Contributions to Political Science

Yiannos Katsourides

The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Era of British ColonialismEmergence, Mobilisation and Transformations of Right-Wing Party Politics

Contributions to Political Science

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11829

Yiannos Katsourides

The Greek CypriotNationalist Right in theEra of British Colonialism

Emergence, Mobilisation andTransformations of Right-Wing Party Politics

Yiannos KatsouridesOED 1University of CyprusNicosia, Cyprus

ISSN 2198-7289 ISSN 2198-7297 (electronic)Contributions to Political ScienceISBN 978-3-319-55534-8 ISBN 978-3-319-55536-2 (eBook)DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2

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Preface

In the last two decades, there has been a remarkable flourishing of studies targeting

Cyprus history and politics. To a degree, this growth in research can be explained

by and conforms to international trends that point to both the expansion of higher

education and a growing interest in social studies. In Cyprus, there has also been a

renewed interest in historiography—particularly studies that try to reconstruct

aspects of the past. The body of social and political research—regardless of the

period of study—tends to focus on topics such as the Cyprus problem, the Church of

Cyprus and international relations. This book examines internal politics in the

Greek Cypriot community in the first half of the twentieth century, an area of

study usually ignored. Very few studies have made political parties their primary

focus (e.g. Katsourides 2013; Protopapas 2012; Attalides 1986), and most research

into political parties has looked at the more recent years where information is more

accessible (e.g. Ellinas and Katsourides 2013; Katsourides 2012; Christophorou

2006a). Thus, the majority of extant studies on the Cyprus political/social scene

make but limited reference to the early stages of party formation with the result that

there is no clear and complete history of political parties in Cyprus. This book tries

to fill in this void without overlooking the Cyprus problem wherever appropriate,

since Cyprus politics cannot be understood without reference to it.

My intention in this book is to outline the fundamental axes/factors of Greek

Cypriots’ nationalist politics as these were reflected in the ideological and political

patterns that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century. The study of these

ideological and political patterns/schemes allows the researcher to detect the

mechanisms through which political antitheses emerged, political choices were

made and political changes were implemented in Cyprus. By focusing the research

on internal politics factors, I aim to stimulate critical thinking in political analysis

that goes beyond the mere displacement of responsibilities and sources of bad luck

in external actors (that are obviously present). The analysis of internal dynamics

within the Greek Cypriot community can contribute to identifying the real effect of

these external influences, as well as the limited choices left available for a small

people like Cypriots to pursue.

v

The book’s focus is political, more specifically, political developments in the

broader context of social, ideological and economic determinants. This book is

concerned with processes of political change in Cyprus during the first decades of

the twentieth century. This means looking at changing forms of political life, the

way in which the political sphere reconstituted itself generally, and a specific set of

changes in the ideology and organisation of the Greek Cypriots. The book considers

these issues by looking in detail at a particular political space, i.e. the nationalist

Right. This was the dominant social and political actor at the time (and also later),

represented mainly by the Church of Cyprus and certain organisations/pressure

groups advocating union with Greece (enosis), which in the 1940s crystallised into

political parties, trade unions and other associated organisations.

My aim is not to produce formal histories of these groups/parties, although to

some extent this is unavoidable; my aim is to use the histories to open up larger

questions that relate to forms of political mobilisation and organisation within a

specific colonial context. My concern is to use these specific histories to clarify the

larger political relationships in which they were situated. These histories were

located in an overall perspective of change initiated by the Ottoman regime in the

second half of the nineteenth century and accelerated by British colonial reforms,

through which the political contribution of the nationalist organisations and parties

may be assessed: the conditions of their formation, their internal social relations,

the character of their ideology, their mode of political practice and the internal

dynamic of their development. Events and processes in these organisations illus-

trate the main features of the evolving relationship between the nationalists and the

existing system of politics.

More precisely, the book analyses the processes and factors that contributed to

the emergence, constitution and eventual consolidation of the Greek Cypriot

Nationalist Right in the era of British colonialism. The Greek Cypriot Right

was—and still remains—a political and cultural space that expressed the interests

of the Greek Cypriot ruling classes and the dominant ideology of nationalism, as is

the usual case with right-wing political forces in every country. Nevertheless, for

long periods of time throughout the twentieth century the nationalists remained

trapped in conflicting positions and practices that led to unexpected and often tragic

consequences (e.g. the October riots in 1931 and the coup in 1974).

My examination focuses on explaining internal politics in Cyprus—and specif-

ically nationalist right-wing politics—as an expression of a modernity very specific

to Cyprus society rather than considering such a political bent to be merely a

consequence of serious faults within Cyprus society. Nationalist party politics is a

perfect example for this. Moreover, the radicalisation of nationalist politics that

occurred intermittently was in fact a threefold response: a critique of Cypriot

modernity’s limitations; a reaction to British inertia and denial towards their claims;

and advances of the communist Left. It is key, therefore, to consider the source of

their radicalisation. Nationalist, right-wing politics occurred on two levels of the

public realm. The first was the intra-community level (e.g. the Church, the press,

etc.); the second was the civic/state level that included elections for the Legislative

Council and/or the Municipal Councils and appointments in the state apparatus.

vi Preface

The book offers research and analyses related to the development of a new

political movement and organisation in Cyprus. Furthermore, it addresses the

social, religious, economic and political environment of nationalist politics in a

small country inextricably linked with Greece, Turkey and Great Britain. Overall,

the book’s scope is to provide a systematic and methodical understanding, as well

as analysis, of one of the most critical political actors in the modern history of

Cyprus, i.e. the (nationalist) right-wing movement. Analysis is focused on the ways

that the (new and emerging) social structure interacts with (past and enduring)

social practices (e.g. clientelism), ideology (nationalism and union with Greece as

its political mandate), religion (the powerful Church of Cyprus), internal opposition

(communism) and external influences (e.g. British authorities and the Greek gov-

ernment), in the development and consolidation of political life in Cyprus and

particularly the nationalist Right camp.

The period under examination extends from the onset of the twentieth century to

the year 1955, not without reason. This date is considered a landmark in nationalist,

right-wing party politics since it was the year that the EOKA (National Organisa-

tion of Cypriot Fighters) armed struggle against Britain broke out. In 1943, prior to

the EOKA, the right-wing camp had established, in response to the Left, the Cypriot

National Party (KEK), which unified for the first time the hitherto scattered right-

wing forces and formations on the island. In the 1940s, other structures of political

representation of the Right were also established that proved durable: a trade union

and an agrarian organisation. The history of right-wing party politics reveals a

process of decomposition and regrouping, with an initial more protracted phase

taking place in the 1900s and a latter more durable one beginning in the early 1940s

and ending with the EOKA in 1955.

While this book is a Cyprus-based case study, it pertains to important areas of

questioning that go beyond this specific focus. Its contemporary significance lies in

the fact that an understanding of the above-mentioned period enables us to frame

and contextualise Cyprus’s current political history and politics. The issues and

cleavages fashioned during these turbulent years significantly influenced the con-

figuration of the party system in Cyprus (and particularly the Right political space)

long afterwards; most important, however, is that these explain the continuous

division and factionalism among the Greek Cypriot Right, as well as why a more

tolerant and liberal tendency never acquired significant social backing until the late

1990s and early 2000s. An understanding of these divisions and factions can reveal

the reasons underlying the subsequent formation of a variety of political parties on

the Right of the political spectrum.

Knowledge of these divisions also enables us to understand the role that Greek

Cypriot nationalism and its internal divisions played in the country’s relationshipswith the British, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in the sensitive area of Eastern

Mediterranean. Greek Cypriot nationalists of the early twentieth century challenged

the colonial status of Cyprus and provided, in the years that followed, the basis for

two of the most controversial organisations in Cypriot history: first, the EOKA

organisation that carried out the armed struggle in 1955–1959 against Britain and

Preface vii

that led to the independence of Cyprus, although the purpose of the struggle was

enosis, and, second, the extremist paramilitary organisation EOKA II in the early

1970s that led to the military coup of 1974 and the subsequent Turkish invasion. In

addition, various nationalistic cliques formed a number of paramilitary organisa-

tions in the 1960s.

The research questions were examined using a combination of both primary and

secondary sources. Specifically:

(a) Secondary literature for mapping out all the relevant information.

(b) Archive research in Cyprus, Greece and the National Archives in Britain.

(c) Indexing of relevant Greek Cypriot newspapers of the period.

Nicosia, Cyprus Yiannos Katsourides

References

Katsourides Y (2013) Nationalism, anti-colonialism and the crystallisation of Greek cypriot

nationalist party politics. Commonwealth Comp Polit 51(4):503–523

Protopapas V (2012) The electoral history of Cyprus: politicians, parties and elections in

Anglokratia 1878–1960. Themelio Publications, Athens (in Greek)

Attalides M (1986) The parties in cyprus (1878–1955). Lectures of the Popular University,

No. 2. Municipality of Nicosia Publications, Nicosia, pp 123–153 (in Greek)

Ellinas A, Katsourides Y (2013) Organizational continuity and electoral endurance: the commu-

nist party of Cyprus. West Eur Polit 36(4):859–882

Katsourides Y (2012) Travelling against the tide: the cypriot communist left in the post-1990 Era.

Perspect Eur Polit Soc 13(2):187–209

Christophorou C (2006a) Party change and development in Cyprus (1995–2005). South Eur Soc

Polit 11(3–4):513–542

viii Preface

Acknowledgements

This book grew out of my PhD thesis, The Early Party System of Cyprus,1878–1931, which I completed in 2009 for the Department of Political Sciences

of the University of Cyprus. This particular theme opened the doors to the fasci-

nating field of political parties, but also, and most crucially, it made me realise the

links between history and politics. However, it is my late friend and colleague, the

historian Rolandos Katsiaounis, who many years ago suggested writing a book on

the Greek Cypriot Right when I was still unsure of what to focus my research on,

who is most responsible for this book. Rolandos pointed out to me the lack of

research on the party-political right-wing in Cyprus, despite the fact that they

represent the dominant political actor on the island. Although I did not take his

advice then, in time I realised the truth of his words and so began research on

this book.

In the process of writing this book, so many people—including academics and

practitioners—offered me their knowledge, feedback and constructive criticism:

Caesar Mavratsas, Maria Hadjipavlou, Michalis Spourdalakis, Rolandos

Katsiaounis, Petros Papapolyviou, Yiannakis Kolokasides, Andreas Panayiotou,

Kostas Gouliamos and Michalis Michael. I particularly thank my former supervi-

sor, Kyriakos Demetriou, who encouraged me to seriously research the issues and

themes in this book.

In addition to the above-mentioned persons, many friends and colleagues have

helped me with their advice and encouragement. Whether they are aware of this or

not, they have all, and in various ways, helped to make this book a reality. I give

them all my heartfelt thanks.

I am particularly indebted to two foundations that supported me financially: the

Leventis Foundation and the British School at Athens. Their generosity allowed me

to take the necessary time to review all the relevant archival material at the National

Archives in London as well as secondary literature. This assistance was vital to my

research.

The Institute of Commonwealth Studies of the University of London offered me

a unique opportunity for furthering my research on the subject during my 5-year

ix

fellowship there (June 2010–December 2015). In particular, I would like to express

my appreciation to the Director of the Institute, Professor Philip Murphy, for giving

me the chance to be a part of this vibrant academic community, and Professor

Robert Holland, for his time, advice and feedback on my work.

I would also like to thank Johannes Glaeser, Marion Kreisel and their colleagues

at the editorial and production departments at Springer for their invaluable help and

superb work in publishing this book, as well as the anonymous reviewer whose

comments allowed me to articulate a more coherent and meaningful argument.

Once again, I thank Kathy Stephanides for her language editing of the manuscript.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude and love to my family: my wife

Yiota, my two sons Nicos and Stelios, my brother Alexandros and my father Nicos.

Although no longer with us, I know that my late mother Androula would be the

happiest person on earth to see this book coming to life. Therefore, I want to

dedicate this book to all the members of my family, those here and those who

have left us.

x Acknowledgements

Book Outline

Chapter 1 engages with the literature referring to nationalism and to the emergence

of political parties in colonial contexts. Because there is a wealth of information on

this subject, it was necessary to narrow the focus. Therefore, the emphasis lay with

the formation of political parties in colonised countries and particularly those that

represented Britain’s most significant European possessions: Cyprus and Malta.

This allows for a uniform benchmark since British colonies in other areas of the

world (e.g. Africa or Asia) were entirely different from their European dominions.

In this regard, the introduction focuses on some important aspects of this topic.

First, it compares the British colonial rule of the two aforementioned countries,

highlighting the most important characteristics of their respective experiences and

the key factors in the rise of party politics. Second, it argues that internal political

factors both between and within ideological camps were the main driving force for

political positions. Nationalism, in this regard, was employed in an instrumental

way in political competition. The Introduction therefore presents the analytical and

historical context of the book within a frame that accounts for the emergence and

development of right-wing politics in Cyprus, as well as its transformations and

subsequent manifestations. The frame emphasises the particular cleavages in Cyp-

riot society, the impact of British colonialism and the internal balance of power

within the Greek community, which led to recurrent internal divisions.

Chapter 2 oversees the island’s transition from Ottoman occupation to British

administration, noting the British continuities with the Ottoman past including

practices such as clientelism (especially their sources and ways of expression). In

this way, the limits of Cypriot modernisation can be better understood. The

transition facilitated and accelerated the rise of the bourgeoisie and from within

this class the emergence of a new sociopolitical elite that soon claimed its stake in

political life. In my coverage of this transition, I look into major developments and

social mechanisms emphasising economic reforms that led to the emergence of a

new class structure on the island and particularly the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the

new social and economic structures still allowed much room for past practices such

as clientelism to perpetuate.

xi

Chapter 3 looks at the political innovations introduced by the British (e.g. the

establishment of electoral processes, the provisions for franchise and the Legisla-

tive Council). Together, the new political institutions and social terrain created a

favourable context for the development of party politics on the island, and electoral

politics, as well as the tensions of political life, are clearly evident in these

institutions. The chapter also emphasises those social and institutional shortcom-

ings that have distorted party politics in Cyprus since their inception. Some were

inherited from the Ottoman era (e.g. usury and clientelism), whilst others were the

result of British choices and decisions (e.g. ethnic division). Clientelistic relation-

ships and ethnic divisions are vital to understanding party politics in Cyprus, then

and now, as these led to a political system characterised by the incomplete political

integration of the masses and based on oligarchic parliamentarism.

Chapter 4 analyses the powerful role of nationalism—which was translated into

the political demand for union with Greece (enosis)—in the transformation of

Cyprus’s political landscape. I explicate the perpetrators of nationalism in Cyprus,

the island’s linkage with Greece, the peculiarities of the nationalist movement, its

gradual massification through a variety of means (e.g. the press) and processes or

events (e.g. the Balkan Wars). Enosis was a radical claim at the time since it

advocated a break with the British Empire. It cohered as a political position

particularly after 1901 and the first victory of the nationalists in the elections for

the vacant post of the Archbishop of Cyprus, becoming a hegemonic ideology

despite the efforts of the British colonial authorities to halt its rise and mitigate its

influence among the Greek Cypriots. The dominance of enosis represented an

important radicalisation of Greek Cypriot politics involving a decisive rupture

with past traditions and a proof of the Right’s popular capability.Chapter 5 explains how a premodern institution, i.e. the Church of Cyprus, not

only survived the (incomplete) process of modernisation but managed to maintain

its hegemonic position within the Cypriot sociopolitical milieu. In addition to the

historical justifications for the Church’s powerful position, two processes are

important here: (a) the immediate conflict with the British authorities that helped

the religious institution portray itself as the ‘protector’ of the Greek population of

the island and (b) the Church’s espousal of the nationalist ideology. This latter

factor produced an inordinate amount of power in the hands of the higher clergy

while also relegitimising the Church within society. The Church of Cyprus deserves

special merit in the analysis because it constituted the link that provided coherence,

unity, organisation and leadership to the dispersed and opposing fractions of the

nationalist right-wing camp. The Church of Cyprus was also the only local institu-

tion representing the Greek Cypriots in the affairs over which they had total control.

Chapter 6 examines the first major and mass conflict in Cyprus, which revolved

around and inside the Church of Cyprus. This concerned election to the post of

Archbishop of Cyprus, the most prestigious title among the Greek Cypriots at the

time. The chapter scrutinises the causes of the conflict, the social forces

representing the various camps, their political discourse and organisation and the

xii Book Outline

election’s impact on citizen participation in civic elections. Essentially, the Archi-

episcopal Question was the catalyst for the nationalisation and ideologisation of the

masses in Cyprus, and through this conflict, we can see the way Greek Cypriot

politics fundamentally transformed.

Chapter 7 focuses on the mobilisation and organisation of the anti-colonial

cleavage within the Greek community of Cyprus, which largely accounts for the

nature of Greek Cypriot right-wing politics in the early decades of British rule and

beyond. During the first decades of the twentieth century, the nationalist organisa-

tions and pressure groups offered a field of political involvement for members/

activists of the rising bourgeoisie who felt marginalised by the colonial adminis-

tration and the lack of channels for personal advancement. In the absence of proper

state/political institutions, these organisations became the domain for power strug-

gles both between their members and with the colonial administration. Moreover,

nationalist party politics were also influenced by external influences

(i.e. developments in Greece and the stance of British authorities) and the internal

political opposition, i.e. the Communists. Consequently, the nature of their inter-

action and opposition is also examined along with their organisational structuring.

Chapter 8 examines the period following the 1931 October riots that marked the

abolishment of the Constitution and the termination of all political activities on the

island for a decade until the late 1940s when the Constitutional Assembly was

convoked; the latter constituted a turning point in Cyprus internal politics. I explore

the reasons behind the right-wing’s compromise with the British authorities for

more than a decade and how they were caught unaware by the rise of the Commu-

nist Party of Cyprus (CPC) in the early 1940s. The realisation of their inability to

confront the CPC, which was renamed AKEL in 1941, and the fear of losing their

primacy within the Greek Cypriot political system spurred the hitherto unorganised

and scattered right-wing forces to cohere and organise in the early 1940s. Both the

British and the Church facilitated this development for different reasons, and thus

were founded the first ever island-wide party of the nationalist right in Cyprus, the

Cypriot Nationalist Party (KEK), and the various organisations associated with the

Right: the trade union (SEK), the agrarian organisation (PEK) and the youth

organisations.

Chapter 9 covers the period from the late 1940s until 1955 the year that the

EOKA armed struggle began, emphasising patterns of confrontation between the

two camps, a facilitating factor for entrenching the nationalist bloc. In this chapter, I

emphasise the way nationalism and anti-communism were mobilised and the

particular role of the Cypriot Church in unifying the right-wing political space

and provide it with leadership. The chapter concludes with an overview and

evaluation of the main reasons that drove the nationalist right to radicalise its

struggle to such an extent as to form a clandestine organisation (EOKA) in order

to undertake an armed struggle against the British.

In the final chapter, Conclusions, I reflect on the discussions of the previous

chapters and bring the different threads of the argument together to identify the

Book Outline xiii

main reasons for the emergence of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement. There

were particular preconditions, historical sequences and crucial junctures that pre-

scribed the nationalist right’s trajectory throughout the years; these can explain the

contradictions as well as the development of the nationalist movement. The chapter

draws some conclusions on the nature of right-wing party politics. The study of this

historical period offers some important insights into nationalist, right-wing politics

and its role in Cypriot politics and society today.

xiv Book Outline

Contents

1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation

in Colonised Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 Greek and Greek Cypriot Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1.2 Colonial Narratives of Party Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1.3 Cleavage Lines and Greek Intra-Ethnic Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1.3.1 A New Hegemonic Bloc and Internal Antitheses . . . . . . 17

1.4 Framework of Analysis: From Outsiders to Insiders and

Back Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics . . . . . . . . . . 29

2.1 The End of Ottoman Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2.1.1 Social Relations and the Socio-Political Elite . . . . . . . . 31

2.2 The British Colonial Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

2.3 Economic Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

2.4 A Society in Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

2.4.1 The Cypriot Bourgeoisie to the Fore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

2.4.2 A New Elite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

2.5 Social Relations and Sources of Clientele Relations . . . . . . . . . 47

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

3.1 The Legislative Council: A Quasi-Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.2 Voting Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3.3 Citizen Participation in Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3.3.1 Political Exclusionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

3.4 The Iron Law of Oligarchy: Elite Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

3.5 Patronage Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

3.6 The (Colonial) Limitations of (Nationalist) Party Politics . . . . . 67

3.6.1 Compromised Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

xv

3.6.2 Electoral Process as a Lightning Rod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony

of Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

4.1 Agents of Nationalism and the Demand for Enosis . . . . . . . . . . 74

4.2 The Nature and Singularities of the National Movement

in Cyprus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

4.3 The Popular Nature of the National Movement: An

Artificial Construct? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

4.4 Mechanisms of Transmission of the Nationalist Ideology . . . . . 83

4.4.1 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

4.4.2 Printed Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

4.4.3 The Balkan Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

4.5 Ideas as Carriers of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

5 Modernisation and the Church as an Institution of Continuity . . . . 97

5.1 The Cypriot Church in History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

5.2 The Conflict Between the British and the Church . . . . . . . . . . . 104

5.3 Church Endorsement of Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the

Nationalist Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

6.1 The Archiepiscopal Question: A Rupture with the Past . . . . . . . 116

6.2 The Opposing Camps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

6.3 The Ideological Character of the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

6.4 The Battlefields (1): The Press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

6.4.1 The Battlefields (2): Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

6.5 The Beginning of Mass Politics and the Nationalisation

of Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

6.6 An Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

6.7 The Cypriot Church After the Archiepiscopal Rift . . . . . . . . . . 133

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist

Milieu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

7.1 Clubs, Reading Rooms and Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

7.2 The Organising Pillars: The Freemasons and the Press . . . . . . . 140

7.3 Island-Wide Political Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

7.3.1 Cyprus Political Organisation (1912) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

7.3.2 The Political Organisation of Cyprus (1921) . . . . . . . . . 147

7.4 The Reformist Turn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

7.4.1 The Popular Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

7.5 The Revival of the Nationalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

7.5.1 The National Organisation (1930) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

xvi Contents

7.6 Emergence of the Radical Right (EREK 1931) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

7.7 The Nature of Nationalist Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the

Consolidation of the Nationalist Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

8.1 Right-Wing Compromise and Communist Rise . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

8.1.1 The New Electoral Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

8.2 The Nationalist Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

8.2.1 The Cyprus National Party (KEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

8.2.2 The Pancyprian National Socialist Vanguard (PESP) . . . 179

8.2.3 The New Trade Unions: The Cyprus Workers

Confederation (SEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

8.2.4 The Pan-Agrarian Union of Cyprus (PEK) . . . . . . . . . . 186

8.2.5 The ‘X’ Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

8.3 Anticommunism: A Common Thread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics . . . 193

9.1 A New Political Terrain and the Constitutional Assembly as

a Turning Point in Internal Politics of Hegemony . . . . . . . . . . . 194

9.2 Anti-Communism and Helleno-Christianism: The Unifying

Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

9.3 The Influence and Leadership of the Church of Cyprus . . . . . . . 202

9.4 Radicalising the Enosis Demand and Rallying of all

Nationalist Forces: The EOKA Armed Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

9.5 The Absence of a ‘Third’, Moderate Party on the Right . . . . . . 210

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

10 Conclusions: Old and New Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

10.1 The First Period of Nationalist Politics: A Mosaic of

Perceptions and Personal Ambitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

10.2 The Unifying Force of Anti-Communism: Crystallisation

and Consolidation of the Nationalist Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

Contents xvii

Chapter 1

Introduction: Nationalism and PoliticalRepresentation in Colonised Countries

This introductory chapter engages with the literature referring to nationalism and to

the emergence of political parties in colonial contexts emphasising the British

colonial experience in the Mediterranean. The Introduction presents the analytical

and historical context of the book within a frame that accounts for the emergence

and development of right-wing politics in Cyprus, as well as its transformations and

subsequent manifestations. The frame stresses the particular cleavages in Cypriot

society, the impact of British colonialism and the internal balance of power within

the Greek community, which led to recurrent internal divisions. In this chapter I

argue that internal political factors both between and within ideological camps were

the main driving force for political positions. Nationalism in this regard, was

employed in an instrumental way in political competition.

Much of the literature on political party formation/performance has investigated

the effects of institutions (particularly electoral institutions), which create an

underlying structure that constrains the development of party systems (e.g., Harmel

and Robertson 1985; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). And although, as Coppedge

(1997, 184) argues, the institutional structure is a critical variable, it cannot on its

own explain party formation. Political elites the world over are guilty of modifying

institutional rules, rules that result from political struggles and compromises that, in

turn, shape the future of political competition.

Party politics do not bow to strict institutional rules nor do they take place in a

vacuum. And although the political sphere is quite autonomous of its social base, it

is also—and unavoidably so—connected to and influenced by it. Therefore, party

activity can only be fully understood if it is contextualised and situated within the

social, institutional and economic structure (Meynaud 2002). I argue that political

institutions and configurations of power within a political system help to determine

the likelihood that political parties will form and become successful. The specific

social structure of each country will relate not only to the structure of social and

power relations but also to its past, i.e., its history. In Cyprus, the entire social and

political milieu underwent profound changes during the transition from Ottoman to

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_1

1

British occupation in 1878. This by no means suggests that the changes took place

overnight. It was a much more complicated process, initiated in the second half of

the nineteenth century by the Ottomans but accelerated by British colonialism

(Katsiaounis 1996).

Tradition and modernity are concepts that are often used to explain the appearance

of modern societies (Lekkas 1996, 197–227). However, as many scholars warn, any

analysis using these concepts must not ignore the particular characteristics of the

society under examination. A basic weakness of the theory of modernisation is that it

tends to assume that there is only one path to social evolution (that followed by western

societies). This theory posits that this one path functioned as a global model and

prescription for all other societies, which through a sequential evolutionary process,

arrived at the same endpoint. European historiography has tended to view this process

as a movement towards parliamentary democracy, while the social sciences have

translated it into modernisation theory and political development, where industrial

societies advance naturally towards citizenship and political/societal participation

(Smith 2010, 60–95). Where this official itinerary is not taken (e.g., Germany),

modernist theory looks for the explanation in the survival of ‘pre-industrial traditions’that blocked the traditional path (Eley 1978, 737–750). But this liberal-democratic

teleology constructs a false polarity between authoritarian and parliamentary paths of

development, as it assumes that the obstruction of one results in the success of its

opposite. This position has been starkly criticised. In fact, the ideological consolidation

of capitalist social relations is an unpredictable process—one that has no given or fixed

destination (parliamentary democracy), but that, on the contrary, is both uneven and

reversible, particularly in its early stages (Eley 1998, 164).

Emerson (1967, 238) points out that the problem with modernisation theory

occurs because during the preceding centuries, some nations succeeded in achiev-

ing levels of wealth and power which allowed them to make greater advances than

others, and this led to all other nations and societies following the model of western

societies. Therefore, many researchers consider the opposing categories of tradi-

tional and modern societies as a crude and a-historical distinction because the many

and varied historical paths of development are viewed as homogenous. ‘Historydoes not consist of a single step. Traditional societies are not static and unchanging,

free of historical change and evolution nor is there some unified model of modern-

isation which defines their transformation’ (Hobsbawm 2001, 208).

Hall and Gieben (2003, 27–28) argue that the transition from tradition to

modernity occurred in most countries via similar (and various) mechanisms and

multiple processes (see also James 1967, 78). Political, economic, social and

cultural changes were the drivers of the transition. Yet despite their similarities,

these processes and changes varied from country to country and resulted in different

types of modernity. In colonised countries the definitive impulse towards modern-

isation came from the colonisation pursued by western countries. A brief discussion

on colonialism here will clarify this position.

All colonised nations bear the marks of their colonisation, and the literature on

the subject abounds with conflicting narratives and approaches to colonisation’ssocietal influence (e.g., the ‘Subaltern’ school). An initial, and now highly

2 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

contested, narrative is that the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised

was little more than simply borrowing from the ‘apparently more ‘developed’colonial powers (Cooper 1994, 1516). The lives of local people and the social

and political agencies they produced were forgotten in narratives of mimicry. Those

histories existed in the shadow of Europe not solely because of colonisation’spowerful intrusion into other continents but because Europe’s self-perceived move-

ment toward state-building, capitalist development, and modernity marked—and

still marks—a vision of historical progress against which African, Asian, or Latin

American history appears as ‘failure’ (Chakrabarty 1992, 19).

This approach risks underestimating the possibility that local action might

actually alter the boundaries of subordination within a seemingly powerful colonial

regime. Recognition of the much greater power of the Europeans in the colonial

encounter does not negate the importance of local (e.g., Cypriot) agency in deter-

mining the shape the encounter took. While the conquerors could concentrate

military force to defeat colonised insurgents, ‘pacify’ villages, or slaughter rebels,the routinisation of power demanded alliances with local authority figures. The

difficulty is to confront the power behind European expansion without assuming it

was all-determining and to probe the clash of different forms of social organisation

without treating them as self-contained and autonomous. The binaries of coloniser/

colonised, western/non-western, and domination/resistance begin as useful devices

for examination of power, but finally constrain a more precise understanding of

power, e.g., how it is deployed, engaged, contested, deflected, and appropriated

(Cooper 1994, 1517).

Similarly, a number of Greek Cypriot studies have situated Cyprus history and

politics within the framework of nationalism and resistance to the foreign oppres-

sor, particularly following the EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)

armed struggle against the British (1955–1959). The burst of colonial liberation that

followed—and even preceded—Cyprus independence, as well as some of the ruling

elite’s need to establish their stronghold over internal politics, led many ‘organicscholars’, journalists, media outlets and political actors to promote a narrative of

nationalist resistance in order to build a moral case for right-wing, intra-community

domination. This narrative was rooted in battles against foreign conquerors, filled

with many small tales of resistance, individual acts of disobedience, and forms of

religious and nationalist activism that eventually culminated in the political party

system in the Cypriot state.

One major problem here is that the concept of resistance can be expanded so

broadly as to reduce it to this one narrative (Cooper 1994, 1532), i.e., the dyad of

resistor/oppressor. In this narrative all context is erased; the struggle unites the

colonised population as one resistor, ignoring inequalities of class, age, gender. The

complexity of multi-sided engagement with forces inside and outside the commu-

nity is narrowed into a single framework (Ortner 1996). Significant as resistance

might be, the overfocus on its role may compromise our understanding of Cyprus

history rather than enhance it. There has been little questioning of this nationalist/

resistance narrative in earlier research on Cyprus (see for example Papadopoulos

1964; Loizos 1975). These earlier tales of heroism tended to go unquestioned.

1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries 3

However, this exclusive and overstretched emphasis on this heroic narrative is now

problematised as new questions arise and new perspectives are introduced.

With this in mind, I take an approach that argues that the interplay among several

conflicting factors inherent in periods of transition produced a specific Cypriot

context of modernisation within which nationalist politics unfolded. These factors

included, inter alia: earlier (Ottoman) social structures; the new capitalist mode of

production largely introduced by British colonisation; the emergence and consol-

idation of new social classes; new political structures; the emergence of political

ideologies, etc. Nationalism, in particular, immediately became the most defining

feature of Cypriot politics. Analysing nationalism in its various dimensions, i.e.,

intra-communal, inter-communal, and international would require a far more

detailed and informed scope than I can cover in this book. My focus is the internal

politics of the Greek community of Cyprus: the relationship between Greek nation-

alism and the internal structures and agencies of the Greek Cypriot community but

also the way Greek politics intersected with Greece and Britain. This emphasis on

Greek Cypriot nationalist politics means that the way in which the above factors

interacted is crucial to an understanding of how nationalist politics emerged,

evolved and eventually dominated.

The triumph of the nationalist movement in Cyprus—as well as in other

countries—appears to be less a linear progression than a conjuncture, and its

success less a question of a singular mobilisation in the name of the nation than

one of coalition building, the forging of clientage networks, and party politics. The

kind of politics that eventually took over colonial states was this nation-centered

one, focused on the European-defined boundaries and institutions, and on notions of

progress shaped by capitalism and European social thought. The reasoning whereby

nationalists critiqued colonialism was intrinsically wed to capitalism and colonial-

ism. In their reactions to the colonial powers, nationalists became caught up in the

colonial regimes’ categories; nationalism became a ‘derivative discourse’ (Chat-terjee, cited in Cooper 1994, 1540–1541). The petty bourgeoisie in particular was

absorbed in mimicking the culture of the coloniser.

There are two broad theoretical approaches to analysing the nationalist phenom-

enon (Smith 1994). First, is the ‘national awakening’ school, which views the

nation as a physical class/category, anthropologically stable (Mavratsas 2003,

57). According to this school, the nation has always existed and therefore the real

question is how the sleeping giant was awakened and not how it was mobilised/

constructed. The second school views the nation as an artificial construct, an

‘invented tradition’ (e.g., Hobsbawm and Ranger [1983] 2015). The argument

here is that the nation is a by-product of eighteenth-century Europe as an ideolog-

ical project of the modern state. Consequently, nationalism is closely related to

modern societies and the new social and economic forces. In this regard, it was

nationalism that created nations and not the other way around.

Thus, although the various nationalist traditions perceive the concept of the

nation in different ways, there were, according to Heywood (2006, 159–164), two

opposing approaches that were particularly influential. The first (that largely cor-

responds to the ‘national awakening’ school) presents the nation mainly as a

4 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

cultural community, stressing the significance of ethnic ties, while the second

supports a civic version. In Western Europe, nationalism was a political movement

that aimed to limit government power and ensure political rights. In contrast, in

Eastern Europe and the Balkans, regions where political ideas were less developed

and the social structure was ‘backward’ in comparison to Western Europe, nation-

alism was a cultural movement first. It was ‘the dream and the hope of poets and

intellectuals’, and the East’s inferiority complex towards the West was mixed with

an over-emphasis on the ‘soul’ of these peoples, on the survival of the glorious pastand on their ‘mission’ in the world (Liakos 2005, 82). We must understand this

dichotomy in context: in Western Europe, where the nations separated and became

autonomous in the eighteenth century, unifying trends prevailed; in the East, it was

separatism that predominated (Lekkas 1996, 91–93).

Nationalism, however, did not fall from the sky. Both the theoretical starting

point and the empirical evidence show that nationalism in Europe was essentially a

result of socio-economic changes and developments, which the nationalists subse-

quently influenced and helped to shape. Capitalism and its driving forces were a

pre-condition for the realisation of the idea of nation (Beck 1996, 157).

Industrialisation and the development of a commercial-industrial culture on the

one hand, and the appearance of the nation on the other were a historical coinci-

dence, which some scholars do not see as occurring by chance (Hobsbawm 1994,

28). The social classes that supported this process of ideological change were those

most directly linked with the social progress of the era: commercial circles and

some from the landowning class, as well as bankers, the educated middle class,

industrialists and entrepreneurs (Hobsbawm 2002, 193). New petty bourgeois

classes became the vehicles of national movements, with teachers, merchants,

lawyers and doctors as the agents of the ideological preparation and initial

mobilisation of the national movements (Liakos 2005, 22). Nationalism, in other

words, was supported by social forces that sought to upgrade and legitimise their

own social and political positions (Lekkas 1996, 69).

At the same time though, there are undeniable connections between nationalism

and traditional structures and culture: e.g., language, religion, myths, etc.

(Mavratsas 2003, 57). Moreover, there are theoretical and methodological problems

with trying to explain the rise of nationalism solely as the direct expression of social

interests, which in the case of Cyprus and because of colonialism, made these

dividing lines were even more difficult to discern. Nationalism was thoroughly

woven into the social and political fabric of Cyprus with people of all classes and

professions being attached either to the old ruling class or the new one taking shape

after British colonialism. Therefore, the answer may lie with politics and ideology

as well as social structure. As Kitromilides remarks,

Ethnic conflicts have been approached in scholarly literature as the outcomes of social

mobilisation and political change that disrupt traditional equilibria in ethnically segmented

societies while the role of ideological factors in this process has generally been overlooked.

Yet systems of ideas play a decisive role in the emergence and escalation of confrontations

by mediating the opposing groups’ self-conception. (1979, 143)

1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries 5

What stands out about nationalism is its ability to join elements of tradition with

modernising features. According to Hobsbawm (1994), nationalism created

(invented according to his own terminology) a new tradition within which religion,

as well as other pre-modern traditions and institutions, were incorporated. As a

result of this fusion of past and present social forces and traditions, nationalism

gradually became a hegemonic ideology throughout the western world, endorsed

and promoted by the newly founded nation states and their ruling elites. It is in this

context that nationalism has been described as an intrinsically integrative ideology:

it stresses the common identity of all citizens by reference to language, history and

shared traditions. Moreover, the fact that political practice has been shaped by the

linguistic, institutional and territorial extent of the nation-state has been of incal-

culable importance, for it has held political imagination in a structure of limited

possibilities and heavily constrained the expression of dissent (Eley 1998, 167).

1.1 Greek and Greek Cypriot Nationalism

A clear understanding of Greek nationalism is pivotal in any discussion of Greek

Cypriot nationalism, its emergence and evolution. Although nationalism was ini-

tially a democratic movement, in Greece a concerted effort of established conser-

vative social forces led by the Church soon altered its stance (Clogg 1973, 1–40).

The conservative nature of Greek nationalism was epitomised by its acceptance of

absolute monarchy after the nation-state was established, which reflected conser-

vative interests in Greek society (Kitromilides 1979, 147). It was also a period of

religious revival culminating in a surge of religious fundamentalism and millenar-

ianism. Further, Greek scholars began to argue for the ethnological and cultural

continuity of the Greek nation and Greek civilisation. The result was a type of

organic nationalism that rejected the sort of social criticism inherent in the classi-

cism in the Enlightenment; in Greece this critical perspective was replaced by

ancestral worship.

These intellectual orientations were soon translated into a political programme

(Kitromilides 1979, 152-157), i.e., the ideology of the Megali Idea (Great Idea).

According to Lekkas (1996, 106), the main thrust of the Great Idea refers to the

expansion of the national space (territorial, cultural and economic) into regions

regarded as belonging ‘by right’ to the Greek nation. The Great Idea narrative

blamed the decline of Greece’s power on the rise of the Ottoman Turkish Empire;

therefore, to reclaim their prior glory they had to replace the Ottoman Empire with a

Greek state that would include the unredeemed Greeks of the periphery (e.g., Crete,

Cyprus, etc.), who would be converted to the values of the Great Idea through

education and the creation of a network of political and cultural ties with a free

Greece. The irredentist Greek nationalism successfully consolidated the prevailing

status quo in Greek society by focusing politics on external preoccupations, thus

distracting attention from domestic problems and defusing social pressures from

below. The ideology of the Great Idea denied legitimacy to domestic social

6 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

conflicts such that the conservative status quo remained in place. According to this

line of thought, Greek nationalism remained irredentist and aggressive because of

the economic and cultural underdevelopment of the Greek state and society.

Greek Cypriot nationalism is traditionally and rightfully analysed and

contextualised within the parameters of Greek nationalism. Scholars argue that

the type of Greek Cypriot nationalism (ethnic as opposed to civic), as well as other

shortfalls in Cyprus’s political development (e.g., clientelism) are due to the

historical conditions of Cyprus political backwardness: that is, absolutist Ottoman

structures on the one hand and authoritarian, anti-democratic structures and prac-

tices in state and society due to British colonisation on the other, as well as the

absence of a sovereign state. As a result, many processes were fragmented and/or

distorted by the primacy of pre-modern traditions in the political culture, which

would have been erased through a ‘healthier’ process of liberal-democratic political

modernisation (see for example, Mavratsas 2003; Attalides 1979; Markides 1977;

Kyriakides 1968). Hence, in Cyprus, there was no bourgeois domination based in

successful industrial capitalism; instead there was a deficit of citizenship, of

bourgeois parliamentarism, and of firmly anchored liberal bourgeois political

culture that opened the way for the type of nationalism (irredentist) that prevailed

(Bozkurt and Trimikliniotis 2014).

Moreover, the spread of nationalism was facilitated, it is claimed, by the

existence of a disoriented popular mass, which lacked the security of traditional

communities. Thus, broad social strata responded to nationalist initiatives, includ-

ing the petty-bourgeoisie of craftsmen and small businessmen, parts of the labour-

force, of the rural strata and of the larger landowners. Here, nationalism is associ-

ated with the ‘status anxiety’ of traditional small producers and other elements hit

by the growth of capitalism.

For the exponents of this approach the emergence of the nationalist movement

is explained simply by the inherited cultural dispositions of a Greek bourgeoisie

and the Church which had failed to produce a vigorous native liberalism. Rather

than being investigated in its own right, nationalism is plotted along an ideolog-

ical continuum between the emergence of the enosis movement in the late

nineteenth century and that of the EOKA (1955–1959). The absence in Cyprus

of a bourgeois revolution in the classic liberal-democratic mould is made to

structure the entire history of the ensuing century. The failure of the Greek

Cypriot bourgeoisie to generate a successful tradition of liberalism is made to

determine, step by step, a disastrous accumulation of right-wing attitudes:

extreme nationalism, but also violent anti-communism, hostility to parliamentary

reform, anti-Turkishcism, and so on. In other words, instead of being interpreted

in the determinate context of the particular conjuncture itself, notably between the

end of the Archbishopric (1909) and the start of the EOKA armed struggle,

(radical) nationalist ideology simply disappears into the linear continuity of

‘pre-industrial’ authoritarian traditions.

To be sure, such formulations have a certain descriptive value. But however

illuminating when applied to particular policies or institutions, the functionalist

view of nationalism substitutes a description of effects for analysis of the conditions

1.1 Greek and Greek Cypriot Nationalism 7

under which different types of nationalist commitment were formed (Eley 1998,

162). Nationalism becomes the precipitate of a political reaction between two sets

of factors: the historic authoritarianism of the Greek Cypriot political culture and

the particular need to re-integrate a society riven by the effects of modernisation

and the advent of capitalism. Α number of other factors (e.g., the electoral success

of AKEL, etc.) then helped to make it more extreme.

The preceding is definitely part of the story. For example, it can’t be denied thatdeep historical perspectives affect and distinguish the structural trajectories of

many European countries. However, as some scholars point out (see for example

Eley 1998, xv) ‘there is a problem with the normative teleology of “development”

and “modernisation”, which constitutes some national histories as healthy and

successful and other as backward and flawed’. While this approach conforms to

the long-accepted framework for explaining Cyprus exceptionalism, in fact, it

actually serves to limit our understanding of the various social and political

processes in Cyprus. The present study incorporates some points of this analysis

but it also looks sceptically at this model. The Cypriot political culture’s backward-ness and authoritarianism were/are not due solely to a false modernisation. They

also result from the way in which capitalism developed on the island and the way

nationalist politics unfolded with their internal antitheses and antinomies.

The particular effects of the changing organisation of the economy must also be

acknowledged, as well as other events and processes: the economic crisis on the

island that followed WWI, the breakthrough to trade-unionism, the competition

from Turkish nationalism, the calculated manipulation of nationalist sentiments for

integrationist ends (e.g., during elections), and so on. All these must be accounted

for in the formation of the (irredentist) expression of nationalist belief under the

British Empire. In this regard, Cypriot nationalist, right-wing politics must not be

considered solely as a result of a feudal or authoritarian past; it must also be seen as

a complex result of the capitalist process at the time. After all, Britain—who set the

pace for reforms in Cyprus—was the most dynamic and advanced capitalist country

at the time. Yet in the political sphere, Britain set Cyprus on a course of

parliamentary-type of politics that incorporated aspects of traditional politics, i.e.,

clientelism and ethnic segregation.

In addition, the specific type of (nationalist) politics in the Greek Cypriot

community must be examined within the context of the nationalism predominant

in Cyprus. Moreover, and as noted above, it must also be examined in the context of

Greece/Greek nationalism. ‘Motherland nationalism’, namely a sense of primary

loyalty to the ‘national centre’ of Athens, exercised a defining influence over GreekCypriot nationalism (Loizides, 2007, 173). Greek Cypriot nationalism would be

defined as ethnic/cultural in the bibliography on nationalism. This is the type of

nationalism that precedes the establishment of the state and the development of

capitalism (Mavratsas 2003, 63). Countries with this sort of nationalism lack the

political independence of the nation, and consequently acquire a liberationist,

secessionist character. The nation exists only as an ideology and a plan for imple-

mentation (Liakos 2005, 5). In addition, Greek Cypriot nationalism developed

before industrialisation and not as its legacy, as happened in Western Europe, and

8 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

at a time when Cyprus was an occupied country. The ethnic and liberationist nature

of Greek Cypriot nationalism appears to place it in the category of anti-colonial

nationalism, since it was inspired by opposition to colonialism and by the idea of

national self-determination. At the same time, however, it was linked with the

desire for social development, giving it both an economic and a political dimen-

sion—two characteristics of anti-colonial nationalism.

Greek Cypriot nationalism, although primarily anti-colonial, reveals similarities

with other categories of nationalism, especially the liberal and conservative. The

agents of these various types of nationalism—not only in Cyprus—were sectors of

the bourgeoisie with conflicting interests and perceptions (Hobsbawm 1994). Like

liberal nationalism, Greek Cypriot nationalism pursued the notions of popular

sovereignty and constitutional government; like conservative nationalism, it prom-

ised social cohesion and public order, while also offering identity and security in the

framework of an organic unity. Devotion to the motherland and the national

consciousness stem from the common past (on the traits of the two nationalisms,

see Heywood 2006, 165, 168–169). Considering Greek Cypriot nationalism as just

described, we can see that it was a complicated, multifaceted phenomenon that

included opposing traits and dynamics: modernisation and secularisation yet attach-

ment to traditional values; friendly predisposition towards the British but also anti-

colonialism; anti-communism that had both liberal and conservative elements.

These were the outcome of a long process of Cypriot modernisation that blended

together all these opposing characteristics.

Within the nationalist frame a dual form of (in)equality was adopted: internal

and external. Internally, an imaginary community of equal citizens was established

in contrast to all outsiders (the external dimension) who were branded as the

‘others’, the ‘useful enemies’ (e.g., the Turks). Based on this distinction the variousnations and groups were hierarchically ordered, with some nations being more

equal than others. A second distinction went hand in hand with the first: within each

nation internal enemies were also created, usually those in revolutionary Marxist

parties and movements. These groups were considered internal enemies to be

demonised and usually expelled from the political body, thus creating inequality

within the nations as well. Communism was seen to cause divisions within the

nation. This will become clear in Chaps. 8 and 9, which examines AKEL, the

Progressive Party of the Working People (successor of the Communist Party of

Cyprus CPC), and its reception by the nationalists. However, nationalism also

created intra-ethnic divisions among nationalists themselves, not uncommon

among colonial societies (Mozaffar 2006) and even beyond these boundaries (see

below).

While in some ways nationalism divided the then Greek Cypriot ruling class, it

also provided a framework for rallying the establishment and mobilising new

sources of popular support and strategies (used first against the British and later

the communists). Thus political mobilisation was radically changed by nationalist

ideology. The new Greek social and political elite in Cyprus needed popular

support in order to maintain its political presence under conditions of expanded

suffrage and semi-parliamentarism. This would be found in the peasantry although

1.1 Greek and Greek Cypriot Nationalism 9

the nature of their political relationship was not entirely straightforward. There was

no simple subordination of the peasantry determined solely by the pre-modern

traditions of deference. Therefore, the role of ideology was crucial here. National-

ism became the tool for mobilisation, as well as domination of the agrarian masses.

I will in this book examine a number of issues related to the above discussion:

the way Greek ethnicity was politicised with the aim of achieving union with

Greece via collective action; internal divisions within the Greek Cypriot nationalist

movement; the reasons behind these opposing views and interests; the ways in

which they were electorally, organisationally and politically expressed; the ways it

dealt with the rising communist ‘threat’; and the way Britain and Greece reacted to

these efforts. However, in order to understand the above processes it is important to

first examine the way party politics emerged and evolved in colonised countries,

focusing on the British Mediterranean experience.

1.2 Colonial Narratives of Party Politics

Political parties did not develop uniformly throughout the world. For example, in

parts of the West political parties developed gradually through a series of steps:

representative government at first limited to small groups among the aristocracy

and the middle classes; extension of the franchise; the struggle of new social classes

to achieve political representation, particularly the working class; and eventually

full-scale, democratic party politics (Epstein 1967, 118–148; Lipset and Rokkan

1967; Neumann 1956; Duverger 1954). In other parts of the western world the

picture was different. In general, according to Macridis (1967, 14), a functional

party system developed wherever there was a solid national identity, governmental

institutions were legitimised, and there were civic participation and representative

government. Where national identity was not secure (e.g., Germany and Italy) or

where legitimacy was precarious (France) the development of political parties was

impeded.

We must look at Cyprus, as a country under colonial rule, as being outside the

western paradigm of party formation. For one thing, as scholars in the West admit,

‘they [political scientists] erred in anticipating democratic institutions in nations

whose economy and culture were not yet ready to sustain the tensions of party

conflict’ (Lipset 1970, 35–36). The greater cultural and historical diversity of the

less developed nations complicates the search for a single set of factors to explain

the development of a competitive party system, such as, for example, the correla-

tion between economic development, literacy and a stable democratic polity. Their

politics are more complex and are marked by intense conflicts and increased

ideologisation. Problems related to industrialisation, religion and political institu-

tions in these countries were unsettled for a long time. Thus, it was difficult not only

to establish institutions and a set of procedures to cope with the tensions in political

life, but also to maintain a corresponding culture of compromise that could accom-

modate conflicting views and ideologies (Lipset 1963, 454).

10 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

These countries also experienced substantially different economic conditions

and high levels of inequality and poverty such as were not seen in Western Europe

(Van Cott 2005). This renders unsuitable the application of theories pertaining to

(north) European parties. Furthermore, what reflects the situation in some develop-

ing areas is often difficult to apply to other countries because issues such as ethnic

identity is experienced and expressed in different ways in each region. In India, for

example, the principal ethno-political cleavage lies within the dominant ethno-

religious grouping, between upper- and lower-caste Hindus (Chandra 2004). Thus,

ethnic relations are distinct in India compared to Latin America and a patronage-

based model of ethnic party formation - usually used to explain party models and

structures in this part of the world - is unlikely to explain all cases.

In colonised countries the most important cleavage was that between the

oppressed nation and the colonial/imperial power. Many of the biggest parties

and organisations have grown out of the movement for national liberation; for

example, the African National Congress and the Indian National Congress (Randall

2006, 389). In most of these countries class issues became secondary in the face of

anti-colonial struggle. Ethnicity has always had greater social relevance than class.

Political parties emerged in most of the now ex-colonial countries in order to cope

with a series of problems that never directly involved their western counterparts:

national emancipation and identity, the creation of a set of values within which

political parties would be implemented, the creation of legitimised governmental

institutions, the management of conflict, the issue of patronage politics, etc. In these

countries there was no system to support the creation of political parties; no sense of

citizenship; there was little if any experience with representative government; and a

stark propensity for conflict (Macridis 1967, 15–16).

As a result the politics in countries under colonial rule tended to develop along

ethnic lines (Reilly 2006, 812). Whether or not these ethnic conflicts existed or were

significant prior to colonisation, the politicisation of identity served both local

politicians and the colonising power. It was the easiest way for campaigning parties

to attract voter support, far easier than appealing to issues of class or ideology. As

parties compete for votes a process of ‘outbidding’ can take hold, pushing the locusof political competition towards the extremes (Rabushka and Kenneth 1972). By

making communal appeals to mobilise voters, the emergence of ethnically based

parties typically has a centrifugal effect on electoral politics, thereby aiding

extremists and heightening ethnic tensions.

For these reasons, the party systems were often less institutionalised than in the

western world, a process that is dependent on four factors (Mainwaring and Scully

1995, 20): regularity of party competition, the depth of parties’ roots in society, theextent to which parties and elections are widely accepted as the means of deter-

mining who governs, and the strength of parties’ internal organisation. In inchoate

party systems, ‘party organisations are generally weak, electoral volatility is high,

party roots in society are weak, and individual personalities dominate parties and

campaigns’. With the exception of electoral volatility, these are also some of the

defining characteristics of political systems based around ethnic parties, which

typically have low levels of ideological coherence and programmatic commitment,

1.2 Colonial Narratives of Party Politics 11

lack a well-developed organisational structure and membership base, and depend

on clientelistic mobilisation for their electoral success, often relying upon a single

charismatic leader (Gunther and Diamond 2001, 23–24).

Of particular interest here is the development of party politics in colonial settings

and particularly British colonial settings. In the early part of the twentieth century,

Britain held three colonies in the Mediterranean: Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar

(Holland 2013). Because Gibraltar remains a colony even today, the focus here is

on Cyprus and Malta, and especially their anti-colonial, nationalist party-politics.

Cyprus and Malta are the only two islands in the Mediterranean that enjoy sover-

eign status and, despite a number of societal differences they share/d many struc-

tural and cultural traits.

Both countries embraced a cultural rather than an economic nationalism,

although economics certainly played a role, especially in Cyprus (Frendo 2013).

In both countries the chief proponents of cultural nationalism were lawyers, jour-

nalists, literati, university students, priests, and small businessmen; and in both

countries there was a residual preference or identification, an affinity with a ‘mother

country’ (Italy or Greece). Sustained by their ancient civilisations and religious

loyalties, and probably spurred on by their geographically peripheral and frontier

position, both the Maltese and the Greeks of Cyprus presumed that their pedigrees

entitled them to greater respect. They felt that their cooperation with the British

would be rewarded, and that they obviously did not belong to nor would they be

slotted into an African or Asian typology of colonial empire, of the ‘superiorEuropean/backward native variety’ (Frendo 2013).

In Cyprus, nationalism focused heavily on the union of the island with Greece

(enosis), whereas in Malta, until World War II (WWII), nationalism took the form

of constitutional demands and manifested itself in expressions of linguistic and

cultural affinities with Italy (Fenech 2014, 21). Even after WWII contesting Mal-

tese parties proposed to recast Anglo-Maltese relations through integration with

Britain or dominium status. Therefore we cannot compare Maltese attachment to

Italy with Greek Cypriot attachment to Greece. That the hallmark of the Nationalist

Party (PN) in Malta during the inter-war years was the so-called italianita might

suggest a parallel with Cypriot Hellenism; yet in contrast to the situation in Cyprus,

only a very small and educated minority could speak Italian and anyway, it was not

the same as saying that the Maltese were Italian. And while irredentism was not

alien to a section of the PN, there is no evidence that the party as such was

irredentist: its attachment to Italy was essentially cultural, linguistic and sentimen-

tal. Most importantly, the realist majority recognised that Malta had become so

economically intertwined with British defence spending that no one, not even Italy,

could usefully step in as an equivalent substitute (Fenech 2014, 26). In addition, the

Roman Catholic hierarchy of the Maltese Church had developed a collaborative

relationship with the British, which taken together with the economic dependence,

held enormous sway over people’s lives. Consequently, anti-British feelings that

surfaced from time to time were never enduring in Malta and there was no

grassroots movement supporting, much less militating for, a union with Italy, or

even a strengthening of links with it—as was the case with Cyprus.

12 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

In these two countries’ (anti)colonial nationalism there were two basic opera-

tional factors. One was geographical and historic: sheer proximity underpinned by a

linguistic identification or close affinity with a larger neighbouring country, which

in the course of the previous century had become independent European states in

their own right (Greece and Italy respectively). The other was the central role

played by religion and the religious institutions. Both Malta and Cyprus were

deeply religious societies where ‘national’ Churches (Roman Catholic in the former

case, Greek Orthodox in the latter) inevitably played a political as well as a

religious role (Holland 2014, 14). Cypriot Orthodoxy and Maltese Roman Cathol-

icism shared a common hatred for secularism, the Left and often modernity in

general. In the absence of a secular statehood, these traditional institutions tended to

become repositories of nationality and moral authority, which in practice was to a

greater or lesser extent also political authority. The eastern Ethnarchy, in particular,

emphasised the political role of the episcopacy, the despotes (Frendo 2013). How-

ever, unlike the Greek Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church of Malta was not a

force for nationalism; rather it worked toward intermediation (Fenech 2014, 28).

In terms of their trajectories as colonial or dependent polities, they were more

different than alike (Holland 2014, 9). In imperial and strategic terms Malta always

had a clear rationale, whereas Cyprus kept changing stance. The financial and

developmental implications of their different backgrounds were profound. Over

time the British came to spend a considerable amount of money in Malta, while in

Cyprus they spent relatively very little. Under such conditions the onset of moder-

nity in Malta went hand in hand with a dynamic colonial order. The long-term effect

of colonialism was that economically, and to a certain extent culturally, Malta’scharacter became practically unrecognisable from that of its geographical hinter-

land (Fenech 2014, 21). In Cyprus, the relatively circumscribed character of this

dynamic meant that modernity came much more slowly, and in more ambiguous

forms, whereas affinity with Greece grew constantly.

All the above help to explain, at least partially, why party political institutions in

Cyprus developed more slowly than those in Malta. Although Cyprus had had a

communist party since the mid-1920s, it was nothing like the Malta Labour Party,

with its tentacles in every Maltese village and town (Holland 2014), and the Cypriot

Right was even more unorganised and based on personal clans, unlike the powerful

Maltese (anglophile) Constitutional Party of Lord Gerald Strickland.

The political struggles that emerged in both islands were essentially triangulated,

whereby the British, though constitutionally sovereign, over time became the

weakest leg (Holland 2014). In Cyprus the competition lay between an expatriate

administration, a socially very conservative Hellenistic Right and a secular Left. It

is important to note that in this configuration the Turkish Cypriot community was

for a long time largely passive politically, confident that the British would contain

Greek aspirations for enosis (McHenry 1987). In Malta the defining political

division was also a three-way affair made up of the British, a rather old-fashioned

Italian bourgeoisie of moderate disposition and an increasingly assertive working-

class that institutionalised as the Malta Labour Party. The point here is that in both

Malta and Cyprus any attempt to interpret events through a simple binary split

1.2 Colonial Narratives of Party Politics 13

between ‘imperialism’ and ‘nationalism’ breaks down under close examinations.

The internally driven conflicts were the most powerful and threatened to over-

whelm the British.

1.3 Cleavage Lines and Greek Intra-Ethnic Politics

The above shaped the cleavage lines in colonial Cyprus both between and within the

two main ethnic communities of the island: the Greek and the Turkish Cyptios.

Cleavages are deep structural divides that persist through time and through genera-

tions (Mair 2006, 373). Cleavages involve social divisions that distinguish between

groups of people on the basis of key socio-structural characteristics such as religion,

ethnicity or class. According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), it is societal divisions and

conflicts that lead to the emergence of political parties that represent the different

social groups. As many theorists have pointed out, however, some social cleavages

were never translated into party politics (e.g., gender), while others were translated in

only some countries (Lipset and Marks 2000; Mair 1992). Moreover, some cleavages

have proved more enduring than others; some have acquired increased salience

within party systems; others have remained on the margins.

For that reason, one of the most enduring questions in political science is how

social cleavages and collective interests are translated into party systems (Van Cott

2005, 1). What actually explains the variation is the ‘translator’, i.e., the political

party (Sartori 1990; Mair 2006). In the context of this book, however, we must note

that cleavage theory omits any reference to an extremely significant cleavage in the

developing world: oppressed nations against the imperial power (Randall 2006,

389; Macridis 1967, 15–16). Nevertheless, cleavage analysis is still inherently

useful, because politics in modern societies is fundamentally a struggle between

different groups seeking to obtain resources and to promote their values and visions

for society (Siavelis 2006, 361). In this respect generally, and for the specific

purposes of this book, cleavage theory offers a valuable analytical framework for

contextualising nationalist politics in Cyprus.

In Cyprus, two cleavages proved defining in the period under examination: the

ethnic and the anti-colonial cleavages. In multiethnic societies, ethnic cleavages are

likely to generate political parties and to organise political competition (Horowitz

1985, 291–293), while the national cleavage forms the basis for identification

(in Cyprus for both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots). The constitution of political

life on national terms forced almost all members of the two Cypriot communities to

align with the demands and the interests of their own ethnic community. Percep-

tions of a common origin and history with Turkey or Greece have been instrumental

in mobilising each community in favour of competing nationalist projects (Loizides

2007, 174). At one time or another, both communities in Cyprus have linked their

destinies to those of their ‘motherlands’, an identification facilitated by the colonialpowers—and not only in Cyprus. As the coloniser, Britain actually institutionalised

segregation of different ethnic groups with, for example, separate electoral lists,

14 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

separate polling stations and consequently separate political representation

(Katsourides 2013; Georghallides 1979). Political parties were almost forced to

be drawn along ethnic lines, and all potential tools and mechanisms that might unify

the two Cypriot communities were intentionally avoided (Katsiaounis 1994). These

arrangements highlight the importance of ethnicity as a source of identification and

division, as well as a tool for electoral mobilisation.

In most accounts on Cyprus, the two ethnic communities tend to feature as unitary

actors. In other words, Turkish and Greek Cypriots are assumed to be homogeneous,

and political analyses are based on their unitary interest (Bozkurt and Trimikliniotis

2014, 245). However, the relationship between ethnicity and political actors is more

complicated than this as the same authors argue. Studying the case of Africa,

Mozaffar (2006, 239) concludes that conventional accounts of the party-ethnicity

relationship as homogeneous are wrong. Sant Cassia’s (1986) analysis on the nature

of cleavages in Cyprus in the early decades of British occupation reached a similar

conclusion: Cypriot politics were characterised by their intra-ethnic nature (see also

Katsourides 2013). Despite periods of consensus and occasional unity on the nation-

alist movement, the intraethnic divisions did not, in fact, reveal a set of unified actors.

Traditional approaches assume that ethnic parties form automatically wherever

ethnic identities are important sources of collective meaning. Ethnic groups recog-

nise their own unique interests, which implies different and therefore competitive

interests with other ethnic groups. Ethnic parties form to represent the internal

dynamics of ethnic groups as distinct communities and in reaction to other groups

in society. In addition, ethnic elites organise their peers into parties in order to

secure their particular interests. Because ethnic identity is ascriptive, ethnic elites

understand that once they have captured their ethnic constituency they will be able

to count on its support (Horowitz 1985, 293–295). Studies often assume that those

sharing an ethnic identity naturally have common interests that they look to achieve

through their own political parties. This perception ignores the internal dynamics

within each ethnic community.

In this book I look at ethnic party/organisations differently from Horowitz’s(1985, 291–292) widely used definition that sees ethnic parties as serving the

interests of a particular ethnic group, from whom the party overwhelmingly derives

its support. I argue that ethnic groups and their political parties, organisations and

movements generally reveal internal tensions and divisions. These may be caused

by (1) inter-ethnic rivalries, particularly when some groups have a history of

dominating other, smaller groups; (2) ideological differences, typically emerging

between those preferring to forge class alliances with other popular sectors and

those aiming to preserve ethnic identity; and (3) personal conflicts concerning

access to resources and leadership positions. Sometimes these conflicts can be

negotiated within existing organisations; other times, however, differences are

severe enough to require parallel organisations.

In Cyprus, we see that competition for power, i.e., the essence of politics,

unfolded on two levels: intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic. Inter-ethnic refers to the

conflict between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, which although it certainly

existed since the beginning of the twentieth century, was not really activated until

1.3 Cleavage Lines and Greek Intra-Ethnic Politics 15

the 1940s (Nevzat 2014; Demetriou 2007). I will focus on the intra-ethnic level in

relation to the Greek Cypriot community, which was actually even further divided

into two fronts. One source of conflict was related to the communist opposition.

Immediately following the conclusion of the Archiebishopric Question

(1900–1909), the balance of power was clearly in favour of the nationalist camp,

with unequivocal popularity and standing. While directing blatant attacks on the

nationalists, the CPC—founded only in 1926—was nevertheless unable to under-

mine the Greek Cypriot nationalist supremacy (Katsourides 2014a, 2014b). By the

1940s, however, they were completely successful (this is discussed at length in

Chaps. 8 and 9).

The second and most important source of conflict within the Greek Cypriot

community (particularly before the 1940s) was over the strategy for mobilising

anti-colonialism, i.e., the intra-enosis movement tensions. That the nationalists

would oppose British authority is no surprise. The rise of nationalism goes hand

in hand with the claim of a critical space (lebensraum) within which the bourgeoisiewould dictate the rules of the game. In their claims for enosis Greek Cypriot

nationalists became divided over the means to achieving it. Nationalism and

particularly radical nationalism emerged because of the limitations of the colonial

regime and the traditional Greek Cypriot politics of compliance with foreign rulers.

Much of the dynamism of the nationalist movement came from a growing impa-

tience with the existing mode of establishmentarian politics. As a result, numerous

groups, organisations and parties, all with different opinions regarding the tactics

and strategy of the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus, emerged. This in itself would

indicate that ethnic communities are not unitary, homogeneous actors.

In the long course of right-wing political and organisational formation three

distinct forms of organisation can be observed. First, there were the reading clubs

and associations founded by the old ruling class of the landed nobility, which

included big merchants as well as the first members of the bourgeois class

(Chrysanthis 1986). These clubs emerged in the late nineteenth century to gather

together the educated in favour of enosis, and branched away in the first decade of

the twentieth century during the fierce fight for the Archiepiscopal Question (see

Chap. 6). Second were the various pressure groups and organisations created after

the conclusion of the Archiepiscopal Question in 1909 for promoting enosis (seeChap. 7). Finally, there were the first ever island-wide nationalist party established

in 1943 (Nationalist Cypriot Party KEK) and other associated organisations like

trade union and agrarian organisations. The final group represented the most

comprehensive institutional form of the Right in the period prior to independence

(see Chap. 8).

Within the context of anti-colonialism another high salience issue concerned the

role of the powerful Church of Cyprus. In Cyprus, membership in the Greek ethnic

community meant membership in the Greek Orthodox Church. This, together with

the fact that prior to 1940 there were no established parties of the Right, enabled the

Church to preserve and increase its role in political affairs. The Church of Cyprus

became the arena where all political and ideological fermentations of the Greek

Cypriots took place and the only constant point of reference for the nationalist Right

16 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

(Katsiaounis 2000, 21). The Church utilised a vast array of resources including

ecclesiastical committees, monasteries, local churches, vast land ownership and

control over the education system through which it managed to exercise effective

control over both religious and secular issues. Therefore, the study of the Church of

Cyprus is of particular importance for the nationalist right-wing milieu since it

epitomises the political expression of right-wing politics in Cyprus until at least the

Turkish invasion in 1974. There are many who argue this is true even today.

The many newspapers that were founded in this period attest to the multi-form

and complex nationalist politics (see Chap. 4). One explanation is the absence of a

countervailing Leftist force (although the Left emerged in the mid-1920s it only

became a strong political actor in the 1940s). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have

argued that a greater variation among political groupings is found on the right of

the political spectrum, suggesting that the explanation lies in the earlier entrance of

the Right into the political arena. They argued that the decisive contrasts among the

party systems that produced the crucial differences had emerged before the entry of

the working class movements/parties into the political arena leading to greater

variety in the Right. This is certainly the scenario in Cyprus in the first half of the

twentieth century, as well as later. There was very little ‘narrowing of the support

market’ in the Right, and consequently Greek Cypriot politics were marked by

fragmentation on the nationalist side. This was largely the result of the composition

of the new hegemonic bloc that emerged after British occupation.1

1.3.1 A New Hegemonic Bloc and Internal Antitheses

Britain made legal and social changes that transformed Cyprus from a system of

estate, based on a ‘code of honor’ to a contract system based on written agreements

and commercial profit; these changes also led to a change in class relations

(Katsiaounis 1996, 16–17), which meant that the traditional ruling group lost its

social dominance which was economically no longer viable. This new system also

led to the emergence of a new hegemonic historical bloc in the Greek Cypriot

community (Bozkurt and Trimikliniotis 2014, 253), but this new elite was far from

homogeneous. The ruling grouping comprised a cluster of notables from the

emergent bourgeoisie and the upper middle class, on the one side, and the remnants

of the old ruling class of merchants, landowners, money lenders and the clergy, on

the other (Katsourides 2013).

The two groups functioned according to two different points of reference. The

older, more established group related to sources of power rooted in the Ottoman

1A historic bloc is a concept developed by A. Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks. A historical bloc

refers to a historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly,

an alliance of different class forces politically organised around a set of hegemonic ideas that give

strategic directions and coherence to its constituent elements (see Simon 2015, 24).

1.3 Cleavage Lines and Greek Intra-Ethnic Politics 17

system of administration, while the rising bourgeoisie worked within the context of

the British occupation. Most of the latter’s members had studied (tertiary education)

in Greece and were exposed to the country’s rising nationalism (Attalides 1986,

125); this led them to espouse more radical views on the political future of Cyprus.

As they gained more currency in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,

the middle classes and the bourgeoisie began to question the all-embracing control

over political life of the Church of Cyprus and the powerful families of the landed

gentry and merchants.

To fully apprehend this point we must analyse political life within the texture of

the social relations into which the nationalist ideology and organisations were

inserted. This took place in a general context of accelerated capitalist development,

demographic upheaval and higher levels of political mobilisation both within the

elite itself and amongst previously dormant strata at a time when the old pattern of

electoral politics was decomposing. The ruling elite could no longer be certain of its

cohesion or of the traditional support of subordinate classes it enjoyed, for they

were defecting to new agencies of nationalist protest.

This heterogeneity in the ruling class produced a long-lasting division among the

nationalistic forces: the intransigent nationalists (adiallahtoi) and the ‘moderates’(diallahtikoi). The moderates were willing to accept the political/economic free-

doms and reforms instituted by the British until enosis was realised following a

law-abiding policy. The radicals, in contrast, called for pure enosis and for using

more radical means to achieve their goal (for the origins of these two tendencies see

Katalanos [1914] 2003, 155–170). Because the moderates had far greater socio-

economic resources, the radicals had to rely on ideology. However, although they

represent two factions of the bourgeoisie, their ideological differences, tended to

fade away during their competition (Attalides 1986, 129). No political party or

organisation arose to unite these opposing interests/tendencies (ibid, 124–125), and

so the nationalist camp was forced to accommodate both tendencies.

