IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA (Before a Referee)

THE FLORIDA BAR,

Complainant,

v.

RHONDA S. CLYATT,

Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. SC-

The Florida Bar File Nos. 2016-00,112(14); 2016-00,129(14) 2016-00,254(14); 2016-00,460(14) 2016-00,514(14); 2016-00,591(14) 2016-00,622(14); 2017-00,033(14) 2017-00,084(14)

___________________________/

THE FLORIDA BARS COMPLAINT

The Florida Bar, Complainant, hereby files its C omplaint against Rhonda S.

Clyatt, Respondent, pursuant to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and alleges:

1. Respondent is, and at all times mentioned in the Complaint was, a

member of The Florida Bar, admitted on September 16, 1982, and is subject to the

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida.

2. Respondent resided and practiced law in Bay County, Florida, at all

times material.

3. The Fourteenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee found probable

cause to file this Complaint pursuant to R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.4, and this

Complaint has been approved by the presiding member of that committee.

Filing # 58583835 E-Filed 07/05/2017 10:31:19 AMR

EC

EIV

ED

, 07/

05/2

017

10:3

3:26

AM

, Cle

rk, S

upre

me

Cou

rt

COUNT I - THE FLORIDA BAR, TFB #2016-00,112(14)

4. On or about August 18, 2015, respondent was arrested in Cabarrus

County, North Carolina, for driving while impaired and possession of an open

container. She was released on bail the next day.

5. On May 5, 2016, respondent pled guilty to a level five impaired

driving offense and received a suspended sentence of 60 days in jail, subject to an

unsupervised probationary period of 12 months. According to the North Carolina

Sentencing Report, respondent submitted to a mental health assessment and

voluntarily participated in any recommended treatment.

6. Respondent failed to report her arrest to The Florida Bar.

7. By reason of the foregoing, respondent has violated the following

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 3-4.3 Misconduct and Minor Misconduct; 3-4.4

Criminal Misconduct; 3-7.2(e) Notice to the Florida Bar of Criminal Charges; and

4-8.4(b) Engage in criminal activity.

COUNT II THE FLORIDA BAR, TFB #2016-00,129(14)

8. In a pending family law case, Respondent failed to appear at the

deposition and final hearing that was scheduled several months before the actual

dates.

9. In that case, based on counsels inability to agree on hearing dates, a

Case Management Conference (CMC) was held on May 14, 2015. At that CMC,

2

both parties agreed that a deposition of respondents client would be set for August

5, 2015, and a hearing on August 28, 2015. Later that day, opposing counsels

office contacted respondents office and both dates were confirmed by email.

10. On August 4, 2015, the day before the deposition, respondents office

contacted opposing counsel and informed them that the client would not be

appearing as respondent had a garage door fall on her head and she had stitches.

11. Respondents office also stated that the client had outstanding

criminal charges and would be pleading the Fifth Amendment.

12. At approximately 5:00 p.m. that day, opposing counsel emailed

respondent that there was no agreement to a non-appearance and the deposition

was going forward. Opposing counsel, her client and the court reporter waited an

hour on August 5, 2015, at the court reporters office, but Respondent and her

client failed to appear.

13. On August 5, 2015, at approximately 2:41 p.m., respondents office

emailed opposing counsel, stating that it had been agreed to cancel the

deposition. Opposing counsel replied that they had never agreed to the

cancellation.

14. On August 18, 2015, opposing counsel filed the Fathers Verified Ex

Parte Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief and the Fathers Motion for Order

to Show Cause and for Fees and Costs, based on respondents failure to appear at

3

the deposition. The motions were set for hearing on August 28, 2015, the date

previously scheduled with the court. An amended notice of hearing was sent to

respondent the same day.

15. During a series of emails between respondents and opposing

counsels offices on August 25-26, 2015, the hearing on the 28th was confirmed.

When asked if respondent would be in attendance, however, respondents assistant

replied that respondent wanted to reschedule the hearing. Opposing counsel

refused.

