Chapter IV

THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA AND ITS

IMPACT ON INDONESIAN-PHILIPPINF.

RELATIONS

lndopesia-Malaya Relations

Although diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaya

were established only after the latter gained independence in 1957,

ties between the two countries had already existed for a long

period. Malays and Indonesians have common historical, geographical,

racial and cultural background. Like Filipinos, Indonesians and the

Malays too regard the Malay people as their common ancestors. with

the arrival of the wPstern colonial powers, the Indonesians, the

Malays and the Filipinos were separaten from one another.

Unlike in Indonesia and the Philippines, there existed no

significant political party in Malaya during the British colonial

period. ( 1) The existence of multiracial society in Nalaya, comp-

rising largely of Chinese, Indians and Indonesians, made the forma-

tion of sound political party which would cover the interest of the

Whole society difficult. As a consequence, there emerged various

political parties, and other social movements based on the concept

of racial strength in the society, rather than a national

movement. (2)

( 1) J. Norman Palmer, "Malaya and Singapore", in George McTurnan Kahin, ed., Goyernwents and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New York, 1959), p. 245.

{2) For a detailed account on the Malay political movement in this period see Radin Soenarno, 11Malay Nationalism, 1896-1941", Journal So11theast Asian Historv (Singa~ore), Vol. 1, No.1, March 1960, and also William R. Roff, ~~e Persatuan Melayu Selangor, an early Malay Political Association", in ibid., Vol. IX, No. 1, March 1968.

1G2

It was not until after the end of thP. Second World War, that

political parties on national basis began to emerge in Malaya. A

small number of 1-ialay nationalists, founded the first political party,

called Malay Nationalist Party as Parly as 1948. It is obvious that

the emergence of the first political party in Malaya took place,

following the proclamation of Inaonesian independence in 1945. Soon

the Mal83 Nationalist Party was banned by the British Government,

because it was suspected as being too radical and pro-Indonesian in

its outlook. Towards the 1950s a new political party based on Malay

nationalism was established - i.e. United Malays National organiza-

tion ( ID-1NO). The emergence of nationalism in l1alaya during this

period coincided with the communist insurgency within the country,

and the war of independence in Indonesia. Many Malay political

leaders sympathized with the Indonesian struggle for independence.

Malay citizens who were in Indonesia during this period, fought

along with the Indonesians against the Dutch, who attempted to re-

capture their former colony.

While the 1-ialay nationalists trere determined to achieve inde-

pendence through peaceful means, thP Malayan Communists on the other

hand made frantic efforts to oust the British colonial power from

Malaya by force. It should be noted however, that the Malayan

Communist movement was confined mainly to the local Chinese. The

Co~unists obtained their strength during the Japanese occupation

in l'iala_ya. The Allied Forces rendered war material to the Commun-

ists, who called themselves guerillas, to fight against the Japanese.

1Nhen the British returned to Malaya after the tolar \'iSS over, the

Communists were permitted to carry out their political activities

1C3

from the time being. However, When the t1alayan Communists began to

use their aggressive tactics, and Pven force, the British proclaimed

a State of F.mergency in latP. 1948. The proclamation of Communist

Emergency in Malaya was preceded by the formation of the Federation

of Malaya in February 1, 1948. (3) Attempts by the British, and

later by the Malay leaders themselves to make peace with the

Communists always met with failure, and it was only in 1960, that

the l1alayan Emergency finally ended. (4)

When Tengku Abdul Rahman was still Chief Minister, and Malaya

had yet to achieve its independence, he made his first state visit

to Indonesia from November 8 to 16, 1955. A joint-communique issued

on November 14, 1955, provided for cooperation in the educational

and cultural fields. Malaya and Indonesia were to develop the Indo-

nesian and Malay languages. Both Governments agreed to exchange

experts in agriculture and, to improve trade relations between North

Sumatra and Penang. Following Tengku's visit, the Indonesian Consu-

late in Kuala Lutnpur was raised to the level of Consulate-General.

In 1955 Indonesia was host to the first Asian-African Con-

ference. As Malaya had not yet achieved full independence, it was

represented only by observers. Following the attainment of Malayan

independent on August 31, 1957, Indonesia elevated the status of

its Consulate-General in Kuala Lumpur to the Embassy level, and Mr.

Mohammad Razif was appointed as Indonesia's first Ambassador to the

Federation of Malaya. Similarly, Malayan mission in Djakarta became

an Embassy, with Enche' Senu bin Abdul Rahman as first Malayan

(3) Palmer, n. 1, P 253.

(4) Ibid., PP 281-2.

Ambassador to Indonesia. (5)

The attainment of Malayan independence coincided with the

brewing of political conflicts in Indonesia. Thus, barely six

months after Malaya and Indonesia established full diplomatic rela-

tions, rebellions broke out in Sumatra and Sulawesi. It was during

the PRRI/PFBMESTA rebellion that the first major diplomatic issue

betl-reen Indonesia and Malaya took place. When the rebel leaders

sensed that their revolt \.fas bound to fail, they took refuge in

Malaya and asked for political asylum. Apart from its sympathetic

attitude sholm towards rebellion the Malayan Government gave protec-

tion to some of the rebel leaders. (6)

During these crucial years of 1958-1960, ~ndonesia and Malaya

continued to maintain their relationship. This was clearly demons-

trated by the good intention of both Malayan and lndonesian leaders.

In November 1958, for instance, the Malayan Deputy Prime Minister,

Tun Abdul Razak led a goodwill mission to Indonesia. (7) In April

1959, the Prime Minister of Indonesia, Dr. Djuanda, paid a return

visit to Malaya, and concluded a Treaty of Friendship between the

two countries in Kuala Lumpur. (8)

( 5)

(6)

(7)

{8)

As early as 1950 and 1951, President Sukarno had paid state

Malaya/In~ones!a RP,lations, published by the Government of Malaysia Kuala Lumpur, 1963), p. 1.

Ibid., P 5.

Ibid., PP 1-2.

Pewarta Kem1u (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin), published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, Vol. v, Nos. 1 to 4, January to April 1959, PP 1136-8. (hereinafter Penarta Kem1u>

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visit to New Delhi ana Manila respectively. Since 1956 he took

personal diplomacy, which led to the frequent state visits to almos1

all countries in the world. It is strange however, that he failed

to pay any single state visit to neighbouring Malaya. Hanna was of

the opinion that "Bung Karno, ubiquitous state visitor that he is

has not yet taken Malaya up on its standing invitation to visit the

Federation, just possibly he is aware that not only the political

attitudes but the economic contrasts and comparison are not in his

favour". (9) Eversince IndoQ.esia successfully achiP-ved its indepen

dence through thP revolutionary method, most of its people tried to

undermine other nations who obtained independence by peaceful means.

This kind of general feelings among the population was cleverly

exploited by the leaders of Indonesia during this period for their

own interests. Thus, President Sukarno's attitude towards Malaya,

was based more or less on this kind of feeling. (10)

Philippine-Ma1aya Relations

Although Filipinos belong to the same Malay racial and cul-

tural background, the people of Malaya generally feel much closer t

( 9) Willard A. Hanna, Seguel to Colonialism (New York, 1965), PP 189-90.

( 10) "Indonesians are extremely anti-colonial in outlook and they show contempt for the Malayan leaders because the Malays remain in close alliance with their former master. The Indonesians comparing the Malayan independence movement with their own come to the conclusion that the Halayans have been deprlved of their rightful revolution, and that Malaya to this day remains a British colony in everything except in name", }tlohammad Ayoob, "The Interpretation of Indonesian Neutralism", in EaSt West Center Reviel{ (Honolulu), Vol. 1, No. 3, February 1965, p. 37.

lti6

the Indonesian people. This was due to the dissimilarity of reli-

gion, cultural outlook, colonial master etc. between Filipinos and

the rest of the t-ialays. Nevertheless, during the emergence of early

nationalism in the Philippines, particularly in the Rizal era, the

feeling of oneness with the Malay identity was already propagated.

Iounger Filipino nationalist leaders in the years of American occu-

pation, also spread out the idea of the so-called Malay irredenta.

W.Q. Vinzon, Manuel Quezon and others supported the idea of Malayan

regionalism. When the Philippines attained independence in 1946,

its leaders, chiefly Quir1no, also initiated the idea of regional-

ism in South-East Asia by convening the historic Baguio Conference

of 1950.

Although Philippine-Malayan relations were established as

early as 1957 following the attainment of Malayan independence, the

first full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level were

only established in 1962, when V.alaya appointed its first Ambassador

to the Philippines. (ll)

While Indonesian-Malayan relationship from 1957 to 1960

experienced many unhappy moments, Malayan-Philippine ties on the

other hand continued to be friendly. As a matter of fact, both

(ll) Halaya/fbiligpine Relations, Published by the Government of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1963), p. l. Until 1962, the Philip-pines' mission in Kuala Lumpur was represented by its Ambas-sador to Thailand, While the Malayan mission in Hanila was under the care of a Charge' d' Affa~s/Legation. See t1ala,ya Yearbook 1959 (Kuala Lumpur) , and also "Relations Bet\teen Federated Malaya and the Philippines", speech delivered by Christopher Thomas Ewart-Briggs, British Consul and Concur-rently First Secretary, British Embassy, Manila, before a symposium at Araneta University (Manila), Closer Ties Between the Filipino and Malay Peoples (Manila), March 16, 1958, PP 28-29.

