The impact of flooding on bridges and other transport … · 2010-03-30 · Ev 2 Transport Committee: Evidence 17 March 2010 Mr Andrew Moss, Mr Kenneth Brooks, Mr Michael Winter,

HC 473 Published on 30 March 2010

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House of Commons

Transport Committee

The impact of flooding on bridges and other transport infrastructure in Cumbria

Oral and written evidence

Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 24 March 2010

5

The Transport Committee

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Department for Transport and its associated public bodies.

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Mrs Louise Ellman MP (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) (Chair) Mr David Clelland MP (Labour, Tyne Bridge) Rt Hon Jeffrey M Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) Mr Philip Hollobone MP (Conservative, Kettering) Mr John Leech MP (Liberal Democrat, Manchester, Withington) Mr Eric Martlew MP (Labour, Carlisle) Mark Pritchard MP (Conservative, The Wrekin) Ms Angela C Smith MP (Labour, Sheffield, Hillsborough) Sir Peter Soulsby MP (Labour, Leicester South) Graham Stringer MP (Labour, Manchester Blackley) Mr David Wilshire MP (Conservative, Spelthorne)

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List of witnesses

Wednesday 17 March 2010 Page

Mr Andrew Moss, Head of Service, Highways and Transportation, and Mr Kenneth Brooks, Business Manager, Cumbria Highways, Cumbria County Council; Mr Michael Winter, ADEPT Bridges Group Chairman and Head of Engineering, Dorset County Council, and Mr Graham Cole, ADEPT Bridges Group Secretary and Structures Group Manager, Surrey County Council; and Mr Amrit Ghose, Chair of Structures Panel, Institution of Civil Engineers and Regional Director Transportation, AECOM Ev 1

Mr Matthew Lugg, Chairman, UK Roads Board, and Mr Greg Perks, Chairman, UK Bridges Board, UK Roads Liaison Group; Mr John Dora, Principal Engineer (Climate Change), Network Rail; and Mr David Rooke, Head of Strategy and Engagement, Environment Agency Ev 7

Rt Hon Sadiq Khan MP, Minister of State, and Mr Mostaque Ahmed, Division Manager, Regional and Local Major Projects and Roads Maintenance, Department for Transport; and Mr Neil Loudon, Group Manager, Structures Policy and Pavements, Highways Agency Ev 11

List of written evidence

1 Mr D Holladay Ev 18

2 Adept (Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport) formerly the County Surveyors’ Society (CSS) Ev 21

3 UK Roads Liaison Group Ev 27

4 Cumbria County Council Ev 32, 51

5 English Heritage Ev 36

6 Network Rail Ev 38

7 Environment Agency Ev 42, 52

8 Department for Transport Ev 44, 49, 50

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 1

Oral evidence

Taken before the Transport Committee

on Wednesday 17 March 2010

Members present

Mrs Louise Ellman, in the Chair

Mr David Clelland Mr Eric MartlewMr Philip Hollobone Ms Angela C. SmithMr John Leech Graham Stringer

Witnesses: Mr Andrew Moss, Head of Service, Highways and Transportation, Mr Kenneth Brooks, BusinessManager, Cumbria Highways, Cumbria County Council, Mr Michael Winter, ADEPT Bridges GroupChairman and Head of Engineering, Dorset County Council, Mr Graham Cole, ADEPT Bridges GroupSecretary and Structures Group Manager, Surrey County Council, Association of Directors ofEnvironment, Economy, Planning and Transport and Mr Amrit Ghose, Chair of Structures Panel,Institution of Civil Engineers and Regional Director Transportation, AECOM, gave evidence.

Chair: Good afternoon gentlemen and welcome tothe meeting of the Transport Select Committee. DoMembers have any interests to declare?Mr Clelland: I am a member of Unite.Mr Martlew: Member of Unite and GMB unions.

Q1 Chair: Louise Ellman, a member of Unite. MayI ask the witnesses to identify themselves with nameand organisation for our records?Mr Brooks: I am Kenneth Brooks. I work for CapitaSymonds and I represent Cumbria Highways.Mr Moss: I am Andrew Moss. I am CumbriaCounty Council’s Head of Highways andTransportation.Mr Winter: I am Michael Winter. I am hererepresenting the ADEPT Bridge Group. ADEPT isthe Association of Directors of Environment,Economy, Planning and Transport, which wasformerly the CSS.Mr Cole: I am Graham Cole. I am representingADEPT Bridges Group of which I am Secretary.Mr Ghose: I am Amrit Ghose and I am representingthe Institution of Civil Engineers.

Q2 Chair: Mr Moss, may I thank you for your eVortson Monday. Members of the Committee visitedCumbria and we were able to see at first hand someof the things which were happening.Mr Moss: You are welcome.

Q3 Chair: Following on from that, could you give usan idea about why you think so many bridgescollapsed when that had not happened on previousoccasions when there has been flooding?Mr Moss: My first observation is that the primaryreason for the kind of damage we sustained inCumbria was not just bridges; we lost an awful lot ofother parts of our road infrastructure, carriagewaysand such like. I suspect the issue about infrastructuredamage to bridges is more about the impact of thehigh level of rain that we received; something of theorder of 320mm to 370mm of rain fell within a 24-hour-plus period in the days before the floods on 19and 20 November. That rainfall in catchment areas

funnelled through to the Derwent Valley and downfrom Keswick into Cockermouth and then into theWorkington town area impacting on structures as itaccumulated as it went. That is our primary belief asto why we have lost so many structures. We are,however, in the middle of investigations into thetechnical reasons for structural failures andstructural losses. It is too early for us to say at thispoint what the specific reasons were. We have ouropinions and we start with rainfall, the topographyof the county, the unique nature of Cumbria as amountainous county, primarily with themountainous mass in the centre from where therainfall catchment areas fall and focus towards theconurbations of Cockermouth and Workingtonwhere, as you saw on Monday, most of the damagewas sustained.

Q4 Chair: When do you expect to be in a position togive any firmer conclusions about why thishappened?Mr Moss: It is a little early for us to give a specificdate but we have an investigation underway at themoment with our technical staV to understand thereasons for technical failure. I would expect towardsthe late summer/early autumn to be in a betterposition to report on what the specific reasons were.There is an awful lot of anecdotal evidence andobservation, not just from within Cumbria but fromwithin the industry as to why bridges of the kind wehave in the county did collapse or sustain damage.Much of that focus is around whether or not themasonry arch bridges and such like, which primarilyform our bridge stock, are inherently weak incomparison to the needs of flood impact damage.

Q5 Chair: How rare is it for bridges to collapse inthis way or to be so severely damaged? Can any ofour other witnesses give a view on that from otherplaces?Mr Winter: The first thing to say is that bridgefailure is very rare in the UK but there are diVerentmechanisms of bridge failure. There can be bridgefailure due to the structural integrity of a bridge,

Ev 2 Transport Committee: Evidence

17 March 2010 Mr Andrew Moss, Mr Kenneth Brooks, Mr Michael Winter, Mr Graham Cole and Mr Amrit Ghose

through overload or lack of maintenance and so on,but this is actually an external force, the sheervolume of flows that were experienced in Cumbriacausing the damage to the structure. Speaking ingeneral terms, there are probably three reasons whymasonry structures of the type in Cumbria fail. Thefirst is really scour, the removal of the river bed andthe undermining of foundations leading toinstability. The second one is really the force of thewater, the hydrodynamic forces of the flood waterand debris. The third one, on masonry structures inparticular, you get damage to the fabric caused bythe sheer velocity of the water and the turbulencewhich sometimes can rip out the stones andmasonry. Behind these arches it is just loose fill, so ifyou get penetration of the structure of the arch, thenthe loose fill behind can wash out quite rapidly andyou can get quite catastrophic failure of thestructures such as this.

Q6 Chair: No Highways Agency bridges or NetworkRail bridges collapsed, did they? Is there a reasonfor that?Mr Winter: We need to distinguish between thecharacteristics of the majority of the HighwaysAgency’s structures and the structures which failedin Cumbria. The Cumbria structures are actuallymulti-span arches with supports in the river channeland in themselves created constriction to the flow.Often more contemporary structures—and many ofthe Highways Agency’s structures are less than 50years old—will completely span the river channel,they will not create the same sort of partial dammingeVect that an older structure would.

Q7 Mr Leech: Could the collapse of these bridgesrealistically have been foreseen if any checks hadbeen going on on the bridges before it happened?Mr Winter: All bridges are checked on a two-yearcycle for general maintenance but that would notassess the capability of a structure to withstand theforces that we saw in Cumbria. That would have tobe a separate assessment and that is more or less adesktop calculation approach.

Q8 Mr Leech: How would a calculation be madethat a bridge needed to withstand this sort ofpressure?Mr Winter: You start by looking at the catchmentarea that is feeding the water which is potentiallygoing to damage the structure and you would haveto decide then on the design storm, if you like, thereturn period of probability of the storm and thevolumes of water that would be coming downtowards the structure. From that you could modelthe forces on the structure and then check thestability of the structure, the extent to which thevelocities of the water might lead to scour and thedamage to the fabric.

Q9 Mr Leech: How would you calculate thelikelihood that that sort of pressure would be createdin that sort of natural disaster? In terms of flooding,if it were a 1:1,000 risk or 1:100 risk, where would

you draw the line about what was considered anappropriate amount of expectation of what a bridgehad to withhold?Mr Winter: The guidance we have within our designstandards for new structures suggests that we shouldbe designing structures for a 1:200 return period, a1:200 probability storm. The impact of climatechange and the pressure to look at adaptation forclimate change suggest that we perhaps need to beadding to that expectation; indeed the EnvironmentAgency suggest in its Planning Policy Statement 25that we add a 20% enhancement of peak river flowsand 5% to 30% on rainfall intensities to allow for thefact that we are facing increasing extreme weatherevents.

Q10 Mr Clelland: It is not just a question of thevolume and rate of flow of the water, is it? It is alsoa question of the debris which is carried in the water.You could do as many calculations as you like abouthow the bridge might stand up to a volume of water,but how can you calculate the debris, the gravel andtree trunks which are carried in the water and arecolliding with the bridges?Mr Moss: It might be worth observing here some ofthe technical design standards referred to by Mikejust now relate to new build bridges. Some of ourbridges are of a considerable age, 100 or 200 yearsold; some of them older. The bridges in Workington,Northside Bridge, the one which fatally collapsed,we think is around 100 years old, something likethat. Our bridges do have an inspection programme.We comply with government guidance for inspectionand for maintenance. It might help if Ken explaineda few things that we do regarding that in a moment.

Q11 Chair: Did you follow the UK Liaison Group’sadvice on maintenance and on checks?Mr Moss: Yes; we carry out general inspections onall our bridges, we have a two-year programme.Northside Bridge that collapsed was inspected in2008 and a detailed report made out on thatstructure. It is not just about the theoretical formulafor calculating bridge stress: I wanted to make thepoint that it is also about the age of the structure,some of which pre-exist the writing of thegovernment standards. Debris is a factor certainly.The unique nature of the Cumbrian floods in 2009was that an immense amount of debris, as you sawon Monday in your visit, flowed down the RiverDerwent and impacted increasingly into the lowerparts of the river so the bridges further down wouldhave sustained more impact damage. So debris is afactor as well.

Q12 Chair: Were there any recommendations formaintenance as a result of the inspections?Mr Moss: Not from the recent inspection and not ofa significant structural nature. We are talking hereabout one structure which is currently under ourauspices for inspection and investigation of thereasons for its collapse. The last repair requirementfor Northside Bridge was noted around the turn ofthe century, 2000–01, following the inspectionslightly before that. I am not the structural guy in



terms of specialism but we can talk about that inmore detail. In general, where an inspection iscarried out within Cumbria and repairs are noted,repairs are then carried out.

Q13 Mr Martlew: What you are saying is that therewas a need for repairs after the inspection in2000–01. Were they done?Mr Moss: Yes; yes.

Q14 Mr Martlew: I am a bit surprised that you donot know the age of the bridge. I would have thoughtthat the archivist could have told you that quiteeasily. You think it is “about 100 years old”. I wouldhave thought you would have been able to find outby now.Mr Moss: That is partly due to my recent arrival inthe county.

Q15 Chair: Mr Brooks, can you tell us the age ofthe bridge?Mr Brooks: I do not know the date of itsconstruction but I understand it was about 1860.