16. Despite the filing and service on respondent of the Notice of Filing

Affidavit for Return of Service, clearly stating the appearance of a witness at the

hearing, respondent failed to appear at the hearing, claiming she understood it to be

cancelled.

17. On August 28, 2015, both parties were present at the hearing, as was

opposing counsel, her witnesses and the judge. Respondent did not appear.

18. The court entered an order to show cause to respondent for her failure

to appear, and stated on the record, three hours have been reserved on the Courts

docket, and that time is basically being wasted

19. On September 15, 2015, respondent wrote a letter to Judge Mallory,

apologizing for not appearing, claiming that she thought the hearing had been

cancelled. She further claimed that the deposition, which was scheduled on

4

August 5, 2015, had also been cancelled as it had been "removed as an event from

my calendar."

20. Respondent's client, however, told the court that she was unaware that

the deposition had ever been scheduled.

21. The August 28, 2015, hearing was eventually reset for January 25,

2016.

22. Respondent failed to timely respond to The Florida Bars inquiry

letter.

23. In her eventual response to The Florida Bar, dated June 29, 2016, after

the matter had been sent to the Grievance Committee, respondent neglected to

mention anything about a garage door falling on her head when attempting to

explain her failure to appear at the deposition.

24. By reason of the foregoing, respondent has violated the following

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.1 Competence; 4-1.3 Diligence; 4-1.4

Communication; 4-3.2 Expedite Litigation; 4-3.3 Candor to the Tribunal; 4-5.3

Proper Supervision of Employees; 4-8.4(c) Misrepresentation; 4-8.4(d) Conduct

Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice; and 4-8.4(g) Failure to respond to the

Florida Bar.

5

COUNT III - ANNA MARIE MORRISSEY, TFB #2016-00,254(14)

25. On December 8, 2014, Anna Marie Morrissey (Morrissey) hired

respondent for $2,500, to represent her in enforcing a contempt issue from her

previous divorce, regarding alimony payments.

26. Morrissey did not hear from respondent from December 10, 2014

until approximately July 16, 2015, after she had contacted the Attorney Consumer

Assistance Program (ACAP) at The Florida Bar.

27. Morrissey admittedly had several conversations and exchanged emails

with employees of respondent, however, they could not answer her questions and

repeatedly told her that they would have to talk to respondent.

28. On March 26, 2015, Morrissey received an email from Barbara

Justice, a legal assistant at respondents office, requesting that Morrissey review

her final judgment and inform Justice what she wanted in the contempt paperwork.

Respondent was not even mentioned in the conversation.

29. On May 7, 2015, Justice again emailed Morrissey, claiming that they

were waiting to see which Judge was assigned to the case, as the original judge had

retired.

30. On July 13, 2015, after 7 months, Morrissey contacted the clerk of

court, only to find out that nothing had been filed in her case.

6

31. Finally, on July 16, 2015, respondent emailed Morrissey, with a

motion for contempt that she claimed she intend[ed] to file tomorrow.

32. Respondent further claimed the motion had not been filed earlier

because she had received at least one email indicating that he (Morrisseys former

husband) had resumed payment. There was one email, sent by Morrissey

informing respondent of her ex-husbands new address. That email would have

been sent before the first letter to Morrisseys ex-husband in February 2015, and

would not explain respondents understanding.

33. When Morrissey attempted to call respondent regarding the motion,

she did not get an answer or a return call.

34. Even after intervention by The Florida Bar, respondent still failed to

contact Morrissey.

35. On or about August 26, 2015, respondent told Morrissey that, after

talking to opposing counsel, he had agreed to advise his client (Morrisseys ex-

husband) to begin making payments again.

36. When asked about specifics, respondent told Morrissey that opposing

counsel was to get back with her with firm answers within 2 weeks.

37. When no paperwork was received and no specifics were relayed,

Morrissey called opposing counsel herself. She was informed that nothing had

7

been worked out regarding payments by her former husband. Respondent had

clearly misrepresented the facts to Morrissey.

38. A month later, Morrissey emailed respondents office asking if

anyone had heard from respondent, as she had been trying to contact her with no

success. Again, Morrissey asked for the status of her case and why it had been

nearly a year with no result.

