The Historical, Economic, and Political Bases of France's African Policy

The Historical, Economic, and Political Bases of France's African PolicyAuthor(s): Guy MartinSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1985), pp. 189-208Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160570 .

Accessed: 09/05/2014 01:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to TheJournal of Modern African Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 01:11:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup

http://www.jstor.org/stable/160570?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


The Journal of Modern African Studies, 23, 2 (I985), pp. I89-208

The Historical, Economic, and Political Bases of France's

African Policy

by GUY MARTIN*

A QUARTER of a century has elapsed since France granted independence to her former colonies in West and Central Africa. Yet to this day, France continues to wield considerable power and influence in these countries politically, economically, socially, and culturally, thanks to a tightly-knit network of formal and informal relations. France's African policy has been remarkably constant and stable through the various successive governments of the Fifth Republic. How can this persistent situation of dominance/dependency and this continuity in foreign policy be accounted for? More specifically, the present study tries to analyse the main characteristics and essential mechanisms of France's post-colonial policy in Africa, all too often shrouded under a veil of secrecy, albeit premised on a number of historical factors for its ideological foundation. On this basis, a variety of economic and political interests have been developed which constitute the main elements of this policy and its principal explanatory variables. Eventually, it is concluded that a neo-colonial strategy has been adopted in order to preserve a status quo that is clearly favourable to the conservative interests of the western world in general, and to France in particular.

THE HISTORICAL BASIS

From the very beginning, France's process of decolonisation was designed in such a way as to perpetuate dependency links after independence. This neo-colonial strategy was based on the infamous 'divide and rule' approach which resulted in the break-up of the large Federations of French West and Equatorial Africa.

As inheritors of the lofty ideals and values of the 1789 Revolution,

* Visiting Lecturer, Diplomacy Training Programme, University of Nairobi. This article is a revised and updated version of an earlier study in French by the author entitled, 'Les Fondements historiques, 6conomiques et politiques de la politique africaine de la France: du colonialisme au neo-colonialisme', in Geneve-Afrique (Geneva), XXI, 2, I983, pp. 39-68.

7-2



I90 GUY MARTIN

the French have always portrayed themselves as staunch and dedicated defenders of human rights and of racial equality. Yet the historical reality hardly conforms to this widely-held belief. Thus, William Cohen has brilliantly and convincingly argued - on the basis of incontrovert- ible historical evidence - that Africans have from time immemorial been considered in a negative light, as being inherently inferior to other human races.1 Such prejudices appeared even before any contacts were actually established between France and Africa. First, the Atlantic slave trade, then colonisation contributed to crystalline this negative image in the French collective psyche. The persistent belief in the congenital inferiority of blacks was coupled with the image that they were totally passive and submissive, just waiting to be dominated by foreign masters.

When French colonialism spread over large areas of the continent at the turn of the century, such a perception of 'the African' came in handy. It is therefore not surprising that racism, in fact, became one of the main elements of colonialism. In Albert Memmi's now classic statement on this process,

Racism summarises and symbolises the fundamental relationship between the coloniser and the colonised... Racism thus appears as a constituent element of colonialism. It is the clearest expression of the colonial situation, and one of the colonialist's most characteristic features.2

According to Bernard-Henri Levy, racism has become one of the constituent elements of the 'French ideology', which is nothing but 'a Fascism with French colours' transcending the traditional political cleavages, and fundamentally anti-democratic, xenophobe, and racist.3 It has become clear that the image of Africa retained by the French collective psyche is essentially negative: the inhabitants are quintessen- tially and permanently dependent on France for their survival. This carefully-nurtured inferiority complex has become progressively in- grained in the minds of many Africans and constitutes fertile ground for the development of new types of domination after political independence.

The I96I All-African People's Conference provided the following early definition of neo-colonialism:

The survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries, which become the victims of an indirect

I William B. Cohen, The French Encounter with Africans: white response to blacks, i53-i880

(Bloomington, i980). 2 Albert Memmi, Portrait du colonies, precede du portrait du colonisateur (Paris, i966), pp. 107-

i i i - translated by the author, as elsewhere in this article. 3 Bernard-Henri Levy, L'Idiologiefrancaise (Paris, i98i).



FRANCE S AFRICAN POLICY I9I

and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military, or technical means.'

This new strategy has been devised by the European imperialist powers in order to enable them to carry on the economic exploitation of their former colonies, while relinquishing political power to the compradore national bourgeoisies.

According to Kwame Nkrumah, the age-old strategy of 'divide and rule' is based on 'the principle of breaking up former large united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable states, which are incapable of independent development ) 2 It is such a policy of 'balkanisation' that France has successfully carried out in Africa. Although the locally-elected nationalist leaders of most of the 14 states of the Federation de l'Afrique occidentalefranfaise and the Federation d'Afrique equatorialefranfaise expressed their desire to obtain independence within these larger administrative frameworks, key French officials manoeuvred in such a way that this status was finally granted to each state separately.3

With the notable exception of Guinea, the independence of the African territories in i960 came more as a result of French 'goodwill' and 'magnanimity' than under the pressure of African nationalist movements. The transition from colonisation to 'co-operation' was smoothed before the formal grant of independence by the negotiation of agreements between France and the African states that 'tended to perpetuate a colonial type of domination under a rejuvenated legal cover'. Co-operation, indeed, appeared as 'the pursuit of colonisation by other means'.4 In effect, the two notions of independence and co-operation are intimately associated. Through the linkages established between the accession to international sovereignty and the signing of model co-operation agreements, France managed to institutionalize her political, economic, monetary, and cultural pre-eminence over a number of African states, which thereby remained almost totally dependent on her. In this regard, the new co-operation agreements concluded between France and her former African colonies between 1973 and I977 constitute-with the exception of Mauritania and

1 'All-African People's Conference, Cairo, March 23-3I, I961 IResolution on Neo-Colonialism', in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: a short political guide (London, i962), p. 254.

