spirit of the people, and especially to rouse the spirit of the
proletariat, making a distinction between the art of the past, or art for art’s sake as a tool
of the bourgeois, and accessible art for the masses.
Socialist realism is related to realism in form and in name, but it is different from
the previous realist school of painting. Realism as the “the accurate, detailed,
unembellished depiction of nature or of contemporary life”34, establishes the idea that art
is to be a solid and non-idealized view of the world as grounded in the realities of the
everyday person, not the idealized visions of the world through the eyes of the bourgeois
and ruling classes. Use of the term “realism” as part of the term “socialist realism” also
ties it directly to mainstream nineteenth century European artistic movements. The
similarity of the terms, emphasizes Socialist Realism’s debt to artists like Manet and
Courbet for challenging the artistic status quo in nineteenth century Paris. Their works
were influenced by such recent events as the Revolutions of 1848, during which most
west European countries went through a period of upheavals that sought to overturn the
previous monarchist structures. France was the only country that succeeded in this,
33Sinyavsky, Andrei. On Social Realism. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1960. Print.
34 "Realism." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d. Web. 11 Feb. 2015.
26
ushering in an era of social consciousness and class struggle.35 These contributed to the
rise of Russian realist art in the late nineteenth century. France’s new bourgeois class and
the salon system as a tool of the bourgeois to perpetuate the model of “art for art’s sake”,
contributed to these painters’ class consciousness and revolutionary quality, reflected in
their works. Not only did the new realist school of painting challenge what art is and who
it is produced by, but it challenged the corruption of society by the moneyed class and
elevated the poor from “the lowly” to the celebrated and treasured. Though this
“elevation” of the masses unfortunately did not come to fruition in nineteenth-century
France (nor Russia until the October Revolution), Socialist Realism developed as a way
to reignite realism’s previous intention of revolutionizing the ways that art can be used as
a tool to enlighten. This time, though, the working class and countering previous
institutions of power with the power of the working class collective would now take
center stage. Socialist Realism would as a way of picking up where they believed the true
spirit of Monet and Courbet left off.
Of course, not only is the definition of Socialist Realism important, but the
techniques that it borrows from the realist painters is of even greater importance to its
ability to communicate revolutionary values. Paintings show the distinctively North
Korean reworking of Socialist Realism, its similarities to earlier forms of realism, and its
adaptation of various Russian and Chinese models. Just as Marxism was supplemented
35 Sperber, Jonathan. Introduction. The European Revolutions, 1848-1851. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. N. Print.
27
by Juche to produce a uniquely North Korean amalgam, North Korean Socialist Realism
is a combination of various imported and indigenous elements.
To begin the process of understanding North Korean art, we should first look at
the Soviet Union, as it was the largest influence on the DPRK’s reworking of Socialist
Realism, as well as the initial model which most Communist countries imitated. Though
the DPRK eventually eliminated its initial reliance on Soviet culture, Charles Armstrong
illustrates how pervasive the influence once was during the time of the DPRK’s
development:
The Soviet cultural presence in North Korea was manifold and included
the Soviet Information Bureau, the international book agency...the Soviet news
agency...theatre, dance, music, film, literature, and art were widely promoted in
North Korea. After the DPRK and the USSR signed an agreement on cultural
exchange in early 1949, North Korean dance troupes, literature, and arts were also
brought to the Soviet Union. The Russian language became compulsory in senior
middle school.. .English was discontinued and replaced by Russian for entrance to
Kim Il-Sung University in 1949.36
This cultural exchange served as the foundation for North Korea’s own transformation of
culture and gave them a blueprint for what would eventually become their own form and
distinctive style, though eventually, this strong cultural tie would fall out of favor with
36 Armstrong, Charles K. "Constructing Culture." The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Ithaca:Cornell UP, 2003. 171-72. Print.
28
the Kim regime during the development and implementation of Juche ideology during the
late 1950’s and early 1960’s. Much of the translated Soviet works on the market at this
time would begin to disappear as more works became available from the DPRK’s
“cultural front”. This almost certainly had something to do with China’s simultaneous
disenchantment with the Soviet model, leading up to a complete break with the Soviet
Union in 1960.
The evolution of Stalinist Socialist Realism in the DPRK can be seen in the
formation of the NKFLA (North Korean Federation of Literature and Art) in 1946.
Principles were established that would eventually culminate in Kim Il-Sung’s Juche, to
augment the Soviet model of Socialist realism into something that would better serve the
Korean people. The tenets include:
1) The establishment of a national art and culture based on the principles of
progressive democracy.
2) The promotion of the national unification of all Korean literary and artistic
movements.
3) The extirpation of all anti-democratic and reactionary artistic forces and
concepts be they Japanese imperialist, feudal, treasonous, or fascist.
4) The implementation of a large scale enlightenment movement for the
cultural, creative and artistic development of the masses.
5) The suitable appraisal and appropriation of the nation’s cultural heritage.
29
376) The exchange of our national culture with international culture
These tenets emphasize the idea of an independent Korea, and provide ideas and
subjects that we can see represented throughout all North Korean works of art, literature,
film, and architecture. In spite of this change, the subject matter of the Soviet model was
still held intact by DPRK artists in all forms as well. The figure of “the positive hero”38
remains central to the work of art, and as we will see, the idea of hero and fatherly figure
are melded, fitting perfectly into the Marxist/Confiician values adopted by Kim Il-Sung’s
Juche.
In our first example, the image of “the positive hero” is front and center, in the
stoic, yet grand figure of Joseph Stalin. Socialist Realist subjects can diverge very far
from the “realistic representation of life” one might expect from Socialist Realism’s
historical relationship to realism. Though we can see that some of the initial techniques of
this art mimic realism (see Figs.l and 2), the scenes depicted by the artist are quite
imaginary. Roses for Stalin (Fig. 1) by Boris Eremeevich Valdimirski, provides us with
a perfect example of the techniques adopted from the realist school of art. Vladimirski
works directly between Realism and Impressionism. There are semi-pronounced
brushstrokes in Roses, which are similar to Impressionism, but the use of light and
shadow is something definitely closer to that of Realism. It bears some resemblance to
37 Myers, Brian. Han Sorya and North Korean Literature: The Failure o f Socialist Realism in the DPRK. 1st. Ithica: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1994. Print.
38 Clark, Katerina. "Socialist Realism and the Sacralizing of Space." The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology o f Soviet Space. By E. A. Dobrenko and Eric Naiman. Seattle: U of Washington, 2003. 3. Print.
30
Figure 1: Roses for Stalin
Figure 2: Stonebreakers
Courbet’s Stonebreakers (Fig. 2). Also, the colors are what the viewer would see in
nature, such as the color of the roses, the grass, and even the way the shadows are cast
31
that correspond to the presence of physical elements such as mountains, trees and other
subjects within the paintings. We can see that at least the form of Socialist Realism
attempts to capture the spirit of Realism, in spite of ignoring the “reality” of what is being
communicated.
This ignoring of reality is one of the most important deviations between Realism
and Socialist Realism. Courbet provides us with a scene of ordinary, working class
miners on a French roadside, toiling away as though unaware that there is a viewer. The
workers are captured in a candid moment, and they are completely consumed by the task
at hand, giving the observer a sense of a real event. This was one of the most notable
markers between realism and neo-classicism, in that the subject matter was realistic in
who it depicts, rather than the images of mythical heroes. Roses for Stalin provides us
with a completely different scene, and tends to be a little closer to neo-classicism in its
portrayal of subject matter. Just as with neo-classical painting, it is as though the viewer
is transported to a “perfect moment” in time, and one that is staged for our benefit. The
sense of fluid reality seen in Courbet is suspended and strange within Roses. As an
observer, we are not encouraged to enter the frame, as we are with Stonebreakers, but
instead to stop and take notice of the scene.
