The g asworke rs’ strike 197213: an analysis of causes by Philip White Lecturer in Industrial Relations, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

THE occurrence of widespread labour unrest in the British Gas Industry between November 1972 and March 1973 can be said to have had its origins in a variety of causes, but it is not without significance that the industrial action followed the announcement of the Government’s gc-day “Prices and Incomes Freeze” on the 6 November. At that date, negotia- tions were proceeding on the Gas National Joint Industrial Council (NJIC), although certain im- portant agreements had already been concluded in other industries.

Unofficial industrial action (including working- to-rule and overtime bans) was reported to be sporadically taking place in Scotland from the 17 November, and matters seem to have been exacer- bated by the Government’s original ruling that negotiations during the Freeze, “whether in the public or private sectors, should not be carried to the point of offers of improved remuneration”.’

By January, however, the Government had reversed its original ruling and, at the resumed NJIC negotiations, the gas unions (GMWU and TGWU)’ were offered increases of E2 per week; the offer was rejected. Three days after the resumed negotiations, the “second phase” of the Government’s Prices and Incomes Policy was announced, including the stipulation of a maximum permissible wage increase of “ E I + ~ % ” and the suggestion that Pay and Prices Boards be set up as institutional adjuncts to the p01icy.~

By the end of January, Scots gasworkers had voted to stage a one-week strike from the 2 February; the strike was seen as an extension of the overtime bans and a one-day strike which had already occurred in Scotland. At the end of January too, the NJIC talks broke down over the Gas Corporation’s improved offer of A;2-24 per week-the maximum allegedly permissible under “Phase 11”.

The Times, 15 December 72.

and General Workers’ Union.

Stage, Cmnd. 5205, January, 1973.

Letter from the Prime Minister to Lord Cooper, quoted in

General and Municipal Workers’ Union and Transport

The Programme for Controlling Inflation: The Second

Unofficial, but sporadic, action began to build up in the early part of February, and by the 6th of that month, it was said to be occurring in Northern England, Merseyside and South East England. On the same day, the Executive Committee of the major union in Gas (the GMWU) decided to call selective strikes, overtime bans and withdrawal of co- operation from the 13 February.

Despite the facts that industrial action was now officially sanctioned by the unions, and that the action eventually led to the disruption of gas supplies to a large proportion of the consuming public, the Government in public announcements consistently set its face against “retreat” and “yield- ing to pressure”. The Government’s rejection of the unions’ suggestions that a Court of Inquiry be set up, in association with a revised pay offer from the Gas Corporation on the I I March, seems to have weakened the resolve of the unions. They therefore decided to put to their members (by postal ballot) the question, “Are you in favour of returning to normal working on the basis of the Gas Corpora- tion’s new offer?”. The vote, announced on the 23 March, was 18776 in favour of the offer and I I 267 against ;4 normal working was resumed al- most immediately.

This then, in brief outline, was the course of the gasworkers’ industrial action, but there are certain major implications which are explored in fuller detail below. For example, we are referring to industrial action in an Industry which has tradition- ally been strike-free ; how, therefore, can we account for this particular industrial dispute at the point in time when it did occur ? Is there any significance in the fact that the Industry is part of the public sector and in the fact that it has recently undergone

Much was made in the press at the time of the “low” proportion of workers who voted. These comments tended to overlook the fact that significantly less than the 50 000 manual workers were eligible to vote. The figure has to be reduced for the following reasons: there were certain non-union workers; apprentices did not vote; and workers under Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering agreements (approx. 3000) were excluded.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, Spring Vol. 5 No. 1 1974 Mercury House Business Publications Ltd., London. 27

The gasworkers’strike 197213 : an analysis of causes

major organizational and technological change ? A closer investigation of these and other factors can, it is suggested, throw light on the course and causes of the gasworkers’ industrial action. A closer investigation can also provoke a re-examination of certain industrial relations issues which have been widely investigated over the past few years, for it is only through re-examination that workable policy and procedures can be improved and devised.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENTS

The future of the nationalized Gas Industry is now assured in a way that could not have been said with any degree of certainty even 10 years ago. At nationalization in 1948, and for several years there- after, the Industry was totally reliant upon the coal carbonization gas-making process as the major source of gas. The process relied upon “coking coal” as an input and as long as gas production was bound up with coke production, there were substantial difficulties in concentrating gas produc- tion into the larger units, capable of achieving economies of scale.