39. When respondent was confronted about her misrepresentations to her

client, she blamed Morrisseys interference, claiming that the case had now lost all

traction, and opposing counsel was offering a settlement of only $2,500.

40. On October 6, 2015, Morrissey sent another email to respondent with

her final offer to her ex -husband. A confirmation email was sent the following

week, as Morrissey had heard nothing from respondent. Another email was sent

on October 27, 2015 requesting contact.

41. In a letter to respondent, dated November 30, 2015, opposing counsel

stated that the highest his client would offer was $2,500 and that he had no

intention of agreeing to make any further payments.

42. Morrissey terminated respondents services in early 2016, eventually

retained new counsel, and the case settled for $3,500 shortly thereafter.

43. By reason of the foregoing, respondent had violated the following

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.3 Diligence; 4-1.4 Communication; 4-8.4(c)

8

Misrepresentation; and 4-8.4(d) Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of

Justice.

COUNT IV - MARGIE LANGFORD, TFB #2016-00,460(14)

44. Margie Langford (Langford) was involved in a foreclosure case

involving U.S. Bank, in Bay County, Florida. She was served with the foreclosure

complaint on or about September 10, 2014.

45. Respondent entered a notice of appearance on behalf of Langford on

September 19, 2014.

46. No response was filed thereafter, and on October 13, 2014, plaintiff,

U.S. Bank, filed a motion for judicial default.

47. A default was entered on October 20, 2014.

48. On January 27, 2015, respondent filed a Verified Motion to Set Aside

or Vacate Default claiming excusable neglect and mistake by inadvertence in

designation of e-filing addresses.

49. The Motion was heard on November 5, 2015.

50. On November 16, 2015, Judge Kathleen Dekker, entered an Order

Denying Respondents Motion to Vacate Default, finding there was no excusable

neglect. In fact, Judge Dekker found that the neglect was inexcusable and fairly

dumb-founding.

9

51. The court pointed out that even though respondent filed a notice of

appearance eight days before an answer was due, she did nothing. She did not file

a motion for extension of time or an answer.

52. When the Motion for Default was filed and noticed to respondent, of

the 3 e-mail addresses previously furnished by respondent, one was wrong, based

on an error made by respondent.

53. The court further found that respondents failure to timely answer the

complaint, the failure to respond timely to the motion for default, and even to

respond timely to the order of default, was due to Clyatt's office practice of

delegating 100% of case management to her nonlawyer assistant. Even a monthly

review system would have caught the issue before an order had been entered on the

default. It appears, inconceivably, that there was no meaningful oversight of the

nonlawyer staff. There was no meaningful supervision. This is not just a lapse of

judgment or an isolated error. This is gross negligence.

54. On December 1, 2015, respondent filed a Motion for Rehearing,

Reconsideration, Correction and/or Clarification of Order Denying Motion to

Vacate Default, placing blame on an intentional act by an employee assistant.

55. Langford terminated respondents services on December 31, 2015.

The court allowed respondent to withdraw on January 5, 2016.

10

56. On February 3, 2016, Judge Dekker dismissed the Motion for

Rehearing without prejudice.

57. Respondent failed to timely respond in writing to The Florida Bar.

58. By reason of the foregoing, respondent has violated the following

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.1 Competence; 4-1.3 Diligence; 4-1.4

Communication; 4-3.2 Expedite Litigation; 4-5.3 Proper Supervision of

Employees; 4-8.4(d) Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice; and

4-8.4(g) Failure to Respond in writing to the Florida Bar.

COUNT V DEBBIE DAVIS, TFB #2016-00,514(14)

59. Respondent and co-counsel, Guy Green, were representing the former

husband in divorce proceedings. A hearing was held on September 22, 2010, at

which time a settlement was proposed involving the former husband financing

(primarily through reverse mortgages) approximately 40 acres of real property.

60. At the hearing, Mr. Green announced that if the reverse mortgages did

not go through, then everything would revert back to the court, and either another

agreement would be reached or the case would proceed to final hearing.