Roses presents us with Stalin front and center. He is not really a participant in the
scene, in that he doesn’t seem to interact with the children on the periphery, but he is the
focal point around which all others gather. Another striking feature of this work is
Stalin’s rigidness, as though he were a monolith. He is a manifestation of stoicism and
strength. His immobility communicates the consolidated power of the Soviet State itself.
Instead of channeling a truly Marxist subject (like the working class citizens of
Stonebreakers), this painting provides a message of how the citizen should regard their
leader. Perhaps the angle at which the viewer is situated contributes to this effect. In
Stonebreakers, we are positioned above the workers, looking down toward them. In
Roses, we are positioned below Stalin’s gaze, as though we too are the children
surrounding him. The effect is both grandiose and somewhat surreal. This is not a
moment of Joseph Stalin, the man, but Joseph Stalin, the fatherly savior of Soviet
communism.
While their subject matter is entirely different, these works’ technique and
painterliness are very similar. Both artists use of light and shadow to convey a scene we
could consider realistic in that the viewer gets the initial sense that these scenes could
occur in everyday life (though in Roses, further examination tells us differently). The
brushstroke techniques utilized in both, difficult to see here, are also similar in their
quality in that we aren’t as focused on the artist’s presence. The artist is not inserting
themselves noticeably within the visual dialog. It is though looking through a window,
instead of dealing with someone’s interpretation of events. This can be attributed to the
artist “system” by which those with the highest degrees of ideological purity are chosen
to produce works of art, especially within DPRK studio system, which will be discussed
later at length.
32
33
Now that we can see the links between Realism and Socialist Realism in
technique and form, if we compare Roses For Stalin to a notable portrait from the DPRK,
there seems to be something left out of the equation. The style is radically different,
except for the common elements of subject matter and the portrayal of the “hero”. An
example is Embraced by the Great General (Fig. 3). The similarity is in subject matter:
the stoic leader (this time Kim Il-Sung) embraced by the “children of the nation”, are
intact. Missing is the “realist” technique—we are presented with an even more abstracted
image. Actually, this change can be explained with North Korea’s relationship with
China and the specifically Chinese adaptation of Socialist Realism from the Soviet
model.
This specific adaptation in style stems from Jiang Feng, a revolutionary
printmaker and vice-chairman of the All-China Congress of Literary and Arts Workers in
July 1949, which established the Art Workers Association. He explains, “ ...many artists
had begun, presumably under the party's direction, to use the single-outline and flat-color
techniques of folk painting because effects of light and shade were difficult for the
workers, peasants, and soldiers to understand. He urged the continued practice of this
39style”. The flattening of the image was one of the techniques used to achieve
accessibility. For the peasants and working class to read the ideological messages of
socialist realist art, the artist was to keep in mind that these masses were from poor class
j9 Andrews, Julia F. Painters and Politics in the People's Republic o f China, 1949-197931. Berkeley: University o f California Press, cl994 1994. http://ark.cdlib.Org/ark:/13030/ft6wl007nt/
34
Figure 3: Embraced by the Great General
Figure 4: Mao with Citizens (Unknown artist/title)
35
backgrounds, and largely uneducated. For the work of art to enlighten them to
revolutionary struggle, it should be simplistic in its form to reach the largest number of
people. This idea was favored by the DPRK, in that there were also many among its
population with little or no education. It also fits with their slogan of “intellectualize the
working classes and working class-ize the intellectuals”40, ensuring that there would not
be a contamination of art with previous bourgeois practices of “art for art’s sake”.
In comparing Embrace with the Chinese portrait in figure 4, we can see that there
was not a radical departure in Socialist Realist painting of the DPRK to the USSR, but
the fact that Chinese influence can be witnessed as well by comparison. As Rebecca Karl
states:
[P]rint art sought to combine realism with folk art in a rediscovery, as it
were, of the authentic mass origins of native Chinese drawing. The accustomed
sharp outlines of revolutionary heroes, rendered in bold primary colors, were
blunted with new softer color schemes and less abrupt brush- and pen strokes.41
While the Soviet counterpart shows more realistic, naturally occurring tones and shading,
the use of bright color is intentional in Chinese and North Korean art, and many times
you will see the color red recurring throughout these particular types of portraits. This
however, does not exactly account for the shift in the use of bright hues overall, which is
40 Armstrong, Charles K. "Constructing Culture." The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Ithaca:Cornell UP, 2003. 167. Print.41 Karl, Rebecca E. "Model Revolutionary Culture." Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-century World: A Concise History. Durham: Duke UP, 2010. 147-48. Print.
36
especially pronounced within the DPRK’s adaptation of the socialist realist model of
artwork. Vibrant fuchsias, oranges and greens often dominate the palette, giving a
distinctively appealing quality to these types of works.
During the 1940’s, Mao had advocated the further popularization of art, in that
“Rather than transform the revolutionary masses, art should be received by them in a pop
way; the artists themselves were to be reeducated by the proletarian masses...”42, which
resonates with the previous quotation concerning the “working class[izing] of
intellectuals” as the central role of culture in the DPRK. While it can be argued that this
stems from Kim Il-Sung’s distrust of intellectuals and a desire to control those that may
pose a threat to his regime, we can also understand it as another mode of collectivizing
the arts and eliminating class divisions. Another facet is the idea that artists should also
take part in the same activities that the working class experience. The DPRK seems to
have taken yet another cue from their Chinese counterparts, at least in theory, that “not
only did art have to cater to, and be favored by, the masses, but artists also had to
acknowledge that the masses were wiser than they were with regard to the standards and
forms of art”.43 Taking this thought one step further, in the DPRK, artists are strongly
encouraged to integrate themselves within the communities they depict, as not to lose
touch with the “reality” of those they are tasked with enlightening.44 Kim Jong II also
believes that “[I]n a socialist society, everyone should be encouraged to give full play to
42 Gao, Minglu. "Avant-Garde in the Past." Total Modernity and the Avant-garde in Twentieth-century Chinese Art. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2011. 41-47. Print.
4! Ibid44 Though Kim Jong-il discusses this in On the Art o f Cinema, it can be applied to painters, writers, and other cultural artists, as they are all tied together under the North Korean adaptation o f Socialist Realism.
37
his genius.”45 Theoretically this opens an avenue for those of any social class to fulfill
whichever roles in the revolution they desire—if they have the proper ideological
mindset, of course. Though this idea seems to echo Mao’s sentiments regarding artists
and social distinctions, there are noticeable differences in the DPRK’s artist system
which tend to run counter to this theory. The development of art within the DPRK is also
reliant on the “studio system”, and as we will come to understand in the following
chapter, this “system” is yet another layer to the communication of the Juche Grand
Narrative.
45 Kim Jong-il. “For the Further Development o f Our Juche Art”
38
Chapter 3: The Studio System: Ideological Purity in Creation
“An extraordinary artist emerges from the masses. In the course o f developing the arts on a mass scale individual talents are discovered, and the more artists with great skill, the faster the general level o f mass art and culture rises. By continuing to implement the policy o f making the arts popular we should discover still more talented people from among the masses and train them into the artists with extraordinary skill. Kim Jong-il, May 6,1975 “For the Further Development o f Our Juche A rt”.
Extraordinary artists may not be the first phrase that comes to the minds of art
lovers or connoisseurs when looking at DPRK portraiture, but what we can see is that
there is a noticeable amount of skill that goes into producing these works. Seamlessly
uniform in their representation of the Kims, they raise questions regarding artist and craft.
While some believe that in order for something to be a work of art, it must reflect at least
some interiority of the artist themselves to have communicative properties, this may be
untrue. The DPRK’s art is focused on collective character and a celebration of ideological
purity. While many would believe a “system” that grooms young artists would place
restrictions on their creative ability, the creativity in this case lies within the prescribed
boundaries and channeling of collective consciousness to achieve its power.
