THE GEOGRAPHICAL PIVOT OF AFGHANISTAN

Melanie Graham MA Candidate

UNBC Ints 690

27 November 2007

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The Geographical Pivot of Afghanistan International Studies 690

UNBC MA Candidate Melanie Graham

November 2007

The intent of this paper is to undertake an exploration of the political culture of

Afghanistan. Research indicates that while much has been written about the politics and the

culture of Afghanistan there has been little about the Political Culture per se. There is the added

challenge of trying to identify an overarching political culture for a collection of regionally co-

located but otherwise distinct and fiercely independent tribal people.

Much of the existing literature on Afghanistan, furthermore, reflects a Euro-centric

perspective on the country. Contemporary literature tends to be highly reflective of recent

international efforts to introduce western democracy to a nation of diverse people more shaped

by generations of violent conflict than by any shared vision of central governance or national

identity. Historical literature, on the other hand, tends to be strongly coloured by the colonial

perspective of the 19th century British Empire.

To achieve some semblance of balance between the contemporary and historical view of

the Afghan political culture in this exploration it will prove beneficial to include a geopolitical

perspective. The premise for this last inclusion is the belief that the political culture of a people,

individually and collectively, cannot help but be shaped to some extent by their physicality,

specifically their physical and strategic geography. This final perspective will act like a third

bearing point in order to establish a triangulated fix, so to speak, on the political culture of

Afghanistan

The historical exploration of the Afghan political culture will be based largely on Marin

Ewan’s book Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics, United Kingdom, 2001,

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and Stephen Tanner’s book Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall

of the Taliban, USA 2002. Specific reference to unique aspects of the Afghan Political Culture

will be drawn to some extent from anthropologist G. Whitney Azoy’s book, Buzkashi: Game and

Power in Afghanistan, Second Edition, Waveland Press Inc, USA, 2003. Azoy has described

Buzkashi as “an apt metaphor for ongoing Afghan political chaos since 1978.”

The more contemporary exploration of the Afghan political culture will be based on the

objectives and ideals articulated in both the Bonn Agreement and the Afghan Constitution of

January 4 2004.

This exploration of the Afghan political culture will also be better framed by

distinguishing a conceptual frame of reference. First and foremost it will be necessary to attempt

to clarify what is meant by political culture. The Primary reference for identifying a range of

overall types of political culture in Afghanistan will be undertaken with the approach taken by

Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba in their work The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and

Democracy in Five Nations 1989.

The term “political culture” thus refers to the specific orientations – attitudes toward the

political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. 1

The geographical context will begin with the concept of geopolitics as first introduced in

1904 by Halford Mackinder with his paper “The Geographical Pivot of History” but will apply

the relevant concepts from this still respected but much disputed paper to the strategic and

physical geography of Afghanistan as a veritable ‘geographical pivot’ for the development of

this nation’s unique political culture.

1 Almond, Gabriel a. and Verba, Sydney, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Sage Publications USA 1989

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The theoretical context for this paper tends to the post-structural perspective in that it

regards persons as Subjects that are culturally and discursively structured, created in interaction

as situated, symbolic beings. People in the singular or the plural are created through their

cultural meanings and practices. They derive from various culturally based sites of meaning

with each resulting in a different construct of the self. These include but are not limited to

cultural variables such as different language uses, different values, and different social practices

or customs and traditions.

People are also material beings present in a physical world, wrapped in the practices and

structures of their society. They are social in that they take their meaning, value and self-image

from their identity groups, from their activities in society, from their intimate relations, from the

multiple shared meanings, symbols and practices by which they interact with both their sub-

cultural groups and with their larger society as a whole.

In this context reality can be seen as somewhat disjoint, varied, dynamic and

culture-specific with particular relevance given to Subject histories, and to local

contextual details. This includes a greater emphasis on the role or relevance of the

human element in the texture of time and history with particular attention to cultural

workings, language and text in reality and identity constructs. Adding the geographical

component works well as a natural follow-on to the post-structural perspective of

political culture in terms of illustrating how the physical and strategic environment can

help to shape human reality and identity constructs.

Why is it relevant to undertake an exploration of the Afghan political culture?

Afghanistan today, in the words of Iranian filmmaker Moshen Makmalbaf (Kandahar

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Cannes Film Festival 2001) is a country that “does not have a role in today’s world. It is

neither a country remembered for a certain commodity, not for its scientific advancement,

nor as a nation that has achieved artistic honours.”2 It is important in the face of such an

indifferent contemporary world-view to take the time to understand the multiple layers of

the Afghan political culture. To do otherwise is to either abandon the Afghan people or

to concoct a governance solution for the country that is unlikely to be sustained without

ongoing and long term foreign aid and intervention.

In either event, to neglect Afghanistan would likely result in an escalation of

regional and inter-tribal conflict. This in turn would aggravate existing regional

instability and have an impact well beyond the borders of Afghanistan. An Afghanistan

trapped in an escalating spiral of perpetual conflict will invariably have an impact beyond

its borders. There will continue to be the economic and social disruption of waves of

displaced humanity pouring into neighbouring countries. There will also be the

continued use of uncontrolled mountain regions as secure training grounds for

international terrorists by virtue of both geographical isolation and the driving force of

poverty. It pays to be a terrorist in Afghanistan today. There will also be the challenge

of controlling the cultivation of poppies for the development and international sale of

illegal narcotics. Without viable and sustainable economic alternatives, for many this

represents not only a real cash crop but also serves as funding for terrorism and arms

acquisition.

2 Makmalbaf, Moshen Limbs of No Body: Indifference to the Afghan Tragedy Monthly Review Volume 53, Number 6 November 2001

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The moral argument for intervention in Afghanistan has yet to be successful. Mr.

Makmalbaf pointed out in his 2001 article that since 1992 2.5 million Afghans had died

as result of war, famine, or lack of medical attention. As of 2001 the number of Afghan

refugees living in Iran and Pakistan was 6.3 million. The international community,

however, seemed more distressed by and responsive to the March 2001 destruction of the

giant Buddha statues in Bamiyan Province. For the sake of regional stability alone, then,

a solution for sustainable governance is essential for Afghanistan. The means to ensuring

the development of a sustainable form of governance for the Afghan people furthermore

is more readily achieved with a clear understanding of their unique political culture.

What is Political Culture? Almond and Verba have confined their definition of political

culture to democracies so the definitions are somewhat contextually specific but there is still

relevant generic application.