The different stances also depended on material interests: for example, the

merchants/brokers who had close business ties with the British were generally

pro-British and conservative, whilst the professionals (doctors, lawyers, and

teachers) had a much more liberal-nationalist tendency (Katsiaounis 1996,

34–35). Their rivalry reflected a conflict between two value orientations: the

recognition of status through ascription and kin connections versus the claims for

status through achievement and enterprise, typical of transitional societies (Lipset

and Rokkan 1967, 19). The new bourgeois and middle strata hoisted themselves

into politics through professional careers, by the insistent claims of their own

achievements rather than the more refined procedures of establishtarian politics.

It was on this basis and as strong exponents of nationalism that they staked a claim

to recognition in national politics.

This division naturally affected the enosis movement, a topic that will be further

explored in Chap. 4. However, nationalism eventually provided a new framework

for the Right to join forces, as well as a way for them to mobilise popular support

and work within a system of open competition against the communists. Under the

influence of nationalism there were other modernist developments in the public

18 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

arena, where we saw an expanding electorate, new propaganda and communication

techniques, and new levels of organisation (see Chaps. 6, 7 and 8). Localism was

declining, politics were becoming less factional and more ideological, and nation-

alism was growing (Katsiaounis 1996, 189).

The new bourgeois society clashed with the old feudal forces of the Ottoman

regime, which was common for societies in this transitional stage (Hobsbawm

2009, 37). Also typical is that these conflicts are most intense in the early stages,

lessening as the rising elite becomes more established (Rokkan 1970, 108). The

rising Greek Cypriot middle classes first gained access to economic power; they

needed to also gain full or at least effective political control as well. Clashing with

the landowning classes and the Church was unavoidable in this process, although

their relationship was not permanently confrontational. As Peristianis (1993, 251)

notes, ‘the usurious, commercial class has a peculiar relationship with the Church

featuring periods of conflict and periods of cooperation. Generally, though, this

class, being unsure of itself, accepted the Church’s political leadership’.The tensions within the hegemonic bloc were largely the result of the prolifer-

ation and differentiation of the various bourgeois strata, an unavoidable conse-

quence of capitalist development and the consequent complex social relations

(Meynaud 2002). The various and often conflicting interests led to lack of cohesion

and in turn to a multitude of organisations that represented those interests

(Katsiaounis 1996). In a political system dominated by individualistic characteris-

tics, strategies in the various groups’ fight for dominance were extremely person-

alistic. One important reason for the strong internal differentiation was that a new

generation had emerged with no memories of the Ottoman occupation. This new

generation became socially and politically active in the more liberal context of the

British administration.

It was clear that there was a new generation gap as the younger generation grew

up in a different educational, social and political environment than older age

cohorts. Thus, there were both a generation gap and a social gap, and these were

mutually reinforcing. The younger age groups were naturally the most progressive

socially and politically; this natural state was also heavily influenced by Greek

nationalism. We see the generational differences at play in the first schism in Greek

society following the death of Archbishop Sophronios in 1900 (see Chap. 6).

However, it was not only a matter of age and educational changes: the introduction

of capitalism and the gradual improvement of living conditions led a part of the

ruling class to seek improvements and reforms within the confines of colonialism

(Servas 1985, 73), nourishing different, less intransigent political aspirations.

Borrowing Meynaud’s (2002, 368) classification for Greece, we can say that theearly expression of Greek Cypriot nationalist right-wing politics was characterised

and expressed by two main classes of conservatism: traditional and liberal. These

two terms satisfactorily reflect the political conflicts in the early twentieth century

nationalist camp in terms of the social, political and ideological traits of the two

main and opposing tendencies of this period: the moderates and the intransigents.

Each side pushed for greater organisational solidification as a means to counter-

weight the power of the other.

1.3 Cleavage Lines and Greek Intra-Ethnic Politics 19

1.4 Framework of Analysis: From Outsiders to Insidersand Back Again

This section builds on the previous and suggests a more general framework for

analysis of Cypriot nationalist, right-wing party politics, one that extends beyond

the period examined. This will be important to understanding subsequent trans-

formations within the right-wing camp. The proposed framework emphasizes the

organisation and mobilisation of nationalism/anti-colonialism, which led to a

permanent division among the Greek Cypriot right-wing political forces, i.e.,

between the moderates and intransigents/radicals. I argue that the continuous

division and factionalism that marked the Greek Cypriot nationalists far into the

twentieth century are rooted in the period of initial nation-building and anti-colonial

mobilisation. A broader frame of analysis will highlight the importance of internal,

intra-ethnic politics and the role of nationalist ideology in Cyprus in these conflicts

(and which could apply to other colonised countries), which are usually largely

ignored.

This framework takes into account the relatively autonomous role of ideology as

posited in Gramsci’s concept of domination (Eley 1998, 163), which views dom-

ination as a process whereby the existing distribution of economic and political

power in a society (the status quo) is maintained. With regard to this concept, many

scholars accept a functionalist model of ‘social control’ in which the maintenance

of a traditional value system or the spread of nationalism involve the straightfor-

ward one-way transmission of authoritarian values downwards to the general

populace via the management of key institutions (e.g., the Church, schools and

the media). But the moral authority of a ruling class is neither automatically nor

spontaneously generated by its economic power, nor even by its control and

manipulation of such key institutions. On the contrary, that authority must first be

constructed and reconstructed by material processes, and these are open to contest

and hence unpredictable (Eley 1998, 163). To avoid a simple model of ‘domination-

subordination’, therefore, in which the dominance of a set of ideas follows naturally

from another set of social and economic facts, it is crucial to consider Gramsci’snotion of hegemony (Simon 2015).

In its argument for negotiated consent, in which the dominance of a ruling class

is constructed ideologically through a continuous process of resistance and inter-

vention, Gramsci’s theory has some clear advantages. It provides an alternative to

the simple notion that ideologies spread merely by permeating the value system of a

society. It allows us to see a society’s dominant ideas as the object of an ideological

struggle whose precise outcome is never fixed, and to consider that, most impor-

tantly, hegemony has to be won, secured, and constantly defended. It is a struggle to

win over the dominated classes, but also all parts of the ruling class, in which any

resolution involves both limits (compromises) and systematic contradictions. It

posits that the dominance of a ruling class is continually renegotiated in accordance

with the shifting strength (economical, cultural, and political) of the subordinate

classes and of the various component parts of the ruling class itself. The

20 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

construction of hegemony is a historical process, whereby many areas of social and

political activity are steadily constrained.

Moreover, hegemony must not be regarded primarily as the conscious goal of a

ruling class, nor a grand strategy of manipulation and ideological containment.

Rather, it is determined by many and diverse pressures, some consciously directed,

but others emerging more randomly from economic and political conflicts. It is not

part of a grand design, but the result of a series of struggles from which a pattern

gradually coheres, a process only partially subject to direct political control, in

which first one and then another fraction of the ruling class gains ascendancy. The

complexity comes not only from a diversity of strategies for containing popular

opposition, but also from the need to resolve and accommodate conflicts within the

ruling class itself. These two sets of contradictions—those of the struggle for a

negotiated equilibrium between the dominant and subordinate classes, and those of

the internal fractioning of the ruling bloc—determine the varying forms of political

rule in different periods and countries (Eley 1998, 165). During the colonial period

in Cyprus the general process of hegemonic construction was in its early stages and

was marked by numerous antitheses within the ruling class. One example of their

contradictory notions was in the way that they dealt with the communists (i.e.,

coercive/repressive vs. conciliation/consent) in the 1940s. In that period we can see

hegemonic construction developing in two distinct levels/strategies (in relation to

the communists): the more obvious was the repressive policy towards AKEL, while

underlying this primary struggle against the communists was the nationalists’ needto find new ways to ensure the allegiance of a mass constituency.

In this analysis it is evident that ideology is relatively independent—where

ideology is understood to mean ‘an objective systematised representation of social

relations embodied in real material institutions and practices’ (McDonough 1978,

41). It is vital to recognise that membership in the nationalist camp had its own

internal logic: activists conceived it as an autonomous sphere of political engage-

ment, one that could not be reduced to the functional requirements of the so-called

‘ruling strata’ and their ‘strategies of domination’. On the contrary, it denoted the

real idiom in which they believed and in which they acted out their political beliefs,

the real terms by which they understood their membership and their relationship to

the party-political arena. The ideology of the national interest was the primary

instance around which the self-understanding, political activity and internal life of

the nationalist organisations were organised.

It is therefore crucial to consider nationalist ideology on its own terms—not as a

definitive credo but as a philosophy that comprised numerous opposing viewpoints

and antagonisms within the nationalist ruling bloc. Those antagonisms certainly

originated in the social consequences of Cyprus’s capitalist transformation, in the

sense that this enabled their possibility. But the main conflict between the old and

the new Right in the nationalist bloc was more ideological than social, and this

conflict cannot be reduced to social determination. The division between moderate

and radical nationalists did not only correspond to different social groupings, or to

different fractions of capital. In many ways the attack on establishmentarian politics

came from individuals who were themselves part of the establishment: they might

1.4 Framework of Analysis: From Outsiders to Insiders and Back Again 21

indeed be less wealthy and prestigious than their opponents, but they expressed

their opposition primarily at the level of ideology. The conflict revealed alternative

notions of political order and competing modes of political practice, as well as

inequalities of social access even among the radical nationalists themselves.

Because the terrain of the conflict was primarily political, therefore, we should

not be surprised to find some archetypal notables on both sides. The more radical

nationalists were constituted as a distinctive political grouping not only by their

similar social origins, but by a shared political experience and its ideological

formulation.

In order to identify the main sources of factionalism and division amongst the

nationalists, I will focus on how promotion of enosis affected the patterns of Greek

ethnic mobilisation, patterns that reflected the various swings in enosis demands

that were due to internal rivalries among the nationalists and the stance of the

colonialists (Katsourides 2013). In the first half of the twentieth century Greek

Cypriot nationalist politics was the exclusive domain of a small social and religious

elite; this scenario is known to lead to factionalism. The way in which individuals

and/or collectivities coped with colonialism—which in turn determined their access

to power—constituted at once the most salient and the most divisive issue of

political organisation. Whenever there was conflict between Greeks and British,

organisational efforts revived. They were always handled within legal and political

frames, however, due to the Greeks’ realisation of the superiority of the British

military force and the Greek Cypriots’ tendency to conform/accede to the British.

The British administration constituted both the opposing pole for the Greek

Cypriots and the context within which the nationalists operated; the new national

authority would establish itself either in conflict with the British or in cooperation

with them (Michael 2005, 312). The divisions between the nationalists proved very

difficult to reconcile. Their intense rivalry permeated all efforts towards

mobilisation and organisation and affirms Duverger’s (1954, 1) argument that

‘the life of parties in these early stages stem from rivalry amongst small groups’.This led to a political context marked by conflict between insiders and outsiders.

During this period nationalist right-wing party politics operated within a vicious

circle: those outside the power structure professed more radical views both in terms

of collaborating with the British and the management of the Church’s and their

community’s affairs. However, once they managed to break into the power struc-

tures they accepted more moderate approaches—and became objects of criticism

from those left out. ‘Once in the [Legislative] Council, the Greek representatives

could not implement their public promises and they consequently felt threatened by

the extremists among their supporters’.2 This pattern was constantly repeated.

Although any sort of affiliation with the British was verbally abused, in actual

fact it was pursued; the nationalists oscillated between cooperation with the gov-

ernment and opposition. This was one of the paradoxes of Greek Cypriot

2TNA, CO 67/227/39518 (Part 1), ‘Proposals for reform of the constitution’, Confidential (2),Nicholson to Amery, 14 December 1928.

22 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

nationalism. Essentially, the Greek Cypriot Right entertained and reproduced a

constant internal divide: that between of a more pragmatic and liberal tendency on

the one hand and a more radical nationalist tendency on the other. This divide was

manifested in different political organisations, but also even within these organi-

sations. The Greek Cypriot Right navigated along an axis that moved from

pro-western moderation to extreme nationalism, producing a fundamental dualism

in both practice and rhetoric.

As a result, nationalist discourse not only regularly changed but it did so in a

non-linear fashion; this was also reflected in various other areas: mobilisation

efforts, cooperation with the British, intra-ethnic controversies, etc. The discourse

was influenced by broader political and socio-economic developments, which in

turn were determined by the enosis stance of the various groups of the bourgeoisie,the clergy, the working class and the peasants and by whichever group was

strongest at the time. This is not unique to Cyprus: people in all nations hold

varying views about its nature, which take the form of political differences (Grosby

2006, 5).

The various (nationalist) perspectives in Cyprus were naturally related to the

British and Greek positions and actions regarding enosis. The British did not simply

oppose enosis; they also opposed giving Cyprus a responsible government as they

understood that this would only strengthen the enosis movement.3 In their rejection

of Greek Cypriot demands, the British actually encouraged more intransigent

approaches and neutralised more moderate approaches. Greece, on the other

hand, had always been reluctant to pressure its close ally to surrender Cyprus,

and abided by the scheme of traditional Greco-Anglo friendship (Markides 2008,

69). Whenever Cypriots experienced intense disappointment over a Greek or

British decision, they became more sharply and publicly critical and renewed

their efforts to attain enosis (see Chaps. 4 and 6).

Internal affairs were as influential as external events. In the 1920s social

questions began to be put forward, and with urgency. The founding of the CPC in

the mid-1920s was influential in this regard, although it soon became evident that

the traditional nationalist discourse could not offer solutions. Hence, at this time—

throughout the 1920s and especially the 1930s—the nationalists toned down their

rhetoric. One exception to this moderate stance occurred towards the end of the

1920s, when there was a sudden radical outburst caused by the British colonial

government refusal to respond to even modest demands. This led to the uprising of

October 1931, to which the British responded with harsh measures. Cyprus entered

the period of the so-called ‘Palmerocracy’, in which all reactionary voices were

stifled.4 During this period, nationalist discourse was marginalised and the nation-

alists were forced to compromise with the British (see Chap. 8).

3TNA, CO 883/8/3, Cyprus: ‘Correspondence and minutes relating to the constitutional develop-

ments in Cyprus’, X. 39518/29, Dawe to Amery, 23 April, 1929.4The term ‘Palmerocracy’ takes its name from the then Governor of Cyprus, Richard Palmer.

1.4 Framework of Analysis: From Outsiders to Insiders and Back Again 23

In the 1940s the working class began to challenge the elitist nature of public life.

The origins of this challenge were mixed: the rise of communist AKEL, WWII and

the decolonisation movement, the impact of the Greek civil war, among other

things. As a result, in the 1940s AKEL began to overshadow the nationalists in

the social and national arenas. While between 1931 and 1939 AKEL’s (CPC) mode

of action consisted mostly of initiating strikes, it was in the early 1940s that the

most significant steps of outbidding began to unfold when the party began to initiate

large-scale political demonstrations together with intense trade union strikes.

Increased unionisation and the growth of AKEL strengthened the call for right-

wing unity, and the communist’s win in the 1943 local elections gave some added

impetus to nationalist. The early communist movement in the 1920s, but even more

profoundly in the 1940s, added another dimension to political competition on the

island. At this time however, it represented a unifying element among nationalists.

Having lost their lead within the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial movement and in

an effort to regain primacy in political competition, the nationalist Right was

pushed to radicalise their mode of contention. Several critical events led to this

decision: the (unsuccessful) attempt to introduce into Cyprus in the late 1940s the

extreme right-wing Greek organisation ‘X’ (Alecou 2013); the nationalists refusal

to participate in the constitutional assembly convoked by the British in 1947, which

allowed them to regain the lead in the local elections of 1949 (Katsiaounis 2000);

the archbishopric elections of 1947; the enosis referendum in 1950; and above all

the armed EOKA struggle of 1955–1959. The latter was pivotal.

During the period under study, the occasional radicalisation of enosiswas causedas much by intense factionalism and rifts within the Greek nationalist movement as

it was by communist opposition, and the British and Greek positions. While Britain

was still perceived as the primary culprit, it was the internal Greek rivalries that

generated tensions over power and influence. In this context, the intra-enosis arenawas often more important in triggering the radicalisation of enosis. The nationalistRights’ difficulties in making progress with the enosis claim had two important

consequences: it not only made the communist opposition more influential and

popular in the 1940s, but it also highlighted the tension between the moderate and

the intransigent nationalists, very often to the benefit of the intransigents. In this

context radicalisation was a strategic way to stifle discontent in the nationalist camp

as well as among the Greek populace—and, in the process, it also countered the

challenge posed by the communists.

The way in which nationalist party politics were created and evolved, as well as

the overall pattern of political competition in the country throughout this period,

resembled nothing so much as a pendulum perpetually shifting between two axes of

conflicting interactions. On the one axis there was the conflicting interaction

between western (British) colonialism on the one hand—that bore with it elements

of western modernisation—and anti-colonialism on the other, which included

elements of Greek nationalism, traditional values, and communism. The other

axis represented the conflicting interaction between Greek Cypriot nationalism

and communism. The central issue around which this pendulum of interactions

swings has always been the struggle for power and ideological domination within

24 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

the Greek community (see Fig. 1.1). We can locate all political parties and

organisations along these axes.

During the period under study British colonialism inaugurated a process of

accelerated capitalist development, which brought with it a decrease in the custom

of clientelism and paternalism. This was part of a far-reaching process of political

change in which the entire structure of the public domain was re-ordered. Therefore

when we look at the dynamics of change involved in the study of right-wing politics

in Cyprus, we can see how they are quite complicated. These processes of change

and their after-effects are analysed through the particular phenomenon of the

nationalist political organisations and other formations. A good understanding of

the history and politics of these organisations/parties/pressure groups allows us to

clarify the larger political relationships in which they were situated. My analysis of

the right-wing is located in an overall perspective of change in the first half of the

twentieth century, and looks at the conditions of their formation, their internal

social relations and composition, their relationship with the colonial authorities,

their ideology, their political practice and their opposition. The emergence and

eventual consolidation of nationalist right-wing politics only makes sense in this

context of change, namely the demise of one political structure run by the elite and

its gradual replacement by another (mass politics). The analysis is further

contextualised in a broad discussion of Cypriot politics and society.

The book is also concerned with other important issues as well: the character of

Greek Cypriot nationalism, the forms of modern mass politics, the nature of

political mobilisation and the role of ideology, but I am mainly interested in

understanding the Greek Cypriot Right. With this in mind, right-wing party politics

in this period included the following characteristics: anti-communism; hostility to

liberal forms of pluralism; critique of the older right-wing establishment; both

product and cause of a related crisis of established politics.

Colonialism

Communism

Anti-colonialism

Nationalism

Fig. 1.1 The two axes of

conflicting interactions

1.4 Framework of Analysis: From Outsiders to Insiders and Back Again 25

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28 1 Introduction: Nationalism and Political Representation in Colonised Countries

Chapter 2

The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party

Politics

This chapter examines the Cyprus political scene during the transition from Otto-

man occupation to British administration. This transition facilitated and accelerated

a new social order—the rise of the bourgeoisie and the working class, and the

emergence of a new socio-political elite that soon claimed its stake in political life.

These societal changes were favourable for the development of party politics on the

island, while at the same they entailed numerous shortcomings that served to distort

party politics. These related primarily to the usurious practices and clientelistic

relations that were put into place in the political system which have been entrenched

in Cypriot party politics ever since.

The traditional social structure of Europe in the eighteenth century offers a

theoretical model for examining Cypriot society at this transitional time. Cyprus

too, was a traditional society, one based essentially on land ownership and com-

prising social groups rather than economic classes. The wealthy landowners were

the dominant ruling class. Next in the hierarchy was a class of ‘traditional’occupations (clerics, state officials, etc.) and another class of small landowners

and farmers. There was also a rising and developing ‘new’ bourgeoisie that was

involved in new forms of industry and trade, as well as a traditional class of feudal

merchants that included many artisans (goldsmiths, tailors, cartwrights, shoe-

makers, builders, etc.). Below this bourgeois middle class were a large servant

class, and a small working class that was supplemented on a seasonal basis with

workers from the provinces. Villagers or peasants made up the greatest part of the

population (Hamilton 2003, 60–61). The economy was based on agricultural

production and landowning was the decisive factor in determining social position

(Brown 2003, 208). Industry and handicrafts developed primarily in the towns and

were organised around guilds of artisans, which controlled entry to the professions

through a system of apprenticeships. In the context of this society, it was natural for

women and children to work from a young age (Bradley 2003, 261).

This, more or less, accurately depicts Cypriot society both during the period of

transition from the Ottoman to British rule and during the early decades of British

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_2

29

occupation. At this time there was also the beginning of a small-scale proto-

industry functioning on a capitalist basis, i.e., organised as a profitable activity by

entrepreneurs who did not work themselves but provided the initial investment

capital. This new class of entrepreneurs emerged from several social groups: some

of its members were initially merchants or master-craftsmen, others were farmers

who broadened their entrepreneurial activities to include manufacturing, while

some even came from the working classes (Katsiaounis 1996).

2.1 The End of Ottoman Occupation

Until the end of the nineteenth century, Cyprus was a vassal of the despotic

Ottoman Empire. Throughout the period of Ottoman occupation, Cyprus was

governed according to the principles of the millet system,1 under which Ottoman

power was mediated by local representatives and religious communities, both of

which enjoyed various degrees of autonomy within the Empire. The Ottomans

allowed the Greeks considerable latitude in managing their own affairs and encour-

aged the Orthodox Church to assume secular as well as religious leadership within

its community. The position of the Archbishop as Ethnarch2 was to a great extent anOttoman creation (see Chap. 5). In many cases, the Greek Orthodox Church, the

Ottoman authorities and many large landowners from both communities joined

forces against the violent protests that broke out among the most poverty-stricken

rural strata in the two ethno-religious communities of Cyprus (Michael 2016;

Holland 1999, 24; Kyrris 1984).

During the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire underwent major internal

changes that also affected Cyprus (Quataret 2005, 54–74; Michael et al. 2009).

Besides the old class of landowners, new ruling class groups (Kyrris 1984), and new

social forces emerged (Kitromilides 1984, 8). In the last years of the Ottoman

occupation, a change in socio-economic relations led to the creation of a new Greek

elite, the tax collectors. This development was facilitated by the partial weakening

of the Church (Katsiaounis 1996, 13). At this time the Ottomans established a new

system of taxation whereby wealthy Greeks were allowed to buy the rights—for

life—to collect taxes in exchange for giving a fixed percentage to the Ottoman

authorities. This practice resulted in a network of middlemen, merchants and

moneylenders who controlled the productive activity and finances of most of the

economically active population, which was made up of petty landowners and

landless peasants (Katsiaounis 2004, 19).

1An ethno-religious entity that the Ottoman regime used as an administrative organisation.2The literal meaning of the term means the ‘leader of the nation’. The term suggests the holder

both of spiritual and secular authority and was assigned to the Church of Cyprus and particularly to

the Archbishop.

30 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

The peasantry represented the vast majority of the Cypriot population: according

to the 1891 census, 49.7% of the economically active population belonged to this

class (Census 1891, 12). This figure was likely far larger, as entire families

including their children worked in agriculture without being officially included

among the economically active population. Yiallourides (1993, 167) estimates it at

around 80%. Given this population composition, the most pressing issues on the

island involved the farming population. At its core the issue concerned the unbal-

anced relationship between the small poverty-ridden farmers and the prosperous

large landowners including the Church (Katsourides 2014, 22–27). To put it another

way, this was a problem ‘between the producers of wealth and those who accumu-

lated it’ (Hobsbawm 2002, 27). Farming in Cyprus was seldom profitable due to the

very bad weather conditions, especially the extended droughts, and also the heavy

taxation (Demetriou 1999, x). The Cypriot agricultural economy was founded on

relations of exchange, mainly barter, among the villagers. Trade was minimal, and

was primarily limited to the European consulates.

During the late Ottoman period, agricultural landholding was based on small

ownership, making the land in Cyprus ‘a sea of owners’ (Census 1921, 12–13). TheCypriot villager passed down from generation to generation a piece of land that he

cultivated, providing a feeling of economic and individual independence. Although

inequality in land ownership was not as pronounced as in other European countries,

in Cyprus too there were big landed estates (chifliks). A substantial part of the land

belonged to the Ottoman pashas and the large landowners, the Church and the

monasteries, while the people lived in conditions of vassalage. The British consul-

ate in Larnaca estimated that there were 70 large landholdings of 700–7000 hectares

each (report cited in Katsiaounis 1996, 33).

The living and working conditions, for most people in Cyprus were quite

primitive, which also led to widespread poor health. Homes were usually built of

brick, clay and reed, while public buildings were built of stone. The living space,

which included the stable and storerooms, was shared with animals. A Cypriot

village of this era did not differ substantially from a primitive settlement

(Demetriou 1999, 16). The 1881 Census recorded 699 inhabitable settlements, of

which 37 were villages with fewer than 10 people. The average number of inhab-

itants per settlement was 281, an indication of a very low level of urbanisation

(Census of 1881, 6).

2.1.1 Social Relations and the Socio-Political Elite

In a feudal society like Cyprus under Ottoman occupation, social stratification was

reflected in the political system. The Ottoman government held all legislative and

executive responsibilities, while the Greek Cypriot society was marked by internal

stratification based on power and wealth. Politics revolved around the personal

interests and ambitions of the clerics and the prominent landowners and their

families, and were inherently clientelistic (Katsiaounis 1996, 21–23).

2.1 The End of Ottoman Occupation 31

Although economic and social inequality was high, the traditional hierarchical

political system worked because of the social norms of the period, which deemed

that social position and class carried certain inherent obligations. In this perspec-

tive, the position of rich and poor was considered to result from the ‘primordial

order of things’, and supported by personal, family and local obligations; it was

never perceived as a product of impersonal economic and social forces that might

be changed through political action. Moreover, in traditional societies such as the

Cypriot one at the time, the people were quite religious and placed their trust in the

Church enough to adhere to the Church’s position of supporting the status quo(Lipset 1963, 274).

When in 1878 Cyprus was transferred to the British, the political and social elite

were virtually one. This correlation between a political system based on traditional

values and the existence of a stable social hierarchy, in which power (economic,

social and political) was concentrated in the same individuals, applied to most of

Europe (Guttsman 1960, 142). In addition, the small size of Cypriot society with its

many small and scattered villages was extremely conducive to the development of

clientelistic relationships. This, in turn, created conditions of paternalism and

philanthropy, with the greatest part of the population pledging loyalty to the

dominant figure in their rural society/community. Under these conditions, the ties

created between the landowners and their tenants resembled those of a family—and

a family of a patriarchal type.

Paternalism was manifested in a variety of ways. One example was through

charitable donations of the rich to the misfortunate. These played a defining role in

maintaining the social and political status quo: because the recipients could not

reciprocate, they became dependent on the donors (Katsiaounis 1996, 116).3 Thus

inequality was determined in large part by the social structures. The fact that some

lower class individuals, whether through specific skills, determination or luck, were

able to achieve upward social mobility did not change the fact that the majority

could not. Charity became a means of social control, insofar as it created obliga-

tions for the recipients. This had political consequences: in such a context, politics

was something to buy rather than to exercise.

On the eve of the British takeover, Cypriot society presented a number of

structural singularities that stemmed from the economy’s agricultural character

(Tzermias 2001, 71). Nepotism, bribery and general corruption of the officials

were widespread (Sophokleous 1995, 21). Most Cypriots could not read, while

travelling was almost completely unknown. To illustrate the level of under-

development: in the 1911 census, after 33 years of British occupation, the illiteracy

rate was 73.21% (Census 1911, 15). In this underdeveloped environment, in which

the villagers lived in primitive settlements lacking any of the trappings of European

3Hopkin (2006, 409) notes that in situations of absolute poverty, gifts such as food and clothes are

usually sufficient to buy votes although he stresses that philanthropy is not wholly limited to the

distribution of material goods.

32 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

civilisation, there was no cultural progress in terms of artistic events, theatre

performances, sport, etc. (Demetriou 1999, xi).

2.2 The British Colonial Era

In July 1878 Cyprus was purchased by the British, whose governance style was

radically different from the Ottomans. At this time (and throughout the nineteenth

century) Great Britain was the world’s largest colonial empire and leading com-

mercial power (Brown 2003, 214). Therefore, we must look at their purchase of

Cyprus in the context of the developing global capitalist economy: market relations

were growing, a growth motivated by a rising demand for raw materials and

reflective of the colonial powers’ expansionist policy (Held 2003, 156). Britain

saw Cyprus as way to expand its markets as well as a way to increase British

military and commercial interests in the Middle East. Richter (2007, 45) quotes an

item from the Times of London that described Cyprus as ‘a wonderful naval base,

either for the protection of the Suez Canal and ensuring a second route to the Indies

or for the country to acquire the necessary prestige in its relations with the Sublime

Porte’.Cyprus afforded Britain little in the way of economic bounty, only some

agricultural products and metals (Varnava 2009); the island’s utility primarily lay

in serving their military and geopolitical interests in the broader region

(Georghallides 1979, 5–6; Ioannou 2007, 396–397). The British of course tried to

develop Cyprus as a market for its products; they changed laws to operate on

capitalist lines and spurred economic development in some sectors, especially

raw materials. On the domestic front the Greek Cypriots welcomed the British

occupation while the Turkish Cypriots silently accepted it (Hill 1952, 286–287).

The Greek Cypriots hoped the British would grant Cyprus to Greece as they had

earlier turned over the Ionian Islands to Greece.4 The formal annexation of the

island by Britain in 1914 further strengthened Greek Cypriot ambitions of Union

with Greece.

The British initially took a stance of minimal involvement in Cypriot affairs,

while at the same time acting pragmatically on issues related to the island’sgeostrategic significance (Georghallides 1994, 81). This last eventually clashed

with the ideological tendencies and nationalist ambitions that were developing in

the island (Demetriou 1999, 3). The British promoted no reforms that would have

4‘The Issue of the Ionian Islands and the Cypriot Question’, Eleftheria, 30 March 1929, 1. See also

Sophokleous (1995, 261) which quotes an excerpt from the newspaper Neo Kition dated 19 May

1880 about the election of Gladstone in England: ‘But when we learned that the person assuming

control of Great Britain’s important interests is the same man who returned the Ionian Islands to

their Mother. . . our joy and that of our fellow nationals had no limits. . . Greeks! At last the greatcitizen of England, the great politician, the wise man, the philhellene Englishman, has come to

power. Rejoice, celebrate and proclaim in the loudest tones. . .’.

2.2 The British Colonial Era 33

given a decisive role to the local population, which confirms that the British viewed

Cyprus essentially as a military base, with its strategic importance enhanced after

the opening of the Suez Canal. In addition, it is clear from the internal debates

among the British that it was uncertain how long Cyprus would remain under

British occupation (Holland 2013; Hill 1952, 269–292; Storrs 1945, 463–464).

British concerns that if they left Cyprus might fall under the influence of another

country led them into further indecisiveness and unwillingness to accept enosis(Holland 2013; Georghallides 1979, 14).

British circumspection was evident in their lack of investment in Cyprus during

the first decades of the occupation; the British also felt the island’s development

was a Cypriot responsibility (Georghallides 1979, 24; Fenech 2014). Nevertheless,

governance in Cyprus appreciably improved after 1878, owing, in part, to Britain’sliberal attitude towards the activities of its new subjects (Georghallides 1979, 81)—

e.g., allowing Cypriots unimpeded contact with the outside world, especially with

Greece, Britain and the wider European area. Yet we must not forget that any

changes the British enacted were done so to facilitate their goals.

When the British took over the administration of Cyprus, the economy was still

primitive, the transport network was rudimentary and public infrastructure was

non-existent (Demetriou 1999, 12; Katsiaounis 1996, 53). The first British Com-

missioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, like Ronald Storrs later, was determined to

improve conditions on the island, not least to better serve the British administration

of the island (Demetriou 1999, 4; Servas 1985, 72). He initiated changes at both the

political and economic level, changes that affected all areas and understandings of

governance.

To aid their efforts to introduce the structures and practices of a modern political

system to Cyprus, the British required a fuller knowledge of the country. To this end

they immediately conducted a population census. Censuses were used by modern

states not only to gain information but they also served as mechanisms of control-

ling the population.5 At the same time, in 1885 they established the practice of

property registration (Zapheriou 2008, 55). The first British censuses revealed that

Cyprus was a society of major class inequalities, with a population in poor health

with a high infant mortality rate, and marked by a very high level of illiteracy and

extensive emigration. At the same time, ownership was still highly fragmented,6 a

large part of the agricultural population depended on moneylenders, productivity

was low and the position of landless labourers was dire (Tzermias 2001, 81).

5On these practices of the state, see Hobsbawm (1994, 117).6‘During the British occupation, the expansion of agricultural land and its further subdivision

among heirs in the case of the private landed estates contributed to a further reduction in the share

of the large landowners. By the time of the general census of 1909–1929 from a total of 1,390,000

hectares of agricultural land, only 7.5% belonged to these big owners’ (see Katsiaounis 1996, 128).See also Census of Cyprus of 1921, London, 1922, pp. 12–13 where it is specifically mentioned

that Cyprus is to a large extent a country of peasant landowners as one in every 6.7 people owns

land (46,321 people) with about 30% of the country’s territory being in private ownership.

34 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

In its effort to encourage the island’s economic development, Britain set about

improving the transport network as a first priority. This action facilitated the growth

of domestic economic activity and instigated a population shift to the cities, both of

which contributed to the rise of the middle and working classes. The improvement

of the provincial roads allowed every large village to have daily contact with the

urban centre of its region by road.7 Evidence presented by Georghallides (1994, 84)

shows that in 1902 there were 610 miles of main road arteries, while by 1930 this

number had increased to 3000. At the same time, however, in 1930 as many as

101 villages were still inaccessible by road.

Cypriots’ living conditions improved, as did the ordinary citizens’ security by

the British imposition of law and order and their reformation of the justice system

(Georghallides 1997, 83). Newspapers were published and Greek education was

largely controlled by the Greek Cypriots themselves. The British reforms included:

modernisation of the administrative machine, abolition of the farming tax, fighting

against bribery, reforestation, bringing water to the villages, promotion of the

agricultural credit system, the foundation of agricultural cooperatives and the

reduction of illiteracy (Georghallides 1979, 37; Katalanos 2003 [1914], 57–58).

Government activities for the benefit of society were also substantially expanded.

During this period, much basic infrastructure was set up, while Cypriot society

gradually adapted to more advanced models in the fields of education, administra-

tive organisation and communication (Demetriou 1999, 52). Many elements of

paternalism in Cypriot society began to diminish, especially respect for the Church

and for rich politicians and moneylenders (Katsiaounis 1996, 139–158). The begin-

ning of the British occupation was hence accompanied by changes at all levels.

The demographics also reflect changes in economic relations and in the health

and living conditions of the population after the handover to the British. The

population increased from 186,173 in 1881 (Census 1881, 6) to 347,959 in 1931

(Census 1931, 1)—an increase of 186%. During the same period the number of

urban dwellers also increased significantly as a result of internal migration,8 in

accordance with a new urbanisation noted in countries where capitalist economies

had sprung up. The social reorganisation that the country was undergoing during

this period weakened the peoples’ traditional ties to the land, and urbanisation

accelerated by leaps and bounds. As the first British census of 1881 reveals, it was

during this period that population balance of the two major ethnicities became

fixed, with the Greek Cypriots, who made up 74% of the population, constituting

the overwhelming majority (Census 1881, 12).

And yet these reforms must be weighed against the real aims of the British

administration. The British induction of Cyprus into the ‘modern’ system of

7See the report by S. B. Surridge (1930), Administrator of Limassol, on the situation of the

agricultural class in Cyprus.8Evidence from the population censuses show that while in 1881 only 18 towns or villages had a

population of more than 1000 inhabitants, by 1931 the number had risen to 53, with Limassol

experiencing the highest population growth and also being the most densely populated urban

centre. See Census of 1881, 7; Census of 1931, 4.

2.2 The British Colonial Era 35

administration, with attendant social organisation, infrastructure and communica-

tions was primarily undertaken for their own benefit (Ioannou 2007, 387). All

efforts towards modernisation and all improvements were done so as to facilitate

the transition to a regime of colonialist capitalism.While the British were obliged to

use state resources, as financing from London was very limited especially during the

early decades (Storrs 1945, 475), they nevertheless successfully prepared the way

for Cyprus to enter the free market: in other words of British enterprises. The most

important of all reforms were those in the economy and particularly taxation because

they provided the basis and the context for societal (and political) changes.

2.3 Economic Reforms

The British inherited a tax system from the Ottomans that was both complex and

crippling, with virtually no sector of production exempt from taxation.9 The most

onerous tax was the tithe, which was imposed on the village as a whole. This tax

was divided out among the families by the mukhtar10 and the council of elders,

which resulted in arbitrary treatment and favouritism. Another Ottoman tax, the

vergi tax, is especially significant because the electoral regulation was based on it

and it was retained by the British. This was a tax on income regardless of the

taxpayer’s class or religion, and comprised three categories: (a) Vergi kimat: 4‰(thousands) on the sale price of immovable property, (b) Vergi irad: 4% on the

income from renting land and property and (c) Vergi temettu: 3% on the profits of

artisans and wage-earners. Tax collection was the responsibility of the mukhtarwhile the tax amounts were defined by the regional administration.11

The most important economic reform was the elimination of the communal tax

obligation, which was replaced by an individual tax that was related to individual

land ownership and that citizens paid directly to the state. While this change aimed

to both modernise economic activity and to free the peasantry from exploitation by

the local notables, it also carried with it a new set of problems. The land could now

be mortgaged—with the inherent danger that ‘the poorest and those with the least

business sense became exposed to the probable dangers of debts and loss of their

land’ (Katsiaounis 1996, 99–100). Moreover, in 1885 a law was enacted that

provided for the compulsory sale of land, a change from the Ottoman practice

that forbade moneylenders to sell off the villagers’ fields (Noussis 1951, 228).12

Considering that most of the population earned their livelihood from the small plots

9These taxes included the land tax, the poll tax, the tribute tax, the tithe (i.e., 1/10 of production on

all agricultural products), the military tax for non-Muslim subjects, the goat and sheep tax, import

duty and taxes on trade, fishing, pigs, salt, silk, etc. See ‘Taxes, Duties and other sources of

revenue’, Cyprus Blue Book 1892–1893, 4–44 and Cyprus Blue Book 1915–1916, 1–60.10This Turkish word essentially means community leader.11Cyprus Blue Book 1883–1884, 4. See also Cyprus Blue Book 1901–1902, 7.12Noussis was a pseudonym used for his articles by the economist Christos Economides.

36 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

of land they owned, any violation of the terms of the system would—and did—

bring significant social problems.

The Cypriots did not appreciate these new tax reforms, especially because the

resultant increase in public revenue was not reflected in a corresponding increase in

public expenditure (Katsiaounis 1996, 72; Georghallides 1984, 25; Hill 1952,

444, 457); in fact, it appears that the British administration spent a large part of

its revenues for its own benefit (e.g., paying the salaries of high ranked British

officials), and with no investment in productive activities. Confirming this is the

fact that between 1913 and 1929 the state wages bill increased by 200%.13 More-

over, British insistence that taxes be paid in full, often with the concurrent use of

coercive methods and with no consideration of the people’s economic hardship,

provoked intense dissatisfaction among the people.14 The result was the develop-

ment of a popular anti-British sentiment, which even reached the point of nostalgia

for the Ottoman period.15 The tithes remained the chief source of government

revenue until their abolition in 1926.

Nevertheless, despite the increase in public revenue, the economic resources of

the colonial government were particularly limited. The problem was not that tax

revenues were insufficient, but the tribute tax paid to Turkey, which until its

abolition in October 1927, bled the island dry,16 leading the local press to accuse

the British of extortion.17 In their efforts to collect this sum (£92,800), which was

enormous for the time, the British administration diligently collected the already

heavy taxes while limiting expenditure to the minimum, investing only 3% of gross

income in infrastructure and education (Katsiaounis 1994, 312). When the tribute

tax was abolished, the British government replaced it with an annual sum of

£10,000, which the Cypriots were required to pay for the ‘defence of the empire’.Some politicians criticised this as even worse than the tribute tax because it was

13‘The memorandum of the Greek parliamentarians to the Minister for the Colonies’, Eleftheria,11 September 1929, 1–2; 14 September 1929, 4.14‘The victory of 27 September’, Evagoras, 4 October 1901, 1.15A characteristic example is the following excerpt from the Nicosia newspaper Kyprios dated29 December 1900: ‘The joy this caused was momentary. The fleeting hope of bliss was false, the

pompous promises of a happier future were a deceptive dream which fled at the first awakening.

Despotism was succeeded by tyranny, physical injuries by spiritual and moral injustices. Under the

new master, not only was no work for the better carried out as expected, but life became more

burdensome and unbearable, increasing the sufferings of misfortune with additional measures

more oppressive than those which existed before’.16Eleftheria, 12 October 1927, 2. The tribute refers to the annual amount of £92,800 that Cyprus

was obliged to pay to the Ottoman Empire.17‘Blatant Robbery’, Eleftheria, 5 November 1910, 1. Also characteristic is the report in the

newspaper Kypriakos Fylax (Cypriot Sentinel) dated 8 April 1906: ‘Against the tribute tax, the

national policy took aim accurately and spiritedly, correctly believing that it constitutes the

maximum and insuperable obstacle to any kind of administrative, material, spiritual and moral

improvement of the country, draining revenue for the benefit of third parties and resulting in

economic exhaustion and weakness’.

2.3 Economic Reforms 37

accepted by the Greek deputies in the Legislative Council while the tribute tax had

been imposed against their will.18

Even with reform of the tax system, taxation continued to be unfair and to favour

the rich—which was due to the way that taxes were calculated (Katsiaounis 1996,

193–194). The Governor of Cyprus, in a document of 1898 addressed to the British

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accepted that ‘(. . .) the whole difficulty lies in the fact

that the big properties are undervalued and the small households are overvalued’(cited in Georghallides 1979, 35). The British were not willing to introduce

legislation to promote greater tax equality and were prepared to accept many

shortcomings so long as the tribute tax to Turkey was paid.

The entire tax system was based on class inequality as indicated by the fact that

67% of revenue derived from indirect and only 12% from direct taxation, thus

offering tax relief for the rich while leaving the peasantry to suffer the greatest tax

burden (Hill 1952, 461). A study carried out by a special tax commission set up by

the British administration concluded that the tax burden in Cyprus amounted to

17.5% of individual income while the Greek Cypriots’ representatives estimated it

at 25%.19 The issues of direct taxation of individual income, inequality of the tax

system and the taxation of capital were raised by organisations like the Communist

Party of Cyprus (CPC) and by individual politicians from all parts of the political

spectrum,20 but without any result.

Another question raised with some intensity by parts of the Greek Cypriot

political class concerned the very limited taxation of the two mining companies,

Amiantos and Skouriotissa, both owned by foreign interests and which received tax

relief on the import of machinery.21Complaints concerned the privileged treatment

that foreign capitalists received compared to the local capital but also with regard to

the fact that no labour legislation was enacted to protect the workers. Tax relief was

also provided on imports of foreign carob, causing severe problems for the sale of

native carob, which was one of Cyprus’ main agricultural products.22 Moreover,

entire sectors of economic activity were exempt from taxation: bank deposits,

capitalist entrepreneurs and higher civil servants were not taxed.23

18Article by Savvas Loizides, ‘Tribute tax: a tax both old and new’, Eleftheria, 21 September 1927, 1.19‘Report by the taxation sub-committee’, Eleftheria, 10 May 1930, 2; ‘Memorandum from the

Holy Synod and Parliamentarians to the Deputy Minister for the Colonies’, Eleftheria, 22 October1930, 1–2.20Article by Savvas Loizides, ‘Tax system’, Eleftheria, 24 December 1926, 1; Article by

I. Clerides, ‘Income tax’, Eleftheria, 14 September 1927, 1; ‘Taxation’, Laiki, 22 January 1926, 1.21Laiki, 10 July 1925, 1. ‘The protection of capital’, Neos Anthropos, 1 June 1926, 3.22‘Continuing the arbitrary behaviour of the English government’, Neos Ergatis (New Worker),

29 March 1929, 1.23‘Tax system’, Eleftheria, 8 January 1927, 1.

38 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

2.4 A Society in Change

During the period under examination, Cyprus underwent social and economic

changes that led to the restructuring of society and the class system and the rise

of a new hegemonic bloc (see also Chap. 1). In Cyprus there was no period of social

revolt analogous to the French Revolution or the bourgeois revolutions of 1848 with

the concurrent intense social and political turmoil. Instead, there was a gradual

transition and a slower formation of the bourgeoisie. This was neither a simple

process nor one with stable results. As Hobsbawm (2001, 90) noted, the formation

of a social class is not by any means ultimate and permanent; it entails a process of

continual reshaping. Moreover, social classes are not internally homogeneous, they

abound with internal rivalries and conflicting interests—for example between

financial and industrial, commercial and banking capital within the bourgeoisie

(Heywood 2006, 273–274). This fragmentation of interests within the bourgeoi-

sie—in many if not all societies—makes it difficult to describe it according to

common demands, interests and class consciousness (Jones 1991, 14–22), as the

Cyprus case also reveals.

2.4.1 The Cypriot Bourgeoisie to the Fore

The emergence of the Cypriot bourgeoisie was a multifaceted and complex process,

one in which economic, political and social characteristics are intertwined. The new

relations of production that led to the emergence of the bourgeoisie have their roots

in the context of the Ottoman regime and were strengthened with the arrival of the

British (Ioannou 2007, 386). As a result within Cypriot society there were two

distinct classes linked to different economic systems: the dominant feudal struc-

tures of Cypriot society inherited from the Ottomans, and an embryonic capitalist

structure—a not uncommon pattern (Newman 2006, 33). The clash between these

two ‘systems’ led to structural tensions and confrontation, which were reflected in

the island’s political and ideological conflicts.

The new social differentiation and the beginnings of the bourgeois class can be

dated to the mid-eighteenth century (Kitromilides 1984, 8). In the two ports of

Cyprus, Limassol and Larnaca, a bourgeois class, with a European orientation and a

tendency to liberal ideas, began to develop (Hill 1952, 306; Tzermias 2001, 70;

Sophokleous 1997, 7; Ioannou 2007, 384). These first members of a Cypriot

bourgeoisie comprised intellectuals, clients and personnel of the consulates, foreign

merchants, and the consuls themselves who were gradually assimilated into local

society. An important role in the creation of the bourgeoisie was played by the

arrival of Ionian islanders in Cyprus in the mid-nineteenth century. As British

subjects the Ionian islanders benefited from the special conditions of the Capitula-

tions, which enabled them to develop strong commercial activity in Cyprus.

Sharing both language and religion with the Greek Cypriots, they were easily

2.4 A Society in Change 39

assimilated into local society, but they also brought new and influential ideas. The

deputy consul, Filippos Vardas, wrote in 1864 that ‘the Ionian islanders establishedin Cyprus number 205 souls, one third of whom live in Larnaca, among our more

reputable compatriots, peaceful merchants, belonging to the first rank of society’(cited in Michael 2005, 309). Descendants of the Ionian islanders included some of

the largest bourgeois families of Cyprus; in Larnaca, these included the Pierides,

Vontisianos, Karydis, and Peristianis among others (Ioannou 2007, 385).

It was a particular characteristic of Cyprus that until the end of the nineteenth

century, the political and cultural life, and so the bourgeoisie, was more developed

in the coastal towns than in the capital. Nicosia had the largest population but it was

less obviously bourgeois than Larnaca. The fact that the capital lacked foreign

communities and consulates hindered a more cosmopolitan development (Michael

2005, 312). However, throughout the Ottoman period their numbers were small.

The late emergence of the Cypriot bourgeoisie (compared to Europe) was due

primarily to the late development of capitalist relations of production and the failure

of the Ottomans to develop infrastructure on the island. The island’s cultural andeconomic development was also hindered by the absence of towns of any signifi-

cant size, the lack of commercial relations between the towns and the countryside

and the paucity of schools. Sickness and epidemics ravaged a population that was

almost entirely employed in agriculture. The new bourgeoisie could not really

develop until the British began implementing reforms, including building the

transport network and improving communications. As the bourgeoisie penetrated

throughout more of the island its importance grew—not just in its larger member-

ship but its greater economic and political power, with the main sectors of employ-

ment being trade, moneylending and small-scale industry.

It was not until the end of the Ottoman period that a bourgeoisie with the will and

means to promote its identity and interests was formed in Cyprus. This class sprung

from the wealthy group of landowners and merchants of the Ottoman era, and yet

even they had only elementary education; Anagnostopoulou 1999, 202; Katsiaounis

1996, 16–17). The new bourgeoisie was based to a great extent on monetary

relations. The money economy and the institutional regulations that safeguarded

private property encouraged the growth of trade and also moneylending, phenom-

ena referred to earlier. Thus began, small-scale industrialisation and capital accu-

mulation, which spread to the mines and the small enterprises in the towns. Small

industrial units appeared in sectors such as wine and tobacco, which did not

compete with Britain’s own domestic industries.

Another result of British reforms was the decline of the handicraft sector, which

had at one time employed a large number of people. Despite its decline it still

represented a significant part of the country’s economic activity. Household econ-

omy, on the other hand, was almost completely destroyed in Cyprus, without

significant industry developing in its place. At the turn of the century, the Cypriot

economy remained to a considerable extent pre-modern, with no large-scale indus-

trial production and with a very small working class (Katsourides 2014, 29–32).

The economy was structured primarily around craft, with small production units

40 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

and with the majority of the population continuing to work in the primary sector.24

The great majority of industrial–handcraft units were family enterprises that

employed but a few wage earners. Still, some branches of the Cypriot handicraft

industry, especially textiles, were actually quite developed. These changes to the

island’s economic activity meant that a growing sector of the population was no

longer bound to clientelist relations with the clergy, landowners, tax collectors and

merchants (Katsiaounis 1996, 119).

Probably the most important sector of bourgeois economic activity was trade.

The Ottomans, who preferred landownership, had left this important area of eco-

nomic activity to the (Greek) Orthodox inhabitants. Although both foreign and

domestic trade remained under the control of the big merchants of old ruling class,

its increasing volume made room for new entrants, especially from the middle

classes of Nicosia and Limassol. Apart from the existing merchants and artisans,

significant economic advantages also accumulated for many small ‘master crafts-

men’ and wholesalers, both in imported and Cypriot goods. From among the many

small traders, a new class began to develop, made up of strong representatives

characterised by mobility and low running costs (Katsiaounis 1996, 176).

The establishment of commercial offices and trading houses with the

corresponding personnel, as well as the numerous handicraft enterprises and

small industrial units, brought corresponding changes to the social composition of

the population. It was the merchant class that facilitated the development of the

money economy: the merchants bought and then sold in a wider market the

handicraft products. These merchants represented a new bourgeois class of business

middlemen many of whom were from the group of big landowners, but many, too,

were independent of it. Their activity was centred in Limassol, and they gradually

succeeded in accumulating enough capital to stand out (Katsiaounis 1996, 78, 178).

Also in Limassol, the manufacturing sector began to develop, aided by the presence

of British military forces in the town (in the Polemidia area).

Foreign capital (mainly from Britain, mainland Greece and America) invested in

the exploitation of Cyprus’s mineral wealth.25 Richter (2003, 101) writes that these

companies found conditions in Cyprus ideal because the British administration had

given them sovereign rights to the land, giving them thus the freedom to exploit the

labour power.26 To the contrary, until WWI, Cypriot capital was almost exclusively

involved in moneylending. To quite a significant degree, money-lending practices

24‘Need for industry’, Foni tis Kyprou [Voice of Cyprus], 22 September 1901, 1.25In a report written in 1927, the British supervisor of the mines, H. G. Mountain, noted that there

were nine mining concessions in Cyprus that had been given to four companies: the Cyprus Mines

Corporation which exploited the mines at Skouriotissa and Mavrovounio, the Cypriot Asbestos

Company, the Sulphur and Copper Company which was located in the town of Chryssochou and

the Chromium and Calcium Company in Troodos. See, ‘A review of the Cypriot mines’, news-paper Nea Laiki [New Popular], 6 and 13 May 1927, 1, which reprints the report of the British

inspector of mines.26Characteristically, in 1928 when legislation was passed establishing a 6-day working week with

a compulsory day of rest on Sundays, an exception was made for the mining companies.

2.4 A Society in Change 41

and very high taxation served to check the development of local industry (Richter

2003, 100). The politician N. K. Lanitis noted that ‘the majority of Cypriot

financiers, earning their capital through moneylending, lack any creative or pro-

ductive value’.27 Even where this practice developed into a commercial house, this

was really ‘in name only’, as these individuals did not have the necessary commer-

cial education and training. Indicative of this underdevelopment was the fact that it

was not until 1927 that industrial and commercial chambers were established to

support the trade in Cypriot products.28

The fact that the island’s basic enterprises belonged to foreigners caused many

grievances among the Greek Cypriots;29 it also meant that domestic capital did not

begin to develop significantly until after WWI (Servas 1951, 129). Although

Cypriot entrepreneurs had invested in the banking sector as early as 1899 when

the Nicosia Savings Bank (renamed the Bank of Cyprus in 1913) was established

(Noussis 1951, 229),30 the banking industry was not sufficiently developed at this

time due to a lack of knowledge and money.31

The Cypriot economy developed within a framework of serious structural

problems, one of which was usury and moneylending practices. This made the

island very vulnerable to external influences and crises; it also left the peasantry

unprotected and allowed for wealth accumulation at the top of the social pyramid.

The local bourgeoisie—and especially certain groups within it such as the

merchant-money-lending strata—took advantage of the periodic agricultural crises

to accumulate wealth. These crises, in combination with the absence of a reliable

banking system, allowed the merchants and moneylenders to seize the lands of the

peasants who had mortgaged their lands to them at high interest rates in periods of

economic prosperity. Meanwhile in the latter periods, the merchants and money-

lenders exploited the peasants’ more favourable economic situation in order to sell

their products at very high prices.32

Although in the period 1878–1931 Cyprus was still essentially a peasant society,

throughout these years the agricultural population slowly declined. Gradually, and

27Article by N. K. Lanitis, Eleftheria, 16 October 1926, 1. The traditional practice of Cypriot

capitalists of putting their money into moneylending is referred to by Storrs (1945, 487).28Article by Kriton Tornaritis, Freedom, 13 1926, 1; ‘Chamber of Commerce’, Eleftheria,24 January 1927, 2; ‘Regulation of the Chamber of Commerce’, Eleftheria, 16 March 1927,

4. A similar view was held by the prominent lawyer I. Clerides. See, article by I. Clerides, ‘Themining enterprises’. Eleftheria, 25 March 1927, 1.29‘The memorandum of the Greek parliamentarians to the Minister for the Colonies’, Eleftheria,11 September 1929, 1–2; Eleftheria, 14 September 1929, 4.30The Bank was created on the initiative of I. Economides, a Member of Parliament.31Article by N. K. Lanitis, Eleftheria, 16 October 1926, 1.32Many of these merchants created property worth hundreds of thousands of pounds during and after

WWI by exploiting precisely these conditions. See ‘The peasant question in Cyprus’, NeosAnthropos, 18 February 1925, 1. See also article by N. K. Lanitis, in Eleftheria, 16 October 1926, 1.

42 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

towards the end of this period, a significant part of the labour force shifted to other

sectors (e.g., to export industries such as metals, to light industry, and to services

such as working for the government). Census figures reveal that the number of

people employed in trade rose from 405 in 1891 (Census 1891, 13) to 3220 in 1921

(Census 1921, 12), an increase of 795%. According to a memorandum submitted by

a Member of Parliament, Spyros Araouzos, to the Minister for the Colonies in

London in 1923, at that time there were 107 lawyers, 117 doctors, 1178 primary and

secondary school teachers, 5929 merchants and thousands of employees in trading

houses.33 These changes represented a significant population shift away from the

agricultural economy of the countryside to the commercial economy in the towns.

Alongside the bourgeoisie and the working class, a substantial middle class devel-

oped, consisting of various categories of craftsmen (shoemakers, carpenters, tailors,

blacksmiths, etc.). In 1930, according to an official government report, there were

19 middle class (craft) professions in Cyprus with 8872 employers/master crafts-

men, employing 6557 workers/employees. The majority (2736) could be found in

the construction sector (PEO 1991, 11).

2.4.2 A New Elite

When the British arrived in Cyprus the dominant political class was composed

largely of elite landowners, whose power derived from their influence over the

Church and the clergy (Attalides 1986, 127; Yiallourides 1993, 167). This class was

almost exclusively made up of old and powerful Nicosia families (e.g., Achilleas

Liassides and Paschalis Konstantinides), who had already achieved prominence

during the last years of the Ottoman occupation. Together with their counterparts in

Kyrenia and Famagusta and the higher clergy, they dominated the country’s affairs(Katalanos 2003 [1914], 156). In contrast to the Ottoman period when the Church

leaders were most important, during the British period the secular leaders became

more prominent, moving to centre stage (Katsiaounis 1995, 229).

In managing the Church (and the Greek community more generally), the Arch-

bishop became increasingly dependent on close cooperation with the secular

notables. The most important was Paschalis Konstantinides, who built up a major

clientele network in Nicosia, Famagusta and Kyrenia in close collaboration with

Achilleas Liassides, the son of the first representative of the Ottoman Bank in

Nicosia (Katsiaounis 1996, 89–90). These notables played a mediating role

between the colonial administration and the population, as they controlled two

important sources of power: access to the colonial authorities and individual power

in their own right, both of which forced the authorities to work with them.

The changes in economic structures referred to above led to new bourgeois

groups—lawyers, merchants, doctors etc.—that lived and worked alongside the

33The memorandum was published in Eleftheria, 25 August 1923, 2.

2.4 A Society in Change 43

traditional social establishment (clergy and large landowners), and initially enjoyed

a degree of economic power. This new bourgeois class was too large to be

assimilated into the established elite, apart from some few at the top of the social

pyramid, but their numbers gave them a continually growing influence such that

they were able to eventually establish a political role in their own right—, a process

common to all European societies at that time.

Doctors, lawyers, merchants and entrepreneurs constituted the main members of

the newly established bourgeois class of self-employed professionals, which from

quite early on assumed a leading role in shaping public opinion, especially the

lawyers (Ioannou 2007, 400–402). The British occupation and the new social

structure brought important changes to the professional structure of the population,

as reflected in the censuses. One important repercussion was the growing number of

university graduates who started to arrive on the island.34 While the 1891 census

did not record the number of lawyers, the 1931 census recorded 138 (Census 1931,

61); the number of doctors rose from 40 in 1901 (Census 1901, 54) to 175 in 1931

(Census 1931, 61). Apart from lawyers, doctors and government employees, there

was also a significant number of teachers (who increased from 554 in 1901 [Census

1901, 54] to 1938 in 1931) [Census 1931, 61]).

The rise of the bourgeoisie—following British occupation—and their efforts to

establish a political outlet, naturally led to conflict with the dominant elite, who

regarded with contempt the bourgeoisie’s interference in public affairs in Cyprus

(Katsiaounis 1996, 180). Despite their differences in social composition, for quite

some time the two co-existed, although there was always an underlying latent

conflict, which rapidly developed into an open one over the Archbishopric question

(which will be examined in Chap. 6). The conflict between the forces of the old,

feudal social structures and the new bourgeois society is a pattern which according

to Hobsbawm (2002, 42) appears in all societies during this transitional stage.

In Cyprus, the only way that the rising bourgeoisie could dominate and take

complete control of the economic system was to wrest political control from the

landowners and the Church. They adopted a nationalist ideology and called for

enosis with Greece in order to differentiate and free themselves from the tradition-

alist establishment, and also in order to contest the British colonial administration

(see Chap. 4). However, for the period we are considering here, the bourgeoisie and

the traditional political establishment shared political and parliamentary power.

Many of the doctors and lawyers at this time were also important political

personalities and some even figured among the literati. A typical example was

Filios Zannetos (of Greek descent), who was a doctor, politician, tobacco factory-

owner and publisher-historian. The members of this bourgeoisie, who were marked

by economic strength, university education, political and social prominence, not

only began to take over the reins of the country’s political and social life, but were

also the chief representatives of nationalist ideology in Cyprus. How this change in

34‘The Cypriot Scientists’, Eleftheria, 27 April 1906, 1.

44 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

the composition of the social elite was expressed at the political level will be

examined more analytically in Chap. 4.

Although initially the bourgeoisie were quite anti-British, there were many in

this class who favoured the British colonial administration for the many benefits it

received—here they were mimicking the established elite in compromising with the

dominant power. This was reinforced by the preference of mainland Greek gov-

ernments in favour of pacifying the confrontation with the colonial establishment

(see Chap. 4). This is also telling of the character of this bourgeoisie, which was

prepared to compromise even with those whom it sought to overthrow, if this served

its interests. This class saw no contradiction in promoting a nationalist policy while

also seeking appointment to a high-ranking post in the colonial government

(Katsiaounis 2000, 31). As often occurs with subjugated peoples, such appoint-

ments were made from within the higher social class, on the understanding that they

would support government policies.

The secular Greek establishment sought contacts with the British, not only for

the obvious economic advantages they might gain, but for a chance to secure one of

the new posts in the country’s administration and politics. Here we see the tradi-

tional Greek socio-political elite once again gradually supplemented by another

privileged group: those employed in the police and public administration. The

contacts and relationships between the locals and the British, including their social

relations and clientelist networks, had, as we shall see in the following chapters,

ideological and political dimensions. In particular, this gave Cypriots an insider’sview of the colonial authority, which taught them how to best approach the British.

To better illustrate the situation, a look at the 1891 census shows 500 government

employees and 623 policemen (Census 1891, 50), while by 1931 the numbers had

reached 2204 and 849 respectively (Census 1931, 60). The British occupation

meant that Muslim political predominance ended, although they continued to

enjoy a higher ratio of state sector employment. Katsiaounis (1996, 81) notes that

after 2 years of British administration, the Greek Cypriots held only 34% of

363 public sector posts. Particularly striking was the degree of inequality in the

police force: of the total of 763 men, 420 were Turkish Cypriots (55%). 34 years

into the British occupation, the newspaper Eleftheria noted that 300 Turkish

Cypriots and 411 Greek Cypriots held state jobs, while (up to then) 146 Turkish

Cypriots and 225 Greek Cypriots had been appointed by the various British High

Commissioners.35 This number was an insult to the population ratios of the respec-

tive communities.

This ratio had not changed even at the close of the 1920s. The government did

not hide data concerning employment and salaries in the public service, as Table 2.1

affirms.36 This table reveals the expediency of the British administration in

supporting the smaller communities on the island in order to counterbalance the

predominance of the Greeks. Thus, all ethnic groups, apart from the Greek

35‘Statistics concerning public sector employees in Cyprus’, Eleftheria, 25 May 1912, 1.36‘The ratio of government employees’, Eleftheria, 12 December 1928, 2.

2.4 A Society in Change 45

Cypriots, enjoyed a higher ratio of employment in the public sector than their share

in the total population.

Teachers were prominent among this new elite. Control over the education

system became a crucial issue several years later, and not without reason

(Heraclidou 2014): education is definitive in the production and reproduction of

an elite system. The established political elite can maintain control over the

channels of social mobilisation and reproduction to the extent that it maintains

control over the educational system (Guttsman 1960, 147). In Cyprus, the educa-

tional system (and especially the teachers) was a point of conflict between the

Church and the bourgeoisie, as well as between the Church and the British.

Education was an important vehicle of social mobility and the British very pur-

posefully invested in education to promote the formation of a new group of

individuals who would collaborate with them.

The British tried to create a faithful bureaucratic intelligentsia, giving scholarships for

study at British universities to the most capable children of the middle classes. In this way,

the British created alongside the rich merchant families a special colonial mechanism of

Cypriots who were well paid and devoted to the Crown. (Anagnostopoulou 1999, 207)37

The goal of both the Greeks and the British was to control the mechanism

through which the political elite emerged. The way in which teachers were involved

in political contests is analysed in Chap. 4.

Cypriot society was changing. The 1881 census recorded 25,799 Cypriots under

5 years of age and 45,952 aged 5–15. In 1931 the corresponding figures were 39,732

and 76,874 (Census 1881, 10; Census 1931, 10). Lacking experience of the Otto-

man occupation the younger generation was naturally more receptive to new ideas

and forms of social organisation and political behaviour. The changes in social

mobility and social stratification also left their mark on Cypriot politics. There was

a gradual but stable change in the leadership group, with the old oligarchy of

landowners evolving and becoming interlinked in multiple ways with the develop-

ing bourgeoisie. The group of self-employed professionals (lawyers, doctors,

Table 2.1. Table of government employees 1927

Ethnic

group

Number

of

employees

Proportion

of the total

population

Share of the

community in

the total

population of the

island

Salaries

(£)

Proportion

of total

salaries

Average

by ethnic

group

(σε £)Greeks 1101 56% 80% 123,820 48.1% 112

Turks 699 36% 17% 70,680 27.5% 101

British 76 4% 3% 48,320 19% 635

Catholics 56 3% 10,792 4.2% 192

Armenians 21 1% 3180 1.2% 151

Total 1953 256,792

37See also ‘The government scholarships’, Eleftheria, 6 August 1927, 1.

46 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

teachers, journalists, etc.) grew, while alongside the merchants and middlemen who

were dependent on British capital there began to develop a new group: the public

sector employees.

The bourgeoisie was highly varied in terms of obligations and interests, with

some derived from the old social structure and others from the new. Some groups

and individuals aligned themselves with the British administration and some

remained outside it. And yet, despite the radical changes in class structure, the

political/social hierarchy (comprising the clergy, local notables, large landowners

and large merchants) remained basically the same for the period under examination.

An important contributor to this was the fact that Cyprus remained a basically

agricultural society, which supported the continuity of all these networks and was

not conducive to radical social and political change. However, towards the end of

WWI, we can point to a system of social classes with distinctive characteristics and

properties. This became apparent from the fact that the need to systematically

organise and promote competing demands was finally recognised, as will be

examined later in the book.

2.5 Social Relations and Sources of Clientele Relations

The changes outlined above gradually began to shape a different social and political

environment, although many elements of the existing social arrangements remained

in place. The class structure created through the inequality in land ownership, and

mechanisms such as the tax system were also reflected in social relations. This was

particularly true in the countryside where the majority of the population lived.

Social interaction in the small village communities continued to be regulated by the

local mukhtar, who was elected on an annual basis and was supported by a council

of elders (azas). In most cases, the mukhtar was simultaneously the tax collector,

local shopkeeper and town policeman (Katalanos 2003 [1914], 125). The top of the

social hierarchy also comprised the teacher and the priest, while the peasants/

workers were uninvolved in public affairs, largely due to the nature of their work.

Those who worked long hours could not be equally politically active with individ-

uals who enjoyed greater security and a more flexible work timetable, and who,

although a minority, enjoyed economic and cultural supremacy. In the towns, the

dominant groups were various categories of professionals, such as merchants and

lawyers.

Social relations in Cypriot society at this time were dependent on a network of

interdependence and clientele relations. This aspect of social life deserves special

mention because it was on this premise that nationalist politics largely developed.

The clientele system was essentially built on the economic misery of the majority of

Cypriots and the absence of any credible banking system or other source of state

loans and relief. As a result of this situation and of the legacy of Ottoman

maladministration, further clientelist centres developed. Interlinked in this network

were landowners, merchants, middlemen and moneylenders (Faustmann 1998,

2.5 Social Relations and Sources of Clientele Relations 47

44–46) with lawyers joining later. As the largest landowner the Church also

participated in this network (see Chap. 5), renting its lands to rich citizens who

sublet them to smallholders. Clientele networks were created both at the local

(villages) and the provincial levels. Producers lost the right to sell their products

freely; instead their products were traded by middlemen or moneylenders. These

networks encouraged the economic dependence of the poor strata and facilitated

political control over their electoral behaviour.

Political clientelism and wealth accumulation were essentially based on usurious

practices. Usury was a product of the class structure of Cypriot society, whose

population was overwhelmingly peasants and smallholders.38 The peasants, being

small-scale producers, needed capital to fund their basic necessities and activities:

to buy animals and tools, to buy food for their family and their livestock, to build

their houses, to make the necessary improvements to their lands, and, often, to

repay old debts. The lack of a reliable and extensive banking system forced the

peasants to resort to various moneylenders, who provided loans on very harsh

terms. The only existing bank at the time, the Ottoman Bank, loaned money strictly

to the merchants, considering the farmers un-creditworthy.