The possibility of restrictions as something enjoyable and challenging is an idea
that DPRK artist Kim Sunyong supports. He states:
To figuratively represent the beauty of reality and to satisfy the aesthetic
demands of the people is the essential nature of art. It then follows that the talent
of the artist can be summarized as the creative ability to actively pursue the realm
39
of beauty in reality and to figuratively represent this in an artwork that people
emotionally understand and relate to.46
The marriage of the “people’s demands” and the educational qualities of revolutionary
works produces an environment where the work of art, in combination with the
harnessing of natural artistic talent by the state, merge into a symbolic communication of
collective cultural identity. Understood this way, Socialist Realism is not as much an
inhibitor for the artist as it is a refinement of skill. The more ideologically aware and
open the artist is, the greater the enhancement of his abilities as an artist of the people. As
Kim Jong-il states in his “Treatise on Art” (“Misullon”), “An artist can create great works
only when the degree of his ideological preparedness is high.”47 This ideological
preparedness is something that can be witnessed and encouraged at an early age, and
children are the perfect candidates for this system of grooming.
Various after school institutions, Mangyongdae Children’s Palace being the most
prestigious, foster the creativity of youngsters whose instructors have singled them out
for their artistic acumen. Kim Jong-il made it a point to ensure that the child’s
individuality as an artist would not be sullied by having group instruction, and this is why
tutoring sessions take place one on one in an after school setting. If this personalized
instruction yields favorable results, upon graduation from compulsory education, students
will enter one of several specialized universities in the arts, such as Pyongyang College
46 De Ceuster, Koen. "To Be an Artist in North Korea." Exploring North Korean Arts. Verlag fur ModemeKunst, 2012. 51-71. Print.47 Ibid
40
of Handicrafts, the Pyongyang College of Cinematics, and the Pyongyang University of
Fine Art (PUFA). The latter is the most prestigious in the nation, and the others are for
those who are not quite at the level of skill and acumen suited for the PUFA. Students
accepted to the University of Fine Arts will be required to complete a 5 year program,
after which they will be sent to work at one of the many art studios around the country:
Minye, Paekho, Central, and Mansudae, among others. Mansudae is the largest and most
highly recognized DPRK art studio in the world.
These institutions are in Pyongyang, North Korea’s “showcase capital.” To live in
Pyongyang, one (and one’s family) must be in favorable standing within the upper ranks
of the Party structure. Obviously, this contradicts Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il’s
assertions that the masses are welcome to pursue creative ventures and explore their
“genius.” Pyongyang is indeed elite, and unfortunately, there are not many avenues for
the actual masses to ascend the ranks and reap this particular reward. But in theory, a
child might be spotted for his or her creative talent, and it is possible—though unlikely
for a family to ascend the Party ranks and gain a spot in the capital.
Mansudae Studio artists produce a myriad of works, including beautifully
embroidered flowers, nature scenes, woodcut prints, oil paintings and intricate ceramic
vases. Many of these works are available to foreigners for purchase. The notable theme
among these diverse works is that they express love for the North Korean country and
Korea’s past culture, while the artists remain well within the regime’s ideological
constraints. Their works have a distinguishable personal style, which is esteemed in
41
DPRK art, as Kim Jong-il went to some lengths to encourage it. Koen De Ceuster quotes
from an editorial in:
Yesul Kyoyuk (2003)
... [T]he masses demand talented artists with individuality, not artists of the same
character and appearance.. .If art education wants to develop the individuality of
the students.. .and nurture their ability to creatively apply those art forms in a way
that corresponds best with their physical and intellectual character and their
48temperament.
Despite the common expectation that state controlled art would have no emotion or sense
of the artist, we see the opposite in this statement, which is also reminiscent of the ideas
of Juche, in that producing a work of art, while there may be a personal side to it. It is a
constant effort to maintain awareness of those you are trying to reach through your art.
This is also reinforced through engagement with the community through weekly self-
criticism sessions with peers and weekly study of Juche on Saturdays in which all North
Koreans participate.
While looking at some of the works presented on the Mansudae International
website, we should also notice that not all of the works for sale are created with ideology
in mind. This fact seems to be largely ignored by current DPRK scholarship on any
cultural front, art or otherwise. Though the aforementioned systems do help the
reader/observer come closer to how art is produced in the nation, this other art is largely
48 Ibid
42
excluded in the discussion altogether. For example, there is much attention paid within
the DPRK to “Korean Painting” or Chosunhwa, a type of ink and brush based portrait
created much in the same way Japanese and Chinese ink drawings/ paintings are. This
technique was developed in 100 B.C. according to the Mansudae Studio
website49.Though they state that the art form is used to produce its most important
ideological works, more than half of the paintings of this genre were scenes of nature,
flowers, and other similar topics with no real political implications (they may have
political implications that are not immediately obvious to an outsider), though it should
be noted that some of the scenes and flowers have ties to nationalistic symbolism. The
results are striking, intricate, and yet, for the most part, non-controversial. You will rarely
(if ever) see these works discussed in intellectual terms, possibly due to the very fact that
there isn’t anything political for us to read into them, leaving some scholars of the DPRK
at a loss. It is an interesting contradiction for academics such as Brian Myers to state that
DPRK art cannot be taken at face value, when they have selectively eliminated whole
genres of art from the discussion50. Unfortunately, some take pride in this form of
ignorance and believe that discussion of “the DPRK’s pseudo-apolitical ‘high art’” is
something for those that study culture to be ashamed of. “I confess: I am no more
interested in North Korean artists’ preference for oil versus ink, or how they are
“trained,” than I care about the play of light and shadow in Rodong Sinmun (The Official
49 This information was taken directly from a side bar on the website that is present when you look at any o f the available artworks on this website. "Confrontation." Works. Official Website Abroad o f the Mansudae Art Studio- Pyongyang, n.d. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.50 Again, his comments about intellectuals engaging “pseudo-apolitical high art”, and that in addressing these forms they are “pretending to overlook the more revolting aspects of official culture”.
43
State Newspaper) photographs”51. In this case, it appears as though Myers has an axe to
grind with anthropologists for believing that there is value in all forms of art, not just the
paintings of Kim Il-Sung which can lead us to wild speculation, as I will elaborate.
Though Myers states he does not “want to be pedantic”52 when dealing with culture, it is
good form to explain to audiences the intricacies of North Korean culture. There should
be attention to all the details, not just the ones that service the mystified mindset that is
being perpetuated about North Korea; otherwise we are able to make no perceptible
headway in discovering other cultures. In an effort to illustrate the differences in
technique and tone, I will briefly discuss some of these other works that are available for
foreign collection.
Though in there are differences in tone and message between regime portraiture
and art for “outsiders”, Juche remains central to any work of art produced in North
Korea. Though it is true that these paintings are “manufactured” in this large art studio, it
is easy to see that the works are not what might be imagined as the products of large scale
production. This might remind the western viewer of artists such as Andy Warhol and his
Factory which churned out identical prints, but these works show the artists’
craftsmanship which is not seen (and was not meant to be seen) in Warhol’s art. They are
embodiments of Korea’s centuries of artistic culture, some even alluding to the western
51 Myers, Brian. "The "Strong and Prosperous Country" Campaign in North Korean Propaganda."Exploring North Korean Arts. Verlag fur Modeme Kunst, 2012. 72-87. Print.
52 Ibid
44
and outside lenses which they understand will be scrutinizing their work. There has been
an increasing market for North Korean art, and places such as Australia, China, Japan,
and South Korea are some of the main consumers of this “outside” art. With
approximately four thousand works produced each year (half of which are public
orders)' , we can assume that these works are produced for the citizens of the DPRK’s
consumption as well. It is most likely that only those in showcase cities like Pyongyang,
however, who would have the disposable income to acquire artwork of this nature.