The term “political culture” thus refers to the specifically political orientations –

attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the

self in the system.”3

Almond and Verba borrowed the term culture from anthropology as a concept to describe

the “psychological orientation toward social objects.”4 In the case of political culture they

describe the psychological orientation towards the political system of a given society, or the

“political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population.”5

3 Almond, Gabriel A and Verba, Sydney, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Sage Publications Inc. 1989 pg 12. 4 Ibid, pg 13 5 Ibid

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While there is a political culture for a nation, or a “distribution of patterns of orientation

towards political objects”6 there needs to be some systematic way of first identifying individual

orientations within this distribution pattern. Specifically, Almond and Verba felt that they

needed to “define and specify modes of political orientation and classes of political objects.”7

To this end they identified three orientations:

1. Cognitive – knowledge and belief about the political system; 2. Affective Orientation – feelings about the political system; and, 3. Evaluational orientation – judgements and opinions about political objects

This classification of political orientation was also given levels of analysis. The first is

the general political system as a whole. Is it large or small, strong or weak? Can the polity be

described as democratic, constitutional or socialistic? The second looks at how the populace feel

about their political system. Do they, generally experience feelings of patriotism, indifference or

alienation? At the other end of the analytic spectrum Almond and Verba look at the orientation

of the self or the individual as a political actor within their specific political system. What is the

content and quality of the individual sense of self as an actor within the context of their

relationship with their political system? What is their sense of personal political obligation and

individual competence in relation to their political system?

They also identified three general classes of political objects:

1. Specific roles or structures of political objects; 2. Incumbents of roles; and, 3. Particular policies, decisions or enforcement of decisions by political objects.

6 Ibid 7 Ibid

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These objects are further broadly classified by their role in the political input process or

the administrative output process. Political input is the flow of demands from society into the

polity for conversion into authoritative policy. Structures that fulfill this role include political

parties, interest groups and the media. The administrative output process refers to the

authoritative policies that are applied and enforced, typically by structures such as bureaucracies

and courts.

The importance in this process of classification of political cultures is in identifying the

differences in emphasis from one system to another. Almond and Verba use this classification to

help further distinguish a political culture as Participant or Subject, by identifying the presence

or absence of orientation toward specialized input structures and processes.

In order to better determine individual orientations toward a polity, Almond and Verba

created a simple matrix:

TABLE 1 1. SYSTEM AS

GENERAL OBJECT

2. INPUT OBJECTS

3. OUTPUT OBJECTS

4. SELF AS OBJECT

COGNITIVE AFFECT EVALUATION

In this table (1) refers to the knowledge the individual has of the nation and the political

system in general terms. These include history, size, location, and power characteristics. (2)

refers to the individual’s knowledge of the structures and roles of the political elite and the policy

proposals that are a part of the input or upward flow in policy making. How does the individual

feel about these structures and roles? (3) refers to individual knowledge of the downward flow

of policy application and enforcement. How does the individual feel about them? 4. refers to the

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individual’s self-perception as a member within their political system. Are they aware of their

rights and responsibilities? How do they feel about their capabilities?

The results of this first simple matrix can then be incorporated as values in a second

simple matrix:

TABLE 2 SYSTEM AS A

GENERAL OBJECT

INPUT OBJECTS

OUTPUT OBJECTS

SELF AS ACTIVE PARTICIPANT

PAROCHIAL 0 0 0 0 SUBJECT 1 0 1 0 PARTICIPANT 1 1 1 1

Parochial Political Culture occurs when orientation to specialized political objects as

indicated in the first table approaches zero. The political cultures of tribal societies and

autonomous local communities can be placed in this category. There are no specialized political

roles beyond that of the headman or shaman, which is a diffuse political/economic/religious role.

Individuals in a Parochial system do not distinguish between religious and social orientations.

Implicit in this is also a relative absence of expectation for politically initiated change.

The Subject Political Culture manifests a high frequency of orientation towards a

differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system. Orientation towards

input objects and toward self as an active Participant, however, approach zero. The individual

may be very aware of specialized government authority, but the relationship is toward the system

on a general level and focuses on the output or downward flow of authority. It is essentially a

passive political culture.

The Participant Political Culture is one in which the individuals tend to be explicitly

oriented on all levels. They are oriented to the system as a whole, as well as to the political and

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administrative structures and processes. Put simply, they are oriented to both input and output in

their political culture. They are also inclined to a self as activist orientation.

This is not to say that application of these three general types of political cultures is an

either/or absolute classification. They also fall short of incorporating the additional dimension of

political development and cultural change. Political systems change. Sometimes the political

culture does not change at a pace or in the same direction as the system. What happens when a

political culture is not congruent with the structures of its political system?

A congruent political structure is one that is appropriate to the political cognition of the

populace, where individual knowledge of the political system is accurate and affection and

evaluation of the structure are inclined to be favourable. Rapid cultural change can often lead to

incongruence between political structure and culture. To assess this Almond and Verba crate yet

another simple matrix:

TABLE 3 ALLEGIANCE APATHY ALIENATION COGNITIVE ORIENTATION

+ + + AFFECTIVE ORIENTATION

+ 0 - EVALUATIVE ORIENTATION

+ 0 - A (+) sign means a high frequency of awareness, of positive feeling or of evaluation towards political objects. A (-) sign means a high frequency of negative evaluations or feelings. A (0) means a high frequency of indifference.

All political cultures outside of simple Parochial tend to be mixed. A Participant culture

may well include Subjects that are oriented as Subject or Parochial and a Subject culture may

include Subjects oriented as Parochial. When a culture contains significant proportions of both

the simpler and the more complex patterns of orientation they are said to be systemically mixed.

As a culture develops and evolves it may not complete in terms of political cultural and structural

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development and may in fact stabilize at a point that falls short of congruence with the authority

or administrative structure. Development may also establish a slow but continuous pattern of

cultural change that is balanced by a corresponding evolution in political structure.

Political Cultures may also remain systemically mixed for an extended period of time.

This, however, tends to create ongoing strains between culture and structure that manifest as a

tendency to structural instability.

Almond and Verba identified three types of systemically mixed political cultures:

1. Parochial/Subject Culture; 2. 2. Subject/Participant Culture; and, 3. 3. Parochial/Participant Culture.

Parochial/Subject Culture has a substantial portion of the population reject the exclusive

claims of tribal, village or feudal authority to replace it with an allegiance to a more complex

political system and centralized government structure. The shift from Parochial to Subject

culture is a difficult one and prone to instability in the early stages.

Subject/Participant Culture is generally seen as the next progressive step after the shift

from Parochial to Subject culture and is greatly influenced by how the first transition is achieved.