1G7

Malaya and the Philippines were suspPCted by Indon~sia of siding

with the Indonesian rebels. It was in this period of cordial r~~a

tions between Malaya and the Philippines, that the idea of regional

cooperation in South-East Asia reemerged. The idea came from i-~alaya,

when the Prime Minister of that country visited the Philippines in

January 1959. Re, then introduced the subject on January 3, 1959,

at Manila. Tengku Abdul Rahman said that the proposed association

was for stabilizing economy and politics of all countries of South-

East Asia. (12} This time cooperation was sought between Malaya,

Thailand and the Philippines. The response of the Philippines

towards the proposal of Tengku Abdul Rahman was very favourable.

In February 1961, President Carlos Garcia paid a return state visit

to Kuala Lumpur, preceded by the meeting of Foreign Ministers of

the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand to do preliminary work about

the formation of South-F.ast Asia regional association. At the out-

set, the Philippine Foreign Minister said in the Malayan capital

that the regional grouping of South-Rast Asian countries which he

had in mind would be valuable even if nations such as Burma and

Indonesia did not join it. But later in the joint-communique issued

by the Foreign 1-Unisters of Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines,

it was agreed that the sponsoring countries would not wish to

exclude other countries in South-East Asia from participating in this

organization should they so desire, and apply to join. (13} Prime .

(12) Ma1a~s1a, Bulletin issued by the Malayan High Commission in New Delhi, 20 March 1963.

( 13) Asian Recorder (New Delhi), March 26-April 1, 1961.

1GB

Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman sent lP.ttPrs to almost all leaders in

South-Fast Asia, inviting them to join th@ proposed regional asso-

ciation of South~East Asia. In the opinion of the Indonesian leaders

during this period, Afro-Asian cooperation was more significant than

the regional activities. with this in mind, and with the unfavour-

able state of relations between the Philippines and Indonesia, and

Indonesia and Malaya, Indonesia did not wish to join the associa-

tion. (14) Apart from the aforementioned reasons, Indonesia sus-

pected that the proposed Association of South-East Asian Nations as

being inspired by the SEATO. ( 15) Finally on July 31, 1961, the

Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASA), comprised of the

Philippines, Malaya and Thailand was formally established.

Malaya and West Irian Issue

When Indonesia first brought up the West Irian issue to the

United Nations, V.alayan policy towards this issue was far from

clear. This was due to the uneasy relations between the two countr-

ies following the PRRI/PERM'FSTA affairs. ~

1G9

should like once again to reiterate that, in the view or my delega-

tion, the question of West Irian is one of vestigal colonialism, and

it is in this light that we must express our concern in this

matter." ( 16}

In 1960, anxious to restore and str~ngthen relations between

Malaya and Indonesia, Tengku Abdul Rahman took the initiative to

mediate in the West Irian conflict. He forwarded proposals to the

Indonesian President to solve the west Irian problem. At the same

time he approached the Netherlands Government, the United Nations

Secretary-General and the United States in an attempt to solve the

west Irian issue. (17} The Tengku's proposals were to seek the

Indonesian and Netherlands agreement for a temporary UN Trusteeship,

as an intermediate step leading to the eventual transfer of West

Irian to Indonesia. (18)

The Tengku's mediation efforts had been wrongly interpreted

by the Indonesian leaders. Indonesian public opinion accused the

Tengku of meddling too much in Indonesian affairs. (19}

When President Sukarno announced the so-called Three-fold

People's Command (Trikora- Trikomando Rakjat} for liberating West

Irian by force, he also invited volunteers from friendly countries

to join the Indonesian volunteer corps. The Malayan people quickly

(16) Ibid., PP 7-8.

(17) Ibid., PP 8-9.

(18) Ibid., P 9.

(19) Ibid., PP 39-41.

170

~esponded to the Indonesian appeal. It was reportPd that about

2,600 Malayan volunteers registered themselves at the Indonesian

Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Although there was a wide publicity of

the arrival of Malayan and Singaporean volunteers, in reality there

were perhaps about one hundred volunteers. (20)

lndoaesian-Sinaaoare Helat~ons

As in the case of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore too has

its special relationship with Indonesia. Apart from being the trade-

centre of South-East Asia, its geographical proximity to Indonesia,

Singapore was also the hub of colonial and anti-colonial activities

in pre-war time. One need not, therefore, wonder, that nationalist

leaders of South-East Asia used Singapore as their base for launch-

ing their independence movement. It was in Singapore in the 192os,

that Tan Malaka, Indonesian nationalist-communist leader, launched

his manoeuvre against the Dutch and British colonial authorities.

The first Malay political party, Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (KMS or

Singapore Malay Union), was founded in Singapore on May 14, 1926. (21)

In the early days of the Indonesian revolutionary struggle between

1945-1949, Singapore became the centre of Indonesian supply mission.

(20)

(21)

For further details on the arrival of ~1al~an and Singaporean volunteers in Djakarta, see Indonesian Hera1d, 24 April 1962, which stated that a total of 35 Singaporean volunteers arrived in Djakarta. See also Indonesian Hera1d, 23 May 1962, and 7 July 1962. The latter reported the arrival of 73 Halayans and 15 Singaporeans to join Indonesian volunteers.

Radin Soenarno, n. 2, pp. 9-10; see also Justus M. Van der Kroef, Communi~m in Ma1aysia and Sin"agore (The Hague, 1967) , pp. 16-17.

Realizing the strategic position of this island as the trade

centre in South-Fast Asia, the Singapore Government pursued close

and friendly relations with its neighbours, particularly Indonesia.

Similarly, Indonesia too needs Singapore as its entrepot, for its

material, mostly processed in Singapore, and for importing many

commodities. The first Indonesian mission, headed by a Consul-

General in Singapore was concurrently accredited as Consulate in

the Federation of Malaya. Even before Singapore achieved its inde-

pendent status, exchange of visits took place between various

gover~ent leaders. The first Singapore Government delegation led

by David Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore, visited Indone-

sia, between September 8-12, 1955. The joint-communique issued by

the Indonesian and the Singapore Governments stressed the need for

improving economic and trade relations between the two countries.

Like Malaya, Singapore too was very much affected by the

activities of the PRRI/PFRMESTA rebels. The Indonesian Government

found it necessary to post a highranking army officer to head the

Indonesian Mission in Singapore during this crucial period. Two

groups of students' delegation from the University of Malaya in

Singapore, visited Indonesia in 1957 and 1959 respectively. The

purpose of the second visit was particularly to give the Malayan

and Singaporean intellectuals eye-witness evidences, that Indonesia

was not in a chaotic condition as the result of the rebellions in

Sumatra and Sulawesi. The Indonesian Government too wanted to prove

to the 1-lal.ayan and Singaporean students that the Communists were

not in power, contrary to the rebels' claim. (22)

(22) Personal information.

When Singapore achieved statehood, and Lee Kuan ~ew became

Prime Minister, he immediately paid a state visit to Indonesia, on

January 19, 1960. In his welcoming address, First Minister Djuanda

stressed the existence of cordial relations between Indonesia and

Singapore, apart from being close neighbours. In his reply Prime

MinistP~ Lee Kuan Yew said, that had they not been separated by the

European colonialists, relations among Malaya, Singapore ann Indone-

sia would hav~ been closer. He further stated that the struggle of

the Indonesian people against the Dutch for their independence had

become the source of inspiration for the nationalists in Singapore.

They paid full attention to the efforts of the Indonesian people to

overcome the stagnancy of their development, caused by centuries old

negligence of the Dutch colonialist. (23) In 1961, following the

visit of Singapore Minister of Trade, Indonesia ana Singapore con-

cluded a Trade Agreement.

West Irian Settlement apd Malaysia

For Indonesia to convince world public opinion that it wanted

to liberate West Irian only and nothing more, was very essential.

To liberate West Irian then seemed to be the sole intention of Indo-

nesia. In 1957, the Indonesian Chief Delegate to the United Nations,

Ali Sastroamidjojo, told a press conference in New York, that Indo-

nesia did not have any desire to possess the territories of British

Borneo, after the West Irian issue was settled. (24) During the

(23) Pewarta Kem1n, Vol. VI, No. 1-2, 1960, PP 198-99.

(24) Ibid., Vol. III, No. 11-12, November-December 195?, p. 802.

1':3

visit of the Indonesian President to Portugal in 1960, he deemed it

necessary to stress that Indonesia did not have any intention to

liberate Portuguese Timor. (25) Indonesia wished the return of

West Irian territory only, since it belonged to the former Nether-

lands East Indies.

During the year 1961, Indonesia's policy of non-alignment

was at its height, when it attended the first Non-Aligned Conference

in Belgrade, and domestically, Indonesian politicians and leaders

were in f~ver of Guided Democracy idea. The campaign for West

Irian liberation too, reached its climax, Wh~n President Sukarno

ordered thP. recruitment of volunteers, and was det~rmiaed to

liberate West Irian by force.