However, a breakthrough occurred in Gas in the late 1950s when the Industry initiated a shift towards oil-based gas production. Although the shift was accelerated in the early 1960s, its implica- tions paled into insignificance alongside the dis- covery of commercial quantities of natural gas in the North Sea during the late 1960s. This discovery facilitated the speedier rundown of gas production stations and it also piaced the Industry in a strong competitive position as the possessor of a major indigenous fuel source.

An accompaniment to the reduction in the number of gasworks since nationalization (there were over 1000 in 1949 and 96 in March 1972) has been the reduction in manual employment in the Industry (from over 100 000 to 50 000 in the same period). Yet, although a reducing labour force has been a feature of Gas since nationalization, it may be seen from Table I that the recent quickening pace of

technological change has also led to accelerated redundancies.

TABLE 1 : Labour redundancy in gar, 19S112- 1971 12

I95r12-1956/7 1957/8-1965/6 I966/7-197II2

yo reduction in labour 5-3 207 28.7 force

Source: Gns Council Reports and Accounts (yeus ended 31 -1.

The first period covers those years when the Industry was generally scrapping its obsolete and very small-scale plant, the middle period includes the shift from coal to oil, while the third period embraces the effective elimination of gas production and its replacement by North Sea Gas.

Gasworkers, therefore, have been faced with a progressive contraction in the labour force, but these changes have generally been accepted without overt dissension. Sir Henry Jones, the then Chairman of the Gas Council, was asked by the Donovan Com- mission how the manpower reductions had been achieved in such an apparently smooth manner. He replied that the Industry’s redundancy pay scheme pre-dated the 1965 Redundancy Pay Act and pay- ment was given “whether a man got a job the next day or In further evidence, he said that the announcement of intended closure was made through union officials several months before the event. There was, he said, “a lot of personal con- sideration of the men declared redundant” and attempts were made to offer men alternative employment in the Industry? Nevertheless, fears were expressed during the strike about the possibility of a further 1500 redundancies up to March 1973, and it is not too extreme to argue that the strike, in part at least, was a belated reaction to earlier change

a Gas Council oral evidence to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, 14 November 65, Q. 1802.

ibid.

28

and an expression of anxiety about future changes. Indeed, in the March settlement, the Corporation agreed to impose a moratorium on redundancies until the autumn of 1973.

A further consequence of the shift to natural gas has been the increased centralization of the Industry, characterized above all by the creation of the British Gas Corporation on the I January 1973. The Industry has traditionally been one of the most decentralized in the public sector, but the discovery of natural gas arguably facilitated the vesting of overall control at the centre. (The nature of coal gas production prevented the formation of a gas equiva- lent of the “National Electrical Grid”.) In develop- ing proposals originally made by the previous administration, the present Government sought the abolition of the 12 Area Gas Boards so that the assets of the Industry would be vested in the new Corporation.’

Were organizational centralization to be accom- panied by centralization in the industrial relations field, then this might lead to certain unfavourable consequences. For example, one view articulated during the 1972/3 strike was that increased centrali- zation and the creation of a “large anonymous corporation, was largely responsible for the present troubles”.* The flaw in this argument is that the ’ See, especially, Sir John Eden, Hansard, Vol. 829, col.

1637. Letter from a ‘BGC Employee’ to The Guardion, 4 March

73.

“troubles” started before the effective creation of the new Corporation. Nevertheless, the increase in disputes in the Industry in 1969 and 1970 arose, in part, from the March 1969 NJIC agreement’s effect of eroding, and sometimes abolishing, the plus rates which had been locally negotiated as supplements to the basic rate. (More will be said about these disputes later.) With the aid of this perspective, therefore, it is not too extreme to suggest that the 1972/3 strike was partly influenced by the recent and possible future organizational changes in Gas.

LABOUR DISPUTES IN GAS

Table 2 shows that the incidence of disputes was relatively low until 1968, but that it increased markedly in the two succeeding years. Analysis will initially seek to explain the situation up to 1968, but attention will then be focused on the situation in 1969 and 1970.

The Industry, in common with the public sector generally, tends to offer better than average fringe benefits: and “the importance of these things to the quality of the relations existing between an under- taking and its workers can scarcely be exaggerated”.’O

9The Pay and Conditions of Manual Workers in Local Authorities, the National Health Service, Gas and Water Supply, NBPI, Cmnd. 3230, March 1967 (esp. paras. 43/6).