If the earlier Parochial and local authorities were allowed to survive the first transition, they can

be instrumental in easing the second transition from Subject to Participant culture. If they were

excluded and driven underground so to speak, however, they are more likely to have a divisive

impact and contribute to a widening gap between private and public spheres of influence in the

evolving political culture. In the Subject Participant culture a significant part of the population

develops specialized input orientations and an activist self-perception but the bulk of the

population remains passive in self perception and oriented toward an authoritarian governmental

structure.

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Parochial/Participant Culture represents a contemporary problem that often relates to the

cultural development in emerging nations. In this instance the predominating political culture is

Parochial. The structural norms that have been introduced or imposed, however, are usually

those of a Participant culture. The result is usually a profound incongruence between culture and

structure. Unless specialized output and input orientations can be developed concurrently this

particular type of mixed political system will teeter precariously between authoritarianism and

democracy and will always be threatened by Parochial fragmentation. There is no supporting

structure on either side, neither a bureaucracy built on loyal Subjects nor an infrastructure based

on responsible and competent citizens. The only means to ensure success in this situation is to

see to it that the earlier Parochial autonomies and loyalties not only survive but also are

somehow retained as a component of the culture. The key is to penetrate the Parochial systems

and incorporate them in the output side while transforming them into valid interest groups on the

input side.

It is tempting to go deeper into the details of the Almond and Verba analysis of political

culture but the objectives of this paper are better served in turning now to the political cultures of

Afghanistan itself and placing them in the context of the Almond and Verba analysis. As

indicated in the introduction, there are three approaches that will be of value in triangulating a fix

on the Afghan political culture: The historical: the contemporary; and, the geographical.

The origins of the Afghan people are both diverse and obscure. The population today, as

of a July 2006 estimate, stands at 31,056,997. Roughly two-and-a-half million of this is made up

of nomads who have for centuries, possibly millennia, moved annually with their herds and

flocks between the plains and the uplands. It is a population of twenty or so main ethnic groups

(more than fifty overall), possessed of distinct ethnic, physical and linguistic differences. The

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majority can speak at least one of the two official languages, Pashto and Dari, but there are over

thirty different current languages in use.

Figure 1 Ethno linguistic Groups in Afghanistan - http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/maps-people.htm

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The word Afghan has a long history having turned up as early as the 3rd century in

Sessanian inscriptions, in the 7th century writings of the Chinese traveler Hsuan-Tsang and in

first millennium Muslim records. Until recently, however, the term has been synonymous with

Pashtun, the name of the country’s largest (nearly half the population) and most dominant ethnic

group. Given their historical dominance, especially of local and regional governance and related

conflict, it is the Pashtun people that will be the focus of this Afghan political culture

exploration.

The Pashtun tribe is further subdivided into a large number of sub-tribes the most

dominant of which is the Durranis (formerly the Abdalis) from which comes the Afghan royal

house, and the Ghilzai. Both sub-tribes live to the south of the country and have traditionally

been antagonistic towards one another with the Durrani dominating.

The Pashtun overall are a proud and aggressive, highly individualistic tribe. Theirs is a

familial and tribal society with predatory habits. They adhere to an ethos, called Pashtunwali,

that is part feudal, and part democratic, combing an uncompromising Muslim faith with a simple

code of conduct. The rigidity of this code has relaxed somewhat over time but still maintains

social obligations of revenge (badal), hospitality (melmastia), and sanctuary (nanawati) that

continue to guide conduct. Questions of honour (namus) specifically as they relate to economics

or politics frequently result in private vendettas and collective conflict that are recognized as an

integral part of Pashtun life. Pashtun society overall is highly Parochial, fiercely independent

and resistant to outside influence. Prior to the establishment of the Durrand Line in 1893 which

established the border of Afghanistan with British India the Pashtun people extended their

territory well in to what is now the North West Frontier of Pakistan.

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Figure 2. Abdali Durrani was Pashtun, the First King of Afghanistan and founder of the Sadozay dynasty of the Abdali tribe. Borders shown as of 1772 http://afghanland.com/history/ahmadshah.html

Abdali Ahmed Khan is a positive example of the type of monarchy that has historically

pre-existed todays Afghan Republic. He was elected Shah of Afghanistan by a jirga or council

of the 9 Abdali sub-tribes in 1747. He was named Durr-I-Dauran (Sha, Pearl of the Age) and

ruled as Ahmed Shah Durrani until his early death (due to natural causes) in 1772. He has been

recognized by Afghani’s as the Father of the Nation and through effective and aggressive

leadership was able to consolidate and expand the country from Central Asia to Delhi and from

Kashmir to the Arabian Sea. His reign established Afghanistan as the greatest Muslim empire of

the 18th century. He established an Abdali council with which he consulted as the first among

equals and was careful to maintain a conciliatory approach with the Pashtun tribes.

Unfortunately he was not inclined to consolidate his reign as he and his followers had little

interest in government or administration. They were instead simply successful warriors and

freebooters. The nation he was said to have established, as a result, was more a federation of

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tribes than a nation state. His approach to leadership has been the norm throughout the history of

Afghanistan, so much so that the monarch has sometimes been referred to as merely the King of

Kabul. Centralized governance in the region has traditionally tended to be inconsistent or non-

existent and often violently contested with tribes shifting loyalties to the leader most likely to

ensure security and successful predation on neighbouring regions.

The sub-tribes and clans of the Pashtun that Abdali was so careful to keep on-side during

his reign are called khels and the leaders of these khels are called khans. They often hold their

positions by hereditary right but there are no firm rules of succession so factionalism is a

dominant theme. The authority of the khans is competitive among the sub-tribes and clans and is

largely dependant on the success of their leadership qualities. The only moderating influence is

that of the assembly of elders, called the Jirga. This assembly can occasionally expand

participation to all the adult males. The passage of time has seen the control of the khans find

further expression in economic power resulting in something of a feudal system. The underlying

ethic of equality, however, remains, with every adult male being entitled to participate in the

jirga and contribute to the decision making process.

G. Whitney Azoy, in his book Buzkashi, draws an interesting parallel between the Afghan

sport, Buzkashi and the political culture of the Afghan people that helps to expand on an

understanding of the intricacies of power balance among the khans that predominate in rural

Afghanistan. The game itself sees two teams of horsemen called Chapandaz compete to take

possession of a headless and hoofless body of a calf in order to carry it off to an identified goal

area. There are few rules to the game itself and there is both a traditional version and the new,

official government version of the game. A traditional game can on go for hours or even days.