On several occasions these loans were sub-loaned to the farmers at higher

interest rates. This was allowed by law since an 1882 ruling provided for a

maximum interest rate of 9% unless there was a different and explicitly stated

agreement between the contracted parties; the exception, however, proved to be the

rule (Katalanos 2003 [1914], 58; Noussis 1951, 227–228). The interest rate, on

some occasions, reached a massive 30%, as debts passed from father to son.39

Failing to pay the installments on the due date resulted in loss of the peasant/

debtor’s land. Consequently, the moneylender profited from this situation both by

extracting money from the farmers and/or from taking possession of his land

(N. Lanitis cited in Richter 2007, 261–262). The majority of the moneylenders

gradually became influential merchants and politicians, and who continued to

exploit the peasantry.40

The 1920s was a period of intense economic and political (structural) crisis,

brought on by the expropriation of peasant ownership. Similar earlier crises in the

world economy had not affected Cyprus for several reasons: the island was not so

dependent on the world economy and trade; the Ottoman legal structures punished

debtors but did not allow the transfer/confiscation of property (Panayiotou 2006,

84). Although the crisis was essentially agricultural, the importance of the agricul-

tural sector in the overall economic activity in Cyprus swept along the entire

economy. According to a British memorandum, in 1929 a staggering 80% of

peasants were indebted to moneylenders.41 It was also a period that saw the

38Tornaritis Kriton, in Eleftheria, 13 November 1926, 1.39‘Usury’, Foni tis Kiprou, 23 November 1901, 1.40‘Usury’, Foni tis Kiprou, 23 November 1901, 1; N. Kl. Lanitis, in Eleftheria, 16 October 1926, 1.41TNA, CO 67/22714, No. 143227, Governor Stevenson to the Minister of Colonies Amery,

30 January 1929.

48 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

beginnings of wealth concentration in the hands of the emerging Cypriot bourgeoi-

sie. In 1924 the crisis reached a climax. The number of forced sales totaled 3304

(as opposed to 2470 in 1923) including 56,862 donums of land, compared to 36,752

in 1923, and 665 houses and buildings with a registered value of £170,323 that were

sold for £158,030 (as opposed to £106,688 in 1923) (Georghallides 1979, 429). This

situation continued for two more years, with 6024 forced sales amounting to a total

registered value of £274,793, sold for £249,747. Until this time, large land owner-

ship was the exception in Cyprus. Owing to the economic crisis, however, the

structure of land ownership was substantially distorted. Many small owners lost

their land, which fell into the hands of moneylenders and usurers.

Throughout the 1920s, the rural economic situation was a topic of continuous

public discussion. A 1927 British-ordered survey on the conditions of rural eco-

nomic and social life found that the peasants lived in miserable conditions. Their

income fluctuated according to weather conditions and the exploitation of the

moneylenders. Without the working contribution of the women and on many

occasions of their children, the peasant family was reduced to a state of poverty

(Surridge 1930). Rural debts were reviewed in a special part of the survey: they

were extremely widespread, affecting 82% of all famers. The total amount of rural

debts was estimated at £1,800,000.

Surridge’s report proved a self-evident reality: the vast majority of Cyprus’srural population, throughout the period of British occupation, was having a very

hard time making a living. The inadequate British investment in the island’sinfrastructure had further aggravated the problem. Still, despite their reluctance to

finance large projects of infrastructure, the British were keen to improve the

peasantry’s living and working conditions. As they began to implement projects

to this end, however, we must consider their intentions in light of their interests as a

colonial power. In this respect, two points must be taken into account. The first is

that their primary concern was to increase the island’s production capacities, whichwould generate wealth that they also would profit from. Their secondary target was

to weaken the peasantry’s political and economic dependency on the nationalist

elites and the clergy, who controlled the patron-client relationships and conse-

quently political representation (see next chapter). These efforts did not produce

immediate results, but little by little the dominance of the moneylenders and the

brokers in the agricultural market began to be undermined (Faustmann 1998, 55;

Katsiaounis 1996, 139–158).

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1878–1945. Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia. (in Greek)

Katsiaounis R (2004) Social, national and political contradictions in Cyprus during the period of

British rule 1878–1950. Lectures of the Popular University, No. 16. Municipality of Nicosia

Publications, pp 19–43. (in Greek)

Katsourides Y (2014) The history of the communist party in Cyprus. I.B. Tauris, London

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Michael M (2005) The Archbishopric question (1900–1910), its ideological context and the rise of

the Church of Cyprus as a national authority within the British context of administration.

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(6):127–129. (in Greek)

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Cyprus Blue Book 1892–93

Cyprus Blue Book 1916–17

52 2 The New Social Terrain of (Nationalist) Party Politics

Chapter 3

Institutional Engineering and Political

Change

This chapter examines the political innobvations introduced by the British, espe-

cially electoral processes and representative institutions. Also discussed are the

level of citizen engagement in the political process (i.e., participation in elections),

and the nature of electoral politics/political representation in this period. The new

political institutions, a nationalist ideology and the changing social landscape all

provided the context for the development of electoral and party politics on the

island.

A number of social and institutional shortcomings distorted party politics and

the nature of political representation in Cyprus, including: (a) the discrepancy in

social background of the deputies and the majority of the population; (b) the voting

criteria that precluded mass participation; (c) the constitutional provisions dividing

the two ethnic communities of Cyprus (Greeks and Turks). While some of these

were inherited from the Ottoman era (e.g., clientelism), others were the result of

British choices and decisions (e.g., ethnic division). These all led to a political

system characterised by the incomplete political integration of the masses and

based on oligarchic parliamentarism.

Political institutions are crucial to the establishment of democratic, representa-

tive politics (Duverger 1954, xxiv; LaPalombara andWeiner 1966, 9; Scarrow 2002

6, 9). Today’s liberal model of democracy calls for governments/legislatures to be

directly or indirectly elected by its citizens, all with equal voting rights. This model

also assumes sufficient civil liberties to guarantee the right to choose, as well as

legal equality (McPherson 1986, 19).1 Nevertheless, this model will always be

qualified by the social and cultural norms of the period and of the country. With

these conditions in mind, it is anticipated that in colonial Cyprus the representative

institutions and the franchise will be limited and/or restricted, similar to other

1For a more thorough discussion on the various models and theories of representation, see

Heywood (2006, 314–320).

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_3

53

countries at the same level of development (Rokkan 1968, 188). In Cyprus, the

British influence is also key since it was their colonial policy that largely deter-

mined the political arrangements on the island. Their policies also reveal the extent

to which they intended democratic principles to be applied.

Conventional wisdom suggests that institutional engineering—i.e., designing

new institutions and other organisms that promote democracy—is sufficient to

create the conditions required for democratic politics (Waldner 2009). In the vast

corpus of democratisation studies, institutional engineering—as part of a wider

project of political reform—and democracy tend to develop together (Huntington

1988). Therefore, despite the many known difficulties, experience and theory

suggest that institutional engineering can engender and sustain democracy

(Waldner 2009). When constitutions are carefully worded, they will produce

conditions in which conflicts are resolved peacefully and democracy is pro-

moted—even in seemingly inhospitable environments. In Cyprus, institutional

engineering was part of a process of change initiated by the British after their

arrival on the island in 1878.

By 1883 a new political structure had been set up in Cyprus: a proposed

constitution for the colonial state was approved by an Order in Council on

30 November 1882.2 The new constitution largely overruled the Ottoman institu-

tions and style of governing, reflecting the spirit of the new masters. It also marked

the beginning of modern Cypriot politics, although it did not immediately alter all

polity provisions (Loizos 1986, 104; Katalanos 2003 [1914], 57). The High Com-

missioner, renamed Governor in 1925 when Cyprus became an official colony of

the British Crown, was head of government. He was appointed by the Minister of

the Colonies in Britain, to whom he was solely accountable. The British also

established an Executive Council, holding only advisory powers and composed

exclusively of British officials until 1897, when membership was widened to

include three Cypriots (two Christians and one Muslim) who were appointed by

the High Commissioner. The most important change to the political structure,

however, was the introduction of representative institutions, at the local level as

well as nationally, with the Legislative Council (LC); both entailed elections and

the voting reform. The LC was established in 1882, a vestige Parliament that the

British granted to the Cypriots.

3.1 The Legislative Council: A Quasi-Parliament

The Ministry of Colonies and the British officials in Cyprus disagreed over the type

of regime as well as the degree to which the islanders might participate.3 The

British were most concerned with establishing a government that would facilitate

2The Cyprus Constitution was adopted on 30 November 1882 and the law governing the elections

of the members of the Legislative Council on 14 November 1883.3TNA, CO 883/2/4, ‘Cyprus: Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Cyprus’ (173 pages).

54 3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change

implementation of Britain’s official policy. To achieve this end, two issues were

especially important. First, it was deemed crucial that Cypriots become involved in

the political process: this would minimise their opposition. This was common

British practice since ‘(. . .) local notables (. . .) were awarded more power in

managing their internal affairs, provided they would adopt the social and economic

projects outsourced to them; that is, taxing their countrymen’ (Darwin, cited in

Ioannou 2007, 400). Second, the British realised it was important to use to their

advantage the island’s two major ethno-religious groups (Greeks/Christians and

Turks/Muslims). The British followed their traditional colonial practice: structuring

all institutions along ethno-religious lines (see below), and making ethnic groups

the building blocks of politics. Establishing the Legislative Council along these

lines led to permanent tension and confrontation between the two communities. It

also ultimately determined the island’s political development. The conflict became

institutionalised and ‘the system relied for its efficiency upon keeping alive the

racial hostilities between the two sections of the population’,4 i.e., the ‘divide andrule system’.

The Legislative Council was made up of both elected and appointed members:12

elected members (nine Greeks and three Turks) and six official members (British)

appointed by the British government. Seats were distributed to counterbalance the

votes of the British and Turkish members, against the Greek legislators. Further-

more, the British chairman of the Council (the High Commissioner, after 1925 the

Governor) was allowed to vote in case of a tie. Incumbency was set at five years

with the exception of the first term that was limited to three years. The electoral

provisions were based on separate electoral lists for the two communities. The

composition of the Council remained in effect until 1925 when Cyprus was

declared a colony of the Crown, at which point minor changes were introduced,

most reflecting the need to adjust to population changes, particularly the growing

Greek community. And yet, although Britain allotted the Greeks three more seats in

the Council, any advantage was cancelled out by increasing the official (British)

seats from six to nine. The number of Turkish members remained at three

(Georghallides 1994, 82; Richter 2007, 308), while the Greek constituencies were

increased from 3 to 12, making elections single-seated contestations.

While this may sound progressive in terms of local representation/input, the LC

decision could be overrided whenever the High Commissioner/Governor thought it

might interfere with colonial policies. Thus, the LC was essentially powerless.

Moreover, the Council dealt with very few important issues. For example, any

legislation related to the island’s budget or any other expenses was solely the

decision of the Governor—in line with British parliamentary practice.5 This

4TNA, CO883/8/3, ‘Cyprus: Correspondence and minutes relating to the constitutional develop-

ments in Cyprus’, X 39518/29, No. 31, A. J. Dawe, Memorandum on Cyprus Constitutional

Question, 23 April 1929.5Cyprus Blue Book 1886–1887, 87–98.

3.1 The Legislative Council: A Quasi-Parliament 55

relegated all Cypriot participation to matters of secondary importance. The Coun-

cil’s core activity was floor debate, where all major issues were addressed; and yet

even this was relatively powerless as there was no committee system to enforce any

work. Nevertheless the new institutional setting was important for how it affected

the authority of the Church of Cyprus, the most powerful local institution of the

Greeks:

The establishment of the Legislative Council signalled the abolition of the political role of

the Church and undermined its authority over the Christians, taking into account that the

political power rested henceforth with the elected members of the body. The new scenery

made it possible for secular mechanisms of organisation and mobilisation of the masses to

emerge. This in turn, points to the rising of popular political forces legitimised by the body

politic. (Anagnostopoulou 1999, 200)

This above-quoted assessment is not entirely correct, however, as the Church of

Cyprus continued to maintain its hegemonic political role despite the greater

presence of laymen in political and public life (see Chaps. 5 and 6). Moreover,

the new system introduced by the British was actually contradictory: while their

institutional changes helped to modernise Cyprus society and enabled radical

transformation (i.e., elections), they also retained elements of continuity with the

Ottoman past: political life and electoral processes were structured solely along

religious lines: Christians versus Muslims. It was common practice, in fact, for

colonial powers to implant political divisions along ethnic and religious lines by

giving ‘institutional incentives for constructing and politicising ethnic groups and

identities’ (Mozaffar 2006, 240). The confessional nature of the electoral system

encouraged the Greeks and the Turks to maintain their traditional ethnic and

religious identities and to adopt a communal perspective when considering political

opportunities offered by the British. The demarcation of the conflict on purely

ethno-religious grounds therefore encouraged and perpetuated the Church’s dom-

inance. It also gave the British permanent influence over the island’s politics andmediating capabilities in relation to the two communities.

While political systems generally stipulate a clear separation between offices, in

Cyprus one could belong to both the LC and the Mayorial council, while one also

could sit on both the municipal and the village council. Therefore, at times the two

offices were held simultaneously by a few individuals. In 1930 the colonial admin-

istration proposed separating the offices, a suggestion that was partially accepted:6

the offices of deputy and Mayor were declared incompatible, but a member of the

parliament (MP) could also hold the post of city councillor. Underlying the com-

plete acceptance of this stipulation was the ruling elite, who wished to hold onto

their offices for the power they enjoyed for their own benefit. This is amply

illustrated by the very limited number of people who served these offices (see

below).

6‘The bill on municipal authorities’, Eleftheria, 12 April 1930, 2; ‘The bill on municipal author-

ities’, Eleftheria, 24 May 1930, 2.

56 3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change

In October 1931 the Governor of Cyprus overruled a majoritarian decision of the

Council; the result was complete chaos, with spontaneous riots culminating in the

burning of the Governorate. The British reacted harshly, and put in place an

oppressive and authoritarian form of government, in which the LC was abolished

and all civil rights were terminated. Moreover, the constitution was suspended,

gatherings of more than five persons (with the exception of church-goers) were

forbidden and the press was censored (Georghallides 1985, 703). These were

partially reinstated in the 1940s when the circumstances of WWII demanded a

different (British) policy (see Chap. 8). To understand the 1931 Greek rebellion

against British rule, we must reconsider the British political reforms, as well as

internal divisions among the Greek ruling elite (for the latter see Chap. 7). The

British instigated changes that recognised the need for a more liberal political

setting but they also made changes that would ensure the smooth administration

of Cyprus—for example, the Governor’s right to overturn a Council vote and to

dissolve the Parliament at any time. Most important, however, was the British

strategy of siding with the Turkish minority against the Greeks. Haynes Smith,

High Commissioner of Cyprus at the time, clearly demonstrates this line of thought:

‘The Constitution of the Legislative Council was based on the idea that there wouldbe a proper balance of parties in the Island, because when the Turkish members

agreed with the Government the two would form a majority’.7

3.2 Voting Reform

Voting rights were extended throughout Europe during the first decades of the

twentieth century, although they varied by country, and depended on the country’smajor power stakeholders (Rokkan 1970, 27). The democratisation of suffrage was,

and is, inherently related to the act of political participation. In Cyprus, the

franchise was first introduced in the late Ottoman period for the election of the

mukhtars; the British subsequently modified the electoral laws on five occasions

during the period under examination. First, in 1882, they established the LC and

enacted laws governing the election of its members. Second, in 1906, they ruled for

the secret ballot. When Cyprus was officially declared a Crown colony in 1925 the

laws on voting were again amended to increase the number of constituencies. In

1931, after the October riots, they abolished all electoral and civil rights, until 1943

when they reinstated voting rights for local elections. Throughout this period voting

was voluntary, despite the Greek press plea for compulsory voting. The Greek press

felt that voluntary voting would enhance popular sovereignty and discourage

corruption;8 the franchise was always restricted to male voters.

7TNA, CO 883/6/5, ‘Cyprus: Correspondence relating to affairs in Cyprus’ (574 pages), ‘HaynesSmith to Mr. Chamberlain’, December 1901.8‘Obligatory voting’, Eleftheria, 2 December 1925, 1.

3.2 Voting Reform 57

The Colonial Office and the British officials assigned to Cyprus were responsible

for deciding voting policy and constituency composition. Initially, they seemed to

favour cross-voting between Greek and Turkish electors for a prescribed number of

seats in the LC was the rule, but High Commissioner Biddulph, immediately

rejected this on the grounds that it would underrepresent the Moslem minority

(Georghallides 1979, 45). Thus under the 1882 Constitution the franchise was

conferred on all male British or Ottoman citizens above the age of 21 who held a

permanent residence on the island at least five years prior to the election date,

provided they had paid any of the three vergi taxes (see Chap. 2) of the previous

year or the rent on a house or a shop.

For the period under consideration, women were never given voting rights which

compromised the legitimisation of the electoral process and the democratisation of

the political system. Furthermore the issue was raised only one time, within the

parliamentary context; this was in May 1930 during discussion over legislation on

municipalities and was suggested by K. Rossides, a member of the Legislative

Council. His suggestion was voted down with the clergy members of the Council

most vehemently against the proposal.9

Another key feature of the electoral process in Cyprus was the property quali-

fication attached to the franchise, a common norm throughout the West and beyond,

especially in the early phases of mass mobilisation. The landed nobility were

typically considered the only eligible claimants of social and political privileges

(Hobsbawm 2002, 31), and political citizenship was inconceivable without land

ownership. The British took a conservative approach, in line with their belief that

the common populace lacked the maturity to take part in the political process

(Katsiaounis 1996, 85). In effect, this meant that those eligible to vote were limited

to economically successful individuals as measured by property holdings or busi-

ness dexterity. In a society marked by heavy debt, this was equivalent to political

rights being denied to the majority of the population. Because failure to pay the

vergi taxes every year was not penalised (unlike the payment of the tithe), vergidebtors had no motivation to pay their taxes and thus acquire the right to vote. This

led to the de facto exclusion of the lower strata and large parts of the rest of the

population from voting.

There were objections to the British voting regulations from the rising Greek

Cypriot bourgeoisie. For some, the problem lay with the early collection of the

vergi taxes on the 13th of January because this would preclude an important section

of the middle classes from the electoral process.10 Others addressed the issue in a

wider perspective, believing that the electorate should include all male citizens

regardless of their financial and property position.11 This position was related to the

pressing demand of the Greek Cypriots for enosis: an enlarged electorate could givelegitimacy to the unionist claim.

9Eleftheria, 5 March 1930, p. 2. Eleftheria, 21 May 1930, 2.10Stasinos, 2 April 1883, 1.11‘Suffrage extension’, Eleftheria, 9 December 1912, 1.

58 3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change

Yet the bourgeoisie did not push for all-inclusive voting rights: women were

never considered, nor were the peasants and labourers. One voice that took excep-

tion to this was Laiki, a newspaper published by a populist politician in the

mid-1920s, which demanded universal suffrage for all men regardless of their

economic or property status.12 There was also the Communist Party of Cyprus

(CPC), which represented the sole official political force demanding universal

suffrage for all citizens above the age of 18, with no restrictions.13

The electoral law stipulated open balloting. Voting took place over a three

(working) day period and the voter was entitled to vote for as many candidates as

the number of seats allotted in his district (three for each for the Greeks and one for

the Turks).14 Each polling station was manned by the presiding officer, a clerk, an

interpreter, a number ofmukhtars for the purpose of identifying the voter, and eitherthe candidates or their agents. Once allowed into the polling station, the voter would

declare his candidates of choice,15 and openly due to the high percentage of

illiteracy.16 Under these conditions, which seemed unavoidable, voting was highly

unfair.

The open ballot regulation meant that the voter (client) could be caught voting

against the will of the candidate (patron). In a system where candidates needed very

few votes to be elected, the influence exerted by the clergy and the affluent was

decisive. It was very easy to pressure voters, particularly those whose properties

were mortgaged. The act of voting could not be isolated from its daily contexts:

social, economic and cultural; it was frequently more an expression of loyal

deference than of political protest.

Eventually, therefore, it became necessary to introduce the secret ballot. Two

factors were key to the decision: the population was becoming more educated; the

upcoming elections for the new Archbishop were fraught with tension. Thus, on

18 August 1906, the secret ballot was introduced by the then High Commissioner,

King-Harman.17 The campaign for the post of the Archbishop, the most influential

office within the Greek community, was underway and was rife with bias.18 For the

elections, there were separate ballot boxes for each candidate; each box had two

compartments, one painted white to represent a yes vote and the other painted black

to signal a no vote. The colour differentiation was to allow illiterate voters to

participate. Winning was by a simple majority, i.e., whoever received the most

12‘Peculiar legislation’, Laiki 12 February 1926, 1; ‘Universal suffrage’, Laiki 2 April 1926, 1.13‘The duties of the CPC’, Neos Anthropos, 6 November 1926, 3.14Cyprus Blue Book 1883–1884, 124.15See articles 21 and 25 in the proclamation for the first elections of 1883.16Thirty-years into the British colonial era 73.21% of the population could not read or write.

Census of Cyprus 1911, 15. There are no figures in the previous censuses of 1881, 1891 and 1901.17‘The dissolution of the Legislative Council. Secret voting’, Eleftheria, 23 August 1906, 2; TNA,CO 883/6/9, ‘Cyprus: Further correspondence relating to affairs in Cyprus’, ‘High Commissioner

Sir C. A. King-Harman to the Earl of Elgin, A Proclamation’, 14 August 1906, Enclosure in

No. 68.18The rivalry for the post was very intense and it had split Greek Cypriots in two. See chapter 6.

3.2 Voting Reform 59

white votes. This system still left considerable room for the exertion of pressure:

social relationships were far-reaching and intricate and the ease with which one

could be observed and controlled meant voters still lacked a really independent

choice. Further, much of the electorate was accustomed to allegiance and to

accepting the social and economic elites as their political leaders. This was reflected

in the social and economic characteristics of political representation (see below).

The early 1920s brought further amendments to the electoral law. At this time

the Greek nationalists successfully boycotted the LC actions (1921–1922) and the

1923 elections in their efforts to promote the enosis movement. Amidst strife and

conflict, in 1923 the High Commissioner submitted to the Ministry of Colonies a

number of proposals, suggesting a restructuring of the constituencies and amending

the franchise as a means to subdue the Greek nationalist movement. These were

accepted two years later, May 1925, with the introduction of the new constitution

(Georghallides 1979, 292–293). Although similar proposals had been made earlier,

they were never incorporated into legislation.19

Under the new electoral law the Greeks were given 12 (as opposed to three)

constituencies and 12 deputies (from nine), making all districts single-member,

under a plurality electoral system. The number of Turkish constituencies remained

the same. The franchise was limited to British citizens to prevent otherwise eligible

Greek citizens (living in Cyprus for more than 5 years) from running in the

elections. The rationale was that some of these Greek citizens were known to be

leading figures of the nationalist movement in Cyprus (e.g., Zannetos). Candidates

were required to be permanent residents of the district for which they sought

election, terminating the earlier practice allowing candidates to run in more than

one district. Suggestions that ballot papers be introduced were dismissed on the

grounds that the illiterate would be unable to vote. The system with ballot boxes

remained in place.20

The real purpose of these changes was to strengthen the local candidates against

the increasingly powerful network of urban nationalist elites and moneylenders.

Although the British were keen to exclude clergymen from elected office, they did

not pursue this idea. The nationalists loudly criticised the new system, recognising

that the small-sized constituencies were more open to corruption and interference

by the local notables.21 Yet the more important reason for criticism was the

established elite’s fear of losing their preferential access to the LC, and the concernthat their authority within the Greek community might be undermined. Their fears

came true in the elections of 1923 and again in 1925 where all candidates elected

fell outside the influence of the Ethnarchy for the first time.

19TNA, CO 883/6/6, ‘Cyprus: Further correspondence relating to affairs in Cyprus’, ‘HighCommissioner Sir W. F. Haynes Smith to Mr. Lyttleton’, Confidential, 8 June 1904.20Eleftheria, 2 May 1925, 2.21‘The opinion of medical doctor Themistocle Dervi’, Eleftheria, 2 February 1929, 1; ‘The small

constituency’, Eleftheria, 16 March 1929, 1.

60 3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change

3.3 Citizen Participation in Elections

The British Constitution brought major changes to the social and political set-up on

Cyprus. While in theory, it promised democracy and equality before the law, in

practice it mirrored the economic inequalities of the society. In other words, the LC

represented an important advance, but not for everyone: only those with the

appropriate social and economic standing could involve themselves in electoral

politics. The majority of the population, whose main concern was their daily

survival, lacked the time, resources, and education to pursue politics. Table 3.1

Table 3.1 Greek cypriot participation in legislative council elections 1883–1930

Year of

election

Greek

cypriot

population

Registered

votersa

Registered

voters as a

percentage of

the total

population Turnout

Turnout as a

percentage

of the

registered

voters

Turnout as a

percentage

of the total

population

1883 137,631 21,073 15.31 9172 43.52 6.66

1886 137,631 15,408 11.19 607b – –

1891 158,585 10,029 6.32 2176c – –

1896 158,585 12,093 7.62 4575 37.83 2.88

1901 182,739 24,952 13.65 17816 71.4 9.74

1906 182,739 33,229 18.18 17166 51.65 9.39

1911 214,480 34,331 16 8241d – –

1916 214,480 42,071 19.61 18380 43.68 8.56

1921 244,887 49,109 20.05 –e – –

1923 244,887f 49,109 20.05

1925g 244,887 45,342 18.51 29966 66.08 12.23

1930 283,721h 49,831 17.40 26024 52.70 9.17

Source: Author’s compilation of data based on the population censuses of 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911,

1921 and 1931 and the Cyprus Blue BooksaRegistered voters were recorded based on the payment of one of the vergi taxesbVoting took place only in one of the three electoral districts (Nicosia–Kyrenia); in the other two

the candidates matched (or were fewer than) the number of seatscVoting took place only in one of the three electoral districts (Larnaca–Famagusta); in the other

two the candidates matched (or were fewer than) the number of seatsdVoting took place in two of the three electoral districts; in the other (Limassol–Paphos) the

candidates matched the number of seatseVoting did not occur in any districtfIn January 1923 supplementary elections took place in order to replace the Greek Cypriots

deputies who abstained from the workings of the Legislative CouncilgThe first elections that took place under the new Constitution after the official declaration of

Cyprus as a colony of the Crown. According to the new constitution the Greek Cypriot seats

increased from 9 to 12. The number of electoral districts also increased from 3 to 12hThe figure is based on the population census of 1931

3.3 Citizen Participation in Elections 61

presents the data on the Greek Cypriot electoral participation in the elections for the

Legislative Council from 1883–1930.

Looking at Table 3.1, we can see a small, gradual increase in the electorate, and

fluctuating levels of electoral participation. The process of electoral decision-

making brought the individual voter face-to-face with numerous pressures such as

economic conditions, the candidates themselves and their clientelistic networks, the

political context as this was determined by the Greek Cypriot demand for enosis,the increasingly decisive role of the press. Also important were the internal conflicts

among the Greeks of Cyprus, which stimulated participation (e.g., the elections of

1901 and 1906 during the fierce fight over the Archiepiscopal question), as well as

circumstances that signaled indifference (e.g., the conclusion of the Archiepiscopal

question in 1909 and the abstention from the election in 1923).

Throughout the period of legislative politics (1883–1931) the electorate consis-

tently comprised less than 20%of the total Greek population. While this was a very

low percentage, even smaller was the percentage of those eligible to vote who

actually voted, which remained (with only one exception in 1916) below 10%. This

illustrates a distinctive feature of Greek Cypriot politics at the time: only a minority

of the people actually engaged in politics. This was in fact unsurprising given the

various (economic) conditions attached to the franchise and the absence of ideo-

logical debates. Moreover voting was not obligatory.

The institutional setting and the electoral process were marked by their elitist

nature. True mass participation had not yet been achieved: the lower strata did not

vote according to their social and class position, and their choices were shaped by

ideological and economic manipulation and control that inhibited their free expres-

sion. The fact that so few workers, peasants and other low-income groups even

bothered to vote reveals their ignorance of crucial economic relationships: with no

understanding of these relationships, they could not see the importance of going to

the polls and supporting candidates of their own class (Lipset 1963, 197). Since

education affords insight into complex social problems, as the middle classes

became more educated their political participation grew. The lower classes did

little more than elect members of the traditional political class as members of

parliament. Lack of participation and representation also reflects lack of effective

citizenship and consequent lack of loyalty to the system as a whole (Lipset 1963,

227).

3.3.1 Political Exclusionism

Very clearly, the majority of Cypriots were excluded from the political system,

which supports the argument that politicisation and electoral participation are not

tantamount to political inclusion. For integration to be achieved there must be a

general willingness to accept a full-fledged political partnership of all citizens

without reservation (Kirchheimer 1966, 183). The development of socioeconomic

relations and of more universalistic loyalties (i.e., the nation) can encourage greater

62 3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change

political participation and integration, as can modern social and political organisa-

tions (Lemarchand and Legg 1972, 154, 171).

For the majority in a country to be fully included in the political process, there

must be widespread civil, political and social rights. In societies of late develop-

ment like Cyprus these basic rights were more restricted than in western and

northern Europe. Here the lower strata were denied even the basic rights that

would give them a reasonable share in the political power and wealth. In Cyprus

inclusion took place through patron-client networks controlled by bourgeois poli-

ticians—a type of network that cuts across the more horizontal forms of political

organisation like the (class-based) trade unions and political parties. When there are

barriers to establishing more integrative modes of inclusion, patronage networks

take root and adapt to modern environments (Mouzelis 1995, 226–227).

Greece is a good example of this type of political modernisation (Mouzelis

1995), and the situation in Cyprus is very similar—especially with regard to the

roles that religion and nationalistic ideology played in culturally including the

masses. Because this type of inclusion preceded the economic and political incor-

poration, clientelistic relations were easily perpetuated as mechanisms of integra-

tion. Political integration of the lower classes was never fully achieved until 1930,

and the political landscape changed significantly in the 1940s (see Chap. 8). The

vast majority of the population was not enfranchised and their organisations were

underdeveloped. Their basic individual and social rights were never fully put in

place. Consequently, their political rights were also impaired and the masses of the

population were excluded from the political process. As a result,

parliamentarianism and politics in general were restricted to a very few. In Cyprus,

the lower strata and particularly the peasantry had little experience of electoral

politics except as passive players in traditional clientelist networks, and they were

not able to benefit from the availability of supply in the electoral market.

3.4 The Iron Law of Oligarchy: Elite Politics

The Archiepiscopal Question (see Chap. 6) led to a change in political representa-

tion, although it remained basically clientelistic. What changed was the sociolog-

ical and ideological profile of the deputies—many switched from more

traditionalist stances to become nationalists (Lyssiotis 1990, 67–68). These, nation-

alist deputies were younger and more educated; during university studies—in

Athens primarily—they were exposed to and greatly influenced by the ideology

of Greek nationalism. The more traditional political group for the most part was

older, less educated, and had not been exposed to modern ideologies. However,

mobilising capacities and mechanisms (patron-client relationships) remained the

same for both groups; they were both part of the same social establishment, which

did not change.

Between 1883 and 1931 there were 11 legislative periods; or to put it differently:

11 elections took place in which 61 deputies took office (with the exception of the

3.4 The Iron Law of Oligarchy: Elite Politics 63

supplementary election of 1923). Given the number of deputies and the number of

the legislative periods, if every member were elected once, the total number of the

Council members would be 105: nine elections were held between 1883 and 1923

when the Greek members of the LC were nine in number and two more elections

took place in 1925 and 1930 when their seats rose to 12. However, as only

61 persons served the post, this means that each of those elected members had a

50% chance of being re-elected. We should bear in mind, though, that some

deputies elected served the post as many as four times while others were only

elected once. Therefore, the actual possibility was even smaller.

A study of the deputies’ profiles (Koudounaris 1995) reveals a strong relation-

ship between Council membership and certain socio-economic variables: level of

education, personal wealth, occupation, and family relationships. There was but one

exception: the supplementary elections of 1923, where due to the abstention of the

nationalists (see Chap. 7), farmers and peasants prevailed. The deputy profiles

further reveal kinship ties, either direct (i.e., father and son, brothers, etc.) or

indirect (i.e., through marriage). Lyssiotis (1990, 65) notes that if one considers

only the relationship groups ‘father-son’ and ‘brothers’, seven political families

constituted 25% of the total deputy population.

It was also extremely common for the same individual to be elected/appointed to

multiple offices (recycling). In most cases, those elected to the LC also held

positions of authority in other institutions, which included, inter alia: the municipal

councils (i.e., Mayor and municipal councilors), members of the central or district

educational boards, members of the ecclesiastical committees, managers of finan-

cial institutions, school directors, etc. There were also individuals appointed as

members of the Executive Council of Cyprus while holding the office of the deputy.

The pattern of representation in the political elite dictated how one would ‘climb the

office ladder’; i.e., going from lower prestige offices to higher.

The pattern of political representation reflected class and gender inequalities,

unsurprising in view of the legal provisions for the franchise. In spite of their

numbers the peasantry had no representation in the LC; the same was true of the

working class. Political representation in Cyprus was consistent with a very specific

conceptualisation of politics: politicians were expected to be financially well off,

with no need of the income provided by their political occupation. This barred all

except what Weber (1987, 106) identified as ‘the man of independent means’—which aptly describes the Cypriot political elite. In 47 years of electoral politics

(1883–1931) no labourer or female was ever elected, indicating a very stable

political elite, and little social mobility. Those elected to the LC generally came

from the small but more educated or better-off classes that included merchants,

lawyers, moneylenders and Church prelates, while the masses remained sidelined

and denied access to the power structure. Consequently, the social and political

spheres overlapped to such a degree that 88% of those on the LC also practiced the

occupation/s of lawyer, merchant and/or landowner (Lyssiotis 1990, 62, 65). There

were two leading groups in the Greek Cypriot community during the first decades of

British rule: the Orthodox Church, and the politicians who controlled clientelistic

networks (Faustmann 1998, 46).

64 3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change

Unsurprisingly, then, there was a huge gap between the interests of the parlia-

mentary representatives and those of the vast majority (Tzermias 2001, 85). The LC

was unlikely to take any radical action when dealing with social problems on the

island: it was an oligarchic society and an oligarchic Parliament,22 and electoral

politics were the domain of but a few. The popular strata were excluded from

politics. This oligarchy was strongly integrated by common education, intermar-

riage and shared activity in many places of public life. The model of representation

that best describes the period under study is the administrative model (Heywood

2006, 315), wherein the elected representative has no obligation to his constituency,

but instead makes independent decisions since he is considered the better judge of

their interests. The people’s representatives in the LC were considered independent

actors and differences of opinions were expected and accepted.23

3.5 Patronage Politics

Clientelism is not a new phenomenon: it occurs/has occurred in any number of

contemporary and historical settings, western and non-western and regardless of

degree of development (Lemarchand and Legg 1972, 149).24 Hence political

clientelism must be examined in the context of a society’s historical, economic,

cultural and political realities. Clientelistic relationships are always unbalanced and

they penetrate all social sectors. The peasant and his family (clients) provide votes

for a politician (patron), who in return is expected to provide for their material

needs. The developing world reveals a more pervasive clientelism (Randall 2006,

393), which, with special reference to the countries of late development in the

Balkans and southern Europe, Mouzelis (1995, 231) attributes to their ‘pre-inde-pendence despotic heritage’. We can locate Cyprus in this category: under the

Ottoman rule the nobility and high state officials gave total obeisance to the Sultan.

The situation was ripe for patron-client relationships, which carried on well into the

British era and beyond (Faustmann 1998).

The institutional structure of Cyprus politics is ineluctably linked to the social,

economic and class antitheses of the time (see previous chapter). Within this

context, patronage was vital to the basic survival of the poorer strata: their vote

was useful for bargaining for their need, it was basically a commodity. Meynaud

(2002, 66–67) is speaking of Greece in the quote that follows, but he could well be

referring to Cyprus: ‘For an independent observer this practice would seem as “an

act of amoralism”. However, this would be the perspective of someone whose life is

not dependent on material needs’.

22The term is used by Mouzelis (1995) for the case of Greece.23‘Variety of perceptions’, Eleftheria, 23 November 1927, p. 1.24For clientelism in general see Hopkin (2006).

3.5 Patronage Politics 65

Social conditions in Cyprus nurtured clientelism. Patron-client relationships

were woven into both the social fabric and the political culture, with dependency

interlinked on all level. Peasants were totally dependent on their creditors (mer-

chants and lawyers) to whom they were heavily indebted, while teachers exercised

control over their electoral conduct. Being the only literate person in the village,

teachers were highly respected and villagers followed their lead. Teachers in turn

were dependent on the Greek Educational Council and the District Educational

Committees, whose members were (at least in in part) determined by the Greek LC

deputies and the Church. Teacher appointments, promotions, salaries, etc., were

fully dependent on how well a teacher served his patrons (Richter 2007, 369).

Clientelism penetrated social and political interactions among members of the elite

as well, with the Greek newspapers providing the arena for these dealings. Editors

and columnists were tied to ambitious politicians and parliamentarians in a relation

of dependency and mutual benefit. The newspapers supported politicians and

policies in return for payment, usually in the form of advertisements.25

Favouritism and corruption are endemic to the clientelistic system, and in

Cyprus these were so powerful that they constituted a serious barrier to the free

expression of the electorate’s will. Naturally it was easier to exercise pressure on

the poorer strata and especially on the indebted smallholders. Papademetris and

Petrides (1979–1980, Vol. 3, 184) describe the rampant bribery (130 occasions)

during the elections of 1906, citing the Chief Justice’s report: ‘In the poorest

villages the voter seems practically under the complete control of his creditor’.Lefkis (1984, 133) reports a case in the town of Limassol, in 1925, where 18 people

offered to christen someone’s child in view of the forthcoming elections.26 Open

balloting further aggravated the problem since it was highly conducive to patron-

client relationships involving the candidates and the electorate, and the introduction

of secret ballot in 1906 did little to improve things. There was a complete lack of

ideological differences in the electoral contests, which enabled the growth of

vertical relationships and a political system based on clientelism.

There are some, however who disagree with this viewpoint. Richter (2007,

15–16, 99–100), for example, argues against the paradigm of patronage politics

in Cyprus beyond the early years of British rule. He questions the extent of

clientelism on the basis of the significant internal development on the island due

to the initiatives taken by the British on several levels. Yet most scholars and even

the actors of the time themselves disagree with him (Faustmann 1998; Choisi

1995). Patron-client relationships were rooted in the Ottoman era but they were

cultivated and spread in the British era, although the British did in fact lay the

groundwork for changing or at least mitigating the effect of patronage (see

Faustmann 1998, 54–58). For example: they established measures to improve the

farmer’s lot; they improved education; they established patterns and forms of

25‘The opinion of medical doctor Themistocle Dervi’, Eleftheria, 2 February 1929, 1.26Christening within a rural society like Cyprus was associated with loyalty towards the patron and

was an intangible source of clientelism bonding the client/voter with his patron/politician.

66 3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change

organisation; they passed legislation that set a ceiling to interest rates; they

established special agricultural courts, etc.

Political life in Cyprus was still in a transitional phase where numerous pro-

cesses were evolving. The nexus of social and institutional factors described above

were gradually leading to increased political awareness and participation, in spite of

some back-pedaling. Although the traditional patron-client relationships and per-

sonal commitments that kept the voter obligated were starting to crumble, they

remained strong throughout this period. In fact, patronage has never died out in

Cyprus and has always constituted a defining feature of Cypriot politics.

3.6 The (Colonial) Limitations of (Nationalist) Party

Politics

The abolition of the Constitution in 1931 signalled the termination of all electoral

processes. Thenceforward the British Governor appointed all public office-holders,

on the sole criterion of their willingness to implement British policies. This meant

that the Legislative Council no longer represented Cypriots in even the smallest

measure. Granted that it was not a governing body, yet, along with other institutions

of representation, it constituted the cornerstone of both liberal and democratic

politics. It is along these two dimensions that the institutions of representation

ceded to Cyprus by Britain should be evaluated, together with the key functions

usually assigned to assemblies: representation, deliberation and legislation. Liber-

alism is usually judged according to the provisions for power separation and the

weight assigned to the Assemblies, while representativeness is asserted through

the powers vested in representative institutions, the functions they perform and

the extent to which popular sovereignty is established or qualified. If we consider the

political landscape in Cyprus under the British, we immediately note two features:

the democratic deficit of the institutions provided that compromised democratic

politics, and the use of elections as a means to legitimise the colonial regime.

3.6.1 Compromised Democracy

Britain’s priority in designing Cyprus’s institutional setting was to facilitate their

colonial rule. Consequently, the executive arm of the government (the British

Governor) retained its power throughout the period despite certain modifications

and regardless of the good will of some Governors; while ‘the Legislative Councilhas always been an impotent parliament given to the Cypriots in order to confer the

suppressive regime a democratic dressing’ (Yiallourides 1993, 166). Because the

Governor’s authority was virtually unlimited, politics on the island were far from

liberal or democratic, as this quote from the press attests: ‘[the Council is a]

3.6 The (Colonial) Limitations of (Nationalist) Party Politics 67

‘rampant and crippled body whose composition constituted a parody and a mockery

of liberalism’.27

The Parliament remained under the firm control of the executive, meaning there

was absolutely no separation of power. Although the LC could accept or reject

government bills, it had no power to amend them, and should the Greek and the

Turkish representatives agree on a position, the Governor could override their

majority. The Council could not propose its own budget; it could only approve or

reject the budget proposed by the government. What the Council mainly did was to

debate/discuss a variety of issues: considered national issues, examined general

policy examined government proposals, reports and memorandums. The form of

representative politics in Cyprus was, therefore, little more than a ‘discussion club’.The LC was limited to an arena for the expression of its members’ grievances andprotests against British policies.

A truly representative government must have institutions that offer both popular

participation and efficient decision making, with the majority rule as the operating

rule for decision making (Miller 1970, 284), a rule that was clearly violated by the

British, as was the aforementioned premises of a libertarian constitutional tradition.

The British divided electoral provisions along ethnic lines, failed to safeguard the

rights of the majority, imposed limitations on the franchise and restricted the LC’sactivities to the point of practically delegitimising it. In addition, any democratic

‘principles’ the British put into place were primarily, as mentioned before, to

benefit the colonial interests. The colonial government’s ability to manipulate

processes and institutions to fit their policy is typical of the colonial system and

represents one of the paradoxes of capitalist (colonial) democracy: ‘Democracy

within one country does not exclude despotic oppression and inequality with

respect to other countries’ (Heller 1993, 144).There was nevertheless a context of basic democracy/democratisation, evident

in the relative freedom of the press, the separation of the executive from the

judiciary, the right to petition and criticise the regime. However, we must analyse

the institutional structure in light of the unwritten laws and customs of the society.

In many developing and colonised nations, including Cyprus, one such ‘unwrittenlaw’ was clientelism. In Cyprus this proved to be a decisive feature of electoral

politics and greatly weakened the system’s democratic elements. Furthermore, the

electoral system was riddled with class and gender discriminations and even open

balloting. Most Council members were elected/appointed from among the clergy,

the landowners and the urban elites (lawyers, doctors, and merchants), the classes

that effectively monopolised political representation. As a result the interests of the

other classes were rarely considered at Council meetings nor given any press.

Analysis of a country’s electoral system must include notation of the range of

offices filled through election; who is entitled to vote; the electoral rules for

transforming votes to seats (plurality or proportional systems; the number of

27‘The Cypriot polity’, Eleftheria, 26 October 1907, 1; ‘What Cypriots want from England’,Eleftheria, 31 August 1907, 1.

68 3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change

alternatives presented to the voters (Heywood 2006, 321–322; Taagepera 2007).

Clearly under the British colonial structure the electoral system was hardly demo-

cratic: most offices were appointed, including the British High Commissioner

(Governor since 1925), the Executive Council, District Commissioners, and almost

half the members on the LC. It would seem that elections served first and foremost

other principles than genuine popular sovereignty and accountability.

3.6.2 Electoral Process as a Lightning Rod

Elections are hugely important in the liberal/representative model of democracy,

while they also help stabilise semi-competitive regimes insofar as they allow for

some degree of participation (Nohlen 2007, 20, 30) and so absorb certain societal

tensions (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 5). Rokkan (1968, 180) likened elections to

‘locks in a canal: they allow the rising socio-cultural forces to flow further through

the established channels of the system but also make it possible to stem the tide, to

keep back the flood’. Viewed this way, elections can function to control the

masses—negating radical demands—because conflict is contained between groups

in society, or against the government and not the system itself. Competition is less

intense as it excludes systemic variables. This could describe Cyprus in this period.

The colonial power legitimised its rule through establishing elections for the LC

and the local authorities. The political setting they created incorporated the Cypriot

elite in the administration of the island, which reinforced the existing political

system and discouraged more radical demands and any possible attempts to over-

throw the system. These two measures ensured that any anti-British protests were

generally ‘soft’. The British cleverly trapped the Cypriots in this constitutional formof conflict resolution, which absorbed the tensions in political life. Their inclusion

of the Cypriot economic/social elite in the administrative system and the judiciary

guaranteed Cypriot loyalty as well as providing vital inside information (Lyssiotis

1990, 55). The restricting influence legislative politics exercised upon their

demands and particularly the means for claiming them was fully understood by

the protagonists themselves. For example, in a memorandum of the National

Council to the new Labour government in London, in 1924, the regime in Cyprus

was characterised as a ‘sham form of government imposed to enslaved people either

to corrupt them or to socialise them into particular forms of action and political

participation devoid of any risk of overthrow’.28

British policy in Cyprus, including the Constitutions of 1882 and 1925, was

intended to legitimate their government by incorporating a limited degree of

Cypriot participation. While the British reforms offered the basics of a modern

political system, they also included provisions that in effect nullified the (suppos-

edly granted) constitutional principle of the separation of powers. The British

28Cited in Eleftheria, 27 February 1924, 2.

3.6 The (Colonial) Limitations of (Nationalist) Party Politics 69

Governors were vested with an authority that enabled them to impose their will at

any time, and they had the right to dispense with the LC altogether. In any case, the

Council had such a limited scope of activity that its political significance was

negligible. Arbitrary government by governmental or queenly decrees was the

last resort of the British rulers in a political system lacking any institutional form

of checks and balances. The lack of liberal provisions in the Constitution, and the

actual abolishment of the Constitution in 1931 attest to an authoritarian British

regime in Cyprus. Despite these shortcomings, the introduction of the first-ever

institutions of representation and rudimentary political liberties facilitated devel-

opment of the societal infrastructure required for representative and party politics.

The political process incorporated increasing numbers of citizens in the context of

an embryonic parliamentarism.

Political arrangements were put in place in a country with no parliamentary or

democratic traditions. Cyprus, at the time, was a country characterised as a late-

comer to capitalist development and marked by a lack of inclusion of the masses in

the political system. At the institutional level the main characteristics were the total

freedom of the executive from parliamentary controls, and the restricted franchise.

The Cyprus Parliament was given a very false authority: it was only partially

representative (given the deficits in democratic representation) and had no sover-

eign right to pass laws. In sum, the colonial government’s imposition of a system in

which there was an absence of democratic representation and a false legislative

power rendered their ‘legitimisation’ of government in Cyprus essentially

non-existent.

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72 3 Institutional Engineering and Political Change

Chapter 4

The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The

Hegemony of Nationalism

This chapter analyses the pivotal role of nationalism—which was translated into the

political demand for union with Greece (enosis)—in the transformation of Cyprus’spolitical landscape; my examination covers the agents, the nature and the mecha-

nisms through which nationalism spread in Cyprus. As argued in previous chapters,

societal change involves more than economic reforms and the rise of new social

strata; it involves perceptual changes. Therefore, the battle of ideas is crucial in

processes of change. Greek nationalism was the defining ideology and mechanism

through which the rupture with the traditional order of things took place at the level

of ideas. Nationalism played an important role in the politicisation of Cypriot

society and contributed to the development of anti-colonial sentiment and organi-

sation. Ethnicity was politicised via nationalism and gradually replaced (and was

mixed with) religion as the defining factor in identity, i.e., Greek/Turkish rather

than Christian/Muslim.

Nationalism, as an ideology and a political movement, undoubtedly remains one

of the most important—if not the most important—factors that has shaped and

defined the history of Cyprus for over a century (Ioannou 2007, 383). In the late

nineteenth century, perceptions of the Greek nation as a perpetual entity captured

the imagination of the Greek Cypriots (Kitromilides 1979), who increasingly saw

their destinies linked to the ancient Hellenic past of Cyprus and their future to its

revival through unification with Greece. Politicised forms of Greek nationalism

resulted from resentment over British colonialism and signals of support from key

political players on the Greek mainland, as well as the British refusal to give Cyprus

to Greece or an alternative compromise (Crawshaw 1978, 75–83; Stephanides

1999, 74–108). The normative basis of the Greek Cypriots demand for enosisresulted from their strong reaction against British colonial rule and their cultural

and historic affinity with Greece (Loizides 2007, 175). Because of their numerical

superiority on the island, the Greek Cypriots believed that they could rightfully

decide for all Cypriots. Like other colonial peoples the Greek Cypriots had fought

in both World Wars as allies of the British and suffered casualties. They naturally

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_4

73

felt eligible for freedom and self-government, which they translated into the

demand for union with Greece.

There is no strong evidence of nationalism in Cyprus before the late phase of

Ottoman rule (Kitromilides 1979, 157). Although since the early nineteenth century

there had been some expressions of nationalism (Hill 1952, 496), these were far

from manifestations of a fully-fledged nationalist movement. It would be more

accurate to refer to a generally conceived national orientation of Greek Cypriot

elites, which gradually acquired a more specific ideological content while its social

bases also slowly but steadily grew. The ideology that inspired the enosis move-

ment in Cyprus was the Megali Idea (Great Idea) project that was gradually

transmitted from the political elite and intelligentsia of Athens to the major centers

of Hellenism outside Greece.

When it first appeared enosis was quite a radical claim since it advocated

departure from the British Empire. It cohered as a political position particularly

after 1901 and the first victory of the nationalists in the elections for the vacant post

of the Archbishop of Cyprus, becoming a hegemonic ideology despite the efforts of

the British colonial authorities to mitigate its rise and influence among the Greek

Cypriots. In this chapter I will examine the carriers of Greek nationalism in Cyprus,

its linkage with Greece, the peculiarities of the nationalist movement, its gradual

popularisation through a variety of means (e.g., the press) and processes or events

(e.g., the Balkan Wars). The Church of Cyprus is not included in this analysis as its

role is so important that it deserves its own chapter (Chap. 5). Although the Cypriot

Church initially opposed the new ideology, it eventually became the main advocate

of enosis and the major pillar around which it was structured and promoted.

4.1 Agents of Nationalism and the Demand for Enosis

Cyprus was in a process of change. The social and economic forces as well as the

political and spiritual tools required for this process of change, of which enosis wasa major component, were already in place. The former encompassed the rising

bourgeoisie, who had not lived through Ottoman occupation and who had devel-

oped close ties with Greece through education; the latter included the establishment

of schools, the publication of newspapers, and the reverberations of the Cretan

Question with the participation of (over 1000) Cypriot volunteers in the Greek-

Turkish War of 1897 (Katalanos 2003, 122) and in the Balkans Wars (1912–1913).

It was through the educational system in particular that nationalist ideology became

the main value system into which younger generations were systematically

socialised. All these factors contributed to the formation and diffusion of a secular,

national and Greek identity (Anagnostopoulou 1999, 203).

For the reasons explained in Chap. 2, it was the commercial bourgeoisie of

Larnaca that played the most important role in transmitting the first nationalist ideas

in the last decades of the nineteenth century; it was they who formulated a specific

political discourse based around the demand for union with Greece (enosis).

74 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

Moreover, at this time Larnaca had the highest proportion of Greek Orthodox

among its population, which facilitated diffusion of the nationalist ideology

(Michael 2005, 309–310).

Nicosia’s contact with the outside world was primarily through Larnaca, home to

the island’s major port. This distance acted as a check on the transfer of ideas and

concepts from other countries, which we see in the variety of political perceptions

in the different cities around the island. For example, for the Archbishopric and its

elitist circle, cooperation with the political authorities was an established practice

and a substantive perception of the functioning of the community. In contrast, for

the Bishopric of Kition and the nationalist circle which developed around it from

the second half of the nineteenth century, Hellenic ideals and the Greek state

constituted a permanent ideological and political reference point (Michael 2005,

312).1

In addition to the merchant class, in Larnaca and in Limassol, the educated

graduates of the University of Athens played an important role in the diffusion of

national ideas. These included lawyers, medical doctors and professors/teachers,

many of whom had studied in Athens with the encouragement of the Greek consul

since the 1850s (Kitromilides 1979, 161).2 The circulation of newspapers following

the arrival of the British, and the newly established religious/cultural associations

inspired the young intellectuals in Larnaca and Limassol. They became intensely

active, writing articles about politics and other matters of popular concern

(Katsiaounis 1996, 311).

The members of this bourgeois class, with their economic power, university

education political discourse and social superiority, gradually assumed control of

the island’s political and social life. And their mantra was nationalism. The fact that

this class was in command of the enosis struggle was clearly recognised at the time:

‘the townsmen—those who possessed most financial independence—were the

strongest nationalists’ (Georghallides 1985, 203).3 The fact that the Greek Cypriot

bourgeoisie took a leading role in spreading the nationalist doctrines is unsurpris-

ing. As Heywood (2003, 156) notes, ‘In the early years of nation building enthu-

siasm for nationalism was largely restricted to the rising middle classes, who were

attracted to the ideas of national unity and constitutional government’. In this

regard, nationalism was instrumental for the rising Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie and

the middle classes to claim an increased role in political life.

Mainland Greek school teachers who staffed the Cypriot schools before and after

the British occupation also played a crucial role in mobilising for the national cause.

Nicolaos Katalanos, for example, is considered by some one of the most important

1More on this issue in the next chapter.2For example, the first to scholarship students who were sent to the Theological School of the

University of Athens were Sophronios and Kyprianos who became later on Archbishop and Bishop

of Kitium respectively.3The author makes his assessment based on a series of articles of parliamentarian Kyriakos

Rossides republished in Eleftheria, 30 March, 3 April, 6 April, 10 April 1929.

4.1 Agents of Nationalism and the Demand for Enosis 75

promoters of nationalism. To promote the cause, he founded a chain of clubs named

the ‘Love of the People’ club, and also wrote articles in several newspapers for

which he was chief editor (Kokkinoftas, prologue in Katalanos 2003).4 Other

prominent members of the bourgeoisie led associations, reading rooms and clubs

throughout Cyprus that organised several events for promoting nationalism and

enosis: for example, the annual Pan-Cypriot games in honour of the Greek national

holiday of 25th March, the anniversary of the massacre of a number of Greek

prelates—the then Archbishop included—by the Ottomans on 9 July 1821, the

name day of the King of Greece, etc. (Katalanos 2003, 259–260). Another Greek

personality who played an important role in promoting the Unionist demand (at the

end of the 1920s), was the then Greek Consul, Alexis Kyrou. So active was he in his

work that Governor Storrs asked for his recall (Storrs 1945, 503–505).

Freemasonry, an ideology that rejected the social distinctions on which the old

aristocratic order was based, was key in the dissemination of Greek nationalism.

The progressive role of masons, including their work in Cyprus, has not gone

unstudied (Hobsbawm 2002, 38; Katsiaounis 1996, 18). The Cyprus masonic

lodge Zenon had as members many leading personalities of Greek nationalism.

Established in 1893 in Limassol by doctor I. Karageorgiades (Tornaritis 1948, 9),

important members included F. Zannetos, a doctor of Greek descent, a major

personality of Larnaca and an important nationalist, and G. Frangoudes, publisher

of the newspaper Fos (Light) and later founder of the Panteion University in

Athens. Other important representatives of masonry in Cyprus included the Legis-

lative Council members, C. Sozos, Ioannis Economides, Ioannis Kyriakides and

Theofanis Theodotou (Katsiaounis 1996, 182).

Research (Elmazis 1998) also suggests that the secret societies that promoted the

national cause during the Greek War of Independence of 1821 were in fact masonic

groups. He posits this argument on the grounds that the founders of most of these

societies were masons and the lodges’ rule of silence enabled the struggle to be

organised and protected without the danger of betrayal. One of the many organisa-

tions created for claiming enosis, the Nationalist Radical Union of Cyprus—EPEK

(see Chap. 7), had precisely this character. Without suggesting a corresponding

ratio for the Cypriot case, we can simply note that in most national organisations a

number of cadres and members were Greek Cypriot masons (see also Chap. 7).

In Europe the bourgeois classes cried out for liberty (Beaud 2008, 125)—and

here liberty referred to possessive individualism and economic freedom. In Cyprus,

however, where the bourgeoisie was at a far remove from state affairs and privi-

leges, the primary demand was for political liberty—a call for the abolition of all

social/political privileges. There was also a cry for Union with Greece, as well as a

desire for economic liberalism and participation in religious power and property.

Many in this class, especially professionals and the educated, expected a degree of

4The newspapers that he worked for were Evagoras, Kypriaki Epitheorisi (Cypriot Review), andKypriakos Fylax (Cypriot Sentinel). Katsiaounis (1996, 210) regards Katalanos as the most

outstanding personality of the nationalist movement.

76 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

social recognition that was denied to them. This pushed them towards the nation-

alist cause, where they would be able to participate in political life. Thus the rising

nationalist movement had another aim: besides challenging British authority, it also

challenged the privileged Greek establishment (Katsiaounis 1995, 230). These

members of the bourgeoisie sought freedom from the Church and an autonomous

position within the power system in Cypriot society.

Nationalism became identified with the political demand for enosis, which drewon the project of the ideology of Greek nationalism. Enosis clearly rejected the

existing political settlement in Cyprus as a British colony—it demanded a different

institutional structure. According to a report written by Governor Storrs on

11 February 1932, ‘it is on this blot of disobedience that the strength of the

movement for Union is mainly based’ (cited in Richter 2007, 507). Enosis at thebeginning of the (twentieth) century was ‘the war cry of the classes which were

outside the political system’ (Katsiaounis 2004, 28), reiterating the above hypoth-

esis that nationalism was pursued by those classes and groups that wanted to

upgrade and legitimate their social standing, and who recognised that it would be

easiest to mobilise the masses with the call for enosis. The bourgeoisie led the

movement for Union, which was further strengthened when the Church joined the

cause. The national movement under the dual leadership of these two agents and

linked with economic demands, such as the abolition of the tribute tax and the

demand for political rights and freedoms, mobilised the population en masse (see

Sect. 4.3).

4.2 The Nature and Singularities of the National Movement

in Cyprus

As we have seen, Greek Cypriot nationalism was introduced by mainland Greeks

who called for Cyprus to become part of their Great Idea, the Greek political

programme of irredentism that aimed to unite all ‘unredeemed’ Greeks. Cyprusproved a particularly hospitable ground for Greek irredentism (Kitromilides 1977)

because Greeks made up the majority of the population, and with systematic

cultivation of the demand for enosis, there were very favourable conditions for

the establishment of Greek irredentism in Cyprus (Mavratsas 2003, 63). In Cyprus,

a logical extension of the Great Idea was the political demand for the island’s unionwith Greece. Cypriot enosis was irredentist as it did not aim at independence but at

union with another state: the Greeks of Cyprus genuinely believed that they were

part of the great Greek nation and that union with Greece was only natural. This was

the first singularity of Greek nationalism in Cyprus.

Greek Cypriot nationalism blended together features of anti-colonialism, liber-

alism and conservatism that reflected the composition and political goals of its

major promoters. Arguably, what distinguished Greek Cypriot nationalism in these

early stages was anti-colonialism. From this stemmed the second characteristic of

4.2 The Nature and Singularities of the National Movement in Cyprus 77

the Greek Cypriot national movement: its anti-colonial, ethnic nature. Britain’sstance was therefore crucial. Britain largely refused to discuss enosis in any form.

Although Britain had in 1915 offered Cyprus to Greece (which the Greek govern-

ment refused), this was an act that best served the British naval and war needs of the

particular moment (Markides 2008, 58; Storrs 1945, 463). In reality and in the

longer term, Britain needed Cyprus as a strategic point for naval and air bases in

order to control the regions of Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt. Nevertheless, Cypriots

seized on the British offer as an act that legitimised and justified the Unionist

movement. Yet there are many more recorded negative responses of the British to

Greek Cypriot demands, votes and memorandums asking for enosis. For example,

in response to a 1926 memorandum from Greek parliamentarians, the Minister for

the Colonies said: ‘the question of the Union of Cyprus with Greece has been

definitively closed and cannot be reopened’.5 The stand of the British was also

apparent in letters of the Minister for the Colonies dated 1 June and 15 August 1921,

in which he rejected not only a referendum but also Union altogether (Papademetris

and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. 7, 22).

The demand for Union represented both a demand for social improvements and a

way for Cypriots to reclaim their dignity. Consequently, it had a political and anti-

colonial content. However, it was actually quite millenialist insofar as it was

assumed that all problems, especially in the socio-economic sphere, would be

solved only in ‘another life’, after Union—a tactic that downplayed the class

inequalities and class struggle within Greek Cypriot society (Anagnostopoulou

1999, 206). In this sense it was also contradictory since, although it revealed a

dislike of British colonialists and the power structure upon their dominance rested,

it also legitimated the domestic political power structure of the Greek Cypriots that

excluded the majority of the people (Panayiotou 2006b, 277). This was another

characteristic of the enosis movement. The demand for enosis was socially pro-

gressive to the extent that it expressed the interests of the rising bourgeoisie as

opposed to those of the landowners, the clergy, and the colonialist power. However,

it did not have democratic ambitions in the sense of safeguarding human rights and

political freedoms as in the French Revolution; nor was it concerned with the

political rights of the peasants, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the

population. The nationalists accorded little importance to the masses—especially

considering their numbers. The Greek Cypriot ruling elite single-mindedly pursued

their community’s right to national self-determination, a demand that

overshadowed the rights and needs of the individual.

The fourth singularity of the Greek Cypriot national movement concerns its

moderation in relation to the British. While Greek Cypriot nationalism supported

the withdrawal of Cyprus from the British Empire, it was not anti-British. It always

remained within the framework of ‘legality’ and verbal representations. National-

ists were not anti-western; Greek nationalists saw themselves as allies of the British

Empire and potentially the local representatives of its world hegemony (Panayiotou

5‘The reply of the Minister for the Colonies’, Laiki (Popular), 26 February 1926, 2.

78 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

2012). Particularly illustrative of this reality was a 1919 letter promoting enosis sentby members of the Greek Cypriot mission to London: ‘We have complete and blind

faith in the British Nation, its traditions and principles and its sense of justice’.6 Inthe same document, it was suggested that military and naval bases be ceded to

Britain in exchange for the acceptance of Union. A few years later, in response to a

negative reply from the Minister for the Colonies to a Unionist memorandum, a

Greek Cypriot parliamentarian noted that ‘the call for Union is not a revolutionary

demand to be greeted with such an improper response’,7 and the newspaper

Eleftheria published an editorial in 1929 that claimed that there was no Greek

who wanted ‘to fire even one shot’ against the English, as the latter maintained the

balance between the old world and the new and guaranteed the security of Greece.8

To fully understand the particularity of Greek Cypriot nationalism, we must

consider the heterogeneity within the historic bloc discussed in Chap. 1 that resulted

in conflicting goals among parts of this bloc and in turn produced intra-enosisantitheses.

Cyprus was already marked by delayed development of a domestic bourgeoisie

when the main industrial sectors (mines) passed onto foreign ownership. This fact

did not allow the Cypriot bourgeoisie to acquire a ‘national’, anti-imperialist

character, as had occurred in other colonised countries. Instead, despite its political

affiliation with Greece, a significant part of the bourgeoisie was linked primarily to

English capital, while any involvement with Greek capital was minimal (Servas

1951, 129; Katsiaounis 1996, 34). For example, more than 50 years after British

occupation the large majority of Cyprus exports (63%) and imports (78%) were

with Britain, Egypt and other British dominions and colonies, while Cyprus exports

to Greece comprised only approximately 10.5%.9

Furthermore, most Cypriot political leaders, at least in the first period of British

occupation, were ‘dazzled’ by the English. An Englishman’s greeting was consid-

ered a blessing, and the expression ‘he’s an Englishman’ was a compliment.10 In

addition, some nationalists believed that the political leaders of this period had been

led astray by the promises and rhetorical aphorisms of the English Liberals and

called for enosis as a favour and not as a right.11 As a result, the Greek Cypriot

nationalists had, for the most part, conceptualised political protest within a

law-abiding context. The members of the Greek Cypriot deputation of 1929 to

Lord Pass field stated that ‘they fully understand that they were a small people and

6Eleftheria, 15 March 1919, 3.7‘An Answer to the Minister’, Laiki, 5 March 1926, 1.8‘Organisation should begin soon’, Eleftheria, 15 May 1929, 1.9TNA, CO 67/225/6, ‘General development of Cyprus: water supplies, roads, harbours and

forests’, Despatch No. 145, Enclosure No. 4, Principle Forrest Officer to the Governor,

1 September 1927.10‘Truth and reality’, article by Achilleas Emilianides, secretary of the National Organisation,

Eleftheria, 11 March 1931, 1.11‘Unorganised’, Eleftheria, 20 May 1931, 1.

4.2 The Nature and Singularities of the National Movement in Cyprus 79

could therefore only hope for the achievement of their aspirations through the

generosity of Great Britain’.12

A third explanation, in the exact opposite direction, is usually attributed to the

British themselves. Many British officials believed that Britain was over-tolerant of

the national movement in Cyprus, which facilitated its further development (Hill

1952, 492–493, 501). Indicative of Britain’s tolerance—but also of the moderation

of Greek Cypriot nationalism—was the fact that for most of the British rule of

Cyprus, there were very few British officers and soldiers to perform all the

functions of government.13

Also contributing to the Greek Cypriot nationalists’ moderate stance was the

Church, which believed acquiescence to their foreign rulers was the best policy

(Georghallides 1979, 82–83). During the first decades of the British presence, this

policy of non-provocation towards the British guided the stance of the important

Nicosia politicians (Constantinides and Liasides) and of the Church (Katsiaounis

1996, 186–187). Inherent initially in this stance was the attempt to win over the

Turkish Cypriots on common economic problems.

Another important factor was Greece’s heavy dependency on Britain; for this

reason Greece encouraged compliancy among the Greek Cypriot elite and declined

to provoke Britain (Katsiaounis 2000b, 275).14 Greece made other fronts priority

for its irredentist claims (Markides 2008, 69), and its interest in the Cyprus question

was one of sentiment rather than direct interest. In fact, it appears that during the

Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the Greek government sent ‘fire-fighting’ messages to

the Cypriot politicians warning against stirring up the unionist movement

(Papapolyviou 1997, 13, 248–249). And this statement of the then Prime Minister

of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos, further attests to the Greek position on Cyprus:

‘There is no Cyprus Question between Greece and England but only between

Cypriots and English government.’15 He continued: ‘we are not concerned with

Cyprus. The Cypriots can resolve the issue with England’.16

And later, repudiating the uprising of 1931, Prime Minister Venizelos said: ‘Theunfortunate thing is that the events in Cyprus took place in ignorance of the fact that

the Greek Government was anything but in favour of these actions’, while a few

weeks later he was quoted in a London newspaper, stating that ‘unfortunately the

demonstration assumed an anarchical character and led to these distressing events’.In his proclamation he also warned that he would not allow ‘parts of the Greek

12TNA, CO 67/227/39518 (Part 3), ‘Proposals for reform of the constitution’, Minute by A. J.

Dawe, 28 October 1929.13‘Statistics on the civil servants in Cyprus’, Eleftheria, 25 May 1912, 1. That year there were

84 British. There was also the military guard, which was based in Limassol and in 1921 amounted

to 108 soldiers from India (Georghallides 1979, 191).14TNA, CO 67/228/39543 (Part 1), ‘Movement for union of Cyprus with Greece’,No. 376, MacKillop (Athens) to Lord Cushenden, 1 October 1928. On the dependence of Greek

foreign policy on Britain, see also Georghallides (1997, 92) and Meynaud (2002, 60).15‘Cyprus–Dodecanese: Venizelos’ Statement’, Eleftheria 29 September 1928, 2.16‘Cyprus–Dodecanese: Venizelos’ Statement’, Eleftheria 13 October 1928, 2.

80 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

family which are outside the state’ to intervene in the national affairs of his

country.17

The leading Greek Cypriots at the time, taking Athens’ dependence on London

for granted, believed that enosis could be achieved within the framework of Anglo-

Greek friendship; in the meantime they could live under the British and work for

constitutional and economic concessions. In the context of this peculiar

conceptualisation of the unionist demand, some Greek Cypriot leaders never cut

all channels of communication with the British and participated in political and

other institutions. They even took part in formal celebrations by the British admin-

istration, such as the 50th anniversary of the British presence on the island, despite

the formal decision of the National Council in favour of non-participation.18

Earlier, in 1923, during the name day celebration of the King of England, politician

Achilleas Liasides began to shout hurrah for the English King, giving the signal to

the rest of those present. 19

This ‘strange’ and unequal Greco-British cooperation saw even the most com-

mitted advocates of Union accepting appointments on the Executive Council. For

example, in 1927 and 1928 N. Paschalis, a highly prominent leader of the enosismovement, took such an Executive Council appointment (Georghallides 1997,

84),20 leading to a heated public debate21 After the October 1931 events, when

both the Executive and Legislative Councils were abolished and replaced by the

Advisory Body, the same thing occurred. Among those who accepted appointment

to the Advisory Body and to the Executive Council over the years included such

renowned nationalists as the Bishop Kyrillos of Kition, Christodoulos Sozos,

Theofanis Theodotou, Spyros Araouzos and Antonis Triantafyllides.22

This peculiar approach to the nationalist movement produced further political

paradoxes. For example, the leaders of enosis had collaborated with the British andbenefited from the period of colonialism.23 Apart from the security forces and the

lower government employees who carried out the work of government, the British

sought—and in many cases, achieved—the cooperation of leading figures in the

17‘Eleftherios Venizelos Proclamation to the Greek people’, in Eleftheria 25 November 1931.18‘The people should reject the festivals of the occupier’, Neos Anthropos, 14 January 1928, 1;

‘Their pitiful predicament’, Neos Anthropos, 13 June, 1928, 1. For the National Council see

Chap. 7.19‘The name day of the King of England in Nicosia’, Eleftheria, 6 June 1923, 3.20See also, ‘Mr N Paschalis the public prosecutor’, Eleftheria, 16 March 1927, 2, 3; Eleftheria,19 March 1927, 1.21‘The opinion of Mr Evgenios Michaelides’, Eleftheria, 23 June 1928, 1.22Cyprus Blue Book 1903–1904, 94; Cyprus Blue Book 1911–1912, 106; Cyprus Blue Book

1916–1917, 110; Cyprus Blue Book 1930, 108.23Muller (2006, 190) notes that these individuals in all similar societies, gained material and

immaterial advantages, such as the experience of relations with the authorities and titles indicating

social position (e.g., knights), while the material benefits included public donations, subsidies,

government contracts, tax relief, public housing, etc. The most important was employment in the

public sector.

