The Hard Way: An Analysis of Israel’s Targeted Killing Policy from 1995-2009By

Nicholas Lusas

American Military UniversityINTL641 Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflicts

Dr. Lawrence Cline

Introduction

Israel has been in a persistent state of war since its founding in 1948. In particular, the

Israelis have been involved in low intensity conflicts (LIC) for a long period of time and against

a large array of enemies. The Israeli approach to LICs in the twentieth century has been diverse,

ranging from aggressive military operations to more subtle efforts coordinated by Israel’s

intelligence apparatus.

Israel brought its extensive experience to bear during the period following the Oslo Peace

Process, and during the Al Aqsa Intifada in particular. This period was marked by the

deterioration of the agreements made in Oslo between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and

Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat. This period was further

characterized by the emergence of a new tactic by Palestinian terrorists in the form of suicide

bombing. Israel’s response to Palestinian terror evolved similarly, and targeted killings became

a staple of the Israeli counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine.

Israel had conducted targeted killings from the earliest days of its existence, most

famously perhaps, following the 1972 Munich massacre. During the early 1990s, Israel carried

this tactic to southern Lebanon, killing senior members of Hezbollah, and finally to the

Palestinian territories, with the killing of Yehiya Ayyash being the most significant among the

earlier targets. However, Israel expanded the program to unprecedented levels during the Al

Aqsa Intifada, when the volume of killings exceeded all previous periods of use.1 The

widespread use of the tactic pushed the issue into the international spotlight, resulting in

condemnation from many parts of the globe, while other observers questioned its effectiveness,

morality and legality.

1 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): under “A History of Violence.” During the Al Aqsa Intifada, Israel targeted and killed 203 Palestinians, and an additional 114 civilians died during the attacks.

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Targeted killing provides Israel with little in the way of strategic utility. The

fundamental situation between Israel and the Palestinians is not significantly altered as a result of

the killings, but it does provide a tactical benefit to the Israelis. The role it plays in disrupting

terrorism and the deterrent effect it produces among terror networks are of substantial benefit to

Israel. In this sense, targeted killing makes sense for Israel in the context of the war it is waging.

However, this tactic is not universally applicable and should only be exercised by other nations,

including the US, after careful consideration of the costs, benefits, and alternatives.

Why Does Israel Kill?

Terrorism affects the political balance of any country in which it is experienced. A

pattern of terror attacks will naturally and inevitably lead to demands on the government from

the citizenry to act in response to the threat. In Israel, this dynamic is very well established. The

staying power of Israeli governments is often directly linked to the effectiveness with which a

government can handle security threats to the nation. The governments of Golda Meir,

Menachem Begin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Olmert all suffered disaster as a result of their

perceived inability to successfully confront the threats Israel faced during their time in office. A

strong security portfolio, as well as the willingness and competence to counter the myriad threats

to the country are essential to electoral success in Israeli politics.

Targeted killings are a very visible way for the government to satiate the public’s desire

to see tangible actions being taken against terrorism. It provides satisfaction that the terrorism

problem is being addressed, while gratifying the natural human urge for revenge after attacks

that killed Israeli citizens. Israeli politician do not usually face domestic political pressure as a

result of the tactic, though they stand to gain tremendously from the perception of active

aggression against terrorism.

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In order to justify the policy fully, the Israeli government has indicated that the targeted

killings serve a preventive purpose.2 The common phrase used in Hebrew by the government in

official press releases literally means “focused prevention”, largely removing the references to

killing but focusing on the preventive element of the tactic.3 The idea behind applying the label

of being preventive is that the killing is carried out when a terror attack is imminent, based on

reliable intelligence, and when arresting the planner or attacker is impossible.

The burden of proof for this argument is on Israel and it is a difficult case to make.

Targeting killings are very rarely conducted when the target is en route to an attack. There have

been incidents during which Israeli security personnel successfully arrested terrorists as they set

out on terror missions, undermining a categorical need to employ targeted killings in a

preventive effort.4 However often targeted killings may or may not occur in the name of

prevention, it is more often the case that attacks, which are characterized as preventive, are

actually preemptive.