Q16 Mr Martlew: It looked a good 100 years old.Our inquiry is not about finding fault for what hasgone on in Cumbria but learning the lessons fromwhat has gone on in Cumbria. If I may turn to therailways for a little moment, if you remember, therewas a very serious accident on the East CoastMainline where a car went oV the motorway ontothe line and the train crashed into it. After that a lotof alterations were made to the bridges and barrierswere put up to stop vehicles doing that. Is thereanything we could do which would stop debrishitting the bridges now? Could we put some sort ofreinforcement in front of these Victorian bridges?Mr Winter: Since writing our evidence I have givensome thought, with colleagues, to a process to riskassess the structures for flood damage. Could Imaybe take you through that? I have submitted aprocess map to the Committee as part ofsupplementary evidence and if I might brieflyexplain, it might be useful. What we need to do is toidentify on a risk basis the catchments which havethe characteristics which will lend themselves mostto high velocity impact of water at bridge sites. Somelong, wide open catchments are unlikely to have thesort of characteristics we saw in Cumbria; there theyare more likely to have inundations rather than highvelocity floods. Working with the EnvironmentAgency, we should be able to do that and to somedegree that process overlaps with the flood riskregulations which came out in December and theemerging Flood and Water Management Bill whichis going through at the moment. For these high riskcatchments we need to simulate a flood event—Imentioned 1:200, perhaps enhanced for climatechange—and actually get some figures at bridge sitesof the forces that we need to check the bridge out forto see whether it will withstand those forces. Then weneed to look in three areas. I said at the outset thatthere were three mechanisms for bridge failure andwe need to look at the stability of the structure towithstand the hydrodynamic forces, whether or not

the bridge is going to tip over because the forces areso great on it, we need to look at the scour, we needto look at the damage to the fabric of the structure.There are actually already standards for the first twoof those which would help us in developing guidancefor this process. The HA has an advice note onassessing bridges for scour and there is already adesign standard for new structures which givesindications of forces. The gentleman here referred todebris impact. There is guidance on loadings fordebris impact and that is quite basic. It is the forceof a three-tonne log hitting a structure at the velocityof the river flow. So we do have standards already setout; it is a case of knitting them together to look inthe same way that we looked at the risk of vehicles’incursions onto the railway. It is a case of knittingthem together and getting some sort of priorityranking for our bridge stock. If we were to gothrough that, we could then see where our highestvulnerability was and based on that look at whatmeasures could be taken to improve the resilience ofthe bridges to withstand these floods. There arethings that we can do to protect foundations withsheet piling or rock or gabions. Having done that, wecan then move on and actually prioritise that workby looking at the cost of the measures and balancingthem with the enhancement to the resilience we get ofthe structure but also looking at the socio-economicbenefits of doing the work because any work wouldhave to be prioritised against the wider maintenanceprogramme.

Q17 Chair: That is very helpful to us and we will readthe detail of what has been submitted. Mr Ghose,could I ask you from your experience whether youwould say there was a danger of collapse of this typeof bridge over waterways in other parts of thecountry?Mr Ghose: I would say there is. I would not be ableto identify exactly where. As Mr Winter said, youneed to identify the types of flow, the types ofrainfall, working with the Environment Agency andto look at the risk and vulnerability of structures.One thing I would say is that there are diVerent typesof bridges, so in Cumbria I believe we are looking atmulti-span arched bridges which are an older type ofbridge which would not have been designed forlateral forces due to water. They are very reliant onthe mass of the structure to keep them stable andalso they have fairly shallow foundations. Again,diVerent parts of the country may have diVerenttypes of infrastructure. You referred to railwaybridges and in general terms, when bridges are riverbridges, they have had a programme of looking atscour on railway structures because of theirvulnerability and there were incidents quite anumber of years ago. The railways authorities haveundertaken some work in this area to try to identifysome of the risks on a regular basis. On theHighways Agency side, the Highways Agencynetwork stems from the motorway network ingeneral so it stems from the 1960s onwards but againwe are generally looking at more modern types ofstructures which are more robust.



Q18 Mr Clelland: It is one thing assessing the likelydamage made through volumes of water and debrisbut there is also the question of avoidance, is therenot? What could be done, for instance, to avoid thelikelihood of large amounts of debris, tree trunks, etcetera being caught up in the flood? Shouldsomething be done about managing the river and thegeneral environment to avoid that sort of thing infuture?Mr Winter: Yes. It is probably a matter for theEnvironment Agency to talk along those lines ratherthan us but certainly anything we can do to avoidtree trunks and so on hitting the bridges would bevery beneficial.Mr Brooks: I would just like to go back to the verybeginning and try to emphasise the extraordinarynature of this event. We had significant amounts ofrainfall and it was very focused and only happenedin discrete areas of our county. That is why it aVectedthe bridge stock that we are seeing has beendamaged. It did not come across any HighwaysAgency structures as such; it only came across onerailway bridge and all the other bridges which havebeen aVected have been masonry structures. Thescale of the flooding was unprecedented, so the landmanagement structure upstream of those bridgeswould not have anticipated rubbish and debris beingpicked up and the figures you have quoted talkedabout design standards of 1:200-year return;everybody else in Cumbria is talking about a1:1,000-year event. It is of a much greater scale andbeyond anything anticipated or expected.

Q19 Mr Martlew: I am afraid you lost me a littlebecause it is a very technical issue. When you wereanswering the question, what you were really sayingwas that you can identify which bridges are mostat risk.Mr Winter: I think we could.

Q20 Mr Martlew: Could that be done reasonablyquickly? Secondly, could you do something aboutpreventing collapses?Mr Winter: Yes, that is the first point. We wouldneed to prepare some guidance and with DfTsupport we could fairly readily build on the workthat was suggested by Network Rail on assessingscour, particularly as they have done some very goodwork following a rail incident in the late 1980s whenthere was a failure due to scour in South Wales. Theyhave done some excellent work. If we can use thatand work by the Highways Agency, I think we canactually produce some guidance quite readily. Thatwould identify bridges at risk and there is a series ofengineering measures which can be done to mitigatethe risk of flood damage for some structures; not all.For some it will just be cost prohibitive but there willbe some structures where we can probably do thingsto make them more resilient.

Q21 Mr Martlew: Usually when we have a disasterlike this some eminent professor comes out and says“We told you so”. Was there any warning within theprofession, amongst the experts, that this sort ofthing could happen?

Mr Winter: We have had incidents in Boscastlewhere a bridge was lost and we had theGloucestershire floods. Certainly Boscastle was notdissimilar but Gloucestershire was more aboutinundation rather than a high velocity. Parapetswere damaged and I think one bridge was damaged.With hindsight maybe we should have been morefocused on flood risk and I would certainly besuggesting that we put some improved guidance inour code of practice on highway structures torecommend that authorities do consider flood riskand carry out some sort of assessment.

Q22 Mr Martlew: But nobody was actually flaggingup that this could happen?Mr Winter: No, not particularly.

Q23 Chair: What would you say is the condition ofthe current bridge stock nationally?Mr Winter: We do believe we have quite a significantmaintenance backlog. We have about 58,000 bridgesin England; about half of them are masonrystructures. The asset replacement value we talk of forthose is about £25 billion and probably £2.4 billionis the estimated backlog. However, we do not have aformal figure; that is based on a survey done byauthorities done in 2007. It is a shame we do nothave a better picture on that but as we move towardsasset management in the coming year or two as partof a programme the DfT are promoting, we ought tobe able to get a better picture as to what theposition is.

Q24 Chair: Are there any diVerences in maintenancebetween the bridges owned by local authorities, theHighways Agency, Network Rail or others? Is thereany significant diVerence on the maintenancerecords?Mr Ghose: It is fair to say that a lot of generalstandards are common throughout the diVerenthighways and rail authorities. Where the diVerenceprobably lies is with Network Rail bridges where, ifthere is failure within the structures, there is greaterpotential for loss of life because you are carryingrailway lines. One of the issues they have is on bridgeimpacts. If the bridge moves slightly then you havemoved the lines slightly and then you have potentialfor derailments. That is perhaps part of the reasonwhy they have looked at scouring in a more holisticway and earlier than perhaps a lot of highwayauthorities and they are also linked in with privatefunding, so the operation of the railways is quitecritical. On the highways side, again there are lots ofcompeting requirements. Bridges in general are well-maintained, they generally do not fail and it is reallyquite a rare event. A lot of that is down to the skill ofthe engineers in keeping bridges going and in regularmaintenance, regular inspections. However,obviously there are going to be occasional extremeevents, as in this particular case, which may not havebeen foreseen. This is probably something we as aprofession should be more aware of and perhaps inlooking at actual risks and where this might occur,that is where we could focus a little bit more.



Q25 Chair: What happened in Cumbria was seen asa 1:200-year occurrence. Do you take any lessonsfrom that? Should a change be made on maintenancestandards and reviews?Mr Moss: My recollection is that it is more than a1:200 occurrence in terms of the weather event. Wewere under the impression that it was much broaderthan that: towards 1:1,000-year event.

Q26 Mr Clelland: How do you know it is a 1:1,000-year event?Mr Moss: A good question. That is anecdotally howour understanding of this has emerged. I would haveto report back to the Committee to verify the specificdetail on that.

Q27 Mr Martlew: To go on from the bridge collapse,we were very impressed with the fact that you had anew railway station there and you had the footbridgeup and the work was underway on the temporarybridge. However, there is deep frustration amongstmy friends in the Workington area. If you look at thecost benefit, it has split the town in two creating allsorts of problems. Do you think that the lessonslearned from this collapse, with regard to gettingnew replacement bridges, will be learned? Has therebeen any frustration on this?Mr Moss: There are many lessons to be learned,some of which we have begun to refer to in thisdiscussion this afternoon regarding bridge riskassessment, for instance at a national level. In termsof lessons learned in getting replacements, we are indiscussions with our colleagues in DfT, Departmentfor Transport, regarding how we can accommodatefuture transport objectives, sustainable transportobjectives for instance, where a bridge replacementis concerned where we can build in capacity for othermodes of transport, cycling, pedestrian activity andso on. We are trying to accommodate that within thedesign. Some of the frustration emerges whereconstraints emerge from the guidelines for fundingfor recovery work after a flood event or anyemergency event of this nature such that your startpoint is to put back what you lost. It is my view thatis not necessarily the best for the locality which isaVected, in this case by a flood.Mr Martlew: I am perhaps not explaining myself toowell. Firstly, the impression we got when we werethere was that, to be honest, the Government hadbeen very generous and there had been no financialconstraints, but the frustration felt by the people ofWorkington and elsewhere is the time it takes tobuild the temporary bridge and then the permanentone. Are there any lessons to be learned on that?

Q28 Chair: Do you agree that the Government havebeen generous? Are you satisfied with the help thathas been given?Mr Moss: Cumbrian County Council has welcomedand recognises the support we have received fromGovernment, from the Department for Transportand other government departments which have beenpresent in the county. As we discussed during theCommittee’s visit to the county on Monday, anawful lot of work has been done and the situation

would be very diVerent for the county authority as ahighway authority in respect of its future workprogramme had we not received that support. Wevery much recognise that aspect of the governmentassistance. More broadly, both government oYcersand county oYcers worked towards the guidelinesfor funding provision and in this case emergencyFlood Recovery Grant from the Department forTransport and a discussion takes place about thevalue of the funding initially and that took place inCumbria. Following the securing of a funding routefor the recovery work we then have to go throughEuropean procurement standards and such likeprocurement routes to deliver the projects we havein hand.

Q29 Mr Martlew: May I stop you on that? This is anemergency, is it not?Mr Moss: Yes.

Q30 Mr Martlew: It appears that the EUprocurement procedures would have taken sometime. If it happens in the future, would you suggestthere is a way of getting round that?Mr Moss: I understand the question. I suppose thereare two parts to the answer. One is that procurementinevitably puts on us requirements to comply withcertain standards in order to be fair and open andtransparent, which we fully sign up to. It is my viewthat we did the procurement for flood recoveryproject work as quickly as could possibly be done inthe environment in which we all work. For instance,for the temporary road bridge, we went through anemergency negotiated procedure process whichprocurement oYcers identified as the quickest routeand that is the fastest I have ever seen anythingbought of this value. However, it still took a numberof weeks. While we reassured the communities inWest Cumbria that we were doing all that we could,I think they felt that in their view we could have donesomething quicker.

Q31 Mr Martlew: This bridge is ahead of schedulethough, is it not?Mr Moss: The bridge is on schedule; our objectivedate is end of May to deliver and we committed atthe outset of the award of contract to work with ourconstruction partner to shorten that where at allpossible. At the moment we are in a positive place inrespect of shortening that date.

Q32 Chair: What are the key steps that theGovernment should take to protect bridges fromflooding events in the future, looking at the positionnationally?Mr Winter: First and foremost, some sort ofassessment process in support of the development ofthat would be very helpful.

Q33 Chair: In support of the development?Mr Winter: Of the assessment process that Ioutlined, some support in actually providing theguidance to authorities to carry out thatprioritisation process for people then to go tohighlight the structures which potentially need to be



improved by damage mitigation measures.However, those measures would be at a cost andunless extra money is provided over and above theexisting maintenance budgets there would bediYculties. The problem we have at the moment isthat whilst the Department for Transport providewithin their local transport plan settlementsindicative allocations for the spend on bridge worksby local authorities, local authorities tend—and thisis part anecdotally and part through sounding outneighbouring authorities—to spend less than theirallocations from the DfT. They do that because theneed for highway maintenance spend oncarriageways and roads is a much higher publicprofile than the spend on bridges. Most of the public,when they travel across bridges, do not know theyare travelling across bridges. They might just see aparapet and not really think about the fact thatbelow them might be a poorly maintained structure.As a consequence, certainly local politicians tend todirect maintenance monies towards the roadnetwork rather than the bridge network, so we dotend to find on average an authority is spending 50%to 60% of their allocations and that is one of thereasons why we have the maintenance backlog wehave.

Q34 Chair: What lesson would you draw from that?Do you think there should be more governmentguidance to local authorities?Mr Winter: I guess it will not happen but the idealthing from a bridge maintenance point of viewwould be to ring-fence that indicative allocation butsince highway maintenance funding in its own rightis not ring-fenced, I guess that is not going tohappen.

Q35 Mr Martlew: I was a bit shocked there. You saythat X amount of money is provided for bridgemaintenance and they only spend about 60% of that.Mr Winter: There is X amount of money forhighways maintenance and there is arecommendation from the Department forTransport that a proportion of that, maybe about20% or 30%, it depends on each authority, should bespent on bridges.

