The Gettysburg Campaign

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The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

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CMH Pub 7510

Cover: Scene from the Gettysburg Cyclorama painting, The Battle of Gettysburg , by Paul Phillippoteaux, depicting Picketts Charge and ghting at the Angle.

Photograph Bill Dowling, Dowling Photography.


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by Carol Reardon

andom Vossler

Center o Military History United States Army Washington, D.C., 2013

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Introduction

Although over one hundred fy years have passed since thestart o the American Civil War, that titanic conict continues tomatter. Te orces unleashed by that war were immensely destruc-tive because o the signicant issues involved: the existence othe Union, the end o slavery, and the very uture o the nation.Te war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, withover six hundred thousand killed in the course o the our-yearstruggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the AmericanCivil War was no exception. Te seeds o the conict were sownin the earliest days o the republics ounding, primarily over theexistence o slavery and the slave trade. Although no conict canbegin without the conscious decisions o those engaged in thedebates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way topaper over the division o the country into two camps: one thatwas dominated by slavery and the other that sought rst to limitits spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed hal slaveand hal ree, and that could not stand.

Regardless o the actors tearing the nation asunder, the

soldiers on each side o the struggle went to war or personalreasons: looking or adventure, being caught up in the passionsand emotions o their peers, believing in the Union, avoringstates rights, or even justi ying the simple schoolyard dynamico being convinced that they were worth three o the soldierson the other side. Nor can we overlook the actor that some wentto war to prove their manhood. Tis has been, and continuesto be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the pro es-

sion o arms. Soldiers join or many reasons but ofen stay in theght because o their comrades and because they do not want toseem like cowards. Sometimes issues o national impact shrinkto nothing in the intensely personal world o cannon shell andmini ball.


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Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly andonly culminated with the conquest o the rebellious Con ederacy,the preservation o the Union, and the end o slavery. Tesecampaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared incommemoration o our national sacrices, seek to rememberthat war and honor those in the United States Army who died topreserve the Union and ree the slaves as well as to tell the story othose American soldiers who ought or the Con ederacy despitethe inherently awed nature o their cause. Te Civil War was ourgreatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study andcontemplation.

RICHARD W. S EWARChie Historian


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The Gettysburg CampaignJuneJuly 1863

Strategic Setting

A ter the Con ederates victory at Chancellorsville in May1863, General Robert E. Lees Army o Northern Virginia and theArmy o the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker,once again con ronted each other across the RappahannockRiver near Fredericksburg, Virginia. he battle, which costHooker nearly 16,000 casualties and Lee some 12,300 losses,had proved indecisive. he two armies maintained an uneasystalemate, occupying virtually the same ground they had heldsince December 1862. Washington, D.C., the U.S. capital, stood

i ty-three miles to the north, while Richmond, Virginia, theCon ederate capital, lay i ty-seven miles to the south. he rival

presidents, Abraham Lincoln and Je erson Davis, ponderedtheir next moves.Despite the de eat at Chancellorsville and mounting

discontent on the Northern home ront, Lincoln could takeheart rom recent developments in the west. In April 1863, Maj.Gen. Ulysses S. Grant shi ted 20,000 Union troops rom the westbank o the Mississippi River to the east bank, about thirty- ivemiles below the Con ederate garrison at Vicksburg, Mississippi.

From 1 to 17 May, Grants command de eated Con ederate orcesat Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hill, and the BigBlack River Bridge. By the end o the month, Grant had trappedLt. Gen. John C. Pembertons 30,000 Con ederates inside their

orti ications around Vicksburg. A ter two unsuccess ul rontal


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assaults, Grants army settledinto a siege; meanwhile, aCon ederate relie orce underGeneral Joseph E. Johnson

ailed to rescue Pemberton.Davis con ronted a more

daunting set o problemsthan his Northern counter-part. Amid bad news romVicksburg and other parts othe Con ederacy, he summonedLee to Richmond twice inmid-May to discuss their stra-tegic options. Despite Lees victory at Chancellorsville, themilitary situation in Virginiaappeared to be deteriorating. Inthe idewater region, a Federalgarrison o some 20,000 menheld Suffolk, and their presencethreatened both Nor olk andHampton Roads. Given thesize and location o the Federal

orce, Davis and Lee also earedor the sa ety o Richmond.

On 16 February 1863, Leehad ordered the in antry divi-sions o Maj. Gens. John Bell

Hood and La ayette McLawsto march rom the armyswinter camp at Fredericksburgto Richmond and HanoverJunction. wo days later,Lee ordered Lt. Gen. JamesLongstreet to take commando the Suffolk Expedition, as

he called it. On 21 March, Leeadvised Longstreet to remainalert or an opportunity odealing a damaging blow, or odriving [the enemy] rom any

General Lee (Library of Congress)

General Longstreet by Alfred R.Waud (Library of Congress)


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important positions. Should Longstreet nd such an opening, Leeurged him not to be idle, but act promptly.

Bad news on nearly all military rontsabove all, the reportthat Grant had trapped Pembertons army inside Vicksburgsde enses orced the Davis administration to consider a widerange o options. No single course o action could resolve all thechallenges acing the president. In addition to Vicksburg andSuffolk, Davis also had to consider impending Union offensives inmiddle ennessee and at Charleston, South Carolina.

Lee had, in act, already crafed a plan or his own army. Inearly April, he advised Con ederate Secretary o War James A.Seddon: Should General Hookers army assume the de ensive,the readiest method o relieving pressure on [Vicksburg andCharleston] would be or this army to cross into Maryland. Oneweek later, Lee suggested to Davis:

I think it all important that we should assume the aggressive bythe rst o May when we may expect General Hookers army to beweakened by the expiration o the term o service o many o hisregiments. . . . I believe greater relie would in this way be afforded

to the armies in middle ennessee and on the [South] Carolinacoast than by any other method.

During his mid-May deliberations with Davis and Seddon,Lee continued to advocate an offensive operation against Hookersarmy. He hoped to take the Army o Northern Virginia north o thePotomac once again. Lees reverse at Antietam in September 1862did not deter him rom making a second northern expedition.

While in winter camp in February 1863, Lee had directed JedediahHotchkiss (then Lt. Gen. Tomas J. Stonewall Jacksons chieengineer) to draw up a map o the valley o Virginia extending toHarrisburg, PA and then on to Philadelphiawishing the prepara-tion to be kept a pro ound secret.

Not everyone who participated in the strategic con erence inRichmond agreed with Lees plan. A number o senior Con ederateofficialsincluding Postmaster General John H. Reagan and,

or a time, even Davis himsel advocated sending all or part oLees army to Mississippi. In the end, however, Lees views wonout. Davis gave his approval or the Army o Northern Virginiasinvasion o the North. Only one question remained: When shouldthe campaign begin?


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Operations

THE ADVANCE INTO P ENNSYLVANIA Lee issued his initial orders or the northern offensive on

3 June, stealthily breaking contact with Hookers Army o thePotomac near Fredericksburg to concentrate around Culpeper.Despite Lees best efforts, Hooker discovered that the Con ederateswere marching northward on 5 June. Hooker sent a orce o 7,000cavalry and 4,000 in antry and artillery under his new cavalrycommander, Maj. Gen. Al red Pleasonton, in pursuit o theCon ederates. Early on the morning o 9 June, Pleasonton surprisedMaj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuarts Con ederate horsemen at Brandy Station.In a chaotic ght that proved to be one o the largest mountedclashes o the war, the Union troopers initially scattered Stuartsmen and nearly captured the vaunted cavalry commander himsel .In the end, Stuart held his ground, but it had been a near thing.Richmond newspapers sharply criticized him and demanded that

he redeem himsel throughheroic action.