An example of works for outside consumption is Confrontation( Fig. 5), a 2006
oil painting by Kim Hyon Myong, which shows a North Korean confronting the western
gaze. As a young girl and a foreign visitor play “Go”, as we see the cameras fixed on the
game, we also notice that the young girl is winning, and that her foreign opponent looks
quite perplexed as to his next move. When we look at the little girl, we see her
assertiveness, and a gaze that is commanding beyond her years. In many ways she is an
embodiment of North Korea after the Korean War. The western gaze (America
especially), may see a young, misguided country, with a childish leadership and a quick
temper. This could be the artist emphasizing that while the girl may be young, her spirit
and abilities are far beyond the expectations of the West. She understands that the
camera’s gaze is on her, and while all others are fixated on that moment, she has already
taken command of the board, awaiting the next move. The artist is consciously trying to
convey this to the outsider, using Western techniques of realism. We should feel
53 Portal, Jane. "The Production and Consumption o f Art." Art under Control in North Korea. London: Reaktion, 2005. 126-27. Print.
45
Figure 6: Sunflower
46
comfortable with applying our perception of what is being said because it is directly
confronting us on terms with which we are familiar.
Of course there is also an historical understanding that the “outsider” should
consider in reading any work of art from the DPRK, whether it be for our specific
consumption or not. The painting Sunflower (Fig. 6) by artist Kwon Kyung Su as read by
Aiden Foster-Carter and Kate Hext for their article “DPRKrazy, Sexy, Cool: The Art of
Engaging North Korea” is a primary example of the kind of presumptions that we should
avoid in reading DPRK art:
... [T]he gentle sunlight, casting light shadows on the wall, combines with
the ensemble of variously contented, curious and well-nourished children to
suggest an image of childhood as carefree and happy, spent at leisure and set in
organic relation with the world. However, there is a slightly discordant note. It is
difficult to tell from the catalog reproduction, [my emphasis] but the child on the
far left is sketched in a very uncertain outline... [T]he pastels are applied so thinly
to the separated child.. .that it becomes translucent.. .creating] a ghostly effect.
Innocent as this observation may seem, the authors go on to state:
These are ghosts of children, indelible yet intangible. The painter’s
intentions we cannot o f course know [my emphasis]. But, that is hardly the
point.. .the effect is to bid us question and probe the impenetrable surfaces of
kitsch and ideology [of the DPRK]... As an absent presence, the ghostly child
undermines the mood of the painting by evoking the disenfranchised child, the
exploited child, the soldier child, the hungry child, and of course, the dead child;
for children.. .suffered disproportionately in the terrible famine which peaked
during 1996-8, when at least a half million North Koreans starved to death. Even
now, according to the UN World Food Programme, one in every three North
Korean children remains malnourished or ‘stunted’...54
As correct as the information is that Carter and Hext provide concerning the statistics of
the Arduous March and the plight of children in North Korea, one has to wonder if the
same conclusions would be reached if we were dealing with any other state (though this
situation is unique to North Korea). While it is obvious why a DPRK outsider would
make these associations, we do need to question why these parallels are drawn, and why
other aspects that are present in these works go without discussion. Instead of
preconceiving a villainous state with its people crying out for assistance, the viewer
should be more concerned with the elements that are presented within the painting.. In an
article that begins with an explanation to the reader of how they should “engage
intellectually” with the art of the DPRK, much of this discussion veers off course, pulling
the reader in under false pretenses. While I believe that Carter and Hext had no ill
intentions, their description falls prey to the exact political rhetoric that their introduction
states they seek to avoid. Maybe this interpretation really does stem from a poor
reproduction within the Flowers for Kim il-Sung art catalog. Unfortunately, the reader
54 Foster-Carter, Aiden, and Kate Hext. "DPRKrazy, Sexy, Cool: The Art o f Engaging North Korea." Exploring North Korean Arts. Verlag fur Modeme Kunst. 2012. 42-44. Print.
I h l l ( - • 1
47
was not provided with the opportunity to see for herself, since the text does not include a
reproduction of the work with the alleged ghostly apparitions. I sought out the catalog to
see Sunflower for myself, and to provide my readers with the same opportunity.
Sunflower is similar to Confrontation, though devoid of its political connotations.
It is not regime portraiture (which is what I had expected given Carter and Hext’s
interpretation). The painting could very well be one of the works produced for outside
consumption, as it uses realist techniques of light and shadow like Roses for Stalin. Many
works produced for outside consumption are devoid of strong political sentiment, and this
is a very good example of the subject matter that this particular style of painting contains.
We see children on a balcony on what looks like a perfect spring day. The use of white to
communicate warmth is very reminiscent of Roses, as is the brushstroke technique. The
children are basking in the warm glow of the sun, enjoying the beautiful sunflowers
before them. In the doorway stands a child who seems to engage and beckon to the
viewer to join them.
While we can conclude that the artist is portraying North Korean children as “the
Happiest Children in the World”, maybe little else about this work is political. The
system under which it is created, coupled with the fact that artists must possess a strong
ideological character translating into a love of country and ruler, can also be seen as
contributing factors which viewers might tend to equate with political statement. But, we
do have to question how much of that is a real influence on what we see in this particular
work. If we read everything as being political, we enter into territory where we make
I I i
48
49
false judgments based on presupposition, never once truly engaging the art that we see
before us.
Carter and Hext’s reading of Sunflower presents it as many things it is not. First,
the “spectral child” they discuss is little more than a veiled attempt at inserting regime
criticism into their discussion. I simply do not see this. Though it can be argued that this
child looks somewhat hastily painted, I would hardly call her “spectral”. The use of soft
yellows and whites reflect the light and the flowers around her, not “trans 1 ucen[ence]”.
There is little else pointing to “ ...the disenfranchised child, the exploited child, the
soldier child, the hungry child, and of course, the dead child”.55 While my statements
may seem harsh, and in all fairness there is quite a bit of pressure to make sure you are
not seen as an apologist for the regime, my question lies in its appropriateness to the
discussion of art. The critical commentary on this painting is an example of how the west
tends to discuss the DPRK as a “monstrous regime” first, and as human culture last (if at
all).
Even the introductions presented in the Flowers catalog provide the viewers of the
MAK exhibit with some of the context in which the artwork was presented. In the words
of The DPRK’s Minister of Culture An Tong Chun:
I truly hope that our exhibition of fine art... will contribute to deepening
mutual understanding among people in general, and cultural workers, in
55 Ibid
50
particular, from both countries and the further development of friendly relations,
including cultural exchanges.56
So, perhaps we should approach North Korean art the way we would engage art from any
other nation: free from paranoia about indoctrination. It is a cultural exchange, so let’s
explore it for what it’s worth.
While assertions about political circumstances are not appropriate in this
particular instance, we may feel that regime portraiture would be a suitable opportunity
for political criticism of the Kims. But, with this as well, we should tread lightly, and
adhere to the actual historical and social realities state sponsored art reflects. Regime
portraiture is definitely not intended for our gaze, as it uses symbolic language meant for
the revolutionary purpose of eliciting emotion from the North Korean citizen. We are the
Happiest Children in the World (Fig. 7) was created exclusively for a domestic, public
audience. As Jane Portal, curator of Chinese and Korean art for the British Museum,
points out in her piece “The Challenges of Forming a Museum Collection of North
Korean Art”, “ ...all efforts we made in 2001 and 2002 to acquire portraits of the North
Korean leaders were rebuffed.”57 These kind of works are not for purchase by foreign
collectors, which is why you will never see a collection, except for the MAK’s 2010
56 Han, Chang Gyu., Frank Hoffmann, and Peter Noever. Flowers for Kim Il-Sung: Art and Architecture from the Democratic People's Republic o f Korea. Ntimberg: Verlag Fur Modeme Kunst Numberg, 2010.57 Portal, Jane. "The Challenges of Forming a Museum Collection of North Korean Art.” Exploring North Korean Arts. Verlag fur Modeme Kunst, 2012. 133-144. Print.