2 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: the last stage of imperialism (London, i965), p. xiii. 3 On this process, see WilliamJ. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven,

i964); Joseph-Roger de Benoist, La Balkanisation de l'Afrique occidentalefranfaise (Paris, I979); and Guedel N'diaye, L'tchec de la federation du Mali (Paris, i980).

4 Albert Bourgi, La Politiquefranfaise de cooperation en Afrique: le cas du Senegal (Paris and Dakar, I979), pp. 3 and 7-



I92 GUY MARTIN

Madagascar - mere adjustments to previous agreements that in no way affected her hegemony.'

Behind France's constant and determined efforts at entertaining division among African states lurks one overriding concern, namely to prevent at all cost the realisation of African unity. Thus, French leaders and authors constantly emphasise divisive, rather than unifying elements in their pronouncements and writings on the 'dark' continent. In what amounts to a 'semantic balkanisation', they usually partition Africa into a multiplicity of component parts. Hence, the common reference to 'Black Africa' or to 'Africa South of the Sahara' in opposition to the 'White' Maghreb; the distinction between the states of Africa and the islands of the Indian Ocean, as if the latter were not part of the continent; the well-known division between 'francophone', 'anglo- phone', and 'lusophone' Africa, as if the official foreign languages constituted a major and permanent distinctive criteria; and the more recent categorisation based on economic criteria: 'oil-exporting', 'high', or 'middle-income' versus ' oil-importing', 'low-income', 'poor', 'least developed' states (the latter being generally 'Sahelian' and 'drought- stricken'). By way of contrast, prominent African scholars, such as Cheikh Anta Diop, have convincingly demonstrated that there is an underlying historical, geographical, psychological, linguistic, and cultural unity running through the continent.2

THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF FRANCE S AFRICAN POLICY

Although France's African policy is based on specific economic and policital interests and objectives, some fundamental permanent characteristics underly this policy, whatever the actual government in power.

I. Racism

Racism has pervaded franco-African relations ever since the first encounter between the two civilisations. Such an attitude persists in the neo-colonial era; according to Memmi, 'The paternalist is one who sees himself as generous, once racism and inequality have been established'.3 This strategy has carefully cultivated the image of the African as a

Ibid. pp. 76-88. 1 Cheikh Anta Diop, L'Unite culturelle de 1'Afrique noire (Paris, i960), and Les Fondements

economiques et culturels d'un etatfidiral d'Afrique noire (Paris, I974, 2nd edn.). 3 Memmi, op. cit. p. I I 2.



FRANCE S AFRICAN POLICY 193

perpetual minor, inherently incapable and dependent, permanently in need of a master. The very conditions under which independence was granted to most of the countries in Africa contribute to reinforce this attitude. In addition, latent prejudices - based on the underlying theme, 'since we left, the Africans are incapable of ruling themselves' - are carefully nurtured by the French media which delight in dwelling on the eccentricities of the Amins or Bokassas, but hardly ever mention the positive aspects of African politics.1 In short, racism continues to serve as a justification of neo-colonial domination/dependence just as it did in earlier decades.

2. National Chauvinism

Racism is but an extreme manifestation of the latent xenophobia which, as Levy has shown, is one of the salient features of the 'French ideology '.2 In the area of France's African policy, such xenophobia takes the form of a deep suspicion of the motives and actions of the other foreign powers in Africa, especially in francophone Africa which France considers to be her natural preserve, off-limits to the United States, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union. Thus, France's African policy is primarily motivated by her own conception of her national interest in the political, strategic, economic, or cultural fields.3 Although disguised under the label of 'co-operation', France's African policy is, in fact, motivated by strictly nationalistic considerations and blatantly disre- gards African concerns and interests. As former President Giscard d'Estaing bluntly declared, 'I am dealing with African affairs, namely with France's interests in Africa'.4

1 For a fairly typical illustration of French public opinion and the media's idea of Africa, see Favilla in Les Echos (Paris), 2 I January I 983: 'Africa is quite different from France... Democracy does not and cannot have the same persuasion there as in the European countries with an ancient humanist tradition... under these inhospitable climes where civilisation has hardly penetrated, the daily exercise of power does not allow for any weakness.' Quoted by Jean-Francois Bayart, La Politique africaine de Franfois Mitterand (Paris, i984), p. 124.

In much the same vein Pierre Messmer, the former Minister of the Armed Forces, declared in May i982: 'To criticise the "personalisation" of political relations between France and Africa is to demonstrate one's ignorance of the African psychology'. Quoted in ibid. p. I 20.

Levy, op. cit. 3 Thus, there is some evidence that external interventions in the coups d'etat which led to the

murder of Sylvanus Olympio in Togo in I963 and to the overthrow of Leon M'Ba in Gabon in I964 were primarily motivated by French fears of the possible prevailing influences of the West Germans (Togo) and Americans (Togo and Gabon). See Yves B&not, 'Vingt ans de "politique africaine"', in La France contre l'Afrique/Tricontinental I (Paris, i98i), pp. 58-60; and Pierre PNan, Alfaires africaines (Paris, I983), pp. 46-50.

4 Televised interview of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, as reported in Le Monde (Paris), 29 January I98 I.