Te scare at BrandyStation did not deter Lee inthe least. He orged ahead withambitious plans that wouldtest his armys new organiza-tional structure in active eldoperations. Afer the death oGeneral Jackson on 10 May,Lee had recongured his army

o two corps under Jacksonand Longstreet into threecorps. Longstreet retainedcommand o the First Corps,while two newly promotedlieutenant generals, RichardS. Ewell and Ambrose PowellHill, led the Second and Tird

Corps respectively. Te inclu-sion o Stuarts cavalry raisedLees total strength to roughly75,000 officers and enlistedmen. An unbroken string o

General Stuart (Library of Congress)


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victories during Lees thirteen months in commandassumingthat Antietam was a tactical drawinspired high morale amongthe rank and le and great condence in the commander. As oneGeorgian said while passing the general during the march north,Boys, there are ten thousand men sitting on that one horse.

Lee planned his northward route with care. ( See Map 1.) Aferconcentrating at Culpeper, he intended to clear the ShenandoahValley o Union troops and then continue north into Pennsylvaniasrich Cumberland Valley. I he stayed west o the Blue RidgeMountains, the range would shield both his armys supply trainsand, in time, southbound wagons lled with goods taken north othe Potomac. On 10 June, Lee ordered Ewell to proceed into theShenandoah Valley. Lee chose Ewells Second Corps to lead the

General Ewell (Library of Congress) General Hill (Library of Congress)


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advance into Pennsylvania because that command contained mosto the veterans o Jacksons 1862 Valley Campaignmen whoknew the region they were marching into.

Te ght at Brandy Station, meanwhile, convinced Hooker toreconsider his options. When it became apparent that Lees entirearmy was heading north, Hooker recommended marching southand attacking Richmond instead. President Lincoln, however,reminded him that Lees army and not Richmond, is your sureobjective point. On 13 June, Hooker ordered the Army o thePotomac to begin its pursuit o the Army o Northern Virginia.Consisting o seven in antrycorps and one cavalry corps, theArmy o the Potomac numberedabout 94,000 effectives. WhileHooker saw no need or thekind o massive reorganizationthat Lee had recently under-taken, he knew that several ohis corps contained only twodivisions rather than the usualthree and that he had just lostthousands o veteran soldierswho mustered out when theirtwo-year enlistments expired.For those reasons and more,Hooker believed that Leeoutnumbered him, and he ofenbadgered the general in chie o

the U.S. Army, Maj. Gen. HenryW. Halleck, either or rein orce-ments or or authority overgarrisons not currently underhis control.

On 14 June, Ewell passedhis rst test as corps commanderat Winchester soundly de eating

Union Brig. Gen. Robert H.Milroys garrison. So impetuouswas the charge o our men that ina ew minutes they were over thebreastworks, driving the enemy

General Hooker (Library ofCongress)


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out in great haste and con usion, described a Louisiana captain.Ewell captured 23 cannon, 300 wagons, and 4,000 prisoners. He thensent Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins cavalry brigade scouting aheado the main column. Jenkins horsemen rode into Chambersburg,Pennsylvania, on 20 June, and two days later, Ewells in antry enteredthe Keystone State near Greencastle.

For the next week, Ewells troops scoured south-centralPennsylvania or supplies, advancing as ar north as the outskirtso Harrisburg, the state capital. On 21 June, Lee issued GeneralOrders 72, setting orth proper oraging procedures: quartermaster,commissary, ordnance, and medical officers were to obtain neededgoods at air market value, and all soldiers must respect privateproperty. Jenkins cavalry apparently interpreted the order quiteloosely. Some people, with . . . antiquated ideas o business, mightcall it stealing to take goods and pay or them in bogus money,wrote a Chambersburg journalist, but Jenkins calls it business,and or the time being what Jenkins called business, was business.When Ewells in antry arrived, they also enjoyed the bounty othe region. Pvt. Gordon Bradwell o the 31st Georgia recalled anissue o two hindquarters o very ne bee , a barrel or two o our,some buckets o wine, sugar, clothing, shoes, etc. All this or abouttwenty men.

Reports o such excesses troubled Lee. On 27 June, he issuedGeneral Orders 73 chastising his soldiers or their instances o

orget ulness and reminding them o the duties expected o usby civility and Christianity. Still, even be ore Lees entire armyhad crossed into Pennsylvania, wagon trains loaded with ood-stuffs and other goods began heading south. In addition, reported

the Chambersburg editor, Quite a number o negroes, ree andslavemen, women and childrenwere captured by Jenkins andstarted south to be sold into bondage.

Pennsylvanians responded to the arrival o Lees army in various ways. Many civilians in Lees path simply ed with all theycould carry. Some Pennsylvania Democrats believedwrongly,as it turned outthat their political affiliation would protectthem rom depredation. A Harrisburg editor opined that Lees

men enjoyed great success as oragers because the people o theState were not prepared to meet any oe, and least o all, such aoe as marches beneath the black ag o treason. He cited the

legislatures recent ailure to improve the states militia systemor leaving south-central Pennsylvania open to invasion. On 9


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June, the Lincoln administration had established the Departmento the Susquehanna to organize local de ense, and GovernorAndrew G. Curtin had called out the states emergency orces, butall such efforts proved utile. On 26 June, the 26th PennsylvaniaEmergency Regiment deployed against some o Ewells men justwest o Gettysburg; those who did not become prisoners scatteredin panic afer exchanging a ew shots with the Con ederates.

Even as Ewell neared Harrisburg, he aced only minimal resis-tance; however, the rest o Lees army aced ar stiffer oppositionduring its northward advance. Now alerted to Lees movements,Hooker sent his cavalry and some in antry to probe the Blue Ridgegaps, seeking opportunities to intercept the Con ederate columns.Lee had kept Longstreets First Corps and Stuarts cavalry easto the Blue Ridge to block Hookers advance, resulting in sharpclashes between rival horsemen at Aldie on 17 June, at Middleburgon 19 June, and at Upperville on 21 June. On 23 June, Lee orderedStuart to harass and impede as much as possible the progresso Hookers army i it attempted to cross the Potomac, and,should that occur, to take position on the right o our columnas it advanced. Stuart certainly bothered the Union army andcaused great consternation in Washington, but he chose a north-bound course that placed Hookers hard-marching army squarelybetween him and Lee or one crucial week in late June. Lee thushad to conduct operations without benet o the excellent intel-ligence that Stuart usually provided him.

Even so, Lee continued to display an aggressiveness thatcon ounded Hooker. Still convinced that he aced an enemy in my

ront o more than my number, Hooker delivered an ultimatum to

Halleck on 27 Juneeither send rein orcements or relieve him ocommand. Hookers superiors decided to replace him. In a letter tohis wi e, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade noted that he was awakenedbe ore dawn on 28 June by an officer rom Washington. Teofficer, Meade wrote, said that he had come to give me trouble.At rst I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, andpromptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear. . . . He thenhanded me a communication to read; which I ound was an order

relieving Hooker rom the command and assigning me to it.Hooker was in such a hurry to leave that he ailed to provideMeade with a detailed assessment o the military situation. Tenew commander there ore knew little about his own armys statusand even less about Lees. With a hostile army on the march ahead


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o him, his own army in hot pursuit, and a myriad o adminis-trative and operational challenges con ronting him, Meade hadto assume the responsibilities o high command in short order.He began by making a ew essential administrative and organi-zational changes and then communicated with General Halleckand President Lincoln in Washington. Meade also eldednumerous requests or in ormation or supplies rom politicaland military officials, and began to develop a plan o action orhis new command based on Hallecks instructions: You will . . .maneuver and ght in such a manner as to cover the capital andalso Baltimore. . . . Should General Lee move upon either o theseplaces, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrivewith him so as to give him battle.

Despite the de ensivetone o Hallecks instructions,Meade understood that he hadto nd and ght the enemy,and he ordered the Army o thePotomac to resume its north-ward advance the next day,29 June. On 30 June, Meadewas still uncertain as to Leeslocation and intentions, so hedrafed a contingency plan toconcentrate his army alongPipe Creek in Maryland, justsouth o the Pennsylvaniastate line. Meades critics later

cited the Pipe Creek circularas proo o his unwillingnessto ght, but his concludingsentence suggested otherwise:Developments may causethe Commanding General toassume the offensive rom hispresent positions.