61. The court entered the Supplemental Final Judgment of May 2, 2011,

nunc pro tunc to September 22, 2010.

11

62. Although the former wife had quit claimed her interest to the property,

the former husband did not perform pursuant to the Agreement, causing Ms.

Davis attorney to begin proceedings to enforce the Agreement.

63. On October 3, 2011, nunc pro tunc to September 21, 2011, Judge

Wells ordered the former husband to pay all monies due within 30 days or the

marital home would be turned over to the former wife. Respondent was the

husbands attorney of record in that proceeding.

64. On October 26, 2011, the former husband conveyed to respondent

approximately 21 acres of the property at issue. The alleged purpose of the

transfer was to secure the payment of respondents attorneys fees for continued

representation.

65. The following day, on October 27, 2011, respondent filed an appeal of

the October 3, 2011 order, and the former husband conveyed the remaining

acreage to himself.

66. On November 30, 2011, Judge Wells ordered that the former wife be

put in possession of the marital home.

67. On December 20, 2011, respondent conveyed the property previously

conveyed to her by the former husband to the son and daughter-in-law of her

client.

12

68. A lis pendens was filed by the former wifes attorney and new

litigation began. In that litigation, the former wife alleged that respondent was

involved in a fraud to deprive her of a marital asset.

69. Respondent claimed that she conveyed the property to the son and

daughter-in-law because her client had satisfied his debt for attorneys fees.

70. On September 19, 2012, the appeal filed in October 2011 was

dismissed.

71. The former wifes attorney then began supplemental enforcement

proceedings which resulted in an Order on Order to Show Cause, dated December

11, 2015, by Judge Wells, finding that the former husband fraudulently, and in

violation of the Courts order, deeded the property after the former wife was

compelled to release her interest in anticipation of the former husband obtaining

the reverse mortgages previously agreed upon.

72. The fraudulent conveyance referenced in the Order was the transfer to

respondent of the 21 acres, which she then transferred to the son and daughter-in

law, who claimed they knew nothing of the Supplemental Final Judgment or the

fact that the property was the subject of a prior agreement.

73. The former wife claimed that respondent took title to property that she

knew, or should have known, was intended to remain part of the marital estate if

the financing was not finalized.

13

74. Due to the fraudulent actions of respondent, the former wife was

deprived of a large part of the marital estate.

75. Based on the foregoing, respondent has violated the following Rules

Regulating The Florida Bar: 3-4.3 Misconduct and Minor Misconduct; 3-4.4

Criminal Misconduct; 4-1.16(a)(1)(4)(5) Declining or Terminating Representation;

4-1.8 Conflict of Interest-Prohibited Transactions; 4-3.3 Candor Towards the

Tribunal; 4-3.4(c) Knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a Tribunal;

4-8.4(a) Violate Bar rules; 4-8.4(b) Engage in criminal activity; 4-8.4(c)

Misrepresentation, Fraud, and Deceit; and 4-8.4(d) Conduct Prejudicial to the

Administration of Justice.

COUNT VI - EDWARD PONS, TFB #2016-00,591(14)

76. In early November 2014, Edward Pons (Pons) hired respondent to

represent him in a divorce proceeding that had been filed against him in July 2014.

Respondent was paid a $5,000 advance fee.

77. Pons filed a pro se Answer on August 8, 2014, stating that he intended

to hire an attorney.

78. Respondent entered a Notice of Appearance and Designation of E-

Mail on November 4, 2014.

79. On February 5, 2015, Pons wife voluntarily dismissed the petition.

No cross-claim or counter-claim had been filed on behalf of Pons.

14

80. According to Pons, he repeatedly called and texted respondent over

the next nine months.

81. On October 27, 2015, Pons sent a termination letter to respondent,

requesting a return of the $5,000 and all records and documents in his case before

November 26, 2015.

82. A few days later, respondent contacted Pons via text, informing him

that although the fee was non-refundable, she was ready to file a petition on his

behalf. Pons chose not to proceed with respondent and again requested a refund of

his $5,000.