I94 GUY MARTIN

Furthermore, France's African policy has consistently been anti- nationalist and anti-socialist over the years. France has ruthlessly dealt with those African nationalist leaders who have dared confront her policies. As a result of this attitude of 'innate animosity towards those individuals who at some point have not acquiesced to our dictates',1 many African leaders have been either neutralised or physically eliminated. In this connection, it is troubling to note that a number of coups dtat have occurred in various francophone countries precisely when French economic, political, and strategic interests were being directly or indirectly threatened - although France's responsibility in these events has never been formally established, except in the Central African Republic.2

3. Hypocrisy

A number of observers of French-speaking Africa have been struck by the gap separating policies that are officially proclaimed by Paris and those that are actually implemented. Thus, France officially proclaims that she will under no circumstances meddle in the internal affairs of African states and loudly promotes the slogan 'Africa for the Africans'. Yet France has militarily intervened about 20 times in various African states between I 963 and I 983, in blatant contradiction with the sacrosanct 'non-intereference' principle, albeit usually justified on the grounds that the preservation of her interests in Africa - and of those who protect these - were at stake. As Giscard d'Estaing openly claimed in i98i, 'We have intervened in Africa whenever an unacceptable situation had to be remedied '.'

South Africa provides another example of French hypocrisy. At the official level, the French Government unequivocally condemns the apartheid strategy of institutionalized racial segregation stubbornly pursued by successive Afrikaner regimes. But at the unofficial level, economic and trade relations between the two countries continue to

1 Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, 'Les Interventions militaires francaises', in La France contre l'Afrique, p. 96.

2 This seems to be the case of the military coups d'ltat which led to the overthrow (or elimination) of Presidents Modibo K&ita in Mali (' 9 November I 968), Hamani Diori in Niger (I 5 April 1974), Marien Ngouabi in Congo (i8 March I977), Ali Soilih in Comoros (13 May 1978), Moktar Ould Daddah in Mauritania (i oJuly 1978), and 'Emperor'Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Republic (2i September i979). The same applies to the 'quasi-coup d'ettat' which resulted in the temporary neutralisation of Captain Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso on the very day that Guy Penne (France's main presidential adviser on African affairs) arrived for an official visit to that country (17 May 1983). Le Monde, 29January i98i.



FRANCE S AFRICAN POLICY I95

flourish. Thus, South Africa is one of France's main providers of such strategic raw materials as coal, natural and enriched uranium, manganese, titanium, platinum, and diamonds.1 In addition, direct French investment in South Africa currently amounts to some R500 million, representing 7 6 per cent of all foreign investment, while more than 8o French firms operate in that country.2

Furthermore, after having largely contributed to the build-up of one of the strongest and most sophisticated military arsenals on the continent, France has helped South Africa to graduate to the status of ajunior nuclear power.3 As a rule, France's much-publicised embargoes on specific categories of arms are usually preceded by lucrative licensing contracts which enable South Africa to manufacture all the weapons needed.4 In this regard, President Franqois Mitterand's policy does not seem to differ much from that of his preceedessors. The official position of his Parti socialist was that trade with Namibia should cease forthwith, that imports from South Africa should be reduced, that French public and private investments in that economy should be discontinued, and that the so-called 'front-line' states should be given adequate political, diplomatic, and humanitarian support.5 Not surprisingly, none of these policy options have been implemented to this day. As explained by Mitterand during a state visit to Cameroun inJune I983:

We do not have any binding commitments towards South Africa. We have maintained diplomatic relations, just as we do with other states whose policies we don't necessarily approve of. Having chosen a policy of presence rather than one of absence, we maintain some ancient and limited trade and exchange relations. We honour our contracts, and we try not to renew them when they relate to 'suspicious' matters. There have been no major innovations in this area over the last two years.6

I Brigitte Masquet, 'France-Afrique: depasser les contradictions', in Afrique contemporaine (Paris), ii9, January 1982, p. i6.

2 Antoine Bouillon, 'Du Bon usage de l'apartheid', in La France contre V'Afrique, pp. 206-7.

Thus, it is the French firm FRAMATOME which provided the equipment and technology necessary for the construction of phase I of the Koeberg nuclear power plant in South Africa. Phase II is now under way after the Mitterand Government gave its tacit approval. On this point, as on franco-South African relations in general, see Kaye Whiteman, 'President Mitterand and Africa', in African Affairs (London), 82, 328, July 1983, pp. 331-2.

4 Bouillon, loc.cit. p. 208. 5 Statement by Lionel Jospin, Secretary-General of the Socialist Party, 20 May i98i, quoted

in Bayart, op.cit. pp. 24-5.

6 Press conference given by President Francois Mitterand in Yaound6 on 2i June i983, while on a state visit to Cameroun (2-2 I June i983). This statement is obviously in contradiction with the recent government-authorised Koeberg II deal which, indeed, relates to a particularly ' suspicious' matter!



i96 GUY MARTIN

4. Continuity

One of the most striking characteristics of France's African policy is its continuity throughout the various political regimes of the Fifth Republic from i960 to i985. There is no doubt that an autonomous and permanent policy exists, transcending the traditional political cleavages, the various regimes and individual political leaders. The successive Governments of General Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pom- pidou, and Valery Giscard d'Estaing have inaugurated and strengthened this African policy. Although Francois Mitterand had proclaimed his desire and willingness to somewhat 'liberalise' this policy, his socialist regime (inaugurated in May I 98I) found its room for manoeuver strictly limited by 'historical' constraints and by the weight of economic, political, and strategic interests. Mitterand was thus led to manage rather than to radically transform this inheritance.1 In the final analysis, it seems that it is indeed the permanence of these economic, political, and strategic interests which account for such remarkable continuity.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS

The decision-makers responsible for France's African policy usually tend to minimise the role of economic factors in its formulation and implementation. According to them, 'Black-Africa is not an indispensable source of raw materials for France. Our investments there are minimal and our trading relations remain fairly limited. '2 Similarly, Giscard d'Estaing asserted that 'There is no relationship whatsoever between the Government's policy and economic interests'.' The truth of the matter is that Africa plays a vital economic role for France as a source of raw materials, as a market for her manufactured goods and technology, and as an outlet for her capital investment. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that 'in the short-term, France's economic and social equilibrium depends on her control over Africa'.i4

Much the same argument is made by Bayart, op. cit. p. 52, who goes as far as to assert that it was, in fact, Mitterand himself who initiated a 'new deal' for Africa when he became Minister for Overseas French Territories in 1954: 'The real continuity actually starts with M Mitterand and is passed on to General de Gaulle and to his successors'. See also Whiteman, loc. cit.