Heavily preoccupied by the west Irian campaign, Guided Demo-

cracy, and the successes gained after the rebellions had been

completely crushed, as well as in its non-aligned foreign policy,

Indonesian leaders hardly paid any attention to the happenings that

took place in Malaya. Thus, when Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman

made his historic speech to Foreign Correspondents Club in Singapore

on May 27, 1961, proposing the establishment of Mal~sia, Indonesia

did not react sharply. Indonesia's attitude at that time was

indicated by the speech of the former Indonesian Foreign Minister

Subandrio, When he delivered a speech in the United Nations General

Assembly in Ne\11 York:

(25) fewa.rta Degartemen Lnar Negeri (Department of Foreign Affairs Bulletin, hereinafter Pm:rsrta>, Published by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, Vol. VI, Nos. 3-4, 1960, P 601.

We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies, though they are of the same island, but - more than that - when Malaya told us of its intentions to merge with the three British Crown Colonies of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that we had no objections and that we wished them success with this merger so that everyone might live in peace and freedom.

For the sake of clarification, I may tell this Assembly that three-quarters of the island of Borneo is Indonesian territory, while the remainders constitute the aforementioned three British Crown Colonies. ~;t~. Naturally, ethnologically and geographically speaking, this British part is closer to Indonesia than, let us say, to ~1alaya. But we still told 14alaya that \ITe had no objection to such a merger, based upon the will for freedom of tht? people concerned. (26)

At the outset, the proposal to merge the threa northern

Borneo territories, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya into

Tengku' s proposal for a Federation of Malaysia received an unfavour-

able response, particularly from the Bornean loaders. They feared

that once their territories were merged into ~1alaysia their own

interests would be neglected by their greater and more advanced

partners. (27) It was in this context that the North Bornean poli-

tical leaders began to organize themselves by forming the so-called

United Front, with A.M. Azahari representing the Party Ra'ayat

(People's Party) of Brunei, Ong Kee Hui of the Sarawak United

People's Party (SUPP) and Donald Stephens of the United Kadazan

Organization (UNKO) of Sabah. {28) The formation of this United

(26) UNGA, 16th Session, Official Records, lOSBth Plenary Meeting, Doc. A/PV 1058.

{27) James P. Ongk111, 'the Jlorneo Response to Ma1aysia ),961-1963, (Singapore, 1967), pp. 26-27.

(28) Straits Times (Singapore), July 10, 11, 1961.

1is

Front took place after Sir Alexander ~'iaddell, Governor of Saral'rak,

Sir william Goode, Governor of Sabah, and Hr. D.C. white, British

High Commissioner to Brunei, held discussions on the Malaysia pro-

posal with Lord Selkirk, the British High Commissioner to South-

East Asia in Singapore, on June 2627, l96l. Within Malaya and

Singapore too, the Mal~sia proposal did not go tUlopposed. The

Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) and certain socialist parties in

Malaya and Singapore opposed it. It was a real fight for the Singa-

pore leader, Prime l-iinister Lee Kuan Yew, to convin.ce his countrymen,

of the advantage of becoming a member state of the Federation of

Malaysia. It is '-torthy to note, that the day following Tengku' s

announcement of Malaysia's proposal, Straits Times, the leading

newspaper of Malaya and Singapore, statP.d that in carrying out such

a great Federation scheme, " the reactions of Britain, the con-

trolling power in the three North Borneo states, and of Indonesia

would be a 'most important factor in realizing the plan"'. (29)

In the course of developments however, Tengku Abdul Rahman

was able to mute the opposition somewhat. An opportunity arose when

the leaders of Mal83a, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei came to

Singapore to attend the eighth regional conference of the Common-

wealth Parliamentary Association. Thanks to Tengku Abdul Rahman's

tactful approach, and with the support of Prime Minister of Singa-

pore, Lee Kuan Yew, the radical challenge of the Bornean leaders to

the Malaysia proposal was changed to a posture of compromise. (30)

( 29) Ibid., May 29, 1961. Emphasis added.

(30) Ibid., July 22, 1961.

1':6

The Malaysia proposal emerged much stronger from this Commonwealth

Parliamentary Conference with thA formation of the Malaysia Soli-

darity Consultative Committee (MSCC) to rally support from all walks

of life in the regions intended to be covered by l'1alaysia. (31)

From August 1961, to February 1962, the MSCC held four meetings in

J essel ton (Sabah), Kuching (Sarawak), Kuala Lumpur and Singapore to '

discuss the pros and cons of the Malaysia proposal. It was at its

last meeting in Singapore that the delegates from Sabah, Sarawak,

Malaya and Singapore finally reached agreement on the formation of

~1alaysia. {32)

It should be noted, however, that long before the consensus

was reached by the MSCC, the Malayan and the British Government had

concluded a new agreement. The substance of the new agreement was

primarily to extend the existing defAnce agreement of 1957 with

Malaysia. ThP. other important decision taken during the meeting

between the British and l-1alayan Prime Ministers was the esta,fish-

ment of a Commission to asc~rtain the attitudes of the peoples of

Sabah and Sarawak towards the Malaysia plan. The Commission was

headed by Lord Cobbold. Its other members were Sir Anthony Abell

and Sir David ~atherston (nominated by the British GoYernment) ; and

two members nominated by the Malayan Government: Dato Wong Pow Nee

and Muhammed Ghazali bin Shafie.

As stated previously, at the beginning, the Indonesian

Government's reaction to the tt.alaysia proposal was favourable. The

(31) Ibid., July 28, 1961.

(32) Ibid., February 2, 1962.

177

PKI, on the other hand, sharply denounced the British and Malayan

plan to establish Malaysia, and to preserve the British military

presence. The PKI's opposition was clearly demonstrated in its

Third Plenary Meeting in Djakarta in December 1961. Owing to its

preoccupation with the West Irian Campaign, Indonesian public opi-

nion generally paid attention neither to the Malaysia proposal

itself, nor to the sharp reaction of the PKI.

Preparation for Malf\YSia

The Cobbold Commission proceeded to Sarawak and Sabah on

February 19, 1962, to ascertain the views of the peoples of these

territories, and completed the task on April 17, 1962. (33) Accord-

ing to the Commission's report:

About one-third of the population in each territory strongly favours early realisation of Mal~sia without too much concern about terms and conditions. Another third, many of them favourable to the Malaysia project, ask, with varying degrees of emphasis, for conditions and safeguards varying in nature and extent: the ~Tarmth of support among this category would be markedly in-fluenced by a firm expression of opinion by Governments that the detailed arrangements eventually agreed upon are in the best interests of the territories. The re-maining third is divided between those who insist on independence before Malaysia is considered and those Who would strongly prefer to see British rule continue for some years to come. If the conditions and reser-vations which they have put forward could be substan-tially met, the second category referred to above t-Iould generally support the proposals. Moreover, once a firm decision was taken quite a number of the third category would be likely to abandon their opposition and decide to make the best of doubtful job. There will remain a hard core, vocal and politically active, Which will oppose ~alaysia on any terms unless it is preceded by

(33) Ongkili, n. 27, p. 64.

J 78

independence and self-government: this hard core might amount to near 20 per cent of the population of Sara-wak and somewhat less in North Borneo. (34)

In August 1962, Lord Cobbold submitted his Commission's

findings to the British and Malayan Governments. The two govern-

ments were of the opinion that, judging by the Cobbold Commission

report, the atmosphere for creating a Federation of Malaysia was . favourable in the Sabah and Sarawak territories. The two govern-

ments agreed that the transfer of sovereignty in North Borneo,

Sarawak and Singapore would take place on August 31, 1963. The

two governments also informed the Brunei Sultanate of the agreement,

saying the British and l~alayan Governments would welcome the admis-

sion of Brunei in the 14alaysian Federation. There was no particu-

lar problem in the way of Singapore merging with Malaysia, since

the People's Action Party, with the strong bacKing of Prime Minister

Lee Kuan 'Xew, were in favour of Malaysia. This was clearly indicated

through the outcome of a referendum held on September 3, 1962, which

favoured Singapore's merger with Malaysia. (35)

The Sultan of Brunei's cold response to Malaysia can be

attributed to his fear of losing his rich oil revenue once Brunei

merged into Malaysia. In the sequel, however, Brunei's apathy

towards Malaysia encouraged the radicals in the northern Borneo

territories to oppose the measure. The Party Ra' ayat of Brunei

under the leadership of A.M. Az;ahar1 obtained a majority of seats

(34) H.M.s.o., Report of the Commission of Enguiry, North Borneo and Sarawa1r, Aueust 1962, Cm.nd. 1794.

(35) State of Sineapore Annual Report 1962, p. 24.

179

in the election to the Brunei State Legislative Assembly. Azahari

was reported to be suspected of being a pro-Indonesian Communist.

In the midst of the hectic preparation for Malaysia, and encouraged

by the victory of Party Ra'ayat of Brunei, Azahari proclaimed the

"Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara" (Unitary State of North Kaliman-

tan) Following the proclamation of the Azahari "Government", a

revolt broke out in Brunei. During all this period Azahari was not

in Brunei or any other state or northern Borneo, but in the capital

of the Philippines. However, owing to the miscalculated strategy

of the rebel leader, Azahari, the rebellion was quickly suppressed

by the British forces. Contrary to Azahari' s expectation the rebel-

lion did not spread through the entire northern Borneo terri-

tories. (36)

Indonesia and the k1alays1a Plan

Before the Azahari rebellion broke out, Indonesian leaders

were still unaware or the rapid pace at which events were moving

towards realization of the Mal~sia plan. Indonesia's attitude at

this juncture was quite understandable, since it had just reached

agreement on the solution or the West Irian dispute in August 1962.