51
Vienna exhibit, with one to display. While in North Korea developing what would be
their collection, Portal
i3*ST . - , * ’
Figure 7: We are the Happiest Children in the World
sought to buy medals with the “Great Leader or the Dear Leader” as well as the
ubiquitous lapel pins that North Koreans are required to wear. As Portal states, “These
were not available to foreigners, we were told, and we returned to London with scarcely a
single example of the most iconic image to be found in the country.”58 In making the
distinction between art for inner vs. outer consumption, we should also understand that
58 Ibid
modes of thinking might be acceptable in one case that are not in the other. The
difference between Confrontation or Sunflower and Happiest Children best illustrates
these two modes of thought. The titles of these pieces are a demarcation line; on one side,
you have North Korea’s engagement with the West, then the alternative, a highly coded
message to insiders regarding unity, benevolence, and ideological purity stemming from
a deep admiration of Kim Il-Sung. It is not that we should intentionally shy away from
viewing these regime portraits, but that we should tread lightly in our perceptions of what
they say and maintain a flexible stance in order to avoid automatic criticism of the regime
and its policies alone, and really discover what these works are communicating and to
53
Chapter Four: Juche Symbolism and Communication within Portraiture
“I f works o f literature and art are to reflect reality truthfully, provide impressive artistic solutions to a profound ideological content and make an effective contribution to the revolutionary education o f the people, they should create a realistic typification o f man and life thoroughly... Depicting typical human character in works is the main factor in ensuring the true representation o f life and their high ideological and artistic value as well as in guaranteeing their cognitive and educational significance. “Creating Realistic Typification and Life Thoroughly”- Kim Il-Sung, A Talk to Party Writers, February 1967
While we discussed Mansudae Studio’s system of production and the differences
in the types of art it produces for internal and external audiences, the regime portrait is
the primary focus of this and subsequent chapters. It is the ultimate and most easily
accessible form of communication of the Juche Grand Narrative to the North Korean
population, aside from film. These works of art are crafted to reach the masses in a very
specific way. The understanding that the masses may not have the fundamental education
to engage “bourgeois” forms of art (such as those that use techniques more closely related
to realism), public portraiture stands as the vital symbol of the nation in its inclusive
message. There is no need to understand the use of light, shading, or brushstrokes. What
matters is the possession of sobak ham, the knowledge of Juche and Chajusong, and a
deep willingness to fulfill your role as subject to Eternal President Kim il-Sung. Those at
the famed Mansudae Studio are the only subjects trusted to produce this highly
communicative form of art because they themselves have fulfilled the standards of
ideological purity they are tasked with communicating.
54
Portraiture in the DPRK takes various forms, as we have seen earlier with the
presentation of Happiest Children (Fig 7). Recalling the Juche Grand Narrative’s
melding of Confucian values, Christian imagery, and Marxist/Stalinist ideals, these
grandiose expressions of devotion for the Dear and Great leaders become much easier to
read, and subsequently, it becomes easier for us to avoid what some scholars who study
DPRK regime portraiture tend to do: insert the Western political agenda within their
readings of these works.
To elaborate on these work’s dense symbolism, we should look no further than
We are the Happiest Children in the World. With its pastoral setting, beaming children,
and grinning Kims, it encapsulates all that the North Korean regime seeks to
communicate to its populace. As we can see, the technique is much less complex than we
saw in the paintings created for an outside audience. Its style is much closer to that of the
Chinese portrait of Mao shown earlier (Fig. 4). The children themselves don various
uniforms, so we can get the sense that this is indeed discussing the Confucian relationship
of ruler and minister and parent/child and the relationship a citizen is expected to have
with Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il. We have children in traditional Korean chosunot,
miniature soldiers of the navy and army, a nurse, and even a soccer player, which recalls
the North Korean soccer players in the 1966 FIFA World Cup and their win against Italy.
We also have the demonstration of benevolence and naivete that is so highly prized in
North Korea, as it is those with ideological purity of heart and mind who will become the
greatness of the nation under the Kim’s parenting.
55
We should also take a look at the use of light and the scenery itself as a form of
communication. As we see, the use of white to create warmth is very present here, not
only to illuminate those who are the surrounding the Kims, but emanating from Kim il-
Sung like an aura, which is central to Christian artistic depictions of Christ, as is the child
motif. Happiest Children (1995) shows the transition of power between the Kims. While
Kim Jong-il joins the gathering, we can see that he is not the central figure quite yet.
Though Kim Il-Sung had passed away in 1994, he remained Eternal President of the
nation (the position of President was eliminated after his death), while Kim Jong-il
became the Generalissimo and Great Leader. Although Kim Jong-il inherited many
names, these two were most used to denote that, while inheriting the leadership of the
nation, he would remain subordinate to Kim Il-Sung. This portrait also was painted
within the traditional Confucian three year mourning period, further solidifying this
notion. In the left of the frame (as well as a small portion in the middle, right, edge) are
branches of the flower named for the Eternal President: Kimilsungia. In numerous
parades and displays, this flower is seen alongside Kimjongilia as a way of expressing
love and admiration for the Great and Dear Leaders.
In this portrait, it is easy to see what emotions are meant to be evoked in those
inside the country. We have the “positive hero” Kim Il-Sung occupying the central
portion of the painting, with his warm smile, evoking the observer’s nostalgic feelings
while also presenting Kim Jong-il as a continuation of his Fatherly Leadership. It is a
painting that could have quite possibly been conceived in an effort to alleviate the
56
Figure 8: Leader and a Peasant
uncertainty of the change in leadership, confirming a continuance of the past through the
two leaders’ juxtaposition. Of all the regime portraits I have seen, this one also has a
remarkable sense of fluidity, in that Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il appear to match and
engage with the surroundings. Many portraits of this type have a certain discontinuity to
them. Much like Roses For Stalin, the Leaders generally do not take part or interact with
the other human subjects, as though they were statues or had been painted from
photographs while everything else has a slightly more realistic quality. For example,
another painting in the Flowers For Kim il-Sung catalog, The Leader and a Peasant (Fig.
8), contains this very unusual depiction, creating a separation between Kim Il-Sung and
what the viewer sees in the rest of the frame. This portrait was painted in 2003 by Hong
57
Song Gwang, nearly ten years after the passing of Kim Il-Sung. This time, the very
Christ-like depiction is unmistakable, and with good reason: it solidifies Kim Il-Sung’s
spiritual presence in everyday North Korean lives. He is an apparition, reaching out to the
peasant in a gesture of comfort, and possibly as the protector of the peasant’s son, seen
next to him lying on the bedding sprawled out on the floor. Light emanates from this
apparition, casting light and shadow onto the peasant from Kim’s direction. The basket of
potatoes and the notebook with a pencil near it, are also illuminated, highlighting the idea
that the peasant’s productive ability is commendable and in tune with the nature of Juche,
and just as essential to continuing the overall health of the nation. The mental (writing,
literature, study) is just as necessary as physical nourishment, and both are equally
essential to Juche. It also strengthens the regime’s ties to the peasantry as the foundation
of the regime, alluding to the peasants’ benevolence, purity, and revolutionary spirit in
the face of adversity.
Elaborate portraits such as these are present in many of the museums, subways,
and study halls of North Korea, and while they do account for a part of the regime
portraiture that North Koreans encounter on a daily basis, they are not quite as present as
the portraits of the Great and Dear leaders’ profiles. While it may be much easier to read
these larger and more complex portraits, many of the same messages are communicated
through profile portraits as well. They are the main means of communication to all North
Koreans, and they are just as expressive as public space, another communicative tool of
the regime.
58
For an observer of these profile portraits, the first and most striking feature is the
use of a bright white surrounding the portrait. Some of these profiles are round; some are
even framed in golden hues, presenting the divine aura of the Great and Dear leaders.
Many of the more complex portraits, such as Happiest Children or Leader and a Peasant
also have this suggestion of divine light that shines on or emanates from the leaders. Most
commonly, these portraits of Kim Il-Sung show him smartly dressed in a suit and tie, but
I have also seen some that show him in full military uniform with badges. Kim Jong-il’s
portraits are the same in this way, and usually depict him wearing his trademark
windbreaker, though there are some that show him in military uniform. The most
common, and those that are at the center of the Grand People’s Study House, are the
portraits of both men wearing black, somber, buttoned-up military coats, often worn
outside at formal military functions. These uniforms state sanctioned semi-formal dress:
something Mao Zedong might have worn. The type of clothing also seems to dictate the
expressions on the leader’s faces. So, the less formal portraits show them with bright,
welcoming smiles, while in somber or military garb they are straight faced and serious. It
also appears that the nature of the event has much to do with the type of portrait shown.