I Louis de Guiringaud, 'La Politique africaine de la France', in Politique itrangere (Paris), 2 June I982, p. 443-

3 Le Monde, 29 January 198I.

4 Path6 Diagne, 'Mitterand, la gauche, l'Afrique et le tiers-monde', in Peuples noirs/peuples africains (Paris), 27, May i982, p. 6.




I. Francophone Africa's Supply of Strategic Raw Materials

Europe in general, and France in particular, are highly dependent on the import of strategic raw materials from Africa. Such minerals are called 'strategic' because they are vital to the functioning of the European high-technology industries, notably in aeronautics, nuclear energy, and weaponry. France's rate of dependency on these minerals from Africa is ioo per cent for cobalt, 87 to ioo per cent for uranium, 83 per cent for phosphates, 68 per cent for bauxite, 35 per cent for manganese, and 32 per cent for copper. France's rate of dependency from francophone Africa is 35 per cent for manganese (Gabon), 32 per cent for chromium, and 22 per cent for phosphates (Senegal and Togo) .1

Uranium is an interesting case in point. France's ambitious nuclear- power expansion programme makes her greatly dependent on long-term African sources of supply. Thus, uranium plays a prominent role in France's African policy. In I982, Africa accounted for 35 per cent of the western world's uranium production, the major producers being South Africa (I 5 per cent), Namibia and Niger (about I o per cent each), the latter providing 4,646 tons, or nearly 6o per cent of France's requirements. As regards reasonably assured uranium resources - i.e. known deposits which can be recovered within the given production range - those of South Africa actually represent I4 per cent of the world's total, Niger 9 per cent, Namibia 6-8 per cent, France 3-4 per cent, and Gabon I per cent. Furthermore, France is at present actively prospecting for uranium in Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Mauritania, and Zaire, as well as in South Africa.2 Two major French parastatals, Le Bureau de recherches ge'ologiques et minieres and La Compagnie generate de matieres nucliaires actually control most uranium exploitation and prospection activities in the producing francophone African countries.

Through custom-made co-operation agreements concluded with those countries at independence, France even managed to secure her supply of all strategic raw materials from them. Thus, the I974

co-operation agreement concluded between France and Gabon stipulates that the latter will provide on a priority basis uranium, thorium, lithium, beryllium, and helium. These, as well as oil, are classified as

1 'L'Afrique: un partenaire indispensable', in Actuel diveloppement (Paris), 36, May i980, PP- 39-40.

2 Figures taken from A. D. Owen, 'The World Uranium Industry', in Raw Materials Report (Stockholm), 2, 4, I984, pp. 6-23; Libhration-Afrique, 'Les Particules de Giscard: l'uranium africain', in La France contre l'Afrique, pp. 144-6; and 'La France et I'Afrique', in Marchis tropicaux et miditerraneens (Paris), 2041, 2i December 1984, p. 3169.



198 GUY MARTIN

'strategic raw materials' which, according to the defence agreements signed between France and certain francophone African states, must be made readily available to France - and restricted to third countries - ' for common defence purposes'. As Pierre Pean rightly observes, 'France has complete mastery over the Gabonese resources, and Gabon has been officially made into a French preserve of raw materials '.'

2. Trade Relations

Franco-African trade relations remain fundamentally asymmetrical. Up to three-quarters of Africa's trade is realised with industrialised countries - including 50 per cent with the European Economic Community - and 5 per cent represents intra-African trade, while the E.E.C.'s trade is intra-European in the proportion of 50 per cent, only 5 per cent of its trade being with Africa. In addition, France's share in francophone Africa's total imports and exports remains as high as 40 per cent. Such asymmetrical relations are a reflection of the great inequalities in economic development and potential existing between these two partners. Furthermore, most trade and marketing activities in the former French African countries are monopolised by the old colonial trading companies - La Comipagniefranfaise de 1 'Afrique occidental and La Soci6te commercial de l'ouest africain - which have conveniently branched into import-export activities, and which operate within the vast protected market circumscribed by the franc zone. Similarly, French companies control most of the activities associated with the shipping of goods to and from these countries. A quarter of a century after independence, the foreign trade of African countries is still functioning according to the rules of the trade economy, according to which the African territories were restricted to the function of suppliers of raw materials and agricultural products, while the European metro- poles reserved for themselves the exclusivity of industrial production and the export of manufactured goods. According to a recent study, 65a2

per cent of France's imports from Africa in I 983 were made up of energy and fuel products, and I 3 6 per cent of agricultural and food products. During that same year, about 50 per cent of France's exports to Africa were constituted by manufactured goods.2

France's main African trading partners remain the ' privileged friends' who still constitute the hard core of the ' franco-African community', namely Cameroun, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger,

PIan, op. cit. pp. 42-3. The other main source for this information is Bourgi, op. cit. p. 99. 2 'La France et I'Afrique', p. 3i68.