The game itself, however, is only the final outcome of a prolonged social-political process that

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has been consistent since its early Turkic-Mongol origins. Today the game is shared by several

Central Asian ethnic groups in Northern Afghanistan including Uzbeks, Turkmans, Hazaras,

Kazakhs, and Kirghiz as well as Tajiks and Pashtun. This extensive shared history of the game

further supports Azoy’s identification of three ways in which Buzkashi can be related to Afghan

society:

1. commemoration of cultural heritage; 2. metaphor for chaotic, uninhibited and uncontrolled competition: and, 3. an arena for certain aspects of political competition. It is the third that is of particular interest to this exploration of Afghan political culture.

Azoy explains that life in Afghanistan is far from compartmentalized. Theirs is an approach to

political power that depends on reputation and there is no clear cut demarcation between

political, social and religious authority particularly at the rural level. Authority is chronically

insecure. There are few political institutions and legitimacy is always at issue. Power relations,

therefore, are always shifting and changing. The result is that all aspects of public experience

have a potential political message. Often the most effective political messages, furthermore, are

of an implicit as opposed to explicit nature and can be, as a result, unconsciously absorbed by

their society.

Buzkashi is more than a game yet is described in Afghan culture as shouq or a merely a

leisure, recreational pastime. It is openly presented as “only a game”. Reality indicates that the

game is more of an experience, a ritual, a socio-political event. People participate in Buzkashi as

a competitor, as a spectator or as a sponsor with the most important participation being that of

the sponsors. These individuals are khans who sponsor riders, horses or an entire game. They

are also the individuals who most often dominate politics outside the realm of Buzkashi. It takes

considerable resources to sponsor Buzkashi at any level. Sponsorship of entire games is

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therefore restricted to wealthy and powerful khans who are typically in fierce competition with

one another on an ongoing basis. Their rivalry, though unofficially accepted as commonplace, is

in conflict with an Islamic based ideal of cooperation. Buzkashi though professed to be nothing

more than a recreational game that doesn’t count “provides a sanctioned arena in which this

process can occur publicly and be observed by one and all. Herein lies the subtle, crucial

paradox: Khans support buzkashi “for the fun of it” but their play competition inevitably

assumes extra-play overtones.”8

There is a political side not only to the outcome of a buzkashi game, but also to the

success of the overall social event or Tooi. Planning begins well in advance with unofficial and

oblique discussion preceding open discussion. If it does not look like an anticipated game is

likely to be a successful event at this contemplative stage, it will go no further. The sponsor of a

game must ensure that their quam or their collection of dependants oriented towards them and

maintained by their reputation are prepared to work hard for the success of a buzkashi before

they can begin to speak openly of planning for a game. The logistics and expense involved in

arranging food and accommodation for the anticipated Participants, competitors and spectators

alike, and in ensuring attendance by important people and talented competitors, are significant

and cannot lightly be undertaken. An event that either fails to happen once openly discussed or

is regarded as a mediocre success or worse still a failure, will cause a sponsor to lose social

status and will ultimately diminish the range and extent of their quam.

Just as traditional buzkashi in Afghanistan now competes with government sponsored

national buzkashi, so the competition for social dominance can be seen to be played out, yet

again, through the game. Nationally sponsored games are played by more organized rules within

a finite time frame. Where the objective was once simply to take the carcass of the dead calf or 8 Azoy, G. Whitney, Buzkashi: Game and Power in Afghanistan, Waveland |Press, USA, 2003 pg 9

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goat outside the game to drop it, there is now an identified goal circle. The portion of the

viewing area once set aside for favoured guests of the sponsoring khan is now set aside for

representatives of the central Afghan government and international VIP’s. There are walls

demarking the perimeter of the national game and of course the prizes for competitors are often

greater than those managed for traditional games. In essence, through buzkashi, the Afghan

government continues the unofficial political competition, but instead of a horizontal competition

among rival khans, it is now a public expression or manifestation of competition between the two

levels of governance, the khans and the central government.

Religion has also played a central role in shaping the political culture of Afghanistan.

Islam is practiced by 99% 9of the population in Afghanistan and is both the national religion and

the basis of the Afghan culture and values. Dominated by Sunni Muslims (80%)10 it is likely the

closest thing the country has to a unifying concept. Islam has superimposed itself on the ethnic

diversity of Afghanistan, becoming the primary focus of loyalty. The imams or mullahs, as the

spiritual leaders of Islam, have considerable influence which can include ritual, juridicial,

medical and educational roles at village and tribal levels. They are also often land owners.

According to UN statistics11 as of 2005, 22.9% of the Afghan population lived in urban areas

with the remaining 77.1% living in rural village areas. Given that current literacy levels have

increased to 36% overall12 for Afghanistan and much of the population remains ignorant of

modern ways of life and wedded to tradition, this puts considerable local and regional power in

the hands of the imam or mulla.

9 Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book – Afghanistan - https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html 10 Ibid 11 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/hum-sets.htm 12 Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book – Afghanistan - https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

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For all their local and regional power, however, the imams or mullahs are at the bottom of

the religious hierarchy. Next up the chain are the ulama or maulvis, the scholars of Islamic Law

and tradition, and the qazis and muftis who exercise judicial functions. There are also a number

of influential Suffi mystical orders the most prominent of which are the Qadiriyya and the

Naqshbandiyya. Both orders are, by long standing tradition, heavily influential in politics and

their contemporary leaders, Sayyid Ahmad Gailani and Sebghatullah Mujadidi, have also been

leaders of militant Afghan resistance groups.

The Pashtun, the dominant tribe of the region, have long been expansionistic, generating

long-standing antagonism between themselves and many of the other tribes of Afghanistan.

Regional differences as a result, are significant. The towns and villages that are home to over

75% of the population are largely self-sufficient, however, and the inhabitants have long been

accustomed to run their own affairs with little interest or even tolerance for outside interference.

Local economies are based on subsistence level agriculture and animal husbandry. The Afghan

state, whether monarchy or republic, has never been strong enough to exercise any significant

control throughout the country so little has been done until recently by a central authority in the

way of educational or medical support or the development of infrastructure to support transport,

communication or industry. Government revenues, furthermore, have been drawn from foreign

assistance and taxes on commerce and business. The land, agriculture and pastoralism have been

exempt from taxation. With Islam as the only link any sense of national unity is weak at best.

The only exceptions are historical incidences of particularly strong leadership like Ahmad Shah

Abdali (Durrani) or significant external threat. Even these exceptions could only generate

ephemeral cooperation, which quickly evaporated in the face of long standing tribal divisions.