The less formal would most likely be reserved for celebrations, such as the leaders’
birthdays, giving off an aura of informality, as though they are one of the people. The
more common, somber portraits, would be used within the more “serious” public places,
such as educational sites.
59
Figure 9: Kirn portraits in Metro Car
All state sanctioned profile portraits of Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong Suk
(Kim Jong-il’s mother), and now Kim Jong Un are produced by the elite assembly of
chosen artists at Mansudae Studios. The portraits are not just the large mosaics that adorn
subway walls, or paintings in stadiums, study halls and department stores, but also the
smaller portraits that are in every North Korean dwelling in the country, including
subway cars and trolleys. Oddly, they remain missing from buses, at least for the
moment.
60
These smaller framed profile portraits occupy a very curious place in DPRK
tradition and everyday life. They are perhaps the purest example of the Juche message.
All homes and offices have been adorned since the mid-1970’s with at least two portraits,
sometimes three, which are framed with protective glass; the likeness of the “Dear
Leader,” Kim Il-Sung, his son the “Great Leader”, Kim Jong-il, and either Kim Jong-il’s
mother or a portrait of the Dear and Great leaders together. There is a set of rules for the
display of these portraits. They must be hung on a wall in the dwelling where no other
decor is present, and above where any works of art or wall hangings might normally be
placed. This position reinforces the leaders’ position in relation to the inhabitants of the
home: they are to be looked up to.
The pictures must also be meticulously cared for. As Andrei Lankov states in his
work North o f the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea:
[EJvery set comes with a special box which is used to keep tools for maintaining
the portraits. Inside such a box there are two pieces of soft cloth for cleaning the
portraits, and a brush. The cleaning should be done daily.59
Lankov goes on to state that these portraits are inspected by higher ranking officials on a
regular basis, and even unintentional damage to the portraits is considered problematic
for the individual, and can result in punishment. These portraits are to be handled with
the utmost respect, and as we will see, are they regarded as an extension of the Kims
themselves.
59 Lankov, Andrei. North o f the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2007. Print.
61
Stories that surround these portraits also join the epic tales of the Dear and Great
Leaders, cementing their own interesting space within the Juche Grand Narrative
structure. One tale of these portraits provides the most extreme example of how much
importance they have among the DPRK citizenry. In Andrei Lankov’s recent 2013 work
The Real North Korea, he writes
[I]n 2007 the official media widely reported an incident that allegedly occurred in
August of that year.. .During a severe flooding, Kang Hyong-kwon, a factory
worker from the city of Ich’on, was trying to make his way to safety through a
dangerous stream. While leaving his flooded house, he took the two most precious
things in his life- his five-year-old daughter and portraits of the Leaders
Generalissimo Kim Il-Sung and Marshall Kim Jong-il. Suddenly overwhelmed by
the current, he lost grip of his daughter, who fell into the swollen waters, but still
managed to keep hold of the sacred images. The media extolled North Koreans to
emulate Kang Hyong-kwon, a real life hero.60
While this behavior is strange from a US perspective, it illustrates the importance of the
Kims’ iconography. They are to be protected and cared for as an extension of the Kims
themselves.
Another recent article regarding a North Korean defector reiterates the respect for
this iconography. Moon Eun Hae (a pseudonym) defected from the DPRK to South
Korea in the late 1990’s. Writing for Daily NK, a Seoul publication, she recounts
60 Lankov, Andrei. The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia. New York: Oxford UP, 2013. Print.
62
circumstances that led her father to deface one of these sets of household portraits during
the “Arduous March” in the 1990’s. This was a time of extreme poverty for most in the
DPRK, which was caused by the severe droughts, floods, and the change in leadership
after the passing of Kim Il-Sung. The Arduous March resulted in an estimated 400,000 to
1.2 million deaths by starvation in the DPRK. She states,
[0]ur household had to struggle with poverty. We lived like that for several years,
but finally sold our house in order to have something to eat. Without a place to
live, we stayed at places like the factory break-rooms... One day, when there was
nothing to eat, our family, who had gone without several meals, finally put our
hands to something which should not have been touched. My father took out the
glass from Kim Il-Sung's portrait and sold it. It was a crime for which one could
have received a life sentence, but at that time, people sold everything which could
be sold. We could not put the portrait above our sustenance. Some time later, the
factory manager came and told us that someone had reported us. We could not
stay in North Korea anymore. ..Because we had touched Kim Il-Sung's portrait,
our hands were tied behind our backs. All of our family members crossed the
Tumen River following the woman.6’
The gravity of Eun-Hae’s situation led to her forced defection from North Korea,
showing us that these portraits are not just a representation of the Kim regime, but are
regarded as an embodiment of the leaders. They reach into the ordinary lives of the
61 Eun Hae, Moon. "Kim Il-Sung Portrait Cannot Be More Important Than One's Life." Daily NK. N.p., 25 July 2007. Web. 4 May 2015.
63
DPRK populace, where disrespect in the slightest form, even out of sheer necessity, is
punished rigorously.
The associative property of these portraits is a large factor in how the public is
conditioned to respond to them. From childhood, the stories of the Kim’s in everything
from children’s books to public art, are meant to elicit a fondness for the images of their
leaders, which translates into how they react to them as adults. One of the most popular
examples of children’s associations is that with Kim Il-Sung as a kind of “father
Christmas”. As Kang Chol-Hwan remembers in his memoir, Aquariums o f Pyongyang:
To the child I was, Kim Il-Sung was a kind of Father Christmas. Every year on
this birthday, he would send us gift packages of cakes and sweets. Our beloved
Number One chose them himself, with a care and kindness that gave his gifs a
saviomess all their own. Thanks to his generosity, we also had the right, every
third year, to a school uniform, a cap, and a pair of shoes.62
This is just one of the thousands of stories and associations that a citizen might briefly
recall when looking up at the faces in these portraits. So, we can relate, in that we might
look fondly upon a photo or portrait of a cherished individual from our childhood
memories, such as Christ, Buddha, or Santa Claus. The stories that surround the portraits
themselves also serve a similar function in how the citizen is conditioned to regard them
as a tool necessary to their function as a citizen of the collective in North Korea, along
62 Rigoulot, Pierre, Kang Chol-Hwan, and Yair Reiner. "A Happy Childhood in Pyongyang." The Aquariums o f Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag. New York: Basic, 2005. 1. Print.
64
with the consistent presence of the larger and more complex portraits in the public spaces
of the DPRK. In the next chapter, I will discuss the use of architecture and the spaces of
Pyongyang in this conditioning and engagement.