Senegal, and Togo. In i983, these seven countries together accounted for I 7 per cent of France's imports from Africa, and for 2I per cent of her exports to the continent.' It is noteworthy that France's balance of trade, which is in chronic deficit vis-a-vis other industrialized countries, has practically always been positive with Africa between I 975 and I983. This trade surplus, which amounted to a staggering 25,500 million French francs in I 98 I, diminished to the still respectable figures of FF7,900 million in I982 and FF5,ooo million in i983.2

3. Aid and Investments

Globally, French official development assistance to Africa has stag- nated (if not diminished) in absolute terms over the last four years. This represented o038 per cent of her G.N.P. in ig80, o045 per cent in i98i, 049 per cent in i982, and o047 per cent in i983, still well below the official objective of 0o70 per cent.3 About 50 per cent of these funds for francophone Africa were allocated for technical assistance, the remainder being available for economic, budgetary, and financial help. Until recently, French aid to Africa consisted primarily of public grants, but during the last few years, loans from private sources have constituted an even greater proportion of this 'aid '. Thus, the proportion of loans to the total official development assistance has increased from I6 per cent in I979 to 30 per cent in I982.4

The two main French aid agencies, Le Fond d'aide et de cooperation and La Caisse centrale de cooperation economique are, in fact, acting as conduits for the transfer of French public capital to the beneficiary African state agencies, and from the latter to the French firms operating in these countries.5 Indeed, the 'rate of return' of F.A.C. and C.C.C.E. aid is generally estimated at between 67 and 8o per cent! Similarly, 54-5 per cent of French total official development assistance, 62-4 per cent of French bilateral grants, and 72-4 per cent of French bilateral loans were partially or totally tied in I983.7 It is noteworthy that

Ibid. pp. 3I69 and 3175- 2 Ibid. p. 3179. Development Co-operation: 1984 Review (Paris, I984), p. 2IO. These figures, according to the

newly-adopted computation system, exclude overseas districts and territories. 4 Philippe Messine, 'Nord-Sud: la gauche an I', in Cooperation et dipendances/Critiques de l'Iconomie

politique (Paris), 20, July 1982, p. 25. 5 Richard Joseph, 'The Gaullist Legacy: patterns of French neo-colonialism', in Review of

African Political Economy (Sheffield), 6, May 1976, p. 9. 6 Yves Berthelot and Jacques de Bandt, Impact des relations avec le tiers-monde sur l'6conomiefranfaise

(Paris, 1982), p. 43. The 'rate of return' is a measure of the percentage of FFioo of aid which actually 'returns' to France in the form of purchases of goods and services from that country.

7 Development Co-operation: 1984 Review, pp. 2 19-20.



200 GUY MARTIN

sub-Saharan Africa receives approximately 6o per cent of total French bilateral assistance. The main beneficiaries are her traditional economic partners, namely the Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Senegal, and Gabon. Total French financial flows to these four countries in i982 amounted to $63I, $303-2. $2944, and $168&4 million, respectively.1

These same countries were in I974-5 the recipients of 6o per cent of French direct investment in Africa, primarily directed towards oil in Cameroun, Congo, and Gabon; phosphates in Senegal and Togo; iron in Mauritania; manganese in Gabon; copper in Zaire; chromite in Madagascar; bauxite and aluminium in Cameroun and Guinea; and uranium in Gabon, Niger, and the Central African Republic.2 Fur- thermore, the French share of import-substitution and other processing industries usually ranges - depending on the type - anywhere between 6o and i00 per cent.3 Quite clearly, France's commercial interests in francophone Africa are considerable, and the franc zone further contributes to her overwhelming economic presence in these states.

4. The Franc Zone and Dependency4

France continues to play a dominant role in the formulation and implementation of monetary policies in francophone Africa 25 years after independence. Through the franc zone - a monetary co-operation arrangement set up between France and her former colonies in West and Central Africa following the latter's independence in the early i960s - France actually controls their issuance and circulation of currency, their monetary and financial regulations, their banking activities, their credit allocation and, ultimately, their budgetary and economic policies.

Through their acceptance of the strict membership rules of the franc zone, these African governments have actually entrusted all their monetary and financial responsibilities to France in what amounts to

1 Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1980/1983 (Paris, I984), various tables.

2 Philippe Hugon, 'L'Afrique noire francophone: l'enjeu economique pour la France', in Politique africaine (Paris), 5, February i982, p. 88.

3 Edmond Jouve, 'L'Afrique, enjeu mondial: le r6le de la France', in La France contre l'Afrique, p. 82.

4 On this point, see Patrick and Sylviane Guillaumont, Zone franc et diveloppement africain (Paris, I984); Guy Martin, 'The Franc Zone: underdevelopment and dependency in francophone Africa', I3th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Paris, I5-20July 1985; and Aguibou Y. Yansan6, 'Some Problems of Monetary Dependency in French-Speaking West African States', in Journal of African Studies (Los Angeles), 5, 4, Winter I978-9, pp. 444-70.



FRANCE S AFRICAN POLICY 20I

a voluntary surrender of sovereignty. For instance, the structure of decision-making by the African central banks is such that the French administrators in these institutions still retain a quasi-veto right. Similarly, because of the links established between the two currencies, any modification in the value of the French franc Vis-a-vis other foreign currencies automatically and fully affects the C.F.A. franc - the legal tender in the member-states of the African franc zone - without their governments being even consulted prior to any French devaluation decision.' Ultimately, the C.F.A. franc appears to be a mere appendage to the French franc, with no real autonomy of its own.

THE POLITICAL BASIS

The implementation of France's foreign policy has led her to maintain a system of political and cultural domination designed to safeguard her position and influence in Africa. Through the frequent resort to military intervention, this policy has largely contributed to the preservation of a status quo which clearly favours her interests and those of the West in Africa, often to the detriment of the indigenous peoples.