4.2 The Nature and Singularities of the National Movement in Cyprus 81

Greek community, who also controlled the majority of the population. Another

contradiction of the Greek Cypriot national movement was the fact that while, it

encouraged Cypriot military participation in Greek wars (such as the Balkan Wars),

it did not take a similar approach to the Cyprus Question (Papapolyviou 1997, 212).

However, and despite these inherent contradictions, nationalism became hege-

monic and enosis became a popular movement. This remark brings to the fore the

discussion over the ‘natural’ or ‘constructed’ nature of nationalism in the case of

Cyprus.

4.3 The Popular Nature of the National Movement: An

Artificial Construct?

The question of whether nationalism gives birth to nations or if it is the other way

around has interested scholars for many years (see Chap. 1). In many ways it

resembles the age-old conundrum of whether the chicken or the egg came first.

Most scholarship seems to agree on the ‘constructivist’ approach, i.e., that the ideaof a common ethnic identity and a certain national idea required mechanisms and

agents of socialisation to succeed. Such mechanisms included schools, the mass

media, institutionalised rituals and symbols (myths, flags, songs, etc.), national

societies, books, journals and other institutional forms of political mobilisation

(Rokkan 1970, 61; Hobsbawm 2000, 140). The literature describes this view of the

nation as an ‘artificial construct’ (Hobsbawm 1994, 23; Liakos 2005, 53, 58), i.e.,

referring to the mechanisms of ethnogenesis (on the mechanisms of nationalism

generally, see Lekkas 1996, 135).

And yet, for such a response to be elicited there must be an ideology (and in this

case nationalist ideology) that speaks to a common national identity and origin; and

this can only develop if the raw materials are already present. Such materials

consist of,

pre-existing forms of collective solidarity or collective rejection of cultural elements,

traditional societies whose inheritance is claimed and appropriated by the emerging nation,

historical events and successes of other eras, morals, habits, myths, beliefs, artistic tradi-

tions, even non-cultural elements such as the size of the aspiring nation, its concentration in

a specific geographical region, the history of this region, its cultural and geopolitical

significance (Lekkas 1996, 115).

With regard to Greek Cypriot nationalism the raw material was there, thus

allowing the easy transmission of nationalist ideology. The predominance of the

Greek ethnic element provided the demographic and cultural infrastructure that

allowed Greek nationalism to become established as the strongest political ideology

in contemporary Cypriot history. As former Governor of Cyprus Storrs (1945, 469)

wrote in his book Orientations, ‘the Greekness of the Cypriots is in my view

82 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

undoubted’.24 Language, religion, common descent and the Greek antiquities that

abound on Cyprus offered strong proof of the Cypriots’ ‘Greekness’—a strong

foundation upon which to build the national movement (Persianis 1978, 37). The

culturally unifying factors included the modern media and public education, both of

which became well established with the arrival of the British.

Hellenic nationalism successfully built on these elements in its early stages

(especially before the British occupation), although the national movement lacked

broad popular appeal, because the majority lacked elementary literacy, which

prevented transmission of the idea of a national identity based on ancestral culture

(Demetriou 1999, 37; Georghallides 1979, 81). Consequently, in its early years

nationalism had no consistent political programme nor a minimum level of support.

While few in numbers, those involved had a decisive influence: most were located

in the larger towns, which were the center of political power, and they were highly

educated. Although initially nationalism was very weakly organised (at the end of

the nineteenth century), it gradually was disseminated through newspapers, as well

as reading rooms that sponsored lectures by literate Greeks from Alexandria,

Smyrna and Istanbul. Reading rooms were also a venue for reading newspapers,

although the reading audience was quite limited (Katsiaounis 1996, 52).

Greek Cypriot nationalism at this early stage therefore, has been described as an

elitist movement (Richter 2007, 114); and in fact in the early stages enosis was

mainly a question for the urban higher classes. Because of the organised dissemi-

nation of the program and its adoption by the Church, however, nationalism rapidly

acquired a popular character. An important role in this process was played by

education and the print media. With the Archbishopric elections (1900–1910) and

the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) nationalist rhetoric became hegemonic and acquired

a truly mass appeal. The nationalist system of propaganda was related to the

relevant developments of the economy and society at large: the growth of a national

reading public, the expansion of popular press, the establishment of postal service

by the British, the building of roads, the spread of libraries, reading clubs and

voluntary associations.

4.4 Mechanisms of Transmission of the Nationalist

Ideology

Like all contemporary ideologies, Greek nationalism was very systematically

promoted. A network of both local and external agents were mobilised to spread

the irredentist ideology of the independent Greek state: ‘with the creation of associ-

ations to promote the education of the irredentists, and the sending of teachers and

24Hill (1952, 441) mentions the offer of a significant number of donkeys to meet the needs of the

Greek army in 1880 during the period of preparation for the war with Turkey and the departure of

150 volunteers as an indication of the national orientation of the Greek Cypriots.

4.4 Mechanisms of Transmission of the Nationalist Ideology 83

educational materials to the communities of the Greek periphery, Cyprus experi-

enced the immediate consequences of these initiatives’ (Kitromilides 1984, 12).

The chief mechanisms for the ‘construction’ of a Greek national identity in

Cyprus were the educational system, which was controlled by the Orthodox Church,

the printed media and the volunteer societies founded by intellectuals who had

studied in Greece and by the Greek consulate (Mavratsas 2003, 65). The primary

and secondary schoolteachers—most of whom were mainland Greeks invited to

work in Cyprus, or Cypriots educated in Greece—saw themselves as missionaries of

the Greek nation (Tzermias 2001, 88). Young Cypriots who studied in Athens

returned to Cyprus as the most enthusiastic supporters of Union. This new genera-

tion grew up to see Union as liberation, not only from the Turks, but also from

English tyranny (Richter 2007, 115). It is important to understand how ethnicity,

which is traditionally a cultural category, gradually developed into a political agent.

4.4.1 Education

It has been said (Gellner 1983) that nations are constructed through a country’seducational system, as it can disseminate a consistent variant of high culture to the

everyday reality of the people. The state’s leaders and its political elite use educationto promote a specific set of values and norms, and for the national determination of

their communities (Choisi 1995, 55).25 This presupposes a degree of literacy that did

not exist in Cyprus at the period of transition to British rule; in fact, the majority of

the population was illiterate at this time. Even in 1911, after 33 years of British

occupation, 73.21% of the population did not know how to read and write (Census

1911, 15). The development of education was catalytic in molding a Greek national

identity since rise in education levels went in tandemwith Greek education curricula.

Statistics reveal the growth of the state education system; in 1879 there were

83 Greek schools with 1071 boys and 426 girl pupils, and 65 Muslim schools

(a report by the English education supervisor, Spencer); In 1886 there were

180 Greek schools (The Cypriot Encyclopaedia, Vol. V, 26); in 1916 there were

699 schools with 39,567 pupils and 856 teachers (Zapheriou 2008, 65). As a result,

by 1931 there was 45% literacy (Census 1931, 16), which reflected in the growth

and the spread of nationalist ideology (Kitromilides 1979, 160). The expansion of

the network of primary and secondary schools first in the cities and later in the

countryside opened up new audiences for Hellenic national values.

The expansion of education became possible when the colonial authorities

introduced legislation that allowed the school committees to collect a school tax

for their own use (Choisi 1995, 54). Nevertheless, the education system was fraught

with inequalities, especially between towns and rural areas. Small villages had

25On the relationship between education and nationalism, see Hobsbawm (1994, 134); Lekkas

(1996, 135).

84 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

limited financial resources, with most unable to finance construction of a school, or

pay the salary of a teacher. Throughout the British occupation, middle schools were

limited to the towns, while women’s access to the education system was limited

(The Cypriot Encyclopaedia, Vol. V, 26). As a result, the transmission of national

ideas to the countryside was much later than in the towns.

Overall, the growth in state education boosted the popular growth in nationalist

ideology; this in turn, was the means by which the national movement grew from an

elitist to a popular cause. Scholars also credit the importance of nationalism for the

educational system since; as an ideology nationalism promoted value of education

for all (Persianis 1978, 35–37). For the emerging national bourgeoisie, education

served another purpose: it became the primary vehicle for the political socialisation

of the people (particularly the youth), since it was difficult to keep education under

the establishment’s control. For the vanguard of bourgeois nationalism, the expan-

sion of education was decisive: it facilitated the challenge to the established order

and helped its own class to rise. As the new national bourgeoisie established its hold

of power and became afraid of possible threats to its hegemony by possible new

claimants the demand for the growth and propagation of education became more

conservative. For example, when in 1926 Larnaca MP Loukis Pierides, proposed

that education be compulsory for all, regardless of ethnic group, religion and

gender, the proposal was rejected.26

The British mandated continuation of separate education for the two communi-

ties and left school administration to communal institutions. During the first

decades of the British occupation, Greek schools were mainly financed by the

Church and various private initiatives—which gave these entities administrative

control (Faustmann 1998, 53). Prior to the 1931 October riots the Greek Educa-

tional Council and the District Educational Councils (legally established in 1895)

held control of these functions (Katalanos 2003, 277). These bodies were used by

the Greek Cypriot elite in their promotion of enosis. The Educational Council

comprised the British Chief Secretary, the Archbishop of Cyprus, three Greek

parliamentarians from the Legislative Council and six members elected for a

2-year term, one from each district (drawn from the District Committees); their

responsibilities included determining the courses and the syllabi, drawing up the

rules of the schools, choosing books and taking decisions on building new schools.

The British Administrator of the district, the local Bishop and four elected

members sat on the District Educational Councils; their responsibilities included

appointment and dismissal of teachers, and setting salaries and schools tax (Cypriot

26‘Compulsory education’, Nea Laiki, 8 January 1927.

4.4 Mechanisms of Transmission of the Nationalist Ideology 85

Encyclopaedia 1986, Vol. V, 28).27 Their many responsibilities reveal the powerful

role assigned to members of these councils, dominated by the clergy, the upper

bourgeois and the landowning class. Because the British did not intervene directly

in educational matters, the curriculum was defined by the Church and the Greek

state for many years, giving teachers the freedom to promote, cultivate, indoctrinate

even, an ethnocentric bias. Classrooms were decorated to explicitly highlight the

connection between Greece and Cyprus—using pictures of the Greek royal family

and maps of Greece (Storrs 1945, 467; Loizides 1980, 12).

The British had understood early on how education could potentially challenge

their domination in Cyprus. As early as 1897, and soon after his arrival on the

island, the first Governor, Wolsley, investigated the school system and submitted a

report warning that the Greek schools could be transformed into ‘centers of Greekpropaganda’. He also recognised that in the Greek schools education seen as a way

to promote the idea of Union and had the support of the leadership elite (cited in

Georghallides 1979, 47). The Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie was well aware of this,

which explains their reactions to British attempts to dehellenise education:

The Greek school is the seedbed of the Greek national idea. Teachers and books are carriers

of the pure Greek spirit. The books come directly from the Greek center or are based on

those written there, the teachers are trained by professors who gained their knowledge and

education on free Greek soil.28

With schools becoming ‘hotbeds of anti-British propaganda’ (Choisi 1995, 56),the British reacted. Yet, issues regarding the direction and management of educa-

tional issues were not initially addressed by the British, likely because Cyprus’sfuture as a colony was uncertain (Varnava 2009). While Cypriots managed these

functions during the first decades of British occupation, when the question of Union

began to threaten the preservation of the colony, the British changed their stance.

Recognising the Church’s control over education, the colonial government

believed the religious leaders aimed to influence the people and that the schools

were used primarily to achieve the Church’s political goals (Persianis 1978, 18;

Georghallides 1979, 274–275). Therefore, the colonial government tried to restruc-

ture the entire educational system, from changing how teachers were appointed, to

mandating English as the language of instruction. This served merely to intensify

conflict with the Church and the nationalists.

Not only in Cyprus, but throughout Western Europe, control over state education

was a source of conflict because the teaching profession functions by definition as a

highly politicised sector of the social structure (Rokkan 1970, 297). In Cyprus the

27‘The distribution of school taxation’, Eleftheria, 5 March 1927, 2. In this article, information is

given on the amounts paid in tax by the various population groups in the capital: merchants,

journalists, state employees, etc.; ‘Greek Educational Council’, Eleftheria, 18 May 1927, 2. Infor-

mation is given on the decisions taken, among others, concerning the number of schools which

would be built; ‘Greek Educational Council’, Eleftheria, 3 August 1927, 2. Information is given on

the appointment of teachers; ‘The educational council’, Nea Laiki, 17 July 1926, 3 where infor-

mation is given on the appointment of teachers.28Article by Savvas Loizides, Eleftheria, 9 February 1929, 1.

86 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

conflict over educational control was part of the broader political struggle for

Union. Cypriot politicians recognised the value of teachers as important political

capital and they strongly opposed any British interference. Teachers were depen-

dent for their appointments, transfer and salary on the District Educational Coun-

cils, which were run by politicians and the Church; in return for placement they

offered services including electioneering (Georghallides 1979, 51; Surridge 1930;

Storrs 1945, 500).29

If we consider the important role of the teacher in the microcosm of the village,

we can understand the political value in controlling them. Most teachers were the

only educated person in the village, and were a key part of the politicians’ electoral‘machine’. Also, and more important, teachers often operated on their own initia-

tive to consciously promote Unionist ideology—this was a result of their studies in

Greece, the ‘national center’ (Loizides 1980, 13). By virtue of his position the

teacher was at the heart of nationalist activities. For example, the Pan-Cypriot

Gymnasium headmaster, Michail Volonakis (1896–1911), is noted for pioneering

the systematic organisation of events to celebrate national anniversaries: e.g., the

Fall of Constantinople, Flag Day, etc. (Papapolyviou 1997, 59–60). Other teachers

in 1904 founded an association called ‘The Patriotic Club’, which for 2 years

carried out visits to all the towns and villages of Cyprus in order to raise money

for the ‘national fleet’ (Katalanos 2003, 415–421).Persianis (1978, 64–65) divides the British education policy in Cyprus into three

periods. The first, which he describes as a policy of minimal involvement, began

with the arrival of the British and lasted until 1929; the second, which he regards as

a period of intervention, lasted from 1929 to 1956; while he describes the third,

from 1956 onwards, as cooperative. Georghallides (1979, 50) regards the year 1923

as the turning point because of new legislation on the control of primary education.

The two bills of legislation differed in terms of who was responsible for teacher

appointments. For this second period, the British administration assumed the

payment of the teachers, but the curricula remained in the hands of the Educational

Councils (see below).

Although the British attempted to intervene in the education system in 1920,

they were unsuccessful until 1923, when they passed legislation that gave them the

right to decide teacher appointments. Changes in Greek political representation at

this time, with moderate politicians elected in the Legislative Council, enabled the

new law (see Chap. 7). The new legislation stipulated that the High Commissioner

would appoint teachers on the suggestions of the Educational Council (teachers had

been appointed by the school committees), and the colonial government would

assume all financial responsibility for the schools. The law furthermore changed the

composition of the Educational Council and the District Educational Councils, by

taking over member appointments; this significantly reduced the responsibilities of

the Church (The Cypriot Encyclopaedia, Vol. V, 28). In the 1930s the British also

29‘The non-transferability of teachers’, Eleftheria, 13 April 1927, 1.

4.4 Mechanisms of Transmission of the Nationalist Ideology 87

established scholarships for Cypriots to study at British universities (Storrs 1945,

480).

A new British legislation in 1929 authorised the Governor to appoint and pay

teachers, turning them into state employees, and also assumed their appointment

directly; this provoked considerable tension. The new law abolished the District

Committees and stipulated that all teachers would be British subjects—a regulation

that aimed directly to block teachers from the Greek mainland. The newspapers

covered the long and heated debate that focused on the dehellenisation of education,

a natural result of the new British control, and the heavy budgetary burden which

this would entail. The real (and unspoken) concern, however, was the politicians’prospect of losing all the privileges associated with teacher appointments.

With the support of three Greek parliamentarians, the 1929 draft law in the

Legislative Council was ultimately approved.30 Numerous protest memorandums

were submitted while demonstrations were organised in Nicosia and Paphos. Once

the law was enacted, teachers were forbidden to partake in political activity, thus

rendering a sector of the educated classes inactive.31 There were of course other

sides to this story: for one, a number of teachers favoured the law, as it would

significantly improve their financial situation. Moreover, many politicians—even

those who fiercely opposed the new legislation—concealed the fact that among

them there were some appointed to the Executive Council and received good

salaries, whereas members of the Legislative Council also received remuneration.

Despite this intervention the enosismovement continued to flourish (The CypriotEncyclopaedia, Vol. V, 28), meaning that whole generations of Greek Cypriots

were growing up in a system that was hostile to the British. An important side effect

of this process that falls outside the scope of this particular inquiry is its impact

upon the relations between the two Cypriot communities. As Panayiotou (2006a,

91) notes, ‘the school classroom was a place where imported national histories and

geographies nearly eclipsed Cypriot time/history and space/geography’.

4.4.2 Printed Media

The press was introduced to Cyprus just 3 weeks after the arrival of the British,

reflecting a growing popular interest in political issues. The first Greek newspapers

30The three Greek parliamentarians who voted for the law were Chatzieftichios Chatziprokopis,

Neophytos Nikolaides and Panayiotis Kakoyiannis. As a result of the public outcry, none of the

three parliamentarians ran as candidates in the 1930 elections.31‘Temptation of the teachers’, article by P. Loizides in Eleftheria, 29 June 1929, 1, and 6 July

1929, 2; ‘Turning the teachers into employees’, article by Antis Triantafyllides in Eleftheria,7 August 1929, 1; ‘The new draft law on education’, Eleftheria, 27 November 1929, 2; ‘The draftlaw on education. The amendments which have been made’, Eleftheria, 11 December 1929, 2.

88 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

were published in Larnaca, since at that time it was the leading commercial,

spiritual and cultural center of Cyprus (Katalanos 2003, 165).32 Most newspapers

were local rather than island-wide and were published either weekly or fortnightly

(The Cypriot Encyclopaedia, Vol. V, 219). The newspapers represented different

degrees of Greek nationalism and devoted considerable space to news about

Greece. For most of the Greek population, the awakening of national consciousness

was a process that developed in parallel with the dissemination of the written word

(Katsiaounis 1995, 234), and the newspapers were key (Ioannou 2007, 388).

The press reported the important political and social issues of the period; yet,

besides providing information on such issues, they also reinforced the national

spirit of the Greek Cypriots. The circulation levels of the Cypriot newspapers of the

period show that public interest in politics was continually increasing. Here we note

the significance of ‘print capitalism to the spreading of nationalism’ (Anderson1983, 46–47), meaning that the spread of nationalism is not merely restricted to

printing as a technique but it is capitalism as a system that ensures the circulation

and dissemination of printed material (see also Liakos 2005, 88).

Table 4.1 presents the circulation rates and the number of newspapers published

at specific points in time until the October 1931 riots. When reading the table some

things must be taken into consideration since not all newspapers were nationalistic

nor their numbers reflect a unique value of readership. In the mid-1910s the first

satirical newspapers appeared; these included Mastigio (The Whip) and Mikroula(The Little One) both of which had significant circulation rates (of around 1600

copies). In the early-1920s the first socialist newspaper was printed, Pyrsos (TheTorch), with a circulation rate of 100 copies.33 Pyrsos was followed by NeosAnthropos (New Man) in January 1925 and had a circulation of approximately

1600 copies. Likely there was considerable overlap, as many people would have

taken more than one newspaper. Furthermore, the main audience for these news-

papers was a small educated social elite, who were law abiding in relation to the

government—a fact that the newspapers themselves recognised.34

The Greek nationalist newspapers were owned and edited by eminent members

of the rising Greek bourgeoisie; as such they acted as the public face and mouth-

piece of Unionist demands. They were filled with articles written by clergymen,

politicians, and intellectuals. An indicative formulation of the Unionist demand is

32Cyprus was the island’s first newspaper and appeared in Larnaca in August 1878, ten weeks afterthe arrival of the British. Alitheia (Truth) was published in Limassol in December 1880 by

Aristotelis Palaiologos, a Greek from Istanbul. Stasinos was published for the first time in Larnaca

in 1881 by Themistocles Theocharides, a teacher who lived in Cyprus. Salpinx (The Trumpet) was

published in 1884 by Stylianos Chourmouzios and Enosis (Union) in Larnaca in 1885 by

Christodoulos Kouppas. No newspaper was published in Nicosia until 1881 when Neon Kition(New Kition) moved there from Larnaca. Stasinos, which was renamed The Voice of Cyprus, alsomoved to Nicosia in 1887. For more details, see Sophokleous (1995).33Cyprus Blue Book 1923, 165. The number of each newspaper’s circulation is based on their

editors’ declaration and concerns the average circulation rate per publication.34‘On events’, Neo Ethnos (New Nation), 12 February 1916, 1.

4.4 Mechanisms of Transmission of the Nationalist Ideology 89

that found in the first issue of the newspaper Kypriakos Fylax (Cypriot Sentinel),

whose editorial was entitled ‘The National Programme in Cyprus’ and referred to

the need for Hellenism in Cyprus to organise and plan for the aim of Union with

Mother Greece.35 Eleftheria (Freedom), in a front page article entitled ‘OnlyUnion’, called on the parliamentarians in the Legislative Council to demand

Union with Greece during the first meeting of the forthcoming parliamentary

period.36 The Greek Cypriot newspapers systematically reproduced historical

prophecies and legends to emphasise the continuity of the Greek community on

the island with the Byzantine past and the ties with wider Hellenism, actions which

Papapolyviou (1997, 78) sets in the context of ‘preaching the Great Idea’. They alsoplayed a leading role in carrying out nationalist activities such as fundraising for

Greece when that country was at war.

The newspapers’ encouragement of nationalism and their criticism of the colo-

nial power led the British to take measures to control and limit the press. The

appearance of the Communist Party was also a factor in the British reaction. In May

1930, legislation was enacted that required newspaper publishers to pay a guarantee

of £200, an enormous sum for the time. They were also required to publish all

government communiques without payment. Moreover, all permits to publish

newspapers were rescinded, a clause which was implemented 3 months after the

law came into effect.37 This law also allowed the British to discover the true

identity of the newspaper owners, who often hid behind others who appeared for

legal purposes as responsible for the newspapers (Richter 2007, 413).

The Greek community reacted strongly, condemning it as an attempt to limit the

freedom of the press. They claimed that it would hang as a ‘damclean sword’ overpublishers and journalists, and the guarantee payment would hurt the poorest social

Table 4.1 Indicative circulation of Greek newspapers

Year Number of issues Number of newspapers issued Number of magazines issued

1884 1200 3 –

1887 2400 4 –

1893 2990 6 –

1901 4630 7 1

1907 8500 12 –

1917 11,250 13 1

1922 14,650 14 2

1926 16,356 16 2

1931 12,600 9 2

Source: Cyprus Blue Books 1883–1884; 1886–1887; 1892–1893; 1900–1901; 1908–1909; 1916–

1917; 1922; 1926; 1931

35Kypriakos Fylax, 8 April 1906, 1.36Eleftheria, 1 March 1913, 1.37‘On the draft press law’, Eleftheria, 10 May 1930, 2.

90 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

groups, who would lose the publications that promoted their cause and views.38

This prediction proved correct: both Isotis (Equality), published by the Bishop of

Kition, and the communist Neos Anthropos were unable to pay the guarantee and

both closed down in August 1930 (Richter 2007, 414).

The press played a leading role in shaping public opinion to favour enosis bydisseminating specific principles, attitudes and convictions, as well as producing

(nationalist) ideology. With the help of the press, Cypriots—even those in the most

isolated villages—began to understand that they were part of a broader whole. They

began to identify with a common Greek national sentiment and with a political

entity greater than the local environment of their village (Ioannou 2007, 389).

4.4.3 The Balkan Wars

The two Balkan wars (1912–1913) played a defining role in popularising the

national movement. Not only did significant numbers of Greek Cypriot volunteer

to participate, but they also organised numerous activities (e.g., fundraising) in

support of the Greek state. These activities allowed the Greek Cypriots to express

their feelings of ‘national solidarity’ with the ‘motherland’. This was not the first

time Cypriots had supported Greece: during the Greco-Turkish War (1897)

fundraising committees had been set up, and many Cypriots had joined in the

fight and some lost their lives on the battlefield.39 Papapolyviou (1997, 11–12)

describes the Balkan Wars as ‘the most glorious period of the Cypriot Unionist

movement in the years of the British occupation’. He also argues that it was at this

point that the balance in Cyprus—Greece relations shifted decisively towards Ath-

ens, the ‘national center’. While the events of this period helped consolidate the view

that Union was feasible, domestic conditions were also favourable, as the Archbish-

opric Question was resolved and the political leadership reunited (see Chap. 6).

Enthusiasm for enosis was evident in a variety of ways: many shops were

named/renamed in reference to the war or personalities from the war; school

textbooks included lessons on the new epic adventure of the Greeks; school parades

and events related to Greek history were organised. Journalists and politicians

successfully called for volunteers to fight for the Greek cause, and while some

prominent citizens volunteered, it was primarily poor peasants who travelled to

Greece with the money raised by the committees (Loizides 1980, 13). One well-

known volunteer was politician Christodoulos Sozos (parliamentarian, mayor of

Limassol and Executive Council member), who died in battle; his death helped to

increase publicity around the cause.

38‘Protest by newspaper editors about the press law’, Eleftheria, 3 May 1930, 1.39Salpix Lemesou (The Limassol Trumpet) 14 June 1896, 2; 17 July 1896, 1; 9 August 1897, 1; and

26 March 1897, 1.

4.4 Mechanisms of Transmission of the Nationalist Ideology 91

The first Cypriot mass mission (200 volunteers) left in January 1913, after the

death of C. Sozos, accompanied by the Bishop of Kition, Meletios Metaxakis.40

Despite uncertain information and the fact that the records are incomplete, there is

an estimate of 1800 Cypriot volunteers (Papapolyviou 1997, 227–231). National

memorial services were held for the war dead and were widely attended; underlying

the organised services were the aims to instill the collective memory of sacrifice,

and to create heroic examples to be imitated. This was a conscious practice of the

Cypriot leadership so as to maintain the climate of national excitement. The death

of C. Sozos offered a particularly important ideological opportunity. It was

described by Papapolyviou as ‘a valuable gift to Unionist ideology’ and became

transformed into ‘a national symbol’.National fundraising activities also reveal the depth of national identification.

The press and the Church played leading roles, while Cypriot women, especially

from well-known families, played an active part; but so did the lower classes

(Papapolyviou 1997, 100–101, 105). In total, it is estimated that these fundraising

activities raised around £16,000.

These two activities—fundraising drives and the volunteer movement—prove

that by that time the Unionist movement was anything but elitist. This is also

apparent in the popular Cypriot poetry written in this period (see Papapolyviou

1997, 89–95, 206). These manifestations of support proved the solidarity of the

Greeks of Cyprus with the Greeks in mainland Greece and the close ties between

them, thus leading by association to the self-evident need for enosis. After theirreturn, the Cypriot volunteers were honoured as heralds of the nation and standard-

bearers of the Great Idea. With their transformation into heroes, the Cypriot

volunteer movement became an ideological tool to further cultivate the demand

for Union. Many war veterans were invited into schools to share their experiences

with the pupils. Participation in the wars and the human sacrifices gave the struggle

for Union a strong emotional element.

Either the popularisation of the national movement was not understood or it was

underestimated by the British officials in Cyprus, who took the simplistic position

that the movement was a creation of the Church, politicians and teachers

(Papapolyviou 1997, 68). This perception is clear from the writings of R. Storrs

(1945, 468), who believed that if a referendum by secret vote were held, 90% of the

population would vote in favour of a closer relationship with Great Britain (see also

Hill 1952, 494–495, 525, 531, 533). Most British officials in Cyprus agreed with

this; they did not believe that the Unionist movement represented the will of the

Cypriots. For example, in 1919 a Cypriot mission to London petitioning for Union

was sent off by nearly 6000 Greek Cypriots in Nicosia and a corresponding number

in Famagusta, but it was not even mentioned in the High Commissioner’s reports tothe Ministry (Georghallides 1979, 118–121). The British persisted in believing that

the Unionist movement was an artificial creation of the clergy, lawyers and

40Eleftheria, 13 July 1913, 2.

92 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

moneylenders. Had the British accepted a referendum, they would have seen the

true extent of the support for this movement.

4.5 Ideas as Carriers of Change

Nationalist ideology brought constant challenges to Cypriot society. The world

view ceased to be unitary, given and uncontested, as defined by religion and the

Church. Instead, it was open to multiple interpretations and conscious attempts to

reshape it. Nationalism cohered as a political position particularly after the conclu-

sion of the Archbishopric Question in 1909 (see Chap. 6). The major socialising

institutions, i.e., the education system, the press and the Church, worked together to

promote enosis, while also working together to maintain their control over the

lower strata. The nationalists may be identified with a particular political generation

for which enosis was a formative ideological experience. Because of their social

and financial advantage, the leading nationalist circles of the Greek Cypriot elite

enjoyed political hegemony. They promised that enosis would bring economic and

political benefits but these benefits were really for themselves, ensuring for their

(the landowners, the merchants, the rising bourgeoisie and the prelates) positions

within the power structure. There were some nationalists, however, who were

opposed to the conservative establishment of Nicosia—and they needed the help

of the lower strata in their attempt to prevail. Hence, they gradually embraced the

popular masses of workers and peasants. As long as the dominant issue was

opposition to the colonial regime and the local establishment, there was a natural

identification of interests between the popular masses and the leaders of the

bourgeoisie (Katsiaounis 1996, 222). This gave nationalism a popular character.

In this regard, nationalism also offered an alternative source of political legiti-

macy for the ruling elite, beyond their influence and power over the popular masses

through networks of economic dependence. The national movement succeeded in

making the concept of Union inseparable from the identity of the Greek Cypriot. As

Papapolyviou writes (1997, 49), ‘the press easily adopted accusations of “national

unworthiness’”, making things difficult for anyone who took a different stance (e.g.,

the communists). All the mechanisms that promoted the national consciousness of

the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie were continually mobilised with the aim of convinc-

ing the lower classes of the value of nationalism in order for the movement to

acquire a mass character and to become a political force to be reckoned with. They

were successful, and so the popular strata took the stance maintained by the Greek

ruling class (clergy and urban bourgeoisie). The main reason for this was:

The total ideological and political superiority of the bourgeois and clerical rulers, who

controlled all the expressions of organised life of the Greek community: ecclesiastical

committees, chambers of commerce, cultural, athletic and philanthropic associations, and

leagues of war veterans and graduates of various schools. The ruling class exercised

complete and absolute control over the key sector of education, where through the school

boards it controlled both the content of the syllabus and the appointment of the teaching

4.5 Ideas as Carriers of Change 93

staff. A similar situation applied to the mass media where the Greek Cypriots had already

developed a network of local and island-wide newspapers (Katsiaounis 2000a, 21).

It was in this period that large-scale celebrations of national events took a

prominent role in the way nationalist politics were performed. The object was to

popularise enosis and communicate the fervour of the nationalist movement to a

larger audience. Great stress was also placed on close and regular contact with the

press whose engagement was crucial for the spread of nationalist ideas. The idea that

the Greek nation was defined by a unique cultural individuality made manifest in its

language, customs, religion, institutions and history, constituted the (Greek) nation

as the new subject of history and subsumed the notion of individual and political

freedoms beneath the superior ideal of national self-realisation. This powerful

tradition coexisted uneasily with ideals of liberal self-government during the first

half of the nineteenth century, but after the late 1940s the declining prospects of

parliamentary reform and the rise of the communist movement raised it to an

undisputed primacy in the political programme of the Greek Cypriot nationalist

politics. In this way Greek nationalism acquired a distinctive anti-democratic quality.

The most powerful institution of the Greek Cypriots throughout the Ottoman and

British rule was the Church of Cyprus. It was the emerging bourgeoisie who first

promoted Greek nationalism and enosis, but the movement acquired real strength

and momentum when the Church decided to endorse it. It is impossible to speculate

what might have happened had the Church not embraced nationalism. After an

initial period of adjustment with the new reality, the Cypriot Church was incorpo-

rated and, at the same time, it incorporated the enosis doctrine. Moreover, it became

its most ardent promoter and led the movement until Cyprus’s independence in

1960. The next chapter, therefore, focuses on the role of the Church in Cypriot

society at the time.

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volunteerism. Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre. (in Greek)

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96 4 The Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: The Hegemony of Nationalism

Chapter 5

Modernisation and the Church as anInstitution of Continuity

This chapter examines the Church of Cyprus—for Greek Cypriots the most impor-

tant institution throughout the Ottoman and British rule. This examination will

allow the understanding of why the Church became the basic pillar of right-wing,

nationalist party politics throughout most of the twentieth century. I review the

factors underlying the Church’s powerful economic and social position in Cyprus

and consider the historical identification of the (Greek) Orthodox inhabitants of the

island with the Church. Next, looking at how the Church positioned itself in a

period of rapid change, most important here are the Church’s response to the new

British policies, and how its role and discourse in Cypriot society changed in a

period of intense and important transformations—especially its embrace of nation-

alism. It appears that the Church’s conversion to the nationalistic cause can be

interpreted as an attempt to re-legitimise its social and political presence.

In sociological research, religious institutions are commonly examined in the

framework of a polarity between tradition and modernity. In this way important

issues regarding these institutions are examined through comparison: the way they

changed or not; how they changed; their stance vis a vis political ideologies; their

role in social structures, etc. In traditional societies, religion was one of the most

important ideological, political, economic and social institutions; in fact, it gener-

ally determined the society’s dominant discourse. According to Wiatr (1970, 312),

each society had a specific mode of assimilation as well as a number of institutions

that ensured the continuity and unity of the whole organism. These institutions

varied among societies, determined largely by the country’s socio-economic situ-

ation. In Cyprus, this institution was the Church.

Examination of the Church of Cyprus is particularly important for this book for many

reasons. In the absence of a state the Cypriot Church, through its national network of

ecclesiastical committees, monasteries and convents, extensive landed property and

control over the education system, held both the religious and the secular power within

the Greek Cypriot community. The Church negotiated with the British administration

for the Greek Cypriots’ social and economic interests. Its strong influence on the

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_5

97

emerging national movement of the period left little room for other movements that

could challenge it and/or propose themselves as an alternative (Melissas 1996, 11).

As already argued (see Chap. 1), the modernisation of many countries can be

seen as the result of their colonisation by western and more developed countries. In

Cyprus too, the British presence is generally considered the catalyst for its mod-

ernisation (Peristianis 1993, 256). Of interest here is the particular way moderni-

sation unfolded in Cyprus, its limitations and impact on the Orthodox Church. The

most important contextual parameter defining Cypriot modernisation was the

colonial power. It was also due to the island’s lack of a tradition of self-government

and representative institutions; moreover there were no other indigenous institu-

tions apart from the Church. The Church’s unique power within the country allowedit both to participate in, and to a great extent, influence the modernisation process,

despite the fact that it was predominantly an institution of tradition.

Whilemost research agrees that modernitywas ushered intoCyprus by theBritish,

some studies further suggest that the Church made Cyprus’s transition to modernity

unusual and in many respects inflexible (Anagnostopoulou 1999, 199–201). Two

elements of the British periodwhich are regarded as de facto antithetical to each othersupport this argument. The first was the continued political discrimination between

Christians and Muslims and consequently, the institutionalisation of two recognised

entities, which became political as well as demographic (see Chap. 3). The second

was the abolition of the Church’s secular role and privileged power. These two

features of British Cyprus created a scenario of continuity and discontinuity: the

first factor allowed the religious institution to continue to exert influence, while the

second led to the limitation of its activity and influence.

Yet we cannot attribute Cyprus’s induction into modernity to the British alone.

British colonialism served to accelerate the island’s transition to modernity, how-

ever, spurring changes that had already begun in the late Ottoman period (see

Michael et al., 2009). In most societies, the first messages of modernity were of a

cultural nature and usually external. Cyprus fits this profile, as it drew on external

sources in its transition to economic relations and ideologies associated with

modernity: nationalism from Greece and socialism from Russia (which reached

Cyprus through Greece). In the same vein, Cyprus’s particular transition to moder-

nity was also due in large part to the specific form of capitalism then prevalent in

Cyprus; its characteristics were analysed in Chap. 2.

In Cyprus, the period of British domination marked the beginning of the end of

the traditional perception of politics based on the ‘Divine Right to rule’—a char-

acteristic belief of all hierarchically stratified societies (Hobsbawm 2000, 48). It

also highlighted and called into question the traditional patriarchal society and the

privileges of the higher social and economic strata, especially the clergy. The

demise of ‘Divine Right’ can be traced to the French Revolution, at which time

the nation and the concept of popular sovereignty assumed the highest authority,

replacing God, in the context of the nation-state (Liakos 2005, 77; Beck 1996, 46).1

1Doyle (2007, 103) appends the Declaration of the Rights of Man adopted by the revolution, which

in article 3 makes special reference to the nation and the nation-state: ‘The source of all

98 5 Modernisation and the Church as an Institution of Continuity

One of the most intense ideological conflicts to have influenced modern societies

concerned the place of the Church within the new system (Lipset 1970, 25). This

problematic, in relation to the Church of Cyprus, is examined in the rest of this

chapter.

The position and privileges of the Cypriot Church were at the heart of this

inherently conflictual situation—and became an issue because of the British efforts

to undermine the Church’s influence and privileges. In Cyprus, however, religion

remained constant as a spiritual and political force, in stark contrast to the rest of

Western Europe where secularisation became the driving force in the transition to

modern capitalist societies (Bocock 2003, 365; Hobsbawm 2002, 309). Because

this did not occur in Cyprus, the Cypriot Church successfully held onto most of its

privileges and power.

5.1 The Cypriot Church in History

To understand the Church’s significance in Cyprus, as well as its role in the contextof social, economic and ideological change, we must first examine the nature of the

Cypriot Church and especially the power it had acquired over the preceding

centuries. We must also not forget that at that time religion was the idiom of the

overwhelming majority of the world’s population (Hobsbawm 2000, 404). The

history of the Cypriot Church is directly linked to the island’s political history: infact, the Orthodox Church is the largest institution of continuity in the island’shistory (Englezakis 1984, 309), and was the main institution through which the

Greek community expressed itself during the centuries of Ottoman rule. Moreover,

as a result of the Ottoman system of administration and the attendant privileges,

some regard the Church as the real governor of Cyprus from the eighteenth century

until the arrival of the British (Persianis 1978, 9).

Although Hill (1952, 316–319) concurs with this view of the Church, he warns

against overestimating the Church’s power, arguing that this view is based primar-

ily on the evidence of foreign travellers; he finds no real evidence of the Church’spowers prior to the Sultan’s 1865 decree. He also notes that while the bishops and

the Archbishop were accorded strong powers, especially from the mid-eighteenth

century, they did not use their influence and power to protect the people from

oppression.2 Yet he also recognises that the Church was often forced to make

sovereignty resides in the nation. No group of people and no individual can exercise power which

is not derived from the nation’.2To confirm his opinion that this was a ‘foreign’ viewpoint, Hill cites an 1865 note of the French

Consulate that mentions that the annual revenue of the Church came to 1,198,000 piastres, of

which 1,038,000 were reserved for the higher clergy, while the Church showed no interest at all in

the ordinary people.

5.1 The Cypriot Church in History 99

decisions on a rather diplomatic basis in order to protect itself and the Christian

inhabitants of the island. Georghallides (1979, 55) notes that although Cypriots

were disappointed with the European powers’ dealings with Cyprus after the first

century of Ottoman occupation, they eventually acquiesced and adopted a more

pragmatic and submissive policy towards the Ottomans. The Church was no

different, proving its important ability to adapt to various situations. The Church

also revealed its adaptability and flexibility in regard to the British as well as the

emerging nationalist ideology; this attitude allowed the Church to continue playing

a leading role (see below).

Greek Cypriots respected the Church and the prelates, not least because the

Ottomans offered them no alternative channel for political intervention (Stavrides

2009, 91–95). The lack of a tradition of democratic politics and representative

institutions in Cyprus facilitated the Church’s position as the regulator of political

and social activity. Moreover, until the establishment of elections for state institu-

tions, the Archbishop and the bishops were the only popularly elected authorities;

this fact conferred them an important legitimacy. A second point concerns the

nature of the Church: over the centuries it evolved as the ‘protector’ of the

community; in the traditional society that Cyprus was, the people very willingly

gave the Church not only respect but also authority.

There are several factors responsible for the Church’s revered position in

Cypriot society. Under the Ottomans, the Church was granted many social, political

and economic privileges, the most crucial being the 1865 order (Berat) of the Sultan

that ceded numerous privileges to the then Archbishop of Cyprus (Persianis 1978,

10–12 [appendix]). The Berat was an official charter stipulating the Church’sreligious and secular authority. The Ottoman classification of their subjects

according to religion meant that bishops were ‘appointed’ as the political leaders

of the subjugated peoples. The Greeks were regarded by the Sublime Porte3 as a

special millet (nation), and around the mid-seventeenth century the Archbishop was

given the title of ‘millet bashi’; in other words, he was recognised as the Ethnarch(national leader) of his community. The term ‘ethnarch’ denoted secular responsi-

bilities (taxation—civil jurisdiction) in addition to the spiritual duties the Church

already enjoyed (Encyclopedia 1986, Vol. IV, 333, 375). Hence the Archbishop

became the Greek Cypriots’ representative to the Sublime Porte (Hill 1952, 376;

Richter 2007, 61). The Ottoman regime imposed the role of Ethnarch on the

Orthodox Church to ensure that the Orthodox inhabitants of Cyprus were tractable.

The regime decreed the Church as the sole political representative of the Greeks,

and viewed the Church as a ‘tool of control’ in regard to the Greek subjects

(Persianis 1978, 7). Therefore we can trace the leadership role of the Church within

the Greek community to the role it was assigned by the Ottoman administration as a

mediator between the Christian population and the Porte. In this way, i.e., this

3Sublime Porte was a metonym for the central government of the Ottoman Empire. The naming

has its origins in the old Oriental practice, according to which the ruler announced his official

decisions and judgements at the gate of his palace.

100 5 Modernisation and the Church as an Institution of Continuity

historical leadership role, the Church was actually ‘gifted’ with substantive legit-

imation for its political activity (Yiallourides 1993, 164; Hill 1952, 316).

The privileges given to the Church meant that it exercised functions resembling

secular power: it was awarded extensive lands; it had the right to collect income and

taxes while being exempt from taxation itself; it participated in the island’s CentralAdministrative Council and the Provincial Councils; it was responsible for the

education of the Greeks; and it judged lawsuits for/between the Christian inhabi-

tants of the island (Georghallides 1979, 56; Persianis 1978, 13–14). The Church

was much more able/suitable than the Ottomans to carry out these functions,

especially tax collection, because it held the community’s demographic statistics,

e.g., marriage, birth, death records, etc., but also because it was held in high respect

by the popular masses (Richter 2007, 62). Because of the Church’s responsibility astax collector, it developed a systematic accounting system to register all data related

to the Christians (Encyclopedia 1986, Vol. IV, 334). The Church’s growth in powerand wealth clearly had its price: the Church became an integral mechanism of the

Ottoman regime, and in many cases appeared to be its collaborator.

The Church’s exemption from taxation allowed the Church to accumulate eco-

nomic power and landed property, as many poor peasants would transfer their lands

to the Church to avoid taxation and the various moneylenders/usurers (Hill 1952,

310). Richter (2007, 63) notes that it was through this process that over the centuries

the Church became the greatest landowner on the island. The peasants who trans-

ferred their lands to the Church to avoid taxes continued to farm them, paying the

Church various donations and tithes in exchange, resulting in a semi-feudal type of

organisation in which the bishops and priests resembled feudal lords. The monaster-

ies and convents rented these lands to individual monks, who then sublet them to

peasants at much higher rents, perpetuating a cycle of exploitation and dependence.

At the death of the smallholder, the Church usually took over his property due to lack

of official documents, and although heirs may have disputed the loss of their legacy,

it was the Church that usually prevailed (Katsiaounis 1996, 29).

In addition, in 1571 when the Ottomans defeated the Venetians and occupied

Cyprus, they decreed the Latin churches, monasteries, land, etc., as property of the

Orthodox Church. In the same year, the Grand Vezir Mehmet banned Catholicism

in Cyprus, permitting only Orthodoxy and Islam. The restored Cypriot Church took

ownership of all properties of the Latin Church, and also gradually bought a number

of monasteries the Ottomans had taken over (Encyclopedia 1986, Vol. IV,

375–376; Hill 1952, 309). The Church, therefore, was able to amass a vast amount

of property, which it retains to this day: Georghallides (1979, 294) found that in

1923 the Church held 5.3% of the cultivable land in Cyprus. To give an example of

the size of the Church’s property, the Communist Party of Cyprus (CPC) newspa-

per, Neos Anthropos (New Man), claimed that Kykkos Monastery alone owned

property worth 1 million pounds.4 Further, in 1879 the Abbot of the Monastery,

Sophronios, wrote to the British High Commissioner detailing the Monastery’s

4‘The ecclesiastical question’, Neos Anthropos, 14 April 1928, 1.

5.1 The Cypriot Church in History 101

property as including 13 dependencies, 10 churches, 15,148 terraces of land, 8797

olive trees, 429 terraces of vineyards, 22 windmills, five wine-presses and 72 shops.

In the 1880s the Monastery also bought all the Turkish landed estates in the villages

of Saint Dometius, Engomi and Kantartzi, near Nicosia (Zapheriou 2008, 53–54).

Katalanos (2003, 173) argues that these extensive landholdings in the countryside

and especially in Nicosia, as well as its money-lending activities, gave the Sacred

Monastery of Kykkos enormous influence. A report published by the newspaper

Eleftheria (Freedom) in 1923 noted that Church assets came to £1,125,000 and this

included: cash (£3000), bank deposits (£6000), loans to villagers (£3000), and the

movable (£44,000) and immovable property of the Thrones and Dioceses

(£200,000), property of Kykkos Monastery (£160,000) and other monasteries

(£300,000), etc.5

The widespread presence of the Church in Cyprus was not only obvious from its

landownership but also evidenced by the many churches and monasteries through-

out the island. According to British sources, in 1901 there were 607 churches on the

island—with most (122) in Limassol, and 30 monasteries besides.6 Considering

these figures in relation to the Greek Cypriot population, we find one religious

institution for every 288 inhabitants, a very high ratio. In 1917 there were 750 reli-

gious institutions (657 churches and 93 monasteries), which meant one religious

foundation for every 285 inhabitants,7 whereas in 1931, the number of religious

foundations had risen to 755 (659 churches and 96 monasteries),8 while the ratio of

religious foundations to inhabitants was one in 375. The extended spatial presence

of the Church manifested in the many local churches and monasteries all over the

island created a cultural and social bond between the Orthodox population and the

Church. It was also a sign of the Church’s important presence in the lives of the

Greek Cypriots; the Church was a deeply felt and constant point of reference.

Despite the Cypriots’ love of and respect for the Church, the Church often dealt

with its flock in ways that were anything but Christian. These often mercenary

dealings angered some members of society. The press, especially the CPC news-

papers, took note: for example, the clergy appeared to have requested payment in

exchange for hearing confessions of the faithful9 and for conducting wedding

ceremonies.10 It was also reported that monks sometimes even resorted to physical

violence against children who worked on the monastery estates.11 The Church was

also implicated in political conflicts and rivalries; for example, during the

5Eleftheria, 22 December 1923, 2.6Cyprus Blue Book 1900–01, 256.7Cyprus Blue Book 1916–17, 228.8Cyprus Blue Book 1931, 186.9‘The money-making church’, Pyrsos, 9 July 1923, 2.10Behaviour of a priest, Eleftheria, 29 September 1928, 3.11‘Monks mete out Holy Inquisition type punishments to small children’, a letter from a villager

bearing the signature Tsadiotis published in newspaper Ergatis (The Worker), 31 August 1927, 2.

102 5 Modernisation and the Church as an Institution of Continuity

Legislative Council elections of 1925, the bourgeois politician G. Chatzipavlou

accused Kykkos Monastery of providing financial assistance worth thousands of

pounds to support its candidates for the National Council and to buy votes.12

Nevertheless, the Orthodox Church represented more than a space for the

expression of Christian devotional life: it was the most representative face of a

society that often found itself in a state of siege, and its self-governing status

endowed the church with even more authority.13 The Church maintained a central,

although often controversial, position as the trustee of the Greek community in

Cyprus, and for this reason, the survival of the Church is often linked to the survival

of Hellenism on the island (Holland 1999, 25–26). In July 1821, when the Ottomans

executed the Archbishop, the Church acquired its own martyrs and symbols, thus

strengthening their authority in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots who saw the Church

not only as the symbol of their ethnic and religious identity, but their protector

against foreign regimes. The simple, mainly uneducated population did not even

consider that they might be mistreated or exploited by their protector, the Church

that was a crucial part in a system of exploitation.

Not all scholars agree with this interpretation. Englezakis (1984, 311), for

example, argues that the common people felt close to the Church through their

connection to the lower clergy:

The success of the priest in his role as leader was guaranteed by his poverty and low

educational level, which often approached total illiteracy. These two elements led the

people to feel that the priest was one of themselves, as it did not allow the creation of

any particular distance between them.

A German visitor to Cyprus (L€oher cited in Demetriou 1999, 24) agreed with this

viewpoint, noting how priests often had to take on extra work—in the fields or as

shoemakers or tailors—to supplement their meager salaries. The more educated

bishops were unconcerned with the literacy/cultural level of the lower clerics

(Richter 2007, 77; Hill 1952, 375, 379), and thus the peasants could relate easily

to their uneducated local priests. Peristianis (1993, 256), however, argues that the

priests were usually more educated than the working and peasant classes, and thus

were better able to mediate the peasants’ relationship with God as well as with

others. Still, while the lower clergy might have been more educated than the

majority of Cypriots, they likely had little more than an elementary knowledge of

reading and writing.

The political and social elite understood well the Church’s power: its complete

control over education (including the fact that most schools were religious) and its

strong financial standing meant that the elite, in defending their own interests, had

to recognise the Church’s authority (Persianis 1978, 42). Respected journalists

understood the Church’s role too; they defended Church interests and never

12Laiki (Popular), 25 September 1925, 1; ‘The Kykkos pounds poured into the streets’, Laiki,2 October 1925, 1.13On how the Cypriot Church became autocephalous, see Persianis (1978, 3–4).

5.1 The Cypriot Church in History 103

questioned the Church’s importance and leadership role in the national movement

(see Chap. 7).14

For the majority of Greek Cypriots, the Church was part of their daily life—a

fact that probably made it difficult to distinguish between the sacred and the secular.

In a society with a high level of illiteracy, religious prejudices and perspectives

were taken for granted. Society had completely accepted the word of the Church as

law. A telling example is that for many years, until it was established as an official

day of rest in 1927,15 Sunday was a holiday until nine in the morning. Shops were

forbidden to open earlier, so that the Orthodox Christians could fulfill their religious

duties.16 The Church’s vast landholdings and social prestige afforded it a significantadvantage in the distribution of power within the Greek Orthodox community, and

enabled it to act as interlocutor with foreign rulers. Throughout the Ottoman period,

the Greek Cypriots’ political, spiritual and cultural life revolved around the Church,and this remained so to a large degree under British rule (Richter 2007, 63). In

Cyprus’s closed and hierarchical society, religion spread in a natural way and

offered ideological coherence. In such a society, it was normal for more conserva-

tive views, approaches and institutions to prevail and hold power.

5.2 The Conflict Between the British and the Church

After the French Revolution much of the West—including all ideological tenden-

cies—began to challenge religion and the Church because of their conservatism and

control over the peasantry (Hobsbawm 2000, 407). Lipset (1967, 50) emphasises

the clash of values between a pre-industrial, pre-capitalist society represented by

the Church and the values of nationalism and democracy, as these derived from the

French Revolution. Hobsbawm (2002, 315) notes that ‘the tendency for a reductionin the role of the church was reinforced by the direct attack launched by numerous

political regimes against the property and privileges of the church and the clergy,

and the ever increasing tendency of governments and other secular agents to

undertake those duties which until then were mainly carried out by ecclesiastical

bodies’. Technological progress and advanced communications enabled capitalism

to develop in a declining feudal Europe, although the traditional systems of

landowning and taxation slowed its progress. At this time most western societies

were confronting the spectre of modernism, and examining the relationship

between old and new; this naturally led to tension and conflict (Newman 2006, 33).

The two main institutions that blocked progress were the feudal estates and the

Church, as it was their privileges, powers and ideologies that were being challenged

14I. Clerides stigmatised the decision by the Educational Council of Nicosia to impose half of the

city’s total school tax on the ecclesiastical associations. See his article ‘Income tax’ in Eleftheria,14 September 1927, 1.15Nea Laiki, 18 November 1927, 1.16‘Cypriot holiday’, Laiki, 27 November 1926, 1.

104 5 Modernisation and the Church as an Institution of Continuity

(Hobsbawm 2002, 39). This was true of Cyprus too, as the clergy and the Greek

elite, both having enjoyed major privileges under the Ottomans, were among the

loudest opponents of British power and the changes they initiated Richter (2007,

89). Nevertheless, it was at the time of British Occupation, in 1878, that the

relationship between the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and

the State underwent a fundamental change.

The British occupation posed the first challenges to the established powers and

their privileges, as the colonial power tried to eradicate the Cypriot tradition of

projecting their religious interests onto the political level (whereby the Church

represented them politically). Hence, the first major conflict in the modern history

of Cyprus took place between the British, who represented liberalism and capitalist

entrepreneurialism and the Church, which represented traditional pre-capitalist

values. The British made changes that aimed to weaken the Church and its officials,

so it was only natural that conflict would ensue. The rupture was immediate (Loizos

1986, 103), as the British immediately showed that they would discuss the Church’snatural and legal rights, but not pardons and privileges (Peristianis 1993, 251;

Englezakis 1986, 33). In fact, the first British officials in Cyprus considered Church

practices to be reactionary, seeing them as part of a system of exploitation and

bribery (Georghallides 1979, 57–58).

Control of the education system in the newly emerging nation-states was highly

sought by contending social and political forces, and this was evident in the clash

between the rising national elites and the Church (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 38). In

Cyprus, the educational control was not initially a source of conflict; it was other

privileges of the Church that caused concern for the British. This conflict also

occurred in a different context, with different players and stakes, as the Cypriot

bourgeoisie and the Church rallied together against the British (Persianis 1978, 19);

however, they also clashed between them for a different issue. The clash between

the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie and the Church referred essentially to control of the

large ecclesiastical property and the representation of the Greek Cypriots. This

issue came to a head in the context of the Archbishopric question (see next chapter).

The conflict between the British and the Church centred on the Church’seconomic privileges as well as its political privilege (representing the Christians),

with the consequences this had for the Church’s symbolic prestige. The British

rejected the argument that one type of property ownership (agricultural or entre-

preneurial) should contribute to state revenues while another kind (ecclesiastical)

should not—indicative of the different perceptions of a liberal capitalist society

(Demetriou 1999, x; Katsiaounis 1996, 73). Hence, the British repealed the

Church’s previous exemption from the land ownership tax and its judicial rights

on questions of family law. They also banned the use of a state escort during the

collection of ecclesiastical taxes, resulting in a 30% reduction in Church revenues,

which in turn led to fewer Church contributions to education and philanthropy

(Encyclopedia 1986, Vol. V, 7). The British further refused to recognise the

Church’s privileges with regard to their political representation/administration of

the Greek community. Positions formerly held by the clergy were now filled by

election, meaning that prelates had to compete with secular candidates (Katsiaounis

5.2 The Conflict Between the British and the Church 105

2004, 19). The ex officio representation of the Church in the various administrative

councils was also reduced (Encyclopedia 1986, Vol. V, 7).

Sir Robert Biddulph, second High Commissioner in Cyprus, formulated British

policy with regard to the Church: ‘. . . the British government made a practice of

never interfering with the ecclesiastical economy of the people under their rule, and

that he [the Archbishop] rest assured that no interference would take place in that

respect, and that the Greek Church would have absolute liberty in all matters that

relate solely to their religion’. The Church was uneasy over this; the then Arch-

bishop Sophronios (elected in 1865 and died in 1900) complained to the Anglican

Bishop in Jerusalem that his privileges under his Berat were not recognised by the

British, referring especially to his reduced income without the police (zaptiehs)

escort provided by the Turkish Governor for the collection of his fees and dues

when travelling in his diocese.17

The ‘ecclesiastical question,’ as it was named by the press—the management of

the enormous property holdings of the Church—was a regular source of conflict not

only with the British but also within the Greek Cypriots. Politicians outside the

Church’s sphere of influence called for its property to be placed under secular

control, for its forced sale and the creation of a fund, or for it to be handed over to

the landless peasants. The so-called ecclesiastical question developed because the

Church under the British lost its economic privileges to the degree that it could not

pressure its various debtors as in the past, and had to seek the support of the lay

elite, who then became intensely involved in this issue just prior to the Archbish-

opric question (Georghallides 1979, 61–62).

Just as important, and just as serious a challenge to Church authority was the

equal treatment of secular and clergy, especially before the law courts—a ruling

that lessened the symbolic prestige of the Bishops as representatives of the tradi-

tional elite (Georghallides 1979, 59–61). For example, Georghallides refers to the

widespread outcry after a law court condemned two priests to be shaved for

violating forestry regulations and sentenced them to forced labour in public. Such

actions, however, worked against the British even among those who did not

approve the Church’s power.The beginning of the British occupation was accompanied by the undermining of

the political paternalism and clientele relations which had been important compo-

nents of Cyprus’s traditional society and especially of Church-society relations.

These changes served to reduce respect for the establishment, of which the Church

of Cyprus constituted the leading part (Katsiaounis 1996, 139–158; Loizos 1986,

101). The conflict became increasingly tense, and the Church of Cyprus devoted all

its energy to maintaining its power (Holland 1999, 27). Unlike their stance towards

the Orthodox Church, the British treated the EVKAF (the Turkish Cypriot institu-

tion responsible for the vakifs (i.e., all religious and private properties that were

administered by the specific institution for public benefit purposes) quite

17TNA, CO 926/171, ‘Cyprus internal political situation 1954–1956’, Political Influence of the

Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, 28 August 1954, 4.

106 5 Modernisation and the Church as an Institution of Continuity

differently, continuing to provide it with the services of state tax collectors

(Georghallides 1979, 79). The reason for the discrepancy in treatment of the two

religious authorities, lies in the colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’—keeping the

Turkish Cypriots content as a counter-weight to the Greek Cypriots supremacy.

However, we must wonder why, if British colonialism accelerated the process of

rupture with the past and contributed decisively to the coming of modernity, did the

Church remain as the Greek Cypriot community’s national leader. The answer lies inthe politicisation of the Christian-Muslim distinction, which the British consolidated

through the structure of the Legislative Council (see Chap. 3). This allowed the

Church to legitimise its power in the framework of the new political system. The

Church therefore continued to operate as a political organisation, which was clear

when in 1908 the Legislative Council approved the Law on the Election of the

Archbishop, which had been prepared by the Crown Prosecutor, and indicated that

the British administration indirectly recognised in the person of the Archbishop the

political representative of the Greeks Cypriots and accorded him powers which now

derived from a popular mandate, i.e., from elections.18 The failure of the British to

give the political institutions any substantial role also allowed the Church to maintain

its hegemonic role. Thus the British, although opposing the Church’s privileges andengaged in conflict with it, essentially allowed it to maintain its leading role. The

reason for this is that in this way the British were able to keep alive and further

aggravate ethnic and religious confrontation between the Greeks and Turks, making

their presence and mediating role essential. This confrontation, skillfully enshrined at

the institutional level through the electoral procedures for the Legislative Council and

the Municipalities, essentially prevented the Cypriots of both communities from

uniting against the British occupation. Moreover, the British sided with the Church

in the 1940s to jointly confront the rising communist threat (see chapt. 9).

Besides preserving its role as a political protagonist, the Church also maintained

its economic standing to a large degree. Despite its losses, in general, it continued to

enjoy great wealth and remained the country’s largest landowner (Katsiaounis

1996, 77). Although the Church was now taxed, it did not lose any of its property

and retained the right to administer family law (marriages, divorces). The Cypriots’traditional devotion to their Church, the failure of the British to introduce any

innovations to counterbalance its social and educational activities, and the greater

effectiveness of the government’s tax collectors, all contributed to a climate of

hostility towards the British and to the perpetuation of their loyalty to the Church

(Georghallides 1979, 63). These parameters are an important reason why the

Church maintained such a strong influence over the popular strata. However, as

Beaud (2008, 45) notes, there was also the question of its ideological legitimation, a

decisive issue for all religious institutions that sought to control the circulation of

ideas particularly in the era of modernity. For the Church of Cyprus, legitimacy

rested more on ideology/culture than economics (Panayiotou 2006a, 78).

18The need to differentiate the role of the Church within the Greek Cypriot community is noted by

Michael (2005, 357).

5.2 The Conflict Between the British and the Church 107

5.3 Church Endorsement of Nationalism

The process of rationalisation was largely introduced by colonialism. The latter brought a

series of changes, which would normally have been expected to reduce religiosity and

contribute to secularisation. Such characteristics were: the creation of a colonialist central

power, the property relations which were established, some industrialisation, bureaucracy,

etc. However, a new element entered the equation which maintained religious life at high

levels: this was the conflict between the Orthodox Church and the colonial government,

which led to a closer link between nationalism and religion and averted the results of

secularisation (Peristianis 1993, 256).

Faced with the new situation, the Church was forced to seek new ways/tools to

legitimate its presence and political activity (Anagnostopoulou 1999, 200). To this

end it decided to endorse the nationalist ideology, which it used to challenge the

colonial power and to maintain its dominance within the Greek community. The

Cypriot Church realising the weakening of its power and the rise of new popular

forms of power that threatened its supremacy, deemed the British an ‘enemy’, andfor its own purposes it constructed a ‘picture of the enemy’—this effectively

provided it with a source of power.19 The Church claimed that the ‘enemy’ was acollective threat to Greek Cypriot values, which the Church promised to protect and

guarantee. Relieved of its administrative responsibilities (i.e., tax collection), the

Church trespassed more and more onto the political field, and so it took up the cause

of nationalism. Before long, the secular activities of the Church were devoted

almost exclusively to politics.

Although nationalist ideology was examined in the previous chapter, it is the

Church’s ideological and political embrace of nationalism that will be explored

here. In the early years of British occupation, the Church did not favour nationalist

ideology: the idea of the nation was an aspect of modernity which the Church, as the

embodiment of tradition, naturally rejected (Mavratsas 2003, 66). It was the

Archbishopric Question that led finally to the Church’s ‘nationalisation’, and by

the conclusion of this issue the Church had established its moral predominance

among the various national groups. The Church turned to nationalism both to

re-establish its legitimacy and to integrate political demands within its domain of

control (Mavratsas 2003, 66; Katsiaounis 1996, 237). To compete with the rising

bourgeoisie and the British, the Church had to adapt, and its decision to identify

with the nation was a modern way to do this. In fact, because of its traditional role as

Ethnarch, its control over education and the people’s strong religious sentiment, the

Church was a key player in anti-colonial activity. Moreover, British attacks on the

Church provided a rallying point for the bishops and the educated bourgeoisie

associated with them (Katsiaounis 1995, 227).

As an indication of its new ideology, the Church participated in nationalistic

public events during the Balkan Wars; for example, in October 1912 the Arch-

bishop issued an encyclical to raise money for the Greek army; it called on the

19Beck (1996, 171) notes that all societies have held two types of power: one derived from the

people and the other from the enemy.

108 5 Modernisation and the Church as an Institution of Continuity

people to set up fundraising committees with the participation of priests, mukhtarsand teachers; and it petitioned the wealthy to provide a good example through their

own contributions (Papapolyviou 1997, 108). Moreover, seven novice monks from

Kykkos Monastery enrolled as volunteers in the war (ibid, 170).

Holland (1999, 24–25) argues that if we are to understand the contradictions

within the enosis movement, we need look no further than the role of the Orthodox

Church in this movement and in the process of forming a Greek national conscious-

ness. While this movement was so closely linked with the traditional religious

institution (the Church), ‘it flourished despite modernity’. When nationalist ideol-

ogy first appeared in Cyprus, the Church was the primary institution that

safeguarded the identity of the Greek Cypriots, and as Greek Cypriot national

identity was defined above all by religion it was easy for the Church to present

itself as the vehicle for the preservation of Hellenism in the country.20 The majority

of Greek Cypriots, in fact, seemed to believe that religion was a defining criterion of

nationalism, as Greek meant Orthodox; this naturally facilitated the Church’sauthority in the Unionist cause. By presenting nationalism in this way, the Church

maintained its authority and was able to remain the Greek’s most important

institution of continuity with the past. This stance also served the Church in its

conflict with the British: by incorporating nationalism into its political discourse

and practice, and thus adopting the demand for enosis, it was able to acquire new

legitimacy. The higher clergy not only maintained their authority, but in fact even

increased their influence over the faithful, putting themselves at the head of the

Unionist movement (Richter 2007, 94).

The intermingling of religion and ethnicity led to an unusual and sometimes

contradictory ideology. There is a theoretical incompatibility between religion and

nationalism, insofar as religion justifies everything by appealing to a metaphysical

force, while nationalism turns to secularism. The relationship between the two

forces is historically and conceptually complex, as religion is integral to the

creation of nations and their survival, while at the same time it is incompatible

with this (Grosby 2006, 94).21 In this particular case, the contradiction lies in the

fact that a potentially revolutionary ideology of modernity (i.e., nationalism) was

adopted by the most conservative institution, which was not only excessively

attached to tradition but also insisted on social immobility (Yiallourides 1993,

165). Holland (1999, 33) suggests that the Unionist demand was circumscribed

by reaction and obscurantism precisely because of its link with the Church.

The Church and the bourgeois groups that endorsed nationalism were closely

interlinked; hence their relation was marked by mutual interaction. Once the

Church took on the nationalist cause, it (and especially the higher clergy) influenced

the character of Greek Cypriot nationalism and the bourgeois groups which intro-

duced it. This was facilitated by the fact that the Church was the framework within

20On the role of the Church of Cyprus in shaping this Greek identity, see also Tzermias (2001, 90).21On the relationship between nationalism and religion, see Hobsbawm (1994, 99–105) and

Lekkas (1996, 178–193).

5.3 Church Endorsement of Nationalism 109

which social, political and ideological struggle of the Greek Orthodox community

took place. At the same time, the bourgeois groups that supported nationalism and

whose power increased after the British occupation tried (and to some extent

achieved) to reduce the Church’s influence and authority.

The Church also made its mark on the nationalist rhetoric, which soon was

peppered with religious references. Nationalism’s appropriation of religion is a

political act that aims to define, mobilise and motivate the national community to

achieve immediate goals, such as national independence. ‘There is an immense

difference between traditional religion and a nationalism which expresses a reli-

gious discourse. The second case concerns the politicisation of religion (its

nationalisation) and not the opposite’ (Lekkas 1996, 189, 193)—this clearly was

the case in Cyprus. The religious dimension in nationalist discourse was indicative

of a new social role of religion and indirect evidence that traditional society was

beginning to collapse. Thus we see that nationalism’s appearance—even when it

has a strong religious dimension as in the Balkans—is conditioned by (and follows)

the decline of the Church’s social power and the simultaneous rise of lay, secular

strata: state officials, intellectuals, merchants, etc. (Karpat 1982, 143).

Their interaction between nationalism and religion was also possible due to the

very nature of nationalism. Nationalism as a political ideology has the great

advantage that it can be ‘simultaneously interwoven with modernising and tradi-

tional movements’ (Lekkas 1996, 13) and its plasticity allows it to be equated with

anthropological categories such as kinship (Anderson 1983, 15). This is why

nationalism could so easily be identified with the Church in Cyprus, and why

religious references are appropriate in nationalist discourse. Although it is a modern

ideology, nationalism is idiosyncratic insofar as time, which is seen as homogenous

and blank: this allows nationalism to mix modern elements with traditional. It is

within this context that we must interpret ‘Helleno-Christian ideals’(ellinohristianismos), a term that includes Christian identity within Greek nation-

alist ideology. This mixing was possible because of the way the Archbishopric issue

developed (see next chapter).

The Archbishopric issue was essentially a conflict between the traditionalists and

the nationalists, which on the surface, the nationalists won. But nationalism was a

secularising ideology and as the nationalists fought for dominance within the

Church their modernism became diluted and it adapted to local power structures.

In their efforts to control the game, the nationalists adjusted their rhetoric to

religion, which enabled the traditional forces, such as the prelates and religion, to

continue to play a leading role in political discourse and practice (Panayiotou

2006b, 277).

This ideological discourse, based on much compromise, came to be known as

ellinohristianismos. Ellinohristianismos was a framework for mediating the differ-

ences (and opposition) between the Ancient Greek past (considered by the Church

as idolatrous) and the Byzantine Middle Ages (the ‘glorious past’ according to the

Church, but not according to the modernising adherents of the Enlightenment). In

the new transitional narrative, the two periods (Antiquity, Byzantine Empire) were

considered continuous, and part of the history and evolution of the Greek nation

110 5 Modernisation and the Church as an Institution of Continuity

(Panayiotou 2006b, 81–82). In political terms the Church adopted enosis as an

ideology in opposition to the British colonial state, but they also saw it as a cultural

claim to being just as civilised as the colonising West.