While encamped nearChambersburg, Lee learned oMeades accession to commandthe day afer his appointment.Although he assumed that a

General Meade (Library ofCongress)


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new commander would enter his duties cautiously, Lee issuedorders on 29 June or the Army o Northern Virginia to concentrateat Cashtown, east o the Blue Ridge and seven miles northwest oGettysburg. He warned his corps commanders not to give battlewith Meades approaching orces until the whole o the army wasconcentrated to provide ready support. By 30 June, most o HillsTird Corps had already reached Cashtown. Longstreet remainedwest o the Blue Ridge, but was less than a days march away. Ewellmade plans to leave his camps around Carlisle early on 1 July andhead or Cashtown.

On 30 June, Hill sent orward a brigade rom Maj. Gen.Henry Heths division to reconnoiter toward Gettysburg. Tebrigade commander, Brig. Gen.James J. Pettigrew, reportedthat Union cavalry had enteredthe town rom the south.Pettigrew had encounteredthe lead element o the Armyo the PotomacBrig. Gen.John Bu ords cavalry division,which then consisted o twosmall brigades and one six-gunbattery. An outstanding cavalryofficer, Bu ord had deployed hiscommand to cover Gettysburgsroad network rom the HanoverRoad to the east through theYork Pike and the Harrisburg

Road to the northeast, theCarlisle Road to the north,the Mummasburg Road andChambersburg Pike to thenorthwest, and the FaireldRoad to the southwest ( Map 2).Bu ord remained uncertain oLees location and intentions, yet

he sensed that the Con ederateswho had appeared west o townearlier that day would returnthe next morning in ar greaternumbers. He was right.

General Buford (Library ofCongress)


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THE FIRST D AY OF BATTLE, 1 J ULYAs Bu ord had expected, Hill ordered Heths entire division to

advance on Gettysburg at rst light. About 0700, troopers rom the8th Illinois Cavalry, posted three miles west o Gettysburg on theChambersburg Pike, spotted shadowy gures nearing the MarshCreek Bridge to their ront. According to tradition, Lt. MarcellusJones borrowed a sergeants carbine and red the rst shot o theBattle o Gettysburg. He then red several more rounds at skir-mishers rom Brig. Gen. James J. Archers brigade, the lead elemento Heths division. Jones immediately reported the contact; inshort order, Bu ord learned not only o the mounting threat alongthe Chambersburg Pike but also o enemy activity along roadsto the west and north o Gettysburg. He immediately sent briebut in ormative assessments o the rapidly changing situation toMeade at Army headquarters and to Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds,whose I Corps had encamped the previous night just a ew milessouth o Gettysburg. In order to keep the Gettysburg crossroadsunder Union control, Bu ord would need Reynolds help. WithHeths division in the lead and Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pendersdivision close behind, a orce o nearly 14,000 Con ederates romGeneral Hills Tird Corps advanced down the ChambersburgPike toward Bu ords 2,800 cavalrymen.

Fortune avored Bu ord that muggy July morning. Withoutcavalry to scout ahead, Heth admitted, I was ignorant what orcewas at or near Gettysburg. Tis meant that even the slightest resis-tance rom Bu ords pickets compelled Archers brigade to halt,deploy skirmishers, and proceed cautiously as i the command

aced a comparable orce o in antry. As Capt. Amasa Dana o

the 8th Illinois Cavalry recalled, the ring was rapid rom ourcarbines, and . . . induced the belie o our times our number omen actually present. For nearly a mile-and-a-hal , each timeArchers skirmishers came too close we retired and continuedto take new position, and usually held out as long as we couldwithout imminent risk o capture. Bu ords cavalrymen thustraded space or the time required or Reynolds to arrive with hisI Corps. About 1000, Archers brigade halted on Herrs Ridge, two

miles west o Gettysburg, to await the rest o Heths division whileBu ords troopers took up their nal de ensive line on the next riseto the eastMcPhersons Ridgeone mile closer to town.

Reynolds had not yet arrived when Heth launched his stron-gest attack yet. Deploying Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis brigade


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north o the Chambersburg Pike and Archers brigade south oit, Heth sent his troops across Willoughby Run and up the slopeso McPhersons Ridge against Bu ords line. Tanks to the ease oreloading their single-shot, breech-loading carbines, the caval-rymen produced a volume o re entirely disproportionate to theirnumbers, but both sides knew the outnumbered troopers couldnot withstand the Con ederate in antry much longer. At roughly1015, however, the rattle o drums signaled the arrival o GeneralReynolds and the lead division o the I Corps.

Te ghting on 1 July west o Gettysburg breaks down intoour phases. Te advance o Archers Con ederate in antry against

Bu ords Union cavalry that began at 0700 and culminated withthe assault on McPhersons Ridge around 1015 constituted therst phase. No officer in either army more senior than a divisioncommander played a major role in this action and casualtiesremained comparatively light. Te three remaining phases o the1 July ght eatured ar more lethal action between large in antryunits, well supported by artillery, with corps commanders and, intime, Lee himsel present on the battleeld to make key decisions.

Phase two o the 1 July ght, lasting rom about 1030until 1200, included two largely independent brigade-levelin antry actions on McPhersons Ridge, one on each side o theChambersburg Pike ( Map 3). North o the road, Heth sent Davisback into the ght, this time against Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutlersin antry brigade rather than Bu ords cavalry. Davis turned Cutlersright ank, but the 380-man 147th New York ailed to receive theorder to withdraw and remained in position to protect an artillerybattery. Te New Yorkers were hard-pressed by enemy troops in

their ront, and their right ank was exposed or in the air. ocon ront both threats, the 147th New York re usedor bent backits rightmost companies, giving the battery time to withdraw. Asthe New Yorkers ranks melted away in the crossre that engul edthem, Maj. George Harney issued a unique command: In retreat,double time, run. During the short but sharp ght, the 147th NewYork lost almost 80 percent o its troop strength.

At roughly the same time south o the Chambersburg Pike,

Brig. Gen. Solomon Merediths amed Iron Brigadeconsisting othe 2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, the 19th Indiana, and the 24thMichiganarrived on the eld. Reynolds himsel pointed out theMidwesterners rst objective: the repulse o Archers brigade, thencresting McPhersons Ridge through the Herbst amily woodlot.


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Seconds later, Reynolds ell rom his saddle, killed instantly by abullet to the back o the head. Unaware o Reynolds death, theIron Brigade drove Archers men out o the woodlot and backacross Willoughby Run. Pvt. Patrick Maloney o the 2d Wisconsincaptured Archer himsel , making him the rst general officer in theArmy o Northern Virginia to be captured since Lee had assumedcommand thirteen months earlier. Te Iron Brigade learnedo Reynolds all only afer they withdrew to the high ground inHerbsts woods to reorganize.

Te Midwesterners position south o the Chambersburg Pikewas not as secure as it seemed. Reynolds death made Maj. Gen.Abner Doubleday the senior Union officer on the eld, and he

ound his attention quickly drawn north o the turnpike. Tat wasbecause Davis troops, emboldened by their success against Cutler,continued to push eastward; i lef unchecked, the onrushingCon ederates could sweep in behind the Union troops ghtingsouth o the road. o stop Davis advance, the Iron Brigades 6thWisconsin and two New York regiments charged rom south othe pike to the lip o an unnished railroad cut that many o Davistroops were using or cover. Te Federals sudden appearancemade prisoners o hundreds o Con ederates who ound them-selves trapped within the railroad cuts steep earthen walls. Lt. Col.Ru us Dawes o the 6th Wisconsin ordered a Mississippi officer,

Death of Reynolds by Alfred R. Waud (Library of Congress)


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Surrender, or I will re! According to Dawes, the man repliednot a word but promptly handed me his sword. Ten, six otherofficers came up and handed me their swords, Dawes recalled. Tesuccess ul charge consequently averted a Union disaster, inspiringDoubleday to hold McPhersons Ridge in the belie that it had beenReynolds intention to de end the place.