As late as November 1962, Indonesia's Vice-Chairman of the Supreme

Advisory Council, Roeslan Abdulgan1, upon his return from his un-

official visit to Malaya, said that he saw " positive and nega-

tive points in the plan to merge Singapore and the British Borneo

territories into a Malaysia Federation. The plan is still

(36) Straits Times, Dec ember 13, 15, 1962.

JSO

developing. Personally, I welcome any new country around us that

wants to get rid of colonial cha1ns11 (37)

Since its Plenary Meeting in December 1961, the PKI had

remained radical in its attitude to\'lards the Malaysia Plan. By

clever manoeuvring, the PKI was able to swing Indonesian general

public opinion to its side. Step by step the PKI implemented the

December Resolution to denounce the Malaysia Plan.

The PKI's activities were not the only source of inspiration

for Indonesia's hardening attitude towards Malaysia. When Indone-

sia was about to reach a peaceful settlement of the ~lest-Irian issue,

another new development occurred. This time, Indonesian political

leaders under President Sukarno tried to influence sport for politi-

cal purposes. In October 1962, Indonesia was host to the Fourth

Asian Games. Owing to the pressures from Communist China and the

Arab countries, Indonesia did not extend invitations to Nationalist

China and Israel. (38)

President Sukarno desired to have the most perfect Asian

sport event, ever held in Indonesia. For this purpose, he did not

hesitate to pour out a vast sum of money to erect a huge stadium,

a prestige hotel, and other projects. Although in the long run

those projects seemed to be beneficial to the Indonesian people,

the general situation at this time was far from favourable. In the

West Irian campaign alone, Indonesia had used up nearly 70% of its

(37)

(38)

~alaysin/Indonesia Relat1ons, n. 5, p. 13.

It was reported that invitations had been sent to Nationalist China and Israel, but visas for them were denied. Personal information.

JSJ

annual state expenditure. Thus, by the time Indonesia was about to

reach a peaceful agreement \>lith the Dutch on the ~>Jest Irian issue in

the middle of 1962, the economic situation "1as in a critical stage. (39)

Certainly the additional spending for staging the Fourth Asian Games

further aggravated Indonesian economic condition. In the face of a

rebuff from the International olympic Committee over Indonesia's refu-

sal to admit Nationalist China and Israel to the Asian Games in

Djakarta, the Indonesian President determined to hold the so-called

Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANFFu) Despite the stoppage of

military confrontation towards West Irian, Indonesia continued to seek

a challenge in neH development, Which was quite in line with Sukarno' s

thesis of unfinished revolution. That is, the world should be on

permanent revolution as long as colonialism and imperialism exist, and

IndonPsia should lead this revoluticnary movem~nt.

It was in this kind of atmosphere that the Azahari-led revolt

broke out in Brunei on December 8, 1962. Although it took IndonPsian

Government leaders nearly three IUonths to outline a definite confron-

tation policy against Malaysia, the case of the .1\Zahar i rebellion

itself brou~ht a favourable reaction from the Indonesian radicals,

notably the PKl. The Indonesian Government's attitude towards Malay-

sia and its sympathy towards the Brunei revolt had a background. The

peaceful settlement of the West Irian campaign resulted in the idle-

ness of the Indonesian armed Forces, and the Indonesian volunteers

(39) See a periodical report of the Government, delivered by Presi-dent Sukarno before the Second General Session of the People's Provisional Consultative AssPmbly on May 15, 1963, at Bandung, in Ambeg Parama-Arta (to give priority to important matters), Published by th~ Information Centre, Navy of th~ Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta, n.d.), pp. 25-26.

182

corps, Who were braced for the invasion of WP.St Irian. With the

state treasury almost empty, it was impossible for the Indonesian

Government to demobilize this huge army. Some economic reform pro-

gramme, however, had been planned after the peaceful settlement of

the West Irian problem.

As mentioned earlier, during the West Irian campaign, Indo-

nesia categorically stated that it had no claims to other territor-

ies besides the former Netherlands Indies. Even as late as November

1961, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio had expressed Indonesia's

support to the Malaysia proposal. Following the Azahari rebellion

however, Indonesia has shifted its attitude from non-involvement to

that of confrontation policy. Most West~rn nations accused Indonesia

of territorial expansionism in launching the confrontation policy.

They based their accusation on Muhammad Yamin's famous theory of

restoring the old Majapahit Rmpire in modern Indonesia. His theory

had been announced again during thP preparation or Indonesia indepen-

dence in 1945. While it might bP. correct to say that the majority

of Indonesians would agree with Yamin's thesis, it would be wrong to

assume that they really wanted to victimize Mala_ysia for the sake of

territorial expansionism. (40)

(40)

The Philippines was quick in reacting to the Malaysia proposal.

For a detailed account on Muhammad Yamin's theory of the terri-tory of the Republic of Indonesia, see his speech before the Grand Session of the Body for Investigating the preparation for Indonesian independence in Djakarta on July 10, 1945, cited in Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Pndani-undang Dasar ~(Preparatory Documents of the 1945 Constitution), Vol. 1 (Djakarta, 1959) , pp. 187-94.

Jsa

Several articles in the newspap~rs and other periodicals during the

1961-1962 period clearly indicated, that the Philippine leaders and

politicians were worried about the Malaysia plan, lest their national

interests were jeopardized by it. Philippine national interests meant

of course the Philippine claim to North Borneo.

When Macapagal became the fifth President of the Philippines

at the end of 1961, the first thing he did was to cement relations

with Indonesia. (41) The Philippines supported the last phase of

the Indonesian struggle to liberate West Irian. In the middle of

1962, the Philippines formally lodged a claim with the British

Government to restore Sabah to the Philippines. The Philippine claim

to North Borneo was actually not new. As early as 1950 when Macapa-

gal was still a Congressman, he industriously worked out a claim on

an island in the Southern Philippines, which he thought belonged to

the Philippines. When he succeeded in obtaining the title to the

Turtle Isle from the British, Macapagal was encouraged to seek

another concession from the British in the form of the territory of

North Borneo. He was quite positive that the British North Borneo

territory once belonged to th~ Sultan of Sulu, whose descendants

were still alive in the Philippines. To prove that his argument was

weil-founded, he conducted intensive research in the Philippines as

well as in the United States, and informed the general public that

the Sultan of Sulu was the legal inheritor of North Borneo's

sovereignty. After thorough research and consultations with legal

experts at home and in the United States, Macapagal finally decided

(41) Interview with Salvador P. Lopez, Quezon City, May 8, 1969.

to table a resolution in theCongress of the Philippines to claim

North Borneo as Philippine territory. Although the Philippine Cong-

ress approved the Macapagal Resolution, there was no further action

in regard to the claim. According to Gordon: "Allegations have been

made that the most elem~ntary forms of corruption were involved in

-the resuscitation of a claim \othich had lain dormant for at least a

generation". (42) Nevertheless, the Philippines had strong motives

for creating an interest in the North Borneo territory as early as

the 1950s~ It was barely two months aftPr the Philippines obtained

independence on July 4, 1946, that the British maae a move to take

over British North Borneo as a colony. (43) As already known, prior

to this period, from Dec ember 29, 1877, to January 22, 1878, Baron

de Overbeck was working here as an agent of the British firm of Dent

Brothers. vn November 1, 1881, the British North Borneo Compaey was

established and granted a royal charter. In 1888, North Borneo

became a protectorate of the British Government.

It was not until 1.962 that l-1acapagal' s interest in the claim

to North Borneo was revived. Macapagal's coming to power at this

juncture ann rapid developm~nt of the .alaysia plan contributed to

the revival of the North Born~o claim. ThP role of thP press in

creating public inter~st in the claim should not be minimized. For

example, Napoleon Rama, a noted Philippine journalist, wrote a

(42) Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Sputheast MJ.a. (New Jersey, 1966), p. 10.

(43) Ma1aysia/Philippine Relations, n. 11. According to Macapagal, from 1950 to 1961 he was forced to be silent on the Philip-pine claim to North Borneo, since he did not have any chance to create public interest in it. Interview with D1osdado Macapagal, Manila, May 16, 1969.

185

series of articles in the Philippine Free Pre~ as early as January

1962. The evolution of the Philippine claim to North Borneo went

hand in hand with developments in the northern Borneo Territories,

for example with the presence of the Cobbold Mission. Naturally,

a section of the norther_n Borneo peoples who opposed the l~alaysia

plan, as clearly brought out in the Cobbold Report, had become a

source of inspiration to the Philippines to go ahead t.Jith its claim

on the territory. It is worth noting that a sizable number of

Philippine immigrants were working there.