‘OShanks, M. (ed.), The Lesssons of Public Enterprise, Jonathan Gpe, 1963, p. 89.

TABLE 2 : Days lost/lOOO workers in gas, 1960-71

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

2 5 6 8 6 0 8 I I5 5 4 157 33

Source: Pryke, R., Public Enterpire in Practice, MacGibbon & Kee, 1971, p. 92; and Department of Employment.

TABLE 3: Index of average hourly earnings, gas and “all industries” (men)

1960 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

Gas IOO 118.7 127.4 1341 148.5 161.0 168-1 178-1 Allindustries IW 113.7 118.5 127.3 138.6 149.3 1546 166.3

Source : Statistics on Incomes, Prices, Employment and Production.

The gasworkers’ strike 197213 : an analysis of causes

TABLE 4 : Average weekly hours worked, gas and ”all industries” (men)

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

G a s 47’4 46.6 47.4 47.6 48.0 47.8 47.6 47.4 48.0 All industries 48.0 47.6 47’1 47.2 47’7 47.2 46.2 46.2 46.3

Source: Ministry of Labour (etc) Gazettes.

Furthermore, comparative data which are avail- able up to the late 1960s show that Gas earnings grew in excess of the average for industry as a whole. (See Table 3.)

The growth in earnings is partly related to the relatively high level of overtime working during the period : buoyancy in earnings would inevitably follow from negotiated rate increases in association with stability in overtime worked. (See Table 4.)

The growth in earnings is also partly related to the apparent tractability of employers in negotia- tions, for since nationalization there have been but two references by the Gas NJIC to arbitration: 1953 and 1958. Conflict resolution has also been facilitated by what Jones described as “simple but acting appeal machinery” in the event of an em- ployee’s grievance. This “simple and democratic” system had allegedly “brought about a more considerate and friendly relationship between management and workers”.”

A further factor which can be said to have con- tributed to industrial peace in the Industry is the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, Section 4 of which made it a criminal offence for a Gas (an Electricity) worker to break his contract of employment. The Act was only used once in Gas (in 1950) and, in the event, the men were charged under the Emergency Powers Regulations. Yet, despite the lack of application, Jones was reluctant to see the Act go, on the grounds that “trade union officers are helped by the existence of this Act if there are men. . . who feel inclined to take unofficial action”.12 A further argument for retention was that many gasworkers “would have

op. cit., Q. 1798. l2 op. cit., Q. 1738.

30

little sympathy with people who deliberately brought about a failure in gas s ~ p p l y ” . ’ ~

Prima facie, it might be argued that the super- cession of the “Conspiracy” Act by the Industrial Relations Act in I972 was a prime reason for the occurrence of the recent strike. Such an argument would assume as accurate Sir Henry Jones’ descrip- tion of the gasworkers’ attitude towards the role of law, and would accordingly seek to compare an Act whose appropriateness was acceptable to the majority of gasworkers with the more recent Act which has been fundamentally opposed by many trade unionists. However, that strike incidence in Gas increased in 1969 and 1970 seems to suggest that the existing Act was itself being increasingly breached and that gasworkers were feeling sufficiently aggrieved to by-pass the procedures available in the Industry.

What, therefore, were the issues over which unofficial action occurred in 1969 and 1970, and can any relationship be discerned between the issues in those years and in the recent industrial dispute? We have already suggested that centralization (both actual and prospective) may have underlain the 1972/3 strikes; but two other issues can be investi- gated further, viz. comparability and Government prices and incomes policy.

The most protracted strike in the Industry in 1970 occurred in the West Midlands Gas Board Area-the dispute lasted, in all, for three weeks. It is understood that, among other things, there was

I 3 op. cit., Q. 1740. (Sir Ronald Edwards, in giving oral evidence to the Commission on behalf of the Eiearicity Council, also favoured retention of the Act. One argument used was that, if the worker had to consider giving notice before taking strike action, “this might give him cause to pause just a while”, op. cit., 4.3137.)

dissatisfaction at the large pay increases awarded immune from increases negotiated elsewhere, but in other West Midlands industries (notably road specific mention of Water Industry wage rates haulage) and at the negotiation ofan increase of more points to a more general inter-relationship, over than I/- per hour in the Birmingham Water time, between certain key rates in the Gas, Electricity Department wage rate. The reference to these and Water Industries. In short, the similarity of yardsticks suggests that the Gas Industry cannot be these Industries in terms of typology, union