83. Pons then retained another attorney to represent him.

84. On November 24, 2015, the new attorney sent a letter to respondent,

requesting a refund of at least half of Pons retainer as a reasonable refund in light

of the paucity of work on Pons case.

85. Respondent failed to respond in writing t o The Florida Bar.

86. By reason of the foregoing, respondent violated the following Rules

Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.3 Diligence; 4-1.4 Communication; 4-1.5 Fees

and Costs for Legal Services; 4-3.2 Expediting Litigation; and 4-8.4(g) Failure to

to respond, in writing, to The Florida Bar.

15

COUNT VII ASHLEY ANDERSON, TFB #2016-00,622

87. In May 2014, Ashley April Anderson (Anderson) hired respondent

to represent her in two criminal cases, grand theft and criminal trafficking.

Respondent was paid approximately $10,000 for both cases.

88. On several occasions throughout the criminal proceedings, respondent

failed to timely appear at the court proceedings, and appeared unprepared for the

proceedings.

89. Respondent appeared late at the trial in the criminal trafficking case.

90. The criminal trial in this case was set to begin on April 23, 2015, at

8:45 a.m.

91. Respondent did not make an appearance in the courtroom until 9:12

a.m. The judge addressed respondents tardy appearance at the onset of the trial as

follows:

THE COURT: Ms. Clyatt, this matter was scheduled for your appearance with opposing counsel at 8:45, that's on the record, and also the trial was to be commenced at 9 a.m. It's now, by my timepiece on the wall and by the cell phone, 9:12, and you have just entered the courtroom for the first time this morning, so we will conduct a hearing with respect to your tardiness at some point at the conclusion of these proceedings. But let me be abundantly clear with you, this court operates on a schedule that you will abide by. You will be here on time, you will not leave the courtroom unless you are invited to, and I want you to be clear about that before we get started. Okay?

MS. CLYATT: I am, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT: The jurors are our most precious component of this proceeding and it is not my intention that their time be wasted. See Trial Transcript at p. 3.

92. The State then argued their Motion in Limine, concerning questions

asked of the jury by respondent during voir dire referencing possible targeting of

her client by the police and issues of probable cause for the police stop. The court

granted the States motion noting that the court had already ruled that the police

stop was legal and any questions relating to it were irrelevant since it was not an

element of the crime. Further, the State was concerned that if Respondent raised

issues about her client being targeted, then on redirect, it might open the door to

prior bad acts of her client that might be prejudicial to her clients case. Therefore,

the client would need to consent to this type of questioning and understand the

possible prejudice to her case. The State agreed not to raise the issue and

Respondent agreed not to raise it before the jury.

93. The court then considered Defendants Motion in Limine to exclude

any prior history or criminal arrests and any statements made before she was given

Miranda warnings which the court treated as a motion to suppress. The court

granted the motion in part ruling to suppress any evidence of the clients

statements but denied the remainder of the motion.

94. After respondent agreed that she did not intend to raise the issue of

targeting, she then did so several times during the trial proceedings.

17

95. During the trial, the court called a sidebar, asking respondent:

THE COURT: What are you doing? That was the precise information that you asked be suppressed earlier and I ordered that it would. Now you are asking him to talk about what happened at the stop.

MS. CLYATT: He's already -- no, I am asking him about why he said that to her.

THE COURT: No, no, no, you asked her about pulling out the document and that was part of what we suppressed. You are talking about what they talked -

MS. CLYATT: They put that in

THE COURT: Listen to me. You talked about what they were speaking about to each other at the time he stopped her and now you are asking him to talk about when she was trying to pull something out of what we know was her bag and I have already suppressed that. Do you want that to be heard by the jury?

MS. CLYATT: He testified -

THE COURT: Do you want that to be heard by the jury?

MS. CLYATT: I think they have heard that.

THE COURT: No, ma'am, trust me, I listened very carefully.

MS. CLYATT: Okay, if I misunderstood that, I thought he testified on direct that she was taking things out and I, I, I thought that, but I am trying to remember when he

THE COURT: Ms. Clyatt, I have already ruled on a Motion to Suppress that you asked for. You are about to elicit testimony that you asked to be suppressed.