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Afghanistan is a nation of contradictions. As a people they share a fierce devotion to

freedom and can carry hospitality to embarrassing heights in accordance with the tribal ethos

called Pashtunwali. They are, however, consistently and relentlessly formidable and indomitable

enemies when they perceive that they have been affronted or wronged. As a people they also

share a long history of conflict. They have consistently been invaded, Subject to battles, sieges,

vendettas, assassinations and massacres. They have been inclined, whenever not facing an

outside enemy, to indulge in tribal feuding, dynastic strife and civil war. In spite of all this,

though they have never been successfully colonized, they have repeatedly played a pivotal

strategic role in colonization that persists into today’s post colonial world.

It is the strategic role of Afghanistan that will link the military history of the region to the

impact of the geography on the development of the Afghan people. According to Stephen

Tanner:

It has never been Afghanistan’s lot to exist benignly apart from the rest of the world. It

has instead found itself at the hinge of imperial ambitions since the beginning of recorded

history, from the world’s first transcontinental superpower, the Persian Empire, to its latest, the

United States.13

Whenever the Afghans weren’t enduring or resisting invasions they kept in good martial

practice fighting among themselves. Today, after more than a quarter of a century of non-stop

warfare, the Afghan people remain as problematic to US and NATO forces as they were to

foreign armies 2,500 years ago. They can be briefly defeated but they cannot be conquered. To

do so is far too costly in terms of lives lost and resources wasted.

13 Tanner, Stephen Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, USA 2002 pg 1

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Tanner points out early on in his book that understanding the military history of

Afghanistan is as much a lesson in geography as it is in politics or history. It is situated at the

eastern most part of the great Iranian plateau and tucked under the nearly impenetrable arc of the

Himalayas. As such it represents the primary land conduit between the great empires of Central

Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the Indian subcontinent.

Afghanistan’s claustrophobic passes have borne mute witness to armies of Persians,

Greeks, Mauryans, Huns, Mongols, Moghuls, British, Soviets, and Americans.14

The following maps illustrate this better than words.

Figure 3. 522 BCE--486 BCE Darius the Great http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/persian_empire.jpg

14 Ibid pg 2

22

Figure 4. The Empire of Alexander 336 to 323 BCE http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/oldwrld/armies/armyimage/Alexempire.html Old World Contacts / The Applied History Research Group / The University of Calgary Copyright © 2000, The Applied History Research Group

Figure 5. Partian Sub Kingdoms 14 CE http://s155239215.onlinehome.us/turkic/btn_GeographyMaps/AD%2014%20parthia%20map.jpg

23

Figure 6. Kushan Map 106 AD Middle Asia in the 2nd century AD

1 - Direction of Hunnish migration;

2 - Borders of Kushan Kungdom ca. 106

AD;

3 - Sphere of influence of Kushan Kingdom

4 - Territory taken by Kanishka from

China;

5 - Great Silk Road

Figure 7. Hunnic Empire 453 AD http://s155239215.onlinehome.us/turkic/btn_GeographyMaps/AD%20453%20Western%20Hun%20Empire. Gif

24

Figure 8. The Muslim East 13th Century - http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~rs143/meast.jpg

Figure 9. The Mongol Empire late 13th Century http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/Faculty/Nadir%20Ozbek/courses/Hist121/Map_List.htm

25

The strategic relevance of Afghanistan as a pivotal crossroads in world events began to

decline in the medieval era. Historian Rhea Talley Stewart is cited in Tanners book where he

states that:

Two men did irreparable damage to Afghanistan. The first was Genghis Khan, [-]; the

second was Christopher Columbus – “Afghanistan is far less important to a round world,” wrote

Stewart,”than it was to a flat one.”15

With the emergence of viable and reliable global sea power Afghanistan lost its status as

an essential highway between civilizations and became a veritable no-man’s land. It was still

critical territory to the great empires, but now for negative reasons. The nineteenth century saw

the start of what would become called the Great Game, where the world’s dominant sea power,

Great Britain, engaged the then pre-eminent land power – Russia, in a contest for control of

Afghanistan. Neither side had any significant interest in the country itself, in its people or

resources. Its only value was that of a buffer between the two great nations. For the past two

centuries, however, both countries have continued to find “little but grief in their forays into that

buffer.”16

One of the lasting impacts of the Great Game on Afghanistan was the redesigning of the

countries borders that had been established in 1772. The boundaries were reconfigured without

regard to tribal territories, villages or families, to ensure that the borders of British India would at

no time touch those of Russia. The Durrand line was introduced in 1893 and not only divided

tribes, communities and families; it literally cut Afghanistan off from the sea. The country

became politically as well as physically land locked. It also divided the dominant governing

15 Tanner, Stephen Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, USA 2002 pg 3 16 Ibid pg 3

26

Pashtun tribe with half remaining in Afghanistan and the other half consigned to be a part of the

northwest territory of India. In August of 1947 they would be severed yet again with the creation

of Pakistan. The Durrand Line was to be ratified by Afghanistan, but that never happened. It

was to remain in force for 100 years so should have expired in 1993. That also did not happen

and the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has increasingly become a source of conflict

between the two nations. Pakistan wants to see the Durrand line sanctified or made permanent

so that it can retain the North-western Frontier, whereas Afghanistan does not regard the border

as valid, particularly since 1993 when the territory it separated should have reverted back to

Afghanistan.

Figure 10. Proposed Afghanistan Border at the conclusion of the 100 year s of Durrand line - a temporary border imposed by the British in 1893 - http://afghanland.com/history/durrand.html

27

Figure 10 above shows how the expiration of the Durrand line in 1993 would have

returned sea access to Afghanistan and united the Pashtun people. It would also have cut

Pakistan in half and reabsorbed Baluchistan back into Afghanistan.

There is another aspect of the Afghan geography that Tanner saw as relevant to both the

military history and political culture of the Afghan people. The strategic geography routed one

invading empire after another through the country bringing diverse cultures, trade, and new

philosophies. It was, however, the physical geography, the harsh and predominantly

mountainous terrain that may have ultimately shaped the people of Afghanistan.

The landscape of Afghanistan, where it is not made up of jagged tiered rows of mountain

ranges, is largely dessert. Much of the meagre arable land is little more than seasonal pasture.

Figure 11. Afghan Topographic Map http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Afghan_topo_en.jpg

28

This very rugged environment makes for a natural defence whether on a national,

regional or local level. Afghanistan may be readily invaded, but as the British and Russians

know all too well, it is far more difficult to hold. For the people of Afghanistan it has often

proved just as difficult to hold together.

The concept of geography as a contributor to politics and the development of political

culture is not a new one. It was first given voice in 1904 by H.J. Mackinder, a Reader in

Geography in the University of Oxford and then Director of the London Based School of

Economics and Political Science. He coined a phrase “The Geographical Pivot of History”17 in

reference to “those physical features of the world [which I believe] to have been most coercive of

human action, and presenting some of the chief phases of history as organically connected with

them, even in the ages when they were unknown to geography.”18

Mackinder wrote at the open of the twentieth century and described the preceding 400

years as the Columbian epoch, as a time of exploration when human society, especially European

society, had expanded to eventually claim all the habitable real estate on the planet. It was his

contention that for the first time the completeness of human expansion was such that it was

finally possible to draw a correlation between macro geographical and historical generalizations.