I. Political and Cultural Domination

French political and cultural domination over francophone Africa is realised through an elaborate institutional network which enables her to exercise an indirect, but efficient, control over African bureaucracies and national elites. First of all, it should be pointed out that the decision-making structures in the area of French African policy are characterized by three main features - namely, centralisation, secrecy, and specialization.

The formulation and implementation ofmajor African policy decisions is almost the exclusive preserve of the President of the Republic, acting through his main advisor on African affairs, Guy Penne.2 Practically no exceptions to this principle of 'reserved competence' are allowed. The competence of other Ministries - External Relations, Co-operation, and Development - in African affairs is strictly and exclusively by

I These and other problems raised by the functioning of the franc-zone system for the African member-states are examined in some detail in Martin, loc. cit. I985.

2 It is interesting to note that Penne's deputy is none other than Jean-Christophe Mitterand, the President's son. As is often said in France, African affairs are truly 'family affairs'!



202 GUY MARTIN

delegation of presidential authority.' As regards secrecy, as Pierre Pean has abundantly demonstrated, decision-making in African affairs is based on a complex and elaborate information network in which personal relations and the intervention of official or unofficial 'special action' agencies play a prominent role.2 As for specialization, relations with francophone African states since independence have always been the responsibility of the Ministry of Co-operation.

It is interesting to note in this respect thatJean-Pierre Cot's attempt to modify the functional and geographical competence of the Ministry as Mitterand's first Minister of Co-operation met with resounding failure. There is no doubt that his forced 'resignation' in December I 982 was brought about by a coalition made up of rival bureaucracies, the 'neo-colonial lobby', and certain African Heads of State, all of whom had particular reasons for feeling threatened by Cot's proposed reforms.3 Undoubtedly, ' the Ministry of Co-operation will remain the Ministry of the African Neo-Colonies' for many years to come.4

At another level, one of the constant preoccupations for French decision-makers in Africa has always been to inspire and encourage formal or informal institutional groupings bringing together all the francophone African states under the aegis of France. It is such concerns which have led to the creation of Le Conseil de 1'entente by the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey in May I959, followed by L' Organisation commune africaine et malgache which brought together all the moderate francophone African states in February i965. It was partly to make up for the deficiences of the rather ineffectual and dormant O.C.A.M. that Pompidou initiated the franco-African summit conferences during November I973, and since then I I have been held annually, alternatively in France and in Africa.5 These constitute in a

I Cf. Bayart, op. cit. p. 48, for an unequivocal statement by Mitterand during his state visit to Gabon in January i983: 'It is I who determine France's foreign policy, not my Ministers... The Ministers are allowed to think or to have an opinion... It is unthinkable that a policy could be implemented without my agreement, let alone my initiative'.

This state of affairs has been confirmed by a recent report in Africa Confidential (London), 26, 2, I6January I985, p. 8: 'Rarely during the Fifth Republic has decision-making in African affairs been so concentrated in the hands of the Elysee. Indeed President Fran~ois Mitterand has now taken personal charge of the Chad dossier. The foreign ministry and the ministry of cooperation are virtually bystanders. Mitterand consults a small group of advisers and takes all the main decisions.' On the principle of the 'reserved competence' of the Presidency in African affairs, see Brigitte Nouaille-Degorce, La Politiquefranfaise de cooperation avec les itats africain et malgache au sud du Sahara, 1958-I978 (Bordeaux, i982), pp. I04-55. 2 PNan, op. cit.

3 On this episode, see Bayart, op. cit. pp. 37-48; also Jean-Pierre Cot, A l'Epreuve de pouvoir: le tiers-mondisme, pour quoi faire? (Paris, i984).

4 Messine, loc. cit. p. I5. On this point, see also Whiteman, loc. cit. pp. 335-6. 5 The ioth Conference of the French and African Heads of State and Government was held

in Vittel, France, 2-4 October I983, with 39 participants. The I ith summit, held in Bujumbura, Burundi, I I -I2 December i984, brought together 35 participants.



FRANCE 'S AFRICAN POLICY 203

way the institutionalisation of the permanent tee-a-tete maintained between the French President and each of the francophone African Heads of State.

Such intimate contacts are also preserved through the frequent 'official', 'working', or 'private' visits of the francophone African Heads of State to France, as well as the numerous reciprocal visits undertaken by the French President.' At a lower level, a number of ad hoc conferences periodically bring together the French and African ministers who deal with similar areas of competence in their respective countries -justice, education and culture, health, sports, etcetera. Finally, a wide network of organisations and conferences - whose hub is L'Agence de cooperation culturelle et technique - tries, under the heading of La Francophonie, to institutionalize the linguistic and cultural links existing between France and her francophone satellites.

This complex and elaborate network constitutes a means whereby France perpetuates her multi-dimensional domination over her former colonies, thereby retarding the process of decolonisation and also directly or indirectly affecting the state machinery and ruling elites in francophone Africa. Of fundamental importance is the fact that the wholesale importation of the French administrative, fiscal, judicial, and educational systems by these states necessarily leads to a situation of acute cultural dependency. Education and culture, indeed, constitute a priority area of co-operation and technical assistance, thereby helping to reinforce the cultural, technical, and political influence of the former colonial power through the diffusion of her language, thought processes, and behavioural patterns. Thus, it is striking to note the priority given to the language and culture of France throughout francophone Africa.2 This situation obviously results in a significant restriction of the indigenous elite's decision-making autonomy vis-a-vis Paris, a dependency further reinforced by the fact that many French technical assistants still occupy important administrative and management positions, and thus retain significant bureaucratic responsibilities and power.3

The neo-colonial system thus set up actually results in a de facto

1 Thus, there have been 32 state visits to Africa by French Heads of State between i960 and I978 (9 by President Mitterand since May i98i), and 28o meetings between the latter and their African counterparts during the same period. In addition, during the period I959 to I978, the number of visits of all kinds (official or private) by certain African Heads of State is impressive: 47 for Felix Houphouct-Boigny (Ivory Coast), 32 for Leopold Sedar Senghor (Senegal), and i6 for Moktar Ould Daddah (Mauritania), to mentionjust a few. Nouaille-Degorce, op. cit. pp. 463-5.