Preemptive targeted killings are carried out in an effort to disrupt terror operations, to

avoid the stage where preventive measures must be taken, and as a matter of deterrence. At their

most transparent, targeted killings disrupt terror organizations. To achieve this, targets are

chosen according to the importance they have to an organization. Specialists, such as bomb

makers, armorers, and those knowledgeable in the principles of asymmetrical warfare are

targeted due to the operational impact they have on a terror network. The killing of Ayyash is

perhaps the most well known example of a specialist being targeted for assassination.

2 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Targeting Terrorists – Background,” August 1, 2001, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/8/Targeting%20Terrorists%20-%20Background (accessed March 2, 2010).

3 the phrase is commonly used in the Israeli press as well as ,(”pronounced “sikul memukad) ממוקד סיכול government releases. The literal translation was provided by the author and verified by an unnamed native Hebrew speaker.

4 Daniel Byman, Op. Cit., under “The Upside of Anger.”

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Recognized political leaders, and actors within a terror network who have high centrality and

few equivalents are likely targets due to the organizational impact they have within a terror

network. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) found Fahti Shaqaqi and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades

(AAMB) leader Raed Karmi are two examples of this type of target.5

An additional benefit to targeting key personnel in a terror organization is the effect it has

on those who remain alive within the network. As terrorists become more prominent in an

organization, it becomes imperative for them to take steps to avoid falling victim to an attempt

on their life. This preoccupation can significantly impact their ability to focus on their work,

decreasing their effectiveness within the network. For example, Ayyash, during the period

immediately preceding his death, was constantly on the move, dedicating time to crafting

innovative disguises and securing safe lodging.6

Targeted killings further disrupt terror networks by providing deterrence. An effective

program can influence terror leaders to reign in their terror programs. Clive Jones asserts that

this was exactly the message Israel was trying to convey through the killing of Mustafa Ali Zibri

during the Al Aqsa Intifada.7 His high international profile, and the proximity of the killing to

Arafat’s offices were intended to send a strong message to Arafat that he must do more to reign

in Palestinian terrorists. The successful killing of high profile officials, such as Zibri, Ahmed

Yassin, and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, served as examples of the lengths that Israel would go to in

order to discourage aggression. They have enabled Israel to make credible threats to the lives of

5 BBC News, “Killing sparks fresh Mid-East violence,” BBC News, January 14, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1760327.stm (accessed February 23, 2010).

6 Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 55-58.

7 Clive Jones, “’One Size Fits All’: Israel, Intelligence, and the al-Aqsa Intifada,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 4 (July 2003): 280.

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other high-ranking members of Palestinian resistance and terror groups when making demands,

such the return of captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Schalit.8

Revenge has been a frequently cited reason for Israel’s policy of targeted killing.9 Israeli

journalist, Yossi Melman insists that the killings “are meant to appease an angry and frustrated

public...fulfil[sic] the desire for revenge and raise waning national morale”.10 Though it is not

part of Israeli government policy to conduct targeted killings for the purpose of revenge, the

motif has figured prominently into past campaigns. Most notably, following the 1972 Munich

massacre, Kidon, the operational arm of Mossad, embarked on a years-long operation that

featured frequent assassinations of Palestinian notables, ostensibly for the dual purpose of

revenge and deterrence. Revenge is a secondary benefit of many targeted killings in recent

years, but the primary reason behind targeted killings is the preemptive and deterrent benefit they

provide.

Examining the reasons why Israel conducts targeted killing is important, but it is equally

important to dismiss one of the false perceptions about why the policy is in place. The targeted

killing policy is not a manner of avoiding the task of arresting Palestinian terrorists. The chief

reason for why Israel might want to avoid it is that having important terrorists in captivity creates

an opportunity for their release in the event that an Israeli is kidnapped. For example, the high

profile kidnapping of Schalit in 2006 has been followed by demands for the release of Marwan

Barghouti, who was sentenced to life in prison for murder of Israeli citizens.11

8 Chris McGreal, “Israel threatens to target Hamas leaders,” Guardian.co.uk, July 3. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/03/israel1 (accessed February 23, 2010).