Q36 Mr Martlew: So the Department arerecommending you spend a certain percentage onhighway maintenance and you are saying that someof the local authorities are not spending 50% of that?Mr Winter: I am saying that authorities are oftenspending less than that. It varies. I know someunitaries are spending the full allocation. As youknow, at the moment we have been hearing storiesabout potholes after the winter events; we have hadtwo harsh winters and our carriageways are in a poorstate because of that, and there is some pressure todeal with the higher profile needs of highwaymaintenance on the road network and, as aconsequence, the bridge spend is reduced.

Q37 Mr Martlew: What percentage in Cumbria,Mr Moss?

Mr Moss: Funnily enough, in four out of the last fiveyears we have spent more than our allocated grantfrom Government. The last time we under spent wasin 2004–05. I do not yet know, because this is recentdata presented to me—

Q38 Mr Martlew: So that has not been a problemfor you.Mr Moss: I do not think so in this case. The pointwhich was made just now by ADEPT is a valid oneand we need to look at road infrastructuremaintenance across the board but that is myprofessional view and I am sure it is the view ofADEPT as well. In Cumbria we have actually spentour allocation in all but one of the last five years.1

Q39 Chair: Have there been any discussions withGovernment about carrying out assessment risks toall of your bridges?Mr Winter: No, I do not think so; not that I amaware of.

Q40 Chair: Mr Cole, have there been any nationaldiscussions?Mr Cole: The current guidance on scour is adocument called BA74 which is produced by theHighways Agency. The Highways Agency arecurrently reviewing that document and ADEPT andother representatives have been invited and will beinvited to join the group that currently reviews thatdocument. So some work is in hand to review thatadvice note.

Q41 Chair: Which areas is that looking at?Mr Cole: At the moment it deals with scour, soexisting bridges. We would like to expand thatdocument and not only look at scour but look atloading on arches as well and impact eVects.

Q42 Chair: So that will be included in the document.Mr Cole: Yes, we hope that will be included.

Q43 Chair: May I ask Cumbria County Councilwhether they can see any national lessons to bedrawn from your experience at this stage in any wayin terms of government support, assessments,looking at vulnerable areas or in any other way?Mr Moss: From my own perspective and what hasbeen talked about this afternoon about the need forbridge risk assessment, some kind of nationalapproach to identifying the bridge risk issuenationally relative to local topographical conditionsseems sensible to me because I think we all acceptthat is an unknown at the moment. The issue ofprocurement and perhaps establishing a pre-determined set of ready-to-go contract provisionswould have been a big blessing for us in Cumbriabecause simply waiting that number of weeks is vitalto the local economy in West Cumbria and that hasbeen our lesson. That aside, the final lesson in termsof our ability to be flexible and understanding thefuture needs for replacement of lost infrastructure ordamaged infrastructure has to be an important

1 See BIC 04b for subsequently correction by CumbriaCounty Council.



lesson on the government side to understand theguidance approach. That would be an interestingdiscussion with colleagues in the Department forTransport.

Q44 Chair: When you are looking at replacementinfrastructure, are you tied to having replacementprecisely how it was or replacement taking intoaccount lessons which might be learned?Mr Moss: The former; that is the constraint.

Q45 Chair: May I just be clear what you are saying?You are saying that it has to be replacement preciselyhow it was.Mr Moss: Yes; pretty much. Guidance allows ussome flexibility; clearly where a design standard hasimproved over time. We saw the A592 at Ullswaterfor instance, the standard of work being done therein compliance with the new requirement for gabionreplacement and such like. Clearly we would notreplace exactly what was there and what had beenlost. There is little if any opportunity forenhancement and where that takes place it is at thecost of the host authority.

Q46 Chair: How is all that decided? Is that in adialogue between you and the Department?Mr Moss: Yes. That has been one of the lessons wehave learned which has been very positive. Inworking with the Department for Transport we havehad consultants embedded with the authority fromthe outset both on the technical and financial sideand in that way we have been able to have a veryconstructive dialogue with them but the dialogue isabout the topic you raised in your question.

Q47 Ms Smith: Has there been any measurement ofthe impact of increased traYc volumes on the bridgenetwork and in particular is it increasing at a greaterrate now than it was, say, ten years ago?

Witnesses: Mr Matthew Lugg, Chairman, UK Roads Board, Mr Greg Perks, Chairman, UK Bridges Board,UK Roads Liaison Group, Mr John Dora, Principal Engineer (Climate Change), Network Rail andMr David Rooke, Head of Strategy and Engagement, Environment Agency, gave evidence.

Q50 Chair: Good afternoon gentlemen. Could I askyou to identify yourselves please with name andorganisation for our records?Mr Lugg: Good afternoon. My name is MatthewLugg. I am a Director of Environment andTransport for Leicestershire County Council. I amhere in my capacity as Chair of the UK RoadsBoard.Mr Perks: Good afternoon. My name is Greg Perks.I work for Northumberland County Council. I amhere today in my capacity as Chairman of the UKBridges Board.Mr Dora: Good afternoon. John Dora fromNetwork Rail.Mr Rooke: Good afternoon. David Rooke from theEnvironment Agency.

Mr Cole: Since 1984 we have been looking at theimpact of 40-tonne vehicles on the bridge stock, aprocess which is largely complete and a workprogramme of strengthening has resulted from that.Generally the number of private cars does not havea significant impact on the behaviour of highwaystructures but certainly heavier vehicles do and thereis an existing programme to deal with that.

Q48 Ms Smith: My point is that increasingly satnavis sending vehicles on routes that previously lorrydrivers, HGV drivers, would never have thought ofusing. Is that going to be potentially a problem inrelation to maintaining the bridge network?Mr Cole: It can be a problem with strikes on lowrailway bridges; that can be an issue with satnav datathere where that particular restriction is not includedin the satnav data. There could be a problem if thereis a weak bridge which is signed at 7.5 tonnes forexample. If that was not in satnav data then it couldpossibly encourage a vehicle to use an inappropriatestructure. At the end of the day a driver is supposedto read the signs and act accordingly, but no doubt ifsatnav could have details of restrictions it wouldhelp.

Q49 Ms Smith: Are you monitoring this in terms ofthe potential impact of satnav? Leaving aside thequestion of the personal responsibility of the drivers,is it being monitored in terms of the potential impactof satnav on bridge networks in particular of HGVvehicles?Mr Cole: There is a national group called the BridgeStrike Prevention Group which is attended byrepresentatives of Network Rail, local authorities,Highways Agency, Freight Transport Associationand others. Amongst the things they are looking atis that very point you have made, trying to makesatnav data more resilient. The answer to yourquestion is that it is being looked at and advice andguidance is being put out to drivers where possible.Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen, for comingand answering our questions.

Q51 Chair: Would you accept that the major reasonthe bridges in Cumbria collapsed was because theywere old masonry arch bridges?Mr Perks: Yes, it is fairly clear it was the type ofbridge. As you say, they were old masonry archbridges and in the event that occurred, the severeflooding situation, as has been the view expressedearlier, those types of bridges are very susceptible.

Q52 Chair: Does anybody disagree? Mr Dora, mayI ask you about Network Rail? Is it right that yourbridges did not suVer serious damage?Mr Dora: That is correct.


17 March 2010 Mr Matthew Lugg, Mr Greg Perks, Mr John Dora and Mr David Rooke

Q53 Chair: Why do you think that was the case?Mr Dora: The form of construction, particularly ofthe two bridges where we experienced the flood inCumbria, is completely diVerent to the old masonryarch bridges which carry the highway network. If Imay give an example of the one at the mouth of theRiver Derwent, it is a metal construction deck withmetal caissons, which are large piers which havebeen sunk very deep down into the riverbed. It is acompletely diVerent form of construction from themasonry arch bridges.

Q54 Chair: Does that apply to your bridgeseverywhere in the country?Mr Dora: It does not. It is a peculiar form ofconstruction that you will find here and there aroundthe rail network.

Q55 Chair: So your bridges were protected here butwould not necessarily be if floods occurredelsewhere?Mr Dora: They would not necessarily be of that kindof construction.

Q56 Mr Clelland: Have you actually inspected yourbridges following the floods and has there been nodamage at all?Mr Dora: We have inspected our bridges followingthe floods and we found some reduction in the bedof the river, which you would expect from the forceof the water, but not deep enough to compromise thecurrent integrity of the structure.

Q57 Mr Clelland: So it is not necessary to take anycorrective measures following the floods as far asyour bridges are concerned?Mr Dora: We inspect, we make sure they are safe andwe take further measures if we need to, as we havedone.

Q58 Chair: Mr Lugg, did Cumbria County Councilfollow your group’s instructions in terms ofmaintenance and inspections?Mr Lugg: I am not really able to speak on behalf ofCumbria; that is a question you really need to directto them. Certainly the UK Roads Liaison Group,through the Roads Board and the Bridges Boardhave been producing codes of practice for bestpractice guidance across the country. In general,most authorities adopt those types of standards.

Q59 Chair: Are you planning to change any of yourcriteria or recommendations in the light of whathappened in Cumbria?Mr Lugg: In the light of the feedback you certainlyhad in the previous discussion, we do feel that theincreasing number of severe weather events in thiscountry is making us all look at our design andmaintenance standards. Clearly these events arehappening more and more frequently, whether theybe floods, snow or even drought. We certainly aregoing to review our standards in the light of theimpact of those severe weather events. We also have

to take account of the Flood and WaterManagement Bill which is currently going throughParliament and that means that lead authorities,county councils, will have to take into account thenew legislation in addressing issues around resilienceand looking at vulnerable infrastructures in the lightof those recommendations.

Q60 Chair: You say that you are reviewing yourstandards. What frequency would you think isrelevant to direct those standards? Is that a 1:200-year event or 100 years, 250 years? Do you have anyproposals for how you are going to do this?Mr Lugg: We are looking carefully at these events,whether it be Cumbria or Gloucestershire and theimpacts of those. That will help us to makejudgments about what is appropriate in terms ofhow we risk assess our transport infrastructure in thelight of those experiences. I am not sure I am ableactually to give you a specific figure today butcertainly we need to look at all those severe weatherevents and consider carefully what would beappropriate.

Q61 Mr Martlew: We heard earlier that there hadbeen an incident of scouring on one of NetworkRail’s bridges in the 1980s.Mr Dora: Yes.

Q62 Mr Martlew: I presume that you found that outby inspection or what?Mr Dora: We had an incident in 1987 in Wales wherea railway bridge collapsed under a train andtragically four people were killed in that incident.The railway is an organisation that investigates suchincidents and learns from them. After the Glanrhydcollapse in South Wales we commissioned somehydraulic consultants to look at the hydraulics ofscour. They came up with a risk assessment processfor the railway industry to assess its structures overwater. There was a national risk assessment whichwas carried out in the late 1980s/early 1990s on allrailway bridges over water.

Q63 Mr Martlew: Perhaps what I am getting at isthat this was an incident which happened on therailways; you carried out the research and came upwith various conclusions.Mr Dora: Yes.

Q64 Mr Martlew: Could that information have beenused on highway bridges? Did we not learn thelessons in spite of the fact that a train was going overthis and not a bus?Mr Dora: My personal view is that a bridge overwater has certain risks attached.

Q65 Mr Martlew: Whether it carries a railway or aroad?Mr Dora: Whether it is a highway bridge or arailway bridge similar consequences might arise.



Q66 Mr Martlew: What happened? We could wellhave been in the middle of the fiasco with Railtrackat the time; I am not quite sure. Was that just carriedout on railway bridges?Mr Dora: Correct.

Q67 Mr Martlew: Was there was no transfer of theinformation to the local authorities or thegovernment department responsible for roads orwhat?Mr Dora: There have been various fora whererailway scour risk assessment has been broadcast tothe engineering community at large. I attendedconferences and talked about our risk assessmentprocess and there is a document which was publishedin 2002 by the Construction Industry Research andInformation Association that encompasses diVerenttypes of risk assessment for scour at bridgesgenerally and the railway system features in that.

Q68 Mr Martlew: Were any lessons learned?Mr Perks: Yes. Various organisations have over theyears developed standards or guidance, primarily ofcourse for the use of their own organisation. Sincethe establishment of the Roads Liaison Group andits boards in 2001, we are all particularly keen toshare best practice amongst all factors dealing withthe public highway network. As Mr Wintermentioned earlier in his evidence, we are keen to seea development of assessment of flood vulnerabilitywhich includes scour assessment and we would belooking there to investigate and combine work doneby others.

Q69 Mr Martlew: I hear what you say but thequestion was: did anybody learn the lessons fromwhat happened to the rail bridge in Wales?Mr Perks: I think the events which happenedrecently were so severe that that might not haveprevented them.

Q70 Mr Martlew: That is not the question. What Iam trying to get at is that the railways looked at it,found the solution to their problem and it does notseem to have been an alarm call for road reviews. Isthat the case?Mr Perks: There are other standards there for roadsbut something we need to do in future is look ateverything that is out there and get the bestcombined evidence that we can all use.

Q71 Chair: Network Rail have been praised forbuilding the temporary station very quickly atWorkington. What lessons have you learned fromthat?Mr Dora: One of the main lessons we have learnedfrom building the temporary station at Workingtonwas mainly that in the Railways Act 1993 there isprovision for introducing stations, but if it is atemporary station, there is no provision there fordecommissioning the station. There is a sort ofprocess which has to be looked at once you havebuilt the station in order to close it and take it away.Apart from that, everything worked quite well; the

cooperation with the train companies and the localauthority to build the station, find the site and getthe thing working was quite good.

Q72 Chair: Who has paid for it?Mr Dora: Network Rail paid for the station, as Iunderstand.

Q73 Chair: From their existing resources?Mr Dora: From existing resources.