TABLE 5: Comparison of gas and water labourers' hourly rates, 1951-1970/1 (new pence)

1951 1951 I952 1953 I954 I955 19.56 I957 1958 1960 1960

Gas rate 12.6 13.44 1427 148 15'31 16.56 18.23 1927 ~ 0 . 1 0 21.04 22'28 Water rate 12'92 13.44 1427 149 15.31 16.56 17'81 1927 20.10 21-14 22.5 Time difference

(months) 0 0 +I 0 +3 0 -1 +z 0 0 +I Absolute

difference -.312 o 0 - ~ 0 4 o 0 +'417 0 0 -ex04 -208

Gas rate 23.12 23.94 25 26.04 27'7 2917 30.62 32'08 33.56 38.75 40.75 Water rate 23.34 23.75 25 26.04 27.08 29.38 30.83 32'08 33.56 38.75 4075 Time difference

Absolute (months) +I -4 -2 -3 -2 +I +3 -2 0 -1 0

difference - 9 0 8 -208 o o + a 6 2 5 -m8 -.A o 0 0 0

Sources: Ministry of Labour (etc) Gazettes; Time Rates of Wages and Hours of Work. Nore: The time and absolute differences are based on the Gas wage rates. Thus, in 1951, the Gas cnft wage rate increase

occurred three months before the equivalent in Water.

TABLE 6: Comparison of gas and electricity labourers' hourly rates, 1951-1970/1 (new pence) ~~~ ~ ~ ~~

1951 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1960 1960

Gas rate 12.6 13.44 1427 148 1531 16-56 18.23 1927 20'10 21.04 22'29 Electricityrate 12.6 13.44 1427 149 15'31 1656 18.23 1927 20.2 21.25 22'7 Time difference

Absolute (months) -3 0 -1 -3 0 -3 -2 0 -3 -3 --I

difference 0 0 0 -.lo4 o 0 0 0 -.104 --.208 -a417

1962 1963 196314 1964 1965 1965 1966 196718 1969 1969170 197011

Gas rate 23.12 23.75 25 26-04 27'7 2917 30.62 32-08 3955 38-75 43.75 Electricity rate 23.34 2438 25.41 26.66 2781 NM 30.41 31-76 34'8 38.34 43-34 Time difference

A b s o I u t e (months) -2 + I +8 0 -4 - -5 -8 -6 -4 -4

difference -208 -.625 --417 -.625 -a104 - +.208 +'3I2 -1'25 +'417 +'417

Note: NM=not matched. Also refer to Sources and Note in Table 5.

31

The gasworkers’ strike 197213 : an analysis of causes

involvement and negotiating structure has led to the frequent employment of the comparability criterion in Gas wage negotiations.

“Provincial” wage rates have been treated as most representative in the following comparisons, for the only other regional rate determined by the respective negotiating bodies is that for metro- politan areas.

A comparison of Gas and Water wage rates (see Table 5) shows a close similarity of movement (both in timing and in absolute amounts) over the past few years.

It can be seen that movements are closer for the labourers than for the craft rate, perhaps in part as a reflection of the major role of the GMWU in NJIC negotiations and also in part as a reflection of the similarity of factors which go to make up the labourers’ jobs in the two Industries.

Turning now to Table 6, similar considerations may apply, for there is a measure of similarity between labourers’ rates in the two Industries. (Since 1963, Electricity figures have been converted from annual to hourly equivalents.)

GOVERNMENT PRICES AND INCOMES POLICY

It can be argued that the relationship between certain Gas and Electricity wage rates has more than mere historical significance, for the 1972 Electricity wage negotiations were concluded immediately prior to the Government’s “Freeze” announcement, whereas Gas negotiations were still in progress at that date. Certain sections of the press emphasized the significance of the Electricity award to the Gas negotiations, and it seems likely that the comments were derived from interviews with Gas union officials.

The Scotsman, for example, remarked that “gas- workers want E3.20 to match the Electricity award” (I February 73). Similarly, the Guardian reported on the 8 January 73 that Gas “trade union leaders will be looking for a settlement along the lines of the A3.05 secured by the power workers”; and, by the end of the month, the same newspaper wrote that the “unions have been unwilling to settle for anything less than E3.05 which electricity supply

32

workers negotiated before the Freeze”. By way of final example, the Dairy Express referred, on 15 January 73, to the “fear” of many in Gas “that workers will be offered less than the electricity workers won before the Freeze started . . .”.