65
Chapter 5: City and Portraiture Collide
“Modeling the whole o f society on the Juche idea is a great communist programme for developing and consummating socialism o f our style. It is only when the whole o f society is modeled on the Juche idea that the demands o f the popular masses for independence can be realized satisfactorily. Our party sets it out as the strategic target for the building o f communism- to occupy the ideological and material fortresses o f communism- by transforming man, society, and nature as required by the Juche idea. “Socialism o f Our Country is a Socialism o f Our Style as an Embodiment o f the Juche Idea ”, Speech Delivered to the Senior Officials o f the Central Committee o f the Workers Party o f Korea, Kim Jong-il, Dec. 27th 1990
Context is important, and as we’ve seen, interpretations can become problematic
when it is disregarded. Historical and social conditions should factor into the reading of
artwork from the DPRK. Equally, and perhaps more importantly when reading profile
portraiture, is also taking into account the spacial context of their placement. For this
purpose, I will be using the physical spaces of Pyongyang, and the placement of
portraiture to reinforce the communication of the Juche Grand Narrative. As Kevin
Lynch states in his work on architecture The Image o f the C ity , “Nothing is experienced
by itself, but always in relation to its surroundings, the sequences of events leading up to
it, the memories of past experiences.”63 This remains absolutely true here, especially
relative to the fact that Pyongyang is manufactured from the ground up. Built with the
explicit purpose of being North Korea’s “showcase capital”, housing its most
ideologically pure citizens, its most powerful monuments, and its most historical works
of Korean art, it is a space that exists to communicate to its citizens. Though there are
many other, smaller cities, around North Korea that may utilize this same communicative
63 Lynch, Kevin. "Image o f the Environment." The Image o f the City. Cambridge, M A: MIT, 1960. 1. Print.
66
135 Map of central Pyongyang.
Figure 10:Pyongyang city map
measure, Pyongyang is the most easily accessible due to the recent influx and promotion
of international tourism. So, naturally, there are many photographs, maps, and the like,
that the “outsider” is able to access, in other cases, such as Kaesong or Nampo, not so
much.
As of 2008, Pyongyang was a city of over three million inhabitants. To be a
citizen of Pyongyang, one would not be able to just move there, you must be considered a
model citizen. This is usually tied to your family, and their particular party standing.
Many stories about Pyongyang, and North Korea generally, begin with this information,
67
so this is nothing new. What tends to complicate this matter is the idea of the “three
generations rule” in North Korean society. This rule seems to have its roots in the
previous feudal structure of Korea, in which families from undesirable backgrounds were
doomed to be outcasts. This hereditary issue also solidifies your space in the upper
echelons if your family was well to do. The advent of the North Korean state did not tend
to change this much, but in some cases, these family identities may have been flipped due
to party affiliation. Another facet of this three generations rule serves as part of the
mechanism of punishment in the North Korean state, meaning that if you do something to
upset the party leadership, it is not just you who suffers, but your extended family up to
three generations. One need only read Kang Chol-Hwan’s work Aquariums o f
Pyongyang64 to understand the consequences of comporting yourself as a less than
desirable citizen.
Pyongyang was conceived out of the ashes of the Korean War. Extensive (and
many might say excessive) firebombing campaigns completely leveled the once ancient
city, leaving nothing but rubble. It had become a “blank slate” for Kim Il-Sung and the
communist regime to build its showcase with Russian and Chinese financial backing, and
(as I’d stated in earlier chapters) use of socialist realism, which was not just translated in
64 In Chol-Hwan’s testimonial, he tells the story o f his family and their time in the Camp 15 (known as Yodok) internment facility. Chol-Hwan’s family had been repatriated during the 1960’s from Japan, where the family had become quite successful in the establishment o f casinos. Eventually, Chol-Hwan’s grandfather became disillusioned with life in North Korea, and had made his dissatisfaction too well known, resulting in the internment o f not only himself, but Chol-Hwan’s grandmother (a party elite), his father, and one o f his uncles, illustrating the three generations rule all too well.
68
art, literature and film, but also extended to architecture, just as it had been applied in
China with the rebuilding of Beijing and Moscow in the USSR before it.
The techniques for this use of space as communication and the literal “building of
communism” was pioneered by a Russian named Ivan Matsa. A part of the organization
October (concerned with art and architecture), he, along with several other architects
developed VopRA (All-Russian Society of Proletarian Architects).They created what was
to become the new Socialist Realist style of architecture through the 1920’s and 30’s,
seen in places such as St. Petersberg and Moscow.65 Architecture was seen as a
continuance of the communist ideology as translated within the public space. To those
within the public space, the spatial organization and the buildings within this space were
meant to illicit the same revolutionary zeal that would be produced similarly in a painting
or work of literature. As Katarina Clark states in her work “Socialist Realism and the
Sacrilizing of Space”:
At the heart of many canonical works of socialist realism lie spatial myths in
which ‘heroes’ or ‘leaders’ function as human embodiments of, or emissaries
from higher-order space. Even unadorned socialist realist buildings (that is those
65 Bown, Matthew Cullerne., and Brandon Taylor. "Art of the Soviets." Art o f the Soviets: Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture in a One-party State, 1917-1992. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1993. 89-92. Print.
69
with no clear thematic potential) could be interpreted as expressing such spatial
myths.66
Pyongyang served as the perfect “tabula rasa” where many of these other
communist states would have to demolish what had once been associated with their past.
Pyongyang had been destroyed and needed no major overhaul. It could simply begin
building a purely ideological space from the ground up with no need to erase past
associations with what had come before (Japanese imperialism, etc.). It is a perfect
example of the idea that “[a]n environment which is ordered in precise and final detail
may inhibit new patterns of activity. A landscape whose every rock tells a story may
make difficult [or in this case impossible] the creation of fresh stories.”67
The “sacrilizing” of “higher-order” space can be witnessed in most monuments
and structures within Pyongyang. Two such examples are the Arch of Triumph (Fig. 11)
(built as a monument to the resistance against Japanese imperialism by Kim Il-Sung),
positioned in the city across from Kim Il-Sung Stadium at the intersection of Chollima
and Ponghwa Streets, and the Juche Tower (Fig. 12), directly across from Kim Il-Sung
Square on the other side of the Taedong River. The Arch of Triumph is often boasted to
be taller than it’s model, the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, France, emphasizing that North
Koreans can not only build their socialist utopia with the skill of the great architects of
western civilization, but they can do it even better, stronger, and all under the guidance of
66 Dobrenko, E. A., and Katerina Clark. "Socialist Realism and the Sacrilizing o f Space." The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology o f Soviet Space. Seattle: U of Washington, 2003. 4-5. Print.67 Lynch, Kevin. "Image o f the Environment." The Image o f the City. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1960. 6. Print.
Figure 12: Juche Tower
their Dear Leader Kim Il-Sung. The Juche Tower is another that not only reinforces the
states constructional aptitude, but also its ability to communicate the greatness of its
leaders through the symbolic use of building materials to commemorate dates such as
birthdays, and anniversaries. As Jane Portal points out,
The 70 meters of the tower symbolize the 70 years of Kim’s life [when the
monument was built in 1982], as do the 70 levels (17 levels on two sides and 18
on the other two). There is a twelve-line poem of praise to Kim Il-Sung carved in
square 15 by 4 meters [Kim Il-Sung’s birth month and day]. The 25,550 pieces of
granite used are also significant, representing each day Kim lived until his 70
birthday.68
While neither of these monuments have the Great and Dear leader’s portraits posted on
their facades, it is possible that the reason lies in the enormous amount of Juche
symbolism present, which is unmistakable (at least to the average North Korean city
dweller). Possibly, there may be a type of “overkill” in the presentation of these portraits,
where it would be seen as just “too much”.
Spaces that do house these profile portraits are quite interesting, however. Kim Il-
Sung Square serves as one of these backdrops for portraiture that serves to communicate
the Juche Grand Narrative by association. Perhaps the most ideal public space to bring us
to this complete understanding of the North Korean system of symbolic communication
68 Portal, Jane. "The Production and Consumption of Art." Art under Control in North Korea. London: Reaktion, 2005. 126-27. Print.
72
is Kim D-Sung Square (Fig. 13). Situated directly in the middle of Pyongyang, it is
structurally developed to give the sense of collective, marrying the citizenry to the
structures of
Figure 13: View of Kim Il-Sung Square from the Juche Tower
government via use of space. The Square sits directly across from the Juche Tower and is
separated by the Taedong River. At the head of the Square stands the Grand People’s
Study House, which houses an extensive library that includes all writings by Kim Jong-il,
73
Kim Il-Sung, and now, Kim Jong Un. The Study House was also built to celebrate Kim
Il-Sung’s 70th birthday in 1982.