Q74 Chair: And they have not reduced somethingelse to do that?Mr Dora: Not to the best of my knowledge.

Q75 Mr Martlew: The station was a great success.Being quite local I understand and appreciate whatyou have done. What you have done though is tocreate a demand and I suspect the locals will not betoo keen to see that station closed. Obviously itwould have to be a permanent structure, but is therea possibility that could be looked at?Mr Dora: I am sure there is a possibility that couldbe looked at.

Q76 Chair: How can old masonry arch bridges beprotected better, looking nationally?Mr Perks: That one is a challenge. There are variousthings which might be done and we talked alreadyabout the assessment of flood vulnerability and alsoit has been mentioned that scour is a particular issuewith regard to old masonry arch bridges. They wereof course built a long time ago and it is quite likelythat the foundations are not set very deep. It may bethat inspection of bridges considered to beparticularly at risk may reveal that work should bedone on strengthening the foundations, for exampledeeper foundations, foundations strengthened bymore concrete or piled foundations which wouldmake the foundations stronger. You still have to dealwith the issues of the lateral forces of water on thestructure, so you have to make sure the structure isgenerally in good order. There are also issues to dowith the buoyancy eVect of water under the bridgeand lifting the bridge. All of these issues need to belooked at and that is something perhaps where moreguidance could be prepared for practitioners.Certainly the most important point in the beginningis to assess and determine exactly what is there in thefoundations and look to strengthen the foundations,particularly if the structure ranks highly in the floodvulnerability stakes.

Q77 Chair: How far are highways authoritiescarrying out the guidance in your code? I asked youbefore about Cumbria County Council and you didnot know if they had done it. Do you have anyinspection of your own to find out just whathighways authorities are doing?Mr Lugg: What we have produced over a number ofyears is a suite of codes for all components of thetransport infrastructure. We have a code for roads,street lighting and bridges. The bridges code was amammoth piece of work and credit to everyoneinvolved in putting that together. However, it was a



step change for local authorities in terms of takingon a lot of the advice and it was always recognised atthe time that not all local authorities would be ableto do that instantly and that it would take quite a bitof time for them to take on board thoserecommendations. Authorities are progressing thatbut what you will find is that there is a mixedeconomy and some have made more progress thanothers. We would be keen to provide support andadvice for those authorities who are perhaps lagginga bit to move on and take on board thoserecommendations. All the time we are looking torefine those recommendations and certainly in thelight of the severe weather events to provide furtherguidance, as we have already said today, to help localauthorities think about the issues and the problemsaround severe weather events.

Q78 Chair: Why do you think there is a backlog ofmaintenance?Mr Lugg: Inevitably funding is the issue. Clearly thetransport infrastructure is very large and it is verycostly to maintain. We are all trying to make sure weget the adequate funding we need to make sure ourroads are safe and serviceable. The point madeearlier is a good one that sometimes the bridges getoverlooked but, there again, there is not enoughmoney to go around even to maintain our roadnetwork so bridges will suVer in that respect. That isgoing to be increasingly diYcult in the light of theworst winter for 30 years plus potential spendingcuts which aVect local authorities going forward.Nevertheless our advice to Government is toprioritise highway maintenance and if that meanssome new infrastructure happens to be aVected bythat, then it is very important we do not startbuilding new infrastructure when we cannot aVordto maintain what we currently have.

Q79 Mr Martlew: We heard earlier evidence that theGovernment recommends a certain percentage ofyour maintenance be spent on bridges. I used to bea local councillor so I understand the pressures, butbasically your local councils have been taking thedecisions to provide new tarmac and have actuallybeen underfunding bridge maintenance. Can thatbe excused?Mr Lugg: It is very diYcult when you do notnecessarily get enough funding in the first place totry to prioritise. We are investing in techniquesaround asset management to get a much betterhandle on how we make best use of the funding weget in terms of investment decisions and I do thinkpart of the asset management approach will help inprioritising funding for structures, recognising someof the vulnerability issues we have discussed today,making sure more investment does go in. In the lightof the experience we have had, trying to get morepriority and demonstrate the risk issues aroundinvestment structures will make a diVerence to helpensure more funding does go into maintaining ourbridges.

Q80 Mr Clelland: We have mostly concentrated onbridges but we know from our visit on Monday thatnot only bridges were damaged but quite often roadswere flooded and some roads were completelydestroyed in parts because of the floods. Perhaps MrRooke would be best able to answer my question.How well protected is the rest of the country’sinfrastructure, roads and railways, against severeflooding events?Mr Rooke: We undertook a survey of nationalinfrastructure back in 2006–07 and we publishedthat just before the summer 2007 floods. Wepublished that information back in June of last yearand that shows that about 10% of roads in Englandare at risk of flooding and about 20% of railways,along with loads of other infrastructure like policestations, hospitals, schools, et cetera. The summer2007 floods highlighted in a very vivid way and atragic way for some just how much of ourinfrastructure is at risk from flooding and that isbased on current risks; the projections are that withclimate change those risks will increase.

Q81 Mr Clelland: So what lessons have we learnedand what further measures are going to be taken todeal with that increased risk?Mr Rooke: The Government asked Sir Michael Pittto undertake a review of the summer 2007 floods. Hepublished his report. The Government accepted all92 recommendations and amongst them there was arecommendation that the Government should lookat critical infrastructure. The Cabinet OYce have setup a Natural Hazards Team and they have startedtheir work to look at the impacts of flooding andother natural hazards on infrastructure. Theycarried out a consultation as to the sort of standardsand the issues to develop a framework last year. Theconsultation closed in the early part of this year andthey will be publishing a report later this year.

Q82 Mr Clelland: What priority does transportinfrastructure have in terms of flood riskmonitoring?Mr Rooke: The Cabinet OYce group has looked attransport, it has looked at energy, it has looked atwater, it has looked at all the sectors, so that is aquestion really for the Cabinet OYce. We have beenable to supply information to inform the surveys andwork that they are doing.

Q83 Mr Clelland: Do you have any examples ofwork which is being done on protection againstfloods specifically relating to transportinfrastructure?Mr Rooke: Not specifically on transport. We do inthe water sector and electricity following thesummer 2007 flooding. I am aware that work wasundertaken but I cannot give you a specific example.

Q84 Mr Martlew: As you have Environment in yourtitle I am going to ask you this question. There wascriticism from some people and we did visit the farmwhere there were hundreds of tonnes if notthousands of tonnes of gravel placed over the fieldsand obviously they have been responsible for the



scouring of some of the bridges. The argument wasthat they used to dredge the rivers and they had beenstopped from doing that and basically it would helpthe environment, the fish and the wildlife on theriver. Is that a sensible policy? Where should thepriority be?Mr Rooke: We do dredging where it is cost beneficialto do it. We can only do works on what are calledmain rivers, which are rivers which are marked on amap which has been approved by the Secretary ofState; we can only do work on rivers marked on thatmap. Elsewhere it is for local authorities or if thereare internal drainage boards for those to do thework. Obviously we balance the needs to reduceflood risk but also combined with environmentalregulation and we are under a duty to furtherconservation when we carry out works. So theEnvironment Agency is best placed to take all thosetechnical issues into account. Our fisheriescolleagues, our conservation colleagues, ourengineers all work together to provide the bestsolution for a particular community. Sometimes wewill dredge and other times we will not dredge, wewill do other works.

Q85 Mr Martlew: Can we come back to theWorkington situation? I presume that the Cockerand the Derwent are main rivers.Mr Rooke: They are, yes.

Q86 Mr Martlew: Have you reduced the dredgingover the years on those two rivers?Mr Rooke: I know that the local team have lookedat the dredging. Some work was done in theCockermouth area because a shoal had developedjust upstream of the community but there has notbeen widespread dredging because it was notconsidered appropriate and would not haveprovided the necessary reduction in flood risk.

Q87 Mr Martlew: In view of the floods, will you begoing back to re-look at that particular decision?Mr Rooke: My colleagues are talking with thecommunity and with those farmers in terms of whatis most appropriate for going forward because, asyou are aware, the course of the river has actuallychanged in places such was the flow and the amountof debris that was moved. Those discussions aregoing on with farmers in that area.

Witnesses: Rt Hon Sadiq Khan MP, Minister of State, Mr Mostaque Ahmed, Division Manager, Regionaland Local Major Projects and Roads Maintenance, Department for Transport and Mr Neil Loudon, GroupManager, Structures Policy and Pavements, Highways Agency, gave evidence.

Q94 Chair: Good afternoon Minister. Could youand your team identify yourselves for our records?Mr Khan: Good afternoon. My name is Sadiq Khan.I am the Minister of State for Transport. To myright.Mr Ahmed: Mostaque Ahmed from Department forTransport, Head of Regional and Local MajorProjects and Roads Maintenance.

Q88 Mr Martlew: The final issue may be to do withyou or may not be. There was an argument that thedamage which was caused to the bridges wasbasically from fallen trees in the river hitting againstthe buttresses. Would you be in favour of clearingthe sides of these rivers to see that these trees do notfall in?Mr Rooke: We do undertake maintenance on watercourses that can involve removing debris; large trees,et cetera. We do do that on an ad hoc basis and weare inspecting our defences on a regular basis on arisk-based approach. If we do pick up areas wherethere are large obstructions, then we do go in andremove those.

Q89 Mr Martlew: That is when the trees have fallenin the rivers.Mr Rooke: Yes.

Q90 Mr Martlew: It is the trees at the side of the riverwhich are likely to be washed away. Do you have anyinvolvement with that?Mr Rooke: Yes, we do. If they are on the banks of theriver and they look as though they are in danger offalling in and causing an obstruction, then we docarry out works to remove those trees.

Q91 Mr Martlew: Was any of that work done on theDerwent and the Cocker in recent times?Mr Rooke: I am sorry; I do not know that detail.

Q92 Mr Martlew: Can you write to us with theinformation?Mr Rooke: We can.

Q93 Chair: Is a 1:200-year design standard forcritical infrastructure still appropriate?Mr Rooke: The Cabinet OYce Natural HazardTeam, as part of their consultation at the end of lastyear, had an interim 1:200-year standard as beingappropriate for infrastructure and they consulted onthat. We are comfortable with that but there will becases where there are real critical items which willcause enormous destruction at a regional andnational level, where a higher standard may beappropriate. We hope when the Cabinet OYcepublishes its results it will signal that risk-basedapproach between a minimum 1:200 standard and ahigher one where appropriate.Chair: Thank you very much gentlemen for comingand answering our questions.

Mr Loudon: I am Neil Loudon. I am the GroupManager at the Highways Agency responsible forthe Structures Policy and Pavements teams.

Q95 Chair: Minister, do you want to make anystatement to us before we ask you questions?


17 March 2010 Rt Hon Sadiq Khan MP, Mr Mostaque Ahmed and Mr Neil Loudon

Mr Khan: Yes, with your permission. Eric knows thearea very well as he is from the patch but it isprobably worth putting the floods in Cumbria lastNovember in context. It was the largest amount ofrainfall since records began within a 24-hour period.It was not simply a once-in-a-lifetime experience forpeople, it was once-in-three-lifetimes to go throughthose sorts of weather conditions. There was ofcourse one fatality and as far as we are concerned asa Department, the biggest challenge for us was twomajor bridges which connected Workington, one ofwhich collapsed, one is no longer safe andcommunities were divided. Elderly residents couldnot go to buy a loaf of bread, children could not getto their schools and it was a real challenge for us.Over the last few weeks and months we have doneeverything we possibly can to try to help thosecommunities be united by first the rail shuttleconnection, secondly, the footbridge and, thirdly,opening shortly we hope, the temporary road bridgeas well. I am pleased the Committee are looking intothis issue. Although it would be easy for us to becomplacent and say this only happens once every200 years, it is one of those things which just happensand shrug our shoulders, there could be and there arelessons we can learn going forward in other parts ofthe country as well and the combination of theClimate Change Act and the Flood and WaterManagement Bill, as well as some of the issues youmay raise in the Select Committee, will help us goforward.

Q96 Chair: Could you tell us how much funding youhave made available for transport infrastructure inCumbria up to now and where it has come from?Mr Khan: The message the Prime Minister gavewhen he went to Cumbria in the days after the floodwas that we need to do whatever we can to help thiscommunity get back on its feet. So whateverCumbria County Council have asked for, we havesought to meet their needs. We have been workingvery closely with them. We straight away sent aconsultant to work with them, to help them inrelation to expertise in how you recover from a flood.We paid for the cost of that at the outset; towards theend we shared the cost. Secondly, we paid for thetemporary footbridge which MoD helped put up.That cost about £1.1 million. We have paid for thefree train service from North Workington to South.North Workington is a new station which has beenbuilt by Network Rail. We have contributed towardsthe signage and other costs but also paid for the trainservice up until May. That is going to cost £1.2million.

Q97 Chair: You have paid for the train service?Mr Khan: The DfT; correct. We have paid for thetemporary road bridge which began construction afew weeks ago. I was there for the beginning of theconstruction. That is £4.6 million also from DfT.Those are the monies so far. Cumbria CountyCouncil have put a claim in for £1 million and Atkinsthe consultants are currently going through that withDfT to see how we can process that as soon as

possible and working with Cumbria to help them getthrough any perceived bureaucracy about makingtheir claims as soon as they possibly can.