Having equipped itself with the necessary evidence, the

Philippines formally lodged.its claim with the British Government

on June 22, 1962. At the beginning the British paid no heed. The

British tended to view the Philippine claim to North Borneo as the

product of newspaper propaganda. (44) And apparently the British

Government was rather reluctant to entertain the Philippine claim,

since North Borneo was about to be merged into Malaysia. The

Philippines seemed to be racing against time. Several factors had

led the Philippines to hasten its claim to North Borneo. In August

1962, the Cobbold Mission submitted its findings to the British and

Malayan Governments, which was followed by the conclusion of an

agre~ment between the two GovPrnments on the formation of Malaysia.

It was in August 1962, too, that Indonesia reached an agreement

with the Dutch to solve the West Irian question.

BPfore the British to~ere able to give a suitable answer to /"

the Phifippine claim, a new development came to the surface in

(44) Gordon, n. 42, p. 18.

186

Brunei. As already mentioned, on December a, 1962, A.M. Azahari, the Chairman of Party Ra'ayat of Brunei, proclaimed the establish-

ment of the Unitary State of North Kalimantan from 11an1la. on the

same date, a rebellion broke out in Brunei. However, the rebellion

was quickly suppressed by the British forces.

Following the North Borneo claim ana opposition to formation

of Malaysia, President Macapagal was compelled to formulate a new

policy to prevent North Borneo merging into Malaysia. A report by

the study group of the University of the Philippines (commissioned

by Macapagal) submitted to President Macapagal, made the following

suggestion among others:

I am suggesting that our government seriously consider unofficially supporting a national movement, led by Filipiuo Muslim leaders, aimed at the recovery of North Borneo from the British before the proposen Federation of Malaysia is born. Our government must not restrain any spontaneous movement nirected toward this end. (45)

The University of the Philippines study team was not only to

seek ways and means to recover North Borneo from the British through

lodging the claim, but to formulate an alternative to frustrate the

Malaysia plan. Out of this University study emerged the idea of a

Greater Malayan Confederation, which would comprise the Philippines,

Malaya, Singapore, and the northern Borneo territories. It was

generally agreed that the main motivation for Macapagal's idea of

creating a Greater Malayan Confederation was

(45)

a means to incorporate North Borneo with the Philippines, or at least keeping alive its claim to the territory. The establishment of the Federation of Malaysia will render

Su~sested Course ot Action on North Borneo, A paper prepared by the University of the Philippines (Quezon City, 196?.), p. 96.

the Philippine claim over North Borneo more difficult to pursue. Therefore, if the Greater Malayan Confederation proposal fails, other alternatives for pursuing the Philip-pine claim are immediately indicated. (46)

1B7

The Philippine claim to North Borneo also was regarded as a

means to project a new Philippine image in the world, especially in

Asia. And, as the University Study Team suggested in connexion with

Philippine action on North Borneo, ttone of the main benefits of such

a policy would be that a direct confrontation with the British

would boost our prestige in the eyes of fellow Asians, who up to no\ot

tend to regard us as American puppets". (47)

Apart from the factors cited above which led to the Philippine

claim to North Borneo, the Philippines' changing relations with

Indonesia and Malaya should also be mentioned. Radical changes

carried out within the Philippines during the first year of the Maca-

pagal Administration attracted Indonesia considerably. For instance,

t-1acapagal changed the Philippine independence day from July 4 to

June 12, which marked the rebirth of Philippine independence through

revolution. Indonesia also noted with keen interest the Philippines'

hardening attitude towards the United States, its North Borneo claim

and its opposition to the Malaysia plan. The changes in Philippine

domestic and foreign policies were heartily welcomed by the Indone-

sian Government, and followed by the fostering of warmer relations

between the two countries. Incidentally, the Philippines' opposition

(46) Ibid.

(47) Ibid.

Jss

to the formation of Malaysia was id~ntical with Innonesia's. As a

consequ~nce of the Philippines' collusion with Indonesia, and its

persistent pursuit of the North Borneo claim, the existing close

relations between the Philippines and Malaya began to deteriorate.

lndonesiaa Controntation

Towards the end of 1962, Indonesia's attitude towards the

Malaysia Plan, from being non-committal, had begun to harden. The

worsening economic situati.on within the country, and the systematic

campaign of the PKI against Malaysia, certainly had a profound

effect upon Indonesian policy makers as well as public opinion. In

the second half of 1962, for example, most Indonesian newspapers

followed the PKI line. Although the Indonesian Government promptly

sided with Azahar1 after the latter proclaimed the Unitary State of

North Kalimantan, the official Indonesian confrontation policy did

not emerge during this period. It was only on F~bruary 11, 1963,

that SubanCJrio, Indon@sian Foreign Minister, denounced the t4.alaysia

Plan, and two days later, President Sukarno declared Indonesia's

confrontation policy against Malaysia.

As stated earlier, it would be incorrect to say that the

Indonesian confrontation policy was due to the desire on the part

or Indonesia for territorial aggrandizement. The Indonesian con-

frontation policy was largely the result of its mounting political

ana economic problems. When the West Irian campaign was over, the

Indonesian Government was about to launch a very sound economic

programme, and end the State of E&ergency. The Inctonesian President

issued the Economic Declaration in May 1963, in a drive for an

JSg

economic stabilization programme. The Indonesian Armed Forces em-

barked on an ambitious civic mission programme, in order to chan-

nelize idle military power into constructive development. The

United States GovernmE?nt too, began to take an interest in the

Indonesian economic rehabilitation programme, as well as the civic

mission of thE~ Indonesian Armed Forces.

Apparently the PKI feared that once the masses enjoyed poli-

tical and economic stability, the PKI would lose its bases for

struggle among the peasant and worker comffiunities. Hence the poli-

tical and economic stabilization programme of the Government should

be blocked as far as possible. The army shoulo not be allowed to

close ranks \'lith the populace. The general situation in Indonesia

in the first quarter of 1963 was not in favour of the PKI. The

frustration of the people was not expressed by attacking Government

policy. Instead, they staged an anti-Chinese riot. The anti-

Chinese riot took place several days before the arrival of Presi-

dent Liu Shaou-Chi of Communist China. In this period, the power

of Sukarno was at its zenith, when hP became almost the idol of

the Indonesian nation. In this year, too, he was appointed Presi-

dent for life by the Provisional People's Ass~bly.

Sukarno's balancing theory was put on trial. Should he

yield to the ~rmy, and along with them build a heal thy Indonesian

economy? vr should he join the progressive-leftists, \'tho were

constantly crying that the Indonesian revolution was still unfini-

shed? At last Sukarno yielded to PKI pressure and sided with them.

In doing so, he was compelled t(J take the PK.l line in denouncing

halay sia. ~nd as tiukarno said, he would become a traitor to his

190

own soul if he did not denounce the neo-colonialist project of

Malaysia.

Fver since President Sukarno han began to take an interest

in p~sonal diplomacy by conducting foreign tours, h~ had promul-

gated the thesis of the Old F.stablisherl Forces anrl the N e11r Fmerging

Forces. Addressing the 15th United Nations G~neral Assembly on

September 30, 1960, in New York, he said:

It may well be that this body should consider whether its members should surrender any part of their sovere-ignty to this international body. But if any such decision is made, it must be made freely ana unanimously ana equally. It must be made by all nations equally, th ancien and the new the emer ent nations and the gld-establ1shed, the developed and the un er- eve o~ed The sovereignty of the newest nation or the smSlles nation is just as preoious, just as inviolable, as the sovereignty of the biggest nation or the oldest nation.. ( 48)

A year later, on September 1, 1961, he developed further his

thesis on the Old F.stablished Forces (OLDEFO) and the New Fmerging

Forces (NFFO), when h~ told the Conference of non-aligned nations

in Belgrade:

Recognize that the conflict between the new, emer-gPnt forces and the old forces of nomination is today coming more and more into promin~nce. And this is not fortuitous. It is coming more into prominence precisely because the new, emergent forces are thrusting them-selves more and more persistently upon the \>Iorld, while the old forces still strive to preserve the old equili-brium, based upon thP exploitation of nation by nation, based upon l'explo1tation de l'hommepar l'homme. (49)

(48) To Build the dgrld An~w, address by President Sukarno,Pub-lished by the Indonesian Permanent Kission to the United Nations (New York, 1960), p. 12. Emphasis added.

(49) Indonesia and the Conference of Lion-a11~ned Countries, address by President Sukarno, Belgrade, 1961 (Ministry of Foreign affairs, rlepublic of lnuonesia, Djakarta, 1962), P 22. Emphasis added.

J 91

Within the Oldefo, President Sukarno categorized those countr-

ies which were not progressive in outlook, mostly those of the

Western-capitalist group. Even those countries Which achieved their

independence through peaceful means, and usually preferred to side

with or be protected by the Western countries, were termed by Sukarno

Oldefo. Malaysia, according to Sukarno, belongerl to this cat~gory.

Newly independent countries, which attained their indepPndence

through revolutionary means, not aligning themselves with any power

blocs, and even those old established nations having radical and

revolutionary vie~rs, were categorized as N efo. Indonesia, at this

period, not only belonged to the N efo, but also served as "the

beacon" (Mertju Suar) of the ~fro-Asian liberation ruovement. In

the State-of-the Nation Address on august 17, 1962, Presiaent

Sukarno said: "The Indonesian Revolution has a UnivtSal Voice.