The preservation of the Church’s role in social and political life and its parallel

adoption of nationalist discourse (the demand for enosis) influenced nationalist

discourse: it became more conservative, making fewer demands of both the colonial

power and the Greek Cypriot establishment, which many proponents of nationalism

gradually joined. The complex relationship between the Church and nationalism,

and the imprecise boundaries of the various mediating factors, make it exception-

ally difficult to prove with certainty when the Church influences and used nation-

alism, when nationalism influenced the Church and when the two happened

simultaneously.

Thus, to summarise, a combination of factors—both material such as the

Church’s economic power, and political such as the continuing division of the

political community (electorate) into Christians and Muslims, as well as cultural,

spiritual and historical factors, together with the Church’s adaptability—allowed

the Church to continue to play a dominant role in the Greek Cypriot community. To

a large extent the entire political life of the island was under a peculiar ‘vetoscheme’ of the Cypriot Church. The new social realities/processes and ideological

arguments were unable to really challenge or change the traditional institutions of

Cypriot society. To a large extent, the Church maintained the economic and social

power which it had enjoyed during the Ottoman period and which it succeeded in

legitimating anew under the British (Anagnostopoulou 1999, 198). Thus, it would

appear that the power of some social institutions is so great that, even if they are

broken up or revealed as elitist, they are still able to carry weight and influence in

society (Bruce 2007, 39).

The Church’s conflict with the British and its traditional role as the primary

political vehicle of the Greek Cypriots during this period, allowed it to place itself at

the head of the movement for enosis. At the same time, this conflict served to bind

nationalism and religion, hindered secularisation and maintained religiosity at very

high levels among the population. The adoption of the political demand for Union

allowed the Church to acquire a strong ideological tool with which to impose itself,

and which no Greek Cypriot could or would easily oppose. In highlighting the

Church’s power, Peristianis (1993, 251) notes that, ‘the money-lending/merchant-

middleman class has a peculiar relationship with the Church, characterised by

periods of conflict and periods of cooperation. Generally however this class,

which is very weak and unsure of itself, accepts the leadership of the Church’.The Church’s leadership of the nationalist movement became a structural impera-

tive of political life. The Church saw itself as the purest embodiment of the

nationalist cause, standing above the political parties and their conflicts, the

supreme coordinator of individual nationalist campaigns.

5.3 Church Endorsement of Nationalism 111

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Chapter 6

The Crisis of Established Politics

and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

This chapter examines the first major popular conflict in Cyprus: the fight for title of

Archbishop of Cyprus. As noted earlier, the Archbishop was the highest authority of

both the Church and the Greek Cypriots. This conflict was also a battle between the

traditionalists and the nationalists, and the catalyst for the nationalisation and

ideologisation of the masses in Cyprus as well as for the emersion and establish-

ment of nationalist politics in Cyprus. I look into the causes of the conflict, the

social forces behind the two opposing camps as well as their political discourse and

organisation, and the impact on citizen participation in civic elections.

With British colonisation of Cyprus the religious institution faced immensely

different conditions that threatened its supremacy among the Greek Cypriots. The

secular responsibilities of the Church were drastically reduced (see previous chap-

ter) something that reduced its stranglehold over society. While the loss of certain

rights and privileges was very real, in broader terms it was the loss of their secular

duties that was most significant because it affected its structural position within the

Greek Cypriot community (Panayiotou 2006b, 81). In the traditional, Ottoman

world of the millets the autocephalous Church of Cyprus had a clearly defined

role and privileges; in the modern world inaugurated by the British, the Church, as a

traditional institution, found itself undermined vis-�a-vis the new secular adminis-

tration established by the British.

The Church initially tried to work with the new rulers (Katsiaounis 1996). When

this approach failed, the Greek Cypriot elite circles became divided. While one

group continued to uphold the status quo, the other felt that neither the local

establishment nor the foreign rulers could or would try to solve Cyprus’s problems.

This group took up the cause of nationalism to show their opposition to the

government and the old ruling class in which the Church played an integral role.

These activists represented a new generation of nationalists that emerged after

British occupation; they supported enosis, and had no faith in the government and

the local establishment to achieve this target. This divergence signalled the collapse

of the traditionalist elitist hegemony, and within the context of the anti-colonial

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_6

115

cleavage, revealed a new schism: the role of the Church in Cypriot society. This

issue had far-reaching consequences as it resulted in immediate as well as long-term

effects on all levels of political competition in Cyprus. The rupture was first evident

in the 1901 Legislative Council elections, where the disunity of the ruling coalition

was highlighted. The nationalists saw in the state of flux in which the Church and

traditional politics were locked into, a chance for political realignment and they

waged an unrelenting campaign against the established elite.

6.1 The Archiepiscopal Question: A Rupture with the Past

Earlier (Chap. 5) we saw how the Cypriot Church was able to retain its privileged

role in both the Greek Cypriot community and in the political system, despite

British efforts to weaken it. To thoroughly understand the significance of the

Archiepiscopal Question, however, we cannot emphasise highly enough the role

of the Church of Cyprus for the Greek Cypriots and the reasons why the struggle for

power took place within the Church.

Every political system has certain institutions that can only be described as

systemic, i.e., ones that shape its path and internal power structure (Wiatr 1970,

315). The Church was such an institution in Cyprus. It was the most important

independent institution in the hands of the Greek Cypriots before the foundation of

the independent state (Englezakis 1984, 41). When under the yoke of foreign

powers, with every form of expression denied, the Greek inhabitants of Cyprus

turned to the Church, which they made into a space for political agitation and

organisation. Rokkan’s (1970, 125) claim that the Irish Church, a hierarchical and

bureaucratic organisation with a geographical reach identical to that of the state,

was a structural and unifying force, can also be applied to the Cypriot Church.

Every collective demand for the national renaissance of Cyprus and every attempt

to promote national interests went through the Church, which, just as in the

Ottoman period, was perceived as the natural leader of the Greek Cypriots (Michael

2005, 322).

The Church of Cyprus was both the agent of and the context for political and

ideological processes, contradictions and struggles. A typical example would be a

local or regional election in which priests and bishops were elected by the people

who were divided between the clerics seeking election (Katalanos 2003, 176).1

Many rifts within Cypriot society found their expression through ecclesiastical

institutions. Besides the struggle for the succession to the late Archbishop

Sophronios, many elections of prelates turned into confrontations that went beyond

the purely religious and ecclesiastical context. Such clashes included, for example,

the elections of the Archbishop in 1916 and the Bishop of Kition in 1918, where the

1Papademetris and Petrides (1979–1980, Volumes II and III, 294–301 and 377–411, respectively)

give examples of these clashes which mainly took place during the election of Bishops.

116 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

political disputes of the period were expressed through these religious elections.

Moreover, in the elections for Legislative Council members, mayors and mukhtarsthe Church often imposed its own preferred candidates, who were sometimes even

clerics (Yiallourides 1993, 165).

As it gradually became clear that the Legislative Council did not satisfactorily

function as the Greek Cypriot political leadership, the Church began to promote

itself as an alternative political representative (Attalides 1986, 127). Not only did

the Church enjoy the respect of the Greek Cypriots, it also had a widespread

organisational base. Moreover, with the institutions introduced by the British

based on the ethno-religious division of the population, the mechanisms for bring-

ing the Christians together as a political entity largely took shape within the Church.

Consequently, the conflict over the successor to the Archbishop’s throne was

actually a struggle for control of the Greek Cypriot community, although it

appeared as a quarrel between Bishoprics. In this conflict the Church succeeded

in expressing both the progressive and the conservative sections of society; while

each side rallied around the Bishop of their own geographical area

(Anagnostopoulou 1999, 203–204), there was also the issue of ideology. Because

the Church was also a de facto institution of local government for the Orthodox

Christians, the conflict inevitably took on dimensions beyond the candidates’religious profile (Panayiotou 2006a, 79).

Because the Orthodox Archbishop held so much power and authority, the

election for Archbishop Sophronios’ successor soon became the greatest political

problem of the era, overshadowing all political and social developments of the

period. The Archiepiscopal Question constituted the point of rupture with past

socio-political arrangements in Cyprus, and brought to the surface two new and

opposing factions: the radical nationalists and the conservative traditionalists. It

also was the first time the majority of the population was involved in politics

(Katsiaounis 1996, 7). Until the election, both factions of the ruling class tried to

work with the British, primarily for socio-economic reforms such as the abolition of

the tributary tax, an increase in the education subsidy and the establishment of an

agricultural bank. Also until the elections, the country’s political situation as a

British colony had never been seriously questioned. The conflicting interests of the

two camps brought the incipient social and political crisis to the surface and

completely altered the entire Greek Cypriot socio-political milieu (Katsiaounis

2004, 27; Encyclopaedia 1986, Volume II, 349; Attalides 1986, 130).

The Archiepiscopal Question, which also comprised the ‘ecclesiastical issue’related to the management of Church property, deeply concerned the Greek Cypriot

community, and divided both the clergy and the people into two camps. This schism

became intense and was regularly highlighted in newspaper articles and editorials

of the period (Tzermias 2001, 87; Sophocleous 1995, 8).2 Throughout the decade of

the Archiepiscopal Question all classes and strata in Cypriot society became

invested in the issue. This period can be best described as a decade of conflict

2See also ‘Introduction to the Ecclesiastical Question’, Neos Anthropos, 18 September 1926, 4.

6.1 The Archiepiscopal Question: A Rupture with the Past 117

between two political and ideological formations: the moderate, adaptive conser-

vatives represented by the old leadership circles of Nicosia, and the radical

neo-bourgeois and pro-Unionist liberal nationalists of Larnaca and Limassol

supported by the freemasons and the mainland Greeks—e.g., F. Zannetos,

N. Katalanos (Encyclopaedia 1986, Vol. V, 7). It was a conflict between two

attitudes and programmes in relation to Britain (Englezakis 1984, 39).

This conflict also represented the avenue through which the masses were first

incorporated into the power system (Panayiotou 2006b, 273). Both sides drew the

people into this conflict through major public activities such as mass meetings,

speeches, tours, etc.,3 in order to stimulate popular interest in the issue. Therefore,

analysis of the reasons underlying the conflict, and a look at especially what was at

stake, will help clarify the nature of Greek Cypriot politics during this period.

There are two different interpretations of the conflict. The first sees the conflict

as an entirely personal one that concerned ‘party’ disputes. This interpretation is notwithout basis, as ‘dirty’ party politics is regarded by some as typical of the Greeks

(see for example, Frangoudes 2002, 6):

The struggle around the succession to Sophronios, although taking the form of an Eccle-

siastical quarrel, had its source in personal issues and partisanship. In other words, it

concerns a straightforward political or rather, party struggle. The general principle is that

all the Greek parties are more or less immoral and personalistic, while being malevolent

and destructive to the point of treachery (. . .) Our parties are not parties of principles,

competing for the good of our country, but a sort of criminal gangs working to ruin her. The

majority camp is trying to exploit power for personal gain and to ensure its leaders prevail,

while the minority is the most villainous opposition of modern times. (Limbourides 1997, 3)

The second explanation argues that the division was much more substantial and

went deeper than simple personal quarrels and party passions. Englezakis (1984,

39) believes that the conflict between the Kitiaki (the supporters of the Bishop of

Kition) and the Kyriniaki (the supporters of the Bishop of Kyrenia), as the two

opposing camps became known, extended beyond the personal rivalry between the

two Bishops. This position seems more convincing, however, precisely because of

what was at stake.

The main point of contention, which was who would manage and control the

Church of Cyprus, was an important issue. Whoever controlled the Church simul-

taneously controlled the Church’s extensive property, and was also master of its

social, symbolic and cultural capital and spiritual force. The control of the Church

also affected the internal balance of power within the Greek Cypriot community.

There were numerous and various issues in this conflict: the power of the

3For example, ‘The big rally in Morphou, annex to Evagoras, 8 September 1901.

118 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

autocephalous Church of Cyprus in relation to that of the Patriarch;4 the legitimacy

of the Holy Synod,5 which was questioned by the Kitiaki; the views of the people,

which the Kitiaki believed were ignored; the power and role of the Church in a

changing society; the role of the secular (British) power; the separation of clergy

and laity; and control over the finances of the Archbishopric.

The conflict between the two sides revolved around two basic axes. The first

concerned the demand for the Union of Cyprus with Greece, while the second

involved the management of Church property and the democratisation of its

functioning under strong secular control, i.e., more active lay participation in the

management of Church funds. Beyond Church affairs, this would offer the bour-

geoisie a chance to participate in the community’s decision-making institutions.

Thus, the Kitiaki political discourse focused on changing the way in which Church

funds were managed, specifically through more direct involvement of the laity. In

contrast, the Kyriniaki aimed to maintain the status quo, and the Kitiaki, in

response, called the opposing camp a ‘gang’ that was plundering the material

wealth of the Church of Cyprus.6

The Archbishopric issue really represented a broader clash of ideas and policies,

and it became key in shaping the frameworks of power in Cyprus ‘with the central

reference point being the need to establish a national political Authority for the

Greeks of Cyprus’ (Michael 2005, 307–308). While the conflict was expressed

through competing factions, it also had a substantive political content, to the extent

that each group wanted to lead the political entity and control the mechanisms of

power that were taking shape.

6.2 The Opposing Camps

The Archiepiscopal Question was not an issue over religious differences; there were

no competing religious groups among the Greek Cypriots with different doctrines

which then became the focal point for the creation of political parties, as happened

4The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is one of the fourteen autocephalous churches

(or jurisdictions) that together compose the Eastern Orthodox Church. It is headed by the

Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Because of its historical location at the capital of the

former Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire and its role as the Mother Church of most modern

Orthodox churches, the Ecumenical Patriarchate holds a special place of honour within Orthodoxy

and serves as the seat for the Ecumenical Patriarch, who enjoys the status of Primus inter pares

(first among equals) among the world’s Eastern Orthodox prelates and is widely regarded as the

representative and spiritual leader of the world’s 300 million Orthodox Christians.5In several of the autocephalous Eastern Orthodox churches and Eastern Catholic Churches, the

patriarch or head bishop is elected by a group of bishops called the Holy Synod. For instance, the

Holy Synod is a ruling body of the Greek Orthodox Church. In Oriental Orthodoxy the Holy Synod

is the highest authority in the church and it formulates the rules and regulations regarding matters

of church organisation, faith, and order of service.6‘The gang of desperation’, Evagoras, 15 September 1901, 4.

6.2 The Opposing Camps 119

elsewhere. The divisions concerned different perceptions of the Orthodox Church

as an institution of power and with regard to its stance towards the British occupa-

tion. Hence, we do not see the creation of religious parties in Cyprus. Nevertheless,

what did become in part the object of public dialogue was the degree and intensity

of faith of each individual or of the political camp as a collective entity.

Moreover, the Archiepiscopal Question cannot be interpreted outside the frame-

work of the national issue: in other words, the stance of each side in relation to the

colonial occupying authority (Frangoudes 2002, 158). While both camps proffered

the British their respect, there were still significant differences in terms of how to

deal with them. The Kitiaki wanted a pure and simple Union with no compromise;

in contrast, the Kyriniaki accepted collaboration with the colonial authority on

short-term reforms.7 This disagreement was in fact socio-political, as it expressed

different social groups and interests. And there was an ideological facet, expressed

through the introduction of nationalist ideology in the political arena. And yet it

also had an organisational dimension. All three aspects will be examined below.

The social content of the conflict was determined by the social strata and forces

which supported each candidate. The old ruling class rallied around the candidacy

of the Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyrillos Vassiliou, and became known as the Kyriniaki.

Meanwhile the nationalists, most of whom were concentrated in Larnaca and

Limassol, supported the Bishop of Kition, Kyrillos Papadopoulos; these were

named the Kitiaki.8 The two camps were also differentiated as nationalists and

conservatives, or ‘moderates’ and ‘intransigents’. On this level it was a conflict

between the urbanised societies of Larnaca and Limassol and the conservative

agricultural societies of Nicosia and Kyrenia. Analysis of demographic and profes-

sional data reveals the different contexts within which the two communities devel-

oped in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Michael 2005, 309, 312).

Ultimately this was a ‘struggle’ between the old establishment and the new rising

bourgeoisie (Phantis 2005, 21). This becomes clear when we examine the social

dimension of the conflict, i.e., from which social strata the two camps drew their

support.

The Kyriniaki were known as moderates because of their measured stance

towards the British colonialists and their political prudence; these were the guiding

criterion of their actions. In the early 1890s the moderates were the dominant

political camp in Cyprus, as they were seen to have considerable influence with

both the colonial government and the Church of Cyprus. Cypriot civil servants were

largely Kyriniaki because their jobs and/or promotions depended on those in this

camp. The moderates also controlled the police and the Administrative Councils,

remnants of the Ottoman period. The moderates included Archbishop Sophronios

and the higher clergy; through them they controlled the majority of the clergy, both

in the parishes and the monasteries (Katalanos 2003, 156–160). The moderates had

7‘Long live Union’, annex to Evagoras, 22 September 1901.8Limbourides (1997, 14) provides some details about the two candidates: the Bishop of Kyrenia,

‘Kyrilloudin’ (1859–1933) and the Bishop of Kition, ‘Kyrillatsos’ (1845–1916).

120 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

considerable control over the provincial education committees and administrative

councils—as a result they also had control over teachers and mukhtars, the majority

of whom had been appointed by the Kyriniaki. At this point in the conflict the

Kyrenian side also seems to have enjoyed the support of the colonial government,

with two of its most prominent politicians appointed to the Executive Council, and

three outgoing members of the Legislative Council, who supported the Kyrenian

candidate, accused by the Kitiaki of collaborating with the British, even in cases

where the Muslim (Turkish) parliamentarians voted with the Greeks.9

The most important Kyriniaki supporters were the long-established conservative

politicians of Nicosia, who through their contact networks controlled the local

authorities of many villages. The leaders of the Kyriniaki were the higher clergy

and the largest merchant and moneylender families of Nicosia, Famagusta and

Kyrenia (even, to a lesser extent, such families in Larnaca and Limassol). These

families comprised all those who had dealings with the monasteries, the Archbish-

opric, the schools, etc., and they feared the Bishop of Kition’s programme as it

included control of their finances (Katalanos 2003, 158).10 The leaders of the

moderates included the Bishop of Kyrenia and the Abbot of the Kykkos Monastery

among the clergy, and A. Liassides and P. Constantinides among the lay notables.

The Abbot of Kykkos Monastery was the largest owner and administrator of landed

property on the island,11 while Constantinides and Liassides had maintained close

relations with the late Archbishop. Until the turn of the century (1900) these

families were the leading political figures and controlled a major client network.

Other leading supporters of the Kyrenian candidacy included Neophytos Nikolaides

(lawyer, judge, merchant and newspaper publisher [Agon, Struggle]), Spyros

Araouzos (parliamentarian and merchant), M. Michaelides (parliamentarian, mer-

chant and major landowner) and N. Dervis (doctor and president of the Cypriot

Association).12

Most leading supporters of the Bishop of Kyrenia had dealings with the Arch-

bishopric prior to the Archiepiscopal Question, and had sat on provincial education

committees or school supervisory boards, their appointments due in large part to the

bishops. Many were among the founders of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, which was

established and largely financed by the Archbishop. Most lived in Nicosia and

Kyrenia, and quite a few were involved in commercial activities and had extensive

landed interests. Aligned with them were the majority of the lower clergy—

especially the monastic clergy—and the larger shop-owners and master craftsmen.

Even a great many indebted farmers and the poorest workers also supported the

9‘The discourse of Theodotou’, annex to Evagoras, 8 September 1901; ‘The victory of

27 September’, Evagoras, 4 October 1901, 1.10‘The discourse of Theodotou’, annex to Evagoras, 8 September 1901.11‘Elect the essential people to the Legislative Council’, Foni tis Kyprou, 28 September 1901, 3.12‘Resolution for the meeting’, Foni tis Kyprou, 19 October 1900, 2; ‘The parliamentary issues’,Foni tis Kyprou, 21 September 1901, 1; see also Frangoudes 2002, 115); Koudounaris (1995,

28, 30, 142–143, 155–156, 158, 164, 191, 194, 210).

6.2 The Opposing Camps 121

Bishop of Kyrenia, not out of personal interests but due to ties based on traditional

social relations and dependence (Katsiaounis 2004, 27; Frangoudes 2002, 15, 22;

Anagnostopoulou 1999, 204; Katsiaounis 1996, 243).

In effect, the Kyriniaki ‘moderates’ were actually conservatives: they defended

tradition and the established hierarchical society, and were opposed to change.

Consequently, it was vitally important that they retain their influence over the

Church and all other structures threatened by the new ideas of the nation and

liberalism. Although they had little support among the popular strata, whose

numbers would give them a majority, their client networks enabled them to

mobilise strong support against the new ideological tendencies.

In contrast, the leaders of the Kitiaki were the new urban bourgeoisie and the

nationalist intellectuals—lawyers, doctors, teachers, publishers, etc. The Kitiaki

camp also included merchants and capitalists, who, in contrast to the Kyriniaki,

‘gave people better prices and certain guarantees’.13 Their popular support came

mainly from the lower classes: the artisans and workers who swarmed into the

towns at the turn of the century, many of the journeymen and unskilled workers, and

the lower peasant strata, especially those living in the areas near the cities. The fact

that they succeeded in rallying the majority of the lower classes should not be

surprising. The lower classes in all countries tend to be disappointed with the

existing pattern of distribution of wealth and to support political parties and other

organisations that promise some form of redistribution (Lipset 1963, 48). The

largest group supporting the candidacy of Kyrillatsos belonged to the young

generation of graduates of Greek universities who had not experienced Ottoman

rule; these represented the so-called ‘intransigent’ faction of the island’s politicalclass. They earned this name was because of their attitude towards British rule and

the way in which they demanded enosis.The leaders on the Kitiaki side included the Bishop of Kition among the clergy,

as well as a number of leading lay personages such as parliamentarians Theofanis

Theodotou (lawyer); Antonis Theodotou (doctor and banker); G. Siakallis (literary

scholar and lawyer); C. Sozos (lawyer and a founder of the Limassol Savings

Bank—later the Popular Bank); I. Kyriakides (lawyer); Ν. Rossos (lawyer and

newspaper publisher); I. Voditsianos (farmer); F. Zannetos (doctor and newspaper

publisher); and the teacher and freemason, N. Katalanos (Katalanos 2003, 181;

Frangoudes 2002, 15, 22; Koudounaris 1995, 39, 75–76, 84–85, 117, 160, 272, 281,

295). These men had begun to acquire financial wealth and power and many were

well educated, but they were ignored by the old elite and so lacked the social and

political recognition they craved. Hence, they saw this conflict as a way to ensure

and uphold their social position.

Geographically the Kyrenian camp was most influential in the provinces of

Nicosia, Kyrenia and Famagusta—unsurprising as these three provinces were

under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Archbishop and the Bishop of Kyrenia.

13‘Drive out the night crows’, annex to Evagoras, 22 September 1901; ‘Long live the national list’,annex to Evagoras, 26 September 1901.

122 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

In the provinces of Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos the predominance of the Kitiaki

was almost absolute.14

6.3 The Ideological Character of the Conflict

In the broader context of the Ottoman world, the beginning of the nineteenth

century was the period in which the historical conflict between two forms of

cultural identity unfolded in the Orthodox millet—between modern nationalism

and the traditional worldview of Romiosini15 (Kitromilides 1989). Although in

Cyprus the conflict may have begun in this period, it was not until the Archbish-

opric issue that it became crucial. Katsiaounis (1996) views it as being analogous to

the French revolution, while Attalides (1986) sees it as the climactic conflict

between two factions of the ‘Christian-to-become-Greek Cypriot’ community: the

moderates and the intransigents. Kitromilides (1989), in fact, directly links those

two factions to the clash between Hellenism and Romiosini that was being waged in

the broader area of the East Mediterranean and the Balkans—with their two rival

symbolic centres of power: Athens (the Greek national state) and Constantinople/

Istanbul (the seat of the Patriarchate).

The Kyrenian camp represented the old social hierarchy based on religion,

whereby the hierarchy was established by law and each social class knew its

place in relation to the rest. It was precisely this institutionalised inequality that

nationalism would eradicate—at least nationalism as promoted by the Kitiaki

(Katsiaounis 2004, 28). The Kitiaki proclaimed themselves to be the ‘nationalcamp’ and the ‘defenders of the decorous and sacred idea of nationalism’, anddenigrated the Kyriniaki who suggested that Athens was a source of corruption,

unsuitable for education of the youth.16 The Kitiaki were agents of modernity,

which conflicted with the absolute and arbitrary power of the Church.

The Kitiaki were armed with a vigorous political discourse, which can be

described briefly as follows: the Church is the national authority of the Greek

Cypriots; it is crucial to establish institutions of democracy and modernity; the

Ecumenical Patriarch is a threat to the national renaissance of Cyprus; the British

administration is temporary, but can protect the autocephalous nature of the Church

of Cyprus; the end goal is the Union of Cyprus with Greece (Michael 2005, 322).

14‘Long live the national list of candidates’, annex to Evagoras, 26 September 1901; ‘The victoryof 28 September’, Evagoras, 4 October 1901, 1.15Romiosini is an ambiguous term. As a word it signifies Hellenism in the Middle ages. The origin

of the word Romiosini is from being part of the Roman Empire—eastern Rome which became the

Byzantine Empire which was largely Greek and based around its capital Constantinople. There-

fore, the word mixes both Hellenism and Byzantinism and is difficult to describe exactly.16‘The word of Theodotou’, annex to Evagoras, 8 September 1901; ‘The triumph of the national

camp’, annex to Evagoras, 20 September 1901; ‘Long live the national list of candidates’, annex toEvagoras, 26 September 1901.

6.3 The Ideological Character of the Conflict 123

Despite this, the lay Kitiaki did not actively promote an ideology that would

clash with ecclesiastical power; i.e., they contained their radicalism and acquiesced

to the Church’s hegemony over the Greek Cypriot population. Moreover, in their

arguments they referred to the Church as ‘the most certain and secure national

centre’ and claimed that the Kyriniaki were attempting to subjugate the Orthodox

Church to foreign and non-Orthodox power centres.17 The Bishop of Kition

proclaimed a modernist ideology to the extent required by the nationalists but he

was at the same time limited by his religious identity. The Bishop enjoyed a broad

popular support base, which meant that he had to adapt his politics to reflect their

demands (Michael 2005, 320, 331–332). The more important Kitiaki, who were

expected to be more receptive to the plight of the popular strata, held very

conservative social views—not too far removed from those of the Kyriniaki, a

factor that facilitated the two camps’ eventual rapprochement (Katalanos 2003,

182).

The freemasons also played a significant role in the conflict, and effectively

became the guiding spirit of the national movement (Katsiaounis 1996, 229)

through their strong support of the Bishop of Kition. Their main representatives

were N. Katalanos, T. Theodotou in Nicosia, C. Sozos and I. Kyriakides in

Limassol and F. Zannetos and I. Economides in Larnaca. The Kyriniaki exploited

the freemasonry issue, recognising that Cypriots, especially the villagers, were

superstitious. They even suggested that all Kitiaki and even the Bishop himself

were freemasons (Katalanos 2003, 182; Frangoudes 2002, 23–24). In spring 1900,

the Limassol newspaper Foni tis Kyprou (main mouthpiece of the Kyriniaki)

devoted a series of special issues to attacking freemasonry as a heresy and

N. Katalanos personally as the main voice of freemasonry in Cyprus. Many of

these articles were signed by the Archimandrite of Archbishop Philotheos, who

referred to Katalanos as ‘a salaried instrument of freemasonry’.18 To fight back, theKitiaki accused their opponents of ‘Makrakism’ (a heretical movement that had

developed in Greece), arguing that a priest named Technopoulos, one of the chief

supporters of the Bishop of Kyrenia, believed in this heresy.19

Another crucial ideological dimension refers to how the two camps viewed

popular involvement, as their view reflects their perception and commitment to

democracy. However, to analyse this issue we must first examine the election

17‘The triumph of the national camp’, annex to Evagoras, 20 September 1901; ‘Long live the

national list of candidates’, annex to Evagoras, 26 September 1901.18See for example, ‘The Freemasonry Movement’, annex to Foni tis Kyprou, 9 March 1900; ‘Theanti-Christian blasphemies of Mr Katalanos’, annex to Foni tis Kyprou, 23 March 1900; ‘TheMasonic movement and Mr Katalanos’, annex to Foni tis Kyprou, 26 March 1900; ‘New blas-

phemies by the freemason Mr Katalanos’, annex to Foni tis Kyprou, 6 April 1900; ‘The confusionof the freemason Mr Katalanos’, annex to Foni tis Kyprou, 13 April 1900; ‘The freemason author

of Evagoras only worthy of pity’, annex to Foni tis Kyprou, 4 May 1900.19Annex to Evagoras, 8 September 1901.

124 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

provisions. A 1900 Holy Synod encyclical stipulated electoral conditions as fol-

lows:20 the Greek Christian Orthodox population of the island would elect their

special representatives, who would then elect 60 general representatives, of whom

40 would be from the laity and 20 from the clergy; these men, together with the

Holy Synod, would elect the new Archbishop.

The electoral procedures had certain important limitations. First, women (half

the electorate) were excluded. Second, there were age limitations according to the

specific election, with higher age requirements for those who would actually elect

the Archbishop. There were also age restrictions on the right to be elected, as

special representatives had to be over 25 and general representatives over 30. Third,

the clergy carried a special weight in the whole process, as they made up over

one-third of the body of 60 general representatives (66 with the Holy Synod) who

ultimately elected the Archbishop and who could thus potentially distort the

popular will.

The electoral process was a prime opportunity for bribery, whether of those who

elected the special representatives or of the elected representatives themselves.

Moreover, there was no government control over the procedures, which further

compromised the impartiality of the electoral procedures, and the Holy Synod

adjudicated appeals that perhaps should have been heard by a special court.21

Despite these limitations, the electoral procedures were sufficiently comprehensive,

as we must recall that political rights in this period (and not only in Cyprus) were

limited to adult males, and that the Church by nature was conservative. Moreover,

for secular elections, such as for the Legislative Council, there were property

restrictions, whereas for these religious elections there was no such restriction; all

adult males had the right to participate at some level of the procedures.

Popular participation in the election of Bishops and the Archbishop also leant

legitimacy to the Archbishop and Bishops as representatives the whole population,

as they were the only elected positions in which the Greek Cypriots participated.

This largely accounts for the Cypriots’ identification of the Archbishop as their

national leader. The system of election with broad popular participation was later

the subject of considerable criticism by the people’s representatives in the Legis-

lative Council, many of whom described the system as ‘mob rule’, whereby

religious procedures were turned into political party contests. They proposed that

either the condition for special representatives chosen by the people be abolished,

or that an appointed body of ex officcio notables would elect the bishops. Some

believed this body should consist exclusively of members of the Holy Synod, the

parliamentarians and the mayors.22 This of course reflects hostility to the people’s

20Foni tis Kyprou, 24 August 1900, 1–2.21‘The institution of the election of bishops: the politicians’ view’, Eleftheria, 1 June 1918, 2;

Eleftheria, 8 June 1918, 1; Eleftheria, 15 June 1918, 1.22‘The institution of the election of bishops: the politicians’ view’, Eleftheria, 1 June 1918, 2;

Eleftheria, 8 June 1; Eleftheria, 15 June 1918, 1.

6.3 The Ideological Character of the Conflict 125

active involvement in political processes, as well as the oligarchical spirit of many

politicians of the period.

As noted earlier, the Kitiaki strongly opposed the old order and all attempts to

maintain despotic systems of administration. The Kitiaki espoused concepts of

popular sovereignty and the peoples’ election of leaders, citing the people as the

strongest legitimating basis for the power of the leadership (Michael 2005, 326).

This of course concealed the attempt of the bourgeoisie, who supported the Bishop

of Kition, to use the might of the popular masses to acquire access to the political

and economic power of the Archbishop’s throne.In contrast, the Kyriniaki side tried to settle the issue without involving the

people. This was apparent in their continual attempts to convene the Grand Synod

of Orthodoxy with the support of the Ecumenical Patriarch who favoured the

Kyrenian candidate. This position was also clear later when, after the passage of

the government law on elections (see below), they convened the Holy Synod of the

Cypriot Church and arbitrarily enthroned the Bishop of Kyrenia as Archbishop.

6.4 The Battlefields (1): The Press

The two camps publicly aired their arguments and policies through the newspapers.

The main Kitiaki newspapers were the Cypriot Sentinel (Kypriakos Fylax) and

Evagoras in Nicosia; Salamis in Famagusta; the New Nation (Neos Ethnos) and thePeople’s Newspaper (Efimerida tou Laou) in Larnaca. The main Kyrenian news-

papers were The Voice of Cyprus (Foni tis Kyprou) and The Cypriot (O Kyprios) inNicosia; the Trumpet (Salpinx) in Limassol, Fatherland (Patris) and Truth(Alitheia) in Limassol; Union (Enosis) in Larnaca; and Struggle (Agon) in Paphos

(Frangoudes 2002, 379; Katalanos 2003, 167).

Through the newspapers an intense war was waged, with mutual accusations of

intimidation and bribery. For example, Evagoras, the flagship of the Kitiaki,

accused the Kyriniaki of going for votes with promises of appointments, loans,

monetary bribes, licences for the sale of drinks, etc. The newspaper also accused

them of conducting a campaign of intimidation by withdrawing permits and firing

any supporters of the Bishop of Kiti.23 The Kyriniaki made similar accusations

against their opponents.24

This election was the first time that candidates and their supporters made

personally libellous and unsubstantiated allegations in their speeches and articles.

This was also the first time that satire was used as a weapon (in the newspaper

Evagoras), as well as the first use of posters and leaflets—indicative of the intensely

ideological and political nature of these elections (Katsiaounis 1996, 238). The fight

for the throne was intense, and both sides used harsh language. The Kitiaki called

23‘Drive out the night crows’, annex to Evagoras, 22 September 1901.24See for example, Foni tis Kyprou, 15 September 1900, 1.

126 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

the Kyriniaki fiends, voracious wolves, political corpses, a villainous gang, poison-

ous serpents, petty tyrants, an infernal government camp, a devilish crew, a

murderous gang and insatiable leeches,25 while the Kyriniaki representatives

were castigated as ‘anti-Greeks working against the national interests’ (Michael

2005, 316).

6.4.1 The Battlefields (2): Organisation

Any analysis of the organisation relevant to the Archiepiscopal Question must take

into account that Cyprus was a society in transition, and organisational efforts were

still in their infancy. They had not yet become lasting and permanent and were very

specific in nature. In other words, they corresponded to the level of economic and

social development of the period, as happened in many other parts of the world

(Rokkan 1970, 89).

British legislation (Chap. 5) had restricted the Archbishop’s secular power, andlay notables began to take over management of many affairs in the Archbishopric,

including management of its property. Moreover, the advanced age of Archbishop

Sophronios encouraged such politicians as A. Liassides and P. Constantinides and

their colleagues to establish themselves in the Archbishopric (Frangoudes 2002,

10). The network of close colleagues that certain politicians built (e.g., Liassides

and Paschalis) has been deemed a ‘party’ by some scholars (Frangoudes 2002, 10;

Limbourides 1997, 10, 12)—a word that must be understood in the context of an era

when this concept was unknown, and thus cannot carry the same meaning that it has

today. Hence, both Frangoudes and Limbourides note that when the Archiepiscopal

Question broke out, the first political ‘party’ had already taken shape under

Liassides. In Nicosia this ‘party’ was regarded as all-powerful, and its head

attempted to transform it from a local to a national party. The way in which this

network functioned stimulated its opponents into rallying around a rival ‘party’ ledby Katalanos and Theodotou.

As political parties had not been created, the two sides used their client networks,

various clubs and associations in their struggle for predominance, and they did this

in a way that represented a much more sophisticated organisation than simple client

networks. The Kitiaki used a chain of national clubs and societies that were

connected to the association Love of the People (Agapi tou Laou) led by Katalanos.This umbrella organisation hosted many national and charitable events, mainly in

Nicosia, and actively supported the Kitiaki (Katalanos 2003, 210).

The conservatives realised the need to create an organisational counterweight;

they also understood that the conservative Cypriot Association, which was then on

its last legs, would not suffice. So they founded a new and politically credible

25‘The big rally in Morphou’, annex to Evagoras, 8 September 1901; ‘The triumph of the national

camp’, annex to Evagoras, 20 September 1901.

6.4 The Battlefields (1): The Press 127

association, which took shape in July 1900, under the name of Orthodoxy

(Katalanos 2003, 189; Katsiaounis 1996, 227–228). The association was inaugu-

rated on 20 July 190026 and described itself as ‘religious’, indicating the emphasis

on the idea of religion. The association became the Kyriniaki ‘party’ centre and

functioned under the honorary presidency of the Bishop of Kyrenia (Limbourides

1997, 32). The Kitiaki accused the association of being ‘anti-national’ and

‘Protestant’.27

The Orthodoxy’ association, operating ‘under the flag of Christ’ as the associ-

ation itself declared, initially registered around 300 members, appealing to all social

classes.28 This reading room sponsored lectures, mainly on religious issues, and it

even held protest meetings condemning actions by the Kitiaki camp.29 It founded a

free night school for the indigent, which at the end of 1901 had 130 pupils ranging

from 8 to 50 years old.30 Although the Kyriniaki tried to present the association as a

classless organisation embracing all social strata, they could not hide the fact that it

was guided by the elite conservative establishment of Nicosia (Katsiaounis 1996,

227–228). The Kyrenian side was also supported by some other reading clubs in

Nicosia: Patriotism, Phoenix31 and The Cypriot (Katalanos 2003, 210). These

associations, which aimed to coordinate the two rival camp’s activities, were not

just a local (Nicosia) phenomenon but were island-wide For example, in Limassol

there were two clubs of a political nature, Reform (Kitiaki) and Patria (Kyriniaki)

(Chrysanthis 1986, 287), as well as the pro-Kyrenian association Equality presided

over by the Limassol parliamentarian Spyros Araouzos.32

The struggle over the Archiepiscopal Question also influenced education in

Cyprus: the Kitiaki founded their own gymnasium (secondary school) and the two

sides competed with separate ballot lists in elections for the provincial educational

committees, the ecclesiastical committees and school committees (Katalanos 2003,

161–164, 384).33 The two camps also founded their own primary schools and girls’schools, although once the Archiepiscopal Question was resolved, the two second-

ary schools merged (Limbourides 1997, 64–65).

26‘The religious association Orthodoxy’, Foni tis Kyprou, 17 August 1900, 3.27‘Long live the national list of candidates’, annex to Evagoras, 26 September 1901.28‘In association’, Foni tis Kyprou, 31 August 1900, p. 2.29‘Major rally in the reading room of the association Orthodoxy’, Foni tis Kyprou, 7 September

1900, 2; ‘The religious association and the spread of the sacred sermon in Cyprus’, Foni tisKyprou, 21 September 1900, 3; ‘Speeches in the Orthodoxy reading room’, Foni tis Kyprou,14 December 1900, 3.30‘In association’, Foni tis Kyprou, 16 November 1901, 2.31‘Resolution to the Synod’, Foni tis Kyprou, 19 October 1900, 2.32‘Vote’, Evagoras, 8 September 1901, 2.33See also ‘Party innovations’, Eleftheria, 18 December 1908, 3.

128 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

6.5 The Beginning of Mass Politics and the Nationalisation

of Politics

The Archiepiscopal Question marked the beginning of mass politics in Cyprus. It

was the catalyst for the entry of the masses into politics, and the reason why the

masses were involved with the political process. This was an important issue, as its

outcome would determine the structure and balance of power within the Greek

Cypriot community. While this issue was the specific catalyst for mass politics, the

conditions were ripe for popular activism and involvement: Cyprus was experienc-

ing major changes in its economic, political and social systems, which is recognised

as a spur to greater political interest and participation (Lipset 1963, 195).

This issue not only concerned the personal struggles and rivalries of the clergy

and the lay elite—a rather common phenomenon for the era—but also divided the

Greek Cypriot society ideologically and politically. At stake was control over the

ecclesiastical institutions, the most definitive mechanism of power in the Greek

Cypriot community: the Archiepiscopal Question was an attack on the old order of

things. The tug-of-war for power led to a modern and potentially subversive

ideology, nationalism, and divided society down the middle on all political and

social issues. From that time on, all elections became a fight for power and control

(Frangoudes 2002, 431; Katsiaounis 1996, 232; Attalides 1986, 130).

The people’s participation in the elections in this period (1900–1909) was

largely due to the intense election campaigns—not only for the Archbishopric,

but also for the Legislative Council and the municipalities. The vigorous efforts of

the two camps caught the interest of the lower classes, motivating them to pay the

tax (vergi) required to vote. The number of registered voters surged from 12,093 in

1896 to 24,952 in 1901, an increase of 106%. In these elections, the national

candidates swept the board and not even one Kyriniaki candidate was elected

(see Table 3.1).

In addition to the ideologisation of the stakes there was another important factor

that explains why the lower classes became so deeply interested in this struggle.

Their involvement can be attributed—at least in part—to the unwritten rules of

social subordination and the pervasiveness of the patron-client system upon which

the entire social and political system was based. In this context, political alignment

was part of a relationship of friendship and dependence (Faustmann 2010, 45).

Therefore, in all elections, whether intra-ecclesiastical or parliamentary, it was the

politicians and the elite who encouraged and guided the lower classes political

behaviour. The great majority of the peasants and workers had not yet made their

presence felt in the electoral arena. The fact that most had no direct personal or class

interest in this struggle was of little concern: they became involved because of

social pressures, or a sense of social obligation to the politicians and other heads of

client networks.

Besides covering the issues, the press also vividly described the lively popular

involvement, reflecting the intensity and the new methods of campaigning, one

newspaper proclaiming: ‘In all the villages in Cyprus, an unusual activity and

6.5 The Beginning of Mass Politics and the Nationalisation of Politics 129

election fever prevailed before the elections’.34 In fact, on the eve of the election,

the various clubs, coffee shops and associations in the capital were filled with

citizens discussing the ‘burning’ question. The Kitiaki met at the Love of the People

association and marched in the streets of Nicosia. The Kyriniaki did the same,

meeting at the Orthodoxy association. Mass rallies were also held both prior to and

after the 1900 elections,35 revealing the new popular terrain of politics.

When the Kyriniaki lost the 1900 elections, however, political activity around

this issue subsided. The Kyriniaki questioned the results of the election and so for

many years there were consultations and attempts at mediation, until finally the

issue came before the Legislative Council in 1907.

With a gap of 9 years between elections for representatives (1900, and then

1909) the two sides focused on elections for the Legislative and Municipal Coun-

cils. These elections were similarly marked by intense conflict, with both sides

improving their organisational tactics to claim the popular vote. The ideologisation

of the conflict stimulated considerable popular interest, while at the same time, the

competitive struggle over the electoral processes resulted in a broader electorate, as

the voters themselves became interested in being included on the electoral registers

and both sides encouraged and helped people to register. This signified the incor-

poration of increasingly larger sections of the people into political processes.

In the 1901 elections the two sides campaigned with full lists of candidates and

made announcements calling on the people to support them.36 The electoral strug-

gle was very lively with speeches, insults, rallies, election manifestos, etc. The

Kitiaki propaganda designated their own candidates as ‘national’ and called on

the people to vote for them while simultaneously ‘blackening the names’ of the‘gangsters’.37 The Kyriniaki reciprocated, referring to their press support as

the ‘healthy’ media, while criticising the Kitiaki rhetoric, and demeaning their

critique of Kyriniaki’s candidates as ‘old-style politicians’.38 This confrontation

was so intense in all towns throughout the island, to the point that it was sometimes

described as a ‘war’.39 The Kitiaki triumphed once again—they won all nine

parliamentary seats with a large majority, including the Bishop of Kition himself

who was elected in two constituencies (Limassol and Nicosia). The established

politicians, including Paschalis Constantinides and Achilleas Liassides, were

defeated and new politicians were elected, some of whom, such as Theophanis

Theodotou and Filios Zannetos, remained among the political leaders of Cyprus

34‘Electoral issues’, Foni tis Kyprou, 21 September 1900, 2.35‘Resolution to the Synod’, Foni tis Kyprou, 19 October 1900, 2.36‘Long live the national list of candidates’, annex to Eleftheria, 26 September 1901; ‘Who should

the people elect?’ Foni tis Kyprou, 21 September 1901, 1; ‘Parliamentary issues’, Foni tis Kyprou,21 September 1901, 3.37‘Long live the national list of candidates’, annex to Evagoras, 26 September 1901.38‘Who should the people elect?’, Foni tis Kyprou, 21 September 1901, 1.39‘From Paphos. The parliamentary issues’, Foni tis Kyprou, 21 September 1901, 3; ‘FromVarosha. The parliamentary issues’, Foni tis Kyprou, 3 October 1901, 4.

130 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

until 1931 (Frangoudes 2002, 108–109; Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980,

Volume III, 156; Attalides 1986, 130).

The 1906 elections were particularly acrimonious, with the position of Arch-

bishop at the top of the political programme. In response to the fanatical behaviour

around this election, High Commissioner King Harman introduced the secret ballot

(see Chap. 3). Constantinides, Siakallis and Liassides—all three Kyriniaki—issued

a common position statement on several issues (including agriculture, the tributary

tax, the extension of political rights, and the expansion of Greek education),

illustrating how the rift had forced the political elite to use political programmes

as a weapon. The Kitiaki followed suit in a sharp tone and with election pamphlets.

The elections concluded with a victory for the Kitiaki, once again with the Bishop

of Kition re-elected to parliament. This time however a Kyrenian, Spyros Araouzos,

was elected in the Limassol-Paphos constituency. So on this occasion, eight Kitiaki

and one Kyrenian were elected (Katalanos 2003, 383–386; Frangoudes 2002,

234–235; Attalides 1986, 130; Sophocleous, 1995, 9).

The municipal elections of 1908 were called during a period in which the

Archiepiscopal Question was at its height. The Legislative Council discussed a

draft law prepared by the Kitiaki that provided for new elections with the collab-

oration of the British administration (Limbourides 1997, 53–55; Katalanos 2003,

389). Hence, as in the parliamentary elections, the voters were divided into two

camps. Tension was particularly high in Nicosia, where the split resulted in the

election of a Turkish Cypriot mayor for the first and only time during the British

occupation, as the two sides could not agree on the elections of a mutually

acceptable candidate (Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. V, 181).

After many adventures and clashes between the two sides, the legislation

prepared by the Kitiaki was finally voted into law on 4 May 1908 and published

in the official government gazette on 25 May (Katalanos 2003, 403; Papademetris

and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. IV, 135). The law came into effect and the govern-

ment set 10 February 1909 as the date for the election of the special representatives.

The special representatives, numbering 993 in total, elected the 60 general repre-

sentatives who, together with the Holy Synod, elected the new Archbishop. The

Kyriniaki abstained from the elections in protest as they realised that they would

have lost. However, the elections were carried out normally, and all those elected

were Kitiaki (Frangoudes 2002, 466, 472, 475).

In the 1911 elections, not long after the Archiepiscopal Question, a spirit of unity

prevailed, resulting in joint candidates being put forward on behalf of the two sides.

Intransigents and moderates joined forces so that there was nothing substantive at

stake in the election. This was reflected in the diminishing rates of mass participa-

tion in the elections. The same year saw the reuniting of the junior schools, girls’schools and secondary schools that the two sides had been operating separately

since 1905. The merger of schools had greater implications, of course: it marked the

union of the old ruling class with the new bourgeoisie, with the immediate goal of

demanding enosis (Katalanos 2003, 441, 444; Attalides 1986, 131).

6.5 The Beginning of Mass Politics and the Nationalisation of Politics 131

6.6 An Evaluation

The first crisis of established politics, i.e., the Archbishopric, exposed two rival

conceptions of what politics should be like, particularly nationalist politics. On one

side stood a group composed of merchants, landowners and prelates who drew

support from part of the agrarian class and those accustomed to traditional forms of

politics. This group saw no role for popular elements. The second group although

including members of the old establishment as well was firmly rooted in the rising

bourgeoisie and the middle classes that harboured ambitious conceptions about

politics and the future of Cyprus, though its full implications were still unclear.

Nationalism and enosis were rationalised through this conflict into an ideological

system. Nationalism entailed an appeal to the people and at the same time it was an

ideological assault on the old order, its practices and forms of legitimacy. Nation-

alism in this regard supplied a very strong ideological bond for its members and

allowed them to reach down to the popular masses.

The conflict for the Archbishopric throne showed that establishtarian politics

proved incapable of performing the two vital functions required by the ruling elite

in the new colonial era: re-integrating the different factions of the hegemonic bloc

on a long-term basis and re-establishing the historic bloc’s popular legitimacy. The

answer to both questions was a new pattern of politics: nationalist politics. Put

otherwise, nationalism became the meeting point of divergent social interests. The

conflict concluded in a decisive victory for the Kitiaki and with the Church adopting

a Greek nationalist policy. Nationalism had become the popular and dominant

ideology (Katsiaounis 1996, 228). Indicative of this change was that—despite the

administrative and economic influence of the moderates—after 1901 the intransi-

gent nationalists prevailed in the Legislative Council elections and continued to do

so until their electoral defeat in 1925. This meant the beginning of a new period for

Cypriot society. The next generation of activists and politicians were being formed

in an intellectual environment heavily influenced by the Hellenic ideology.

By the end of the conflict the two sides set on a gradual course of convergence. The

division between the formerly warring camps was no longer so absolute. The

centrifugal tendencies that had been developing within the Church were overturned

and the younger generation became gradually absorbed into its orbit. For one thing, in

social origins and positions the nationalists were not particularly distinguishable from

the moderates. There were professional men, civil servants, journalists, lawyers,

businessmen and landowners on both sides of the conflict. Thus a defensive alliance

of capitalists and landowners was formed whose final coalescence was facilitated by

the hardening of British stance toward enosis. In the new period of right-wing

coalescence after 1909 the nationalists furnished the vital ideological perspective.

This dialectic between the two opposing camps led to an inherently contradic-

tory situation, but one that seemed to reflect a new modus operandi: first, the

discourse of the Church as a whole became more radicalised and nationalist;

second, the discourse of the younger generation became more conservative.

Deprived of the role of social vanguard, the younger generation employed a

132 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

political discourse with absolutely no social content (Anagnostopoulou 1999, 205).

The best way to explain this conflict and the subsequent union of the varied sections

of the bourgeoisie is the following: the initial resistance and reaction of the more

progressive and liberal elements were followed by mass mobilisation and a shift to

more progressive demands. It was then completed with the moderates splitting and

shifting to the ‘right’, until the majority of the lower strata and the lower bourgeoi-

sie moved into the conservative camp (Hobsbawm 2002, 96).40

The election of the Archbishop of Cyprus under the conditions of the 1900s was

not a simple ecclesiastical question: it was a major political and ideological issue in

modern Cypriot history. Through this conflict and especially through the electoral

victory of the Bishop of Kition, the Church of Cyprus was forced to transform itself

so that in the end it was able to retain its position as the national political authority

of the Greek Cypriots. At least until other political forces appeared on the Greek

Cypriot political scene, the Church remained the exclusive voice of the demand for

a national renaissance. The conclusion of the Archiepiscopal Question meant

victory for the nationalists—those who supported urgent reference to the demand

for Union. This set the Church in conflict with the British administration, but it also

revealed the Church’s adaptability, which allowed it to maintain its power as

political representative of the Greek Cypriots (Michael 2005, 355–357).

6.7 The Cypriot Church After the Archiepiscopal Rift

The years immediately following the Archiepiscopal Question (1909) highlight

once again how important the Church, its authority and its control were to the Greek

Cypriot community, and how pivotal its role was in the nationalist and right-wing

milieu but occassionally to the British too. Although the pivotal role of the Church

in the Greek national movement will be thoroughly explored and substantiated in

the next chapter a brief contextualisation will help put things in perspective.

When Archbishop Kyrillos (Papadopoulos), former Bishop of Kition, died in

1916, he was succeeded by his earlier rival, Bishop Kyrillos (Vassiliou) of Kyrenia.

When Archbishop Kyrillos (Vassiliou) died in 1933 the Church found itself in even

worse circumstances than in 1900, since two of the three Bishops (Kitium and

Kyrenia) had been deported for their part in the 1931 riots, leaving the Bishop of

Paphos as the only member of the Holy Synod in Cyprus. Nor was the British

administration any happier: by that time (1933) the Bishop of Paphos, Locum

Tenens by default, had already been convicted of sedition, and it was clear to the

British that the Greek Cypriots would want to fill the Archiepiscopal vacancy with a

40Michels (1997, 289) wrote that in the case of young people who wanted to overturn the older

generation in a variety of institutions and contexts, as soon as they achieved the goal of taking over

positions of power, they underwent an internal transformation and essentially became like their

predecessors. ‘Today’s revolutionaries are tomorrow’s reactionaries’, as he writes

characteristically.

6.7 The Cypriot Church After the Archiepiscopal Rift 133

politically active and nationalist Bishop. Only with the election of an Archbishop

who was prepared to attend exclusively to the spiritual needs of his flock and the

welfare of the Church, would the prospect of any serious revival of enosis sentiment

be kept at bay. The election of an Archbishop pledged to Hellenistic aims would act

as a severe setback to the government’s policy and would gravely embarrass those

Cypriots who had since 1931 chosen to cooperate with the government. As none of

the Bishops saw any prospect of his own election, all were quite content with an

indefinite postponement of elections.

The situation changed little until the summer of 1937 when it became known

that the government was considering legislation in connection with the Church. In

fact, the measures under consideration were not related to the archiepiscopal

question; the principal measure was in response to complaints over mismanagement

of Church finances and property, while another concerned educational policy (i.e.,

government’s intention of bringing all branches of education under government

control). A third proposed measure would reorganise the district administrative

councils in terms of its members and the role of the Church; these councils dealt

exclusively with secular business.41

Therefore, those with vested interests in the Church’s continuing authority in

secular affairs decided that immediate steps were necessary to stop or reverse such

reforms, and to this end an active and influential Archbishop, pledged to a

Hellenising policy, had to be put into place. Accordingly, through the intervention

of the Greek Consul, the Locum Tenens was brought to Athens where he and the

Bishop of Kyrenia (who was living in exile there) agreed to waive their own

candidatures and support the formation of a Synod that would elect a pro-enosiscandidate from one of the sister Churches. Here, the British government stepped in

and, inter alia, proceeded with the enactment of the Autocephalous Greek Ortho-

dox Church of Cyprus Law of 1937 (Governor’s Approval of the Archbishop),

which stipulated that the person elected Archbishop had to be approved by the

Governor before his election could be confirmed with any religious or ceremonial

rites.

The Locum Tenens refused to take action until this law—and two others relating

to the archiepiscopal vacancy which had been enacted simultaneously—were

repealed. For 9 years the colonial office declined to review the laws, and the

outbreak of World War II in 1939 caused the whole issue to be shelved. The lay

population and most of the clergy were not overly interested either, or perhaps they

were just resigned to the state of affairs. The new Government in London in 1945

decided to review the laws, and in October 1946, the Foreign Secretary announced

that the laws would be repealed as soon as possible and the exiled Bishop of

Kyrenia would be allowed to return to Cyprus (the Bishop of Kitium had died in

September 1937). The ground was therefore fertile for new elections (see Chap. 9).

41TNA, CO 926/171, ‘Cyprus internal political situation, Cyprus 1954–1956’, Political Influenceof the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, 28 August 1954, 7.

134 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

The Church of Cyprus presented a paradox to the British. As they admitted, ‘theChurch, although exercising an influence for good especially upon the rural popu-

lation in that it recognises and preaches to the peasants that the doctrine of

communism is the doctrine of antichrist is, nonetheless, responsible for a great

deal of unnecessary lack of cooperation with the Government and government

officials’.42 Throughout all these years the Church continued to maintain the policy

‘enosis and only enosis’, with the prelates and the Archbishop especially unflinch-

ing, categorically refusing any constitutional reform or proposal that would impede

or delay immediate enosis. This was particularly true in the 1940s, when the

communists posed quite a real threat (see Chap. 8). The leading dignitaries of the

Church in the 1940s were very openly anti-British, constantly proclaiming in public

such phrases as ‘Cyprus in chains’, ‘the enslaved people of Cyprus’, and the

‘foreign conqueror’. It was seldom that any meeting or even Church service

presided over by the Archbishop or the Bishops did not end with cheers for enosisand the King of Greece, and the congregation singing the Greek national anthem.

However, with no figure at the head of Church, the campaign for enosis suffered,and no real progress was made. At the same time, the inability of the Church to lead

the nationalist movement left space for the Left to take advantage; something they

did in the early 1940s (see Chap. 8).

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136 6 The Crisis of Established Politics and the Emergence of the Nationalist Right

Chapter 7

Politicising Nationalism and Anti-

Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

To understand Greek Cypriot nationalist politics we need to look at the mobilisation

and organisation of the anti-colonial cleavage within the Greek community of

Cyprus which produced two opposing right-wing factions. In this chapter, I look

at their colonial stances, their vested interests, their strategies, etc. The way

nationalism was politicised left a lasting imprint on Cypriot politics, and not just

nationalist politics, which was marked by internal rivalries and conflicts, especially

that between intransigents and moderates. Nationalist party politics was also

affected by external influences, particularly developments in Greece and the stance

of British authorities, while there was also internal political opposition, i.e., the

Communists.

The political agenda had been dominated by nationalism and enosis (see

Chap. 4) to such an extent that no member of the Greek Orthodox population

could hope to succeed in politics unless he put Union at the head of his programme.

The hegemony of enosis was reflected in the many political organisations, nation-

alist organisations, cultural associations and pressure groups devoted to the Union

cause. Moreover, these organisations enabled the political involvement of mem-

bers/activists of the rising bourgeoisie who felt marginalised by the colonial

administration and lacked channels for personal advancement. As an activist

phenomenon, (radical) nationalism depends on a mobilised bourgeois and a petit

bourgeois core (Eley 1998, xvi). In the absence of state/political institutions, these

organisations became not only the breeding ground for nationalism but also the

arena for power struggles between members as well with the colonial

administration.

In the long course of nationalist, right wing party formation we can identify three

distinct forms of political organisation: reading clubs and associations, the various

pressure groups and organisations created for promoting enosis and political parties(see also Chap. 1). These represented powerful agencies of popular nationalism that

served as the basis for future political formations, platforms and political parties,

and they were also important vehicles of socialising people into the ideological

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_7

137

value system of nationalism. The cultural associations and reading clubs

represented the most widespread organisation of conservative politics at this early

stage, and they were linked to leading nationalist politicians. Although ostensibly

cultural associations, in reality they were overwhelmingly political. They were the

obvious centres of political discussion, and around them clustered a variety of

charitable, recreational and philanthropic agencies. To some extent changes in

this associational fabric preceded the tightening-up of party organisation, a process

similar to what happened in the German Right (Eley 1998, 151).

7.1 Clubs, Reading Rooms and Associations

Despite their different names (reading rooms, associations, clubs, societies, etc.)

these organisations were much the same: they were established by bourgeois

politicians, the landowners and the Church; they were addressed to literate mem-

bers of the socio-political elite; they were usually short-lived. Politically motivated,

they nevertheless operated in the cultural sphere, offering to their members’ small

libraries, daily newspapers, and occasional lectures on topical issues (Chrysanthis

1986, 271, 274). In the initial stages they were not nationalist and did not function to

promote enosis; rather, they were an upper class forum for political activity usually

used to advance their founders political careers. As the enosis movement grew,

however, they were gradually incorporated into the overall enosis system of

organisation and propaganda.

Clearly these clubs were founded to serve the interests of the conservative wing

of Cypriot politics, and so it was only natural that the first clubs were established in

Nicosia, the seat of the Archbishopric, before spreading to other towns (Katsiaounis

1996, 165). And while some had been operating since the late Ottoman period, they

only took on their political character after British occupation (Katalanos 2003,

168–170). The most well-known clubs were the Zenon in Nicosia, Kitiefs in

Larnaca and Isotis in Limassol. In 1879 four of these clubs in Nicosia merged

(Zenon, Solon, Elpis and Omonoia) to form the Kypriakos Syllogos (Cypriot

Association), which enabled the Nicosian elite to promote their agenda in a unified

manner. By the end of the nineteenth century the Kypriakos Syllogos had become

the epicenter of social and political activity in Cyprus, and was hugely involved in

the fierce fight for the Archbishop’s office in the 1900s (see previous chapter).

These clubs and associations served a number of purposes. They provided a

place for politicians to publicize their ideas and organise their activities,1 and they

also served as meeting point for their peers who wanted to advance their political

careers as well as their business activities. The clubs’ administrative boards usually

1For example, deputies G. Chatzipavlou and I. Kyriakides each held the presidency of a reading

club, Ellinismos (Hellenism) and the Liberals Association respectively, Laiki, 2 July 1925, 2;

Eleftheria, 10 March 1917, 3.

138 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

included politicians, regardless of the official reason for their establishment

(Chrysanthis 1986, 275). For example, the Pancyprian Teaching Association,

founded in 1911, was presided over by non-teachers, usually politicians; e.g.,

Ioannis Clerides (lawyer), Giorgos Hadjipavlou (merchant), etc.

Another function of these clubs was to confront and thwart the insubordinate

tendencies of the working poor and especially the younger generation (Katsiaounis

1996, 165). The clubs and their activities operated to control the movement of

ideas, and their conservative nature, which reflected the stance of Nicosia’s upperclasses, is explicit in the Kypriakos Syllogos bylaws (article 42): ‘any person who isto deliver a public lecture in the association must inform the committee in advance

on the subject of the lecture. What is more, the subject must not in any way deal

with religious, moral or political issues’ (cited in Katsiaounis 1996, 79). Their

definition as non-political organisations was mainly an expression of extreme

political caution against nationalism. The exclusion of political issues was in effect

the exclusion of nationalist and anti-colonial issues aiming to defuse their political

potential. Some of these associations though kept in touch with the increasingly

politicised times and served as vehicles for the dissemination of such modern ideas

as nationalism; however, any modern ideas were still quite conservative, in line

with the concept of Greece being something of a scout for British interests in

Eastern Mediterranean (Katsiaounis 1996, 223).

The establishment recognised that in order to prevent the working classes’possible radicalisation they needed to include them. This reasoning led to the

founding in 1891 of Agapi tou Laou (Love of the People), a club that was open to

all and had members from the popular masses as well, unlike the elitist KypriakosSyllogos (Chrysanthis 1986, 274). The elitist clubs were exclusive and membership

was limited to certain educated people; in fact, the Kypriakos Syllogos was littlemore than a loose organisation for Nicosia notables.2 In contrast, the Agapi touLaou was open to all, even those who could not pay the subscription fee. In spite ofits references to the ‘people’, however, the club was headed by leading members

of the established elite: for example, the first president was G. Nikopoulos, editor of

Foni tis Kyprou, and I. Vergopoulos, tobacco factory owner, was treasurer

(Katalanos 2003).

Agapi tou Laou became Cyprus’s most influential club, marking the society in a

variety of ways (nationally, politically, socially and culturally), and the course of

nationalist politics in particular. This club represented a turning point in the

character of these associations, as its ‘primary mission’ was now clearly to embrace

and cultivate nationalism and enosis. Agapi tou Laou was an umbrella association

of a cluster of reading clubs throughout Nicosia representing the emancipatory

drive of the bourgeoisie at a time when there were no fixed party organisations.

Gradually, the club began to organise social events on a larger scale and also

assumed a more direct political function. It organised many lectures and discussions

2The club followed a ‘members only’ policy and its elitist nature was ensured by the high

subscription fee (12 cents per year in a period when daily wages for skilled workers was 1 cent).

7.1 Clubs, Reading Rooms and Associations 139

on a variety of issues ranging from national and moral ideas to taxation.3 However,

the emphasis was on national activities for promoting enosis. In one sense this clubwas an attempt to institutionalise the mobilisation of the intellectuals.

Agapi tou Laou was the primary venue for promoting nationalism in Nicosia. It

became the club where many Greek Cypriot nationalists could promote their ideas,

especially their belief that nationalism and political change were identical

(Katalanos 2003, 170, 222, 250). A leading nationalist, N. Katalanos served as

the club’s president since 1897.4 Both Katalanos and other nationalist club mem-

bers offered lectures on Greece and the need for enosis, putting national ideas in theforeground.5 The aim was to carry the national idea into the people and not confine

the efforts to the highest echelons of society. The club marked as special occasions

national anniversaries and particularly the Greek national day (25 March); in fact, it

established this date as its official day of celebration.6 On one such occasion Agapitou Laou distributed thousands of Greek flags throughout Nicosia.

Soon many other reading clubs and associations were established in Cyprus with

the aim of promoting enosis. These clubs became nests of nationalist activities,

focusing on issues related to Greece as well as Cyprus’s Greek heritage. In Nicosia

for example, the philanthropic ‘Association of Greek Ladies Enosis’ founded in

1914, was active in organising fund-raising activities and public lectures for Greece

and enosis (Chrysanthis 1986, 281), whereas in the period of the Balkan Wars

(1912–13) many such clubs were established in towns and villages where they

organised national activities/events. One such club was the now famous football

club—then a reading club—Anorthosis (Rectification) in the Famagusta district

(Papapolyviou 1997, 134). These clubs came to be dominated by prominent members

of the ruling elite, many of whom were freemasons and newspapers owners/editors.

7.2 The Organising Pillars: The Freemasons and the Press

By the turn of the first decade of colonial rule the nationalists had begun to establish

a sound political network, which overcame local and regional linkages; they

accomplished this through the influence of the freemasons and the newspapers

(Katsiaounis 1996, 189). Politics were becoming less factional and more ideolog-

ical, while nationalism was on the rise. The masonic lodges and the newspapers

3‘Public Lectures’, Evagoras, 1 September 1901, 6; Evagoras, 25 October 1901, 5.4Katalanos was born in 1855 in the Greek village Mani in Peloponnesus and came to Cyprus in

1893 to teach at the Pancyprian Gymnasium. He remained in Cyprus until 1921 when he was

deported to Athens where he died in 1933.5Titles of these lectures included, among others: ‘National History: the Mythical Period’,‘National Consciousness in Art’, etc. (cited in Katsiaounis 1996, 217, 221).6‘Miscellaneous’, Foni tis Kyprou, 8 May, 1891.

140 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

became the nuclei around which nationalist ideas were formed and political orga-

nisations were established.

Freemasonry provided the glue that held together the various factions of the Greek

Cypriot bourgeoisie that was taking shape in the early years of British rule, as their

network of lodges was the only island-wide bourgeois organisation (Katsiaounis

1996, 190). While initially they functioned within the English lodges, within a few

years they had established their own Greek lodges. Most freemasons belonged to the

newer professions: most were lawyers, but there were also physicians and teachers.

There were few of the landed gentry. In the earliest days the Greek freemasons posed

a far greater menace to the status quowithin the Greek community than they did to the

British, as was clear in the Archbishopric issue (see Chap. 6). They rose to prominence

largely because of their university education, which made them worthy representa-

tives of the new and literate bourgeoisie; they included such important nationalist and

political figures as G. Frangoudes, F. Zannetos, N. Katalanos, C. Sozos, among others.

This was not a situation that was unique to Cyprus. ‘Bourgeois Europe was or

grew full of more or less informal systems for protection of mutual advancement,

old-boy networks, or mafias (friends of friends) which produced national rather

than merely local linkages’ (Hobsbawm 2000, 367). Freemasonry was one such

network, which in some countries served an even more important purpose insofar as

it was the only national organisation to politically represent the liberal bourgeoisie

and served as its ideological cement. For example, in Wales, by the 1850s the

freemasons had established lodges and cells in all parts of the country such that in

1868 Wales had acquired the nucleus of a coherent political organisation based on

their network (Cox 1970, 139).

Cyprus’s first masonic lodge—Agios Pavlos (St. Paul)—was established in

Limassol in 1888 by British servicemen under the aegis of the Great Lodge of

England; the first Greek Cypriot initiated into this lodge was the physician

I. Karageorgiades, soon followed by other prominent Greeks (Katsiaounis 1996,

190). Many Greeks who joined the lodge were nationalist activists and many held

public office.7 The freemasons were very influential; one need only look at the wide

7Tornaritis (1948), the most prominent Greek Cypriot freemason of the first half of the twentieth

century, offers valuable information about Cypriot freemasons, their network of lodges and the

identities of the Greek Cypriot freemasons. Among the founders of Agios Pavlos were:

I. Karageorgiades (mayor of Limassol 1896–1908), A. Michaelides, I. Kyriakides (deputy),

N. Kartalis, E. Dalitis, etc. Members included: P. Stavrinides (medical doctor), C. Sozos (deputy)

I. Economides (deputy), N. Lanitis (deputy), I. Macrides, M. Michaelides, C. Tornaritis, C. Lanitis,

S. Tornaritis, A. Zenon (later mayor of Limassol), K. Tornaritis (he became Attorney General

later). According to Tornaritis, in 1948 the lodge members’ registry listed 318 persons. The Greeklodge Kimon, number 53, was established in 1918 in Larnaca, which was placed under the aegis of

the Megali Anatoli (Great East), the supreme masonic institution in Greece. Among its members

was G. Aradippiotis deputy and later one of EREK’s founders. In 1921 another Greek lodge, Solon,was founded in Nicosia (number 55). Among its founders was deputy N. Paschalis. Other masonic

institutions included the philosophical workshop Arios Pagos Kypros (Supreme Court Cyprus)

number 3 in Limassol (1919), founded by prominent Greek notables such as D. Severis, G. Kirzis,

I. Karageorgiades, N. Lanitis (deputy), etc.; the processing laboratory Stasinos number 11 in

Nicosia (1929) whose founders included I. Economides (deputy), A. Triantafyllides (deputy),

G. Pierides, etc.

7.2 The Organising Pillars: The Freemasons and the Press 141

and respectful press coverage and the well-attended funeral service for

Karageorgiades for confirmation (including Turkish Cypriots and British

freemasons).8

In a poor colony like Cyprus, just emerging from three centuries of Ottoman

rule, the freemasons stood out as persons with status, wealth and culture. But it was

with their political stance for enosis that they made their greatest impact in Cypriot

society: all freemasons were ardent nationalists and most leading nationalists were

freemasons (Katsiaounis 1996, 191). Aside from their political activities, they

established their leadership via various events and activities. For example, in both

Larnaca and Nicosia they ran night schools,9 while they organised lectures, galas,

balls, etc. These events were well covered in the press and were attended by British

as well as Turkish Cypriots. At one such ball organised by the Solon lodge in

Nicosia both the Greek and the Turk consuls were present and the Greek national

anthem was recoiled.10 Thus, it seems that the local (Greek and Turkish) establish-

ment and the British authorities not only accepted the presence of the lodges but

they became a structural part of this establishment.