Q98 Chair: Where has the money come from? Has itcome from departmental allocations or is it from theTreasury?Mr Khan: It has come from our DfT budget. Wehave had to find monies within the budget. There isno contingency fund for this, as you are aware, andwe have had to find the monies within our DfTbudget to meet the needs of Cumbria. It is worthsaying as a matter of information that there was across-government ministerial flood committeewhich Rosie Winterton chairs and which meets. Onthat committee sit ministers from other departmentssuch as Defra, BIS, DWP. For obvious reasons, wehave been in charge of the transport problems inCumbria which have been the biggest obstacle untilrecently and now the attention has moved on toother issues as we move from recovery to restorationin Cumbria.

Q99 Chair: Could you let us have a total amount ofmoney which has been made available?Mr Khan: Of course we can.

Q100 Mr Clelland: I was just wondering howconcerned the Department was that the bridgecollapsed and that the damage to bridges in Cumbriacould occur elsewhere in the country and whatlessons have been learned and what action hasbeen taken.Mr Khan: The first question that I asked as a layperson not an engineer was why the bridgecollapsed. Could it have been prevented? Couldanything have happened to prevent it taking place?I am not an expert but the experts told me that thesheer volume of water and the speed at which it wasgoing and the scour and all the rest of it meant thatno bridge could have withstood that volume ofwater. There is a question which is worth askingwhich is how should you manage the risks of a 1:200-year flood and that volume of water? Since recordsbegan there has never been more rainfall in a 24-hourperiod. The obvious concern I had as a lay personwas that this was an old bridge, more than 100 yearsold and could it be for that reason that it collapsed.The answer was no, it was just the sheer volume ofwater; even newer bridges may not have been able towithstand that volume of water. To answer yourquestion another way, what lengths do you have togo to to get bridges that withstand that level of waterflow, which could happen every 200 years? Question:is it worth the cost in money terms? When Pitt didhis review the issue he raised was that we should havebridges which could withstand a 1:200-year eventwhich is the sort of levels we are talking about here.

Q101 Mr Clelland: We have heard that several timeshere today; in fact we started oV with 1:1,000 and weare now down to 1:200. I am just wondering whetherwe might come down even further. The fact is that wedo not know whether these events are 1:200 years oronce every year for all we know.



Mr Khan: What makes it even more unknown, as theeVects of climate change impact on communities, isthat what is 200 years before the impact of climatechange may not be so going forward. That is one ofthe interesting things about the Climate Change Actand the Flood and Water Management Bill. How dowe adapt and make our infrastructures resilient tosome of those things? The Highways Agency will bedoing some of that work with the EnvironmentAgency to make sure we adapt. Obviously there arethree main bodies to look towards, Network Rail asthe rail is crossing the bridge, local authorities for thesorts of bridges we are talking about in Cumbria andthe Highways Agency in relation to theirs. It is worthNeil, who is an engineer, just touching on that.Mr Loudon: I would draw the distinction betweenexisting bridges and new bridges. For new bridgeswe work very closely with the Environment Agency,looking at the capacity of the structure and the formof the structure to cater for the 1:200-year storm.Obviously that is under review in the light of climatechange as well. We work very closely with them andwe will look and mitigate against the possible eVectsof scour and erosion as well. When we are designinga new structure, we will take full account of theEnvironment Agency’s requirements, 1:200-yearstorms, to look at the capacity of the structure andalso the form of the structure as well and then look atthe more detailed aspects of the design. For existingstructures, one of the things we have done sinceCumbria is look again at some of our standards andwe are in the process of carrying out that review atthe moment, looking at the hydraulic loading onstructures, looking at our scour assessment and wehave had quite a regime of scour assessment in placefor a number of years. We are looking again at all ofthose standards, looking again at our inspectionstandards in the light of the experience fromCumbria. We have yet to get all the feedback, lookat all those experiences and review our standards inthat light.

Q102 Mr Martlew: First may I thank you for thepersonal commitment you gave to Cumbria; I knowthat Tony Cunningham appreciated your visits andthe actual eVort and money which have gone in. Iwas slightly worried about the way your commentswere taking us. You said that no bridge would havewithstood that particular river flow on that day.There was the Papcastle Bridge which was further upwhich was a modern construction which actually didnot suVer greatly and we saw that. The one that didwithstand it was the one which was further down,which was the rail bridge and it was the Victorian,probably mid-nineteenth century bridges, one ofwhich collapsed and the other one nearly collapsed.Surely there must be a lesson there, that those typesof bridges are more vulnerable and therefore weshould be looking at ways of protecting them, notjust in Cumbria but in areas where we could have asimilar situation with every rainfall coming out intoan estuary.Mr Khan: May I firstly correct, if I have misled you.The question asked was: could anything have beendone to prevent that bridge collapsing, for example,

had there been a failure to inspect, had there been afailure to maintain? There was no evidence of eitherof those things. What the Highways Agency do forthe bridges we are responsible for is very thoroughinspections once every six years, including goingunder water to see whether there are issues withfoundations and every two years there are furthertargeted inspections. I will let Neil explain some ofthe technical issues around why some bridgescollapsed and some did not.Mr Loudon: One has to be careful about makingpresumptions about types of bridges. I would say Ido agree that a modern bridge with deep piledfoundations is probably less vulnerable to the eVectsof high water flows and scour than some of the olderbridges. In looking at the risks from scour andhydraulic loading on structures, one really has tolook at the location of those structures as well. It isnot just a case of looking at the particular form ofstructure. One of the bits of work we are doing andwe have instigated post Cumbria is a pilot study inArea Two, which is in the Gloucestershire area. Weare looking at compiling the data sources which arealready available, so that is climate change data,flood risk data and we will work very closely with theEnvironment Agency on both of those and alsolooking at the thorough databases of our assets, notjust structures, but the roads as well and looking atthe vulnerability of the assets. What we are doing aswell is looking at the feasibility of extending thatthrough to look at local authority bridges in thatGloucestershire area. We are looking to identifyspecific areas and specific vulnerabilities on thenetwork rather than just looking at types ofstructures.

Q103 Chair: Are you saying then that you are notlooking specifically at masonry arch bridges?Mr Loudon: I have to be careful because theHighways Agency’s stock of structures tends to be ofmore modern construction and we have fewermasonry structures than other bridge owners. Itwould depend on the span of the structure and thelocation of the supports of the structure. It is notsimply saying that it is a masonry arch versus amodern concrete and steel bridge.

Q104 Chair: So you are not looking at that category.Mr Loudon: We would look at all structures from theHighways Agency’s perspective, look at thevulnerabilities on the network, putting together thisflood data, the climate change data together with ourasset data to see which bridges are more vulnerable.That would entail looking at the types of structurewhich are on that part of the network.

Q105 Mr Martlew: Nobody is saying for onemoment that there was any warning that the bridgesat Workington were not safe. What happenedhappened and there was no expert saying that if youdo not do this the bridge will collapse. But it hashappened, has it not? Mr Loudon is worrying me alittle because he keeps going on about the HighwaysAgency, and I understand why he is doing that, butthe reality is that most of the vulnerable bridges will



be local authority bridges. Unless Government takeaction, we have already seen that they only spend50% or 60% of the money that they should bespending on maintaining bridges anyhow, so it needsguidance from the Minister.Mr Khan: Sure.

Q106 Mr Martlew: May I go back to an earlier issuewhere we had the train crash on the East Coastwhere the Land Rover went over the motorwaybridge onto the mainline and there was a major lossof life. Following that, a decision was taken tostrengthen the barriers on rail bridges. Do you thinkwe may be coming to a conclusion that some of thebridges need strengthening following this accident?Mr Khan: Let me answer your question this way. In1998 a decision was taken that all the evidencesuggested that there was huge underinvestment inour highways including our bridges and ourstructures and a conscious decision was taken toincrease by huge amounts the amount of fundinglocal authorities get for their highways, whichobviously includes bridges and other structures.Over the last ten years that has been about £6.5billion; this year alone it is £750 million under theLocal Transport Plan. The problem is—I say“problem” but it depends how you see it—that thismoney is not ring-fenced. It is for local authorities todecide how they spend this money and they shoulddecide to spend it bearing in mind what assessmentthey make of their highways, their structures. Whatwe are encouraging local authorities to do is whatthe Highways Agency does, which is to carry out anassessment of those infrastructures for which theyare responsible; what is called a Transport AssetManagement Plan. The idea is that a local authoritylooks at the structures for which they areresponsible, have an inventory of the things undertheir control, look at the condition of those things,ask themselves the question “What sort of servicelevel do we expect from these?” and then ask “Howmuch would it cost to bring these up to the servicewe expect?” If you do this as a local authority, webelieve it will save you money because you will planyour expenditure more sensibly; also it will meanthat there is a structure using the guidance from theUK Roads Liaison Group or using the guidancefrom the Highways Agency. You will then bringthem to the front of the queue to be repaired,resurfaced or fixed rather than being neglected. Thepoint is a serious point.

Q107 Mr Martlew: I appreciate what you are sayingbut the problem with that is that when somethinggoes drastically wrong, as it has in Workington, it isthe Government who will have to pick up the bill, isit not, for the new bridge, for the temporary bridgeor whatever? In a way, unless you give guidance andvery strong guidance, if this happens again, theGovernment will have to pick up the bill.Mr Khan: Firstly, nobody is suggesting anythingwent wrong in Workington.

Q108 Mr Martlew: No, the Workington one was nota problem.

Mr Khan: As far as our responsibility is concerned,what I think would be unhelpful would be if we hadsome sort of Doomsday Book of all the bridges inthe country with a coding and we were responsiblefor that. Local authorities should be responsible. Itis one of the upsides or downsides of devolution. Wedevolved down to them the budgets and theresponsibility to maintain their roads. The point Iwas making about the Transport Asset ManagementPlan was that in 2004 when the transport plans firstoccurred, only 9% of local authorities were eventhinking about having this sort of register of localassets. In 2007–08 when we looked at it, about 78%was work in progress.2 We are going to survey againafter the purdah period ends to see what assessmentthere is. I would be disappointed if local authoritieswere saying to me that they still have not carried outan assessment of what structures they have in theirauthority. If they have not carried out thatassessment, how can they then make a riskassessment and invest in those parts of theirhighways, the bridges, that need the investment.Mr Ahmed: We provided £32 million of funding tolocal authorities to help them with developing theTransport Asset Management Plans.

Q109 Chair: There is a local authority bridgemaintenance backlog of £1.8 billion. Are you goingto provide some extra money to deal with that?Mr Khan: I do not recognise that figure; I am notsure how it is arrived at. What we have done in thelast 11 years is increased the amount of capitalmoney local authorities get via the allocation whichhas been £6.5 billion over the last few years. Thisyear was £750 million; next year will be slightlymore. In addition, if the cost of your bridge upgradeis more than £5 million you can apply for moniesfrom the Regional Funding Allocation. Of course, asa local authority you could use proceeds fromcouncil tax or you can prudentially borrow to spendon your roads or, if there is need for a bridgeupgrade. One of the things we are trying to say tolocal authorities is that all the evidence we have,whether you look at the advice given by CIPFA, theaccountants, or government generally, is that if youare on top of your assets you can make eYciencysavings by targeting your monies to the assets whichneed the most investment.

Q110 Chair: What are your current thoughts onplanning for infrastructure which would be resistantto a 1:200-year incident?Mr Khan: We can give you the answer from theHighways Agency and I can then go on to theguidance which the UKRLG are talking about.Mr Loudon: For the Highways Agency it is back towhat I was commenting about before, we are lookingat this pilot study to identify the risks and if that issuccessful—and we hope it is—we will then widenthat out and look at that across the whole of theHighways Agency’s network. Then that will beexactly the same as the Minister said for localauthorities. We would look at where the priorities

2 See BIC 08c for subsequent clarification by the Minister.



are on our network and we would invest in that andit would take its course, along with everything elsewe need to do in terms of maintenance of ourinfrastructure.

Q111 Mr Clelland: I take what you say about localauthorities having the powers to look after their ownroad network and that is entirely right. However,one problem which has been drawn to our attentiontoday is that what tends to happen is that they tendto concentrate more on the bits you can see, potholesin the roads, and not on the bits you cannot see,which is the infrastructure and the strength andstructure of bridges. In light of what has happenedin Cumbria, are any new guidelines being sent out tolocal authorities about looking after the structure ofthe bridges?Mr Khan: The starting point is that there is astatutory duty upon local authorities under section41 of the Highways Act to make sure they maintainthose infrastructures that they are responsible for.The law says they have to do so. Secondly, what wehave done, working with the Environment Agency,working with UKRLG, is to try to see whether anyadaptations are needed in the guidance in relation towhat advice we give to local authorities. We are notthe experts at DfT. The experts are the UK RoadsLiaison Group, the engineers and others and theyare renewing and adapting their guidance over time.Mr Ahmed: In fact we provide the funding tofacilitate a lot of the UKLRG research and we sit intheir working groups with them, recognising that weat the centre are not actually the experts. It is theywho are the experts and we fund and support them.

Q112 Mr Clelland: If there is a shortfall, if theamount of money which is allocated within theoverall totals to local authorities for bridgemaintenance is not being spent, is that because theallocation is too generous or the local authorities arejust not concentrating on the work you say theyshould be concentrating on?Mr Khan: It is because council leaders, councillors,have decided that other things are a priority. One ofthe things we could do is ring-fence this money soyou must spend this money on road maintenance oron bridges. The problem is how we in Whitehallknow what you are spending on your bridges andmaintenance. I would hope that your localengineers, whom you as a local councillor had hired,would advise you what to spend. Just to agree withyou, when I speak to oYcers around the country,they tell me that the highways service within councilsis the Cinderella service. You are right thatcouncillors would rather spend money on thingsthey can point to and say “We did that” rather thanthe structures beneath water or things that youcannot see with your eyes. I can see the challengescouncils have. I am sure you will agree that we havethe same challenges in Parliament.Chair: Local authority discretion certainly remainsvery important.