This correlation, he contended, might make it possible to identify a basic formula for a degree of

geographical causation in history. Tanner has followed through on this with an exploration of

the tribes living in the remote mountain regions of Afghanistan. He points out that these tribes

(Pashtun for the most part) are stilled governed on a feudal basis, and have never been conquered

or subjugated by a central domestic government. Transient armies may pass through devastating

17 Mackinder, H.J. The Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Journal No. 4 Vol. XXIII April 1904 republished by The Geographical Journal Vol 170, No. 4 December 2004 pp 298-321 18 Ibid

29

sedentary communities on the route of march, but such communities are the exception in

Afghanistan. The mountain tribes of Afghanistan have managed to live, free and independent, in

natural elevated rocky fortresses in the remote heights and deep valleys for centuries. The

agrarian communities in the high valleys are more inclined to tend livestock than crops and often

practice a semi nomadic lifestyle in order to move herds and flocks to seasonal pastures. Readily

defensible communities, a highly mobile people devoted to freedom, the Afghan mountain tribes

are also excellent warriors and predators able to participate with devastating skill in collective

defence, civil war or expeditions for plunder. Afghanistan has, as a result, never been held down

by a foreign power, but it also appears to be incapable of national unity unless faced with a

significant foreign threat. In the absence of external threat they have shown themselves to be

inclined to intertribal conflict and feuding. The freedom they hold so dear is not the sort they see

as readily provided by any central government or national declaration of rights. It is an

individual and community based freedom of ancient derivation with little inclination to be

bothered with government at all.

The other aspect of Afghan physicality that impacts on political culture is the absence of

reliable and accessible transportation. The mountain tribes may be isolated by high rock walls

and deep valleys, but desert and an almost complete absence of consistently navigable rivers also

act as effective barriers between regions and tribes. To make matters worse, the Afghan people

have historically been disinclined to develop a significant transportation infrastructure. The

country has one of the worst road systems in the world and has absolutely no rail system.

Amir Abdul Rehman, ruler of Afghanistan between 1880 and 1901, banned railways and

the telegraph from entering Afghanistan, in case they were used in any British or Russian

invasion. Rehman commented “there will be a railway in Afghanistan when the Afghans are

30

able to make it themselves”. . . Rehman forbade his Subjects from travelling on the British line to

Chaman which he described as “a knife pushed into my vitals.”19

Landlocked, Afghans must travel over 2,000 kilometres over rugged and unforgiving

terrain to reach the nearest seaport. The air transport industry has a weak institutional framework

and has no operational regulatory mechanisms. This has left the country with a high-risk profile

that discourages international air carriers from identifying Afghanistan as a destination of

choice.20 The end result is that significant portions of the Afghan population are physically cut-

off both from one another and from any sense of a centralized governing authority.

It is hard to distinguish where traditional Afghanistan comes to an end and a

contemporary vision of the state begins to take shape. Amanullah Khan, recognized as the

Reform King, began his reign in 1919 following the assassination of his father Habibullah. He

initiated a series of ambitious modernization efforts in 1921 following the overthrow of the

British at the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Afghan war. His efforts were cut short in 1929,

however, when he was overthrown by Habibullah Kalakani, who was, that same year, killed by

Nadir Khan who then set about to abolish the reforms introduced by Amanullah Khan.

Contemporary Afhanistan, however, can likely be best seen as emerging with the reign of

Zahir Shah in 1933. Like Amanullah he assumed the throne following the assassination of his

father and remained in place until 1973 when he was overthrown by Daoud Khan and the

Afghanistan Communist Party. Daod Khan abolished the monarchy, declared himself president

and established the Republic of Afghanistan. In 1975 through to 1977 Daoud introduced a new

constitution, and confirmed women’s rights but then turned around in typical Afghan fashion and

19 http://www.ajg41.clara.co.uk/afghanistan.html 20 CIA World Fact Book http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/af.html

31

began to oust suspected opponents in his government. In 1978 there was a bloody communist

coup, Daoud was killed, Taraki was named president, a treaty of friendship was signed with the

Soviet Union and Soviet tanks rolled in to Afghanistan on December 25 1979. The reforms

introduced following the invasion were profoundly at odds with traditional Afghan values and

were deemed to be anti-Islam. Every Afghan, as a result, was obliged to oppose both the reforms

and their advocates, the Afghan communist leaders and their Soviet patrons. Children of the

resulting tide of Afghan refugees who fled for the security of Pakistan would become the

Taliban. The Afghans who remained to wage a passionate nationalist war against foreign

occupation, the US funded warriors of Jihad, would become the Mujahideen. When the Soviets

departed in defeat February 15 1989, they left behind a leadership vacuum. The Afghan political

culture, long tribalistic and sporadically held together by loyalty to one monarchy or another, had

lost any semblance of legitimacy. There was no leadership available capable of uniting the tribes

to rebuild the country. Tribal leaders, especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin

Rabbani fought for exclusive control of Afghanistan adding to the hardship and suffering of a

population weary of war. The Taliban promised a welcome peace and stability. Backed by

Pakistan and welcomed by an embattled population the Taliban had little difficulty in

establishing themselves as rulers of most of Afghanistan by 1996. Their rule was harsh and

restrictive, but it offered the hope of peace and security to the Afghan people under their control.

What does it all mean when placed in the context of the contemporary vision for

Afghanistan that is articulated in both the Bonn Agreement of 2001 and the 2004 Afghan

constitution? Is there a prevailing traditional political culture and does it, on the basis of an

Almond and Verba type analysis, converge with the centralized political culture envisioned by

the current Kabul based Afghan government?

32

The Bonn Agreement was intended to establish a process for political reconstruction in

Afghanistan. In the opening phrases of the agreement there is an acknowledgement of the

“right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance

with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice.”21 They also identify an

objective to establish “a broad based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative

government,”22 The Bonn Agreement identifies the Interim Authority as the official repository

of Afghan sovereignty until such time as a Transitional Authority could be established through

an Emergency Loya Jirga or Grand Council to be opened by the exiled ex-monarch of

Afghanistan, Mohammed Zaher. There was also to be a Constitutional Jirga to draft a new

Afghan constitution, but until it did, the constitution of 1964 would prevail, except where the

provisions were inconsistent with the Bonn Agreement or where they related to the authority of

the monarchy. Given that much of the 1964 constitution was involved with laying out the

authority of and absence of accountability for the monarchy it left a pretty bare bones starting

point for a constitution. The Bonn Agreement also required that all armed factions within

Afghanistan come under the command and control of the Interim Authority. Given that not all of

the conflicted factions were included as signatories to the agreement this would later become

problematic in efforts to establish peace and security.