9 Ami Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press), 25-26.

10 Yossi Melman, “Controversial policy with a hidden agenda,” Guardian.co.uk, February 15. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/feb/15/israel2 (accessed February 23, 2010).

11 Roee Nahmias, “Report: Israel refuses to release Ahmad Saadat,” Ynetnews.com, July 22. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3571431,00.html (accessed March 3, 2010).

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However, kidnapping has generally failed to secure the release of high profile

Palestinians. Yassin was freed from prison in exchange for detained Kidon agents, after the

botched attempt on Khaled Meshaal in 1997. These agents were not kidnapped in the traditional

sense, and former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy, indicates that the move was a gesture of

goodwill to King Hussein of Jordan during a critical point in the relationship between his

kingdom and Israel.12 The kidnapping of Schalit has failed to bring about the release of

Palestinian prisoners, and Israel has refused to release prisoners “with blood on their hands”.13

Most importantly for Israeli COIN, arresting terrorists is generally more beneficial than

killing them. A terrorist in custody can provide useful intelligence that can result in more arrests,

creating a positive cycle of intelligence collection. A dead terrorist does not provide this critical

upside.

The Benefits of Targeted Killing

The benefits of Israel’s targeted killing campaign have been realized only when they have

been prolific. A series of quick, successive attacks can significantly inhibit the operational

capacity of a terror network, particularly if specialists are targeted. The training required to

create a bomb maker or an arms expert is extensive and time consuming, and is typically

conducted by incumbent specialists. Removing specialists breaks the chain of instruction, while

eliminating key knowledge from the terror database. Striking several specialists in a short span

of time can cripple the capabilities of a terror group.

Recovering from a loss of specialization can take years. While the killing may result in

renewed support and anger among those who already support the terror group, any ensuing

12 Efraim Halevy, Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led the Mossad (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 168-169.

13 Sheera Frenkel, “Release of Marwan Barghouti is price of freedom for Gilad Schalit,” TimesOnline, November 26. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6932422.ece (accessed March 11, 2010).

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recruits will encounter difficulty when attempting to acquire essential skills for conducting terror

and insurgency operations. For example, the killing of Shaqaqi greatly diminished the

organizational capacity of PIJ and the group required several years to recover from his death

before they regained their former operational and organizational capacity.14

Hamas and PIJ suffered significant setbacks during the Al Aqsa Intifada as a result of the

targeted killing of their specialists. The effect was pronounced enough that both groups offered

to end terrorist activity within the pre-1967 borders of Israel in exchange for a halt to Israel’s

targeted killing campaign.15 Despite a decrease in the number of targeted killings during the

latter days of the Intifada, Hamas never fully regained their capacity to carry out attacks using

previously common methods, such as suicide bombing.16 Instead, the group was forced to shift

its strategy.

The method of targeted killing provides a benefit over more robust military operations, as

targeted killings are far less likely to result in the kind of collateral damage that can occur during

military operations. In the years prior to Operation Defensive Shield (ODS) in 2002, Israel

received condemnation for the risk posed by targeted killings, but the collateral damage incurred

during ODS quickly demonstrated the benefit of targeted killing over the exercise of military

force. In his letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, UN General Secretary Kofi Annan called on

Israel to restrain the overwhelming use of force displayed during ODS:

“Israel should contribute to this effort by ensuring that the I.D.F. uses only weapons and methods that minimize the danger to the lives and property of Palestinian civilians, in conformity with its humanitarian obligations”17

14 Daniel Byman, Op. Cit., under “Bloody Balance Sheet.”15 Steven R David, "Case Studies: Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing," Democracies and small wars,

ed. Efraim Inbar (London: Routledge, 2003), 140.; William Safire, “Sharon Enters Armistice Talks,” NYTimes.com, February 4. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/04/opinion/sharon-enters-armistice-talks.html?pagewanted=1 (accessed March 12, 2010).