Q113 Mr Clelland: It would not so much be aquestion of ring-fencing or telling people what to do.It was just a question of what lessons we havelearned from Boscastle, from Cumbria and whetherthere is new guidance or any revision of guidance asa result of those lessons.Mr Khan: We will have a better idea. When wesurveyed in 2007–08 what local authorities weretelling us was that 9% already had a completedTransport Asset Management Plan and 80% ofothers were working on theirs.3 We are going tosurvey again after the council election purdah endsand if the response is that there was not 90% plus—I expect to see 100%—then it means there are seriousproblems. If you as a local council leader do notknow the assets you have and how poor they are,then alarm bells should start ringing, especially ifyou are one of the flood areas that Mr Loudontalked about.Mr Ahmed: I would also like to point to theUKRLG’s written evidence to you where one oftheir recommendations is “As a result of this inquiry. . . UKLRG will wish to examine how their suite ofcodes of practice takes account of climate change”and we fund a lot of the research that they do and wesupport them in that.

Q114 Mr Martlew: I presume from what has beensaid that there is no policy of bridge renewal, norolling programme of bridge renewal?Mr Khan: From the centre?

Q115 Mr Martlew: Yes.Mr Khan: No, there is not from the centre in relationto the Government.

Q116 Mr Martlew: So what we are going to have is300-year-old bridges in 100 years’ time, are we not?Mr Khan: Do not forget that there are three ownersof bridges: Network Rail, Highways Agency andlocal authorities. It is not for me to tell a localauthority when to renew their bridge. Just to comeback to a point that is worth mentioning, one of thelessons we have learned from Cumbria is that clearlythere are some bridges which are of huge strategicimportance, for example the bridge which collapsedin Workington cut oV communities. If you are thecouncil for that area that may be more of a priorityfor you when you carry out your asset managementthan a bridge which may be in need of maintenancebut is used by three people every week, forargument’s sake. That is one of the things which youas local councillors would be better placed to dorather than us in Whitehall.

Q117 Chair: Would you say that we need a survey toidentify bridges which are at particular risk of flooddamage in extreme weather?Mr Khan: That is one of the things I would expectlocal councils to do, local authorities to do, whenthey carry out their transport asset managementplan.




Q118 Chair: Do you think it should be done?Mr Khan: I think they should do that, yes..

Q119 Chair: Would there be Government guidancethat that should happen?Mr Khan: It is worth Neil just reminding theCommittee of what the Highways Agency does fortheir bridges.Mr Loudon: As the Minister has indicated, we havea regular regime of inspection of the bridges and partof that is identifying bridges that are susceptible toscour. There are 2,500 bridges which cross watercourses for the Highways Agency. Just over 1,000have been identified as at potential risk from scour;that is they could be in certain circumstances. Thoseare the bridges that we concentrate on in terms ofour inspections. At the six-yearly detailedinspections we would look at underwaterinspections and after events of flooding and heavyrainfall we would also go and look at those bridgesand examine the underwater condition of thefoundations.

Q120 Chair: Outside the Highways Agency, wouldyou have guidance that that sort of survey shouldbe done?Mr Ahmed: The UKRLG do have an existing codeof practice for the management of highwaystructures which builds on some of the guidance forthe Highways Agency but more generally for localhighway authorities. That includes instructions oninspections as well and that could be something that,going forward, with UKRLG, we could look toupdate.

Q121 Mr Martlew: Nobody could have predictedthat one of the Workington bridges was going tocollapse and one become very dangerous andprobably have to be knocked down and cost afortune to repair. Having said that, if something likethis happens again in the foreseeable future, peoplewill say the Government were aware that there was aproblem and they did not do anything. What is youranswer to that?Mr Khan: It is a very good question. The answer isin three parts. Firstly, the new permanent bridgeswhich are going to be built are going to be adapted totake account of some of the challenges we face withclimate change. Secondly, the Highways AgencyoVered and we have given to Cumbria and thecouncils the oVer of the engineers and experts and tothe teams who are out helping local authoritieswherever they need help to inspect the bridges—andthey have carried out a survey of nearly all thebridges and there are thousands of bridges in thatpart of the world you know better than I do—fromthe centre we oVered our experts to help you as localauthorities to do that. The third point I would maketo local authorities is please speak to us about thepotential areas of problem you foresee, let us knowand we will do what we can to assist you. We are hereto help. Something like 98% of the roads in ourcountry are not the responsibility of the HighwaysAgency or Network Rail. We could easily wash ourhands of those but we think that is not sensible. Any

expertise or guidance we have centrally we are happyto pass down. We work with and fund research fromUKRLG and any lessons which can be learned fromCumbria will be learned, not simply in the recoverybut trying to make sure that things like this do nothappen in the first place. All the evidence I have fromthe experts in Cumbria is that actually they are oneof the few councils who, as part of their LAA, haveas National Indicators areas around maintenance.They are not one of these councils with their head inthe sand.

Q122 Mr Martlew: They have spent 100% of themoney on the bridges that they should have done.Mr Khan: Absolutely.4

Q123 Mr Clelland: We have talked a lot aboutbridges but there is also a question of the highwayswhich were also flooded and the A66, which in thatpart of its length is a trunk road and is managed bythe Highways Agency, was flooded and blocked forsome time.Mr Loudon: Flooded for 45 hours.

Q124 Mr Clelland: Indeed a viaduct, maybe 200 feetfrom the valley floor, had two feet of water in itbecause the gullies were not capable of taking thewater away. Obviously this is a 1:200-year event butwe do not know how often these things might ormight not happen again in future. Were any lessonslearned there, any alterations to be made to thosesections of the road or anywhere else in the countrybecause of the likelihood of severe storms like that?Mr Loudon: I can only comment again from theHighways Agency perspective. There was fairlylimited damage to the other infrastructure. Therewas a river adjacent to the trunk road which hadsome minor damage and is being repaired. There wassome localised damage to some of the drainage andsome of the carriageway surfacing but again it wasrelatively minor considering the nature and extent ofthe rainfall and the flooding. To pick up on yourpoint, yes, of course when we do our survey and lookat the vulnerability of our assets, I do not just talk interms of structures, I talk in terms of thegeotechnical, the earthworks, the drainage and thepavements themselves. We have to look at the wholeinfrastructure.Mr Khan: One of the lessons we learned is in relationto drainage. We are now working much more closelywith Defra in the Flood and Water Management Billto have sustainable drainage rather than thepresumption, when you build a highway or property,that you connect automatically to the seweragesystem. It is that sort of foresight which was notthere even ten years ago and we are trying to buildin now and trying to make sure we do not have theproblems in 10 or 20 years’ time that we have now inrelation to where the water runoV goes.Mr Martlew: The people from Cumbria have beenvery fulsome in their praise of the help they have hadfrom the Department but you get the feeling thatthere is a bit of frustration because there is a conflict




between putting things back as they were andactually improving things while you have theopportunity. Obviously at the moment theGovernment are saying that they will fund forreplacement. How do we get over that conflictbetween this being a once-in-a-lifetime opportunityto improve things but we do not have the money andthe Government saying they are very happy to fund,all right using new technologies, but what you hadbefore? How do we get over that problem?

Q125 Chair: When we say “improve” that couldmean learning lessons of something that did notquite prove to be adequate. Is it possible forimprovements to be made within reason?Mr Khan: Absolutely. One of the best conversationsI have had with people involved with this naturalcatastrophe was with some of the technical people inCumbria who made the point that this could be anopportunity to rethink completely the way we dothings in transport in the area. One of the keychallenges we have is to balance getting back thetown’s connectivity—Workington was cut oV—andat the same time start the process of rebuilding a newbridge, for argument’s sake, without consideringwhether there are other things we can think about,like having a permanent railway connection, wherethe station is and all the rest of it. What we have doneis this: we have sent in a specialist person to advisethe council how they want to go about doing therecovery part of it. The important thing was to getthe communities reconnected, so having the freeshuttle service was very important. That is only atemporary arrangement. The footbridge is veryimportant because children could not reach schooland they could not get to their exams; that was very

important. Getting the temporary road bridge in isvery important for obvious reasons. That is the“temporary” stuV. It is for the council now to cometo us with ideas about the permanent side of things.For example, I mentioned a permanent bridge whichwill take two and a half years to build. The counciland local stakeholders may think we ought to thinkabout some other innovative ways. The challengewill be that most of the road networks connect in acertain way because they have been there literally forcenturies, so it will take some innovative work fromthe engineers and councillors to think aboutsolutions for the future. We are very happy, may I sayon the record and I have said this to council leaders,both district and county and to the engineers, towork with them. I do not think there is a chiefexecutive I have spoken to more than the chiefexecutive in the area. She was appointed the daybefore the floods and she has had a fantasticprobation period. I am really happy to work withthem and it is their decision. We cannot impose fromHQ what happens to that community.

Q126 Chair: But you will work with them with theaim of making things as good as they can be?Mr Khan: My task is to fulfil the promise the PrimeMinister made which is to do whatever the people ofCumbria need to put this community back on itsfeet. We have started a process with the footbridge,the temporary road bridge and that process goes on.The key point the Prime Minister made and thepeople made was “Don’t stop coming, don’t stophelping us once the cameras go away”. We still arehelping Cumbria and the cameras have gone.Chair: So help is continuing. That is a very goodpoint on which to conclude. Thank you very muchfor coming.


Written evidence

Memorandum from Mr D Holladay (BIC 01)

I make my submission to the select committee as an individual, who has had some experience in buildinglow cost infrastructure for cycle routes, which, through its being located on land which may often beavailable because it floods from time to time, and thus the design ethos is to accept the occasional flood,which may often simply mean cycling through a linear “ford”, and construct the path in such a way thatwhen the waters subside it is ready for use, with a minimum of work to clear any debris washed onto thesurface. I also comment as a user of road & rail networks who, through riding a bicycle can experience ata very early stage, movements and defects well before they progress into catastrophic failure, and have inthe past predicted the collapse of Leith Street in Edinburgh as the ripples of movement were easily detectedon my regular bike ride. Through my local area I can highlight the progress of damage which will eventuallyresult in collapse of parts of the road network, but further highlight the poor stop-gap methods of repairingdefects in the carriageway which do not address the fundamental structural problems which provide theunderlying cause for the failures—leaving these failures to reappear often after a very brief period. Someroads are simply not being repaired as planned—one length of road locally was to be repaired almost fouryears ago but work here has yet to start.

Briefly dealing with the questions:

What were the causes of the collapse of the bridges in Cumbria?

One theory I subscribe to is that upward pressure on the arches removed the circumferential loading whichforms the core of an arch bridge’s strength and stability. Once separated the voussoir stones then moved andfell out causing immediate catastrophic failure. Water levels above the arch springing and cutwaters shouldtrigger immediate closure of an arch bridge. It may be possible to design in pressure relief systems—see laterdiscussion.

To what extent were the collapses caused by structural flaws, the age or state of maintenance of the bridges?

Blocked drains and a lack of locally based locally working staV means that there may be a lack ofunderstanding on the importance of drain clearance and key points of intervention. The 1707 arch atCarrbridge and other arch structures which have had no maintenance for years suggest that there is aninherent safety in them, if the way they work is understood and the design provides for and detrimentalaction of water to have minimal eVect.

How likely is it that the recent experiences in Cumbria would be repeated in other parts of the country in theevent of similar weather conditions?

The evidence is already clear from the torrents which flow down many roads in heavy rain, as the adjoiningland has been hardened and developed to shed water on to the roads and ultimately into the watercourses.

How well protected are the country’s bridges to cope with the type of flooding events seen in Cumbria?

The concept of building ever higher and ever stronger walls will drive floodwater to deliver ever worsenedflooding elsewhere. The concept should be to manage and attenuate or weir-oV any surge of water fromupsteam in the river system.

What would be the implications if we continued as “business-as-usual”?

Worse flood events and greatly increased costs for maintenance and repair work.

To what extent is the nation’s other transport infrastructure, such as roads and railway lines, adequatelyprotected against severe flooding events?

The experiences of the rail industry (eg Ness Viaduct) and a very diVerent culture on the importance ofdoing things right, rather than at lowest cost, when a repair or renovation is planned has paid dividends.The Engineers in the rail industry commend a higher level of authority when setting an enforcing standardsfor construction monitoring and maintenance. This is also reflected in the safety regimes for on trackworkers compared to highway work. When floodwaters rise on the rail infrastructure there are clear levelsat which the monitoring process sets oV appropriate actions to reduce train speeds or stop the service. Aftermany decades of neglect the rail industry is also making sure that track drainage works, in many casesrestoring the systems originally built over 100 years ago to function as designed.


What measures, if any, should the Government take to better protect bridges and transport infrastructure fromflooding events?

Survey all major watercourses and review the capacity of drainage and bridges to ensure that thedownstream discharge capacity matches the upstream feed, additionally (below) survey all hard surfacedroads and car parks and public open space to a) increase upstream absorption capacity and b) providesacrificial areas to flood.

Is there a need for the Government to undertake a significant building programme to renew or replace bridges?