The space of the Square is much like what Clark mentions about “buildings with
no discemable statement”. With the exception of the Grand Peoples Study House and the
Juche Tower that stands across from it, other buildings do not really have any remarkable
features, other than what they house. The makeup of the square is simply laid out. With
the Study House in the center, the square faces the Taedong River. The buildings that
stand to your left are the Workers Party of Korea Headquarters (closest) and the Korean
Central History Museum (across Sungri Street). On the right stands the Korean Art
Gallery, home to a plethora of reproductions of ancient Korean tomb paintings, as well as
ink paintings, ceramics, and revolutionary art works depicting battles, factories, and
beautiful Korean landscapes.
The placement of these large portraits is no mistake, especially within the space of
the Square. Placing the portraits in the direct center and on the wall of the Grand People’s
Study House equates the Dear and Great leaders with the educational foundation of the
country. Their relatively close proximity to the Korean Art Gallery ties them directly to
the ancient foundations of Korea itself. In this center position of the Square, when your
back faces the portraits, you will look directly across the Taedong River at the Juche
Tower. The vision of Kim Il-Sung is ever present within the confines of the Square, and
anyone standing there will undoubtedly be thinking of the Kim’s as they do so (and
seeing their image in any direction they turn), which also serves as the reminder of the
74
benevolence of these leaders, the stories of past and present, the revolution, the fight
against Japanese imperialism, the greatness of the collective and its ability to achieve
such greatness in the form of “building communism” from the ground up, and so on.
Kim Il-Sung Square is also where most celebrations of anniversaries and leaders
birthdays take place. As you can see, when the Square is used for these events, not only is
the Square itself filled to capacity, but the streets are flooded with procession after
procession of soldiers marching, military tanks equipped with missiles, and soldiers
carrying banners with the profile portraits of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il as the state
leadership and citizenry look on. Watching one of these processions, one can see the
perfect formations of human bodies in these ceremonies. People within the square are not
just “milling around”, but stand in perfectly square formations. They become “blocks”
symbolic the blocks used to build the vision of the perfect, pure, nation under Kim Il-
Sung. Observers are also situated within contained spaces that face the procession. In one
such parade for the 65th anniversary of the North Korean state (in 2013), the procession
begins with two distinct groups of marching soldiers. The first, carrying the portrait of
Kim Il-Sung, and not far behind, the second group with the portrait of Kim Jong-il, both
on broad, red flags.
As the event goes forward, the square becomes alive with the movement of the
once segmented squares of citizens, now coming into formation to wave plastic replicas
of Kimilsungia and Kimjongilia flowers, which surround the center message written in
75
gold with a red background.69 Further on in the parade, replicas of the bronze statues of
both leaders are carried by citizens all holding the flag of the DPRK. Then, the
procession becomes lively with dance as citizens donning the traditional Korean
Chosonot bang drums and twirl with fans, further tying the North Korean state to its
previous historical Korean traditional art forms. These displays are themselves
reminiscent of the colors used in North Korean regime portraiture, also repeating the
associated themes of these paintings as Kim Il-Sung, father of the nation, the liberator to
be celebrated, their Eternal Sun of Mankind inspiring paternal love and devotion in a
display of military might and Juche ideological purity. The participants stage these events
as an homage not only to the Great and Dear leaders, but to their positions in the
periphery, their mastering of themselves in order to better work collectively. Basically,
the physical personification of the Juche mindset, creating the purest space and
communication of what the DPRK is envisioned to be.
69 Unfortunately, I am unable to translate the message spelled out here. It could be guessed that it is either remarking on the victorious building of the DPRK, or possibly a passionate slogan regarding the Great and Dear leaders, but for now, I can only speculate.
76
Conclusion
Engaging North Korean art is difficult. But, as we see, the difficulty doesn’t lie in
the “elusiveness” of the nation. Rather, it’s getting beyond the conversations we have
been conditioned to have and getting to a deeper understanding of culture and social
structure through this medium. Glossing over history and circumstance to use DPRK’s art
to vilify and mystify an entire nation of people is hardly the way to open meaningful
dialogue with or about this country. While there are significant human rights issues that
face this nation and its system of leadership that should be addressed, there are other
equally valid conversations we need to have concerning its citizens. We should maintain
special interest in understanding that North Koreans are a people, not to be confused with
their leadership.
Our first step to alleviate the problematic discourse surrounding every aspect of
North Korea is in the realization that we are dealing with human beings. There is culture
here, and it does reflect many social circumstances. Art is closely tied to their political
system, and in some ways, it is tightly controlled. But, to leave it there is to exclude the
complexity in which art is also a tool of communication in ways that are foreign to us.
“Artists” feelings are displayed in these cases, just in a way that we are not familiar with
from a Western perspective. The commissioned portraits of the DPRK shows us not just
what the leaders want us to see, but also the artists’ feelings and compulsion to embody
Juche. It gives them a way to express their desire to be a part of the collective, to
challenge themselves, to uphold their principles, and to express their desires, becoming
77
masters of their own ideological purity. Maybe it’s just as simple as realizing that they
are not the mechanized, brainwashed masses we imagine and have been taught to see, and
that it is we who are distorting everything through an Orientalized lens. Obviously, it’s
much more complex than that. Our relationship with the DPRK has been created over the
span of more than fifty years. It began with our previous Cold-War discourse, and has
changed little since, providing us with only a negative perspective based on the one
dimensional thinking of this period of time. We need to invest some time into realizing
the centuries of history surrounding the peninsula and their encounters with outside
forces to pin down why North Korea interacts with the world as it does. Centuries of
outside forces (Japan, China, Manchuria, and now, the US) have destabilized their
government, implemented their culture while destroying Korean advances in this area,
and with the Korean War, destroyed their sites of cultural heritage. After so much time
defending themselves from invasion, we can understand why this system of government
was adopted in North Korea: the people wanted to assert themselves as an independent
nation with its own culture and values. Though the results may have been far from the
original utopian vision Korean communists had in mind, there are valuable lessons here.
In many ways, North Korean society has represented something that Americans
find disturbing. We seem compelled to define ourselves negatively, by pointing to what
we find undesirable and trying to contrast ourselves to it. Why shouldn’t we take a
different approach? Why shouldn’t we be more concerned with learning and being
receptive to who North Koreans are culturally? They deserve the same respect that we
78
should have for any other people. They are human. Let’s begin treating them as such and
set a new precedent. Start a different dialogue. Show that we are concerned with them,
not just politically, but socially. Maybe then there could be some headway into beginning
a conversation between one another as two countries. If we stop the accusations and the
shouting match that’s been going on for decades, there would have to be a shift in so
many of the issues we face with them, and that they face internally. Unfortunately, we
might remain far from being able to engage the North Korean people directly. If this were
to change, however, we should be prepared to know them and understand them.
Although maybe what I’ve proposed is utopian, I strongly believe that our
relations with North Korea desperately need to be improved. Although the outcome
would be political, the approach should first be grounded in humanizing them. It counters
the toxic rhetoric surrounding the US and North Korea within both countries’ portrayals
of one another, granting the possibility of cleaning the slate. I’m not talking about
legitimizing the Kim regime, or being an apologist for the atrocities it has committed, but
calling a truce in our negative reaction toward them, and our portrayal of them. Of
course, it’s more complex than this, and there are over fifty years of bad blood to account
for, but it could be a start. What has been happening between the two nations until now
has produced no positive results, and has given the leadership in North Korea a scapegoat
for abusing its people. It’s worth a try. Possibly, if we begin to engage them and our
leaders are expected to understand who they are historically and culturally, we could have
a dialog with their leaders. When we consider nuclear North Korea and how dire this
79
situation can be when the rhetoric and posturing come to a disastrous head. Let’s make a
solid effort to eliminate the “Axis of Evil” black and white thinking of the Cold War era,
and move forward. After all, there is something to the idea of “self-mastery”, which
further enables us to work toward a future free of ascribed identities, imagined
differences, and othering. Maybe we can finally focus on the fact that we have more in
common as human beings than we have been lead to believe by systems of thought that
have wrongly directed us.
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