16 Ami Pedahzur, Op. Cit., 39.17 Kofi Annan letter to Ariel Sharon published in the New York Times, “Kofi Annan's Blunt Words Criticizing

Israeli Tactics,” NYTimes.com, March 19. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/19/world/kofi-annan-s-blunt-words-

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Given that targeted killings are much more effective at minimizing the danger to the lives and

property of Palestinians than full scale military operations, this letter is inadvertently extolling its

virtues as a limiter of civilian collateral damage.18

The Al Aqsa Intifada and the years preceding it represent the only points in recent history

that Israel conducted such a prolific targeted killing campaign. Israel’s targeted killing policy

against Hezbollah during the early 1990s was intermittent and did not result in significant

damage to the organization. In the years since the end of the Intifada, Israel has generally

refrained from using it, even during the 2008-2009 War in Gaza. Israel’s famous targeted killing

campaign of the 1970s was relatively infrequent, and failed to target genuine specialists within

the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), instead targeting those of questionable

operational importance, such as Mahmoud Hamshari, Wael Zwaiter, and Hussein Abd al-Chir.

As a result, none of these campaigns have produced the benefits of targeted killing, though the

costs of the program were still borne by Israel.

What is the Cost of Targeted Killing?

The instantly recognizable cost of targeted killing is the international condemnation that

is leveled against Israel for the policy. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) such as Amnesty

International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and B’tselem have all condemned the Israeli

policy, with AI characterizing the killings as “extrajudicial”, “unlawful”, and “an excessive,

disproportionate [and] negligent use of force”.19 The UN Security Council (UNSC) attempted to

bring about a resolution condemning the policy, only to be vetoed by the US. The proposed

resolution called for “the complete cessation of extrajudicial executions”, while hinting that the

criticizing-israeli-tactics.html (accessed March 14, 2010).18 Steven R. David, Op. Cit., 149-150.19 Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Territories: State Assassinations and Other Killings,” Amnesty

International (February 2001), 2.

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policy is akin to terrorism.20 Annan and the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) both

condemned the killing of Yassin.21

Similar criticism has emerged from the Europe and the West. UK Foreign Secretary Jack

Straw condemned the Yassin and Rantisi killings, while the US, Russia, Spain, and Germany

expressed concern over the policy at a UNSC meeting. At that same meeting, several other

countries formally expressed condemnation of targeted killings, including France, Ireland, South

Africa and Chile.22 Nearly all representatives characterized the targeted killings as extrajudicial

executions. Israel’s standing in the world has suffered as a result of the policy and the negative

publicity it has garnered.

Much of the negative publicity surrounding the policy has focused on collateral damage

resulting from the use of heavy weaponry during attacks. One of the frequent weapons used

during targeted killings is the AH-64 Apache gunship, firing AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, which

have the potential to create significant damage. This attack platform was used in the killing of

Yassin, Rantisi, Massoud Ayad, and Jamal Mansour, among others.23 The rockets are relatively

powerful and have resulted in instant death for the target, but have caused civilian casualties as

well.

20 United Nations Security Council, “Text of proposed U.N. Security Council resolution vetoed by the United States,” United Nations Security Council. http://web.archive.org/web/20040520170714/http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2004/03/25/international2045EST0788.DTL (accessed February 27, 2010).

21 Mark J. Mullenbach, “Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf Region,” Under “Israel/Palestine (national liberation/independence dispute) 1964-present.” http://faculty.uca.edu/markm/tpi_narrative_middleeast.htm (accessed March 1, 2010).

22 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Urged to Condemn Extrajudicial Executions Following Israel’s Assassination of Hamas Leader,” United Nations Security Council. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8063.doc.htm (accessed March 2, 2010).

23 Alan Philps, “Arafat aide killed in helicopter ambush,” Telegraph.co.uk, February 14. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/1322613/Arafat-aide-killed-in-helicopter-ambush.html (accessed March 14, 2010).; BBC News, “Profile: Hamas activist Jamal Mansour,” BBC News, July 31. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1467082.stm (accessed March 14, 2010).