Everywhere, in the Congo, in Algeria, in Angola, in Egypt, in South-

west Africa, in Cuba, in other Latin American countries, in the

socialist states--everywhere people are listening to the Resonant

Voice of the Indonesian Revolution, everywhere people are listening

to the Universal Voice of the Indonesian Revolution." LsicJ (50)

Sukarno believed that as the beacon of the Nefo Indonesia

should be respected and consulted on every development taking place

in every corner of the globe. It goes without saying that he

claimed to have a spPCial position in South-F.ast Asia. But to his

dismay Tengku Abdul Rahman ann Harold Macmillan reached agreement

on establishing Malaysia. Expressing his anger and frustration,

(50) A Year of Triumfh' address by President Sukarno, Department of Information Djakarta, 1962), p. 43. Emphasis added.

SUltarno said: "we don't want to become just onlookers to all the

changes in the status quo around us 11 (51) As f.ialaysia was con-

sidered to be part of the vldefo, for its alignment with the non-

progressive West, and thus represented Western colonialism and

imperialism in a new form, President Sukarno felt it was his sacred

duty to oppose it. Sukarno was of the opinion that since Indonesia

as a Nero nation constituted a threat to Western interests in South-

East Asia, they would \fant to hamper its progressive movement. As

he put it: "Our revolution is a revolution to implement an idea, a

great idea, and this idea is f~ared by the imperialists, Sisters

and Brothers, it is being feared, and therefore Indonesian Revolu-

tion should be contained, and therefore they created i'1alaysia,

meant for containment " (52)

once the confrontation at~osphere had been created there was

no alternative for Sukarno than to concentrate all attention on

disintegrating Mal~sia, at the expense of economic and political

stabilization in Indonesia. Sukarno's action indeed delighted the

PKI leaders. It was the intention of the PKI that while the Armed

Forces and the majority of the people and politicians turned their

attention on Malaysia, the PKI would be left in peace to consoli-

date its power in thf' country, particularly in Java, which were far

(51)

(52)

Genta Suara ijeyplusi Indonesia (Resonant Voice of the Indo-nesian Revolution), address by PrPsident Sukarno, August 17, 1963, Department of Information (Djakarta, 1963), P 44.

Onward No Retreat - Pntil Ma1wrs1a i Crushed, Address by President Sukarno at the State Palace, Djakarta, 31 August 1964, published by the Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta, 1964), PP 9-11, (trans.).

193

from the front areas.

As during the west Irian campaign, tiukarno used both physical

confrontation and negotiation tactics against Malaysia. (53) Thus,

even while denouncing and launching guerilla attacks against Malaysia,

he never missed an opportunity to conduct peaceful talks with the

Malaysian leaders. In the words of Subandrio:

What is to be regretted is that the confrontation policy has to be adopted against an Asian country, a neighbour-ing country. We have always been pursuing a confronta-tion policy against colonialism and imperialism in all its manifestations. It is unfortunate that Malaya, too, has lent itself to become tool of colonialism and imper-ialism. That is why we are compelled to adopt a policy of confrontation. Once again I say, this does not mean we are going to war. iJie can also pursue a confrontation policy without war. Indonesia from no\'I on \-till take an active attitude towards their hostile attitude. (54)

Tbe ftole of Macagaga1 in the Mal.avsia D,\sgute

President l~acapagal had to take bold steps to give substance

to his new foreign policy. Apart from safeguarding his own interests

in the form of the tiabah claim, Macapagal attellipted to mediate the

Indonesian-Malayan dispute on the formation of t4alaysia. on his

return from the Sabah talks in London, the Vice-President of the

Philippines, Emmanuel Pelaez, proposed a summit meeting among Maca-

pagal, Sukarno and Tengku Abdul Rahman to seek a solution of the

conflict. During the ECAFE Ministerial conference in l'olanila, Deputy

Prime Minister ~un Abdul Razak, and Foreign Minister Subandrio, who

(53)

{54)

Amar&B.t President S~karno Pada Konperensi Para Pan"lima Aodam Seluruh Indones~a, Address by President Sukarno before Commander~ of all Indonesia Military Command), Djakarta, 17 March 1364, Department of Information, Djakarta, p. 8, (trans.).

Straits Times (Singapore), January 26, 1963.

happened to be representing Malaya and Indonesia respectively,

came to an agreement with Vice-President Pelaez on his proposal

for a summit meeting of the Heads of State of Malaya, Indonesia

and the Philippines. They were of the view, however, that before

convening a summit meeting, tripartite foreign ministers' talks

should be held in Manila, to be preceded by a sub-ministerial level

conference. (55)

Salvador P. Lopez, Under-Secretary of F'oreign Affairs,

Enche' M. Ghazali bin Shafie, Permanent Secretary for F.xternal

Affairs, and Suwito Kusumowidagdo, First Deputy Foreign Ninister,

represented the Philippines, ~1alaya and Indonesia respectively in

the sub-ministerial meeting in Manila which was held from April 9

to 16, 1963. The purposA of this preliminary meeting was to find

an acceptable basis and ag~nda for th@ proposed three-nation

foreign ministers' conference, to solve th@ problems among the

Philippines, IndonPsia and Malaya on the Malaysia issue. (56)

The prospects for easing tensions between Kalaya and Indo-

nesia appeared more favourable when President Sukarno and Prime

Minister Tengku Abaul Rahman decided to meet in Tokyo before the

convocation of the summit meeting of the three Heads of State.

The role of ~acapagal in this context was undoubtedly important.

He took the opportunity to convince Tengku Abdul rlahman of the

necessity of holding such bilateral talks when they met in Manila

(55)

(56)

Ma1aysia/Indones1a Rel~t!oos, n. 5, PP 15-16.

Summary or World aroadcasts, Part III, The Far East, Second Series, No. 12?.2, 9 April 1963 (London).

in early April 1963, for the ASA Conference. President Macapagal

also met President Sukarno, when the latter passed through Manila

on his way to Tokyo for a vacation on May 24, 1963. A joint communi-

que issued after the Tokyo meeting indicated the Willingness of both

Tengku Abdul Rahman and Sukarno to solve outstanding issues between

Indonesia and Nalaya on the basis of existing treaty of friendship.

The two Heads of Government.also paved the way for the forthcoming

Tripartite Foreign Ministers' Conference ln Manila, which to~ould lead

to preparaticins for the high-level meeting among Sukarno, Macapagal

and Tengku Abdul Rahman. (57)

The encouraging results of the sub-ministerial talks and the

Tokyo conference had smoothed the way for the tripartite ministerial

meeting held in Manila from June 7-11, 1963. -Deputy Prime Minister/

Foreign Minister Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy First Min1ster/Min1stEU~ for

Foreign Affairs Subandrio, and Vice-President/Secretary of Foreign

Affairs Emmanuel Pelaez represented Malaya, Indonesia and the Philip-

pines at the meeting. The three foreign ministers reached a common

understanding on ways and mPans to solve their mutual problPms. The

Manila Accord on June 11, 1963, canvassed President Macapagal's plan

for th~ confederation of the three Malay nations. On th@ other hand,

Indonesia and the Philippines would welcome the formation of Malaysia,

provided the wishes of the peoples of the northern Borneo territories

were ascertained under the supervision of the United Nations Secre-

tary-General or his representatives. The three foreign ministers also

recommended a summit meeting among the three Reads of State not later

than the end of July 1963. (58)

(57) Ibid . , No. 1258, 25 May 1963.

(58) Ma1aye{Indones1a Relation, n. 5, pp. 47-49.

196

In the course of these developments, the Malaysia Plan

gained a more favourable response from the Bornean leaders. It is

still a question whether or not the Philippine claim over Sabah,

Macapagal' s Plan for a Malayan Confederation and Indonesia's con-

frontation policy, were factors in the Bornean leaders' decision to

support rather than oppose Malaysia. Apart from these, the Bornean

leaders had bPen given assurances by the .alayan leaders that the

interests of Borneo and its people would be safeguarded once they

decided to join Malaysia.

Convinced of solid Bornean support for l~ala.ysia, Tengku Abdul

Rahman, Leo Kuan ~ew and the Bornean leaders went to London to sign

the Malaysia Agreement with the British Prime l'1inister, Harold

Macmillan. This Agreement was signed on July 9, 1963. {59) As

expected, Indonesian President Sukarno reacted sharply. He accused

Tengku Abdul rlahman of not keeping his promise to him during the

Tokyo Talks, not to implement the Malaysia until after the surr~t

meeting. Tengku Abdul Rahman felt it necessary to clarify his case

to the Indonesian Ambassador to London, stating that he n~ver gave

any promise to Sukarno. ( 60)

Following the ~alaysia AgrP~mPnt, Indonesia renewPd its

(59) Approven by the Parliament of Malaya on August 18, 1963 by 67 against 18 out of 104 votes. .any of the opposition members had been absent when the voting was taken. Earlier, the House rejected by a vote moved by the Socialist Front to defer the endorsement of the 1\.greement. See AiM rlecorder (New Delhi), September 24-30, 1963, PP 5426-7.

{ 60) l1a1wca/Indonesia rlelations, n. 5, p. 17. President Sukarno was very much frustrated, because Tengku Abdul Rahman went back on his words. On almost every occasion Sukarno expressed his frustration.