18

MS. CLYATT: So you want me to stop?

THE COURT: No, I think you need to know that's what you are about to do. See Trial Transcript at pp. 113-115.

96. The court had to caution respondent 2 or 3 times during the trial about

questions concerning her clients statements that had been suppressed by the court

and advise her not to raise this issue without first addressing the situation with her

client about the possible redirect on prior bad acts and prejudice to her clients

case.

97. After the sentencing hearing on the trafficking case, it appeared that

respondent had failed to pursue the grand theft case for which she was initially

hired. Although the client had been sentenced, she could not be transported to

DOC until the grand theft case was completed.

98. On June 1, 2015, the court removed respondent from both criminal

cases, and appointed an assistant public defender who completed the grand theft

case on June 5, 2015, before the court, and filed a notice of appeal on behalf of Ms.

Anderson in the trafficking case.

99. Based on the foregoing, respondent has violated the following Rules

Regulating The Florida Bar: 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct), 4-1.1

(Competence), 4-1.3 (Diligence), 4-1.4 (Communication), 4-1.5 (Fees for Legal

Services), 4-3.2 (Expedite Litigation), 4-8.4(a) (Violate Bar Rules), and 4-8.4(d)

(Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice).

19

COUNT VIII THE FLORIDA BAR, TFB #2017-00,033(14)

100. Respondent represented the wife in a divorce case in Holmes County,

Florida.

101. On June 9, 2016, a hearing was held on the Former Wifes Motion for

Determining Attorneys Fees and Costs filed by respondent.

102. In the Order Determining Former Wifes Attorneys Fees and Costs,

the court found:

At the attorney fee hearing scheduled by Ms. Clyatt, and conducted herein on June 9, 2016, Ms. Clyatt, again, arrived late and brought with her un-filed pleadings to document her requested attorney fees (Ms. Clyatt also arrived late and brought with her multiple untitled and/or oral motions or pleadings at the Final H earing on January 21, 2016). Ms. Clyatt advised the Court that another attorney had reviewed her attorney fee affidavit and that an additional affidavit in support of her requested fees was forthcoming from that attorney, Martha Sister" Blackmon Milligan.

Approximately 30 minutes into the hearing, an affidavit was received via facsimile to the office of the undersigned court in support of said fees. That affidavit was not provided at any time to opposing counsel, Mr. Roberts. That affidavit is not admissible as untimely as objected to by Mr. Roberts.

Ms. Clyatt did testify about the amount and reasonableness of her fees. The Former Husband's counsel, Russell S. Roberts, had the opportunity to cross examine Ms. Clyatt and objected to the admission of Ms. Clyatt's representation letter to the Former Wife and her itemized fee statement totaling $25,201.25 because these were untitled pleadings or documents. The Court reserved ruling on that issue. Upon further consideration, Mr. Robert's objection to the admission of these items is well-made and hereby sustained.

20

http:25,201.25

Even though Ms. Clyatt scheduled the hearing and had at least four weeks to prepare, she did not file or serve any materials supporting or detailing her attorney's fees or costs until the beginning of the hearing. As a result, neither Mr. Roberts nor his witness, Mr. Matthew Fuqua, had a reasonable opportunity to review any information regarding Ms. Clyatt's requested attorney's fees. Therefore, this Court will not consider Ms. Clyatt's untimely filed pleadings. However, due to the "reasonableness" analysis below and for the reasons stated in this order, this Court's ruling would be the same even if Ms. Clyatt's evidence had been admitted.

No testimony was presented regarding the Former Wife's taxable costs in this matter and therefore, none are awarded.

103. In further discussion, the court found that the reasonable attorneys

fee for this type of case in Holmes County was $200 per hour, not the $375 that

respondent was attempting to charge, stating: it contradicts common sense to find

that the former wife should be allowed to retain any attorney in any price range

from anywhere in Florida, to the husband's detriment, especially given the quality

of the legal representation produced in this case.To allow Ms. Clyatt to charge

almost twice what local attorneys charge is to ignore the abundant case law which

instructs the Court to consider the locality of the pending action.