It seems, therefore, that a classic “anomaly” arose because of the date of the Government’s announce- ment, in that in one industry agreement was reached before the Freeze, while in another (yet related) industry agreement was still pending. Furthermore, by an accident of timing which further aggrieved the unions, memories were still vivid of the impact that the previous Freeze had had in 1966, for the Gas agreement then concluded was deferred during the “standstill” from July 1966 to January 1967.

The recent stituation in Gas was (arguably) exacerbated by the lack of an agency (Pay Board, NBPI or whatever) to which the gasworkers’ case could be put. In the event, in February the Govern- ment offered to the unions the opportunity for them to put their case to the Pay Board even before it was formally constituted. The unions initially expressed a preference for a Court of Inquiry, no doubt mindful of the manner of settlement in the Mine- workers’ dispute earlier in the year, but the Govern- ment’s offer was eventually embodied in the terms of settlement in March.

Another factor which may have contributed to the occurrence of the 1972/3 strike was that the unions (both in Gas and in the public sector generally) had felt themselves to be unfairly singled out by the Government policy. Lord Cooper (the then General Secretary of the GMWU) had reportedly written to the Prime Minister on this matter in November 1972. The alleged inequity in the Govern- ment’s prices and incomes policy had also been a factor underlying the large West Midlands Gas strike in 1970. Recent strikes in Gas, then, can be seen as but a part of the more general pattern of strike activity in the public sector over the past few years.14

’* Durcan, J. W. and McCarthy, W. E. J., ‘‘?%%at is Hap- pening to Strikes ?”, New Society, 2 November 72, (this thesis is explored below).

Yet, the comparison between Gas and general experience may not end there, for again, as in common with certain disputes, the 197z/3 strike originated as a series of uncoordinated outbursts of unofficial action, culminating in the decision to make the strike offi~ial.’~

What might set Gas apart from more general considerations, on the other hand, is the fact that the strike occurred at the time when the GMWU was undergoing a change in leadership (from Lord Cooper to Mr. Basnett) which might have made the official leadership more sensitive of, and amenable towards, rank-and-file pressure. The union had, after all, suffered membership criticisms in the recent past about its apparent disregard of member- ship interests,16 and (arguably) the leadership had to justify itself by action which was seen to be prosecuting an active case on behalf of the gas- workers.

THE STRIKE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS We have therefore attempted to explain why

industrial action occurred in the Gas Industry in 1972/3. Any large-scale industrial action in Gas would have been undreamed of a few years ago, but closer examination suggests that the events of 1972/3 were a development of earlier events, both within the Industry and outside it. We now examine these broader factors. 1 ) Technological change

Many public sector industries have shared experiences in recent years by undergoing major technological change. However, the characteristics of this change have differed, for while the emphasis in (for example) Coal and Gas has been upon the contraction of production units in association with increased mechanisation and automation, in Elec- tricity (to take another example) the emphasis has been upon the creation of larger units, but with relatively smaller manpower reductions.

In common with coal-miners, too, gasworkers seem to have acquiesced in redundancies, until

l5 ibid. l6 See, for example, Lane, T. and Roberts, K., Strike ar

Pilkingtons, Collins/Fontana, 1971.

3

recently, with a minimum of overt opposition. Manning reductions may well have been facilitated by internal transfer of workers, by close consultation between management and the unions and by pro- visions of redundancy pay which predated the Act of 1965. However, both industries have recently encountered shopfloor opposition to the continua- tion of redundancy. Apart from the obvious fear of redundancy, per se, why this apparent upsurge in feeling ?

First, the high levels of unemployment in Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s would be expected to have rendered re-employment prospects more difficult than they otherwise would have been. Second, the pace of redundancy in Gas recently accelerated, and this development may have induced gasworkers to distinguish between “tolerable” and “intolerable” levels of redundancy in their industry. Third, and as part of a more general phenomenon, the outbursts may reflect a reaction to processes of decision-making in industry ; this theme is explored more fully below.

2) Prices and incomes policies The public sector unions have for long claimed

that their members have been inequitably dealt with by government as employer, and it seems far from coincidental that major widespread industrial action has occurred in many public sector industries over the past few years.