As noted earlier (Sect. 4.4.2) the print media played a crucial role in dissemi-

nating nationalist doctrines. The newspapers were important to the development of

competing nationalist factions’ programmes and even played a leadership role—

Evagoras and its chief-editor N. Katalanos were especially important in this regard

(Katsiaounis 1996, 223). The Greek newspapers helped organising and steering the

national movement via a variety of activities; for example, fund raisings for Greece

(Papapolyviou 1997, 100–101).

The Greek newspapers functioned as the platform for circulation of the varying

political opinions. And despite their differences, all Greek newspapers actively

promoted Greek nationalism and thus not only informed Cypriots of this stance but

prepared the way for their acceptance of the reality of the Greek state. The

newspapers also provided the focal point around which politicians, businessmen

and editors/journalists interacted in a mutually beneficial relationship.11 This rela-

tionship was both indirect and direct, and operated within the patron-client system

that pervaded all Greek Cypriot political activities. The newspapers promoted both

particular politicians and particular political stances, even resorting to slander and

defamation of their opponents. In return, the newspapers received direct or indirect

(e.g., via advertisements) payments.12 The relationship between newspapers and

8‘The death of the Great Teacher’, Eleftheria, 17 October 1928, 3.9Eleftheria, 19 April 1930, 3; Eleftheria, 7 May 1930, 2.10‘Inauguration of Zenon lodge in Limassol’, Eleftheria, 28 February 1925, 2; Eleftheria20 January 1926, 2; Eleftheria, 27 January 1926, 2.11See for example: ‘The Legislative Council and the people’, Foni tis Kyprou, 21 September 1901,

1. In this article the paper call on the voters to vote for P. Constantinidis; Neon Ethnos, 14 October1916, 3. The article suggests its readership to vote for F. Zannetos; ‘White vote for Neoptolemon

Paschali’, Eleftheria, 7 October 1916, 1; ‘Vote for Antonis Triantafyllides’, Eleftheria, 15 October1930, 2.12‘The opinion of the medical doctor Themistocles Dervis’, Eleftheria, 2 February 1929, 1.

142 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

politicians was most visible during electoral contests, and newspapers took an

active and often leading role in all political confrontations: the Archbishopric

issue (Chap. 6), the clash between Venizelists and Royalists (see below) or between

nationalists and communists (Chap. 8).

The various reading clubs and other associations, the masonic lodges and the

newspapers represented a first form/stage of organisation for the Greek Cypriot

nationalists in their pursuit of involvement in political life and especially in

claiming enosis. After the conclusion of the Archbishopric question these efforts

took another, more advanced turn. Instead of promoting political programmes

through local newspapers and clubs, their efforts became island-wide through

new types of organisations. These new organisations were not yet political parties,

but they did have statutes, a regulated structure, subscriptions, administrative

organs, etc. The Church of Cyprus took a leading role in these organisations.

7.3 Island-Wide Political Structures

At the turn of the twentieth century, the political landscape in Cyprus was changing

radically: the politically unorganised Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie joined forces with

the Church and through its far-reaching network structured the enosis struggle. Thehegemony of enosis was institutionally crystallised in the many political/cultural

organisations established in the aftermath of the Archbishopric issue. These orga-

nisations were also the arena for power struggles among the Greek Cypriot elite and

the stage for their opposing political programmes.

Ethnic organisations also functioned as vehicles for upward social mobility,

especially for those in the new bourgeois and middle classes. Under colonial rule,

Cypriots were afforded very limited access to social mobility, especially the upper

levels of ‘state’ apparatus, and the state-mandated institutions of political represen-

tation were inadequate, ineffectual and few. The Greek ethnic organisations offered

an additional and alternative channel of upward social mobility (to the few existing,

e.g., Legislative Council, Executive Council, etc.). Ambitious citizens of the

bourgeoisie and middle classes recognised the organisations’ potential for their

acquisition of social status and prestige. Participation meant acknowledgment of

their much-coveted political authority and constituted a pathway for parliamentary

election.

7.3.1 Cyprus Political Organisation (1912)

At the close of the Archbishopric issue, the two opposing camps made common

cause against the British. The Greek ruling class united to demand proportionate

ethnic representation in the Legislative and the Executive Councils and the aboli-

tion of the tribute. When the High Commissioner and the Secretary of Colonies

7.3 Island-Wide Political Structures 143

refused, the Greek legislators resigned en masse in April 1912,13 while all major

towns organised rallies. As a result the Cyprus Political Organisation (CPO) was

established to manage the national issue of Cyprus, i.e., enosis. The CPO attests to

the political consensus among the different parts of the Greek ruling elite.

The establishment of CPO can be attributed to the recent changes in the island’sentire social, ideological and political context. In the quest for enosis, the Greek

elite in the early 1910s could rely on a well-developed education system, a print

media, and a rising bourgeois class of professionals and intellectuals. The fact that

this goal was realised in this particular period reveals that a minimum congruence in

strategy and tactics was achieved.

All higher levels of the CPO were headed by the Church: the highest body, the

Central Committee, was chaired ex officcio by the Archbishop, while other mem-

bers included the three Bishops of Cyprus, the Abbot of Kykkos and the nine Greek

members of the Legislative Council. The Constitution stipulated two lower level

bodies, the regional committees and the community committees.14 The structure

and membership of the organisation’s administrative bodies reproduced the social,

political, and religious elite. All positions were appointed and the poorer classes

were entirely marginalised.

The Central Committee was very active.15 It petitioned the government to

appoint a Royal Committee to investigate Cypriot grievances, and it published a

quarterly magazine in three languages (Greek, English and French) that was

distributed to European politicians and journalists in order to internationalise

Cypriot demands. Any type of protest, however, always stayed within the ‘consti-tutional order’ and was limited, primarily to petitions and telegrams.16 In the mid

1910s, the intensity of the nationalist movement subsided due to WWI and British

promises to cede Cyprus to Greece—an offer made in 1915 that was dictated by the

pressure of the War and essentially meaningless. However, the lessened tension

with the British was a chance for the Greek Cypriot leadership to initiate rapproche-

ment with the British authorities (Papapolyviou 1997, 240).

Soon a new division among the Greek elite emerged—once again testing their

unity—which was due in large part to the bitter conflict between the Prime Minister

of Greece Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine (Papapolyviou 2008;

Georgis 2008). This division could be viewed as an early distinction between

right and centre-right but it was also an internal split within the right-wing camp.

They became known as the Royalists, who represented the right wing and often the

extreme or radical right in terms of their rhetoric on social welfare and the

monarchy although not in terms of their actions, and the Venizelists, who were

more diverse in their social composition and consequently more diverse in what

13‘Proclamation of the Greek parliamentarians’, Eleftheria, 17 April 1912, 3. ‘The demands of the

Greeks: the deputies must resign’, Eleftheria, 20 April 1912, 1.14Charter of Cyprus Political Organisation, kept in the Municipal Library of Limassol.15‘The political struggle of Cyprus’, Eleftheria, 11 May 1912, 2.16‘Reviewing the last year’, Eleftheria, 12 January 1918, 1.

144 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

they stood for: some supported social reforms thus representing the centre or even

the centre left on some occasions, whereas regarding the national issue of Cyprus

they expressed tendencies towards autonomy. Within this setting the Venizelists

expressed what could be labelled as a liberal centre tendency.

The conflict is revealing for how much events in Greece influenced Cyprus

politics; moreover, there were also a number of prominent Greek citizens living on

the island who were very actively involved in many local and topical issues

(Papapolyviou 2008, 39). For example, the Cretan Bishop of Kition,

M. Metaxakis (1910–1918), a personal friend of Venizelos, loudly supported

Venizelos, whereas F. Zannetos was a staunch Royalist. The division was manifest

on multiple levels, pervaded former conflicts (i.e., the Archiepiscopal question),

altered the structure of coalition blocks, influenced the internal power configura-

tions within the CPO and unfolded across various battlegrounds: the press, the

elections within the Church and the Legislative and Municipal Councils. Yester-

day’s friends became today’s foes and vice versa.

Most Greek Cypriot nationalists were Royalists despite the theoretical inconsis-

tency between a secular ideology and inherited forms of rule such as a monarchy.

The explanation lies in Venizelos’s affiliation with the British, which also explains

why certain important nationalist activists and powerful supporters of the Bishop of

Kition during the archiepiscopal rivalry opted to change allegiances—e.g.,

Katalanos and Zannetos (Georgis 2008, 117–118). The popularity of the Royalist

faction is evident in the baptism records of Greek Cypriot children named after

members of the royal family.

The press immediately took sides. Venizelos was supported by the Salpinx in

Limassol, the Foni tis Kyprou and Eleftheria in Nicosia and Enosis in Larnaca. TheRoyalists were represented by the Neon Ethnos of Zannetos in Larnaca, Alitheia in

Limassol and the Kypriakos Fylax in Nicosia, edited by Katalanos (Georgis 2008,

101–102). Confrontation between the two camps was harsher in the cities. In

Limassol the Venizelos supporters (Venizelikoi) established a club named the

Liberal Union,17 which gave lectures, organised gatherings and toured the island

to propagate the ideas of the Venizelos movement,18 while the Royalist press

charged the Liberal Union club with corruption;, i.e., accusing them of taking

money from the Venizelos Government in Athens.19 The conflict was also reflected

in the parliamentary and municipal elections of 1916 and 1917, respectively with

the two parties contesting the elections under separate lists in the three major cities

(Nicosia, Limassol, and Larnaca).20 There was also division within the Church

17Establishment of the Liberal Association in Limassol’, Eleftheria, 10 March 1917, 3. According

to the press 300 persons attended the first meeting.18See for example, ‘Ioannis Clerides lecture on the political situation in Greece’, Eleftheria,2 November 1918, 3.19Neon Ethnos, 11 August 1917, 3.20See for example, ‘The parliamentary elections’, Eleftheria, 30 September 1916, 2 and Eleftheria,7 October 1916, 3; ‘The parliamentary elections’, Eleftheria, 10 June 1916, 1; ‘The importance of

7.3 Island-Wide Political Structures 145

upon the death of Archbishop Kyrillos II, in August 1916: the Venizelos camp

strongly supported the Bishop of Kition Metaxakis, while the Royalists endorsed

the candidacy of Dean Makarios.21

This new cleavage line reflects several key features of Greek Cypriot nationalist

politics in this period. First, it revealed how fragile alliances were within the

hegemonic bloc, forever shifting according to personalistic politics. Second, the

conflict illustrates how inconsistent politicians were, as many so easily changed

sides and positions. For example, many opponents of establishtarian politics during

the Archbishopric became firm supporters of kingship; an institution that embodies

the establishment par excellence. Third, the confrontation revealed the huge impact

of Greek politics in Cyprus.

During WWI, the CPO was marginalised and inactive; politics in that period

took a more parochial and personalised form. In 1917, following the rift between

Royalists and Venizelists, some in the press called for reactivation of the CPO as a

way to reunite Greek nationalists.22 When Venizelos returned to power in the

summer of 1917 public pleas to revive the Organisation under the leadership of

the Archbishop and the Church grew stronger,23 while the Royalists argued that the

national struggle was not the responsibility the Church but of the deputies.24

Eventually, the Archbishop convened a national assembly comprising clergy and

laymen, and current and former MPs, in which a resolution for enosis was

approved.25 There followed a period of much activity that led to the decision to

send a deputation to London in December 1918 to put forward Cypriot demands:

6000 persons sent off the delegation.26

In September 1919, amid rumors that London had refused Cypriot demands, a

National Assembly was convened anew and again it issued a resolution for enosis.The Assembly was attended by representatives from Greek Cypriot communities

throughout the island, current and former deputies and mayors, the Greek members

of the Executive Council, the directors of the Greek newspapers; a total of 914 peo-

ple representing 493 Greek communities and villages took part in the workings of

the assembly.27 Moreover, the CPO decided in January 1920 to establish in Nicosia

a political bureau that would coordinate the national struggle while also creating

the elections’, Neon Ethnos, 22 July 1916, 1; ‘The municipal elections’, Neon Ethnos, 31 March

1917, 3.21‘Two candidates for the Archbishopric throne’, Neon Ethnos, 12 August 1916, 1–2; ‘Theappropriate Archbishop of Cyprus: Meletios Metaxakis’, Eleftheria, 2 September 1916, 1.22‘The Political Organisation’, Eleftheria, 24 February 1917, 1; ‘The Political Organisation’,Eleftheria, 3 March 1917, 1; ‘The Political Organisation’, Eleftheria, 10 March 1917, 1.23Eleftheria, 21 July 1917, 1.24See article of F. Zannetos, ‘United actions’, Eleftheria, 8 September 1917, 1.25‘The National Assembly’, Eleftheria, 15 December 1917, 1.26‘On the occasion of the departing of the Greek deputies to London, Eleftheria, 14 December

1918, 1.27Eleftheria, 11 and 14 October 1919, 2.

146 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

ties with British philhellenes.28 The year 1920 was another year of activity for the

Organisation, although there was serious tension once again regarding the strategy

and tactics of the unionist demand; for example, whether the deputation to London

should be repeated, the way Greece ought to be involved, etc. Some politicians

argued for a Cypriot movement that did not implicate Greece to avoid bringing the

‘motherland’ into a difficult position vis-�a-vis its close British ally.29

In mid-November 1920 members of the deputation returned with news of the

negative British response. At this the CPO central committee decided to change

tactics and end collaboration with the British, as they realised that Britain had no

intention of accepting enosis.30 On 8 December 1920 all nine Greek Cypriot

members of the Legislative Council resigned their posts in protest against the

British decision to maintain the status quo in Cyprus.31 By-elections were arrangedfor 15 January 1921, and as only the nine nationalist MPs who had resigned put

forth their candidacy, they were re-elected. All complied with the CPO decision to

abstain from the workings of the Legislative Council.

The decision of the CPO and the MPs was a source of much dispute and

participation in the legislature became a salient issue for months. The newspapers

and the CPO central committee fought among themselves, with Eleftheriasupporting the decision and Alitheia and Kirikas endorsing a more moderate

approach (Georghallides 1979, 197–200). The more radical views in favour of

abstention prevailed (Attalides 1986, 134). The British reacted by enacting mea-

sures to help the peasantry (Georghallides 1979, 178–183), and deporting leading

figures of the nationalist movement (e.g., Katalanos and Zannetos) because of their

Greek citizenship.32

7.3.2 The Political Organisation of Cyprus (1921)

The Cyprus Political Organisation floundered amidst disagreements over how to

best claim enosis (Katsiaounis 1995, 241). Issues that were contended included:

ecclesiastical elections, individual stances, splits such as the Venizelists vs. theRoyalists, the best strategy for the anti-colonial struggle, deputy accountability,

etc.33 The Organisation was unable to convince the deputies to take a unified policy

position (Georghallides 1979, 196), although they tried to revive the organisation

28Eleftheria, 17 January 1920, 2.29‘Letter from N. Kl. Lanitis’, Eleftheria, 9 October 1920, 2.30‘Refuse any cooperation’, Eleftheria, 19 February 1921, 2; ‘Meeting of the Central Committee of

the National Cause’, Eleftheria, 14 May 1921, 2.31‘The resignation of the Greek deputies’, Eleftheria, 11 December 1920, 1.32‘The deportation of N. Katalanos to Greece’, Eleftheria, 30 April 1921, 2; ‘The deportation of

F. Zannetos’, Eleftheria, 4 November 1922, 2.33‘Some dignity is needed’, Neon Ethnos, 2 June 1917, 1.

7.3 Island-Wide Political Structures 147

by drafting a new constitution.34 While the new constitution was written and filed in

the Cyprus Archbishopric in February 1921,35 it was never actually enforced.

The CPO was slowly failing. A new strategy was required, especially after the

High Commissioner twice refused a petition for a Cypriot referendum regarding

the future of the island (Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Volume E, 22). The

CPO central committee was still conflicted over the MPs’ decision to abstain from

Council activities,36 and so decided to avail itself of a Pancyprian Assembly to

determine their stance in the forthcoming parliamentary elections of October.37 The

assembly was forced to consider the different approaches towards the policy of

abstention, which was not binding. One of the stricter lines called for boycotting the

election process by not submitting candidacies: this was the approach endorsed by

the assembly (Richter 2007, 270).38

The central committee was then tasked with writing the constitution for a new

organisation. The press published their views on the subject as well as those of

many politicians, with most preferring a less democratic structure for the new

organisation, especially in its higher echelons, arguing that ‘Cyprus political

scene is not yet receptive to democratic ideals’.39 The constitutional draft of the

new organisation, named the Political Organisation of Cyprus (POC), was

published in early November 1921 and was approved in a special second assem-

bly.40 The POC’s declared purpose was enosis (Article 2) and all Greek Cypriot

men were entitled to membership.

At the heart of the new organisation was the National Council (NC), which was

chaired by the Archbishop and included ex officcio the four higher Prelates, a

representative of the Teachers Association and another 39 lay members appointed

through indirect elections from the six districts of Cyprus. The National Council

was given comprehensive powers and constituted the real policy centre of the

organisation. The constitution outlined three additional layers of administration:

the Executive Committee, the district committees and the parish committees.

Representation in all three layers was fixed and included ecclesiastical committee

and school board members, teachers, mayors, local abbots, and newspaper editors.

The National Council held regular meetings twice a year and Council members

were appointed for three-year terms. Notwithstanding several differences, the new

organisation, like its predecessor, reproduced once again the traditional ruling class.

34‘Illiberal decision’, Eleftheria, 6 November 1920, 1.35‘The Cypriot struggle: the assembly’, Eleftheria, 26 February 1921, 2.36‘Away from the polls’, Eleftheria, 29 October 1921, 1.37Representatives in the Assembly would come from towns and villages based on the following

ratio: every 100 families one representative; up to 200 families 2 representatives; 200 families and

above were allocated three representatives. All the mayors and one municipal councilor from

every town or village, the newspapers publishers, representatives from cultural and social associ-

ations and the teachers’ union would also be present.38See also Eleftheria, 29 October 1921, 1–2.39Article of I. Clerides in Eleftheria, 5 November 1921, 1.40Eleftheria, 5 November 1921, 2.

148 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

The structure of the Political Organisation was consistent with the (limited) dem-

ocratic rights of the time.

The NC met regularly in its early stages and to help its workings it established a

secretariat and appointed a salaried officer.41 POC members toured villages,

organised meetings, and delivered speeches, so as to mobilise popular support for

the organisation’s decisions.42 One example was the POC call for volunteers to

enlist in the Greek army in the 1922 Asia Minor campaign, and their organisation of

various fund raising events to support the Greek army.43

The POC represented an alternative forum to the Legislative Council (LC) for the

Greek Cypriots, in a period when they were boycotting the Council. The new organi-

sation was not very successful, however, given that all its members were law-abiding

citizens and naively believed in British impartiality and justice (Richter 2007, 275).

When the CPO was launched national fervor was high (it was the beginning of

Greece’s military Asia Minor campaign); it was only natural that it would languish

when regional dynamics changed. The Greek advances in Turkey were halted and by

1922 Greece suffered a humiliating defeat. Moreover, internal dynamics were also

changing within Cyprus: there was the newly emerging Communist Party (CPC), as

well as a peasantry suffering under harsh economic conditions. The combination of all

these led to a new political zeitgeist favouring more moderate approaches.

7.4 The Reformist Turn

By the end of 1922, therefore, the Greek Cypriots had changed strategy; for the first

time they demanded political rights in their quest for enosis.44 The demand for

political liberties voiced the will of a significant portion of Greek Cypriot politi-

cians who realised that enosis could not be achieved using the tactics employed

hitherto. To this end they demanded self-government and more involvement in the

island’s administration.45 The change in strategy did not affect abstention from the

workings of the Legislative Council (LC), which continued to apply.46

41Eleftheria, 18 March 1922, 2. The members of the first Executive Committee were: N. Kl.

Lanitis, N. Paschalis, I. Economides, N. Nikolaides and Th. Theodotou.42See for example, ‘Theodotou’s tour’, Eleftheria, 1 April 1925, 2; ‘News’, Eleftheria, 18 April

1925, 2.43Eleftheria, 22 April 1922, 2.44A relevant proposal was submitted to the NC by former deputy A. Triantafyllides and was

accepted by the body despite the intense opposition by the Bishop of Kyrenia. See, ‘The NationalCouncil of Cyprus: decisions’, Eleftheria, 6 December 1922, 2.45Eleftheria, 6 December 1922, p. 2. Similar views had also been expressed at this meeting by the

parliamentarians Ioannis Kyriakides and Spyros Araouzos, and through letters by the Abbot of the

Kykkou Monastery, the Bishop of Kition, Demosthenes Severis, Michalis Nikolaides, and N. K.

Lanitis.46‘The National Council of Cyprus. Two meetings: decisions taken Decisions’, Eleftheria,20 December 1922, 4.

7.4 The Reformist Turn 149

It is important to consider this quite radical change in context. The early 1920s

saw the beginnings of new political trends. For example, there was an open call to

defend cooperation with the government because of mounting social problems

resulting from the huge economic crisis (Katsiaounis 2004, 30). Greece’s failed

Minor Asia campaign and the subsequent catastrophe facilitated acceptance of this

more pragmatist approach. Internal political factors mattered too: principally, the

emergence of the CPC and its radical political demands for a more socially oriented

approach (Anagnostopoulou 1999, 208). These developments led to the failure of

those politicians who believed that Cyprus could pressure Britain to grant union

with Greece. Moreover, the public had little faith in many of the old guard

nationalist politicians, who had filed lawsuits against the poor, were guilty of

usurious practises, and only spoke to the public a few weeks prior to elections

(Tzermias 2001, 96; Katsiaounis 2000, 28). There was also a breach in the hege-

monic bloc under the leadership of the Church, with the resurgence of the two

conflicting groups, moderates and intransigents.

This changing political environment was evident in both the early party system

and the electoral arena, where many voters began to support the more moderate

politicians who promised to work on socio-economic reforms (Panayiotou 2006,

85). One such example was the Agrarian Party—AP (Katsourides 2014, 74–81;

Rossides 1925). Although headed by populist politicians of middle class origin it

targeted the worsening conditions of the peasant population and which included

both ethnic communities. The agrarian movement mobilised along social issues—

and with their aims to improve the people’s lives—accepted that cooperation with

the British authorities would be necessary until enosis could be realised. The

movement capitalised on the peasants’ resentment over the low prices paid for

their products and their huge debts. The party leaders shared some of the agrarian

class hostility to the (usurer) nationalists and believed in the need to strengthen the

peasantry but only to broaden their own support basis.

In the elections of the time, moderate politicians took the lead in representative

politics. For the elections of November 1921, the Greek Cypriot nationalists

abstained, leaving only two Maronites running for election; they were nominated

by the British Chief Inspector of Education, revealing the colonial government’sinvolvement and its strategy of creating ethnic divisions (Georghallides 1979, 210).

Thus two Maronites and three Turkish Cypriots were elected,47 while seven Greek

Cypriot seats remained empty; therefore, the British called for new elections in

January 1923 for the remaining seats.

Fourteen Greek Cypriot politicians of rural and humble descent submitted their

candidacies despite the NC’s call for boycotting the elections.48 The majority of the

47Eleftheria, 3 December 1921, 2.48‘Supplementary elections: the nominees’, Eleftheria, 30 December 1922, 2; ‘To the Greek

Cypriot population’, Eleftheria, 23 December 1922, 1–2.

150 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

candidates came from the rural areas and villages instead of the urban environment

which was the dominant pattern of geographical and social representation hitherto.

The newly elected were called the eptadikoi (from the Greek number epta-seven),and they represented a new type of public official—very unlike the traditional,

lawyers, merchants and prelates.49 By rejecting their seats in the LC, the more

radical nationalistic oligarchy was essentially vacating vital political space to the

moderates.

Voter turn-out was very low, with only about 3% of the enfranchised population

participating.50 The NC expelled all the candidates from the POC and declared

them persona non grata,51 and the Greek press viciously attacked the elected

MPs.52 The attacks were directly related to the balance of power within the

Greek community since nationalist politicians knew that the new deputies would

have access to power channels and mechanisms that they thus far monopolised

themselves. The seven elected members of the LC remained in their posts until

1925 when the NC lifted the abstention policy and put up candidacies for the

elections.

Facing a situation that threatened the traditional supremacy that the nationalist

camp and the Church enjoyed, in May 1923 the Archbishop convened a Pancyprian

assembly of the POC.53 Before that the intransigent Bishop of Kyrenia had resigned

from the NC. The atmosphere of the meeting was contentious, and the final decision

was a compromise: to pursue the demand for political rights in tandem with the goal

of enosis.54 It was also decided to petition the Minister of Colonies for modification

of the LC’s composition in order to reflect population quotas, to which the Ministry

partially agreed: despite refusing enosis, Britain allowed an increase in the number

of Greek Cypriot members in the Legislative and the Executive Councils. With the

NC’s acceptance of the proposal, the policy of abstention was rescinded (although

officially it remained in effect). However, the British did not fulfill their promises

until the conclusion of the parliamentary period in 1925 and when a new constitu-

tion was enforced.

In October 1924, disagreements once again rattled the NC; the reason this time

was the by-election for a vacant LC seat. The NC decided not to contest the election

but only by a very small majority.55 Those holding more radical views resigned,

demanding that a new organisation with no interest in working with the British, and

49The elected deputies were: O. Evriviades, private employee; M. Tiggirides, farmer from Lefkara

village (Larnaca); I. Photiades farmer from the Agios Theodoros Karpasias village (Famagusta);

E. Chadjiprokopis farmer from Deftera village (Nicosia); E. Eliades, tobacco factory manager;

L. Christodoulou, farmer from Agios Athanasios (Limassol); and C. Chadjigeorgi farmer from

Lofou village (Limassol). Cited in Cyprus Blue Book 1923, 92.50Eleftheria, 6 June 1923, 2.51‘National Council: Repudiation of those who ran for election’, Eleftheria, 24 January 1923, 2.52Indicative, ‘They are bankrupt’, Eleftheria, 2 June 1923, 1.53‘Pancyprian Assembly’, Eleftheria, 2 June 1923, 2.54‘The Third National Assembly of the Cypriots’, Eleftheria, 6 June 1923, 2.55Eleftheria, 1 October 1924, 2.

7.4 The Reformist Turn 151

with active membership rather than en masse membership, be established. Further-

more, the radicals believed the new organisation should not waste their time on

petitions.56

Elections followed the introduction of the new Constitution in 1925, and once

again the NC was divided; they finally agreed to officially terminate the abstention

policy.57 Thus we see, once again, how the divisions within the nationalists

prohibited them from contesting their opponents on a united platform (Katsiaounis

2000, 229). Populist politicians promoting an approach that envisioned cooperation

with the government contested the elections. The principal representative of the

populist trend was the teacher and lawyer George Hadjipavlou, who went on to

found his own political party.

7.4.1 The Popular Party

In 1925, G. Hadjipavlou of Paphos and G. Stavrinakis of Nicosia (both lawyers) set

up the Popular Party (PP)—the most blatant expression of the division within the

nationalist Right. Hadjipavlou was also president of Panergatikos Syllogos(Workers Club), a club that was established to reach working class voters,58 but

which functioned primarily as a vehicle for Hadjipavlou’s own personal advance-

ment.59 The PP issued its own newspaper Laiki (Popular) in July 1925, later

renamed Nea Laiki (New Popular) in June 1926.

The PP’s declared aim was to help and protect the peasant and working classes;

to this end it asked for the abolition of the tithe, the establishment of an Agricultural

Bank and long-term low-interest (4–5%) loans for farmers. It also called for

universal suffrage and political liberties until union with Greece was achieved:

enosis, however, was not considered a revolutionary demand by the party, in

contrast to the nationalists.60 The party fought a two-front struggle: against British

colonialism and against their nationalist opponents whom they vilified as ‘usurers’,‘religious exploiters of the people’ and ‘exploiters of the Greek motherland’.61 Theparty took a bold stance against the Church because the Holy Synod controlled the

NC, which was the party’s main opposition. Therefore, the party demanded sepa-

ration of religion and state and called for Church properties to be secularly

administered.62 The party press characterised the appointed National Council

56Eleftheria, 20 December, 1924, 1.57The meeting of the National Council’, Eleftheria, 20 May 1925, 1.58‘The Panergatikos Syllogos of Nicosia’, Pyrsos, 23 July 1923, 3.59‘The activities of Panergatikos’, Nea Laiki, 25 February 1927, 3; ‘Public lectures: the migration

issue’, Nea Laiki, 8 April 1927, 2; Nea Laiki, 10 January 1930, 3.60‘Instead of a programme’, Laiki, 2 July 1925, 1; ‘Labour legislation’, Laiki, 7 August 1925, 1;

‘The programme of the Popular Party’, Laiki, 8 October 1925, 1.61‘A two-front struggle’, Laiki, 2 July 1925, 1.62Popular solution’, Laiki, 4 December 1925, 2.

152 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

members as ‘dim-witted’ and pointed out the popular legitimisation of the elected

LC members.63

The two opposing camps presented separate lists in the 1925 legislative elec-

tions, and the contest was coloured by accusations from both sides. The PP and

Hadjipavlou accused their opponents as being ‘old-style politicians’, ‘politicallycorrupt’ and ‘aristocratic sharks’.64 Laiki also accused the Abbot of Kykkos of

taking expensive trips to Russia where he was in the company of ‘alluring Russian

girls’,65 and for bribing voters to elect NC candidates.66 On the other side,

Hadjipavlou was accused of ‘political fraud’ and deceiving the workers with false

promises, and was labeled a ‘masked’ and ‘corrupt’ politician.67 Electioneering wasintense and involved the people: for example, on the eve of the election 250 PP

supporters gathered at the Panergatikos headquarters and made the rounds of

villages in search of votes.68

The elections were so vigorously fought because the winner would gain access to

power mechanisms in the Greek Cypriot community as well as in the British

administration. Legislative Council membership was associated with the appoint-

ment of village councils, nomination of teachers, etc. Both sides hid their ultimate

goal of power beneath their rhetoric related to the national question. Overall, the

elections constituted a major setback for the old guard nationalists (only one of the

nationalists was elected), with many new politicians elected. Most of the Greek

MPs elected supported a gradualist, constitutional programme and avoided the

question of enosis in the legislature—indicating significant support for the

eptadikoi in that period. Turnout was significantly higher compared to the elections

of 1923: 29,966 people exercised their voting right out of a total enfranchised

number of 45,342 (Cyprus Blue Book 1926, 122). The elections confirmed the

Greek Cypriot preference for a moderate line of demands. Contributing to the PP

success were the many quarrels and divisions within the nationalist camp. The NC

had become apathetic, with only one meeting recorded in 1926.69

Despite its success in this election, the PP failed to threaten the nationalists and

the Church’s supremacy within the right-wing bloc in the long run. For one thing,

the PP was built around a personality and proved unable to take roots in the

constituency: Hadjipavlou had built a clientelistic network around himself and

63‘The National Council’, Nea Laiki, 26 November 1926, 1.64‘The end of political corruption’, Laiki, 11 September 1925, 1.65Laiki, 4 September, 1925, 3.66Laiki, 25 September 1925, 1; ‘The Kykkos pounds were poured in the streets’, Laiki, 2 October

1925, 1.67‘Political masks’, Eleftheria, 29 August 1925, 1; ‘The corrupted’, «Ο φαυλoκράτης», Eleftheria,1 September 1925, 1; ‘The masked politician’, Eleftheria, 2 September 1925, 1; ‘Workers trade’,Eleftheria, 31 October 1925, 1.68Laiki, 16 October 1925, 2.69‘The National Council: will it revive or not?’, Eleftheria 10 March 1926

7.4 The Reformist Turn 153

considered the party little more than a means for personal advancement. Further-

more, the reformist politicians lost favour because they were not radical enough in

their enosis stance; within a few years they were fully integrated within the

nationalist power bloc.70 The British negative stance towards enosis and political

liberties and towards internal affairs weakened their position within their commu-

nity. An opportunity was therefore lost in the late 1920s for a ‘compromise between

British imperialism and Greek nationalism’ (Georghallides 1985, 187). The major-

ity of the moderate politicians who came into office in 1925 were gradually

incorporated into the nationalist camp and were involved in setting up the National

Organisation (see Sect. 7.5.1) in 1930 that succeeded the POC.71 Hadjipavlou lost

the October 1930 elections, which he blamed on his opponents’ use of briberies andbuying votes.72 The party was legally disbanded in 1931, when the British

abolished all political activities following the October riots (see below).

7.5 The Revival of the Nationalists

The continued British refusal to discuss enosis and to cede more political freedoms

signaled the ineffectiveness of moderate politics. Moreover, the economic/agricul-

tural crisis Cyprus was suffering rendered the British policy of embracing the

peasantry ineffective (Faustmann 1998). Therefore, the deputies elected in 1925

under moderate slogans were forced to change tactics; critical to their new stance

was public disapproval of British actions, including a new criminal law in 1928 and

a financially strict budget for 1929.73 Throughout 1928 and 1929 the MPs were in

constant conflict with the British and this facilitated their rapprochement with the

nationalists—their common stance was clear in their abstention from the 50th

anniversary celebrations of British occupation.74

Despite rapprochement between the nationalist factions, divisional politics con-

tinued; areas of disagreement included the proper method for achieving the strate-

gic goal of enosis, their strategies to realise this and a leader for the cause. This wasto a great extent unavoidable considering the individualistic and parochial nature of

Greek Cypriot politics and the lack of true mass politics. Other disagreements

included the control over Church finances,75 and whether the leadership should

70‘National Organisation’, Nea Laiki, 10 January 1930, 3.71Nea Laiki, 27 June 1930, 1.72Nea Laiki, 24 October 1930, annex.73‘Hasty contempt’, Eleftheria, 24 October 1928, 1; ‘Protest of the Greek deputies’, Eleftheria,24 October 1928, 2; ‘Mass rally in Limassol’, Eleftheria, 3 November 1928, σ. 3.74‘Declaration of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus and the Greek deputies’, Eleftheria,10 March 1928, 1.75See for example, ‘The ecclesiastical issue. The Holy Synod replies to the deputies’, Eleftheria,13 April 1929, 2.

154 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

lie with the Church or the elected representatives (Georghallides 1985, 81–83, 206).

By now the POC was no longer in any position of authority.76 The disagreements

between nationalist factions led to the revelation by A. Triantafyllides of an

important information: the British had secretly proposed a constitutional similar

to the Maltese which was rejected back in 1921 amidst the discussions for absten-

tion (see Sects. 7.3.1 and 7.3.2).77

Thus, the year 1929 brought to the surface two questions: the goal of the anti-

colonial struggle and who would take its leadership. Public debates at the time

revealed three distinct positions: some argued in favour of a unionist line

(Eleftheria), others for autonomy (Rossides, Bishop of Kition Nicodemos), while

others asked for further radicalisation (S. Loizides, Bishop of Kyrenia Makarios).78

Although these factions agreed on certain points, these in fact only served to further

highlight their disagreements: political life tended to arrive at impasses due to the

continuous rivalries and quarrels among the political elite as well as the inefficiency

and absence of strong leadership that could unite the disparate forces and politi-

cians. Lanitis fittingly described the situation: ‘we find ourselves within pathogenicpolitical deadlocks’.79

7.5.1 The National Organisation (1930)

Greek Cypriots were once again calling for a new organisation that would unite all

the various political factions in a single institution with one leader. Most favoured

the Archbishop as their leader so that the ‘national cause would be vested with the

holy status of religion’,80 yet Kyrillos was never active enough to exert any real

influence over the island’s politics (Georghallides 1985, 13). The Holy Synod and

the MPs together decided on the following strategy: (1) to dispatch a deputation to

London where a new Labour government was in power; (2) to begin talks on the

current form of organisation and how this might be changed.81 Governor Storrs

believed that the deputation was sent to ‘preserve the good-will of politicians who

76‘The opinion of T. Dervis’, Eleftheria, 2 February 1929, 1; ‘The opinion of S. Loizides’,Eleftheria, 9 February 1929, 1.77A. Triantafyllides in Eleftheria, 27 February 1929, 1.78See also: ‘Unionists and autonomists’, Neos Ergatis, 16 May 1929, 1; ‘The question of political

organisation’, Eleftheria, 10 April 1929, 1; ‘The opinion of T. Theodotou and K. Rossides’,Eleftheria, 2 February 1929, 1; ‘The opinion of T. Dervis’, Eleftheria, 2 February 1929, 1; ‘Theopinion of S. Loizides’, Eleftheria, 9 February 1929, 1; ‘The opinion of M. Nikolaides’, Eleftheria,16 February 1929, 1–2; ‘Advantages and disadvantages of autonomy’, Eleftheria, 10 April 1929,

1; Eleftheria, 24 April 1929, 1.79‘The opinion of N. Kl. Lanitis’, Eleftheria, 23 January 1929, 1.80‘Organisation must begin immediately’, Eleftheria, 15 May 1929, 1; ‘Be worthy of the occa-

sion’, ‘Be worthy of the circumstances’, Eleftheria, 19 June 1929, 1.81‘The National Cause of Cyprus’, Eleftheria, 3 April 1929, 2.

7.5 The Revival of the Nationalists 155

[. . .] hope to regain [. . .] their lost prestige in time for the forthcoming elections of

1930’.82

The deputation was unsuccessful, and the Greek Cypriot response was immedi-

ate83: public debate on the need for a new Greek Cypriot political organisation was

revived. While there were those who suggested an ‘oligarchic organisation’,84

others noted the sloppiness and spontaneity of the national movement,

characterised as it was by reactionary policies rather than proactive ones. Others

argued that any new organisation should rally all newspapers, clubs and associa-

tions under the leadership of the Archbishop.85 The British reacted with the familiar

carrot and stick policy: for example, they recommended for decoration 61 Greek

and Turkish police officers in an effort to win them to their side,86 while at the same

time they declared that ‘any gesture towards the enosis party is interpreted as a

weakness’.87 They reacted to Greek Cypriot demands by enacting even harsher

measures: for example, they enacted a new bill requiring the newspapers to deposit

a bond of £200 to continue publishing.88

In this context, in January 1930, the Archbishop called a meeting of the Holy

Synod and all current and former LC members to discuss a new organisation. A

committee was appointed to draft a constitution, and after its approval89 they

established an organisation (officially founded in Nicosia on 30 January 1930)

they named the National Organisation of Cyprus (NOC).90 The new organisation’smain goal was to unite all Cypriot political factions and forces, and would pursue

Union with Greece. The PP publicly greeted the founding of the NOC as much

needed ‘political recreation’,91 illustrative of the convergence of the two factions

within the nationalists.

The NOC administration comprised three levels: the highest level was the

Assembly with 37 members that included the Archbishop (President), the three

Metropolitans, two Abbots, the 12 Greek members of the LC, a representative of the

82TNA, CO 67/227/39518, ‘Movement for union of Cyprus with Greece’, 1929 Sept.–Nov., (Part

3) Confidential, Storrs to Passfield, 11 September, 1929.83TNA, CO 67/228/3 ‘Movement for union of Cyprus with Greece’, 1929 Nov., (Part II); CO

67/228/4, ‘Movement for union of Cyprus with Greece’, 1929 Nov.–1930 Jan., No. 39543. See

also, ‘Protests against the central government’, Eleftheria, 16 November 1929, 2; ‘Mass rally’,Eleftheria, 18 December 1929, 2.84‘On the need to form a new, healthy organisation’, Eleftheria, 6 November 1929, 1.85Articles by A. Emilianides in Eleftheria, 23, 27 and 30 November 1930.86TNA, CO 67/228/6, ‘Proposed long service and good conduct medal for the Cyprus Military

Police Force’, 1929 Jan.-May, No. 39545, Nicholson to Lord Amery, 3 April 1929.87TNA, CO 67/234/1, ‘Movement for union of Cyprus with Greece’, 1930 Apr.–1931 Jan.,

No. 40021 (1930) A. Dawe to the Governor, 8 December 1930.88Eleftheria, 10 May 1930, 1.89‘The establishment of a political organisation’, Eleftheria, 11 January 1930, 2; ‘The national

assembly in the Archbishopric’, Eleftheria, 29 January 1930, 2.90See the statute of the National Organisation in the Archbishopric of Cyprus.91Nea Laiki, 31 January 1930, 2.

156 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

press and another 18 members representing the six districts of Cyprus, three for

each. Assembly decisions were binding for all members except the parliamentar-

ians (article 21), which seems to indicate a lack of ideological unity.92 The second

level was the Executive Committee, consisting of the Archbishop and two other

members named by the Assembly for two-year tenure. The third level of adminis-

tration comprised the six district committees consisting of the Metropolitan (Pres-

ident) and the Abbots of the respective districts and a number of no less than seven

members chosen by the Metropolitan. The NOC established several youth associ-

ations as well as a bureau in London under Zenon Rossides.93 They sponsored a

Pancyprian Youth Convention in April 1931,94 which brought together over

40 youth clubs and associations from all over the island.95 They established both

regional and communal committees, and activists paid visits to the villages agitat-

ing for enosis (Richter 2007, 415).96 They also set up committees in Athens,

Alexandria and Cairo.97

The establishment of the NOC enabled the Church and the nationalists to

dominate once again. And a close look at the structure of the NOC reveals a far

less democratic organisation compared to its predecessor of 1921: not even one

member of the Assembly was directly elected by the people; the higher clergy and a

small number of the elite were in total command. In the end, this lack of democratic

legitimisation and the power vested in the parliamentarians weakened NOC author-

ity in the eyes of the people and posed problems when it tried to internationalise the

Cyprus issue. This was made clear in a meeting held in London between Rossides

and the UK Labour Party MPs, who roundly criticised the NOC for its lack of

democratic politics and its disregard for the working class.98 The organisation’slack of authority was also evident in the refusal of a number of mukhtars (53) to sign

a petition for enosis, questioning the NOC’s moral authority over the Greek

Cypriots.99 Despite the mukhtars’ disapproval, the majority of the 496 villages or

quarter commissions signed the petition.100

Before long the various factions within the NOC began to promote their own

interests and aspirations. For example, Eleftheria, noted the ‘absence of a united

92Isotis, 15 March 1930, 1.93‘Decisions of the Executive Committee of the National Organisation’, Nea Laiki, 14 March

1930, 3.94‘The first congress of the national youth associations’, Eleftheria, 18 April 1931, 3.95See indicatively, ‘National speeches by the NOC’, Nea Laiki, 23 May 1930, 3; ‘National youth’,Eleftheria, 14 June 1930, 2.96See indicatively, ‘Community committees of the National Organisation’, Eleftheria, 19 April

1930, 2; ‘Morphou’s regional committee’, Eleftheria, 21 May 1930, 2.97‘Activities of the Executive Committee of the National Organisation’, Nea Laiki, 16 May

1930, 1.98‘Mr. Zenon Rossides’, Nea Laiki, 15 August 1930, 2.99TNA, CO 67/237/10, ‘Agitation for union of Cyprus with Greece’, 1931 Jan.–Aug., No. 41083,

Confidential Despatch, Storrs to Passfield, 17 April 1931.100Eleftheria, 4 June 1930, 2.

7.5 The Revival of the Nationalists 157

national policy’,101 while Nea Laiki thought that the situation once again was

‘chaotic’.102 There was also conflict regarding elections for the Executive Com-

mittee where the intransigent Bishop of Kyrenia prevailed over the more moderate

Bishop of Kition (Georghallides 1985, 353). The Bishop of Kition, Nicodemos,

believed that despite its inadequate powers, the Legislative Council (LC) offered a

useful forum for Cypriots to voice their concerns and obtain political

information.103

Within these contextual parameters LC elections were held in October 1930,

with the results altering the political landscape once again: only seven years after

the reformist turn of 1923, the nationalist camp revived and dominated the Council.

However, and despite their common stance against the moderates, it was once again

the organisation’s internal rifts that took center stage. The leading figures of the

NOC turned the village outreach programme into an opportunity to promote their

own political agendas at the expense of the collective goal. Ultimately, the NOC

was immobilised by the conflicting ambitions of its members and failed to produce

a unified list of candidates to propose to the electorate. Immediately after the

elections and following the refusal of the British under-secretary of State for the

Colonies Dr. Shiels to discuss enosis, Eleftheria (8 November) urged those elected

to resign. However, like their predecessors, the new members were independent,

individualistic politicians and very unwilling to resign from the Council

(Georghallides 1985, 405–407).

The most militant members (e.g., S. Loizides) asked for further radicalisation

since the current policy was ineffective and did little more than verbalise its

objectives. Loizides stood on the right (radical) flank of the nationalists and he

claimed that there were three different stances in the organisation—radical nation-

alists, nationalists and reformists—and he aligned himself with the radical nation-

alists. This group wholeheartedly opposed any cooperation with the British

administration, and any personal, social, or economic relations (while the reform-

ists encouraged cooperation in order to obtain political liberties).104 Loizides did

acknowledge, however, that most politicians were moderates, and this was for

personal, material interests. He also argued that the different factions should not

be afraid to form different political organisations because they were all too dispa-

rate in their aims. Essentially, it would seem, Loizides was proposing the creation of

political parties with specific political programmes to serve specific groups in the

constituency rather than the entire population. In actual fact, this proposal was

not possible at that particular time given the structure of Cypriot society (Richter

2007, 424), although it did express the dissatisfaction with the ruling class felt by

some of the political elite.

101‘Healthy politics is needed’, Eleftheria, 12 February 1930, 2.102‘For the new Board of the National Organisation’, Nea Laiki, 7 March 1930, 1.103Isotis, 11 January 1930, 1.104S. Loizides wrote three articles under the same title, ‘Politically we are infants’, in Eleftheria,26 November 1930, 1; 29 November 1930, 1; and 6 December 1930, 1.

158 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

For radical nationalists the essential component of an organisation’s make-up

was its popular character; without this it would be degraded into an exclusive social

club. Loizides’ perceptions were radical if they are considered within the nationalistmilieu; but his radicalism went only so far as his social position allowed, consid-

ering that he also belonged to the social elite. Loizides published his opinion on the

labour struggles and communist ideology, where he stated that he viewed commu-

nism as a purely social movement but not as a national one. He felt that social

struggles threatened the national goal of enosis, as they hindered the formation of

strong political organisations with a national programme that required the support

of all social classes and strata. The nationalists believed that social issues would be

solved automatically the day after national liberation. The radicals constructed their

ideology mostly from an angry revulsion against ‘political careerists’ and ‘phrase-mongers’ without real commitment to the enosis cause.

On the other hand, there were those who felt that the NOC was a positive force:

within its first year of operation it sponsored over 150 nationalist lectures and set up

over 50 youth organisations.105 Loizides’s arguments, however, soon garnered the

attention and support of other columnists and politicians, and this created another

split in the nationalist circles—how to best promote the unionist movement and the

role of Greece. The NOC failed to formulate a strategy acceptable to all, leading to

a new split between radical and non-radical nationalists. At this time too, the

Athenian press reported the imminent establishment of an autonomous party

(Georghallides 1985, 374), which drew an immediate response and rejection from

the assembly of the NOC.106

7.6 Emergence of the Radical Right (EREK 1931)

Throughout most of the 1920s, the Greek Cypriot leadership tended to acquiesce to

the British administration. This moderate stance resulted in harsh criticism from

several important personalities from the small, economically deprived province of

Kyrenia, and the most radical right wingers (Katsiaounis 2000, 34). Leading figures

among them were Makarios, the Bishop of Kyrenia, Polycarpos Ioannides, secre-

tary of the See, and Savvas Loizides who advocated establishing a radical nation-

alist party. Although the radical nationalists attacked the British, they directed their

strongest venom against the moderate/traditional Greek Cypriot right (Loizides

1980, 24). The radicals had no faith in law-abiding activities (memorials, deputa-

tions, etc.) as a way to achieve enosis; on the contrary, they advised disobedience ofthe laws, boycotting British products, refusing to pay taxes, and the withdrawal of

the elected members from the LC, who they dubbed ‘children of a sinful past’, andwhose opinion could not be changed.107

105See articles of A. Emilianides in Eleftheria, 7 and 10 January 1931.106Eleftheria, 13 September 1930, 1.107Loizides in Eleftheria, 21 January 1931, 1.

7.6 Emergence of the Radical Right (EREK 1931) 159

Many nationalists saw resignation from the legislature as crucial, since Greek

Cypriot participation in the body lent credence to the colonial regime. There were

other politicians who agreed; in Limassol (Alitheia, 23 and 30 January and

6 February 1931) these men called on the Greek parliamentarians to resign their

posts, to be re-elected and to then pursue the policy of abstention in order to create a

political crisis.108 One of the proponents of this stance was Hadjipavlou; a leading

figure in the ‘pro-government’ party but when failed to reelect he radicalised—

verifying once again the basic pattern of Greek Cypriot nationalist politics

explained in Chap. 1. Others, such as N. K. Lanitis, upheld the opposite view and

argued for gradually improving their relationship with the colonial authorities;

while some of the most radical members of the NOC (Loizides and the Bishop of

Kyrenia) eventually resigned.109

Radicals were keen to devise another solution, which they found in a radical

secret society. Inspired by the struggle of the Eptanisian110 radicals (Loizides 1980,25–26), they named their organisation the National Radicalist Union of Cyprus

(EREK), with most of the founding members being freemasons.111 Although EREK

officially presented itself in October 1931, it had been secretly active since 1929

during, which time it had secretly recruited activists from all over the country.

EREK proclaimed its aim to fight for the union with Greece in all possible ways,

armed not excluded. It seems that EREK was encouraged by Alexi Kyrou, then

consul of Greece in Cyprus (Loizides 1980, 25–31), who vigorously supported

enosis and tried (unsuccessfully) to unite Greek Cypriot feuding politicians into a

disciplined body under the command of one leader (Georghallides 1985, 500–502).

Because of Kyrou’s active promotion of enosis, Governor R. Storrs (1945, 503-505)demanded his recall. Venizelos accepted this and conceded that ‘his appointment

was unwise’ because of his Cypriot heritage and his ‘rather irredentist

mentality’.112

While initially a marginal group, EREK spread rapidly and soon was a presence

in the capital city of Nicosia, confirmation of the growing influence of the radicals.

Although there is no conclusive evidence for the internal structure and procedures

of the organisation, it appears that EREK had membership levels, district represen-

tatives, secret signs of mutual recognition and annual subscriptions. The organisa-

tion was associated with the emerging Boy Scout movement in Nicosia (founded in

108Hadjipavlou’s newly launched Laiki Dinamis—Popular Power- (5 June 1931).109‘The assembly of the NOC: members resign’, Eleftheria, 6 May 1931, 2; ‘The meetings

between members of the Legislative Council and the NOC’, Eleftheria, 7 October 1931, 2.110Eptanisa (literally seven islands) is a complex of Greek islands in the Ionian Sea.111Among the founding members were: the teacher G. Karayiannis director of the elementary

school in Kyrenia; T. Sophocleous also a teacher in that school; D. Karolides lawyer; the secretary

of the See of Kyrenia P. Ioannides; and the Bishop of Kyrenia Makarios.112TNA, CO 67/237/10, ‘Agitation for union of Cyprus with Greece’, 1931 Jan.–Aug., No. 41083,Confidential Despatch No. 234 (78/33/31), Patrick Ramsey to Arthur Henderson, 5 June 1931.

160 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

January 1931), and the two groups organised a demonstration calling for Legisla-

tive Council deputies to resign their posts.

At the time of the riots in October 1931, EREK numbered 1200 publicly

registered and 700 underground (secret) members (Georghallides 1985, 417).

This evidence suggests that EREK comprised two sections: the public face—its

political branch, and its clandestine group that carried out subversive activity,

reinforced by the acquisition of some light armament from Egypt for intimidation

purposes (Choisi 1995, 42). When EREK went public on 18 October 1931, with its

founding declaration signed by 21 persons,113 it called for fanatical support of

enosis, rejection of any form of cooperation with the British and declared those who

did cooperate as enemies of the nation. EREK also announced that it would publish

a newspaper called Adiallahtos (intransigent) as of 24 October, but because of the

riots three days earlier the paper was never published.114

EREK signaled a new divide on the right side of the political spectrum: the

organised expression of the radical wing, hitherto represented only by isolated

politicians and columnists. It also introduced a new reading of the national interest:

in contrast to all other organisations that claimed exclusive representation of the

Greek Cypriot community, suggestive of a conservative way of thinking that

conceptualises the nation as an organic entity (Heywood 2006, 169) EREK

presented a very different concept of representation. For the first time, a group

claimed to represent only a part and not the whole of the community. EREK voiced

the most radical concerns of a sect within the Right with regard to the anti-colonial

struggle, which felt alienated from the decision making process but was unable to

establish itself in the long run because of the British reaction to the riots of October

1931. Moreover, most of the Greek Cypriot political and social elite believed that

contact and cooperation with the colonial rule should be maintained, as they felt this

was a way to assert some influence. The radicals called this perception the ‘industryof memorials’.115 Radical nationalists called for firmness, consistency and aggres-

sion in all matters of national policy and this led to tension with the British

certainly, but even more so with the Greek Cypriot moderates.

Two factors led to the eruption of the riots on 21 October 1931 (Oktovriana): theinternal division of the Greek Cypriot political elite, caused largely by the emer-

gence of EREK; Britain’s continued refusal to consider enosis and/or other consti-tutional liberties. These factors were further exacerbated by the worsening

economic conditions on the island.

The parliamentarians were pressured to resign following their humiliation when

an Order in Council mandating tax increases that the majority of the Cypriot

deputies had voted against, was passed into law. Once again, the NOC was divided,

with most deputies calling for a tax boycott, while the Bishop of Kyrenia’s

113‘The Radical Union’, Eleftheria, 21 October 1931, 2.114TNA, CO 67/242/3, ‘Riots in Cyprus: censorship’, 1931 Dec., No. 41397/W Enclosure

No. 9 Governors Despatch No. Secret (2), 16 December 1931.115‘The means of the Cypriot struggle’, Eleftheria, 11 June 1930, 1.

7.6 Emergence of the Radical Right (EREK 1931) 161

followers called for the deputies’ resignation.116 Tension reached a peak when a

public rally was organised in Larnaca on 18 October to protest against the deputies.

When the most prominent deputy Bishop of Kition Nicodemos Mylonas learned of

the planned rally and EREK’s public appearance, he announced his resignation

(on 17 October), calling for civil disobedience in an effort to consolidate his

personal leadership of the anti-colonial struggle.117 This infuriated the other elected

politicians, who felt that the bishop was behaving ‘treacherously’ by publishing a

highly seditious manifesto and resigning from the Council in advance of his

colleagues.

A few days later a mass meeting was held in the Nicosia Church of Faneromeni

that soon took an anti-government character, with participants marching to the

Government House despite the parliamentarians’ plea to entrust them to petition the

Governor (Storrs 1945, 508), disclosing once again their inability to outwit the

traditional context of conflict resolution schemes. The uprising caught all political

leaders out. And because the NOC was failing and EREK was not prepared to

assume a leading role, it was concluded that the insurrection was not planned. Storrs

(1945, 511) documents this perspective, noting that the majority of the populated

centres of Cyprus did not take part in the disorders. Of the 598 Greek and mixed

Greek-Turkish villages in Cyprus, 389 took no part whatsoever in the disturbances.

The insurrection achieved little and it wasn’t massive. For one thing, lack of

effective leadership and Greece’s refusal to help the Cypriots118 made it easy to

stop the uprising. The British immediately imposed repressive regulations based on

the principle of communal responsibility,119 including prohibition of assembly,

censorship of the press, etc.120 The ringleaders of the riots, including two Bishops,

were deported and 2000 persons persecuted; the flying of Greek flags was

prohibited; the Legislative Council was abolished. Another reason for the failed

uprising lies in the social and economic gap between the upper classes and the vast

majority of the population, which tampered the mobilisation of the masses for

revolutionary action.

7.7 The Nature of Nationalist Politics

The 1931 insurrection brought an end to the first period of nationalist politics in

Cyprus. The defining feature of this first period of nationalist politics was the

internal.

116Eleftheria, 7 and 17 October 1931.117‘The proclamation of the Bishop of Kition’, Eleftheria, 21 October 1931, 2.118Prime Minister Venizelos condemned the riots of 1931: ‘It is unfortunate that Cypriots ignorethe fact that the Greek Government disapproves this kind of conduct’. See Papademetris and

Petrides (1979–1980, Vol. V, 98).119TNA, CO 67/240/12, No. 41397/E.120Cyprus Gazette (Extraordinary) November 1931, No. 2177.

162 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

Greek Cypriot rivalry, which can be attributed to the individualistic nature of

Greek politics at this time as well as the lack of a strong opponent on the Left. (The

Communist Party was founded in 1926, but it was too small and weak to pose a

threat to the nationalists.) Subsequent to the October riots, the nationalists of all

nuances spent the next decade (1930–1940) compromising with the British.

Despite their internal disagreements and reluctance to break entirely with the

British, the nationalists challenged the establishmentarian politics and introduced a

new political repertoire. They set up a number of activist groups and organisations

to promote nationalism and particularly enosis—a political aim in direct conflict

with British interests. Most of these organisations, however, were law-abiding, their

membership comprising the social and political elite to the exclusion of the popular

strata. Nationalists mostly but not exclusively represented the rising bourgeois

social strata that benefited from Cyprus’ capitalist transformation rather than

victimised by it. However, all nationalist agencies shared a more or less common

sociology drawing their members from the same categories of people: profes-

sionals, merchants, landowners, etc. This was scarcely surprising for these they

were anticipated in an era when a place in public life was qualified by education and

social status. Their definition of public opinion was socially restrictive and was

largely confined to the so-called educated classes. In fact, they were concerned with

an even narrower band of ‘opinion-makers’—the press, influential political and

economic personalities, key figures within the Church. Their public campaigns

were meant only to mobilise support for their policies and choices but not to create a

wider, extra-parliamentary movement. Because of this they were largely alienated

from the popular base which had first called them into life. Nonetheless, they were

not disconnected from them although their leadership and activists lacked formal

commitment to their organisations and enjoyed a significant freedom from external

loyalties.

It is clear that in this first phase the nationalists were reluctant to involve a wider

range of supporters in the local life of the organisations. They made few attempts to

encourage the formation of local branches, and the organisations neglected to define

the relationship between party organs and membership in their club. While they

held occasional delegate meetings, the organisations had no real influence over

party organs, (which they rarely met) or policy. The internal character of these

nationalist organisations had little variation, all distinguished by a weak commit-

ment to involving low ranked members in important decisions. The power rested

with the presidium that was staffed with high prestige individuals. The provisions in

these organisations’ constitutions formed the basis for concentrating power, author-

ity and resources to the top of the hierarchy. Politics was simply one more arena in

which the existing leaders worked together with the same men they knew and

respected through business, social contact, community involvement, or often

enough, family ties. The organisations/parties existed in precisely interlocking

networks of rural and urban notables, who placed themselves in the political

leadership by virtue of property and education. The ruling oligarchy enjoyed an

exclusive and formalised monopoly over political power on the island.

7.7 The Nature of Nationalist Politics 163

However, the circles of respectable society in which such personalities moved

were not necessarily organisation/party-exclusive. They followed the natural con-

tours of prestige in a class society and were consequently fully capable of accom-

modating some degree of dissidence. The ruling class was neither inward looking

nor isolated from wider social intercourse: rather, it was surrounded by a network of

organised activity with strong lines to the community radiating from its centre. The

visible performance of civic duties was vital to a notable’s moral authority, whether

they involved sitting in charitable or philanthropic societies, improving social

amenities, patronising the arts or people, promoting education, or organising public

festivals/celebrations for important national events (e.g., the 1821 Greek revolution

or the Balkan Wars). So while they did try to build networks of local agents in the

constituencies, this was generally only at election times.

In the first three decades of the twentieth century constituency politics in Cyprus

was run by small elitist groups of important notables who were bound together more

by social prestige than by organised party contact. Therefore local political life was

marked by absence of any organised context; it was rather personalistic linkages

that replaced organic links between parties and voters, which meant that politicians

had little accountability. The nationalist organisations of this period did not chal-

lenge the social status quo: they were political instruments of the ruling class—who

only wanted to preserve their place in the Greek community. All these organisations

were directly linked to the nationalist politicians who were all also members of the

social elite.

Nationalist politics revolved around two pillars at two levels of the public realm:

the Legislative Council and the national organisations for promoting enosis. In bothpublic realms the nationalists were rattled by internal disputes: the major schism

between moderates and intransigents was ever present despite the many guises it

took over the years and despite periods of consensus. The fragmentation of the

nationalist bloc and the lack of cohesion in these organisations prevented the

formation of durable majorities and led to deadlocks and crises. With a small

break in the mid-1920s when moderates were at the fore, it was the intransigent

nationalists who dominated most of this period. By the 1920s (at the latest) the

British found themselves facing a highly politicised and implacable Hellenic

phenomenon (Georghallides 1979). These moderate nationalists, however, were

never very successful, and after the October 1931 riots they were largely consigned

to the margins (Holland 2014, 14).

ΕΡΕK’s establishment was an important step. The moderates were no longer

attacked just for their lack of personal commitment; they also stood accused of

damaging the national cause. EREK, committed to a more radical version of

nationalism that did not exclude armed struggle against the British, stood outside

the existing tradition of nationalist (conservative) right-wing politics. The organi-

sation represented a new type of politics, and was a product of the vicious cycle

described in the introduction. EREK offered an alternative pole of loyalty that soon

attracted the support of younger and more impatient unionist activists who felt

ignored by traditional party politics. The 1931 October riots signalled a new era in

164 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

nationalist Greek Cypriot politics, where the political landscape would be altered

once again.

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166 7 Politicising Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism: The Nationalist Milieu

Chapter 8

The Crisis of Nationalism, Political

Opposition and the Consolidation

of the Nationalist Right

This chapter examines the way in which the nationalist Right took shape in the

1940s successfully rallying a full array of organised schemes and ancillary agen-

cies. I do so by considering the various levels of party, trade union, agrarian, local,

etc. In particular, I focus on the first ever island-wide party of the nationalist right in

Cyprus, the Cypriot Nationalist Party (KEK), and the different organisations asso-

ciated with the Right: the trade union SEK, the agrarian union PEK, the extreme

Right paramilitary group ‘X’, and the many youth associations. Nationalism in this

period had an organisational and an extra-parliamentary dimension which marked

an important difference with the past. The chapter emphasises the unifying influ-

ence of anti-communism, which seems to verify Duverger’s (1954) argument that

the Right followed the Left in terms of organisational development.

Right-wing consolidation went through various phases and was neither linear

nor independent. It was the result of several factors: the British-imposed authori-

tarian regime after the public disorders of October 1931; the entry onto the political

scene of the newly founded Communist Party (CPC) that exercised pressure on the

nationalists and threatened their supremacy in internal politics; the Church involve-

ment in the enosis movement. Arguably the most crucial factor driving nationalist

maturation and consolidation was the new political actor CPC-AKEL, whose

appearance changed the nature of political competition. The overall context neces-

sitated an effective right-wing response to the rise of the communists. By compar-

ison with the disastrous inactivity of the 1930s, in the 1940s, a notable advance of

nationalist party politics was registered at a time of continuing communist gains

which in turn assisted a stabilisation of the nationalist organisations and their

electoral position.

In the 1940s Cyprus was faced with a popular challenge to the traditional elitist

politics that had always defined and directed public life. The Right was forced to

develop their own brand of popular politics in order to meet the threat posed by the

communists. The nationalists realised they could not survive as an elite party but

needed to seek contact with all strata and particularly the peasantry and workers.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_8

167

Important junctures in this process included: the foundation of AKEL in 1941, the

reinstatement of elections in 1943 at the local level and the communist electoral

successes, the deliberations for a new constitution in 1947–1948, the impact of the

Greek Civil War (1946–1949), and the enosis referendum in 1950. The beginning of

a new style of politics was evident in the expansion of the electorate, rising rates of

political participation, the intensity of electioneering, newmethods of campaigning,

etc. In this situation of unprecedented political mobilisation engineered by the Left,

the Right had no choice but to adapt its organisation for a more popular style of

politics. From this time we may detect a notable invigoration of the nationalist party

life. This organisational growth was accompanied by a renewed sense of political

direction strongly aiming for enosis and precluding constitutional reforms.

Competition for power unfolded on two fronts and led to two schisms, one intra-

ethnic and the other the inter-ethnic. In this book I focus on Greek Cypriot politics,

so the analysis here refers to the division within the Greek Cypriot community. In

this chapter as well as the next, I am looking at the years between 1931 and the

mid-1950s, where two intra-ethnic divisions can be identified: intra-nationalist and

nationalist-communist.

8.1 Right-Wing Compromise and Communist Rise

As noted in the previous chapter, in reaction to the riots of October 1931 the British

abolished all democratic institutions. The Greek nationalist ruling class and the

communist reaction to these strictures were very different, with the nationalists

deciding to cooperate with the British to safeguard their privileges (Katsourides

2014b, 37–38; Katsiaounis 2007, 447), and the communists agitating for change.

The British recognised the nationalists’ motive and used it to their advantage; as

Governor Reginald Stubbs said, ‘we need to breed such a class that will be willing tocooperate with us’.1 To this end the British inaugurated a new system of governance

in which all public posts were appointed: executive and advisory councils, municipal

and village councils, etc. At the same time they enforced a strict law against seditious

acts that forced enosis agitators into submission—at least from 1932 to 1940.

It was not solely the colonial government’s idea to abolish elections in favour ofappointments, as revealed by Governor Palmer in his correspondence with the

Ministry of Colonies. It was in fact a Cypriot who first suggested the idea

P. Kakoyiannis (later knighted for his services to the Crown),2 which reveals how

the nationalists decided that compromise was the best policy. And of course, all

government appointments were made to individuals from the ruling class, who

1TNA, CO 67/251/3, ‘Political situation’, 1933 Oct.–Dec., Classified, Sir Edward Stubbs, Gover-

nor of Cyprus, to Sir Philip Cuncliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 June 1933.2TNA, CO 67/256/7, ‘Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Law, 1934’, 1934 Feb.–1935 Jan.,

Palmer to Parkinson, 2 January 1934.

168 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

competed among themselves for the public offices. ‘The appointees were individ-

uals well known for their rightist beliefs’.3 The mayor of Nicosia, Themistocles

Dervis, is a good example of the elite’s willingness to cooperate for their own

personal gain: in 1932 he requested that he be allowed to relinquish his Greek

citizenship in order to acquire British citizenship and thus be eligible for appoint-

ment as mayor (Protopapas 2002, 46). Also indicative of the nationalist elite’scompliant attitude is the fact that in the first 5 years of Palmer’s tenure (1933–38)more Cypriots were awarded medals for loyalty and service to the Crown than had

received medals in the previous 57 years of British rule (Santamas 1986). The

British were also lenient with regard to the Church, primarily owing to the Church

stance against communism. The British considered the Church’s anti-communist

position an ‘invaluable asset’ and hoped to capitalise on it.4

With the nationalists safely under their control the British concentrated on the

CPC, which they recognised as the greater threat (Holland 1999, 33). In fact, the

communist activity represented the only dissonance in an otherwise totally con-

trolled, smoothly running government (Katsourides 2014a, 177–180; Katsiaounis

2004, 35). The British mandated harsh measures—for example, the amendment of

the penal code (Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. VI, 148)—and spent so

much time trying to contain the communist movement that a newspaper editorial in

1933 complained that that the community was left without day-to-day policing

because,

The entire attention of the government is today distracted by the prosecution of commu-

nism. From the honourable attorney general to the last policeman, everybody is preoccu-

pied with the communist flysheets, which are from time to time found in various parts of the

island. Special laws have been enacted, severe sentences have been passed and draconian

measures have been adopted.5

The communist networks campaigned intensively within workers’ circles and

successfully set up a number of trade unions in the latter half of the 1930s. As one

scholar notes: ‘under the shadow of the colonial dictatorship of the 1930s the

communists had their heroic underground phase: they became the backbone of

the emerging working class movement’ (Panayiotou 2006, 269).

The CPC also took a different approach to the anti-colonial struggle: first, the

party appealed to the people of Cyprus on a class basis, thus including the Turks as

well; second, they framed the national question in terms of independence rather

than enosis. The CPC recognised that the national liberation movement in Cyprus

lacked a united front—a front that would also include the Turks of Cyprus. They

therefore took a stance that would attract and represent all Cypriots, and for this

3Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry 1947, Folder 33/3, Subfolder 1, Andreas

Kountouriotis to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 August 1947. Kountouriotis was the then

Greek consul in Cyprus.4TNA, CO 67/254/4, ‘Political situation’, 1934 Jan.-June, Classified, Palmer to Parkinson,

10 January 1934.5Chronos (Time), 6 September 1933, cited in Katsiaounis (2004, 31).

8.1 Right-Wing Compromise and Communist Rise 169

reason they advocated independence.6 However, the majority of Greek Cypriots did

not support this position and the nationalist camp fiercely opposed it. For this

reason, the CPC and its influence were quite marginal throughout its existence

(1926–1941).