104. In addition, the court found that the number of hours charged by

respondent was also unreasonable. Where opposing counsel charged his client for

approximately 30 hours, respondent claimed to have expended over 60 hours on

21

http:case.To

what the court described as a basic dissolution case and when Respondent was

certainly less prepared for the Final Hearing than opposing counsel.

105. In conclusion, the Court found:

Ms. Clyatt is clearly an extremely intelligent and experienced attorney. But, in this case, she has clearly demonstrated poor performance and a lack of professionalism. Prior to the undersigned being assigned to this matter, there was a previous hearing in which Ms. Clyatt was accused of intentionally misleading the Court about a document found to be in her possession at the hearing. There was certainly some evidence to suggest that she did attempt to mislead that Judge.

Thereafter, when the undersigned judge was involved, there were only two hearings conducted herein (a final hearing and a later hearing on attorney fees). Ms. Clyatt appeared late to Court for both hearings. In both hearings, she began the hearings by filing untimely pleadings or making untimely/ redundant motions. Her lack of adequate preparation on behalf of her client for an attorney of her experience was evident at the final hearing.

After the final hearing, this Court gave the parties until February 5, 2016 to submit written closing arguments and proposed final judgments. This date was set by the agreement of the parties and was actually moved forward at the request of Ms. Clyatt. Several days later, Ms. Clyatt requested, and was granted, an extension until noon on February 7, 2016. The extension applied to both parties.

After another extension was thereafter requested by Ms. Clyatt's office and denied, Ms. Clyatt failed to file any written closing arguments or a proposed final judgment at all. Her repeated and re-occurring challenges to the prenuptial agreement were frivolous, resulting in unnecessary litigation and expense. She has consistently been late for court, filed documents at the last minute or

22

failed to file documents at all, and there is evidence that she has been less than candid with the Court.

106. Respondent failed to respond in writing to The Florida Bar.

107. By reason of the foregoing, respondent has violated the following

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 3-4.3 Misconduct and Minor Misconduct; 4-1.1

Competence; 4-1.3 Diligence; 4-3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions; 4-8.4(d)

Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice; and 4-8.4(g) Failure to

respond, in writing to The Florida Bar.

COUNT IX BRENT MILES, TFB #2017-00,084(14)

108. On or about July 22, 2014, Brent Miles (Miles) hired respondent to

represent him in a custody/visitation case. A Retainer Agreement was signed by

both Miles and respondent.

109. At the time, Miles was represented by another attorney.

110. On August 5, 2014, respondent filed a Motion for Substitution and

was assigned to the case on August 18. 2014.

111. Miles immediately began having communication problems with

respondent.

112. On or about November 3, 2014, Miles informed respondent that his

wife had received military orders to report to Beale AFB in California.

113. Miles requested that respondent secure a hearing to obtain summer

visitation with his son.

23

114. On January 13, 2015, respondent filed a Petition for Modification of

Time-Sharing, Fathers Petition for Relocation and Fathers Amended Petition for

Relocation.

115. On April 16, 2015, Miles had a meeting with respondent to discuss a

petition to the court for summer visitation with his son. At that meeting respondent

told Miles that she would have a draft to him within 2 to 3 weeks.

116. When nothing was received, Miles emailed respondent on May 7,

June 3 and June 30, 2015, requesting the status of the draft. No response was

received.

117. Due to respondents inaction, Miles lost the chance to have visitation

with his son over summer vacation.

118. In fact, Miles lack of visitation over that summer was used against

him during the subsequent custody hearing in December 2015.

119. In a lengthy email sent to respondents office on November 2, 2015,

Miles, in discussing setting up a phone conference, pointed out that respondent had

missed 2 previously scheduled appointments. In her response, respondent

neglected to mention scheduling a conference, phone or otherwise.

120. To assist in preparation for the upcoming custody hearing, Mrs. Miles

(Miles current wife) spent several days in respondents office organizing

documents and preparing exhibits for the custody hearing.