The 2004 Afghan constitution identified Afghanistan as a single and united country

belonging to all resident ethnicities determined to establish a government based on people’s will

and democracy. The constitution declared the country to be an Islamic Republic, unitary,

independent and indivisible. National sovereignty was established as belonging to the nation as

exercised through representation.

21 The Bonn Agreement, Afghan Government web site. pg 1, para 4. http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm 22 Ibid pg 1 para 8

33

The ideals and objectives identified in both the Bonn Agreement and the 2004 Afghan

Constitution are commendable and worthy. They are also ambitious and far-reaching in part

because of the devastation that has overrun Afghanistan for much of the past 30 years. But only

in part. The other dilemma is the one raised by the question of congruency and political culture.

Almond and Verba presented three types of orientations for political culture and three sub-types

of mixed orientations for political cultures. In looking back over the evolving development of

the Afghan political culture it is not difficult to see that there are several orientations struggling

to find congruence in Afghanistan. The rural part of the country, by virtue of physical and

economic isolation, is still very much locked in a Parochial orientation.

TABLE 1 1. SYSTEM AS

GENERAL OBJECT

2. INPUT OBJECTS

3. OUTPUT OBJECTS

4. SELF AS OBJECT

COGNITIVE 0 0 0 0 AFFECT EVALUATION

Rural Afghans make up approximately 75% of the overall population. Their knowledge

of the nation and the political system in general terms is limited with the focus being on local

history, politics and power characteristics. Their knowledge of the structures and roles of the

political elite and the policy proposals that are a part of the input or upward flow in policy

making also tend to be restricted to the local community. Expectations of local structures and

roles are established through custom and tradition as laid out in Pashtunwali. Expectations of

national or central structures and roles are remote and unreal, especially in the face of

generations of inconsistency in central governance. Rural Afghan knowledge of the downward

flow of policy application and enforcement, given the above mentioned historical inconsistencies

in central governance that have been the norm, likely also runs to indifference. More faith is

34

placed in the local khan or imam than in some remote and often changing central governing

authority. The self-perception of the Rural Afghan as a member within their political system is

necessarily confined to the local system with rights, obligations and capabilities, for the most

part, shaped, once again, by traditional codes of conduct as laid out in Pashtunwali. Are they

aware of their rights and responsibilities?

Urban Afghanistan has historically been more accustomed to some degree of centrality in

governance, with a monarchy having been the urban norm for Kabul, Herat and Kandahar for the

past few centuries. This would establish urban Afghanistan, or approximately 25% of the

population, with a Subject orientation in their political culture. Where the Parochial orientation

would score a zero in the first matrix, the Subject orientation would rate as a one in their

recognition of the political system as a general object, but would still rate a zero when assessing

their perception of their input. They would be more aware of the output, or application and

enforcement of policy by the political system but would have a limited perception of themselves

as active Participants in the political system.

The objectives of both the Bonn Agreement and the 2004 Constitution clearly require a

Participant orientation from the Afghan people. A democracy demands a Participant orientation

in that it requires not only a cognitive awareness of both the political system and the self as

active Participant, it also requires knowledge of both input and output. This means knowledge of

what can be expected of both the political system and the individual as an active Participant

helping to shape and inform that political system.

35

TABLE 2 SYSTEM AS A

GENERAL OBJECT

INPUT OBJECTS

OUTPUT OBJECTS

SELF AS ACTIVE PARTICIPANT

PAROCHIAL 0 0 0 0 SUBJECT 1 0 1 0 PARTICIPANT 1 1 1 1

Rural Afghanistan has a Parochial Political Culture. The orientation to specialized

political objects as indicated in the first table approaches zero. Theirs is a predominantly tribal

society and their communities have tended to be highly autonomous. There are no specialized

political roles beyond that of the khan or imam, representing a political/economic/religious role.

There is little distinction between religious and social orientations and a relative absence of

expectation for politically initiated change.

Urban Afghanis have more of a Subject Political Culture in that they manifest a high

frequency of orientation towards a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects

of the system. They have certain expectations of the monarchy. Their orientation towards input

objects and toward self as an active Participant, however, still approach zero. They are highly

aware of a monarch’s authority, but their relationship toward the system remains on a general

level and focuses on the output or downward flow of authority. It is essentially a passive

political culture.

The Participant Political Culture is what has been proposed by the Bonn Agreement and

the 2004 Constitution in that it demands that all Afghans learn to be explicitly oriented on all

levels. They must establish an orientation to the system as a whole, as well as to the proposed

political and administrative structures and processes. The vision on the table for Afghanistan

demands that their people cultivate an orientation to their political system and its structures that

includes both input into the system and an expectation of consistent and specific output. The

36

Afghan people, in short, are expected to develop a capacity for an interactive relationship with

their political culture and to see themselves as activists within that system.

The situation in Afghanistan is not dissimilar to an analysis of any political culture. The

assessment of a Parochial Rural orientation and a Subject Urban orientation is not an exclusive

or absolute classification. The country, at all levels, is evolving, and with it all the various

combinations of political culture orientation. The destruction of infrastructure, leadership and

communities in Afghanistan had resulted in a failure on the part of the various political cultures

to change at a pace with or in the same direction as the central political system. The end result is

an overall mixed Parochial/Subject political culture that is not congruent with the structures of its

emerging democratic or Participant political system.

To assess this mixed orientation it will help to return to Almond and Verba’s third

matrix:

TABLE 3 ALLEGIANCE APATHY ALIENATION COGNITIVE ORIENTATION

+ + + AFFECTIVE ORIENTATION

+ 0 - EVALUATIVE ORIENTATION

+ 0 - A (+) sign means a high frequency of awareness, of positive feeling or of evaluation towards political objects. A (-) sign means a high frequency of negative evaluations or feelings. A (0) means a high frequency of indifference.