It has been shown that the Labour Government faced public sector strikes from 1968 Simi- larly, the previous Government may have contributed towards the feeling of resentment by initially relying upon a policy of “suasion”, for it is tempting for government in such circumstances to seek to influence wage determination in the public sector. Nor (in the case of Gas) did it help matters that there was a lack of clarity as to the steps to be taken in the event of a failure to agree at NJIC level. On the basis of the previous year’s experience in Coal, it was to be expected that the Gas unions would press for a Court of Inquiry, since a successful outcome to

” Balfour, Campbell, Incomes Policy and the Public Sector, 19.12, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 215.

33

The gmworkers’ strike 1972/3 : an unalysis of causes

their demands might have resided in that route. Although the Government (again understandably) resisted the idea, there was nothing in the early months of 1973 which the Government could offer as an alternative which would be acceptable to the gasworkers, for, at that stage, the concept of the Pay Board had not been fully thought through. Certain conclusions seem to suggest themselves.

(a) It was, perhaps, unfortunate that the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI) had been abolished by the incoming Conservative Govern- ment, because the Board had operated in a context of specific criteria for judging pay awards. Courts of Inquiry over the past few years have had, by com- parison, to examine pay claims on an ad hoc basis, often in a climate of conflict in the industries con- cerned.

(b) A further merit of the NBPI’s role was that its criteria (at least in principle) were applicable to any group of workers, whether in the public or private sector. The NBPI’s role was treated with resentment because a disproportionate number of public sector cases were referred to it.18

(c) Yet we need not assume that the NBPI’s criteria were beyond reproach, for, notwith- standing the Board’s very cogent arguments against the widespread use of “comparability” as a wage- bargaining criterion, the Gas dispute is but one example of the criterion’s continuing attractiveness to negotiators. As Mitchell has pointed out, “com- parability” is bound up with considerations of fair- ness and equity, but at the same time, as her unfortunate juxtaposition of phrases shows, any prices and incomes policy will stand little chance of success were it to exclude the use of comparability:

L L . . . a sense of fairness was one of the most important elements in both pay claims and acceptable settlements. But, equally, the public sector could not continue to pursue n principle directly counter to incomes policy.”lg (d) We agree, therefore, with Balfour’s view that

“fair comparisons” should be an important deter-

‘s Mitchell, Joan, “The National Board for Prices and

l9 ibid., p. 192 (italics added). Incomes”, 1972, Seeker and Warburg, p. 2%.

minant of public sector pay.2O But the matter does not end there. It has long been held that the “profitability” or “ability to pay” criterion is not appropriate to public sector and while agreeing in general with this proposition, the Trade Union Research Unit’s strictures of NCB account- ing should not be

One factor which i s of significance to the public sector, however, is that of redundancy. The im- proved output per man which has, in part, resulted from manning reductions has been, and should continue to be, taken into account in wage negotia- tions. But, given the recent unrest in the industry so affected, it seems to be important to distinguish between the “wage-improving” and “redundancy resisting” bases of labour unrest, for such a dis- tinction will have an important bearing on the ways in which any future unrest is handled and resolved. (Steel, but perhaps only for the time being, is a special case: wage bargaining has been clearly distinguishable from protests against plant closures.)

(e) There seems to be a continuing need for a body such as the NBPI whose published investiga- tions throw light on major crises of pay determina- tion (and inefficiency) in British industry. Gas itself came under scrutinyz3 and while the incidence of bonus incentive schemes has increased since the Board’s Report, the level of overtime in Gas continues at a level which the Board had earlier criticized. Given the downward inflexibility of overtime (in Gas as in many other industries) analyses might be undertaken of those forces (economic, institutional, technological and socio- logical) which influence the level of overtime working. Investigations on these and other matters might in turn contribute towards a source of savings to the industry and of increased earnings to its workers.

Pari passu with an investigative role, a Board might also be expected to invite submissions of

2o op. cit., p. 235. 21 Wooton, Barbara, Social Functions of Wages Policy, Allen

and Unwin, 1955. 21 Hughes, J. and Moore, R., A Special Case?: Social

Justice and the Minns, Penguin, 1972, 23 NBPI Report No. 29, op. cit.

pay claims. The body of evidence to the Wilber- force inquiry into the miners’ claim, and the thoroughness with which that evidence was scrutinized, underlines the analytical and prescrip- tive role which a permanent agency, acceptable to the unions and employers alike, might play. Indeed, such public (and publicized) deliberations might do much to allay union suspicions of the clandestine and malevolent influence which, they allege, have been exerted by governments, by the Treasury, or both.