24

121. In addition, there were many instances where documents previously

provided by Miles were lost by respondents office and had to be replaced.

122. Both Mr. and Mrs. Miles stated that respondent was totally

unprepared for the hearing and, in fact, was not even remotely familiar with the

case.

123. It was Miles understanding that his bill would be $10,000 for all

work prior to trial, and that he would be notified well in advance if fees were

expected to exceed that amount. Additional fees would be billed monthly

thereafter.

124. According to respondents statement, the $10,000 was spent months

prior to the pre-trial hearing.

125. Miles never received any notification of the increased fees despite his

many attempts to contact respondent and her staff.

126. Miles attempted, as late as November 2016, to resolve his fee issues

with respondent, but neither she, nor her office, made any effort to contact him.

127. By reason of the foregoing, respondent has violated the following

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.3 Diligence; 4-1.4 Communication; 4-1.5

Fees for Legal Services; 4-3.2 Expedite Litigation; and 4-8.4(d) Conduct

Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice.

25

WHEREFORE, The Florida Bar respectfully requests that respondent be

appropriately disciplined in accordance with the provisions of the Rules Regulating

The Florida Bar as amended, in Counts I through IX.

Olivia Paiva Klein, Bar Counsel The Florida Bar Tallahassee Branch Office 651 East Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300 (850) 561-5845 Florida Bar No. 970247 oklein@flabar.org

ADRIA E. QUINTELA Staff Counsel The Florida Bar Lakeshore Plaza II, Suite 130 1300 Concord Terrace Sunrise, Florida 33323 (954) 835-0233 Florida Bar No. 897000 aquintel@flabar.org

26

mailto:aquintel@flabar.orgmailto:oklein@flabar.org

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that this document has been furnished via the E-filing Portal to The Honorable John A. Tomasino, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida with a copy provided to Clyde Taylor, Jr. Respondent's Counsel, at cl@taylor-taylor-law.com; using the E-filing Portal and that a copy has been furnished by United States Mail via certified mail No. 7014 2120 0003 2092 9172, return receipt requested to Respondent's Counsel, whose record bar address is Taylor & Taylor P.A., 2303 N. Ponce de Leon Blvd., Ste. L, St. Augustine, FL 32084-2606 and via email to Olivia Paiva Klein, Bar Counsel, at oklein@flabar.org, on this 5th day of July, 2017.

ADRIA E. QUINTELA Staff Counsel

27

mailto:oklein@flabar.orgmailto:cl@taylor-taylor-law.com

NOTICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL AND DESIGNATION OF PRIMARY

EMAIL ADDRESS

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the trial counsel in this matter is Olivia Paiva Klein, Bar Counsel, whose address, telephone number and primary email address are The Florida Bar, Tallahassee Branch Office, 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, (850) 561-5845 at oklein@flabar.org. Respondent need not address pleadings, correspondence, etc. in this matter to anyone other than trial counsel and to Staff Counsel, Adria E. Quintela, The Florida Bar, Lakeshore Plaza II, Suite 130, 1300 Concord Terrace, Sunrise, Florida 33323, at aquintel@flabar.org.

MANDATORY ANSWER NOTICE

R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.6(h)(2), EFFECTIVE MAY 20, 2004, PROVIDES THAT A RESPONDENT SHALL ANSWER A COMPLAINT.

28

mailto:oklein@flabar.orgmailto:aquintel@flabar.org

the florida bars COMPLAINTCount I - The Florida bar, tfb #2016-00,112(14)count ii the florida bar, tfb #2016-00,129(14)count iii - Anna Marie Morrissey, tfb #2016-00,254(14)count iv - Margie Langford, tfb #2016-00,460(14)count v Debbie davis, tfb #2016-00,514(14)count vi - Edward Pons, tfb #2016-00,591(14)count vii ashley anderson, tfb #2016-00,622count VIII the florida bar, tfb #2017-00,033(14)COUNT IX BRENT MILES, TFB #2017-00,084(14)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICENOTICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL AND DESIGNATION OF PRIMARY EMAIL ADDRESSMANDATORY ANSWER NOTICE