2 On this point, see Abdou Tour6, La Civilisation quotidienne en CUte d'Ivoire: prochs d'occidentalisation (Paris, 198I).

3 Bourgi, op. cit. pp. 205-6 and 224-6. Thus in the Ivory Coast to this day, the Principal Secretary to the Presidency, the Government's Secretary-General, and the Head of State's Personal Secretary, are all French; see Liberation Afrique-Caraibe-Pacifique (Paris), i8, October i983, p. 28.



204 GUY MARTIN

alliance between the French and the African ruling elites, each defending the interests of the other to the detriment of those of the indigeneous peoples. Such a situation accounts for the dependent and expectant attitude of several African leaders towards France, from whom the solution to all of their national problems - be they political, military, economic, social, or financial - is expected to come.' This neo-colonial class alliance also accounts for certain aspects of France's African policy, particularly for her military interventions in certain states designed to protect, maintain, and if necessary, reinstate some leader or ruling group with which she entertains privileged relations.

2. French Military Presence and Intervention in Africa2

France has concluded a number of defence and military technical assistance agreements since i960 with each of her former African colonies. These have been renegotiated in the mid- I970s without significant changes, and they have even been extended to African countries situated outside the traditional French zone of influence, notably to Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire.3 Furthermore, France main- tains a significant permanent military presence in Africa, with at least 6,86o soldiers distributed as follows: Cameroun (6o), Central African Republic (i,ioo), Djibouti (3,500), Gabon (500), the Ivory Coast (500), and Senegal (I,200) . In addition to her military bases in the continent, France has set up a 'rapid deployment' airborne force (of some I3,000) that is capable of intervening at short notice almost anywhere in Africa from its base in France. This elaborate network of defence and military assistance agreements and logistical support structures has enabled the French army to intervene about 20 times in

1 Thus, the Malagasy journalist Sennen Andriamirado recently declared with conviction: 'The futility of debating African affairs among Africans has now become clear. In order to prevent intra-African conflicts, the Africans must necessarily call on France'. 'Comment 6viter les guerres?', in Jeune Afrique (Paris), I2 October I983, p. 49.

2 On this issue, the most authoritative sources are: Pascal Chaigneau, La Politique militaire de la France en Afrique (Paris, I984); Robin Luckham, 'French Militarism in Africa', in Review of African Political Economy, 24, May I982, pp. 55-84; and Sanguinetti, loc. cit. pp. 94-I04.

3 As of I January I984, France had concluded defence agreements with five countries (Cameroun, Central African Republic, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal) and military technical assistance agreements with I7 others (the same as above, plus Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Togo, and Zaire). Chaigneau, op. cit. annexes 7 and 8, pp. II 3-I4.

4 Chaigneau, ibid. p. I I4. It should be noted that an additional 3,000 French troops were stationed in Chad during the period August I 983 to September I 984, following operation 'Manta'. Some sources estimate that about one-third of this force may have been based at Bouar in the Central African Republic, from where they could be sent back to Chad at short notice, should the need arise. Fred Coleman, 'Mitterand's Chad Strategy', in Newsweek (New York), 24

December i984, p. 9.



FRANCE S AFRICAN POLICY 205

Africa during the 20-year period I963-83.1 According to the official French doctrine, military interventions in Africa are ad hoc, always conducted at the concerned government's specific request within the framework of an existing defence agreement, and designed to counter actual or potential external aggression.

The French leaders also usually link the notions of security and development by arguing that their help in creating strong national armies has contributed to the stability - and hence to the economic benefit - of all concerned. Giscard d'Estaing even went as far as to argue in I98I that because the African states have limited resources, they should let France take care of their defence while they grapple with development problems:

Why do certain states ask us to take care of their security? It is because they just do not have the resources to do it, and it would not be wise for them to use their limited resources to build up modern armed forces. Africa must allocate her resources to development projects.2

In this area, as in others, continuity has prevailed over change. Thus although Mitterand stated, prior to his coming to power, that 'the resort to the military option in its various forms does not seem to me to be a viable solution ',3 he has declared more recently, 'We shall intervene, if necessary, provided it is within the framework of the agreements signed between France and the African states '.4 As a matter of fact, the French Government decided to intervene directly and heavily in the Chadian conflict by supporting President Hissen Habre against the rebel forces of ex-President Goukouni Weddeye from August i983 to September I984. In addition to the 3,000 men who made up the 'Manta' intervention force, France provided considerable quantities of arms, equipment, and ammunitions, as well as logistical support.

The size, location, and mobility of these external armed forces make it very easy for the French to interfere in the African continent.5 Such a presence, which in effect results in France's strict control over the

1 The list of these interventions is as follows: Gabon (I964); Chad (I968, 1975, 1978, i980,

I983); Djibouti (I967, 1974, 1976, 1977); Mayotte (1977, 1978); Mauritania (1956-63, 1977, 1978, i980); Central African Republic (1979); and Zaire (1977, 1978). Chaigneau, op. cit. pP. 93-100.

2 Televised interview with Giscard d'Estaing, reported in Le Monde, 29January i98i. 3 Letter from Fran~ois Mitterand to Libiration Afrique, dated April i98i, quoted in Libtration

Afrique-Caradbe-Pacifique, I4, September I982, p. 28. 4 Quoted in Messine, loc. cit. p. 24.