197

attacks on Tengku Abdul Rahman particularly, and the confrontation

policy was escalated. The prospects for covening the summit meeting

were very bleak indeed, as President Sukarno was very annoyed by the

Tengku's action. Nevertheless, Macapagal was determined to pursue

his efforts to hold a summit meeting on schedule. Tengku Abdul

Rahman expressed his willingness to attend tbP proposed Manila

Summit Meeting, despite Sukarno's rebuff. Although, at the beginn-

ing, Sukarno was rather reluctant to attend, he finally yielded.

On the surface, thP result of the summit meeting seemed to

provide a ray of hope for a speedy solution of the ~alasia problems.

The three Heads of Government reached a consensus as indicated in

their approval and acceptance of the earlier Manila Accord. The

Manila Declaration issued after these high-level deliberations said,

among other things, that the three Heads of Gover~ent agreed to

take the initial steps for establishing Maphilindo, a Confederation

of the three Malay nations. While acknowledging the Manila Accord's

proposal to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak,

the joint statement also referred to the Philippine claim over

Sabah, and the need for holding regular consultations (Mushawarah)

among these three countries to solve their own problems. (61)

The Proclamation of Malgysia and Its Aftermath

As the wishes of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak were to be

ascertained again in accordance with the articles 4 and 5 of the

joint statement of the Tripartite Summit Meeting, the proclamation

(61) Malaya/lndonesia Relations, n. 5, PP 45-52.

J9S

of Malaysia, scheduled for August 31, had to be postponed to

September 16, 1963. (62)

Meanwhile, a new issue came up when Indonesia and the Philip-

pines insisted that the British Gov@rnment allow them to send 30

observers each to witness the United Nations team on carrying out

their task in Sabah and Sarawak. ThP British Government rejected

the request. Secretary-General U Thant, ho\-rever, made a bid for a

compromise, and at last the British Government agreed to allow

Indonesia and the Philippines to send eight persons each, numbering

four observers and four clerical assistants. owing to this dis-

agreement, the observers from the Philippines and Indonesia were

only able to witness the last phase of the works of the United

Nations teams in Sabah and Sarawak. This caused much dissatisfac-

tion to the Indonesian and Philippine observers.

The United Nations teams, led by Lawrence Michelmore, accomp-

lished their mission within the stipulated time. Indonesia and the

Philippines, on the other hand, were of the opinion that it was

impossible for the United Nations teams to complete their task

properly in such a short period. (63) As the United Nations teams

(62) Asian Reggrdgr, October 8-14, 1963, p. 5457. By deferring the date of Malaysia to SeptP.mber 16, 1963, the Malayan leaders tried to demonstrate to the world, particularly Indonesia and the Philippines, that there existed goodwill and a spirit of accommodation among Malayan leaders. Thus, if Indonesia and the Philippines tried to hamper the crea-tion of Malaysia, the blame would not be on Malaysia's shoulders.

( 63) "A Survey on the Controversial Problem of the Establishment of the Federation of 1-ialaysia", in Features frgm Indonesia, No. 66, 11 November 1963, published by Information Service Indonesia, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, New Delhi,

(Contd. on next page)

199

was expected to produce their findings only by September 14, the

M~layan Government was obliged to announce the postponement of the

proclamation of -Malaysia from August 31 to September 16, 1963. The

Malayan Government s announcement which took place before .~ the

outcome of the findings of the United Nations teams,was very much

resented by Indonesia and the Philippines. Besides Indonesia and

the Philippines, the United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, was

also disappointed at the Tengku's announcement prior to the submis-

sion of the United Nations teams report to the United Nations

General Assembly. In the words of Secretary-General U Thant:

It was alw~s understood that the ascertainment would be completed within a limited -period of time, and my communication of 8 August noted that every effort would be made to complete the task as quickly as possi-ble. I later informed the Governments concerned that I would endeavour to report my conclusions to them by 14 September. During the course of inquiry, the date of 16 September 1963, was announced by the Government of the Federation of Malaya with the concurrence of the British Government, the Singapore Government and the Governments of Sabah and Sarawak, for the estab-lishment of the Federation of Malaysia. This has led to misunderstanding, confusions, and even resentment among other parties to the Manila Agreement, which could have been avoided if the date could have been fixed after my conclusions had been reached and made known. (64)

By now, Indonesia and the Philippines were not only annoyed

by the Tengku' s determination to announce Malaysia Day on

(64)

pp. 5-7; see also Philinpine Policy Statement, by Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, at the 18th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Plenary Meeting, New York City, 8 October 1.963, mimeographed, pub-lished by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, pp. 7-8.

"Missions to Sarawak. and Sabah, Secretary-General's Conclu-sions", United Nations Review, Vol. 1.0, No. 9, october 1963 (Nevr York), p. 1.4.

2'00

September 16, 1963, but they also criticized the manner in which

the Secretary-General was carrying out his duty relating to the

survey in Sabah and Sarawak. Both Indonesia and the Philippines

demanded a fresh survey to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of

Sabah and Sarawak. On September 15, 1963, Subandrio said Indonesia

could not recognize the Malaysia Federation as things stood: nwe

are attempting to go to the UN to make a correction, and after that

we can change our standn. Indonesia had taken this stand, he added,

because of flaws in the UN assessment in Sarawak and Sabah, which

meant that the assessment had not been carried out in accordance

with the Manila Agreement between Indonesia, the Philippines and

Nalaya. In t-~anila it ~las stated that President Macapagal was

deferring action on the question of recognition. (65)

Tengku Abdul Rahman did not pay heed to the pleas of Indone-

sia ana the Philippines, but proceeded with the proclamation of

Malaysia Day on September 16, 1963, on schedule. Indonesia and

the Philippines reacted strongly to this proclamation. Wild

demonstrations took place, especially in Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur.

While Malaysians ransacked the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur,

the Indonesian demonstrators burnt down the British Embassy and

inflicted damage on the l-1alayan Embassy in Djakarta. Indonesia

and the Philippines had no choice but to refuse recognition to the

new Government of Malaysia. Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman

immediately repaid the Indonesian and Philippine action in kind by

( 65) Asian Recorder, November 5-11, 1963, PP 5502-3.

201

ordering the severance of diplomatic relations with these two

countries.

Despite the joint efforts on the part of Indonesia and the

Philippines to delay the formation of Malaysia, it eventually

succeeded in coming into existence. Indonesia and the Philippines

continued +heir efforts. During the United Nations General Assembly

debates for the admission of Malaysia, InnonP.sia ann the Philippines

tried to block Malaysia membership of the UnitP.rl Nations. Even in

that their attempts failed.

Indonesia and the Philippines were not the only parties to

oppose Malaysia. The remnants of the Azahari rebels, the elements

of the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) and the SUPP of

tiarawak, and the raaical ~ooialist parties in Malaya and Singapore,

such as Party rtakjat (Mal~), Labour Party, Barisan Scsialis etc.,

also opposed it. with the coming into effect of a defence agreement

between halaysia and Commonwealth countries of au~tralia, New

Zealand and the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tengku Abdul rtahman

did not fail to request those three countries to send their troops

to strengthen Malaysia's defences. Tengku Abdul Rahman's action

and the existence of groups within Malaysia which opposed the

Federation seemed to have encouraged Sukarno in his confrontation

policy. ( 66) According to Sukarno, raclical and progress! ve forces

did exist in Malaysia, ready t.o topple the Malaysia Government. And

(66) Menudjy Selfsugnorting Dilapangan Sandang dan Pangan, (Towards Self-supporting in the fields of Food and Clothing),Address by President Sukarno, Department of Information (trans.) (Djakarta, 1964), PP 10-11.

202

Indonesia, as the vanguard of the Afro-Asian liberation movement,

was more than eager to render support to those forces. Since Malay-

sia associated itself with the neo-colonialist powers by asking

help from the Commonwealth countries, it was Indonesia's duty to

wipe out those neo-colonialist forces from its neighbourhood, whose

presence constituted a threat to Indonesia's own security.

A rather chaotic situation developed in Indonesia following

the formation of Malass1a, when radical leftist trade unions took

over several British and Malayan firms. To prevent the situation

from further deteriorating, President Sukarno ordered the authori-

ties to make the take-over of British and Mal89an firms by indi vi-

duals, groups or trade unions other than the Government illegal.

Indonesia's militant attitude in opposing the formation of

Malaysia was more damaging to Indonesia than to Mal~sia. Sabah

and Sarawak ev~ntually joined Malaysia, instead of SP.eking their

own independence. In this context, it would not b~ an exaggeration

to say, that the Malayan leaders we:re able to exercise peaceful

diplomacy and gain the confinence of th~ peoples of Sabah and

Sarawak. ( 6?)

On September 13, 1963, Indonesia sent an economic mission

to the Philippines to step up trade and economic relations between

the two countries. The negotiations coincided with Indonesia's

confrontation policy not only in the military and political fields,

but also in the economic sphere. This meant that Indonesia's

(67) Ongkili, n. 27, p. 127, and John Bastin, Robin W. Winks, Malaysia Selegted H1stor1ca1 ReadinBS (Kuala Lumpur, 1966), P 438.