The Afghan people are struggling to move their Rural Political Culture from tribal

feudalism or a distinctly Parochial orientation to one that is inclusive and democratic or inclined

to a Participant orientation. At the same time they are more easily moving their Urban Political

Culture from the Subject orientation of a monarchy to the same Participant orientation of

inclusive democracy. This represents a serious challenge for the reconstruction and stabilization

37

of Afghanistan. The physical isolation of much of Afghanistan has had a profound influence on

how its Political Culture has developed and evolved so that it is disjoint in terms of cultural and

structural development. The ongoing resultant instability along with the predominance of

conflict as a means of resolving difference and the destruction of infrastructure and leadership

has held the country at a point that currently precludes any kind of congruence between the

majority of the political culture and the authority or administrative structure of the proposed and

hoped for central government.

The Political Culture of Afghanistan is what Almond and Verba describe as systemically

mixed. The dominant is Parochial struggling to evolve to Parochial/Subject. Urban Afghanistan,

however, though only representative of 25% of the population, may be more directly involved in

the reconstruction process as it tends to be better educated and more likely to benefit from

economic development initiatives. This segment of the population is in transition from Subject

to Subject/Participant. The introduction of a democratic form of governance is achievable from

the perspective of the urban or Subject orientation. It involves a transition or evolution that is

already in process. For the rural or Parochial orientation, however, the outcome is less certain.

The leap from Parochial to Participant is not easily accomplished and difficult to sustain. If the

attempts at transition over this veritable chasm of Political Culture orientation drag on and on

with little progress for an extended period of time, furthermore, the result may be an ongoing

strain between culture and structure that will manifest as chronic structural instability.

The rural Afghan will be obliged to first shift from Parochial to Subject Culture. This

will require that local communities not only reject the exclusive claims of khan and imam as

authority, they must replace it with an allegiance to the proposed and far more complex political

system and centralized government structure of the new Afghan Republic.

38

The success of the urban Afghan shift from Subject to Participant Culture has a direct

relationship with the success of the rural transition. If outlying communities can evolve to

Subject culture in a way that retains some manageable aspect of the original imam and khan as

Parochial and local authorities this will help to ease the urban transition from Subject to

Participant culture. If this traditional power hierarchy as exemplified in Pashtunwali is excluded

and driven underground, as in the case of the Taliban, however, they will likely have a divisive

impact on reconstruction efforts and contribute to a widening gap between the rural and urban

spheres of influence in the emerging Afghanistan.

Ultimately, what is expected of almost 75% of Afghanis is the most difficult shift from

Parochial to Participant Culture. This is a phenomenon that is frequently found in the cultural

development in many emerging nations. Rural Afganistan has a political culture that is

predominantly Parochial. The structural norms that are being imposed by the new democratic

Afghan Republic, however, are those of a Participant culture. The result is a profound

incongruence between rural culture and national government structure. The solution is to

concurrently develop specialized output and input orientations that somehow incorporate some

aspect of the traditional authorities. Otherwise Afghanistan will find only a precarious balance

between authoritarianism and democracy and will always be threatened by fragmentation. The

country will be without any kind of supporting structure, neither a bureaucracy built on loyal

Subjects nor an infrastructure based on responsible and competent citizens. The success of

Afghanistan ultimately depends on devising some means to ensure that the traditional authority

of the imam and the khan not only survive the transition but are somehow retained as an evolved,

updated and integrated component of the emerging Participant political culture. It will also be

important to penetrate the code of conduct found in Pashtunwali and somehow incorporate a

39

modern version of these traditional values in the output side while transforming both the

traditional leadership and these Parochial values as valid and respected interest groups on the

input side.

This paper has been titled the Geographical Pivot of Afghanistan because the geography

of the country has very much shaped the various and mixed political cultures of the people. The

geography continues to see the country torn by external powers for its strategic value without

consideration for its people. It is a useful strategic site for overseeing countries like Iran and

Pakistan. It is convenient territory for a pipeline to transport the oil reserves under the Caspian

Sea to the Arabian Gulf.

Just as the strategic and physical geography has shaped the people so it can inform a

better understanding of the global importance of resolving the decades of conflict there and help

to identify a sustainable means to that resolution. The majority of the population is still

physically isolated. What infrastructure existed in the past has, for the most part, been destroyed

by thirty years of war. Irrigation systems, cultivated land, towns and villages have been reduced

to arid rubble. Where there was limited transportation and communication between isolated

mountain valleys and desert villages there is now the added obstacle of chronic violent conflict

and acres of landmines. The traditions of Pashtunwali evolved to sustain the Afghan people in a

rugged and challenging environment. These same traditions, and their associated understanding

of local leadership, incorporated in the emerging democratic Political Culture, may prove to be a

vital tool for bridging the distance from Parochial Political Culture to Participant Political

Culture. This bridging may as a result, prove vital to enabling Afghanistan to achieve a more

peaceful future where conflict and competition are more readily and safely expressed in the

playing fields of Buzkashi.

40

Bibliography: Books: Agnew, John “Making Political Geography: Human Geography in the Making” Arnold Publishers, UK, 2002. Azoy, G. Whitney "Buzkashi: Game and Power in Afghanistan - Second Edition" Waveland Press Inc 2003 Benedict, Ruth “Patterns of Culture” Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston 1934 Chilton, Stephen “Grounding Political Development,” Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991 Dupree, Louis “Afghanistan,” Princeton University Press, 1980 Ewans, Martin “Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics” Harper Collins Publishers, UK, 2001 Firestone, Reuven “Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam” Oxford University Press, 1999. Hendry, Joy “Other People’s Worlds: An Introduction to Cultural and Social Anthropology” New York University Press, 1999. Johnson, R. J. Gregory, Derek, and Smith, David M., editors “The Dictionary of Human Geography: Second Edition,” Basil Blackwell Ltd. Oxford UK, 1988.

Kemp Geoffrey and. Harkavy, Robert E “Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East” Brookings Institution Press, 1997 Mackinder, H.J. The Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Journal No. 4 Vol. XXIII April 1904 republished by The Geographical Journal Vol 170, No. 4 December 2004 pp 298-321 Pigott, Peter “Canada in Afghanistan: The War So Far,” Dundurn Press, Toronto 2007 Rashid, Ahmed “Taliban” Yale University Press, 2001 Stewart, Rory “The Places in Between” Penguin Canada, 2004 Tanner, Stephen “Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban” Da Capo Press, 2002

41

42

Papers: Afghan Bonn Agreement, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions” United Nations, 2001. Http://Www.Afghangovernment.Com/Afghanagreementbonn.Htm Afghan Forums - Farhad, “ Pashtunwali – Get to Know It” 02-18-2007. http://www.afghanforums.com/archive/index.php/t-6813.html Lye , John, Some Post-Structural Assumptions Brock University Department of English, 1996, 1997 http://www.brocku.ca/english/courses/4F70/poststruct.html Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Security, “Canadian Troops in Afghanistan: Taking a Hard Look at a Hard Mission” February 2007.