Te ght at the railroad cut ended about 1200, and an eeriecalm settled over the battleeld. When the third phase beganaround 1400, the battle changed in three important ways. First,both sides received substantial rein orcements. Second, the morn-ings ght west o Gettysburg now extended to the north o town.Tird, General Lee arrived on the battleeld and took a signicantmeasure o tactical control over his armys actions.

Phase three began when General Heth renewed the contestsouth o the Chambersburg Pike by advancing his two remaining

resh brigades against the Iron Brigade. Te Midwesterners linehad been bolstered by two newly arrived I Corps brigades. Fightinggrew in intensity all along McPhersons Ridge, but nowhere didthe carnage exceed that in the Herbst woodlot, where the lefank o General Pettigrews North Carolina brigade assaulted theIron Brigades line. Fate had thrown two o the largest regimentson the eldthe 496-man 24th Michigan and the 800-man 26thNorth Carolinaagainst each other. Col. Henry Morrow o the24th Michigan considered his position to be untenable, but hereceived orders that the line must be held at all hazards. Te 26thNorth Carolina advanced with rapid strides, yelling like demons,Morrow reported. Be ore the ghting ended, at least eleven NorthCarolina color bearersand their 21-year-old colonel, Henry

K. Burgwyn Jr. ell to Iron Brigade bullets. Company F, 26thNorth Carolina, contained three sets o twins in its ranks, andve o those six men were either killed or mortally wounded. Te24th Michigan paid dearly as well, reporting 316 men killed andwounded, along with another 80 listed as missing in action.

In the meantime, a new threat emerged against the righto the I Corps line, this time rom the north and northwest.Earlier that day, General Ewell was heading southwest toward

Cashtown with the Second Corps divisions commanded by Maj.Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Jubal A. Early. Ten word arrived othe ghting at Gettysburg. Ewell immediately changed directionand began marching south toward Gettysburg, bearing in mindthat Lee did not want a general engagement brought on till the


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rest o the army came up. Te deployment o Rodes division onOak Hill, an eminence just north o the Mummasburg Road thatoverlooked the mornings battleeld, placed Ewells men in goodposition to strike the right ank o the I Corps line astride theChambersburg Pike. As Rodes wheeled his batteries onto the highground, Doubleday saw the potential or disaster and sent Brig.Gen. Henry Baxters resh brigade to extend the I Corps line to theMummasburg Road and anchor its ank there. Utilizing the coveroffered by Sheads Woods and the reverse slope o a northwardextension o Seminary Ridge known as Oak Ridge, Baxters menmoved into their assigned position unseen by Rodes.

Wrongly believing that the Union ank rested squarely inSheads Woods, Rodes planned to hit the woodlot hard with acoordinated assault launched by three o his ve brigades. Becauseo poor execution resulting rom incompetence and negligenceon the part o two brigade commanders, Col. Edward A. ONealand Brig. Gen. Al red Iverson Jr., Rodes assault soon ell apart.ONeals Alabamians attacked alone, and Baxters right ankregiments along the Mummasburg Road repulsed them easily.Iversons North Carolinians attacked shortly thereafer, blun-dering orward without skirmishers to warn them o the enemyspresence. o deal with Iversons assault, Baxters men simply acedlef and redeployed behind a stone wall on top o Oak Ridge, ring volleys into the ar Heels ranks that literally mowed them down.Virginia artilleryman Henry Robinson Berkeley passed the elda ew days later and noted in his diary: Tere were, in a ew eeto us, by actual count, seventy-nine (79) North Carolinians layingdead in a straight line . . . all evidently killed by one volley.

Rodes had intended or Brig. Gen. Junius Daniels NorthCarolina brigade to support Iversons assault, but a growing threaton the ar Heels right ank caused the unit to split in two. woo Daniels regiments ultimately supported Iverson, but the restturned south toward the railroad cut and the McPherson arm,where they clashed with Col. Roy Stones small Pennsylvaniabrigade. Te ar Heels and the Pennsylvanians surged back and

orth in some o the costliest ghting o the day across the narrow

swath o ground separating the pike and the railroad cut, withneither side gaining an advantage.While Ewells men approached Gettysburg rom the north,

Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard brought up the Union XI Corps romthe south. Te unit contained a high percentage o German-born


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soldiers. It had been plagued by mis ortune, having borne the brunto Stonewall Jacksons ank attack at Chancellorsville, afer whichthe XI Corps became known throughout the Army as HowardsCowards or the Flying Dutchmen. By virtue o seniority, Howardsuperseded Doubleday as the Union commander at Gettysburg.He ordered Doubleday to continue to hold McPhersons Ridgewith the I Corps. Recognizing the importance o Cemetery Hill,a key terrain eature just south o town, Howard sent Brig. Gen.Adolph von Steinwehrs division there as a reserve in case the situ-ation north o Gettysburg deteriorated. He sent his other two XICorps divisionsthose o Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz and Brig. Gen.Francis C. Barlownorth through the town. As Howards seniordivision commander, Schurz became commander o the XI Corpswhen Howard assumed overall command.

Schurz intended to deploy on the right ank o the I Corpsline, but Rodes presence on Oak Hill made that impossible.Worse yet, the acting XI Corpscommander began to receivereports o the advance o Earlysdivision down the HarrisburgRoad rom the northeast.Schurz con erred with Barlowand quickly decided to estab-lish a de ensive line perpen-dicular to the I Corps line tocounter the threat posed byboth Rodes and Early. Sincethe Carlisle Road bisected his

new ront, Schurz deployedwest o it, and he sent Barloweast o it. Barlow dislikedthe position that Schurz hadassigned him. Concerned thatEarly might trans orm a knobo high ground in his imme-diate ront into a commanding

artillery position, Barlowadvanced his entire division,posting one o his two brigadesas a heavy skirmish line astridethe Harrisburg Road at Rock

General Howard (Library ofCongress)


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Creek and extending the other westward to the knoll. During theadvance, Barlow broke contact with Schurzs right ank near theCarlisle Road leaving a large gap in that part o the XI Corps line.

o make matters worse, Barlows right ank was also in the air.Both points were vulnerable to a Con ederate attack.

Schurz aced problems o his own. Te general realized thathe lacked sufficient numbers to do the three things he deemedessential to maintaining his position: establish a line o battle tostop the Con ederates advancing down the Carlisle Road, orge alink with the I Corps on Oak Ridge, and retain a reserve orce.All he could do was deploy one o his two brigades as a strongskirmish line between the Carlisle Road and the MummasburgRoad, weighted a bit to the lef to provide support to the I Corps ineeded, and keep Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowskis brigade availableto respond to crises anywhere along the XI Corps ront.

When Early nally struck, Barlow bore the brunt o the assault.Brig. Gen. John B. Gordons Georgia brigade advanced directly onBarlows line at the knoll, while Brig. Gen. Harry . Hays Louisianabrigade marched on the east side o the Harrisburg Road in orderto turn Barlows right ank. ( See Map 4.) While Barlow ocusedhis attention on Hays and Gordon, Brig. Gen. George P. DolesGeorgia brigade rom Rodes division advanced in orce down theCarlisle Road toward Barlows unprotected lef ank. A gallantstand along the road by the 157th New York slowed their progress,but the Georgians continued to angle toward Barlows open ank.Schurz ordered Krzyzanowskis brigade orward to Barlowssupport. Pvt. Edwin Southard o the 119th New York recalled the vicious reght that ollowed: We moved straight on to the death

that hurtled rom the enemys hidden lines. We returned volley or volley, and the sulpherous air seemed lled with hissing bulletsand bursting shells. Krzyzanowskis men briey held but sufferedcruelly in doing so.