Political activity throughout the 1930s was sporadic and limited, involving

moderate Greek and Turkish Cypriot politicians, enosis supporters linked to the

Church, and communist activists. Much more active were two overseas groups, a

nationalist association in Athens formed by exiled Greek Cypriots, and a left-wing

organisation in London (Katsiaounis 2000b). Cyprus at this time was experiencing

changes that were not directly political. For example, in 1932 the government

passed a law providing for the operation of trade unions, and the cooperative

movement was growing (Christophorou 2006, 298). Throughout the 1930s trade

unionism was developing quite slowly until it received a decisive boost from a new

(communist-led) initiative that attempted to coordinate the various trade unions

under a common umbrella. The first Pancyprian Labour Congress, convened in

August 1939 in Famagusta, gathered together 100 representatives from all the trade

unions (Slocum 1972, 11). A second congress held 2 years later, in which 65 trade

unions participated, resulted in the establishment of an executive body, the

Pancyprian Trade Union Committee (PSE—Pagkypria Syntexniaki Epitropi). ThePSE made rapid progress: less than 2 years later it represented 84 trade unions with

9500 members. In 1946 the PSE was renamed the Pancyprian Federation of Labour

(PEO) and was under the aegis of AKEL (Ierodiakonou 2003, 358–371).

In 1941 the nature of politics in Cyprus changed dramatically: the CPC seized on

the more liberal political environment that the British had recently established and

launched a new mass political organisation: AKEL, the Progressive Party of the

Working People. This signaled the beginnings of modern mass politics in Cyprus

(Christophorou 2006).

In fact the social and political setting overall was conducive to this new venture

presenting a favourable structure of opportunities for the communist Left: Cyprus

was just coming out from the Palmerocratia (see Richter 2010, 32–38), during

which time many—if not all—those in the nationalist ruling class had compromised

with the British colonialists (Katsiaounis 2000a, 39). The nationalists’ compliant

stance in the 1930s, together with the lack of electoral and representative institu-

tions for over a decade, had created a power vacuum within the Greek Cypriot

community that allowed the communists to grow from a marginal to a major force.

AKEL took the lead in resisting the British by engineering a mass political struggle

for self-determination and prioritising class issues. AKEL’s mobilisation of the

masses occurred at a time of rapid social change, and in an institutional setting

where the workers and the wider popular and agrarian masses bore most of the costs

and enjoyed few of the gains (Alimi et al. 2012).

6‘The Cyprus Question’,Neos Anthropos, 15 June, 4 and 1 July 1925, 4;Neos Ergatis, 9 September

1929, 2.

170 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

AKEL was established on broad ideological foundations (rather than narrow

confessional ones, as some old communist voices had wanted), and its gradual

move towards trade unionism accounts for a fair degree of its success. Not only did

AKEL promise to satisfy a widespread desire for democracy, social justice and

national independence to Cyprus, but its adoption of a ‘popular front’ policy meant

that it attracted a significantly larger audience than before. The party was outward

looking, had a strong network of organised activities and links to various social

groups (Ellinas and Katsourides 2013). It relied on mass mobilisation at the

grassroots level in combination with disciplined loyalty to a centralised organisa-

tion. When AKEL changed its stance to favouring enosis, the party became a mass

organisation in a very short time. The party decided to change its position on this

issue to increase its appeal among the working class and to turn enosis into a truly

anti-colonial and anti-imperialist demand (for a more thorough discussion on the

reasons behind the change in position see Katsourides 2014c, 482–483).

AKEL’s endorsement of enosis as well as its privileged relationship with the

trade union movement led to a huge increase in its electoral strength, as high as 40%

in the municipal elections of the 1940s (Protopapas 2012), and its membership

continued to grow substantially (the 200 members of the CPC in 1941 rose to 5000

by 1945).7 Governor Sir Charles Woolley, as early as 1942, realised that ‘AKELwas a new power in the land’ (Holland 2013, 252). We can note two examples

indicative of AKEL’s growing power and the Right’s inability to cope. The first wasAKEL’s decision in June 1943 to call on its members and followers to enlist in the

British Army: 11 members of the party’s Central Committee and approximately

800 members joined. A similar attempt by the right-wing Cypriot National Party

(KEK) a few days later failed miserably.8

The second occurred a year later, in August 1944, when AKEL and the PSE

organised demonstrations to oppose the visit of Sir Kosmo Parkinson, personal

emissary of the Secretary of the Colonies.9 The British reacted by suspending the

PSE newspaper Anorthosis and Governor Woolley reported that the Executive

Council discussed a possible proscription of AKEL.10 The Governor also pleaded

with Cypriot journalists to ‘free all workers from communist clutches’ (Gregoriades1994a, 125), to which the KEK responded by calling on Cypriots to abstain from the

strike, claiming that the British government would respect the right of Cypriots for

self-determination.11 However, the demonstration was massive, a clear indication

that the political balance on the island was leaning to the Left. It seems that AKEL

had threatened the ‘natural’ leadership of the nationalists in the country and within

7ASKI, F-20/21/14, op. cit., p. 11; ASKI, F-20/21/46, op. cit. p. 7, 18 October 1951.8TNA CO 67/314/12, ‘Political situation: monthly reports from the Governor’, 1942 Feb.–1943

Dec., Top Secret, Political Situation in Cyprus in August 1943.9Aneksartitos, 29 August 1944.10TNA CO 67/323/6, ‘Discussions between the Governor and the Colonial Office on Emergency

powers’, 1944 Aug.–1945 Nov., Urgent and Tope Secret, Woolley to Hall, 27 August 1944.11Pyrsos, Annex, ‘H Kommouna torpillizi’ [The Commune Scuppers], 25 August 1944.

8.1 Right-Wing Compromise and Communist Rise 171

the Greek community, evidenced by the growth in trade unions and party’s electoralvictories. At the level of national politics they were decisive in setting a new pattern

of political life.

The nationalist and moderate Right was the casualty of the new reality imposed

after the October riots of 1931. Not only because it failed to put forward an

organisational and ideological reorientation to meet the communist challenge, but

its decision to compromise with the colonial authorities merely served to erode the

foundations of its traditional supremacy and the type of politics prevailing until

then, i.e., the politics of notables. Therefore the Right was forced to change tactics.

Prior to AKEL’s formation in 1941, party politics in Cyprus were essentially

unknown. The political system was one wherein an indeterminate number of

individuals, each of whom commanded a certain following in the electorate,

campaigned against each other for elected positions. These individual politicians

had no line of policy and little idea of local matters; they only shared a common,

vague cry for enosis.The conservative class was disorganised, disparate, and lacking a common

denominator. The nationalists’ inability and compromise fractured their ideological

authority within the population. It was a period characterised by the absence of any

organised context for a local political life on the Right. The fact that AKEL was

established on entirely new terms meant that the nationalist right had to respond in

like: thus the conflict was turned into an ideological and political battle for power,

and mass political organisations were developed on both the Left and the Right.

Despite the suspension of all political organisations during the years of the EOKA

armed struggle (1955–59), these organisations survived and re-emerged after inde-

pendence. It was during these years that the Left-Right divide hardened in Cyprus

(Christophorou 2006).

8.1.1 The New Electoral Arena

Electoral politics proved the wake-up call for the nationalists, when by 1943 it was

clear that AKEL had taken over the lead in internal politics. The revelation of

electoral weakness delivered a powerful shock to the Right. Local elections—

which had not been held since 1929—were reinstated under the new law 23/1942

enacted by the then Governor Charles Campbell Woolley due to the circumstances

of the WWII and the British’s need to keep their colonies both quiet. The new law

stipulated the following election/voting criteria: incumbency was set at 3 years;

candidates were required to hold British citizenship; eligible voters included all

men 21 years of age and above living within the city limits in the 12 months prior to

the elections; property ownership was not a requirement.12 The property waiver

meant that more of the working and peasant classes were now eligible to vote.

12Eleftheria, 28 November 1942.

172 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

Moreover, measures were taken to ensure fair elections, including personal voter

cards, yearly renewal of electoral lists and procedures for timely review of lists, no

more than 10 voters allowed in the polling stations on elections day, etc. Women

were still excluded, however, seriously limiting the legitimacy of the elections.

The elections were set for May 1943. AKEL had announced that they would

submit candidates for the elections as did the nationalist Pan-Agrarian Union of

Cyprus (PEK—for this organisation see below). PEK was most active in the rural

areas of the island: for example, in Lefkoniko PEK offered its own candidates

whereas in other areas it supported other nationalist candidates (e.g., Galatopoulos

in Paphos). To compensate for their weaknesses the nationalists resorted to what

was to become their most salient weapon: anti-communism. For this election,

however, AKEL was in a much better position than the Right, which was not

represented by a political party but by an agrarian organisation and many isolated

personalities. AKEL won the majority of the municipalities (Protopapas 2012,

364–378).

The loss of the 1943 local elections strengthened the call for right-wing unity. In

any event, it was imperative that the nationalists devise a popular practice adequate

to the needs of the new situation and to this end they improved their organisation

and focused on a strategy of polarisation. Taking their cue from AKEL, the Right

created their own elaborate subculture of party, trade union, agrarian and cultural

agencies. Their rhetoric worked to distinguish the Left and the Right, communist

versus nationalist. These measures successfully turned the Right’s fortunes around.

8.2 The Nationalist Response

Even before the elections of 1943, the right-wing camp was alarmed by the Left’sadvances (Kitromilides 1981, 457), and in May 1942 the farmers’ association of

Athienou actively began to organise, resulting in the founding of the PEK

(Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou). Then, in 1943, the nationalists established KEK,

the first island-wide (pancyprian) political party of the Right, and soon after, in

1944, the so-called New Trade Unions were united to form the Cyprus Workers’Confederation (SEK) in order to challenge the Left’s commanding presence in the

trade union movement (Gregoriades 1994a, 179–180). Recognising that the com-

munists had the advantage in organisation and popular influence, the Right tried to

compensate by soliciting foreign (English and Greek) patrons, the Church

(Christophorou 2006, 301) and nationalism (Anagnostopoulou 1999).

Nationalist ideology was crucial in the Right’s struggle to compete with the

communists. They saw that the only way to draw workers away from the commu-

nists was through assiduous cultivation of ‘national pride and love of the mother-

land’, a marked Greek consciousness and the spirited feeling of national fellowship.

The loss of their monopoly of power and ideological orthodoxy to the communist

Left precipitated the Right’s articulation of the more radical and less liberal face of

enosis (Kitromilides 1979, 164). The nationalists stood for immediate union with

8.2 The Nationalist Response 173

Greece and nothing else. Agitating intensely for ‘enosis and only enosis’ offered theRight a chance to reclaim leadership in internal politics. Throughout the 1940s and

1950s, particularly after the mid-1940s, and in contrast to their earlier positions, the

nationalist Right lost no opportunity to proclaim the futility of constitutional

amendments.13

As the British noted: ‘politically, a Greek Cypriot can at present only be one of

three things: a nationalist, a communist or a “traitor”. To be a nationalist he must

accept the doctrine of enosis and only enosis’.14 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s

enosis permeated and monopolised almost every form of activity on the island. The

Church was largely responsible for this, but the fact that in 1940 Greece joined in

the war as an ally of Britain also contributed. As a consequence the law forbidding

flying the Greek flag was repealed, encouraging the revival of enosis activism. The

remaining of this chapter examines the ways in which the nationalists responded

both organisationally and politically by analysing the nationalist milieu. This

discussion will reveal that the form of nationalist party politics was largely

influenced by anti-communism and that their organisational revival militated

against a left-wing majority.

8.2.1 The Cyprus National Party (KEK)

For a successful response to AKEL advances the nationalist bloc needed an

adequate party-political articulation. The decision to launch KEK (KypriakonEthnikon Komma), the Cyprus National Party was made in the heat of the municipal

elections of 1943 when the nationalists realised they would be defeated. The party

was formed in Nicosia by Dr. Themistocles Dervis, mayor of Nicosia, together with

several other prominent personalities of the capital. He made an open declaration of

his intentions in early May 1943 just before the local elections,15 and on 9 May

1943 published an announcement of the party, initially named Ethniki Parataxis(National Camp).16 Also on 9 May the first meeting took place in Famagusta, with

369 recorded attendees.17 KEK held its first congress on 6 June 1943, attended by

about 200 representatives who had recently been elected in regional meetings; the

congress adopted the proposed articles of association.18 T. Dervis, speaking at a

district assembly in Nicosia claimed that that they had been ‘forced to assume a

13TNA, CO 926/209, ‘Political Situation Reports, Cyprus 1954–1956’, Report on the political

situation in Cyprus for the month of February 1955.14TNA, CO 926/171, ‘Cyprus internal political situation’, 1954–1956, ‘The Monopoly of Enosis’,8 October 1954, 3.15‘Proclamation’, Eleftheria, 9 May 1943.16Eleftheria, 9 May 1945.17Neos Kypriakos Fylax, 11 May 1943.18Neos Kypriakos Fylax, 5 June 1943; Eleftheria, 5 June 1943.

174 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

decisive struggle against the internal enemy; AKEL and its scions’ (Papademetris

and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. 7, 219–223). Savvas Christides was elected the first

Secretary General of KEK, but shortly thereafter, on 16 January 1944, Dervis took

over.19

Politically the party aimed to confront communism by uniting all anti-

communist elements, and therefore embraced nearly all Cypriots who were not

AKEL followers; this included both those who had cooperated with the British

administration in the 1930s as well as those who had opposed it. KEK defined its

politics very simply as an angry repudiation of the communists and a strong

commitment to enosis. Although its rhetoric placed nation above any class or

other interests, KEK was essentially the voice of the social and political interests

of the ruling class.20 In his report to the Greek foreign ministry, the (right-wing)

Greek consul A. Kountouriotis explained the reasons for KEK’s establishment

(cited in Katsiaounis 2000a, 78–79):

The founding of KEKwas invented by the big capitalist class of Cyprus as a weapon against

the Left and particularly the communists. The party’s founders utilised the particularly

attractive but at the same time deceptive title “National” for purposes of internal party

consumption. In practice, the title National is used as a curtain that hides the material

interests of a particular social class rather than expressing the party’s real intentions. Forthese reasons, the Cypriot National Party did not manage to acquire the needed trust of the

popular strata and thus to become indeed National.

Put simply, KEK was a nationalist, right-wing party set up in reaction to AKEL’sdominance in the political and societal field. That, together with the fact that party

policy was linked with that of the Greek Orthodox Church, meant that its

programme had two major aims: enosis and the fight against communism. The

party manifesto and statute declared its purpose to be twofold: the lawful realisation

of enosis through its coordination of the Greek Orthodox Church and the right-wingelements of the island; to combat the growing influence of communism in Cyprus.21

To these ends, KEK believed it was imperative to promote the principles of

Christianity and Hellenism. Thus, for example, upon the establishment of KEK’soffices in Nicosia, a party spokesman said: ‘We perform today the opening of our

new offices with the blessing of our Greek Orthodox Church’.22 The offices were

decorated with portraits of the Greek King George II and other Greek heroes.

KEK had little success in its early years, largely owing to an international

climate of cooperation against the Nazis and little concern for the communists.

Moreover, a number of prominent nationalist figures, including Makarios of

Kyrenia, were still in exile, thus depriving KEK of the help of influential supporters.

19Eleftheria, 17 January 1944, 2.20TNA, CO 67/327/16, Future status of Cyprus, 1945 Jan.–1946 Jan., Top Secret, Deputy

Governor of Cyprus to the Minister of Colonies’, 9 January 1945.21‘The statute of KEK’, Neos Kypriakos Fylax, 7 June 1943; ‘The programmatic positions of

KEK’, Eleftheria, 10 August 1943.22Eleftheria, 3 February 1944, 4.

8.2 The Nationalist Response 175

In 1946 some of these figures were allowed to return to Cyprus; the Bishop of

Kyrenia, in particular, commanded great respect among the majority of the people

and the British felt that his return would help the right-wing camp in its fight against

AKEL. The inception of the Greek Civil War also helped KEK disseminate anti-

communist rhetoric among the masses.23

Following two severe electoral setbacks—one in the municipal elections of 1946

and the other in the election for the new Archbishop in June 1947 when the

communist-endorsed candidate Leontios won (see also Chap. 9)—KEK realised

they had to reorganise internally and improve their campaign practices if they

hoped to compete with the communists. They had an opportunity to prove them-

selves when, just 5 weeks after his election Leontios died and Makarios was

immediately sponsored by the Right as candidate for the post. Improved campaign

strategy combined with the highly popular Makarios led to an overwhelming

victory for Makarios and KEK in December 1947.

KEK’s political viability was further enhanced in the municipal elections of

1949 when the party managed to win most of the mayoral offices (Protopapas 2012,

452–474). Overall the elections showed a marked gain for and swing to the Right.

As the British noted, ‘although the voice of KEK is basically [the] fanatical

expression of extreme right views, in times of elections all non-communists find

themselves obliged to vote for the party in order to make a common front against

AKEL’.24 To this end it was decisive that the Church allied with the party. In fact,

the Church’s influence was dominant over the party.25

Ideologically and politically, KEK’s political discourse was both nationalistic

and anti-communist, and the party believed that enosis could be achieved lawfully

and within the traditional framework of Anglo-Hellenic friendship. For example, at

the British embassy in Washington, Dervis stated that ‘the Cypriots and the Greekswould be disposed to grant the British any military facilities they wish provided that

the British first grant the Cypriots the right for self-determination’. He also noted

that Cypriots entertained no hostile feelings toward the British, affirming that ‘in75 years not one Englishman was assassinated by a Greek Cypriot unlike the case in

Israel’.26 Moreover, Dervis himself was a naturalised British subject, having

23See for example, the proclamation of KEK in Eleftheria, 29 December 1944. In this, the party

accuses AKEL of links with the KKE and closes with the phrase: ‘down with the Bolshevik

dictatorship, terrorism and fascism’.24TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 3, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, 1. This was a lengthy report(62 pages long) which provides much of the information cited in this chapter about KEK and other

affiliated organisations.25TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 31, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, 4.26TNA, CO 67/368/6, K.E.K. The Cyprus National Party: correspondence; memoranda and

newspaper clippings, 1950, ‘Political Situation: KEK, The Cypriot National Party, Department

of State, Memorandum of Conversation’, 3 March 1950.

176 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

voluntarily renounced his Greek nationality in order to be appointed Mayor of

Nicosia in the 1930s.27

The party programme was also revealing of the limits of nationalist politics

regarding relations with Britain: ‘it is certain that the rights of the people for self-

determination and the principles of justice and freedom, as stated by the Atlantic

conference will be implemented in Cyprus because it is so demanded by its history

and the political maturity of its people’.28 And as Greek military officer, colonel

Philippas, noted: ‘as a response to the communist activities a new national party

[KEK] is established with the aim of cooperating and coordinating with the British

for the achievement of enosis via the legal channel’ (cited in Katsiaounis 2000a,

77–78).

Yet, if we consider the tone that nationalist agitators and the nationalist press

used when referring to Great Britain, we see little goodwill. For example, Makarios

Kykkotis, Bishop of Kition, speaking in Limassol on 25 March 1949, called the

British ‘foreign conqueror’ and ‘occupying tyrant’,29 and the nationalist newspaperKypriakos Fylax wrote: ‘The Hellenic spirit of Cyprus should be constantly on the

alert against British imperialism which is always trying with calculation and

method [. . .] to defeat the Cypriot will by the use of powerful means’.30 Neverthe-less, and despite KEK’s verbal aggression, the party never undertook an organised

revolt; it may have expressed its annoyance with Britain, but it was never threat-

ening. On the contrary, the party even occasionally requested British help in their

fight against the communists. For example, on 21 January 1944, Dervis wrote to the

Governor complaining about the small and ineffective police force sent to deal with

a communist attack on right-wing sympathisers.31

It would appear that KEK was primarily concerned with the communist threat

(AKEL); on this matter they joined the Church position against the atheist doctrine.

For instance, the communique issued by KEK in August 1943 that set forth the

party programme was very clear on its stance against communism: ‘The Party

[KEK] will combat and will try to neutralise foreign conceptions transplanted into

Cyprus, which are dangerous to the Island’s family, religious and national life and

threaten gradually to transform and undermine the country’s morals and customs

through the systematic or sporadic energies of individuals or organisations’.32 TheChurch was pivotal to KEK in terms of the party’s (anti-communist) political

discourse and its organisational sustainability. The British were well aware of

27TNA, CO 926/209, ‘Political Situation Reports, Cyprus 1954–1956, Report on the political

situation in Cyprus for the month of July 1954’, 6.28‘The programmatic positions of KEK’, Eleftheria, 10 August 194329TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 31, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, Appendix J.30Kypriakos Fylax, 24 February 1949, 1.31TNA, FCO 141/2819, ‘Th. Dervis to the Governor’, Nicosia, 21 January 1944. According to

Dervis, the communists offended and attacked employees who chose to align with the right-wing

employers who were threatened by PEO-organised strikes.32Eleftheria, 10 August 1943, 1.

8.2 The Nationalist Response 177

this: ‘KEK is largely dependent upon the 600 priests in the island for the dissem-

ination of its propaganda. It has little party organisation and its discipline is

maintained by the religious sanction of the Church, ruthlessly applied’.33

So long as the Church/KEK cooperation targeted communist doctrine, the

British were content. There were even times when they pushed for stronger tactics:

for example, they condemned Makarios II’s advisors for not pressuring the Arch-

bishop into issuing a ‘declaration of faith’, which. The British believed would be

tantamount to renouncing communism if a Cypriot’s failure to sign resulted in his

excommunication. They believed this would have inflicted a severe shock to the

communist’s morale and would certainly scared Orthodox Cypriots into renouncing

communism.34 The British also criticised KEK’s lack of cohesion and coordinationin their fight against communism, which came primarily through the so-called new

trade unions (see below). After the party’s success in the 1949 elections the British

recorded that many employers were ordered to dismiss left-wing employees and

that failure to comply with this directive would endanger a boycott of their

businesses.35

KEK’s ineffectiveness was also due to internal personal conflicts, loose organi-

sation and lack of discipline. The British believed the main problem with KEK was

that it was driven by individual rather than party interests.36 Party leadership was

fraught with jealousies and the long-standing quarrel between the two leading right-

wing newspaper owners: Dervis (Ethnos) and Stavrinides (Eleftheria). The constantthreat of such rifts hindered party cohesion, as did its poor organisation, which was

never island-wide. KEK’s organisation was based on a central committee with

district committees in three of the towns of the island: Nicosia, Famagusta and

Larnaca. The party did not manage to establish an island-wide web of district

committees indicative of its organisational weaknesses (Katsiaounis 2000a, 79).

KEK tried to enhance its network outreach, i.e., the party’s links with various

social groups, including both the party’s own ancillary organisations and other

organised interests. In this direction, KEK established a youth organisation in 1944,

Youth of the National Party (NEK—Neolea Ethnikou Kommatos), whose aims

would match those of the party. Members were youths between 15 and 20 years

old. A further 11 organisations were recorded as affiliated with KEK, most prom-

inent of which were the Confederation of Cypriot Workers (SEK) and the PEK.

Moreover, there were nine Greek newspapers under the loose guidance but not the

control of KEK including the main nationalist newspapers at the time, Eleftheria,the Phoni tis Kyprou and the Neos Kypriakos Fylax; the party’s official press was

33TNA, CO 926/174, Serious Enquiries and Representations regarding political situation, Cyprus

1954–1956 (Cyprus and NATO), Confidential, H. Sepef to Henry Hopkinson’, 23 November 195434TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 31, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, 8.35TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 31, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, 8.36TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 31, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, 3.

178 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

Ethnos.37 With regard to membership KEK seems to have had, in 1949, around

8000 members with only 2000 of them in urban centres.

Unlike AKEL, which had connections with most socialist countries and various

other parties in western Europe, KEK had contacts only with Greece. There were

many Cypriots (some of them exiled since 1931) promoting enosis in Athens and

their presence facilitated these contacts between nationalists in Cyprus and Athens.

Telegrams were often exchanged between KEK and the Church of Greece on such

occasions as the anniversary of 28 October and the birthday of the King of the

Hellenes. In an effort to broaden its influence, in 1949 KEK tried to establish a

permanent Cypriot mission in London that would intensively pursue enosis.Although it could count some intermittent successes, KEK never produced a

definitive or constructive political programme. The party relied on nationalist, anti-

British and anti-communist sentiments rather than political proposals and concrete

accomplishments. Party organisation was always inferior to that of AKEL, and on

every level and every branch.

8.2.2 The Pancyprian National Socialist Vanguard (PESP)

The nationalists’ second attempt at forming a political party was the Pancyprian

National Socialist Vanguard (Pagkypria Sosialistiki Protoporia—PESP), based in

Paphos and founded in 1943 by lawyer and journalist Christodoulos Galatopoulos

who also served as mayor of Paphos from 1943 to 1953. Prior to serving as mayor

he was a member of the Legislative Council, elected, in fact, with the support of the

CPC.38 He held this position only for a very short period in 1930 because, due to his

active involvement in the October riots, he was imprisoned for 4 years

(1931–1934). During his short tenure Galatopoulos was an active member of the

legislature arguing for the need to amend the tax system and to abolish forced

labour (Soteriades 1993, 28–30); he was also editor of the fortnightly newspaper

Politiki Epitheorisis (Political Review) from 1929–1931.

Following the end of Palmerocratia, in 1942, Galatopoulos was instrumental in

the founding of PEK, for which organisation he served as legal counsellor. Soon

after his election as mayor of Paphos in 1943 he founded his own party, and also

republished his newspaper under the title Nea Politiki Epitheorisis (New PoliticalReview), which became the mouthpiece of PESP. In electoral terms, PESP never

rose beyond marginal importance outside the limits of Paphos.

PESP espoused an ideology that combined nationalism and socialism, which

reflected Galatopoulos’s personal ideology: ‘faith in a fair Socialist State which willbe based upon the foundations of race’.39 Although this statement no doubt refers to

37TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 31, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, part II, 9.38Phoni tis Kyprou, 8 November 1930.39Nea Politiki Epitheorisis, 8 January 1944, 1.

8.2 The Nationalist Response 179

ethno-socialism, Galatopoulos was also proclaiming his aversion to fascism—and

German ethno-socialism—and communism.40 This statement was published in

Galatopoulos’s newspaper; and in the same article the unknown author (most

probably Galatopoulos himself) called for a two-front struggle for national libera-

tion and improved social conditions for Cypriots. Like most nationalists, however,

the party advanced these positions within the traditional frame of Greek-Anglo

friendship: ‘firmly believing in the declarations of Great Britain, our mighty ally,

we will continue to pursue our effort for liberation and national restoration’.41

Galatopoulos was especially concerned with the peasant class, and this was

obvious in his personal as well as his party rhetoric; it also explains the party’saffiliation with PEK. His newspaper carried a daily column entitled ‘the cry of the

countryside’ focusing on agricultural issues, and it also published its sponsored

lectures that concerned social and trade union affairs. Despite defining his party as

socialist, Galatopoulos was hostile to the trade unions (as were most right wingers),

instead siding with employers and opposing practices such as strikes.42 Therefore

regardless of its somewhat socialist rhetoric, PESP belonged in the right-wing

political space (Katsiaounis 2000a, 78). Galatopoulos’s personal affiliation with

PEK as well as his estimation of AKEL testify to this. For example, he (through the

party press, in an editorial) referred to AKEL as ‘forgers of our national conscious-ness’ and ‘Slavo-Greekies [Slavo-Grekilous]’.43 The party ceased to exist upon

Galatopoulos’s death in 1953.

Overall, PESP offers another clear example of how the nationalist camp still

suffered from internal conflicts and personalistic behaviours despite the

homogenising power of both nationalism and anti-communism.

8.2.3 The New Trade Unions: The Cyprus WorkersConfederation (SEK)

The nationalist trade union movement was probably the most resilient and powerful

expression of right-wing politics in this period. The New Trade Unions, officially

named Labour Confederation of Cyprus (SEK, Synomospondia Ergaton Kyprou),was first organised in Limassol in 1943 by the lawyer Christodoulos Michaelides,

who subsequently became their legal advisor. It became an official entity in October

1944, when representatives from 20 trade unions convened in Limassol and agreed

to the proposal. Among them were unions that left PSE when the latter sided with

AKEL in the 1943 municipal elections (Ierodiakonou 2003, 272). Its first Assembly

40Nea Politiki Epitheorisis, 2 January 1944, 2.41Nea Politiki Epitheorisis 29 January 1944.42Nea Politiki Epitheorisis, 29 January 1944, 1.43Nea Politiki Epitheorisis, 26 February 1944, 1.

180 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

was held on 29 October 1944 and its first congress in September 1945

(Christophorou 2006, 300; Gregoriades 1994b, 11). Although SEK was founded

in 1944, its application was not approved until 1950 because the British government

had characterised it as a nationalist organisation, which delayed the approval

process.

SEK was established to counter the communist sympathies of the AKEL-

sponsored trade unions.44 At SEK’s founding congress, an official statement was

issued: ‘the organisation of the congress was necessitated by the anti-national

propaganda that treacherously and methodically was induced to the workers by

the paid agent of foreign, pan-Slavic interests [. . .] it was necessitated by AKEL’sauthoritarianism [. . .] The Congress decided to fight communism because it’s a

huge national danger that threatens to devitalise and uproot our national feelings’(cited in Gregoriades 1994b, 13–14).

Throughout its history SEK consistently followed an anti-communist policy,

which was even sometimes extreme (Ierodiakonou 2003, 356). Anti-communism

was firmly embedded in the political DNA of the new organisation because of its

founders’ beliefs but also of its members; for example, Christos Christodoulides, a

SEK member, died in the Greek Civil War fighting against the communists

(Gregoriades 1994b, 17). But the way it was viewed by the Left—as an opponent

that threatened the hegemony of AKEL and the PSE in the labour movement

(Gregoriades 1994a, 213–216)—also contributed to SEK’s strong anti-

communistic stance, as did its secession from the PSE. SEK was established in a

period of intense conflict between Left and Right something that left a strong anti-

communist imprint on the organisation’s political identity. Because of this legacy

SEK denied on several occasions any type of cooperation with PEO (Phantis 2005,

746; Gregoriades 1994a, 207). Although there were many conflicts between the

Left and Right trade unions at this time, the most crucial occurred in 1948, when

there were strikes at the Cyprus Mining Corporation, strikes by the miners at

Amiantos mine and by the construction workers in Nicosia. This rivalry turned

into physical clashes between the opposing factions (Phantis 2005, 759).

SEK grew quickly with the support of the Church, which subsidised its activi-

ties.45 Leading members of SEK (e.g., M. Pissas leader of SEK) were reported to

receive a monthly salary from the Archbishop,46 although Church support was not

limited to financial assistance. It also took important symbolic forms: for example,

in 1952 Archbishop Makarios III represented SEK at an important international

meeting of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in the

USA (Gregoriades 1994b, 46), and he was declared the organisation’s honourable

44TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 31, 22 June 19490, Top Secret, part II, 7.45TNA, CO 926/171, Cyprus internal political situation, 1954–1956, ‘The Monopoly of Enosis’,8 October 1954, 9.46TNA, CO 926/580, Cyprus trades union; TNA, CO 620/1/01, ‘Trade Unions in Cyprus’, Brieffor the Secretary of State’, 29 October 1956.

8.2 The Nationalist Response 181

president at their 8th Congress (ibid, 53). SEK’s ties to the Church offer another

reason for its strong anti-communist stance.

The movement spread beyond Limassol, and new trade unions were registered.

Although in a few cases the New Trade Unions secured the allegiance of a majority

of workers in a given trade, by the end of the 1944 their membership was less than

one-tenth of that of PEO (the Old Trade Unions). Nevertheless, with continued

campaigning—and most new members being workers without prior union affilia-

tion—from 1944–1948 their membership figures rose considerably so that by the

end of 1948 they were nearly four times their original number of 758 in 1944 and

were just one quarter of the total of Old Trade Unions (see also Table 8.1).

Because of the circumstances of its establishment (i.e., the need to dissociate the

union movement from AKEL’s influence), SEK was sensitive to the separation of

trade unions and political parties (Gregoriades 1994a, 116–119). However, there

were several instances when right-wing parties intervened in its internal affairs and

many occasions when SEK officials themselves sought more close political affili-

ation with right-wing parties (Ierodiakonou 2003, 356). Furthermore, in all munic-

ipal elections throughout the 1940s (and also in 1953) SEK endorsed the KEK

candidates largely because they represented the anti-communist, nationalist option.

The New Trade Unions represented one of the main weapons with which KEK

tried to fight communism in this period, as it was through SEK that the right wing

tried to reach the working and labouring classes. SEK was ideologically national-

istic and, while avowedly attempting to better the lot of the working classes, it

condemned communism. Consequently, SEK cooperated with all nationally

minded organisations.47 A testament to this was the fact that every time SEK

held a congress, the Archbishop, bishops, KEK, PEK and other nationalist cultural

and athletic associations sent messages of support.48 The strong link between KEK

and SEK was also evident in the1949 municipal elections when M. Pissas, former

General Secretary of SEK, was brought back from the UK to take part in the

nationalist electioneering campaign.

Despite its theoretical distance from political parties, SEK was ideologically

supportive of KEK’s policies: besides championing worker rights, the organisation

endorsed enosis and the fight against communism. SEK promoted enosis at all

levels and in all its organised events, e.g., national events, speeches, demonstra-

tions, etc. Then—as now—all SEK congresses and other events closed with the

Greek national anthem (Gregoriades 1994b, 13, 18). The long-serving General

Secretary of SEK, M. Pissas, a prominent nationalist who was imprisoned for his

anti-government activities in the early 1950s, voiced his organisation’s position in

an address to Greek trade union delegates: ‘our brother representatives from Greece

will feel the unchanged wish of the Cyprus people who are struggling for union with

mother Greece. . . the Cyprus people will never cease struggling for national

47‘Resolution of SEK’s 5th congress’, Ergatiki Foni (Workers Voice), 26 June 1949. Ergatiki Foniwas the official press of SEK.48See for example, Ergatiki Foni (Workers Voice), 9 June 1952.

182 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

Table

8.1

Mem

bership

figures

Old

TradeUnions

New

TradeUnions

IndependentUnions

Year

TradeUnions

Branches

Mem

bers

TradeUnions

Branches

Mem

bers

TradeUnions

Branches

Mem

bers

1937

6–

367

––

––

––

1938

14

–772

––

––

––

1939

46

–2544

––

––

––

1940

62

–3389

––

––

––

1941

68

–3854

––

––

––

1942

73

43

9991

––

––

––

1943

82

68

9507

––

–1

–78

1944

89

69

10,596

25

–758

1–

75

1945

91

78

12,961

31

–1032

8–

644

1946

87

62

11,101

30

–991

8–

641

1947

51

101

11,259

31

–1145

10

–792

1948

33

99

9604

37

22641

11

4695

Source:TNA,FCO141/4281,‘Cyprus:mem

orandum

ontheorigin

andactivitiesofKEK(CypriotNationalParty)’,1949Jan01–1949Dec

31,22June1949,

TopSecret,Appendix

E

Note:thesharpdropsince

1946in

thenumber

ofOld

TradeUnionsregisteredislargelydueto

amalgam

ations

8.2 The Nationalist Response 183

restoration’.49 Documents from their congresses and the speeches of their officials

as well as of their guest speakers (e.g., Dervis president of KEK and Hadjicharos

General Secretary of PEK) were filled with nationalist/unionist slogans and anti-

communism rhetoric.50

However, SEK (like KEK) had a paradoxical relationship with the British: allies

in terms of anti-communism but opponents with regard to enosis. On the many

occasions that SEK officials and documents asserted their support for union with

Greece, it was always within the traditional framework of Anglo-Greek friendship.

For example, in August 1944 a delegation of the New Trade Unions met visiting

British emissary Sir Parkinson with a memorandum in which they stated: ‘your visithas inspired feelings of joy because we see in you the angel who will bear the news

of freedom. We greet your presence in Cyprus [. . .] we fought with you [in WWII]

to preserve the values of freedom, justice and self-determination as those were

declared by the great leader of the justice-loving British nation’ (cited in

Gregoriades 1994b, 9–10).

In its international relations SEK cultivated anti-communist partners, such as the

ICFTU and the GSEE (Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE). The

ICFTU was an international association of non-communist trade unions largely

sponsored by the USA (for the links between SEK and ICFTU, see Gregoriades

1994b, 21–22), while the GSEE was a right-wing post-civil war organisation. Both

associations guided SEK in terms of organisation and know-how, and also extended

financial assistance. For example, they participated in SEK conferences with

lectures explaining how SEK could promote worker rights and steer the workers

away from communism. On one such instance, G. Laskaris, a representative of the

GSEE, attended a conference of the central committee of SEK in 1953 where he

bitterly criticised communist trade unions for creating unrest in every country with

a view of spreading communism.51 Photis Makris, leader of the GSEE, visited

Cyprus on many occasions and was an adamant supporter of SEK in all interna-

tional fora. SEK and the GSEE were also symbolically united as a means to express

their commitment to enosis (Gregoriades 1994b, 28). E. Kupers, member of the

secretariat of ICFTU had suggested to his organisation that some of SEK young

leaders ‘should be sent as trainees for a period with another affiliated organisation

of the ICFTU and financial aid should be given to the confederation to help it to

employ one or two paid officials’.52

49TNA, FCO 141/2957, ‘Cyprus: new trade unions; Cyprus Workers’ Confederation (SEK)’, 1945Jan 01–1952 Dec 31, No. 535/172, ‘Chief Inspector of Police to the Commissioner of Larnaca’,27 May 1952.50See for example, TNA, FCO 141/2957, ‘Cyprus: new trade unions; Cyprus Workers’ Confed-eration (SEK)’, 1945 Jan 01–1952 Dec 31, ‘The Seventh New Trade Union Conference’,27 May 1952.51TNA, FCO 141/2958, ‘Cyprus: new trade unions; Cyprus Workers’ Confederation (SEK)’, 1952Jan 01–1953 Dec 31, Secret, ‘Commissioner of Police to the Colonial Secretary’, 31 October 1953.52TNA, FCO 141/2957, ‘Cyprus: new trade unions; Cyprus Workers’ Confederation (SEK)’, 1945Jan 01–1952 Dec 31, ITU 25, 21,816/9/52, ‘British embassy in Brussels, Summary of Kupers

184 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

The British had vested interests in supporting SEK, worried as they were by the

nationalists’ seeming inability to compete with the communists whom they consid-

ered ‘a serious long-term threat to the interests of Britain and her allies in the

region’.53 They were especially concerned over the Left’s influence in the labour

movement, which explains their efforts to empower right-wing trade unions with

training from British unions and the ICFTU even amidst the EOKA armed strug-

gle.54 Clearly, the British were anxious to ‘encourage the emergence of legitimate

trade unionism free from communist domination’,55 or as Sir J. Harding, Governorof Cyprus at the time said, ‘get the non-communist trade unions to unite to fight

communism in the labour movement in Cyprus’.56 When an ICFTU visit to Cyprus

ascertained that SEK did not have the financial means to successfully compete with

the PEO,57 a number of outside anti-communist organisations offered funding: the

American trade unions donated $5000, while the GSEE donated 850,000

drachmas,58 as well as another 32 million drachmas as a grant-in-aid from July

1951 to May 1952.59 Moreover, several local employers’ associations contributedfinancial aid: two leading Larnaca businessmen, D.N. Demetriou and Z.D. Pierides,

were reported to have been donating ‘£15 per month each towards the right-wing

trade unions fund in order to meet the salary of the district secretary’.60 Neverthe-less, SEK membership never rose to the level of the PEO throughout this period:

SEK numbered 2882 members by the end of 1954 while PEO’s membership was

18,085.61

SEK’s unyielding pro-enosis stance and its friendly relationship with the Britishauthorities and British-backed organisations in the fight against communism,

report to Emergency Committee on his visit to Greece and Cyprus in November 19510,26 February 1952.53TNA, CO 926/556, Governor’s Appreciation of the Situation in Cyprus, Cyprus Intelligence

Committee Report, No. 32, A Survey of Communism in Cyprus since August 1955, 21 December

1956, 6.54TNA, CO 926/580, 620/1/01, 1954–1956, Trade Unions in Cyprus, O. H. Morris 13 April 1956.55TNA, CO 926/580, 620/1/01, Trade Unions in Cyprus, 1954–1956, Brief for the Secretary of

State, 29 October 1956.56TNA, CO 926/580, 620/1/01, Trade Unions in Cyprus, 1954–1956, Governor of Cyprus to the

Secretary of State, No. 1789, 16 October 1956.57TNA, CO 926/874, 131/67/04, Detention of Trade Unionists in Cyprus, 1957–1958, ICFTU

mission to Cyprus October 1957.58TNA, CO 926/874, 131/67/04, Detention of Trade Unionists in Cyprus, 1957–1958, Secret

Telegram, No. 1664, Governor Sir J. Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.59TNA, FCO 141/2958, Cyprus: new trade unions; Cyprus Workers’ Confederation (SEK), 1952

Jan 01–1953 Dec 31, No. 0765, Trade unionism/counter intelligence, financial aid to the New

Trade Unions, Top Secret, 10 June 1952.60TNA, FCO 141/2958, Cyprus: new trade unions; Cyprus Workers’ Confederation (SEK), 1952

Jan 01–1953 Dec 31, ‘Extract from COP’s weekly intelligence report’, No. 24 (original in S 1/52),

Right-wing trade unions (SEK).61TNA, CO 926/580, 620/1/01, Trade Unions in Cyprus, 1954–1956, ‘Labour Conditions in 1954’,3 October 1955.

8.2 The Nationalist Response 185

highlight the internal antinomies of the Greek nationalist movement. While oppos-

ing the British occupation they accepted (and even demanded) their cooperation, as

well as their money when the issue implicated communism. These inconsistencies

were also evident in their cooperation with the employers against other trade unions

verifying a premise highlighted in Chap. 1 of this book about nationalist ideology’sability to link opposing elements. Despite these contradictions and certain ambig-

uous activities, SEK eventually solidified its presence to become a very powerful

organisation.

SEK’s consolidation was facilitated by the same fact that also hindered its initial

establishment and development: i.e., its stiff confrontation with the communist

trade union. The intensely polarised climate in 1940s’ Cyprus created conditions

conducive to an increased politicisation of the nascent trade union movement. At

the same time, the ideological division within the labour movement offered SEK a

vital political space to which it could appeal effectively and from which it could

recruit members: the traditional nationalist Right. After SEK’s success in gaining

this political backing, the Left PEO was never able to penetrate this political space.

This ideological identity that combined nationalism and anti-communism was the

key to its future growth. Added to this was the invaluable trade union experience

provided by some of its members who had formerly been with the PSE-PEO

(Ierodiakonou 2003, 372). SEK was primed for further development.

8.2.4 The Pan-Agrarian Union of Cyprus (PEK)

The Pan-Agrarian Union of Cyprus (PEK), the oldest agricultural organisation in

Cyprus, was established in May 1942 as a farmers union, with the objective of

promoting and protecting the interests of the agricultural class of Cyprus. PEK was

founded on the initiative of the Locum Tenens Leontios, who recognised the need to

organise the nationalist Right to counterbalance AKEL’s ever-growing influence.

The leading figures included well-known nationalists with close ties to the Church:

C. Chadjiharos, M. Zachariades and P. Koumenis (Lambrou 2007). The founding

congress was held in the village of Athienou and was attended by approximately

6000 people representing 271 villages of Cyprus; elected as the first leader (Secre-

tary General) of the organisation was Chadjicharos,62 who for decades had served

as ecclesiastical commissioner in the Archiepiscopal Throne Committee, another

indication of the Church’s influence on the organisation. The Congress also electeda 17-member Supreme Council in which three Turkish Cypriots were included

(Lambrou 2007, 426, 428).

The new organisation claimed to act as the ‘mother of the peasantry aiming at

defending their interests, seeking solutions to their problems and aiming to

62Eleftheria, 1 June 1942.

186 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

participate in the administration of the country’.63 The fact that Cyprus was an

overwhelmingly agrarian society in this period together with the fact that PEK was

the first organisation to specifically address the needs of this class gave them a

monopolistic role in the first years, as can be seen in membership figures. In 1949,

with approximately 10,000 members, it was the largest membership organisation on

the island. It was disorganised, however, and also lacked strong leadership.64

Organisationally it comprised three layers: a Supreme Council of 17 members;

six nine-member district committees, one for each of the island’s districts; and the

many Agrarian Local Unions (ATE) which still exist under the name ATE-PEK

followed by the village name (e.g., ATE-PEK Ergaton). When PEK convened its

second congress in April 1943, one year after its foundation, there were over

100 ATE-PEKs throughout Cyprus.65 The organisation also had its own newspaper,

the Panagrotiki (All Farmers), which was published from 17 November 1944 until

22 February 1946, when it was replaced by the Foni ton Agroton (Voice of theFarmers). Panagrotiki was published once a week and was strongly anti-

communist and anti-AKEL (Lambrou 2007, 432).

Although PEK focused on agricultural issues, it addressed many others—par-

ticularly the national issue of Cyprus, enosis. This was unavoidable considering thewider political climate of this period and the nationalistic fervour. Moreover, in the

absence of a right-wing political party, PEK immediately took a leading role in

promoting union with Greece (Ierodiakonou 2003, 389). This had repercussions,

however, as PEK’s Secretary General S. Loizides was deported on 3 February 1950for his activism related to the referendum for enosis of the same year (Papademetris

and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. VIII, 333–337).

When KEK and SEK were founded PEK worked closely with both for the union

of Cyprus with Greece and against the common enemy, AKEL. The hostility

between PEK and AKEL intensified during election times during which PEK

supported the right-wing electoral lists (Lambrou 2007, 420). The leaders of PEK

made it clear that their intention was to act as a political force and counter the action

of AKEL. For example, on 1 August 1942 PEK issued a declaration to the Cyprus

people making it clear that the organisation is staffed with ‘persons that are immune

to foreign doctrines transplanted in Cyprus’, clearly pointing to AKEL.66 They alsodeclared that they would be the ‘bastion of racial, moral and economic values of our

land’. At their second congress the two main speakers (Chadjiharos and

Zachariades) openly attacked AKEL, and the audience shouted ‘shame’ when the

name AKEL was mentioned.67 At the same time, and despite its nonpartisan nature,

63Letter from L. Paschalides in Eleftheria, 1 April 1942. Paschalides presided a first meeting with

the aim of founding an agrarian organisation.64TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 31, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, part II, 2.65Eleftheria, 3 May 1943.66Eleftheria, 10 August 1942.67Eleftheria, 3 May 1943.

8.2 The Nationalist Response 187

the congress decided to instruct all its members not to join AKEL. Hostility towards

AKEL was exemplified in the event of Loizides’ deportation. When he heard that

the Left agrarian organisation (EKA) sympathised with him against the British

decision to deport him, called EKA’s stance ‘the kiss of Judas’ (Papademetris and

Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. VIII, 336). He further stated that ‘communism [was]

equally disgusting as slavery’ and AKEL’s proposal for unity was ‘insidious,antichristian and opportunistic that only serves their satanic ploys’.

Although PEK sometimes tried to distance itself from direct political action, this

tended to result in internal disputes. For example, in 1953, two tendencies were

identified: the majority as expressed by then General Secretary Chadjicharos, who

emphasised agricultural issues; and a secondary one expressed by A. Azinas (who

had the support of Archbishop Makarios III) who wanted PEK to operate primarily

as a political organisation in the service of the enosis movement.68 Although

Hadjicharos won this first battle, he lost the ‘war’ just a year later when Azinas

won the secretariat post.

8.2.5 The ‘X’ Group

The ‘X’ organisation was the most extreme of all nationalist political organisations.

Although it proved short-lived it was the prelude to right-wing radicalisation and

played an essential part in polarising the conflict between Left and Right. The ‘X’organisation was founded in Athens during WWII (in 1941) by Colonel Grivas, a

Cypriot serving in the Greek army and a notorious anti-communist (Papageorgiou

2004). The designation of the organisation was derived from the signature of the

King of Greece (Georgios Gliksbourg), which resembled the Greek letter x. This

paramilitary organisation was an extreme-right and militantly anti-communist

group with a dark past of cooperating with both the Nazis and the British (Lygoura

2010). In Greece, the ‘X’ organisation was established as terrorist organisation to

counter the excesses of the communist ELAS (Greek Popular Liberation Army).69

The ‘X’ group first appeared in Cyprus in late 1946, when members of the Greek

organisation came to Cyprus to train local nationalists to fight the rising communist

threat (Peristianis 2004, xxix). Whether the Greek government was officially

involved in their emergence in Cyprus is not clear. However, several memos of

the Greek ministry of Public Order indicate knowledge and support towards their

presence and action. For example, the Ministry of Public Order welcomed infor-

mation that this organisation would be established in Cyprus emphasizing that their

main purpose was to ‘watch merchants and other traders that cooperate with AKEL

68TNA, CO 926/20, Political situation reports: Cyprus 1953, Political Situation Report during the

month September 1953, 5.69TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 1949 Jan 01–1949 Dec 31, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, 7.

188 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

and advertise in their newspapers’ aiming to terminate this unacceptable practice.70

In another note the same Ministry greeted the tolerance of the Greek members of

the Cypriot police towards the ‘X’ members and glorified their anti-communist

activity; a clear indication of ‘X’s relation with the security agencies.71

In late 1946 some young royalist members of ‘X’ appeared in Limassol, led by

two Greek army officers, C. Davios and C. Frangeskou (Katsiaounis 2000a, 287),

with AKEL and the left trade union PEO as their targets—not the British. They

published their own newspaper (Efimeris), and their operational basis was the

football club Olympiakos in Nicosia. Before long their presence was known: in

1947 members of AKEL received threatening letters from the ‘X’ organisation, andthe letter X marked many houses, streets and street corners, sometimes accompa-

nied with threats against the communists. During the strikes of 1948 the organisa-

tion distributed more threatening letters to communist leaders, and then young

members of the organisation began to wear black berets adorned with a silver

‘X’. The organisation was deemed responsible for many clashes and beatings,72

although in Cyprus it proved ineffective and largely inoperative.

8.3 Anticommunism: A Common Thread

Despite their common goal of enosis, what truly united the nationalist organisationsand the Church was their firm anti-communist stance; sometimes, as in the case of

the ‘X’ organisation, this was very extreme. Many examples have been recorded

above that testify to this. The Church and the nationalists wanted to keep the

communists out of the internal affairs of Cyprus. The Greek civil war was key to

their anti-communist rhetoric, which not only was often radical but was

all-inclusive. i.e., it was applied to all levels of social and political activity and in

many different ways.

In the political sphere, we can note a declaration of KEK, PEK and SESP in May

1945:

The three parties seek the cooperation of all patriotic elements of the island in the struggle

to promote enosis, excluding the nationally stigmatised and suspicious persons whose anti-

patriotic and anti-Hellenic activity thus far has proved to be dangerous for our national

cause [. . .] The three parties additionally declare that they will participate in any national

70Diplomatic and Historic Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry (DIAYE), Folder 88/1 (1948),

5th sub-file, Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Kountouriotis, 19 October 1948. Cited in Protopapas

(2002, 105).71Diplomatic and Historic Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry (DIAYE), Folder 88/1 (1948),

5th sub-file, Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Kountouriotis, 22 November 1948. Cited in Protopapas

(2002, 105).72See for example, Democratis, 1 September 1948; Eleftheria, 2 September 1948; Eleftheria,4 September 1948; Democratis, 10 September 1948; Eleftheria 14 September 1948; Eleftheria,18 September 1948; Democratis, 20 September 1948; Democratis, 7 October 1948.

8.3 Anticommunism: A Common Thread 189

body established by the Church under the condition that there will not be included in this

the above-mentioned persons.73

In the elections of 1943, the anti-communist polemic was heightened with the

rhetoric of religion: the communists were accused of being ‘not Greeks and they

were enemies of the Church’,74 while the nationalist candidate in Limassol

announced that he was fighting against the communist candidate Servas, an

enemy of the Church and for that reason he had taken the blessing of Locum

Tenens Leontios.75 Another such example included the Church condemnation of

leftists as atheists in March 1945. This attack in the moral sphere had serious and

immediate implications on the ability of the Left to appeal to the god-fearing Greek

Cypriot society of the 1940s. Right-wing polemic also extended to excluding

AKEL from joint celebrations of the Greek National Day; in this case Dervis, as

head of the Nicosia school board, addressed AKEL’s demand for joint student

parades with the following:

We allowed joint celebrations with AKEL last year as a way to give this party a last chance

to baptise in the national font and to follow the only correct way that leads directly to the

holy rock of the Acropolis and not the Kremlin [. . .] since AKEL remains unrepentant and

continues to mix the idea of Hellenism with communist internationalist doctrines like a

Russian salad, as long it continues to identify with ELAM-EAM that butchered our blood

brothers, the Greek School Board cannot accept such collaboration. If we accept we would

be worthy of hanging.76

Such statements and actions foreshadowed the intense confrontation of the late

1940s—so intense it resembled a civil war. As a result of nationalist organisation

and the consequent polarisation with the Left, by the mid-1940s the two opposing

political camps were standing in ‘battle formation’. To understand why this ideo-

logical clash became violent in the late 1940s it is crucial to understand the broader

international context and especially the importance of the Greek Civil War. Two

world wars between 1916 and 1950 had entailed extensive and prolonged violence

throughout Europe (Close 1993, 14). WWI destroyed one international order and

WWII brought into being a new one (Cold war); the civil wars of the late 1940s

were part of this process wherein the new order was established. The Greek civil

war was one of the most intense of all these civil conflicts, in terms of duration,

scale of violence, geographical extent within the country, and the number of

nationals who participated and suffered (ibid). The effects of the Greek civil war

resonated heavily in Cyprus, splitting society in two irreconcilable ideological

blocs. Further cementing the two poles were the social conflicts of the late 1940s

that included prolonged and bloody strikes, and the Constitutional Assembly that

the British convened in 1947 which will be examined in the next chapter.

73‘Joint declaration of KEK, PEK and SESP’, in Eleftheria, 9 July 1945.74Themistocles Dervis, cited in Neos Kypriakos Fylax, 14 March 1942.75Aneksartitos (Independent), 19 March 1943.76Dervis letter to AKEL, in Eleftheria, 20 March 1945.

190 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

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Kranidiotis Y (eds) Cyprus: history, problems and the struggles of its people. Athens, Estia,

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192 8 The Crisis of Nationalism, Political Opposition and the Consolidation of. . .

Chapter 9

A Proxy Civil War and the Forging

of Nationalist Party Politics

This chapter examines the way in which the Left and Right became extremely

polarised in the late 1940s and early 1950s—so divided that Cyprus was practically

on the brink of civil war. I also analyse how this polarisation impacted nationalist

party politics, especially in terms of how anti-communism and nationalism were

used by the nationalist Right and the Cypriot Church to influence certain critical

events, such as the Constitutional Assembly in 1947–1948, municipal and ecclesi-

astical elections, and the trade union movement. Most important to analyse in this

regard is the Church of Cyprus, as it had a strong unifying influence and leadership

role in the nationalist milieu. I conclude with an overview and an evaluation of

conditions that drove the nationalist Right to radicalise its struggle against the

British through an armed guerrilla movement—the clandestine

organisation, EOKA.

Cypriot political history of the period is defined by this Left/Right polarisation,

which was evident in all major issues—a process termed ‘conflict extension’(Layman et al. 2006, 83). Fundamental issues were at stake, and the parties took

radically different positions; in fact never since have the two stances been so far

apart. The first set of issues revolved around enosis—union with Greece—and this

quite naturally included relationships with/the place of, the Turkish Cypriot com-

munity. The second set of issues centered on class concerns and included social

welfare issues, working conditions, salaries, the right to organise and the right to

strike, among others. Ultimately, all the issues concerned power-holding within the

Greek community, which resulted in even greater party polarisation—even on

cultural issues, with every community and every village hosting both leftist and

rightist cultural and athletic clubs (Panayiotou 2006b). It was in this period,

therefore, that the ideological and political identities of the two camps were formed

and became entrenched in societal blocs.

This important ideological struggle occurred in a wider context of social change

through which the boundaries of political life were decisively redrawn. As the

communists asserted new claims to political life representing the subordinate

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_9

193

classes, by the late 1940s and despite internal differences the right-wing camp was

eventually united. Common action occurred over demands for anti-strike legisla-

tion, support for employers against (communist) trade-union pressure and a stop to

communist rise, while ideological communities were constructed on issues such as

enosis and intransigent opposition to communism, i.e., with calls for toughening of

the criminal law.

9.1 A New Political Terrain and the Constitutional

Assembly as a Turning Point in Internal Politics

of Hegemony

During World War II (WWII) AKEL publicly requested—and on several occa-

sions—a joint Left-Right front against colonialism.1 This proposal was only half-

heartedly accepted by the Locum Tenens (Leontios) and PEK, and initially refused

by KEK (although hesitantly accepted a little later). This consensus was short-lived:

the right wing soon asked Leontios to take a clear position against communism and

AKEL.2 Following theDekemvriana (i.e., the December 1944 events in Greece; see

Clogg 2002, 187–197; Farakos 1996), KEK refused to cooperate with AKEL, who

they believed was sympathetic to the Greek communists (KKE) who KEK blamed

for the murder of many innocent people. KEK accused AKEL of falsely using a

slogan of unity and support for enosis to conceal its true aim of overthrowing the

social system (Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. VII, 256), and it linked

AKEL to KKE anti-nationalist attacks. KEK further argued that AKEL was using

psychological violence to intimidate Greek Cypriot nationalists, and that this

psychological violence might turn physical should AKEL acquire more political

power. Hence, AKEL should not become involved in the enosis struggle.3 Eventu-ally, all right-wing groups (KEK, PEK, and PESP) refused to cooperate with

AKEL, announcing their exclusive support for ‘a church-led body that would

safeguard the Greek race against any nationally stigmatised and suspect elements’(cited in Katsiaounis 2000, 131).

Within this highly polarised environment, the 1946 municipal elections con-

firmed a shift in the balance of power that favoured the Left. In these elections the

Left won the majority of the municipalities as well as the vote: AKEL won four of

the six major urban centres (Nicosia, Larnaca, Famagusta and Limassol), whereas

the Right won only the smaller town municipalities of Paphos and Kyrenia. The

vote returned 56.3% for the Left and 48.4% for the Right in these six urban centres

1See for example, Aneksartitos (Independent), 27 May 1944. Aneksartitos was the unofficial

mouthpiece of AKEL in the 1940s.2Eleftheria, 16 November 1944.3Eleftheria, 20 December 1944.

194 9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics

(Protopapas 2012, 377).4 In the remaining rural municipalities, AKEL won

Lapithos, Morphou, Lefkoniko and Kythrea while the Right won Poli Chrysochous

and Lefkara. The aggregate vote was 59.3% for the Left and 48.5% for the Right,

which heightened Right reactions against AKEL. The shifting balance of power

favouring the Left, and the still on-going Greek civil war frightened the Right and

explains their refusal for any type of cooperation with the Left.

Their fear grew in 1947 with elections for a new Archbishop—the first since

Makarios I’s election in 1916 and the first since his death (in exile) in 1933.

Elections that had been impossible owing to the colonial laws (see Chap. 6) and

an incomplete Holy Synod were now possible because the exiled Bishop of Kyrenia

was finally allowed to return to Cyprus, and a representative of the Ecumenical

Patriarchate (the Bishop of Derkon) came temporarily to Cyprus, making the Holy

Synod a functioning body. Once again the elections were highly confrontational,

with the Left and the Right supporting different candidates. The Right endorsed a

Greek priest, Porfyrios, who was suggested by the Holy Synod of Greece and

completely unknown in Cyprus. The nationalists (ethnikofrones) supported an

anti-communist candidate, and spouting rhetoric that triggered a strong ‘fearfactor’:

No election before has been so important. No prior Archbishop has faced so many problems

as the one you are about to elect. This is even more important because it is the first time in

world history that the atheists, the deniers of religion, are hoping to elect the Archbishop. It

will be a great disaster if you allow a group of communists . . . to elect an Archbishop of

their liking. The communists use lies and slander to deceive the people. Don’t trust them.

Don’t believe them. They do not care nor do they work for the good of our Church. They are

atheists and they want the destruction of the Church. They want to elect an Archbishop in

order to help their effort to spread communism. (cited in Papademetris and Petrides 1979–

1980, Vol. VIII, 44–46)

Leontios, the Locum Tenens and AKEL’s candidate, was elected in June 1947.

When Leontios died just one month after his election the right-wing had another

chance to secure the Church, and this time they picked a well-known candidate,

Makarios, Bishop of Kyrenia. This time the Greek government overtly sided with

the nationalists: the Greek ambassador, Achilleas Kyrou, wrote to his government:

‘it is no longer possible to make a joint stand with the communists under the illusory

pretext of a common stance and unity on the Cyprus issue’ (cited in Protopapas

2012, 427). Dervis, leader of KEK and owner of the nationalist newspaper Ethnos,noted that ‘we must definitely and overwhelmingly repel the devious communist

attack against our nation and our Church’ (Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980,

Vol. VIII, 77).

Makarios was elected by a wide margin, pointing to a change in the Right-Left

power dynamic. The nationalist victory was further cemented in early 1948 when

three right-wing prelates were elected as Bishops of Kyrenia, Kition and Paphos,

rendering the Holy Synod completely right wing. With Makarios’s election the

nationalists hardened their stance against the Left; they refused to make a joint

4The fact that their total value is more than 100% is due to the electoral system which allowed

positive voting to more than one candidate and from more than one list.

9.1 A New Political Terrain and the Constitutional Assembly as a Turning Point. . . 195

stand with AKEL and they made anti-communism their top priority. Makarios

himself affirmed this position, and he also maintained the traditional nationalist

pro-British position with regard to the anti-colonial struggle:

Although our declared aim is union with Greece, our most urgent duty is to fight against

communism. In this regard, it is impossible to disregard the fact that Great Britain

represents the most important bastion against communism in the eastern Mediterranean.

We will never attack Britain to achieve enosis nor will we take part in any attack of any

other nation against Britain. We do hope though that Britain will acknowledge the justness

of our cause and the honesty of our intentions (cited in Katsiaounis 2000, 403).

Makarios’s election and the right-wing swing were heavily influenced by the

1947 Constitutional Assembly deliberations for a constitutional solution to the

Cyprus issue. The British invited a group of hand-picked Cypriots to partake in

the drafting of the new constitution: municipal mayors, trade unions leaders,

representatives from the press, teacher and peasant organisations, and a few digni-

taries.5 They deliberately ignored the political parties as a way to deny their

legitimacy. Assembly participants were to draw up a constitution that would

involve Cypriots in the country’s internal affairs, while also guaranteeing minority

rights. Britain would continue to administer any functions it considered vital to the

smooth running of the island (i.e., defence, foreign relations, and internal secu-

rity)—in other words, those areas that would ensure the island’s colonial status.6

While the Left took part in the negotiations indirectly though PEO representa-

tives and leftist municipal mayors, the Right refused to partake (Gregoriades 1994b,

16), citing its ‘union and only union’ policy and rejecting any other solution. The

Right also vowed to boycott any elections called for under the new constitution

reasoning that they could pressure the British to revoke their proposals. The right-

wing press went further and demanded that the British retain full control over the

administration of Cyprus until they agreed to enosis with Greece.7

The Right was reluctant to endorse any policy other than enosis in the belief thatuniting with a rightist Greece (the anticipated victors in the Greek civil war) would

safeguard two things for them: a western orientation for Cyprus as opposed to a

communist orientation, and primacy in internal politics. However, some scholars

(Katsiaounis 2000) and the British8 argue that the Left’s victories in the local

elections of 1943 and 1946 threatened the Right, who feared an arrangement that

would guarantee a Left presence in the island’s institutions. The election of

Leontios only added to those fears. The ultra-nationalist Efimeris was once again

very illustrative: ‘Union and only union. Until it is achieved we prefer to be ruled by

5For a thorough discussion on the Constitutional Assembly see Katsiaounis (2000).6TNA, CO 926/256, Policy of New Constitution in Cyprus 1954–56, Cyprus Constitution,

Despatch dated 7th May 1948 from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of

Cyprus.7See for example Ethnos, 12 July, 1947.8TNA, CO 926/171, Political Situation Cyprus 1954–56, Enosis: Union of Cyprus with Greece,

Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State for Colonies, 28 August 1954, 6.

196 9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics

England but we do not accept power in the hands of the people as requested by

Ziartides and Fifis’.9

With the Left and Right taking opposing positions over participation in the

Constitutional Assembly, the situation turned extreme, and civil war appeared

imminent (Alecou 2013). Although there were no armed or guerilla forces in

Cyprus, and there was never an open military confrontation, many other character-

istics of a civil war were present: clear demarcation of borders between Left and

Right in all fields of social activity; political assassinations; economic war between

the two camps; intense strikes and collisions between employers and employees;

clashes between Left and Right trade unionists; the emergence of paramilitary

organisations, etc. In some ways, the Cyprus undeclared ‘civil war’ was incorpo-rated into the larger context of the Greek civil war: the more the Greek civil war

progressed and intensified the more the Cypriot ideological camps became aligned

with their respective Greek political and ideological forces. SEK for example,

condemned AKEL’s intension to raise money for the Left guerillas fighting in

Greece, labelling them ‘thieves’, ‘Bulgarians’, ‘Albanians’ and traitors’.10

The Left-Right conflict extended to many other areas. For example, the ultra-

rightist newspaper, Efimeris, asked all nationalists to refuse to hire any communists,

AKEL and PEO members, and to fire any such employees; to stop advertising in the

left-wing press; to boycott any cultural events organised or hosted by the Left.

Moreover, it also demanded that the authorities heighten the persecution of the left-

wing supporters,11 questioning whether Cyprus was governed by the Crown or the

Soviet Union via its planted representatives in Cyprus.12 In response, the Secretary

General of AKEL, F. Ioannou, asked AKEL supporters to boycott all enterprises

and small industries owned by rightists and to only buy from leftists.13 The division

extended even to athletics, when in July 1948 all district gymnastic associations and

football clubs asked their athletes to sign a statement denouncing communism

(Finikarides 2013, 138–223; Katsiaounis 2000, 407). This action led to a split in

all sports-related activities in Cyprus, with many left-wing athletes leaving their

clubs to establish new left-wing ones. Many left-wing unions and associations also

established their own theatre groups, hosting communist-written plays (Katsouris

2005). As a result, all aspects of social life became extremely politicised and the

Left-Right cleavage became the overarching division for the decades that followed.

9‘We enjoyed Palmerocracy and we shout: enosis not autonomy—we prefer Storrs and Palmer

than Fifis and Clerides’, Efimeris 10 April 1948. Andreas Ziartides was the Secretary General of

PEO and Fifis Ioannou the Secretary General of AKEL at the time.10Cited in Efimeris, 9 October 1948.11Efimeris, 9 October 1948.12‘The minimum’, Efimeris, 13 March 1948.13ASKI, F-20/21/14, ‘A short report on the Cypriot situation and AKEL’, 50. See also

Aneksartitos, 3 September 1948; Democratis, 10 September 1948.

9.1 A New Political Terrain and the Constitutional Assembly as a Turning Point. . . 197

9.2 Anti-Communism and Helleno-Christianism: The

Unifying Themes

AKEL’s sudden dominance forced nationalist coalescence, and all nationalist

groups agreed on a strong anti-communist stance. While this position effectively

concealed instances of nationalist cooperation with the British, (highlighting once

again the peculiar relationship between the nationalists and the colonial power) the

Right’s battle against communism was basically a fight against AKEL, aimed at

lessening the party’s popular influence. To justify and lend legitimacy to their

stance, they cited Greek government practice; SEK, for example, issued a statement

congratulating the Greek government for the suppression of communists

(Gregoriades 1994a, 249–250).

Anti-communism was also forged in the societal field, in a period when the

country was divided by intense class struggles. The workplace served as the

battleground, where the Left and Right trade unions adopted opposing positions.

The left-wing trade union PEO called for strikes provoking tension not only with

the employers and the colonial administration but with the right-wing trade union,

SEK, as well. In 1948 alone, 13 strikes were recorded, most of which were lengthy

and fierce. Because the nationalists refused to cooperate with the communists, both

KEK and the New Trade Unions sided with employers against AKEL and the PEO.

In August 1948, at the height of the builders’ strike, a number of right-wing

organisations (including KEK) declared their support for the contractors because

‘the communist leadership of PEO had only one thing in mind: how to serve the

Slavic interests and in this regard they don’t care if they jeopardise the entire

Cypriot economy and the relationships between employers and employees’.14

There were numerous such occasions where SEK sided with employers,15 and at

times the clashes between the two camps were violent: dynamite, assaults and

beatings, serious injuries and arson were not uncommon (Richter 2007, 753). The

employers too were an important factor that subserved tension not only because of

their anti-communist beliefs. Even the more liberal employers were worried by the

gains of the communists and their trade unions and this made them wary of social

and political concessions to labour and simultaneously severed them from a dem-

ocratic politics of compromise with labour. While the governor himself admitted

that ‘the general picture in the month of September 1948 resembled a civil war’,16

and the administration tried to control the nationalism of the Right, it was evident

14‘With the employers’, Eleftheria, 19 August 1948.15TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, Appendix 1, Evidence of nationalist opposition to

AKEL in the strikes of 1948. Two examples from the strike in the Cyprus Mining Corporation

(CMC) that lasted from 13 January to 16 May 1948 are indicative. On 26 February ‘the New Trade

Unions supplied blackleg labour in an attempt to break the power of the Old Trade Union leaders’.On 8 March, ‘lorries carrying 107 strike-breakers to Xeros were stoned’.16TNA, CO 537/4041, Secret, ‘Political Situation in Cyprus during the month of September 1948’.