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Israel has employed F-16s carrying one-ton bombs to carry out some of its targeted

killings. Though this platform has been more widely used in the period following the Al Aqsa

Intifada, it was used during the killing of Salah Shahade in 2002.24 The attack resulted in not

only the death of Shahade, but also an additional fourteen civilians, including Shahade’s wife

and nine children.25 The extent of the civilian casualties prompted even the normally lenient

President George W. Bush to call the attack “heavy handed”.26

The terrorist response to targeted killings is a very costly component of the strategy.

After the killing of a Palestinian by the Israelis, emotional calls for revenge are quickly made in

the aftermath. Mohammed Dahlan, a key political figure in the Fatah party, remarked that,

“whoever sign[s] off of killing a leader among Hamas or any other leader on the Palestinian side

should turn the page and should sign off on killing 16 Israelis".27 The Palestinians were

generally capable of living up to Dahlan’s statement and have been able mount retaliatory

responses to targeted killings of major Palestinian figures. Following the death of Ayyash, there

was a series of suicide attacks conducted by Adnan Al Ghoul, who was determined to avenge his

colleague and friend.28 The assassination of Zibri immediately drew a response from the

Palestinians, as Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi was killed by the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) in retaliation for the killing of Zibri.29 The ability of the

Palestinians to inflict deadly retaliatory attacks in response to targeted killings is a significant

24 Yoav Stern, “3 top Hamas officers among 230 killed during IAF strikes on Gaza,” Haaretz.com, December 28. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050449.html (accessed March 13, 2010).

25 Yuval Yoaz, “State commission to examine civilian deaths in 2002 Shahade assassination,” Haaretz.com, September 19. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/904552.html (accessed March 13, 2010).

26 David Stout, “White House Rebukes Israel for Attack, Calls It 'Heavy-Handed',” NYTimes.com, July 23. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/23/international/23CND-PREX.html?pagewanted=1 (accessed March 1, 2010).

27 Daniel Byman, Op. Cit., Under “Bloody Balance Sheet.”28 Zaki Chehab, Op. Cit., 64.29 Clive Jones, Op. Cit., 280.

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vulnerability to the tactic, which has the potential to undermine the arguments that it is a

preventive measure designed to save Israeli lives.

This creates a propaganda victory for Palestinian groups, who further exploit the killings

of their operatives by turning them into martyrs and developing a martyr theology around them.30

This helps aid in recruitment, and casts the fight against Israel in the light of the underdog David

taking on the menacing and seemingly omnipotent Goliath, only with the roles reversed. The

underdog role of the Palestinians has caused groups to cooperate and coordinate activities on a

scale, which was not present before the policy was in full swing.31

A more sublime terrorist response to the policy of targeted killing has been to shift

existing terror doctrines. The killing of so many specialists at once during the Al Aqsa Intifada

had an impact on the Palestinian strategy of terror that had once been so effective. For example,

the number of Hamas attacks remained steady through 2005, but they became less and less

effective, killing fewer Israelis than earlier attacks.32 The decimation of terror specialists among

the Palestinians resulted in a significant decline in the viability of their older strategies of suicide

bombing, ambushes, and similar attacks. For groups, such as Hamas and PIJ, who had interest in

continuing the fight against Israel, a shift in their strategy became necessary.

The fundamental shift occurred in their strategy that deemphasized suicide attacks in lieu

of conducting attacks from a distance. Beginning in 2001, Hamas had begun to manufacture

crude rockets to fire at Israel, called Qassams. The effectiveness of the Qassam was minimal in

30 Steven R. David, Op. Cit., 143.31 Ibid., 14432 Avi Kober, ““Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada: The Quest for Effectiveness,” Journal of Conflict

Studies, under “Greater Effectiveness for Targeting Senior Political Leaders.” http://dev.hil.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=Summer07/&filename=jcs27art06.html (accessed February 23, 2010). “The number of Hamas attacks grew steadily as the intifada progressed, despite Israeli TKs: 19 attacks in 2001, 34 in 2002, 46 in 2003, 202 in 2004, and 179 in 2005 (most of them in the first half of that year, before Hamas agreed to suspend hostilities against Israel temporarily)...the death toll claimed by Hamas terrorists per attack dropped to 0.98 in 2003, 0.33 in 2004, and 0.11 in 2005.”