General Lee, meanwhile, arrived on the battleeld about1400. In ormed o Earlys initial success, Lee ordered a generalassault around 1600. Tus began phase our o the 1 July ght.Overwhelmed by the weight o superior numbers, the entire

Union line unraveled, starting with the right ank o the XI Corpson the Harrisburg Road. During the rout, Barlow ell seriouslywounded, and his division ed through the streets o Gettysburgtoward Cemetery Hill. Schurz soon withdrew his skirmish linewest o the Carlisle Road, his survivors also heading or the high


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ground south o town. From Cemetery Hill, Steinwehr sent Col.Charles R. Costers brigade orward to cover the XI Corps with-drawal. Costers men became embroiled in a nasty reght withHays Louisianans and Col. Isaac Averys North Carolina brigade.Making a desperate stand at Kuhns brickyard on the northern edgeo town, Costers men soon ound themselves all but surrounded.Tose who managed to cut their way out joined their eeingcomrades in the race to Cemetery Hill. Critics point to the largenumber o Union prisoners as evidence o the XI Corps cowardice,but the long list o killed and wounded says otherwise.

As the XI Corps line disintegrated, the I Corps line beganto give waybut only afer six hours o hard ghting. Te routbegan on the right o Doubledays line. Brig. Gen. StephenD. Ramseurs resh North Carolina brigade reinvigorated theremnants o Rodes brigades that had ought near Oak Hill, and theCon ederates nally swept the Union orces off Oak Ridge. Duringthe ght, a Con ederate bullet struck one o Doubledays brigadecommanders, Brig. Gen. Gabriel R. Paul, in the head and blindedhim or li emany Northern newspapers reported Paul as killed.Col. Charles W. ilden o the 16th Maine assumed command oPauls brigade and received orders unwelcome to any commander:stand to the last and hold as long as there was a man lef. ildentore the regimental battle ag rom its pole and gave a shred toeach soldier in his command. By the end o the day, ilden and 161o his men were prisonersmany captured while occupying thesame railroad cut that had betrayed so many hapless Con ederatesearlier that day. Oddly enough, the Con ederates made theirgreatest haul o Union prisoners at the cut.

On the I Corps line south o the Chambersburg Pike, theremnants o three Union brigadesincluding the Iron Brigadenally abandoned McPhersons Ridge and re- ormed behind a ence-rail barricade in ront o Schmucker Hall, the main building o theLutheran Teological Seminary on Seminary Ridge. Col. Charles S.Wainwright o the I Corps artillery concentrated his batteries alongthe ridge to the right o the in antry and astride the ChambersburgPike. When General Penders resh division launched its assault

on the high ground, Wainwrights guns took a heavy toll on Brig.Gen. Al red M. Scales North Carolina brigade, wounding Scalesand putting every one o his regimental commanders out o action.Te remaining I Corps troops made Col. Abner M. Perrins SouthCarolinians pay in blood or the ridge be ore they and Wainwrights


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guns nally gave way and ell back to the Union rallying pointon Cemetery Hill. About 1700, soldiers rom Perrins 1st SouthCarolina In antry raised their regimental ag over the Gettysburgtown square.

In the meantime, chaos reigned on Cemetery Hill. WhileDoubleday and Howard squabbled over possible courses o action,thousands o lost soldiers searched or their units as small groupso exhausted men gathered around tattered remnants o regi-mental colors. o restore order, Maj. Gen. Wineld Scott Hancock,the commander o the Army o the Potomacs II Corps, arrivedon the scene as General Meades personal representative, carryingwritten authorization to make decisions in Meades name andan order to evaluate Gettysburg as a potential battleeld. I youthink the ground and position there a better one to ght a battlethan the Pipe Creek line, Meade instructed, then the commandinggeneral would order all the troops up. Upon his arrival, Hancock

quickly ended all dissen-sion by assuming commandin Meades name. Ten heordered Howard to keep his XICorps on Cemetery Hill, andoverruled Doubledays objec-tion to sending the I Corpsto de end neighboring CulpsHill. In a dispatch to Meade,Hancock assessed the situationat Gettysburg: I think we canretire; i not, we can ght here,

as the ground appears not un a- vorable with good troops.It was well that Hancock

carried out his orders so effi-ciently. Buoyed by his tacticalsuccess, at 1645, Lee sent Ewellone more order: attack thehigh ground south o town

Cemetery Hilli practicable.Ewell was unaccustomed tosuch discretionary orders. Heper ormed a per unctory recon-naissance o the ground, saw the

General Hancock (Library ofCongress)


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beginnings o a stout de ense, and received reports about possibleUnion activity behind his lef ank. Ten, realizing that he couldnot bring artillery to bear on the hill and all the troops . . . were jaded by twelve hours marching and ghting, he decidedagainstthe recommendations o his senior subordinatesnot to order anassault. Ewells controversial decision, still debated today, ended thedays major combat.

About 2100, General Longstreet arrived at Lees headquarterson the Chambersburg Pike near the seminary. Afer offering hiscongratulations on the days success, Longstreet was stunned tolearn that Lee already had decided to renew the ght on 2 July. Ashe later wrote, I suggested that this course seemed to be at variancewith the plan o the campaign that had been agreed upon be oreleaving Fredericksburg. At the time, the two generals had discusseda strategic offensive into Pennsylvania, in which Lee would shifto the tactical de ensive on ground o his choosing i compelled toght. But now Lee said, I the enemy is there to-morrow, we mustattack him. Longstreet replied, I he is there, it will be because he isanxious that we should attack hima good reason, in my judgment

or not doing so. But Lee had made his decision. As he explained inhis report, It had not been intended to ght a general battle at sucha distance rom our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but ndingourselves unexpectedly con ronted by the Federal Army, it becamea matter o difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with ourlarge trains. . . . A battle thus became in a measure unavoidable.

THE SECOND D AY OF BATTLE, 2 J ULYActing on Hancocks advice, Meade ordered the Army o the

Potomac to concentrate at Gettysburg and thus made the prospecto battle there almost a oregone conclusion. Just afer 2400 on 2July, Meade established his headquarters at the small armhouseo Lydia Leister on the southwestern slope o Cemetery Hill. Heconsulted with Bu ord, Hancock, and other senior subordinates,and afer a quick reconnaissance, laid out a strong de ensiveposition. Meade kept the XI Corps on Cemetery Hill, sent theXII Corps to Culps Hill, and placed the decimated I Corps in

the saddle between the two heights. He also deployed HancocksII Corps on a rise that ran south rom Cemetery Hillknown asCemetery Ridgeand planned to extend his line along that eleva-tion as additional corps arrived. Meade intended to anchor hisde ensive position on two hillsknown as the Round opsat the


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southern end o Cemetery Ridge. When placed on a map, Meadesline resembled a giant shhook.

As Meade deployed his army, Lee considered how best toattack it. As his conversation with Longstreet indicated, Leeevinced little interest in the other options still open to him. At

irst light, he sent out Capt. Samuel R. Johnston, an engineeron his sta , to reconnoiter the Union le t lank. Johnstondescribed the Union line as extending south rom CemeteryHill along the Emmitsburg Road until it ended just south o thedistinctive red Codori arm buildings. When asked i he had

ound Union troops on Little Round opthe less orested othe two hillsJohnston reported that he had ridden to its peakand ound it unoccupied.

Present-day students o the battle nd Captain Johnstonsreport be uddling because the Union lef ank bore no resem-blance to Johnstons description. In act, when the captain madehis reconnaissance, the II Corps linethen the armys lef ankextended along Cemetery Ridge well south o the Codori arm.Te line also rested at least 250 yards east o the EmmitsburgRoadin reality, Meade had posted no Union troops on the roaditsel . Moreover, troops rom Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocums XIICorps and later Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles III Corps encamped inthe area o Little Round op in such numbers that Johnston shouldhave detected their presence. Flawed as Captain Johnstons reportwas, it determined Lees plan o attack or 2 July.

About 0900, Lee explained his plan to Longstreet. As Leelater reported, It was determined to make the principal attackupon the enemys lef, and endeavor to gain a position rom

which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bearwith effect. He gave Longstreet command o the assault on theUnion lef, which he was to drive in. Lee also ordered Ewellto make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemys right,to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer. Hedirected Hills Tird Corps to threaten the enemys center, inorder to prevent the shifing o rein orcements against Longstreetor Ewell. Longstreet once more raised objections to Lees plan.