198 9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics

that what concerned them most (in the broader framework of the Cold War) was the

Left. The influence of the Church in nationalist, right-wing politics was noted by the

British who greeted this influence because it averted the peasantry from adhering to

communism.17

As a result, the nationalists, the Church and the British found themselves united

in the crusade against communism. It was in this period that the schools, for

example, started to be ‘cleared’ of leftists. The Church’s role was crucial in this

confrontation, particularly after the Left victories in the local elections of 1943 and

1946. On one such instance, on 21 March 1948, the Church called on strikers to

return to their jobs, to stop terrorising innocent persons and to ignore the unholy

communists.18 And in the same year the Holy Synod condemned AKEL members

as ‘atheists and nationless’, justifying this as their desire ‘to protect their flock fromthe threat of the infernal and resourceful communists’.19 They further accused

communists of ‘dispelling the institution of family and leading women against the

way she was destined by God’; of being ‘bitter enemies of the Church’; and of

holding principles that were ‘anti-religious and anti-Christian’: ‘for a Christian is

inconceivable to belong in the Church and be a communist at the same time’.In the same spirit the Church took decisive measures to ensure that important

outlets of authority, such as the ecclesiastical offices, were free of communist

influence. To this end, in October 1948 the Holy Synod modified the Chart of the

Church to exclude communist participation in parish and throne committee elections

(Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. VIII, 188–189) because of AKEL’srefusal to accept Church leadership. These committees played an important role in

ecclesiastical elections and communist exclusion ensured that those elected to the

powerful posts of bishop and Archbishop favoured the Right. In this way the

communists were effectively barred from an important area of public life. The

Church also helped strengthen the Right on a local level, at a time when the Left

was acquiring a strong local presence through its cultural and athletic associations

(Petas 1992). Therefore, in order to offset the Left’s influence, the Church gave plotsof its land to local right-wing activists and clubs to build lodges and football fields.

The Church moved ahead decisively with its own efforts for ‘monitoring/polic-

ing’ education (Panayiotou 2006a, 94); one way was by strengthening the cate-

chism schools (the katihitika), first established in 1939. While ostensibly the

katihitika were after-school classes run by the Church to promote religious dis-

course, they were also extremely nationalistic and anti-communist. Classes were

filled with elementary and high school students who were taught contempt for and

antipathy towards the government.20 The Church believed that the Orthodox

17TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, 4.18‘Archbishopric circular on the strike of the miners’, Ethnos, 21 March 1948.19The Encyclical of the Holy Synod of the Cypriot Church, in Eleftheria, 7 September 1948.20TNA, FCO 141/3205, ‘Cyprus: Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA); Orthodox Chris-

tian Union of Youth (OHEN)’, Secret, Censorship of Deportees’ correspondence,

15 October 1956.

9.2 Anti-Communism and Helleno-Christianism: The Unifying Themes 199

Christian Union of Youth (OHEN)—(see next section) and the katihitika were safemediums through which nationalist propaganda could be spread, because their

religious nature ensured their freedom from government interference.

Anti-communism slowly began to colour the articulation and promotion of

enosis: the struggle for union was no longer an anti-colonial battle, but it was

becoming a moral, anti-communist crusade. This new slant on enosis gradually

escalated (Anagnostopoulou 2013, 243) and increased the Left/Right polarisation.

The Right’s definition of nationalism was especially strong in Cyprus (as in Greece,

Close 1993, 12), and also influenced by religion because of the power of the Church

and because Marxism was inherently anti-religious, although AKEL never posi-

tioned itself as an anti-religious party. Communism alarmed the Greek Cypriot

clergy to such a degree that—as we have seen—in 1948 the Archbishop warned the

Greek Cypriots that no real Orthodox Greek could be a communist. Therefore, the

Right appropriated religion and the anti-communist position to its enosis cause,

using nationalism to advance its ambitions and power. The Greek consul was very

descriptive:

The renounced right-wing camp, emphatically known as the nationalists [ethnikofrones],has worn the roan of enosis without truly believing in it. They have endorsed [enosis] to use

it as a weapon against communism, which threatens them. The Right’s only concern is its

material interests, and it does not wish the British departure from Cyprus. The archives kept

in the colonial secretariat are full of evidence for this. [. . .] The word treason would be a

mild way to describe what the so-called unionist leaders of the Right say to British officers

behind closed doors.21

The Right exploited the ideological power of nationalism, recognising that it had

the power to unify and mobilise the masses on their side, while at the same time

drawing the working and agrarian classes away from communism.

The Right led in the battle for hegemony in the late 1940s, which can be

explained by a number of events that worked in their favour: their firm position

on non-participation in the Constitutional Assembly; the Right winning the Greek

civil war; the election of a right-wing Archbishop; and the win of the 1949 local

elections. The 1949 elections were particularly important, and the high stakes

involved were evident in the rhetoric and hard stances of the Church and the

Greek government. Just two months before the elections, the Office of the

Ethnarchy issued a strong statement condemning anyone who cooperated or

voted for communist candidates, who were harmful to the enosis cause and who

were ‘national traitors’ to Mother Greece; further, they declared that such an action

constituted ‘a serious offense, one that equaled an act of national treason’.22 TheGreek government did not remain aloof either. The Greek Consul, Alexis Liatis,

21Diplomatic and Historic Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry (DIAYE), Folder 88/1 (1948),

Confidential, A. Kountouriotis to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 September 1948. Cited in

Protopapas (2002, 49).22The Office of the Ethnarchy, in Eleftheria, 8 April 1949.

200 9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics

stated that he was ‘absolutely against communists elected as Mayors because they

were allies of the Greek communists and therefore enemies of the Greek state’.23

Moreover, the Greek government gave air time on the national radio station to

rightist personalities –both Greeks and Greek Cypriots who wished to campaign for

their candidates (Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. VIII, 227).

As a result, in the 1949 elections KEK candidates won all the major municipal-

ities apart from the three coastal towns, Famagusta, Limassol and Larnaca

(Protopapas 2012, 452–474). The capital city Nicosia returned a right-wing council

headed by Dervis himself with a substantial majority. Overall the Right scored

55.1% in the urban centres whereas the Left polled 44.9%. Excluding Morphou, the

Right won all the large rural municipalities as well (Lefkoniko, Kythrea, Poli

Chrysochous, Lapithos, and Karavas), polling 56.5% as opposed to the Left’s43.5%. These elections were the most violent in the entire period of British

colonialism (Alecou 2013, 219), with numerous incidents that left two people

dead and many wounded, thus intensifying polarisation between the two ideolog-

ical blocs (Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. VIII, 232).

The 1949 elections were a clear illustration of how nationalism and anti-

communism mutually reinforced each other. Here the nationalists of all directions

were operating together finding a consensus and jointly attacking the obvious

outsiders (the communists) who questioned the primary loyalty of Greek Cypriots

to the nation. Although internally there were sources of disagreements over issues

of policies and persons in this particular area (anti-communism) there was a fair

amount of common ground. But on other matters (as later the EOKA armed struggle

revealed) such as the traditional concept of Greek-British friendship, the radical

nationalist position entailed conflict within the nationalist bloc.

These favourable election results made the Right determined to regain and

strengthen its leadership in the anti-colonial struggle. In this direction, the Steering

Committee for the Cyprus Struggle (SEKA) was established in 1949, at the

initiative of nationalist organisations (i.e., SEK, PEK, and KEK), municipal coun-

selors and other prominent cadres of the Right. All Left organisations and elected

officials were excluded (for SEKA see Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol.

VIII, 234–236). At SEKA’s inauguration meeting, Mayor of Nicosia T. Dervis

announced that this new platform would: ‘methodically and systematically elimi-

nate completely the communist danger’.24 He condemned those who had supported

the communists in the elections, pointing to this as an example of the nationalist

lack of unity and a common cause.

The above statements and actions highlight the increasing and intense social

pressure against the Left as well as any leftist sympathisers. The losses in these

elections following the loss of the Archbishopric position in December 1947

seriously weakened the morale and the influence of the Left. In fact, one year

later two leftist mayors changed camp and joined the nationalists (P. Nikolopoulos

23Eleftheria, 30 April 1949.24Eleftheria, 3 June 1949.

9.2 Anti-Communism and Helleno-Christianism: The Unifying Themes 201

in Morphou and L. Santamas in Larnaca).25 Nevertheless, AKEL still commanded a

significant electoral presence and substantial resources, as the British noted:

‘despite the comparative success of the right-wing in the municipal elections of

May 1949 and although KEK was not a negligible organisation it was still very

provincial affair compared to AKEL’.26 However, the Left was unable to regain its

dominant position despite repeated AKEL proposals for a joint front with the right

wing and the Ethnarchy. These were denied every time,27 as the Right felt,

correctly, that they were in a position of power and had no need of the Left. The

Kyrenia bishopric was the most hostile to any cooperation with the communists and

publicly asked the Archbishop and other right-wing forces to refuse to cooperate

with them.28 The Left had lost their momentum and the balance of power was

shifting. By the late 1940s, the influence of the Greek Cypriot Right was strength-

ened at the expense of AKEL. Here again, it was the Church of Cyprus that played

the most influential and decisive role. However, the Church had other ambitions as

well: to take the lead within the nationalists.

9.3 The Influence and Leadership of the Church of Cyprus

The Cypriot Church’s power and influence have been already extensively discussed(see Chap. 5), as has the Church’s role in shaping the enosismovement on the island

(Chaps. 6 and 7). When its influence was curtailed in the aftermath of the October

riots in 1931 the Church was left out of political life, primarily due to the vacant

Archbishop post and the lack of a compete Holy Synod (Chap. 6), a situation that

did not change until 1947 when elections for the Archbishop post took place.

Supported strongly by AKEL the Locum Tenens Leontios, was elected. His sudden

death just one month after his inauguration brought in a rightist successor, Bishop

of Kyrenia Makarios II, who despite his old age carried on the enosis struggle withextreme vigour. When he succumbed in June 1950 the new Archbishop elect,

Makarios III, was a major factor/reason for the Church’s revival and its complete

dominance in Greek Cypriot politics (for Makarios III see Anagnostopoulou 2013,

240–292).

The Church became the conduit linking nationalist, right-wing organisations, all

of which accepted the Archbishop as their natural leader.29 Once again, it was both

25Neos Democratis (New Democrat), 19 March 1950; Neos Democratis, 20 May 1950. NeosDemocratis was the official press of AKEL.26TNA, CO 67/368/6, ‘K.E.K. The Cyprus National Party: correspondence; memoranda and

newspaper clippings’, 90,215/51/50, Confidential, 22 February 1950.27See for example TNA, CO 926/19, ‘Political Situation Reports, Political Situation in Cyprus

during the month of December 1952’. See also K. Partasides interview, in Neos Dimokratis,30 June 1953.28TNA, CO 926/20, ‘Political Situation Reports, Political Situation in Cyprus during the month of

July 1953’, 3.29‘Joint declaration of KEK, PEK and SESP’, in Eleftheria, 9 July 1945.

202 9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics

the religious institution and the nationalists that looked to the Church as the

unifying force in the nationalist camp. For example, when the nationalists in

Famagusta could not decide among themselves on the best candidate for the 1953

mayoral elections, they asked the advice of Archbishop Makarios III.30 The

Church’s integrationist nationalism was both cultural and political aiming at

constructing a broad consensus that excluded only the communists.

Under Makarios, the Church revived its role in the enosis campaign through

sermons that emphasised the close ties between Greece and Cyprus and the natural

desire of all Greek Cypriots to be re-united with mother Greece. In this context and

to confirm the will of the people, in 1950 the Church organised a plebiscite to vote

on union with Greece.31 The atmosphere surrounding the referendum was feverish,

especially after AKEL decided to endorse the effort. Clerics toured the villages and

preached enosis, and the village priests maintained the pressure on their congrega-

tions, leading the British to acknowledge: ‘the Greek Orthodox community in

Cyprus is a religious body’,32 thus facilitating Church’s political role and strong

influence among the masses. The outcome was a strong declaration of Greek

Cypriot commitment to enosis: 95.7% demanded union with Greece.33

Through the referendum the Greek Cypriot leadership and especially the Church

aimed to internationalise the Cyprus question and exercise pressure on the Greek

government and Britain. It was also pressure from powerful AKEL that convinced

the Archbishop to internationalise the Cyprus issue, calling for support from Greece

and presenting the issue to the United Nations (UN). The Greek government was

unwilling to jeopardise its relationship with Britain; in fact, they refused to accept

the referendum results because, as Prime Minister, N. Plastiras, said: ‘the British

would not agree to enosis at this time’ (Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol.

IX, 30).

With the elections of two rightist Archbishops, Makarios II and particularly

Makarios III, the Church became once again the most powerful actor in the island

politics. Under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios III the nationalist movement

became aggressively pro-enosis, leaving no room for ‘middle-road politicians’.34

The Church also worked to strengthen its own direct footholds among the masses,

for example establishing its own youth organisations to encourage political

30Letter from G. Mylonas, in Ethnos, 23 April 1953. See also the letter from T. Georgiou in

Eleftheria, 21 April 1953.31The initiative for the plebiscite was of AKEL but the party decided to leave the Church to carry it

out for purposes of unity.32TNA, CO 926/171, ‘Cyprus internal political situation’, Political Situation Cyprus 1954–56,

Enosis: Union of Cyprus with Greece, Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State for Colonies,

28 August 1954, 10.33In actual numbers, 215,108 Greek Cypriots out of a total number of 224,757 eligible voters,

signed the petition for enosis.34TNA, CO 926/255, ‘HMG’s policy on new constitution, Cyprus’, The Cyprus Question, cabinetpaper, 1954.

9.3 The Influence and Leadership of the Church of Cyprus 203

engagement. Also indicating the influence of the Church was the Ethnarchy Coun-

cil, which was staffed with Church dignitaries and other fanatical right-wingers, the

PEON youth organisation and the OHEN youth clubs.

The Union of Greek Orthodox Youth (OHEN—Orthodoxos Christianiki EnosisNeon), established in 1939, was an important Church vehicle for promoting polit-

ical involvement and organisation. The decision to launch OHEN was taken in May

1938 in a meeting of the heads of the clergy in the Paphos Bishopric and came into

being immediately and successfully. Again, the British recognised the all-reaching

influence of the Church: ‘in a few months about a score of such clubs were

operating in the principal towns and villages’.35

Although not political in name, in terms of policy OHEN was little different

from other right-wing organisations: its stated objectives were to oppose commu-

nism and any other irreligious organisations. Its policy, tactics and methods were

dictated by the Church. However, OHEN’s religious character was no deterrent to

politics; on the contrary, the organisation took a leading role in the 1950 plebiscite,

exhorting people to sign for enosis. Recognising how important the clubs were to

furthering its political activities, the Church generously supported their develop-

ment. The British considered OHEN as ‘probably one of the most efficient means of

subversion employed by the Ethnarchy [. . .] with many of its members becoming

fanatic supporters of enosis’.36 Some OHEN clubs were completely political, using

religion as a cover for inculcating subversive beliefs. These clubs were an integral

part of the enosis campaign for indoctrinating the youth, as they were the only

organisations to which Greek Cypriot nationalist youth were allowed to belong;

Consequently, OHEN wielded great influence among young students who were

encouraged, if not pressed, by their teachers to attend OHEN classes.

Membership was limited to rightists and enosis supporters. By the mid-1940s

there were some 45 clubs with approximately 1800 members, most of whom also

participated in the katihitika (catechetic schools). OHEN and the catechetic schools

were so bound together that it was very difficult to distinguish any real difference

between them. However, with the advent of WWII and the establishment of the

communist youth and other nationalist youth organisations, OHEN membership

dwindled considerably and dropped to about 500. Under Archbishop Makarios II

(1947–1950) OHEN was virtually re-founded: the Church launched an intensive

campaign for the establishment of such clubs. As a result by 1950 membership rose

to around 1000, and by 1955 there were an estimated 50 OHEN clubs with

approximately 3000 members; the catechism schools at this time registered

11,000 students of both sexes.37

35TNA, FCO 141/3205, ‘Cyprus: Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA); Orthodox Chris-

tian Union of Youth (OHEN)’, Secret, 21 July 1955.36TNA, FCO 141/3205, ‘Cyprus: Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA); Orthodox Chris-

tian Union of Youth (OHEN)’, Secret, 21 July 1955.37TNA, FCO 141/3205, ‘Cyprus: Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA); Orthodox Chris-

tian Union of Youth (OHEN)’, Note on OHEN, undated.

204 9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics

We might more accurately describe OHEN as a movement, rather than an

organisation. OHEN clubs were controlled by the Archbishopric or the Bishoprics,

received their instructions from the Ethnarchy, and cooperated with SEK, PEK,

KEK and other nationalist organisations.38 Their activities were directed by a

central committee; pancyprian and district committees existed only in name,

since there were town committees that ran the OHEN clubs in their districts.

There was also a branch of OHEN for women. The OHEN movement was primarily

a rural phenomenon: only five such clubs were established in towns.39 In some areas

OHEN clubs went by different names: in Famagusta, for example, it existed under

the name EHAN (Helliniki Christianiki Adelfotis Neon—Greek Christian Brother-

hood of Youth) and in Kyrenia as Archangel Michael, Evangelismos (Annuncia-tion). OHEN stipulated four types of members: regular members aged 16–40;

members on probation, at least 12 years old; financial contributors and honorary

members with no age limits. Catechetic pupils who attained their 12th year of age

were accepted as members of OHEN on probation. The main source of revenue was

the 4½ piasters monthly subscription required of all members.

The Church had another medium for disseminating its message: the Pancyprian

National Youth Organisation (PEON). PEON was established by Archbishop

Makarios III himself in January 1951, in order to unite all members of nationalist

youth organisations under the leadership of the Ethnarchy and, specifically,

Makarios III. His absolute control was made clear in the organisation’s constitution:any amendments to the constitution required the Archbishop’s approval, who also

had the authority to appoint all PEON officials. PEON functioned as a second-tier

organisation under the aegis of the Church; it was through PEON that the Church

aimed to coordinate and control the enosis movement. Consequently, members of

other youth organisations such as NEK (the youth branch of KEK-SEK youth)

would retain membership in their primary organisations (Gregoriades 1994b, 55).

PEON members were to be 18–40 years old, loyal to the Ethnarchy, national ideals

and the traditions of the Greek race (Article 4 of the statute). Interestingly, the

articles of association made no mention of enosis. The first Secretary General of

PEON was S. Poskotis, with T. Hadjidemetriou assistant Secretary (later a prom-

inent member of the socialist party EDEK).

The organisation was responsible for putting out propaganda and even acts of

sabotage; for example, the short-circuiting of the main Nicosia electric power line

near Dhekelia in June 1953. Young nationalist members of PEON used graffiti as a

tool to advertise seditious pro-enosis and anti-constitutional sentiments, and they

also organised events (e.g., speeches and honorary receptions) for Greek officials

visiting Cyprus (Papademetris and Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. IX, 189). PEON

38TNA, FCO 141/3205, ‘Cyprus: Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA); Orthodox Chris-

tian Union of Youth (OHEN)’, SB/SF/1024/4, Secret, Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon,

21 July 1955, 3.39TNA, FCO 141/3205, ‘Cyprus: Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA); Orthodox Chris-

tian Union of Youth (OHEN)’, SB/SF/1024/4, Secret, Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon,

21 July 1955, 3.

9.3 The Influence and Leadership of the Church of Cyprus 205

ceased to exist in 1953 when the district commissioners refused to renew the

registration of its clubs because of their subversive activity.40 In fact many mem-

bers of PEON later became members of the guerilla organisation EOKA members.

Relations between OHEN and PEON are an interesting aspect of nationalist and

religious organisation investigation since they reveal tension and conflicting

approaches within the enosis movement. Although Archbishop Makarios was

advised by certain leading nationalists to align OHEN with PEON, NEK, and

other nationalist organisations, he declined on the grounds that OHEN should

remain a purely religious institution while PEON would be used in the fight against

communism.41 It seems the real reason was OHEN’s disagreement with the Arch-

bishop’s enosis policy; or perhaps more accurately, their dissatisfaction with the

Archbishop himself since most OHEN leaders supported the Bishop of Kyrenia

who was bitter over Makarios’s election. Archbishop Makarios, therefore, was

afraid that OHEN participation in politics/ alliance with political parties could

strengthen Kyrenian circles opposed to his policy. That the Archbishop mistrusted

OHEN is evident in his haste to establish PEON, whose members would all be

fanatical and active supporters of the enosis movement.

The OHEN leaders and the Kyrenian circles certainly considered PEON a rival,

and they regarded the club with hostility. In fact, when PEON tried to set up

branches in the diocese of Kyrenia, OHEN fought against it. Their rivalry was

short-lived, however, as the Archbishop’s success in persuading the Greek govern-

ment to take the Cyprus question to the United Nations (UN) won the support of the

majority of the leaders of OHEN. So while PEON was never allowed to operate in

Kyrenia, by early 1952 most of the two groups’ differences had been ironed out, andin 1953 when PEON clubs were forced to disband, more than half of its members

were absorbed into OHEN. This led to OHEN’s adopting a more aggressively anti-

British policy; the British were convinced that it was former PEON members

responsible for the overt acts of violence in support of enosis, and further that

PEON was using OHEN to cover for their continuing seditious activity.42

The establishment in 1945 of the Ethnarchy Council was another Church

measure aimed at coordinating all nationalist forces under their leadership. It was

first announced in January 194543 and was established in July 1945. The Council

comprised 22 members headed by the Locum Tenens (the late Archbishop Leontios

was then Bishop of Paphos) as Ethnarch. These were all prominent figures of the

Right, with the exception of the leftist I. Clerides, who, for the purpose of showing a

united front in the struggle for enosis agreed to serve under the head of the Greek

40TNA, CO 926/20, Political Situation Reports, Political Situation in Cyprus during the month of

July 1953, 7–8.41TNA, FCO 141/3205, ‘Cyprus: Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA); Orthodox Chris-

tian Union of Youth (OHEN)’, Secret, 21 July 1955, 5–6.42TNA, FCO 141/3205, ‘Cyprus: Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA); Orthodox Chris-

tian Union of Youth (OHEN)’, Secret, 21 July 1955, 6.43Eleftheria, 4 January 1945.

206 9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics

Orthodox Church. The Council achieved little and its activities ceased almost

entirely during the period of the 1946 municipal elections and the 1947 archiepis-

copal elections. In September 1948 it was decided that the Ethnarchy Council

should be replaced by a new National Council,44 by which time the Council had

dropped all pretense of being an all-party concern and became an expression of the

Right. Other examples of Church involvement in politics include: establishment, in

1948, in Athens of a body (made up of exiled Cypriots who had remained in

Greece) to liaise with the Church and actively promote the cause of enosis; apolitical bureau set up by the Holy Synod in the same year that functioned as a

small executive committee of the National Council.

One year after his election, Makarios III dissolved the Ethnarchy Council and set

up a new one, with the mandate to advise the Archbishop on all political issues. A

fewmonths later the Council’s membership was broadened and included the leaders

of PEK and SEK, among other well-known rightists. All Council members were

rightists and all were appointed,45 highlighting once again the nature of right-wing

politics. Despite the island’s transition to forms of mass politics (as analysed in the

previous chapter) the focus of power remained in the hands of a small social and

religious elite headed by the Archbishop. Makarios III also established, in March

1951, the Office of Religious Information with the aim of better organising and

promoting religious issues. The various catechetic schools and other religious

associations were placed under the jurisdiction of this office (Papademetris and

Petrides 1979–1980, Vol. IX, 196).

The course of events herein analysed reveal that in the late 1940s and early

1950s the internal balance of power within the right-wing camp had changed

fundamentally in two ways: the first was a shift in power away from politicians

and into the hands of the Ethnarchy; the second was a shift from the more moderates

to the intransigents. Within the right-wing bloc the radicals had taken the lead. The

former dominant factions of the Right that professed cooperation with the British,

mayor of Nicosia Dervis, for example, became swept up in the new radical zeitgeist.

Both shifts can be largely attributed to Archbishop Makarios III, who entered the

political scene in this period and soon became the most influential personality in

Cyprus. Subserved by the international and the regional context and still unable to

cope with the Left’s strong presence in society, the Right moved from organisation

and polarisation to radicalisation. EOKA was the result of this shift.

44TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, part II, 4.45Eleftheria, 1 March 1951. See also Papademetris and Petrides (1979–1980, Vol. IX, 192).

9.3 The Influence and Leadership of the Church of Cyprus 207

9.4 Radicalising the Enosis Demand and Rallying of all

Nationalist Forces: The EOKA Armed Struggle

As seen earlier (Sect. 9.1) the inglorious conclusion to negotiations for a new

constitution marked the beginning of a new era that saw the Right gradually

dominating internal politics. The rise of the Left had been contained. The EOKA

(National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) armed struggle (1955–1959) was the

most important step in the course of right-wing domination, as the movement was a

catalyst in turning the majority of Greek Cypriots towards the Right. AKEL

believes that the real reason behind the EOKA armed movement was desire of

the Ethnarchy and the Right to restore their primacy in Cypriot society, which was

threatened by the upsurge of AKEL in the 1940s (see Kolokasides interview in

Katsourides 2014, 492). Aiming to safeguard its dominance in internal politics the

Right sought an alternative structure for protecting its interests and EOKA provided

this. In so doing though it nullified any prospects of any limited liberalisation within

existing structures. In any case, the EOKA armed movement comprised a radical

method for claiming enosis and differed dramatically from earlier nationalist

strategies of anti-colonial mobilisation.

The Right’s decision to embark on a new strategy in the enosis struggle was

facilitated by developments in Greece, where the post-war governments reversed

Venizelos’s policy of not interfering in Cyprus affairs. The Greek administrations

were also heavily pressured by Makarios III—as well as certain sectors of Greek

society, the Church of Greece, the press and the Cypriot lobby in Athens—to adopt

a more radical and aggressive policy. The accession of Makarios III to the Arch-

bishopric in Cyprus in the summer of 1950 also encouraged the nationalist camp to

make a stronger plea for enosis; in1951, on the first anniversary of the unionist

referendum, Makarios III declared outright that the Cypriots would claim their right

to freedom in all possible ways. He was supported by Greek Cypriot General

Grivas, a well-known extreme rightist and anti-communist serviceman (for Grivas

views of the communists see Papageorgiou 1984, 235–236).

In this period there were many nationalist activists who had no faith that legal

tactics would secure enosis, and they began very consciously and strategically to

employ more radical tactics hoping to provoke the western powers and attract

global attention. Makarios firmly believed that the Cyprus issue could only be

solved if Cyprus and Greece seriously pressured Britain (Papademetris and Petrides

1979–1980, Vol. VIII, 299), and in fact, Makarios even blackmailed the Greek

government to convince them to refer the Cyprus issue to the UN (Terleksis 2004,

93–94). With the change of government in Greece and Marshall Papago’s coming

to power in 1952, the Greek government began to actively support the Church and

the nationalists in their claim for enosis.46

46TNA, CO 926/255, Policy on New Constitution in Cyprus 1954–56, Memorandum containing

the basic facts to be taken into account when considering the question of introducing a Constitution

in Cyprus, Top Secret, 25 April 1954, 2.

208 9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics

When the last Cypriot elections of the British colonial era were held (in May

1953), AKEL called for unity between the Left and Right, while the Ethnarchy and

the Right refused vehemently. They mocked the Left proposal,47 stating: ‘Thenationalists are prepared for the battle with the aim to maintain the Municipalities

they have already won in 1949 and regain those few that remain in the hands of

Slavo-servants’.48 Soon thereafter the Ethnarchy announced its official position,

which took advice from the Greek consul: ‘Any collaboration with the communists

is harmful to the national cause’ and it will be avoided.49 At this election period,

despite some minor internal tension,50 the Right was in a much stronger position

than the Left, which was experiencing a severe internal crisis. The Right was

progressing rapidly via numerous strategies including strong local organisation

and internationalisation of the enosis issue. The nationalists raised the bar and

polarised the campaign in an effort to replicate the Greek post-civil war atmosphere

in Cyprus (Protopapas 2012, 525).51 Election results reflected the Left/Right

polarisation, particularly in the rural areas: although the electoral system allowed

the voter to cross-vote between Left and Right only a mere 1.5% voted horizontally

in the rural municipalities. The Right won 58.8% and the Left 45.3%. In the urban

areas (i.e., the six major towns) the Right polled 54.2% and the Left 45%

(Protopapas 2012, 528–530). The results verified the ideological and political

hegemony of the nationalist Right, the Church and, importantly, Archbishop

Makarios III.

The dominance of the nationalists and the increased polarisation between Left

and Right meant that within the Right the more intransigent approaches prevailed,

although this was also due to Britain’s continued refusal to discuss enosis. Arealignment had occurred within the nationalist Right in favour of the radicals. It

was on 1 April 1955 that the EOKA armed struggle officially began, led by

Archbishop Makarios III and Colonel Grivas. AKEL was purposely excluded as

the leaders of EOKA took precautions to keep the communists from participating in

EOKA and consequently from having a say in the running of the enosis struggle.AKEL fervently opposed the EOKA armed struggle, and proclaimed its support for

a peaceful, mass political struggle that would embrace all Cypriots (Greeks and

Turks, leftists and rightists). The EOKA armed struggle fundamentally changed

(or solidified) the power equilibrium between Left and Right in Cyprus in favour of

the Right.

47Ethnos, 27 February 1953.48Ethnos, 1 March 1953.49‘Communique’, Ethnos, 21 April 1953.50See for example, ‘Iacovides leads a national coalition in Paphos’, Ethnos, 8 March 1953.51See also, ‘What must the nationalists be aware of’, Ethnos, 5 May 1953; ‘Mr Dervis speech’,Ethnos, 8 May 1953.

9.4 Radicalising the Enosis Demand and Rallying of all Nationalist. . . 209

9.5 The Absence of a ‘Third’, Moderate Party on the Right

With few exceptions, it was the intransigent politicians who dominated nationalist

party politics in this period. The absence of a moderate, third party of the Right in

this period was particularly evident. Although the major defining division of right-

wing politics has been—throughout the period under investigation—the divide

between intransigent and moderate nationalists, in the 1940s and 1950s it was the

most radical right-wing elements that prevailed. Although there were always

politicians who could be described as more moderate, including many who worked

in local British-led institutions, the legend of EOKA has tended to exclude such

elements in the ‘national’ memory. By the 1940s ‘enosis and only enosis’ hadbecome the dominant rallying-cry in Greek-Cypriot culture, so strong that any

opposition was effectively forbidden.

The British understood that although there were only two organised parties in

Cyprus during the 1940s—the communist AKEL and the nationalist KEK (in their

own phraseology, ‘the extreme left and the extreme right’)—there were still quite a

few Cypriots who did not share the extreme right-wing opinions of KEK and the

Church.52 These ‘moderate rightists’ were generally more educated (lawyers,

barristers and doctors), and their position on enosis was that if they would ulti-

mately be allowed to legally unite with Greece they would in the meanwhile

cooperate with the British (on constitutional and social reforms). However, no

party-political grouping emerged out of the moderate tendency as a series of factors

militated powerfully against any reformist intentions including the hard stance of

Britain towards the enosis demand, the impact of the Greek civil war with the

resulting zeitgeist of robust anti-communism and strong belief in the Church’sleading role.

At this time there was, according to British accounts, discussion among Cypriots

about forming a ‘third’ party. In actual fact, though, the realisation of such a party

was hardly possible: such a party would, in time of elections, split the right-wing

vote as the great majority of the moderate vote would be drawn from the ranks of

those who, at that time, voted for KEK; and the Church of Cyprus strongly opposed

any postponement of enosis. Church influence was so powerful then that very few

Greek Orthodox would defy its authority. Moreover, the Greek press took a hard

line on enosis, effectively refusing to print any opposing positions in its pages. Theintolerant stance of the British also precluded the emergence of more moderate

tendencies since it contributed to the hardening of Greek Cypriot’s positions

(Kitromilides 1981, 451). It is unsurprising then, that this ‘moderate’ party existed

only in theory and never in fact. The radical nationalists were dominant. Their

primary loyalty was an idea of uncompromising struggle for enosis embodied in an

agitational practice which was both anti-communist and anti-British. The

polarisation of political life into two hostile blocs of Left and Right and with

52TNA, FCO 141/4281, ‘Cyprus: memorandum on the origin and activities of KEK (Cypriot

National Party)’, 22 June 1949, Top Secret, 7.

210 9 A Proxy Civil War and the Forging of Nationalist Party Politics

their conflict being so acute it rendered almost impossible any middle-road politi-

cian or party to infiltrate the political arena. Their intense confrontation also

blocked the way for any substantial change in the constitutional structure.

Despite the absence of substantive moderate nationalist politics other than

personal manifestations, the 1940s and 1950s nonetheless reflects a period when

Cypriot nationalist, right-wing politics consolidated in new forms—political

parties, trade unions and farmers unions—new groupings in addition to the

Church’s organisational, ideological and political dominant presence. Yet it was

with Church support that the right-wing trade and agricultural unions managed to

become a mass movement in such a short time; KEK’s influence rested on traditionand its conservative ideology (Christophorou 2006, 301). Consolidation of the

nationalist bloc can be attributed to a number of factors: elections, organisation,

and especially the (communist) political opposition that encouraged the solidifica-

tion of Greek right-wing opinion. This was most obvious in the societal field (i.e.,

the trade union and the agrarian movements), less so in the political field, i.e., in

terms of political parties.

It was an infinitely more difficult task to form a new political party like KEK,

since it involved uniting divergent political approaches and compromising on

personal differences.53 Although it was important for the right wing to have a

political party to counter the Left, from its inception KEK experienced problems

such that it never achieved a satisfactory level of organisation. A British memo-

randum stated:

The nationalists were not well organised compared to the communists. They were led by

fanatic rightists but the membership of the party graduated from the extremists at the top to

the ordinary conservatives at the bottom. There was no party organisation, no party fund, no

party membership, in fact it was a fluid conglomeration of particles, some large some small

who were held together by the sentimental attraction of enosis in itself and also by the fear

of communists.54

Moreover, in the aftermath of the EOKA armed struggle and the declaration of

Cyprus independence in 1960, KEK did not re-emerge as a party—another indica-

tion that it was not a well-organised, stable party.

Elections were another factor responsible for the new right-wing configuration.

The British decision to hold municipal elections in the 1940s revived political life

and popular mobilisation, which in turn led to the emergence and establishment of

both Left and Right political forces. With the elections offering a way to achieve

power, parties formed as a way to better their chances of success. Elections for

municipal authorities/mayors led parties to organise at a local level and called for

the mobilisation of large sections of the population. While electoral mobilisation

was limited to towns and large rural communities, mobilisation linked to the

53The latter were expressed, for example, in Paphos where the SESP of Galatopoulos existed (see

previous chapter).54TNA, C0/926, Memorandum containing the basic facets to taken into account when considering

the question of introducing a constitution in Cyprus, Top Secret, 1.

9.5 The Absence of a ‘Third’, Moderate Party on the Right 211

expansion of trade unionism and to the growing cooperative movement extended to

almost all communities, including small villages. The farmers’ associations wereimportant mobilisation forces since both their establishment and operation at the

local level required extensive and sustained efforts.

However, arguably the most important factor responsible for right-wing consol-

idation was the communist political opposition. This also explains right-wing

efforts to improve their organisation and mobilisation strategies. The Church and

the nationalist elite took various measures in order to bar AKEL from political and

social life: they established trade unions and KEK to counter the activity and

influence of AKEL; they resorted to ideological and verbal confrontation; they

refused to accept AKEL’s participation in bodies dealing with the national cause.

Both the Church of Cyprus and the right-wing elites did not hesitate to align with

the British in their opposition to AKEL, for example. Sometimes opposing workers’demands and industrial action if these were led by left-wing trade unions

(Christophorou 2006, 312).

In the 1940s numerous mass political and other forces emerged for the first time

in Cyprus. These were different from the past attempts at political organisation and

they formed the basis upon which the modern political parties were built. Despite

the Right’s internal problems, especially the division between hardliners and

moderates, the two nationalist allegiances could be held in non-antagonistic tension

more easily because of the communist threat. The nationalist Right successfully

made the transition to a new type of politics in terms of ideology, personnel and

organisation.

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Chapter 10

Conclusions: Old and New Right

In this book I have examined the development of Greek Cypriot nationalist right-

wing party politics, from its inception under British colonial rule, to conflict with

the communist party AKEL, and finally to its most radical expression, EOKA. At

this time Cyprus was undergoing rapid social and political change, which included

a new style of mass politics that the nationalist groups were initially unwilling to

adjust to. The book offered evidence that this change was by no means a natural

stage in the life of nationalist parties and organisations, in which they brought their

practice automatically into line with the demands of a new age and new demands.

However, a combination of factors—the growing popularity of the communists, the

changing social terrain and the island’s imminent decolonisation—finally left the

nationalist Right no choice but to change their political strategy. The most impor-

tant factor in this decision was the communist challenge to the Right’s hegemony

and primacy in internal politics.

For the period considered in this book, 1900–1955, nationalist politics was

examined within the framework of two phases. The first phase, between 1900 and

1941, can be described as the ideologically formative years, a period marked by

ideological tensions and divisions within the nationalist camp that foretold their

future path. It was also a period of organisational experimentation that exposed the

Right’s limitations. The second phase, 1941–1955 (from the establishment of the

communist party AKEL to the beginning of the EOKA armed struggle), was a

period during which the Right consolidated and stabilised. The ways of organisa-

tion as well as of mobilisation differed significantly between the two periods. In the

first period the Right resembled the Duvergerian caucus or elite party model, while

in the second—again in line with Duverger’s hypothesis (1954)—the Right’sorganisation was marked by ‘contagion from the Left’. It was during this time

that the nationalist camp gradually realised the need for political organisation that

involved more than the appeal of celebrated personalities. While these charismatic

individuals have always played a large role in politics, this is particularly true of

right-wing party politics, and especially true of the right-wing in Cyprus.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Katsourides, The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right in the Eraof British Colonialism, Contributions to Political Science,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55536-2_10

215

The early history of Greek Cypriot nationalist right-wing political parties and

organisations (1900–1955) was fraught with fragmentation and realignment with

two major phases. In the initial phase centering in the 1900s the disagreement over

the Archbishopric question disrupted the previous system of established politics

and resulted in a permanent schism in nationalist politics as well as a number of

personalised formations and nationalistic organisations/pressure groups; the second

phase (early 1940s–1955) saw the establishment of KEK, the first island-wide party

of the Right, a result of greater levels of self-mobilisation of the subordinate classes.

In the first phase, the process of (anti-colonial) mobilising around enosis encour-aged the establishment of national organisations and proto-parties, which served to

increase public awareness and knowledge of and engagement with nationalism. In

the second phase, the Cypriot party system underwent radical changes that altered

the context in which nationalist politics and organisations made strategic decisions.

However, the reconstitution of the hegemonic bloc—in both phases—was not

entirely new since—in both cases—it involved the Church of Cyprus. The Church

was the main thread linking all elements of the power bloc.

In the context of the late 1890s and early 1900s the newly emerged Greek

nationalist movement offered opportunities for political involvement that had

been rare in existing framework of established politics. Nevertheless, these oppor-

tunities were limited, and always within the context of elections; all policy or

legislation discussions remained confined to the narrow elitist circles. As such

they gave little scope at the local level and the grassroots for a more continuous

involvement. By the early 1940s the communist threat began to highlight the

dangers of this situation: the nationalist formations were ill-equipped to deal with

rapid social changes, political mobilisation and a mass electorate.

10.1 The First Period of Nationalist Politics: A Mosaic

of Perceptions and Personal Ambitions

In Cyprus, as in other former colonised countries, the anti-colonial struggle was the

most important political issue. Countries under the yolk of colonialism were

motivated to organise politically out of their desire for independence, and often

were led in this struggle by nationalistic activists. Such countries were also

characterised by delayed economic development, as well as by powerful religious

institutions; these factors, together with rudimentary political institutions, created a

political environment much different than that of more developed, western socie-

ties. The absence of a modern economy and the social class system reflecting this,

meant that national and cultural conflicts took precedence over class conflicts.

For these various reasons, the earliest expressions of party politics in Cyprus

were defined by nationalism and anti-colonialism. These two cleavages proved the

most significant ones in most of the colonial era. The mobilisation of the anti-

colonial cleavage created a lasting division in the nationalist camp with

216 10 Conclusions: Old and New Right

repercussions that still are felt today. The division between irredentists and mod-

erates continues to characterise all nationalist, right-wing political forces, and even

underlies many different nominal categorisations. An important point emerges from

this juxtaposition of moderate and radical positions: namely, that the national idea

could be put to work in strikingly different ways, even within the limited context of

particular elite organisations.

During the early years of British rule, political activity in Cyprus was divided

according to these two major positions, both of which targeted the issue of enosis,or union with Greece. The radical, irredentist group supported immediate enosis,while the moderates argued for better economic and social conditions and greater

political freedom until the climate was more conducive to a fight for enosis. Bothcamps were led by men from the bourgeois and upper classes, who did little to

represent the people’s interests; rather they exploited them through clientelistic

relationships and money-lending schemes (Faustmann 1998; Attalides 1986, 127).

These few individuals (and the Church) stood at the center of a vital network of

political and social relations, using newspapers and other connections to dominate

politics. They resembled a political oligarchy, insofar as they enjoyed an exclusive

monopoly of political authority within the Greek Cypriot community.

Despite some tenuous opposition from the recently established Communist Party

(CPC 1926), the nationalists completely dominated this era of Greek Cypriot

politics. Internal struggles and individuals’ desire for control and power in the

nationalist movement left the nationalist camp erratic and unstable. While the

nationalists were politically unified in their demand for enosis, they disagreed

over the approach to fulfillment of this goal. The Greek Cypriot nationalist move-

ment in fact was a contradiction in terms, radical in speech and conservative in

action. The political elites were above all self-interested; their inclusion

(or exclusion) in elected and appointed offices determined their behaviour and

actions.

The Cypriot social context can largely explain the contradictory positions among

the political elite. When the British took over Cyprus, the local ruling class

(prelates, landowners and merchants) attempted to work with the new (British)

rulers. This approach was only partially successful, and resulted in two antithetical

reactions. One group continued to pursue contact, compromises and solutions in the

hope of working with the colonial administration, while the other gradually came to

distrust the local powerholders’ and the British desire to solve the problems of

Cyprus. This group represented mostly the bourgeois and middle classes of the

major towns, which had increased in numbers and had gradually established

themselves economically and socially but they lacked political recognition and

power. They began to challenge the Church’s and the few political families of the

landed gentry and the big merchants’ oligarchic control over the island’s politicallife. The conflict between the two groups was manifested in the Archiepiscopal

question in the 1900s, which proved to be a moment of fission in Greek Cypriot

politics—i.e., the Archiepiscopal crisis led to a latent nationalist programme

assuming formal shape and organisation.

10.1 The First Period of Nationalist Politics: A Mosaic of Perceptions and. . . 217

The nationalist opposition to the (British) government and the established Greek

Cypriot ruling class comprised members of the emerging bourgeoisie as well as

some factions of the old guard. Their criticism of the prevailing political situation

was a primary factor in the division between the old and the new Right. This new

generation of nationalist activists emerged with British rule, as they espoused

enosis, and did not expect the government or the local establishment to successfully

pursue this goal. These activists recognised the importance of including the popu-

lace in the political scene and they revised the political system to achieve this goal.

This signaled the collapse of the old dominant classes’ capability to exert hege-

mony—a collapse that was also caused by the breakdown of their own cohesion and

from challenges from below. The established power bloc that had dominated since

the late Ottoman period was crumbling and faced new pressures it could not handle.

For example, the once-dominant landowners found it very difficult to reproduce

their economic power in the form of political influence, and were reduced to being

one faction among many. The significance of nationalist opposition to the power

bloc should not be exaggerated though, for this was directed mainly at the current

mode of politics. It is perhaps more accurate to regard nationalism as a symptom of

disunity of the power bloc.

Greek Cypriot politics in the early twentieth century was faced with the rise of

new social strata at a time when the political framework was ill equipped to absorb

their impact. This resulted in the breakdown of political relations that had

predominated at least since the late Ottoman period, while at the same time the

cultural hegemony of the old ruling class was under threat from nationalist agita-

tion. In this regard, nationalism was a far-reaching critique of the conventional

values of the Greek Cypriot elite. Nationalist values and ideals were widely

promoted -and these ideals were well received by and compatible with numerous

different interests and politics. The primacy of nationalist goals however led to

extreme hostility when the various factions attempted to negotiate and/or compro-

mise either between them but most profoundly with the colonial authorities; a

central feature of the previous, conventional political process.

However, the nationalists were not powerful enough to overthrow the establish-

ment; they had to find a way to work with them. This was evident both during and

after the Archiepiscopal conflict, a period representing an important transition in

the history of the Right when, despite signs of continuity, vital changes were taking

place. These included types of organisation, class composition, breadth and form of

popular appeal, relation to the colonial administration and the terms of ideological

legitimation. Following the conclusion of the Archiepiscopal rift, in their joint

efforts to promote enosis and to organise for electoral success, both factions of

the ruling elite devised two organisational strategies (or forms of organisation): one

for claiming enosis and the other for advancing their personal careers. However, thetwo strategies were not unrelated and developments in one sphere influenced the

other and vice versa.

The political platforms and organisations, which were primarily those set up to

claim enosis, proved to be short-lived. Most were established in times of strong

national spirit but they all disbanded quickly because of internal differences and

218 10 Conclusions: Old and New Right

rivalries and the inability of political actors to think about the anti-colonial struggle

outside the traditional Greek-British framework. All these organisations were

connected to the Church of Cyprus and the deputies of the Legislative Council.

With the exception of EREK, these organisations were radical neither in their

methods nor their goals; they worked within the ‘constitutional’ framework set up

by the British administration and most importantly within the schema of the

so-called Greek-British friendship. As the actors themselves admitted, ‘our struggleis carried out in law-abiding contexts’.1 Nationalists of all stripes presented the

union case similarly: public addresses, speeches, memorandums (e.g., 1879, 1903,

1915, 1929), deputations to London, resolutions in the Legislative Council, tributes

and solidarity activities in Greece’s national struggles (e.g., the Balkan Wars),

resignations from the Legislative Council (e.g., 1912, 1920), abstaining from

elections (1921), engaging the press, etc. The press called this approach to claiming

enosis an ‘industry of memorials’ to highlight its limitations.2 Yet these methods

were quite effective in spreading nationalism and the enosis message throughout

the island because they were well organised propaganda efforts. Nationalism was

well-equipped with major organs of opinion and an influential circle of politicians

gathered around them.

This ‘soft’ form of anti-British activity can also be explained by the establish-

ment of the Legislative Council, which became the principal forum for debate and

resolution of disputes. Trapped in their internal rifts and desire for control over the

island’s political life, the Greek ruling class complied with the British framework

and only protested British occupation within the legislature. The press saw through

this quite clearly: ‘the political activity of the country focuses mostly on our

representatives in the Legislative Council’.3 Yet this channeling of social and

political conflicts into legislative bodies is a feature of most societies, albeit at

different stages/times (Lipset 1963, 64–82). At the same time, many nationalists

served in the British administration,4 creating a paradoxical situation: while these

nationalists supported enosis (i.e., the end of British colonialism), they also had a

direct stake in colonialism and held positions that were far from merely honorary.

In the late 1920s there began to be signs of radicalisation in the political sphere,

led by personalities located in the remote district of Kyrenia. Their activity chal-

lenged both the colonial authorities and the Greek ruling class, and resulted in the

establishment of EREK. In stark contrast to the compromising positions of most

nationalist politicians, EREK expressed very radical nationalist views that chal-

lenged the prevailing practices and perceptions of representation. EREK made no

1‘On the facts’, Neon Ethnos, 12 February 1916, 1; ‘Our liberation struggle’, Eleftheria,4 December 1920, 1.2‘The means of the Cypriot struggle’, Eleftheria, 11 June 1930, 1; ‘For a serious policy’,Eleftheria, 3 September 1930, 1.3‘The salience of the elections’, Neon Ethnos, 22 July 1916, 1.4See for example the appointments of the renowned unionist politicians N. Paschalis and

S. Pavlides in the Executive Council and the judiciary respectively in 1928.

10.1 The First Period of Nationalist Politics: A Mosaic of Perceptions and. . . 219

claims of representing all nationalists—it represented the more radical nationalists

who refused any compromise with colonial authorities. EREK activists complained

bitterly about the National Organisation, particularly the leadership, who were

accused of compromise with colonial authorities and of perpetuating a ‘caste-spirit’in order to ensure their continued power.

The radicalisation of certain groups—even including in the ruling class—is

largely related to their alienation from the body politique and leadership echelons

(Allardt 1970, 50; Lipset 1970, 27). It was these nationalists who formed EREK—

activists whose opinions were ignored by the ruling Greek Cypriot elite who

preferred to compromise with the British rather than cutting all channels of com-

munication and cooperation. Accepting appointments in the colonial administration

was common practice among unionist politicians. EREK’s radical nationalism was

in reaction to the established conciliatory policy, and signaled a major departure

from the dominant centralist nationalism. EREK’s proclivity for confrontation

revealed a vital difference between radical and moderate nationalists: whereas the

moderates accepted a strategy of political conciliation with British authorities, the

radicals based their practice on a broad philosophy of struggle, armed not excluded.

In the Greek Cypriot community important political issues have always been

framed by the internal balance of power. Differences among the various elite

sectors were manifest in public debates, newspaper articles, short-lived political

organizations, shifting alliances, opposing election lists (parliamentary, ecclesias-

tical elections, etc.) and different opinions for all occasions (memorials, deputa-

tions). The most striking indication of nationalist diversity is found in the many

newspapers published by its representatives, while on the Left there was only one

newspaper throughout these years (Katsourides 2014, 120–125). The fragmentation

exhibited in the dominant nationalist camp confirms Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967,34) argument that the greater heterogeneity in the Right resulted from the intensity

of the cleavages that involved the bourgeoisie and eventually shaped it in the

process of nation building. This same scenario has been observed in the so-called

societies of late development (Raschke 1993, 30) of which Cyprus is a good

example. No Greek ethnic organisation of this period managed to establish itself

as the center of nationalist politics and no ethnic organisation was able to effec-

tively discipline its own members. They remained a heterogeneous assortment of

politicians whose relations both with the organisations and other nationalist forums

were ambivalent and indeterminate, whose nationalism was far too inclusive and

who lacked a coherent perspective on domestic politics.

At this early stage in its formation, the Greek Cypriot Right also established

associations that claimed to be political parties (e.g., the Popular Party) but this was

just a formality. In practice these were personality-centered cliques that functioned

only during election campaigns, when candidates and their agents toured the

villages to present their manifestos.5 Elections were little more than contests

among the different cliques of the Greek Cypriot elite. This not only highlights

5See for example: ‘Political speeches’, Eleftheria, 15 July 1925, 2; ‘Electoral tours’, Eleftheria,8 August 1925, 2; ‘Electoral tours of the national candidates’, Eleftheria, 2 September 1925, 2.

220 10 Conclusions: Old and New Right

the elite nature of Greek Cypriot politics at the time, but it also reveals the conflict

between the populist appeal of nationalism and the closed doors of the organisations

that promoted it.

In their everyday practice, these organisations resembled a caucus party

(Duverger 1954): they were loosely connected and diverse teams of the propertied

and cultured circles representing the interests of the Church, the bourgeoisie and the

upper middle class, held together not by a formal party organisation but by the

Church and the deputies of the Legislative Council. Membership in these organi-

sations was fixed, limited and structured along class, ideological and ethnic lines.

Their class bias was reflected in the internal balance of power, which had always

revolved around the Church and the Greek parliamentarians. Power and authority

were never given to the lower social classes, a feat that was achieved through

explicit provisions or informal practices (e.g., membership criteria). This kept the

balance of power in the Greek Cypriot community in the hands of the Prelates and

the bourgeoisie.

Discrimination in membership also took an ideological stance, and excluded

members or supporters of the Communist Party6; membership was also limited to

Greek, Christian Orthodox citizens. These associations, in their narrow-minded

exclusivity, ignored the Turkish community of the island, which was left to drift

towards British influence. In addition, this exclusivity ensured that well into the

British era Greek Cypriot politics remained a largely intraethnic concern, validating

Cassia’s (1986) insightful analysis, and contrasting markedly with the interethnic

nature of the conflict assumed in more recent decades.

These ethnic organisations were crucial to the production and reproduction of

the ruling social elite. They also served as a vehicle of upward social mobility.

Under colonial rule, many channels of social mobility (namely the upper levels of

the ‘state’ apparatus) were unavailable to Cypriots. These clubs were a way for

ambitious members of the bourgeoisie to acquire social status and prestige, as

membership inherently acknowledged their political authority and offered a path

to parliamentary positions. These organisations were essentially a type of govern-

ment run by the ruling elite who were vested with important symbolic and substan-

tial control and powers over the affairs of their community. Considering the scarcity

of channels for advancement, the conflictual character of Greek Cypriot politics at

the time is understandable. The control of powerful positions and the ownership of

clientelistic networks were also important vehicles for upward social mobility.

Thus, division and factionalism marked Greek Cypriot nationalist politics in the

early twentieth century, due to three major factors. First there were limited channels

for social and political mobility available to the ruling class; this resulted in tension

and conflict. Second, the power mechanisms open to the Greek ethnic team, i.e., the

Church and the Legislative Council, offered opportunities for personal prosperity

and advancement, including creation of clientelistic networks that provided further

status and power. Finally, there were very differing perspectives on the target and

6Eleftheria, 17 June 1930.

10.1 The First Period of Nationalist Politics: A Mosaic of Perceptions and. . . 221

the methods of anti-colonial struggle.7 The Greek consul at the time (in 1912) called

out Cypriot politicians and journalists for their nationalist rhetoric, which seemed

geared to ensure their personal success in internal affairs (cited in Papapolyviou

1997, 244–245). In the first four decades of the twentieth century the lack of an

accepted leader further fuelled the existing differences within the right-wing camp.

Although the nationalist organisations comprised solely the elite, with the help

of the Cypriot Church they rallied almost the entire Greek Cypriot population

(including the large peasant class) around the cause of enosis giving the nationalist

ruling elite significant political power. Emotional appeals and some degree of

responsiveness to the demands put forward by the labouring poor and the peasants

are a tactical maneuver common to all elite movements (Spourdalakis 1990, 96) in

their efforts to secure wider support; they are also characteristic of bourgeois

politics and explain this particular class’s influence and power within political

systems (Hobsbawm 2000, 161). Greek national organisations and their leaders

never spoke to the interests of the common populace but played on their feelings to

acquire electoral support. This type of appeal enabled the bourgeoisie to form an

alliance with the popular strata.

To promote the cause of nationalism an entire system of communication and

propaganda was set up. The foundations of the communication network upon which

nationalist politics developed had already been laid—as early as the first years of

British rule—and were centered around the press. The nationalists held exclusive

control over the Greek newspapers, each of which expressed a different take on

nationalism and enosis and represented the sole means of mass communication at

this time. The nationalist elite’s control over the press meant their control over the

circulation of ideas, the dissemination of the news, and the political agenda. As

Michels (1997, 149) stated, the press ‘constitutes a potent instrument for the

conquest, the preservation, and the consolidation of power on the part of the leaders

over the masses’. The Greek press became a tool for the elites to control the lower

classes and rally them to their causes. In addition, the nationalists successfully

introduced mass methods of action to the political process in the service of enosis.Such methods included touring the country, delivering lectures, organising mass

events such as island-wide assemblies and mass rallies, etc. Political motivation

became a structured system of propaganda.

The Church of Cyprus was pivotal in this process of national, anti-colonial

mobilisation and organisation. This was because in the absence of any other stable,

firmly established institutions, the Church provided coherence, leadership and

coordination to the dispersed and fragmented sections of the nationalist Right.

This key role was expressed in the position of the Church in all leading organs of

administration in Greek ethnic organisations. The Church’s extensive property

holdings gave it significant economic wealth and power, and together with its

solid organisational structure, visibility through a wide web of local churches,

7‘Our political mess’, Eleftheria, 6 February 1926, 1; ‘Disparity of perceptions’, Eleftheria,23 November 1927, 1.

222 10 Conclusions: Old and New Right

spiritual authority, etc., the Church was extremely powerful and influential.

Through its organisational network the Church established contact with the popular

masses and particularly the agrarian class; further, because of, the respect the

Church enjoyed the lower social classes generally supported its decisions. With

no doubt, the Church of Cyprus represented the most important ‘veto player’ inpolitical life of the island.

Prior to World War II (WWII) the vast majority of Greek Cypriot political

personnel and their organisations linked all demands for constitutional and political

freedoms to the call for enosis. Also at this time, their political programmes and

manifestos accepted existing power relations and the socioeconomic situation. This

scenario was possible due to the absence of an influential Leftist organisation (that

would support different social demands) that might challenge the Right. This

changed in the early 1940s when AKEL was established and politics were placed

on a new popular basis. The nationalists’ decision to compromise with the colonial

authorities in the 1930s created a favourable structure of opportunities for the Left.

At the same time the traditional relations of political subordination—the complex

structures of formal and informal established politics—which had previously

ensured the electoral compliance of a popular mass began to dissolve and this

challenged the power block’s hegemonic capability.

10.2 The Unifying Force of Anti-Communism:

Crystallisation and Consolidation of the Nationalist

Right

The establishment of AKEL in 1941 not only changed the nature of party conflict in

Cyprus, but it also signaled the beginning of modern mass politics on the island

(Christophorou 2006). The 1940s witnessed an unprecedented politicisation of the

subordinate classes, severely undermining the social and political relationships on

which nationalist politics were based. The mobilisation of the lower classes

transformed the political context, as nationalist/bourgeois parties vied to adapt.

The effects were transformative and amounted to a definitive popularisation of

right-wing politics, while party organisation outside parliament, practically

unknown before, grew rapidly. Both the Church and the ruling classes reacted to

AKEL by improving their organisational structures, and involving the people in

everyday politics. Elections were held at regular intervals and were actually

meaningful—i.e., those elected could exercise some form of power. Despite the

suspension of all political organisations during the years of the EOKA armed

struggle (1955–1959), these organisations survived and re-emerged after indepen-

dence. It was during these years that the Left-Right cleavage consolidated in

Cyprus.

Social and political change outstripped the capacities of the early nationalist

organisations, and as a consequence the communists gained the lead. Previous

10.2 The Unifying Force of Anti-Communism: Crystallisation and Consolidation of. . . 223

nationalist organisations were hardly suited to the conduct of the new conditions of

party politics. The decomposition of the nationalist bloc was due partially to the

novel organisation of the lower classes on an independent and antagonistic basis

and partially to their failure to adapt and therefore to continue to exercise leadership

over the subordinate classes. As the communists were gaining support from the

masses the nationalists realised that they had to change. No longer were loose

associations of notables with little permanent organisation sufficient; they had to

establish stable and functioning bureaucratic structures in order to recruit and

maintain a new mass membership.

It was in the 1940s that various nationalist organisations were formed, and even

more importantly, consolidated; some are still operating today. The nationalists

successfully reoriented their practice to the needs of popular politics and continued

to adapt well into the 1950s. For example, they created organisations that

represented different interests (e.g., labour and agrarian), thus broadening their

scope to include a more diverse set of cultural, economic and political demands and

unlike the limited set of national issues that the nationalist organisations of the

previous period promoted. Such organisations were able to mobilise more effec-

tively owing to the social and economic development of the island and the limited

democratisation of the British colonial regime. Nevertheless, and despite their

adaptations and modernisations, they still remained dependent on the Church and

the powerful enosis movement. The influence of the Church was far from dead; on

the contrary, the Church of Cyprus was the most important of several agencies

engaged in coordinating and leading the nationalist party campaigns and organisa-

tions at all levels. The Church was overwhelmingly oriented toward defending

cultural and ethnic rights, promoting enosis and fighting communism.

Despite their shortfalls, these nationalist organisations offered a new model of

democratic representation, one that was more inclusive, deliberative and participa-

tory. They included programmes with clear policy goals and that targeted a range of

issues and ideology. They acquired deep roots in society, and their leaders were

elected properly despite the influences from the Church and other vested interests.

For the most part, these organisations represented albeit with restrictions, the

practices and values of some degree of democratic politics, which have been rare

or absent in the first four decades of the twentieth century of Greek Cypriot

nationalist politics. Their new forms of mobilisation brought new life to their

movement, especially via a larger membership and improved moral. The new

model of nationalist politics entailed a far-reaching character shift from an honorific

to an activist and popular form of organisation with a much higher level of

engagement at all levels. This was reflected not only in the changing composition

of the leadership and local officers, but also in the constitutional structures and

campaigning. For example, new kinds of officials emerged in parties, trade unions

and agrarian organisations; the salaried personnel that reflected new career paths

available to the new generation of nationalist activists all made possible from the

new opportunities of political mobilisation. This new activism was no longer the

manifestation of one specific social group but a political-ideological phenomenon

that included people of diverse social origin. At this early stage, the concerns of

224 10 Conclusions: Old and New Right

nationalist leaders were basic: consolidating the organisation, mastering the tech-

niques of agitation, penetrating new areas of support.

The defining characteristic of nationalist politics—the division into radicals and

conservatives—never changed, but it became much less important because of the

rising communist movement. Although there was still conflict over colonialism and

enosis, the fight against communism became a priority. Communist power threat-

ened the nationalists’ hegemony in the Greek Cypriot community as well as their

access to power—a threat confirmed by the nationalists’ poor election results in theearly 1940s. Logically therefore, anti-communism became the chief pillar uniting

all nationalist factions. It also made the various factions realise that they had to

resolve or at least relegate internal conflicts and form a strong political party to

counterweight AKEL. Although there were still conflicts in the 1940s and 1950s

within the nationalists due to the coexistence of contradictory ideological and

material interests within their ranks, these gradually diminished and the most

radical factions and the Church came to the foreground. Their domination was

not unrelated to the need for a strong response to the communists.

Although the nationalist power bloc had been relatively stable and successful

until the early 1940s, communist mobilisation at the popular level called into

question its legitimacy and highlighted its inability to effectively organise support

in the constituencies. This left a vacant political space, not only for the Left, but also

for independent (more radical) initiatives of the Right. It was in the context of an

unstable hegemonic construction marked by the need to find an answer to the

communist threat, and the divided efforts of the Right to claim popular legitimacy

that a distinctive radical-nationalist ideology in the 1950s (i.e., EOKA) was able to

arise.

Despite their difficulties, in this period, the nationalist Right seems to have

established a basic form of party-political representation; first there was KEK,

followed in the years of independence by the Unitary Party (Enieo) and finally

the Democratic Rally (DISY). These large parties of the Right (then and now)

coexisted with a number of smaller and usually more irredentist and radical parties

to the right. However, the nationalist Right even today is a camp without a totally

unified, homogeneous ideology; thus within the ‘big’ party more than one approach

exists. Although nationalism was the hegemonic frame of reference throughout the

twentieth century many fissures existed, as well as various shades. Moreover and

probably more important, as this was made explicit in many references presented in

this book, nationalism was used by most nationalist actors (including the Church) to

serve their own and therefore different purposes: consolidating their political and

social presence, fighting communism, challenging colonialism, keeping the popular

strata quiet, etc. The instrumental use of nationalism was clearly evident in the

nationalists’ quiet cooperation with the colonial authorities; supposedly

unaccepted. The rhetoric of the nationalist Right was populist, while in fact they

favoured the ruling elite and downplayed tensions and inequalities within Cypriot

society.

Nationalism in this context was a useful means for ensuring that the conservative

social strata (mainly the peasantry) would oppose ideological narratives (e.g.,

10.2 The Unifying Force of Anti-Communism: Crystallisation and Consolidation of. . . 225

socialism) that could threaten their supremacy and primacy in Cyprus. Enosis was aconvenient rallying cry for right-wing political parties as it offered them a hege-

monic context, particularly following AKEL’s retrogression in the Constitutional

Assembly of 1947–1948. In this way the communist party’s ability to widely

disseminate socialist narratives was reduced. The hegemony of nationalism in

Cyprus in the late 1940s was further enhanced by nationalist efforts to create an

imaginable wall separating Cyprus from the situation in Greece. Greece represented

a form of moral, social and political capital for the nationalist Greek Cypriot Right,

and the nationalists’ assertion that they alone represented Greece allowed them to

locally legitimise their authority. Therefore, the social and political reality of

Greece had to be filtered and presented as something ideal and unrelated to what

was actually happening in the country (e.g., persecutions of Greek leftists).

The local nationalist elite therefore disseminated an idealised, almost sacred,

image of Greece in order to cover the truth while presenting themselves as the local

administrators of Greece’s will in Cyprus. This masked the obvious inconsistency

between the elite’s support for enosis (an anti-colonial stance) and their support forthe British in the Greek civil war, as well as their common position in the class

confrontation of the late-1940s in Cyprus where the British supported the Greek

Cypriot Right. Moreover, none of the nationalists criticised the elite’s practice of

partaking in the colonial apparatus; a stance obviously at odds with their alleged

anti-colonialism. This indicates that (a) the nationalist bloc accommodated divi-

sions of interest and ideas that were hiding below the slogan of enosis; and (b) this

cover-up was part of a process of legitimising their local hold on power. However,

these inconsistencies were eventually exposed and exploded in the mid-1950s with

the EOKA armed struggle.

EOKA signalled both the consolidation of radical nationalists within the nation-

alist bloc and the overall right-wing domination in Greek Cypriot politics for the

years to follow. Moreover, EOKA was key to the reconstitution of the internal unity

of the nationalist power bloc on a relatively stable basis as it united the vast majority

of all nationalists and was a glorious realisation of the radical-nationalist dream.

EOKA represented the culmination, in concrete political form, of the old demand

for an ideal supra-party national unity that excluded the communists and anyone

who rejected the ideology of the new radical-nationalist hegemonic bloc. However

and although outside the scope of this book, the unity within the nationalist bloc

was consistently tested in the ensuing years, as the history of the Greek Cypriot

Right from 1960–1974 was the history of unsuccessful attempts to reconstitute the

political and ideological unity of the power bloc and simultaneously the leadership

over the subordinate classes.

Greek Cypriot nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s was authoritarian and anti-

democratic. This is usually explained by a number of long-term structural factors:

the island’s delayed national formation and delayed industrialisation, and the

absence of a bourgeois revolution and no true parliamentarisation. This explanation

implies the survival of pre-modern traditions (e.g., the relationship between nation-

alism and the Church of Cyprus) as vital to the emergence of ethnic nationalism as a

successful political movement. Certainly, ideology (nationalism) was mediated by

226 10 Conclusions: Old and New Right

the conservativeness of the Church; yet, this was not the sole reason as it explains

nationalism merely within the confines of political backwardness. The direct

confrontation with a strong communist movement was another pivotal reason for

its particular nature.

The primary significance of the nationalist groups/organisations of the second

period is to be sought at the ideological level. They were inserted into local political

cultures whose earlier integration was decomposing along class lines, and the

nationalist cause attracted many whose ideological commitment was more impor-

tant than their similar social origins. However, in concluding this discussion of the

nationalist milieu it is important to dispose of one potential misunderstanding,

which is present in much existing work; this is the idea that nationalist politics

constituted a well-integrated, interlocking, unified group which is simply not true.

While the various individual groups felt themselves to be part of a greater ideolog-

ical community, they were in fact more like separate sub-cultures within this

community.

An overview of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement in the twentieth century

reveals an interesting pattern of right-wing dissidence and disagreement that

spawned opposing initiatives and organisational platforms. Throughout the period

under examination this political space continually faced problems of internal

cohesion, a fact that reaffirms the limitations of an integrationist notion of nation-

alism. It also attests to the political diversity of nationalist initiatives in public life,

nationalism’s disruptive as well as integrative potential, its ability to divide as well

to unite the nation, even within the limited spectrum of the Right. The nationalist

factor in Greek politics, therefore, cannot be easily reduced to a stabilising element

in the political system. On the contrary, it led to all sorts of conflict within the Right

as to how far and in what ways the national idea could be exploited as an integrative

force.

In Cyprus, the events of the past are very much part of the present. In 1960 the

newly independent Republic of Cyprus was heir to many of the unsolved problems

of the colonial era and a tenuously constituted political arena. Cyprus still faces

problems building networks and institutions that support dialogue and action

among people with diverse pasts and diverse ethnic and ideological origins, and

still struggles to engage with today’s power structures. Cyprus politics have a

complex history that demands a complex analysis, one that includes: an awareness

of how the colonial regime exercised power and the limits of that power; an

appreciation of the intensity with which that power was confronted and the diversity

of futures that people sought for themselves; an understanding of how and why

some of those futures were excluded from the realm of the politically feasible; and

an openness to possibilities for the future that can be imagined today.

Research can help identify these possibilities. Shedding light on various aspects

of the past and particularly the nationalist past can greatly help in understanding the

political situation in Cyprus today. Despite the dominance of nationalism at least

until the 2000s there are still very few comprehensive studies of individual nation-

alist movements and organisations. More and deeper enquiry into the character of

the internal factors binding these organisations, the content of their activities, their

10.2 The Unifying Force of Anti-Communism: Crystallisation and Consolidation of. . . 227

activities at various levels (e.g., the municipal) and how new organisations follow-

ing the island’s independence in 1960 emerged and learned from their predecessors

will be an invaluable contribution to Cypriot politics and history.

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