Whether, as has been suggested, one Board should deal with public sector pay as a whole is a moot point.24 While agreeing that the government “is under an obligation to set up standards of pay and comparisons which satisfy the concept of ‘fair comparisons’y1,25 it might be appropriate, as a first step, to distinguish between the “industrial” and the “non-industrial” parts of the public sector. The latter might then embrace those bodies which determine salaries for such groups as doctors and dentists, civil servants and teachers. Whatever the scope and coverage of the Boards, they would be expected to utilize the skills and techniques which have been deployed by such diverse units as the Civil Service Pay Research Unit, the NBPI and the Trade Union Research Unit.

Furthermore, attention must be paid to the possibility that public sector unions might show at least the same hostility towards the new Board(s) as they did towards the earlier “inequitable” policies. In considering, therefore, whether to have a Board for the public sector as a whole, or whether to have “functional” Boards by industry, govern- ment should take fully into account those aspects of pay determination which unite (as well as those which differentiate between) the public and private sector.

3) General strike courses and causality We have classified the gas strike as being fairly

typical of recent strikes in the public sector, both in

“Balfour, op. cit., p. 58. ibid., p. 235.

regard to its course and its causes. However, were any characteristics of the gas strike part of a more general pattern of events ? We think there were, in the following respects.

Firstly, the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act has been held to be one factor contributing towards the traditional absence of disputes in Gas. However, custom and tradition seem to have counted for less in the industry over the past few years, which seems to suggest that the influence of law in industrial relations is only likely to be felt where those in industry perceive the law to be a p propriate to industrial relations matters and where they acquiesce in its application. The Conspiracy Act was therefore being (albeit implicitly) ques- tioned before the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act.

As for the 1971 Act itself, there seems to be no evidence that the gas employers thought of enforcing its application during the course of the strike, even though the unofficial strikes seemed to be in breach of contract and despite the widespread industrial disruption they caused. In short, then, the Act of which so much had been expected by so many, made no contribution towards the settlement of the gasworkers’ strike.

Secondly, the process of technological change in Britain may have accelerated over the past few years, in recognition of the drive to modernize, to achieve economies of scale and to withstand and challenge internal and international competition.26 Certain recent strikes must be seen in this content, for changes in manning and skill levels must inevitably provoke a reaction from organized labour.

Yet, in British industry as a whole, decisions to invest in newer processes are taken at Board level and the union contribution generally amounts to a reaction to decisions already made and/or to an agreement in principle that technological change is “vital” for the industry concerned. That the gas- workers’ strike initially took the form of unofficial protest by shopfloor groups, in an industry which is

26 Duncan, J. and McGnhy, W. E. J., op. cit.

35

The gasworkers’ strike 197213 : an analysis of causes

becoming increasingly centralized, s e e m to reflect workers for means to protect, articulate and advance a resentment directed towards the decision-making their interests. The current discussion on the role processes themselves or towards the decisions of employee-participation in British industry would arrived at or towards a combination of the two. seem to typify this wider search.

Whatever the prime direction of resentment on the issue of technological change, the gasworkers’ before action seems to be part of the wider search by Government should be interpreted accordingly. Ed.

Note: This article was completed and ready for publication ~ ~ ~ ~ r p l ~ l ~ ~ i ~ ~ . References to he u~~~~

La grave des employ& du gas en 1972/3 : Une analyse des causes

La grtve des employts du gas en 197213 a Ct6 la premibre grtve officielle dans l’histoire de ce secteur industriel, et cet article tente d’expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles cette gtve a eu lieu et powquoi elle a pris cette forme. Nous avons aussi tent6 de situer la grbve dans le contexte plus vaste du dkveloppment des relations industrielles pendant les dernitres anntes.

Le rythme croissant des rkents changements tech- nologiques est all6 de pair avec une acctleration des reductions d’effeaifs. Les eEets de ces reductions sem- blent cependant, (du moins pendant un certain temps) avoir it6 attknub par une attention soutenue portCe aux politiques touchant les exctdents de main d’oeuvre, et par une liaison Qroite avec les syndicats. Les change- ments technologiques ont aussi permis la centralisation de I’industrie qui est maintenant passCe sous le contr8le d’un Conseil Corporatif.