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the early stages, but as Hamas continued to improve on the initial designs, the rockets have been

able to strike into Israel, particularly the town of Sderot. The development of the Qassam rocket

program coincided with Hamas’ struggles to sustain its earlier success through suicide bombing.

As a result, Qassam rocket attacks have almost completely supplanted suicide attacks as Hamas’

attack of choice by 2006.33

The difficulty for Israel is that applying targeted killing against the Qassam rocket

strategy is problematic. Qassam rockets do not produce the kinds of casualties that suicide

bombings and shootings produce. It is more difficult to track suspects who create the rockets

and launch them due to Israel’s lack of contact on the ground in Gaza. Any attacks that Israel

carries out in an effort to thwart a rocket attack in-progress has a higher potential to result in

civilian casualties, as Qassam rockets are often launched from civilian areas. There is an even

lower tolerance from the international community for targeted killings in this context, given that

the Qassams produce very little in the way of civilian casualties in Israel. The targeted killing

tactic is not particularly well suited to countering the Qassam rocket strategy, which represents a

successful recalibration of the Hamas and PIJ strategy that has successfully mitigated the

advantages of the targeted killing policy.

The costs of the targeted campaign are also literal. The ability to be able to identify,

locate, target, and kill specific individuals requires both vigilance and a high degree of

technological development. The cost of vigilance comes from the constant need for surveillance,

which includes aircraft overflight by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), helicopters, and other

manned aircraft. Surveillance is similarly conducted by troops deployed within the Palestinian

territories, as well as Israel’s intelligence agencies, which also establish vast collections networks

in order to pinpoint the identities and locations of targets.

33 Ami Pedahzur, Op. Cit., 139.

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Conclusion

Analyzing Israel’s targeted killing policy is a matter of weighing the benefits against the

costs, while keeping the conflict in perspective. The benefits include the disruption of terror

networks, the establishment of deterrence, and the diminished collateral damage when compared

to full-scale military operations. However, these benefits are only fully realized when the

strategy is employed with high frequency over a sustained period of time as it was during the Al

Aqsa Intifada.

The costs are myriad. Targeted killings, in most instances, provoke retaliatory attacks

that have killed scores of Israelis, are costly to setup, coordinate, and sustain, sometimes result in

civilian casualties, and draw significant international condemnation and pressure to halt the

policy. One of the costs is derived from the effectiveness of the strategy, as groups such as

Hamas and PIJ have shifted their strategy to avoid being susceptible to targeted killing while still

being able to launch attacks against Israel, however less effective they may be.

The balance shows that, while targeted killing has its share of costs, it is effective in

helping blunt the lethality of Palestinian terror attacks against Israelis. The international

condemnation is persistent but has yet to impact Israel in a tangible way, and the final result is

that Hamas has shifted its strategy toward the launching of Qassam rockets in lieu of suicide

bombing. While targeted killing is not the sole reason for this shift, the decimation of terror

specialists within Hamas and PIJ certainly contributed to the shift in specialization between the

two groups.

Though Israel has gained a tactical advantage through the use of targeted killings, the

strategic equation in Gaza and the West Bank has remains largely unchanged by any of Israel’s

policies. Hamas is fully operational and in control of Gaza, while PIJ, AAMB, and the PLFP

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continue to exist and operate. Targeted killing played a role in ending the specific threat of

suicide bombing and other high-yield terror operations, but it is not an answer to the overarching

strategic threat posed by the Palestinian resistance. The policy may even complicate the matter

by exacerbating tensions between the Israelis and Palestinians. While the policy is a tactical

success, it does not come without cost, and cannot be regarded as a universal tool for use in

COIN operations. Its use must be undertaken only after careful deliberation and must be

exercised with due diligence.

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