6 As Luckham cogently remarks, loc. cit. p. 56, 'The presence of French troops and military advisers, the consolidation and reproduction of national military structures through external support and the transmission through military training of metropolitan skills, tastes and ideologies constitute a permanent intervention'.



206 GUY MARTIN

defence of the francophone states - one of the foremost attributes of their sovereignty - contributes to further exacerbate their already acute dependency on Paris. In the final analysis, France's military presence in Africa is determined by three main factors: (i) the size and degree of her economic interests and involvement; (ii) the number of French residents; and (iii) the nature of the links existing between France and the national ruling elites. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the 'core' countries of this defence system are precisely those which are central to France's economic interests: namely, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal.1 Ultimately, one suspects that the main objective is to help pro-French regimes stay in power, as the remarkable political stability and exceptional elite longevity of several francophone states seems to indicate.

3. France and the Defence of the West

Ever since their political independence, the francophone states of Africa have always been considered as belonging to the French traditional sphere of influence by virtue of 'historical' links and geographical proximity. According to this franco-African version of the Monroe doctrine, it is generally understood that 'France is operating in Africa for herself, and within the framework of her responsibilities ',2and that 'Africa South of the Sahara is an entity matching France's ambitions'?

France, whose economy is shaky and whose international prestige has been seriously affected by her unsuccessful colonial adventures - notably in Vietnam and Algeria - is still attempting to raise her global status, thanks to the lebensraum offered by the African geopolitical space. Such a policy, initiated by General de Gaulle, is designed to build France into a respectable middle power, free from the hegemony of the United States and the Soviet Union, and truly 'non-aligned'. Indeed, 'It is in the Third World that France finds the political and economic space within which to disengage from superpower hegemony'.' In this perspective, francophone Africa constitutes a base from which France can develop relations with countries located outside her traditional

I Ibid. pp. 68-7I. 2 Televised interview of Giscard d'Estaing after the French military intervention in Kolwesi

(Zaire), quoted in ThomasJallaud, 'La Cooperation militaire, outil de contr6le', in La France contre I'Afrique, p. 105.

3 Guiringaud, loc. cit. p. 443. It is interesting to note in this regard that the French socialists have a similar view on this issue. Thus, according to Cot, op. cit. p. 38, '[Africa] ... constitutes a territory matching our resources and which we have a duty to develop'.

4 Luckham, loc.cit. p. 77.



FRANCE' S AFRICAN POLICY 207

sphere of influence - witness the recent broadening of the participation in franco-African summits - or with other third-world countries with which Africa entertains regular relations, including Brazil and India. In this respect, there is no doubt that 'France's neo-colonial position in the francophone countries in some respects has facilitated the extension of her global influence'.'

In actual fact, France is acting in Africa not merely on her own account, and in the defence of her own national interests, but also as a proxy gendarme of the western world. From this perspective, France appears as a secondary imperial power, included in the western economy and system of defence, with a specific function assigned to her within the N.A.T.O. alliance, and operating within limits clearly defined by American imperialism. From this point of view, the French military presence and interventions in Africa take on a new dimension and seem to be essentially motivated by three main factors. First of all, they are designed progressively and permanently to integrate the francophone states into the Atlantic alliance. Some strategists even frankly advocate 'the integration of Black Africa and South Africa within the same geo-political security alliance'!2 Secondly, they are intended to contribute to the protection of the sea lanes through which the western world's supplies of oil and other strategic raw materials usually travel. Finally, they aim at countering and limiting the expansion of Soviet military presence and influence in Africa wherever these might manifest themselves.3 France thus appears as a mere instrument - albeit vitally important - of western imperialism in Africa, whose main objective is to ensure the survival of the states and leaders who act as faithful and vigilant guardians of western interests, often against those of their own peoples.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to identify the main historical, economic, political, and strategic elements that explain the essential characteristics and mechanisms of France's post-colonial policy in Africa. On the basis of this analysis, the inevitable conclusion has to be reached that this policy is essentially neo-colonial because it is designed to perpetuate the dominance/dependency pattern prevailing in franco-African relations.

I Ibid, p. 78. 2 Jacques Leguebe, L'Afrique du sud contemporaine (Paris, 1978), p. 205. 3 It is such motivations which explain the French secret destabilization actions against the

M.P.L.A. in Angola during 1975-6, as well as successive interventions in Zaire in 1977 and 1978. Luckham loc. cit., Table ii, p. 6i.



208 GUY MARTIN

One puzzling question remains unanswered: 'How can France do everything that she does in Africa and get away with it?'1 Obviously we need to take into account the limited economic and political power of the African states within the contemporary international system, essentially due to their underdevelopment and dependency. While we cannot possibly condone many of France's activities in Africa, the blame for the situation now prevailing on the continent cannot be put squarely on her shoulders. France is, in fact, merely conducting - with all the means at her disposal - a policy which promotes and defends what she considers to be her legitimate national interests. It is, therefore, the responsibility of African leaders to counter such manifestations of neo-colonialism with innovative and bold policies of consultation, co-operation, and unity aiming at the total political and economic integration of the continent in the interest of the African peoples. Only thus can French neocolonialism be relegated to where it really belongs: 'the museum of antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe'.2

1 Tamar Golan, 'A Certain Mystery: how can France do everything that it does in Africa - and get away with it?', in African Affairs, 8o, 3 i8, January i98i, pp. 3-I I.

I Friedrich Engels, 'The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State', in L. S. Feuer (ed.), Marx and Engels: basic writings on politics and philosophy (New York, 1959), p. 394.



Documents

The Historical, Economic, and Political Bases of France's African Policy