When it became clear that Lee would not reverse his decision,Longstreet sought to delay its execution. Only two o his divi-sionsthose commanded by Generals McLaws and Hoodhadarrived. He wanted to wait or Maj. Gen. George E. Pickettsdivision, still hal a days march away. Lee determined to press on


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without it, but he did permit Longstreet to await the impendingarrival o Hoods nal brigade and even arranged or Maj. Gen.Richard H. Andersons division o Hills Tird Corps to coop-erate with Longstreet. Assuming that Longstreet would obey hisorders to advance rapidly against the Union lef ank, Lee rodeoff to Ewells headquarters.

When Lee returned around 1100, he was upset to discoverthat Longstreet had not yet moved. Yet again he rejected his subor-dinates objections and ordered him to attack at once. Longstreetscolumns soon began their march to the southeast, but they halted just south o the Faireld Road. Te advance had spotted a Unionsignal station on Little Round op, which no doubt would haveseen them had they continued on their current route. Longstreetthere ore ordered his columns to ace about and countermarch.Teir detour took them between intervening ridges that screenedtheir movement but cost the attackers valuable time.

At 1515, McLaws leadbrigade reached the base oSeminary Ridge several milessouthwest o Gettysburg wherethe Millersville Road crestedthe ridge and then proceededeastward to intersect withthe Emmitsburg Road. heCon ederates revised plano attack was to ollow theMillersville Road over thecrest, halt at the Emmitsburg

Road, ace le t, and advancenorth toward the Union le tlank. At the top o the ridge,

however, where McLaws andLongstreet had expected tosee empty ields and quietorchards, they ound SicklesIII Corps deployed or battle.

Sickles actions on 2 Julyremain a contentious issue tothis day. Meade had intended

or the III Corps to occupy thede ensive shhook along the

General Sickles (Library ofCongress)


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southern portion o Cemetery Ridge and to protect Little Roundop until the arrival o the V Corps. From the start, however,

Sickles disliked his assigned position. I the Con ederates placedartillery on the high ground hal a mile or so in his ront, Sicklesreasoned, his entire line would be at their mercy. Te knollthat caused Sickles so much concern was the site o JosephSher ys Peach Orchard; it reminded him o a similar positionat Chancellorsville known as Hazel Grove. Sickles did not wantto repeat what had occurred there: soon afer he obeyed ordersto abandon Hazel Grove, enemy guns occupied the rise andinicted heavy losses on his men.

Tere ore, Sickles requested that Meade let him advancethe III Corps rom Cemetery Ridge to the high ground near theEmmitsburg Road, but Meade re used. A second plea rom Sicklesbrought Meades chie o artillery, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, to makea reconnaissance o the ground in question. While conceding thatthe position held certain advantages, Hunt also in ormed Sicklesthat he did not have the authority to approve Sickles request.About 1200, Sickles skirmishersconsisting o a hundred-mandetachment o Col. Hiram Berdans U.S. Sharpshootersspottedsome Con ederates (though not rom Longstreets command)in the woods just beyond the Emmitsburg Road and brieyexchanged re with them. Te skirmish urther convinced Sickleso the soundness o his plan.

Around 1400, Sickles ordered his command to moveorward with lags lying and drums beatingand while still

lacking permission to do so. he problems he created by seizingthe high ground at the Peach Orchard ar outweighed the

advantages gained. First, Sickles placed Brig. Gen. Andrew A.Humphreys division along the Emmitsburg Road, exposing itto interlocking ields o Con ederate artillery ire and leaving itwithout enough cannon to mount an e ective counterbatteryresponse. hen he ordered Maj. Gen. David B. Birneys divisionto orm on Humphreys le t and extend the line eastward rom thePeach Orchard to the Wheat ield and rom there southeastwardall the way to Devils Den. Birney soon discovered that he lacked

the troops to cover his new ront. A small gap isolated his le tbrigade at Devils Den rom the regiments he had deployedin the Wheat ield near the Rose arm buildings, and an evenlarger gap separated the troops in the Wheat ield rom thoseBirney had posted near the Peach Orchard. Worse yet, the


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bend in Sickles line at the Peach Orchard created a vulnerablesalient that the Con ederates could attack rom both the southand the west. In addition, Sickles decision to abandon hisposition on the southern stretch o Cemetery Ridge uncoveredthe aneytown Road, an essential line o communication orMeades army.

Sickles movement did succeed in complicating Longstreetsassault, however. Since the Con ederates could not execute theirplan to attack up the Emmitsburg Road, Longstreet orderedMcLaws to deploy his men along the crest o Seminary Ridgeparallel torather than perpendicular tothe roadway. Hethen told Hood to extend McLaws line to the south and prepareto assault Sickles new position. Te Round ops had played norole in the original attack plan, but now they had to be taken intoaccount. Hood sent out scouts, and he reported to Longstreet thatthe way to the Army o the Potomacs lef ank and rear east othose hills remained clear o enemy troops. He asked permissionto bypass the Round ops by sweeping around them rather thanattack the hills straight on.

But the clock had advanced to 1600, and Lee had grown impa-tient. When Longstreet reported that the situation had changeddramatically since the crafing o the original attack plan, Leeproved unwilling to reconsider his options. Longstreet betrayedhis rustration with Lee in his comments to Hood. He rejectedHoods repeated appeals to bypass the Round ops and ordered theattack to start at once. Hoods division would strike rst, ollowedby McLaws and then Anderson, the attack proceeding rom southto north. A rustrated Hood lodged a ormal protest, the rst time

that the hard-ghting general had ever done so. But he continuedhis preparations notwithstanding.As Hood prepared to attack, Sickles inspected his new

line. General Meade and his staff caught up with him nearthe Peach Orchard, and afer a color ul and mostly one-sided verbal exchangeMeade was notorious or his hot temperSickles offered to pull back to Cemetery Ridge. At that moment,Longstreets artillery opened re. o prevent the III Corps with-

drawal rom becoming a rout should the Con ederates attack,Meade ordered Sickles to stay put and await rein orcements.Sickles advocates later tried to turn Meades order into a belatedendorsement o his subordinates initiative, but the commanderclearly meant no such thing.


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Hoods attack plan or his our brigades seemed straight or-ward enough ( Map 5). Brig. Gen. Evander M. Laws Alabamianswould step off rst, seize the crest o Round op and move onLittle Round op, bypassing the III Corps lef ank at Devils Denentirely. Te next unit to step off, Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertsonsbrigade, would assault Devils Den. Brig. Gen. Henry L. BenningsGeorgians would ollow the Alabama ags, presumably to theRound ops. Brig. Gen. George . ige Andersons Georgianswould support Robertson. Early in the action, Hood ell badlywounded; rom that point on, his division lacked effective direc-tion, and the attack soon began to ragment.

Harassed all the way to the Round ops by BerdansSharpshooters in their distinctive green uni orms, Laws brigadesplit in two, with three regiments heading toward the Round opsas planned, while the remaining two regiments veered off to dealwith a troublesome Union artillery battery at Devils Den. Laws44th and 48th Alabama thus red the rst Con ederate volleysthat bloody afernoon amid Devil Dens giant boulders. Teenemy were as invisible to us as we were to them, recalled Col.W. F. Perry o the 44th Alabama. As his men emerged onto openground, a sheet o ame burst rom the rocks less than a hundredyards away. Te re came rom the rie muskets o the 4th Maine,which constituted Birneysand by extension, the Army o thePotomacslef ank just then. Te 4th Maine de ended the rockygorge at the southern end o Devils Den.