203

traditional trade with Malaya, Singapore particularly, and with

Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei had been cut off entirely. It was in

this context that the Indonesian economic dPlegates also discussed

the possibilities of shifting the traditional trade with Malaya and

Singapore to the Philippines. In the cultural field, too, Indonesia

and the Philippines took certain steps to strengthen their ties.

When Indonesia was suspended from the International vlympic Committee,

President Sukarno promptly responded by staging the Games of the New

Emerging Forces (GANEFO) in Djakarta in November 1963. Since the

Philippines was considered by Indonesia as a Nefo country, it parti-

cipated in the Games.

New ~fforts for Regongiliatign

Despite the severance of diplomatic relations between Indone-

sia and Mal~sia, and between the Philippines and Malaysia, the

leaders of these three countries did not sit idle. Some efforts were

made towards reconciliation. Apart from the Philippines, other

countries inside and outside South-East Asia were also interested in

seeking ways and means to solve the Malaysia dispute; for example,

the United States, Japan, Thailand and Cambodia, which wanted a

peaceful settlement of the issue.

The first attempt at conciliation had been made by Japan, when

Prime Minister Ikeda was touring several South-East Asian countries

in Sept91Uber 1963. However, at that time Japan was only interested

in exploring the possibility of a rapprochment among Macapagal,

Tengku Abdul Rahman and Sukarno. It declined to act as mediator.

According to . Ikeda, since Macapagal and Sukarno wanted a peaceful

settlement, he did not think it was necessary for him to act as

mediator. (68) Nevertheless, towards the end of 1963 no peaceful

settlement was in sight.

Macapagal and Sukarno did not give up hope of finding a

solution of this crucial dispute. During President Sukarno's

visit to the Philippines from January 7-14, 1964, he and President

Macapagal rPiterated their faith in the Manila Agreement of 1963.

It is worth noting that one of the clauses of the Manila Agreement

says that every dispute arising among the signatoriPS should be

discussed and solved among the signatories thPmselves. ThiS kind

of mutual consultation among the signatories of the Manila agree-

ment was known as f.~ushawarah l-1aphilindo. However, since Tengku

Abdul Rahman's participation in the Mushawarah Maphilindo was out

of the question, only Macapagal and Sukarno held the talks. uut

of this discussion between Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno in

Manila emerged the so-oalled"Sukarno-Macapagal Doctrine'!: that Asian

problems should be solved by the Asian themselves. By announcing

this doctrine, and by reiterating their faith in the Kanila Agree-

ment, both Sukarno and Macapagal wanted to demonstrate to Tengku

Abdul Rahman that it was Malaysia and not the Philippines or Indo-

nesia that han breached thP Agreements, leading to confrontation.

Besides thP search for a solution of the Malaysia problem,

President Sukarno's visit was also intended to channelize the tra-

ditional Indonesian trade flow from the l

205

accompanied Sukarno to Manila, composed mostly of officials from

the Department of Trade. The conclusion of trade and economic

agreements between these two countries was more for propaganda than

for practical purpose.

Hectic diplomatic activities took place particularly in

Manila, Bangkok,Phnom Penh, Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo. Besides Presi-

dent Macapagal, and Prince Sihanouk, President Sukarno himself,

took active part in these new efforts for reconciliation. He

shuttled from Djakarta to Manila, Phnom Penh and Tokyo.

with the escala,tion of confrontation between Indonesia and

Malaysia, and the prospects of a peaceful solution being far from

bright, the United States began to take interest in initiating peace

efforts. The United States interests in South-East Asia were at

stake not only in the Philippines or Vietnam, but it was also

interested in Indonesia. It was owing to the American pressures

that the Dutch hastened in transferring sovereignty to Indonesia in

1949, and later west Irian in 1963. Indonesia's ability to main-

tain a strict non-aligned posture in the cold-war during that

period, and President Sukarno's tactics in balancing the communist

and the army within the country, attracted the United States policy-

makers during this period. The United States saw in Indonesia a

powerful country in South-F.ast Asia which would bP. able to check

the advancement of Communism. (69) It was in this context that

(69) During President Sukarno's visit to the United States in 1961, he reportedly told President Kennedy that he was the best bulwark in Indonesia against Communism. (President Sukarno had been interviewed by the CBS Television Network in Djakarta on January 31, 1965), the text has been republished by the Directorate of North-East Asia and

(Contd. on next page)

206

President Kennedy developed an interest in the Maphilindo con-

cept. (70) President Johnson, at the beginning or assumption or

power also adhered to Kennedy's policy of showing sympathy to Indo-

nesia. As a matter or fact the United States at the outset of

Johnson Administration wanted Indonesia to become a leading partner

in the proposed Maphilindo. For the United States too it was more

advantageous to let the South-East Asian countries take a lead in

maintaining their own security, rather than unnecessarily involving

America in the region. (71) To achieve these objectives, the

United States had to approach the leaders of the Philippines, Malay-

sia and Indonesia. No other American personality could serve these

aims better than the Attorney-General Robert Kennedy himself. He

was a familiar figure in Asia, especially \'lith the Indonesian

leaders, and was the key man 1n the West Irian settlement.

after visiting the Philippines, President Sukarno paid a

state visit to Cambodia between January ll-15, 1964. The joint

communique issued by both President Sukarno and Prince Norodom

Sihanouk among other things stressed the need to solve the Asian

problems by Asian themselves in an asian fashion. (72) From Phnom-

Penh President Sukarno proceeded to Tokyo on an unofficial visit.

(70)

(71)

(72)

Pacific, Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta 1n the Compilation gf Materia! on Malays!, Vol. XV, March l-31, 1965, p. 91, (hereinafter Material on Mala.,vsia).

Diosdado Macapagal, A Stone for the ~difiae (Quezon City, 1968), P 507, Appendix II.

"Sukarno at the Crossroads", an erlitorial in the Eastern Wgrld, London, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, February 1964, PP 5-6.

Asian Recorder, February 26-March 3, 1964, P 5687.

207

It was in Tokyo that Attorney-General Robert Kennedy began his

12-day peace mission for solving the Malaysian dispute. He held

two-d93s' talks with President Sukarno in Tokyo, between January

1718, 1964. The main task of Kennedy's mission was to try to

bring together all the leaders of Indonesia, the Philippines and

Mal93sia, and to search for the solution of their problems. Presi-

dent Sukarno agreed with Robert Kennedy's proposal for a summit

meeting between the Heads of State of Malaysia, Indonesia and the

Philippines. (73)

From January 19-21, 1964, Robert Kennedy was in Manila for

holding discussions with President Macapagal. Kennedy's move for

new reconciliation 'IIIas warmly welcomed by President Macapagal. (74)

On January 22, 1964 Robert Kennedy arrived in Kuala Lumpur and held

important talks \/lith Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman and other

Malaysian leaders. Unlike the earlier talks he had with Presidents

Sukarno and Macapagal, this time .Robert Kennedy faced difficulties

in convincing Tengku Abdul Rahman on the need of holding a new

summit meeting. The latter put forward several conditions for the

proposed conference on the Malaysian dispute. They were: that Indo-

nesia must end its confrontation, and must recognize Malaysia. (75)

(73)

(74)

(75)

lo4ones1an Herald, January 23, 1964, and also lohtisar TAhunan 1964 of Antara News (Antara Annual) , pp. 102-6; hereinafter Ichtisar Tahunan Antara

Macapagal, n. 70, P 264.

Asian Regqrder, February 12-18, 1964, p. 5669, and Ightisat TAhunan Antara, p. 108, and also Indonesian Hera1d, January 23, 1964.

208

Robert Kennedy arrived in Djakarta on January 22, 1964, and

held discussions again with President Sukarno and other Indonesian

high-ranking officials. Robert Kennedy successfully convinced

President Sukarno "that all sides agreed to the solution of the

Problem of Malaysia by way of Mushawarah and without any precondi-

tions". {76) The most successful part of Kennedy's peace mission

was accomplished, when President Sukarno agreed to order the ces-

sation of all military activities in the Indonesian-Ualaysian border

area, and accordingly ordered an immediate cease-fire, to pave the

way for new peace negotiations. However, according to Sukarno's

interpretation, confrontation against Malaysia still continued.

Only tactics were to be changed, but the objectives remained the

same that is to eliminate the British neo-colonialist project. (77)

From Djakarta, Robert Kennedy headed for Bangkok, where he

requested the Thai Government to make arrangements and to supervise

the cease-fire between Mal~sia and Indonesia. Besides meeting the

Thai Foreign Minister, Mr. Thanat Khoman, Kennedy also met Malaysian

Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Tun Abdul i'iazak. Robert

Kennedy was pleased with his peace-mission, and among other things

observed in Bangkok: "I am grateful to have had the opportunity to

be of help in this first step and I now wish the leaders of Indone-

sia, Malaysia ana the Philippines success in their work in solving

this difficult problem". {78) Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman

(76) Indonesian Herald, January 24, 1964.

(77) laagae!ao Het~a, January 24, 1964, and lsbt1~ Iahun~n Ant a~: a, p. 114.

(78) lo.dgo.e!i!ao. Rm:als!t January 24, 1964.

209

too expressed his satis