The strategy should be to manage the eVects arising from extraordinary input events for the watershed.This is discussed below but may include sacrificial land in the form of public open space—especially in urbanareas where a number of councils are permitting questionable levels of over development, this will alsorequire he introduction of a tighter control on hard landscaping—perhaps a planning control to ensure thata percentage of land area remains as absorbent ground either by direct control of all sites and their hard tosoft ratio, or an area-wide audit which requires a developer building a car park or road to provide no overallincrease in non absorbent land by providing absorbent land or its equivalent in the adjacent area. Car parksand similar areas which are not used for the whole day or whole year should be constructed to absorb waterat a rate equivalent to at least 60% of open grassland. A further review of all roads to identify the areas whichare not used/not essential can be assessed from study of recent snowfall and these areas can either be returnedto a fallow state or reconstructed with absorbent surfacing. For the bridges themselves, a fusible plugstrategy is perhaps a less costly and more rapidly implemented action. Bridges most at should have a weakarea or low point which will be the preferred route taken by floodwater when a critical level is reached, andthe local roads management and Police control should have a plan for the required road closure toaccommodate an expected flood.

What would be the estimated costs of such action?

The rainfall absorption programme should be incorporated into road repair and renewal work and it may,by reducing the area of road surfacing which is required to highway standard, actually reduce the cost ofproviding and maintaining roads. At a rough estimate between 50 and 60% of the hard surfaced roads in anurban area are not used for the statutory purpose of moving traYc on wheels and on foot. Much of it is usedfor parking and this can be constructed a) to absorb water b) to flood sacrificially and attenuate a surge ofwater which is directed on to the road, to protect buildings c) to be constructed for a lower cost than a fullysealed surface and d) use a discrete element construction method proven by example to manage settlement(stone setts) without the failures experienced with flexible pavement.

My Own Commentary

Sacrificial areas and fusible plug solutions

The concept of sacrificial flooding of roads has delivered several grade separated crossings of busy roadsand rail lines by building robust paths under flood arches or slightly above the normal level of water in aculvert. For a few days every year those paths may be unusable but for the rest of the time they providevaluable safe crossings. I have been involved with a number of these when working for Sustrans, and thisis used at several locations in the Highlands—examples include crossings of the A95 to reach the River Speyfrom Grantown, and crossing under the railway lines at Aviemore to reach the Speyside Railway premisesfrom the town. Many are very basic and the construction techniques highlight the concept of delivering asimple and robust “pavement” which can survive immersion and be quickly restored to service.

There are further examples notably in the Netherlands (where they know a bit about managing floods).Here you can find underpasses where the road level is below the normal water level, thus providing theheadroom needed for the road, but the fall of the river, eventually brings it down to the lowest point of theroad. In flood the river overtops the sides of its channel and floods the road, but when the water falls backbelow the channel sides the flooded roadway drains oV to that point downstream. (Pictures may be available)

Taking this concept further I would highlight what I’ve known as the Irish Bridge. In this design the basicriver is crossed but no expensive flood arches or defensive armouring is placed to resist extreme water flows.In many cases the approaches to the span are lowered so that any excess water will by pass the bridge anduse the road as a shallow spillway or weir. The span itself may also be designed to have minimal resistanceto water when the water level rises above the soYt, and even over the deck.

I understand that for some of the arch bridges the upward pressure from water forced under the span canact against the fundamental forces providing the integrity of the arch ring, and with the voussoir stoneseVectively separated they can move sideways of drop out causing a catastrophic failure, and there may bea need to consider how a large arch—especially a flat arch—which relies on the keeping a static load betweeneach element of the arch can be protected by releasing that upward pressure—perhaps by the drainage ofthe bridge deck being designed to operate in reverse as a pressure relief system, in extreme conditions.

I believe that with all the arrangements noted so far it is possible to have an automatically released risingbarrier which is triggered to rise up and close oV the roadway or path when the water level reaches a keypoint. Such a device could be very basic and require no powered controls.—eVectively a fit and forget system,


which requires minimal attention. Similarly flood-indicator road signs are an option, switching over in aninstant to provide the required warning display. In working on the Sustrans projects using flood arches forcycle routes I worked out some initial basic ideas.

The logical extension from this is to consider the use of roads as rivers, and I understand that this was theintention in the design of the M5 motorway as it crosses the Somerset Levels. From some rudimentary workit looks as if a basic 7.3m single carriageway road flowing 30cm (1 foot) deep in water at walking pace couldbe taking away around three million litres per minute, and rethinking road design in areas with high floodrisk might oVer an outcome where the streets flow as rivers with car parks as surge reservoirs, taking thewater clear of property and immovable items. Motor vehicles can usually be driven to higher ground ifnecessary, and large vehicles can usually be driven with care through water up to 30cm deep maintainingpassenger and freight transport services. Cycles can also be ridden in water up to axle height if the rider iswearing waders or wellington boots.

One option to rapidly restore motor vehicle access is to build a ford across the river. This is actually auseful preparatory stage for rebuilding a bridge, as it can provide that important link between the two halvesof the bridge site during construction. The ford may not be suitable for private cars and a form of speedhump wide and high with squared corners which can be cleared by trucks and buses capable of traversingthe ford but blocking smaller vehicles with lower ground clearance should provide a reasonable degree ofdefault policing.

Restoring Transport Links—The Bicycle as a Key Tool

Here I wish to put in a strong case for the bicycle as a key tool for rapid recovery when transportinfrastructure is seriously disrupted by events, both natural and man-made. After the 2004 Tsunami thecoastal towns of Sri Lanka took to the bicycle as soon as the waters had subsided, to move people andproduce, carrying the bikes around any blockage. In Vietnam the Viet Cong delivered thousands of tons ofsupplies with every bridge and road destroyed by bombing, and even in London on 7 July 2005, those witha bicycle were relatively immune from the transport melt-down. Whilst the performance of a bicycle withair in the tyres, a working transmission system and brakes is desirable, experience from remote locationswhere parts and accessories are in short supply shows that the transport benefit of a bicycle for a populationotherwise limited to travel on foot is substantial.

I would recommend that those engaged with emergency planning consider a basic course in which theycan experience and evaluate the potential of cycle use for local transport of personnel and materials to seehow it can work within their individual area context. My own connection—working with CTC on theintegration of cycling with public transport leads me to suggest that CTC may be an appropriateorganisation to supply the resource for any training course in this respect, along with the work of variouscycle-based initiatives in Africa, where second-hand cycles are re-fashioned to provide bicycle ambulances,and stretchers for carrying casualties across rough terrain. The bike has transformed medical services, andwater distribution in regions where transport infrastructure has not developed to the levels we have becomeaccustomed to, and represents a situation which could prevail in the UK after a major “natural forces”incident.

The Role of the Taxi

One integration issue I have promoted in my time with CTC is that of carrying bikes by taxi, and againI see an important emergency planning opportunity which can be put into place, through a co-ordinatednational plan for taxi standards, possibly through the licensing system. In the UK most local authorities’taxi licensing has embraced the requirement for wheelchair accessibility by rolling out appropriatespecifications for all new taxis and licences. Few however have take a logical extension of this to make thetaxi oYcially accessible to those with cycles, prams and other larger accompanying articles. In Denmark thetaxi licensing system does require provision for carriage of prams and cycles, and as a result all taxis travelwith a clip-on bike rack. In rural areas of the UK market forces already see taxi operators using 6–8 seatervehicles and occasionally trailers to carry cycles, or outdoor recreation gear, when an area is popular forsuch activities, but there is no UK common standard.

A logical extension of this, especially for rural areas, is to expand the definitions and standards anddevelop some common basics, with the option of using the local taxi parc to enhance the existing ambulanceprovision both in times of emergency, and, potentially saving the NHS substantial sums on dead mileage forambulances sent out to collect non-emergency patients and then return from taking them home again. Theresource of a known fleet of licensed vehicles all capable of use for moving casualties or supplies, and witha ready network of contact to initiate this may be a useful card to have in the pack, when an immediate moveof a large and distributed population is needed, co-ordinating a taxi-based collection network with bus andrail services to minimise the need for individual private vehicle movements.


The Role of the Train—Reducing the Cost of an Emergency Rail Service

In the US all main line rail vehicles have just a single standard of coupling them together and a singlestandard for basic braking. Thus when on a trip some years ago the locomotive on our passenger train brokedown, we simply “borrowed” one of the five locomotives on a passing freight train which coupled straighton to our train without any need for special adaptors or other compromises. At one stage I could countsix directly incompatible coupling systems operating over the same stretch of line into Glasgow Central, allresulting from a compounded history of the free-hand policy of the sectorised British Rail and the decisionmade by the British Transport Commission to pursue the vacuum braking system when most other railwayswere standardising on air brakes. The litany of niggling details that prevent simple and straightforwardoperation are often created by failure to account for the obvious. In the recent cold weather the exposedautomatic couplings were hurriedly covered by bin liners to prevent snow and ice from plugging up air-pipeconnections. Exposed low-point bends in air pipes, where water collects, froze, immobilising the brakingand suspension systems, when the system should have either used a vapour-based “anti-freeze” to depressthe freezing point of that water, or put the vulnerable pipework in a less exposed or warmer position.

January 2010

Memorandum from Adept (Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport(formerly the County Surveyors’ Society (CSS)) (BIC 02)

1. Executive Summary

1.1 The intensity of flooding experienced at a river bridge is governed by various characteristics of theupstream rainfall catchment area.

1.2 The structural vulnerability of a river bridge to flooding depends on its form of construction and, inparticular, whether its supports and superstructure are located within the river channel.

1.3 Scour, the erosion of river bed material, is considered to be the most common cause of bridge failure.It can undermine bridge foundations causing collapse. Damage to the masonry of some bridges can becaused by flood water turbulence. Extreme levels of river flow can exert immense lateral forces on bridgesleading to damage or collapse. Floating debris can cause impact loads or aggravate scour.

1.4 It is considered that the Cumbria bridge failures were due to the considerable lateral pressure of water,the impact of debris and scour rather than any structural flaws in the bridges which are routinely inspectedby Cumbria County Council every two years.

1.5 The bridges that collapsed in Cumbria are similar to many thousands of others across the UK.Therefore, if extreme weather conditions, similar to those encountered in Cumbria, were encountered in alocation with similar rainfall catchment area characteristics, it is probable that further bridges would bedamaged or swept away by flood waters.

1.6 Nationally there is a significant backlog in bridge maintenance work and this is of concern becausewell maintained bridges will generally be less vulnerable to flooding events than poorly maintainedstructures. The Government should provide suYcient funding for the backlog to be reduced to anacceptable level.

1.7 Guidance should be developed for assessing the risk of damage to bridges by flooding. TheGovernment should fund a programme of implementing flood protection works to those bridges found tobe both critical to the highway network and vulnerable to damage. In the interim, emergency plans formanaging vulnerable bridges at times of flooding should be developed by local authorities.

1.8 The Government should support a move to risk ranking investment in maintenance and improvementof the highway network. Pending this, the Department for Transport’s indicative allocations of bridgemaintenance funding should be “ring fenced”.

1.9 Bridge owners should be reminded of the importance of inspecting their bridge stock in accordancewith the Code of Practice for the Management of Highway Structures. The UK Roads Liaison Groupshould be asked to consider adding guidance on assessing flood risk to the Code.

2. Introduction

2.1 The House of Commons Transport Committee has called for evidence to be submitted to its inquiryinto the impact of flooding on bridges and other transport infrastructure in Cumbria. The severe floodingfollowed extreme levels of rainfall in November 2009.

2.2 This submission is made by the CSS (formerly the County Surveyors’ Society) which represents localauthority chief oYcers across the UK who manage transport, waste management, environment, planning,energy and economic development issues. The link to the CSS website is: http://www.cssnet.org.uk .

2.3 This evidence has been prepared by Michael Winter in his role as Chairman of the CSS Bridges Group.This group is the national focal point for a comprehensive network of local authority bridge owners inEngland (arranged through eight regions and representatives from the London Boroughs) but also includes


Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The CSS Bridge Group’s principal role is to consider all issuesassociated with design, management and maintenance of bridges and other highway structures and topromote sound engineering best practice in this field.

3. Background

3.1 In November 2009 Cumbria experienced the highest level of rainfall measured in the UK since recordsbegan with over 316mm of rainfall in 24 hours in some areas. The consequential severe flooding caused thecollapse of three road bridges and three footbridges. Tragically, a policeman was killed when NorthsideRoad Bridge collapsed. Many other bridges were damaged and some had to be closed to ensure public safety.In particular, Calva Road Bridge in Workington was so badly aVected that it will have to be replaced.Cumbria County Council has carried out an initial inspection of all of its bridges across water to identifyany damage caused by flooding and to ensure they are safe for use. Secondary inspections are currently beingcarried out on bridges where high flood water levels precluded an initial comprehensive check.

3.2 In Workington, the loss of bridges has severed direct highway links across the town. Motor vehiclesare now faced with a detour of approximately 20 miles. Access on foot has been partially restored by wayof a temporary footbridge constructed across the River Derwent and the provision of a temporary railstation to connect the north and south sides of Workington.

3.3 Historically, many towns, including Workington, have grown up around river crossing points. Theloss of these crossing points inevitably leads to major disruption to communities which are reliant on bridgesfor access to schools, work, hospitals and shops. Bridges also carry utility pipes and cables and if these aresevered additional problems are caused through lack of power, drinking water or communications.

4. Flooding—General

4.1 Rainfall, if not intercepted by vegetation, or artificial surfaces such as roofs or paved surfaces will fallon natural ground where it will first either evaporate, soak into the earth or remain in localised ponds andpuddles. Any surplus will flow downhill to the nearest stream or river. Therefore, in very simple terms, theriver flow at a bridge is largely governed by the following parameters:

— The duration and intensity of the rainfall.

— The ground conditions (saturated ground, impermeable soils such as clays and rock will permitlittle infiltration of the rainwater).