Robertsons brigade also split as it advanced. Te 4th and 5thexas ormed on Laws lef ank, a move that carried them toward

the Round ops. Te 1st exas and the 3d Arkansas, meanwhile,

attempted to ollow orders directing them to keep their lef ank onthe Emmitsburg Road, and were swept into the ght at Devils Den.Tey advanced into a triangular eld enclosed by stone walls on theDevils Dens steep western slope. Col. A. Van Horn Ellis 124th NewYorknicknamed the Orange Blossoms in honor o their homecountymanned the wall at the ar end o the eld. Pvt. James O.Bradeld o the 1st exas described the ght: Te enemy stoodtheir ground bravely, until we were close on them, but [they] did not

await the bayonet. Tey broke away rom the rock ence as we closedin with a rush and a wild rebel yell. Te New Yorkers lost heavily ina counterattack down the slope, and the exans drove them back toa stone wall at the top o the hill. Here occurred one o our wildestercest struggles o the war, Bradeld recalled, a struggle such as


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it is given to ew men to pass through and live. It was a chaoticghtone in which every man became his own commander.

Te con usion quickly worsened. Under Hoods original plan,Bennings Georgians should have ollowed the Alabamians towardthe Round ops, but as General Benning later explained, a woodon the right had concealed most o Laws brigade rom him.Benning there ore led his men into the ght at Devils Den. Pvt.Tomas Fluker o the 15th Georgia recalled: We raised a dea -ening yell and went over the rock ence and up the hill shoutingand yelling like demons. Birney shifed troops rom other partso his thin line to rein orce Devils Den, but the combined orce oAlabamians, Arkansans, Georgians, and exans overwhelmed thede enders, who grudgingly yielded both the position and severalartillery pieces to the victorious Con ederates. In truth, serendipityplayed a greater role in the Con ederates success than deliberateexecution. With Hood down, the assault lacked a guiding hand to

separate the entangled brigadesand put them back on track.Te absence o capable seniorleadership on the Con ederateright ank stymied Longstreetsefforts on 2 July.

In contrast, the Unioncommanders who directed thede ense o Little Round opdisplayed remarkable skill andinitiative. On top o the hillwith only a small signal detach-

ment, Brig. Gen. GouverneurK. Warren, Meades chieengineer, spotted Longstreetsline o battle extending beyondSickles lef ank at Devils Denand recognized Little Round

ops vulnerability. Knowingthat Meade intended to anchor

the lef o his shhook on thathill, Warren realized that hehad to act. He saw rein orce-ments rom the V Corpsmarching toward Sickles line

General Warren (Library ofCongress)


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and directed one brigade to occupy Little Round op. Col. StrongVincent turned his column up the hill and deployed on the spuro its southern slope.

Tree Alabama regiments o Laws brigade, along withthe 4th and 5th exas o Robertsons brigade, soon approachedVincents position, where his our regimentsthe 20th Maine, 83dPennsylvania, 44th New York, and 16th Michigan ormed in line

rom lef to right. Te ghting rst raged on the right o Vincents linewhere exans took on Michiganders and New Yorkers. Sgt. ValeriusGiles o the 5th exas recalled that he and his comrades used everytree, rock and stump that gave any protection rom the rain o miniballs. Both Sergeant Giles and Pvt. John Griffith took cover behinda moss-covered old boulderabout the size o a 500-poundcotton bale. Te rough terrainquickly disrupted attack orma-tions, so every ellow was hisown general, Giles continued.Private soldiers gave commandsas loud as the officers. Nobodypaid any attention to either.A ew moments later, LawsAlabamians launched an assaulton the 83d Pennsylvania and the20th Maine.

Colonel Vincent had madeclear to Col. Joshua LawrenceChamberlain that his 20th

Maine now held the extremelef ank o the entire Unionline. As a consequence, retreatwas not an option. Firing rstbroke out on the regimentsright and soon spread alongChamberlains entire line. Aferrepulsing several attacks, the

Maine soldiers noticed thattroops o Col. William C. Oates15th Alabama were sweepingaround their lef ank. Inresponse, Chamberlain bent

Colonel Chamberlain, picturedhere as major general (Library of

Congress)


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backor re usedhis lefmost companies to con ront themdirectly. Cpl. Teodore Gerrish never orgot how rapidly thecartridges were torn rom the boxes and stuffed in the smokingmuzzles o the guns; how the steel rammers clashed and clanged inthe heated barrels; how the mens hands and aces grew grim andblack with burning powder; how our little line, baptized with re,reeled to and ro as it advanced or was pressed back. He recalledas well a terrible medly o cries, shouts, cheers, groans, prayers,curses, bursting shells, whizzing rie-bullets, and clanging steel.

When the men o the 20th Maine had exhausted their ammu-nition, Chamberlain ordered them to x bayonets. Accounts varyabout the impetus or what happened next, but suffice to say thatthe 20th Maines re used ank led the charge down Little Round

ops eastern slope, the line o onrushing men swinging out likea giant gate. Te effect was surprising, Chamberlain reported,many o the enemys rst line threw down their arms and surren-dered. A Con ederate officer red his pistol at Chamberlain whileoffering his sword in token o surrender. Te 20th Maine routedthe exhausted Alabamians, but Chamberlain lost 124 o his 386men during the ght, 42 o them killed or mortally wounded.

History has immortalized the 20th Maine or its stand onLittle Round op, but a similar crisis threatened Vincents rightank, where the line o the 16th Michigan nearly gave way. Tetimely arrival o Brig. Gen. Stephen H. Weeds V Corps brigade,with Col. Patrick H. ORorkes 140th New York in the lead, madethe difference. Bloody work was ready or us at our very eet,Adjutant Porter Farley recalled. Many New Yorkers had no time toload their ries or x bayonets. Down this way, ORorke shouted,

and according to Farley, the 140th rushed down the rocky slopewith all the same moral effect upon the rebels, who saw us coming,as i our bayonets had been xed and we ready to charge uponthem. Little Round op remained securely in Union handsbut at a terrible cost. Warren was wounded, and Vincent, Weed,ORorke, and Lt. Charles E. Hazlett, the commander o Battery D,5th U.S. Artillery, all lost their lives de ending it.

While the Con ederates succeeded in overrunning Devils

Den and the Federals managed to hold on to Little Round op, theoutcome o the clash in the Rose Wheateld was not so clear-cut. Atrst only a hand ul o III Corps regiments de ended the position,but they were soon rein orced by two small V Corps brigades.Afer being crowded out o the ght at Devils Den, General ige


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Andersons Georgians attacked the Union line in the Wheateld.Te 17th Maine, posted behind a stone wall at the southern edgeo the eld, bore the brunt o the Georgians rst attack. Accordingto the 17th Maines commander, Lt. Col. Charles B. Merrill, Tecontest became very severe, the enemy at times being driven backby our line, and then by superior numbers compelling us in turnto give way. Te heavily outnumbered Union de enders began tobuckle under the pressure o the Con ederate attacks.

At that moment, Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwells divisionrom Hancocks II Corps arrived to stabilize the position. Each

o Caldwells our brigades launched a separate attack. Brig. Gen.Samuel K. Zooks brigade swept the woods and the western parto the Wheateld, while Col. Edward E. Cross brigade attemptedto clear the eastern hal . Col. Patrick Kellys Irish Brigade engagedBrig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaws South Caroliniansthe rst oMcLaws brigades to enter the ghton a little knob o groundin the Wheatelds southwestern corner. Relieving Cross men,Col. John R. Brookes brigade surged into the woods south o theWheateld and reached a high rocky shel , where they collidedwith the Georgians o Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes brigade. TeCon ederates counterattacked and drove back the Union brigadeswith heavy losses; in the process, Brooke was severely wounded,and Cross, Zook, and Semmes all ell with mortal wounds.

Te intense combat in the Wheateld seared itsel into thesurvivors memories. Pvt. James Houghton o the 4th Michigandescribed one horric moment: My tent mate James Johnston wasshot. He was but a ew eet in ront o me when he ell. I heard himsay I am killed. Tis was the last words that I heard him speak. Te

rest was groans. Tere was no help or him. He was shot seven times.A terried Capt. Charles Fuller o the 61st New York, wounded inthe leg and unable to move to sa ety, had to lie entirely helpless . . .hearing those vicious bullets singing over my head.