L’industrie a une tradition d’absence de grbves, probablement h cause des augmentations favorables de salaires, des procedures rapides de rtglements de conflits, d’une main d‘oeuvre animke d’un esprit civique, et de I’efficacitt d’une legislation anti-gbve qui n’avait jamais ett appliqute mais dont I’existence ttait largement connue au gas. Et pourtant, l’incidence des gbves a augment6 en 1969 et 1970 et ce fait Ctait dQ en apparence a des questions de comparabilitt, de centralisation, de prix et de politiques de revenus. Le r8le jout par le critbre de comparabilitt dans les nkgociations de salaires, et les relations etroites qui s’ensuivirent entre les taux de salaires au gas et les autres taux de salaires sont ensuite examinb.

I1 y a une interdtpendance tvidente entre la grkve et les politiques actuelles de prix et de revenus du gouverne- ment. Rtftrence est bite h l’intervention d’une soi-disant anomalie h cause du chronometrage des nkgociations (ce qui rejoint la remarque 2 tnoncee Ci-dessus), de l’absence d’un agent pour examiner le cas des travailleurs, et h

l’allkgation que le gouvernement traitait “inequitable- ment” les employes du SeCteur public.

La g h e devrait &re 6galement pla& dans un con- texte plus large. Les changements technologiques au Gas et dans les Mines (pour ne citer que z exemples) a rksultk en des excedents considCrables de main d’oeuvre durant les dernibres annCes; en m h e temps la resistance des salarik aux surplus de main d’oeuvre qui ont suivi semble avoir augment&. Parmi les raisons apparentes qui expliquent cette reaction figurent un taux 4evk de ch8mage, un taux croissant de redondance et peut4tre aussi une reaction au processus de prise de dbision dins les industries concernks.

I1 y a aussi I’aCCuSation portk par les syndicats qui dklarent que les travailleurs du se-cteur public ont CtC distinguks injustement par les rbentes politiques gouvernementales. Cette accusation est examinee et certaines conclusions en sont tirkes. Ainsi, il semble important de mettre sur pied une Commission de Salaires qui puisse sonder les conflits de ntgociations de salaires d’aprh un ensemble de crittres spkcifiques, cohCrents et largement acceptables. Les crittres devraient chaque fois que cela est possible, s’appliquer egalement aux secteurs public et privt. Une attention spkiale pourrait devoir &re port& dans le cas du secteur public aux aspects de comparabilitk et d’excedents de main d’oeuvre. Une Commission d’Enqu&e qui pourrait etre semblable au Conseil National des Priv et Revenus (NBPI) pourrait aussi &re en mtsure d’examiner des pratiques inefficaces dans I’industrie britannique, afin de determiner pourquoi elles existent et comment on pourrait y rCmCdier.

Une question importante relative h la structure fon- damentale d’une telle Commission est de savoir s’il devrait y avoir une seule Cummission pour tous les secteurs d’industrie, ou s’il devrait y avoir une certaine diffhenciation “fonctionnelle” couvrant par example, d’une part les salaires du secteur privC, et d’autre part le

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secteur public (industriel et non-industriel). Au moment du choix d’une structure approprike le gouvernement devrait s’attacher a kviter d’attirer de la part des syndicats du secteur public des critiques supplhnentaires de p r b jugis, mais les facteurs qui sont communs aux secteurs publics at privks devraient aussi &re pris en con- sideration.

L’article se tennine par l’examen des implications de la grbve du gas vis-a-vis des problbmes de lkgislation en relations industrielles et de la participation des employb.

En considerant en premier lieu la lkgklation il est re- marque que le nombre des grkves s’est klevk au gas avant

le vote de 1’Acte sur les Relations Industrielles, malgrk I’existence depuis le sikle d’une legislation limitant les gtves. Ou doit aussi noter que 1’Acte des Relations Industrielles ne semble avoir jouk aucun rble dam la rbolution de la gCve du gas.

I1 est aussi suggkrt que les rkentes rhctions au niveau de I’atelier Vis-a-vis des exckdents de main d’oeuvre (au gas ou ailleurs) prouvent le mhntentement croissant avec les processus de prises de dkisions dam l’industrie britannique. Si cela est le cas, il semblerait douc que le rkent dtbat sur la participation des employb soit particuli&rement h props.

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