Among the steady succession o rein orcements thatMeade ed into the Wheat ield were two small brigades o U.S.Regular in antry rom the V Corps; they brie ly restored thenumerical balance and prolonged the seesaw ight across the

trampled grain. As sunset neared, however, the Con ederatesgained the upper hand. By 1830, Brig. Gen. William . Wo ordsGeorgians had pushed the Regulars out o the Wheat ield andpursued them to the oot o Little Round op. Lt. John Page othe 3d U.S. In antry remembered seeing artillerymen on the hill


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waving their kepis as a signal to get out o the way. We realizedthat they wished to use canister, Page wrote, so we took up thedouble quick. In addition to Union artillery, a brigade o thePennsylvania Reserves Division, the V Corps last reserve unit,as well as a resh brigade o VI Corps troops, stopped Wo ordsadvance.

Te Con ederates withdrew to the western edge o theWheateld, while the Pennsylvania reserves deployed along theeastern tree line, trans orming the trampled eld into a grislyno-mans-land strewn with dead and wounded men. One o thecasualties, a Pennsylvania soldier named Lt. J. Jackson Purman,lay in sleepless pain, during the long hours o that midsummernight and worried about being hit by a stray shot rom a nervouspicket. Purman had good reason to be concerned. He noted thatsome men were wounded a second timeincluding himsel while others were killed outright. Pvt. John Coxe o the 2d SouthCarolina elt sorry or the wounded enemy, but he and hiscomrades could do little or them. Coxe gave a wounded Unionofficer a drink o water and never orgot his pro use thanks or thelittle service I was able to render him.

In contrast to the Wheateld, there was little doubt aboutthe ate o Sickles vulnerable Peach Orchard salient. Althoughthe Union artillery chie , General Hunt, supplied several reservebatteries to de end that exposed ground, no in antry rein orce-ments rom outside the III Corps were orthcoming. As a result,the position nally collapsed under the combined attacks oKershaws South Carolinians rom the south and Brig. Gen.William Barksdales Mississippians rom the west. Several III

Corps regiments ought in the Peach Orchard itsel , and Brig.Gen. Charles K. Graham, whose brigade was posted just northo it, tried several times to shif his Pennsylvania regiments therebe ore he ell wounded and became a prisoner. One o Grahamsmen, William E. Loring o the 141st Pennsylvania, recalledghting the Con ederates at close quarters until the Federalswere compelled to all back, our ranks . . . rapidly being thinnedwhile the exultant enemy pressed on in pursuit. As his troops

gave way, Sickles realized that his worst ear had become reality:Con ederate batteries wheeled into position on the high groundat the Peach Orchard and opened re on his command. A shell

rom one o those guns nearly severed Sickles right leg, and it wasamputated that night.


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Worse yet or Meades army, the loss o the Peach Orcharduncovered the lef ank o Humphreys division posted alongthe Emmitsburg Road. Tis threat, combined with the advanceo three o General Richard Andersons Tird Corps brigades

Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcoxs Alabamians, Col. David LangsFloridians, and Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wrights Georgiansagainst Humphreys ront, succeeded in breaking the stubbornresistance o the III Corps and nally orcing it back. Te collapseo the Emmitsburg Road line created yet another crisis or theUnion high command. A huge gap remained in the Union linealong lower Cemetery Ridge in the area ormerly held by Sicklesmen and Caldwells II Corps division. A determined push by

Barksdale, Wilcox, Lang, or Wright could have severed the Unionsupply line on the aneytown Road just behind the ridge.General Hancock displayed great initiative in shifing units

rom quiet sectors o his II Corps line to stop the attackingCon ederates. Col. George L. Willards New York brigade slowed

Confederate Dead at the Edge of the Rose Woods (Library of Congress)


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Barksdales advance, with both commanders losing their lives inthe desperate ghting. Te amous charge o the 1st Minnesotahelped to stop Wilcoxs Alabamians and some o Langs Floridians.Te regiment lost 82 percent o the Minnesotans who went intothe charge, but the right ul losses did not deter the survivors romaccomplishing their mission. According to Sgt. Al red Carpenter,Bullets whistled past us; shells screeched over us; canister andgrape ell about us; comrade afer comrade dropped rom theranks; but on the line went. No one took a second look at his allencompanion. We had not time to weep.

Wrights Georgians crested Cemetery Ridge and capturedseveral artillery pieces, only to collide with counterattacking IICorps soldiers. Meade also sent in XII Corps troops rom CulpsHill, the battered remnants o several I Corps regiments, andeven rallied some III Corps units to ll gaps in the Union line. Asdaylight aded and Andersons last two brigades ailed to supportthe Con ederate attacks up Cemetery Ridge, Longstreets assaultnally oundered. Te Union lef ank and center had held.

While Longstreets attack un olded, General Ewell prepared tolaunch his assault on the Con ederate lef ( Map 6 ). By 1600, Ewellhad deployed most o his artillery on Benners Hill east o townand opened a heavy bombardment on Cemetery Hill and CulpsHill. Although Ewells cannonade did considerable damage, theUnion artillerymen responded with an even heavier counterbat-tery re that soon silenced the Con ederate guns. Ten, ollowingLees orders to mount a ull-edged assaultand perhaps regret-ting his inaction o the previous eveningEwell sent his in antryagainst the two heights.

On the evening o 2 July, three brigades o Maj. Gen.Edward Allegheny Johnsons division attacked Culps Hill. Onlythe 1,400 officers and men o Brig. Gen. George S. Greenes NewYork brigade remained to de end the section o the line vacatedby the rest o the XII Corps, which had gone to Sickles aid. Anengineer, Greene had put his men to work building breastworksthat afernoon. Te entrenchments proved invaluable to theheavily outnumbered de enders. Near the crest o the hill, the

60th New York repelled Brig. Gen. John M. Jones Virginians,capturing both prisoners and battle ags. According to the 60thNew Yorks historian, Te effects o our re were so terriblethat the [enemys] ags were abandoned, and the prisoners werea raid to either advance or retreat.


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Greenes men, however, could not repulse Johnsons attacksagainst the lower part o the hill. Brig. Gen. George H. Steuartsswarming North Carolinians, Virginians, and Marylandersthreatened the overextended 137th New York and orced them towithdraw up the hill to an earthen traverse that lay perpendicularto Greenes original line. ogether with rein orcements amountingto 750 men rom at least three other corps, the 137th New Yorkcontinued to de end Culps Hill rom its new position. But it hadbeen a near thing. In the darkness, Johnsons Con ederates hadadvanced to within a ew hundred yards o the Union supply lineon the Baltimore Pike but ailed to press their advantage.

Ewell, meanwhile, ordered Hays Louisiana brigade andAverys North Carolina brigade rom Earlys division to assaultthe eastern slope o Cemetery Hill. Ewell also had intended orPenders and Rodes divisions to participate by attacking on Earlysright. Pender had been severely wounded earlier that day, andcommand o the division devolved on Brig. Gen. James H. Lane.Both Lane and Rodes were slow to deploy their orces, and by thetime they were ready to step off, the ght on Cemetery Hill wasover.

In any event, Hays Louisianans scattered the XI Corpsde enders at the eastern base o the hill and headed or the NewYork and Pennsylvania batteries on the crest. As one Union batterycommander reported, the Louisianans charged his guns andsucceeded in capturing and spiking my lef piece. Te cannoneers

ought them hand-to-hand with handspikes, ramrods and pistols.Although Colonel Avery, commanding on the Con ederate lef,

ell mortally wounded early in the attack, his ar Heels managed

to advance across open elds swept by Union artillery and brokethe XI Corps line in their ront. As darkness ell, Col. Samuel S.Carrolls brigade rom Hancocks II Corps double-quicked throughEvergreen Cemetery, plugging the gap in the XI Corps line andpushi

Documents

The Gettysburg Campaign