— The size, shape and land use of the rainfall catchment area (how much of the land is developed andserved by drainage systems which discharge directly into watercourses).

— The topography of the catchment area (the steeper the ground, the more rapidly the water will getto the bridge).

— The storage capacity of the river valley’s flood plain.

5. Bridge Vulnerability to Flood Damage

5.1 In general terms, the more that a bridge constricts the river channel flow, the greater the risk of floodwater damage, unless specific engineering measures have been incorporated into its design. Bridges that fullyspan rivers with superstructures above the crest of the river banks and with supports set well back from thebanks will be much less vulnerable than multi-span bridges with intermediate piers founded in the river bedand with superstructures which are within the river channel profile.

5.2 Scour, the erosion of river bed material by flowing water, is considered to be the most common causeof bridge failure. Under normal flow conditions in a river, a general equilibrium will be established wherebyremoval of small particles of river bed material will be balanced by deposition of sediment from upstream.In flood conditions the velocity of the water can provide suYcient energy to disturb larger particles whichare transported downstream. Scour occurs because the rate of removal of these particles exceeds the rate atwhich replacement sediment is deposited. The process of scour can be aggravated by local increases in flowvelocity due to constrictions to flow or changes in the geometry of the river channel—as can occur at abridge.

5.3 The undermining of bridge piers and/or abutments by scour can, particularly with older masonrystructures on shallow foundations, cause collapse with little or no visual warning. In general, bridges withpiled foundations are less vulnerable to scour than bridges with shallow “spread” foundations but scouradjacent to any part of a bridge is undesirable. Bridges can be protected from scour by providing steel sheetpiling or concrete plinths to piers and abutments as well as by stabilising the river bed using stone filled steel“mattress” cages laid flat or cast concrete inverts.

5.4 Bridge damage, or even collapse, can also be caused by debris in the flood waters. Large tree trunksor root-balls and vehicles are sometimes swept down river and can strike bridges causing damage or collapseor get trapped, further constricting flow and aggravating scour or pressure on the structure.

5.5 Extreme levels of river flow can exert immense lateral forces on bridges, particularly older masonryarch structures which eVectively present a solid barrier to flow within the river channel. Although modernbridges are likely to have been designed to withstand hydrodynamic pressures, older masonry structures will


have been designed by “rule-of-thumb” methods based on practical experience to primarily support loadsfrom the highway above. These arch structures are not inherently strong in resisting forces from below orlaterally. Furthermore, once disturbed an arch bridge is often considerably weakened. Recent research hasshown that the vertical load carrying capacity of an arch bridge can be reduced by up to 50% by the buoyancyeVects of flood water. It is possible that the continued unrestricted use of a bridge during a flood event couldcreate further weaknesses. The combined eVects of scour, lateral loading and buoyancy can createcatastrophic results.

5.6 New highway bridges are generally designed in accordance with the Department for Transport’sDesign Manual for Roads and Bridges which includes Advice Note BA59/94, “The Design of HighwayBridges for Hydraulic Action”. This 1994 document requires due account to be taken of potential scour andlateral forces due to flood water and debris. New or replacement bridges over rivers require the consent ofthe Environment Agency who are likely to require design river flows 20% above previous peak flows to allowfor climate change.

6. Response to Question 1

What were the causes of the collapse of the bridges in Cumbria? To what extent were the collapses caused bystructural flaws, the age or state of maintenance of the bridges?

6.1 The Cumbria County Council Bridge Manager, Malcolm Sutherland, agrees with the widely acceptedview that bridge failures were due to the considerable lateral pressure of water and the impact of debris orscouring of foundations.

6.2 Cumbria County Council carries out General Inspections of its bridges at two yearly intervals inaccordance with the national Code of Practice “Management of Highway Structures” as published by theUK Roads Liaison Group (UK RLG). Bridge owners have been encouraged to fully implement this codeby April 2012. The General Inspections are carried out in accordance with “The Inspection Manual forHighway Structures”, published by the Department for Transport, and the condition of each visible part ofthe structure is recorded. The inspection results are used to identify repair works that are necessary in orderto maintain the bridge and higher priority is given to components that have a direct bearing on strengthand safety.

6.3 The Cumbria County Council Bridge Manager has stated that he was not aware of any significantstructural defects in any of the bridges that failed. It is unlikely that any minor outstanding maintenancework which had been identified at previous inspections would have contributed to the bridge collapses whichwere considered to have been solely due to the extreme river flows. It should also be noted that the GeneralInspection process generally leads to bridges being closed before there is risk to public safety. This is doneso that there is a reasonable factor of safety against failure ie the inability to carry any further load withoutexcessive distress or deflection. This is not the same as collapse which can occur at slightly higher loadinglevels. This is one of the reasons why it is extremely rare to see a bridge collapse.

6.4 The highway bridges that collapsed were masonry arches thought to be 100 to 200 years old. Theyare unlikely to have had very deep foundations and this would have made them more vulnerable to scourthan modern structures. The fabric of masonry arches such as these can be severely damaged by the fastflowing river tearing away pieces of brickwork or stonework. This is particularly the case if bricks or stonesare already missing because turbulence is created by the flowing water in the resulting voids causing furthermasonry loss and the “wash out” of backfilling material which is often just unbound soil. This can be aprogressive process in which the “unravelling” of the masonry leads to failure of the bridge.

6.5 It is understood that the footbridges which collapsed were constructed more recently but the reasonsfor the collapse of these is unknown. One appears to have been dislodged from its supports by the impactof a van floating down the river.

7. Response to Question 2.1

How likely is it that the recent experiences in Cumbria would be repeated in other parts of the country in theevent of similar weather conditions? How well protected are the country’s bridges to cope with the type offlooding events seen in Cumbria?

7.1 Unfortunately, there is no national database of bridges so definitive statistics about bridge typescannot be provided. Nor is there any national register of bridges that are at risk of flood damage. However,the bridges that collapsed in Cumbria are similar to many thousands of bridges managed by local authoritiesacross the UK. Therefore, if extreme weather conditions, similar to those encountered in Cumbria, wereencountered elsewhere, it is probable that further bridges would be damaged or swept away by flood waters.It should be noted that the overall impact in Cumbria was due to a combination of the unprecedented levelsof rainfall falling onto saturated ground, the bridge types, the small number of river crossing points, thelocation of the centres of population and the local topography which is characterised by a steep sidedcatchment area. The number of areas where these conditions could co-exist is likely to be limited.

7.2 Like Cumbria County Council, most Local Highway Authority bridge owners manage their bridgestock in accordance with the national code of practice “Management of Highway Structures”. This seeks toensure they are both “Safe for Use” (no unacceptable risk to public safety) and “Fit for Purpose” (available


for use by permitted traYc). The code sets out an asset management approach of inspection, strengthassessment and maintenance. Any maintenance, strengthening or improvement works will generally beprioritised and, carried out as far as funding is available. If significantly defective structures cannot berepaired due to inadequate funding it may be necessary to put interim measures in place to ensure publicsafety. Such measures could range from an increased inspection frequency to bridge restriction or closure.

7.3 Most Local Highway Authorities have significant backlogs of maintenance work and, with theCumbria events in mind, this is of some concern because there is little doubt that, all other things being equal,a well maintained bridge is likely to be more resilient to flooding than a poorly maintained structure. Thisis particularly the case for masonry bridges which should have missing bricks or stonework replaced andjoints pointed if the risk of damage by fast flowing flood water, as outlined in paragraph 6.4, is to be avoided.

7.4 The code of practice recommends that Principal Inspections, which involve a more detailedexamination than General Inspections, are carried out at six-yearly intervals unless a risk based assessmenthas shown that they should be carried out at a diVerent frequency. They should include an underwaterinspection. The code also recommends that special bridge inspections should be carried out due to specificcircumstances or following certain events and this would include underwater checking for scour followinga flood or unusually high river flow.

7.5 Currently, the code does not expressly recommend that bridge owners assess the risk to bridges ofextreme weather events such as that experienced in Cumbria, although the recently introduced “Flood RiskRegulations 2009” do require local authorities to prepare flood assessment reports, flood risk maps and floodrisk management plans in consultation with the Environment Agency.

7.6 The Department for Transport’s Design Manual for Roads and Bridges does include an Advice Note,BA74/06, entitled “Assessment of Scour at Highway Bridges”. This describes a means of assessing thepotential for scour to damage a bridge but does not consider the impact of flood water or debris on thestructure. The majority of local authority Bridge Managers will be aware of this document but the extentto which assessments have been carried out is likely to be variable due to the considerable amount of workinvolved. The limited budgets to deal with general bridge maintenance and the associated backlog of workmean that, even if assessments have been carried out, flood protection works (which can be expensive dueto the extensive temporary works required) may not have been implemented due to other fundingrequirements.



8.1 With climate change we can expect extreme weather events to take place more frequently in the future.It is possible that a similar weather event occurring in another area of the UK would have similar results.The impact on the infrastructure would depend on the ground conditions and topography of the rainfallcatchment area, the structural form and condition of the bridges. The impact on any local communitieswould depend on their reliance on any river crossings.

8.2 In recent years we have seen other major flooding events including Boscastle (August 2004) andGloucestershire (June 2007) which did not have quite the same impact on bridges but were neverthelesshighly disruptive to the local communities and involved loss of life and serious injury. It is important thatthese floods are not dismissed as “freak” events and steps are taken to improve the resilience of our criticalinfrastructure. Failure to do so risks the reputation of Government, the Highways Agency, Local Authoritiesand the highway engineering profession.

9. Response to Question 3


9.1 Whilst the Environment Agency plays a key role in setting national strategy for flood riskmanagement, localised highway flooding is a matter for the Highway Authority and locations subject toregular flooding are likely to be dealt with as part of general highway maintenance unless the solutioninvolves engineering measures for which the cost greatly outweighs the inconvenience caused by a road beingimpassable (most likely for lower classification roads).

9.2 In the case of severe widespread flooding, many low-lying roads would be submerged. These mayinclude important links of the highway network which will often have been constructed along valley bottomsto minimise engineering costs.

9.3 Network Rail should be consulted regarding the protection of railway lines against severe floodingevents. Although the railway bridge across the River Derwent withstood the flooding in Cumbria, there havepreviously been some high profile collapses of railway bridges across waterways, some with loss of life.Indeed, considerable loss of life was narrowly avoided a few months ago when a busy commuter traincrossed a river bridge in Malahide near Dublin just minutes before a span collapsed due to a pier beingundermined by scour.



What measures, if any, should the Government take to better protect bridges from flooding events?

10.1 The Government should commission the development of guidance to bridge owners on aquantitative assessment of the risk and impact of flooding to bridges. This should start with consultationwith the Environment Agency because the assessment should be a development of their Catchment FloodManagement Plans and be integrated with the duties imposed on local authorities, acting as the “Lead LocalFlood Authority”, by “The Flood Risk Regulations 2009”. Advice on measures to improve the resilience ofthe bridge should be provided. Particular attention should be paid to the protection of foundations to scour.The guidance should include a methodology for estimating the lateral forces due to fast river flows anddebris impact and for quantifying the risk of scour. It should build on existing work published by theDepartment for Transport and Network Rail. (It is helpful that the Highways Agency will be reviewing itsAdvice Note BA74 on scour assessment during the coming year and that the CSS will be represented on theTechnical Project Board for this work.)

10.2 The Government should ensure that bridge maintenance is adequately funded so that any identifiedflood protection works can be implemented without increasing the current maintenance backlog or divertingfunding away from other works that are essential to keep the network’s bridges available for use.

10.3 The Government should require local highway authorities to set out emergency plans for managingvulnerable bridges in times of extreme flooding. These plans should include taking decisions to close bridgesto ensure public safety if flood levels and water velocities reach pre-defined values and mitigating thedisruption caused by the loss of key links within the highway network.

10.4 The Government should consider the creation of a national database of bridges. This could becreated by further development of the “ESDAL” (Electronic Service Delivery for Abnormal Loads) nationaldatabase of bridges that is currently managed by the Highways Agency and used for the planning andnotification of abnormal load movements. The success of such a system would be reliant upon mandatoryprovision of data by local authorities. The database could be funded by the Department of Transport as partof its support for the development of transport asset management. If the scope of the ESDAL database wasto be widened as proposed then the responsibility for its management should be reviewed. The databaseshould include provision for recording the risk rated vulnerability to flooding so that the national positionmay be established.

10.5 As part of a strategy of adapting to climate change, the Government should support a review ofguidance on design loadings for new bridges to cater for flood events. This should include consideration ofdesign storm levels and impact loadings on lightweight structures such as footbridges with little clearanceabove high flood water levels.

10.6 On the basis that well maintained bridges will be better able to resist forces exerted by extremeflooding, the Government should seek to quantify the national bridge maintenance backlog and increasehighway maintenance funding to enable it to be reduced to an acceptable level.

10.7 The Government should support the development of a methodology for risk ranking investment inhighway network maintenance and improvement schemes—an approach recommended in the UK RLG’ssuite of codes of practice. Such an approach would enable issues of safety, economy, environment, assetmanagement and cost to be considered in a consistent way across all highway assets.

10.8 Pending the introduction of a risk based system of prioritising highway maintenance expenditure,the Department for Transport should “ring fence” the indicative allocations of bridge funding that areincorporated into the highway maintenance block allocations.


Is there a need for the Government to undertake a significant building programme to renew or replace bridges?What would be the estimated costs of such action?

11.1 It is estimated that almost half of the local highway authority owned bridges in England are masonryarch structures. Many provide prominent features in the landscape and contribute to our national heritage.Some are listed structures or scheduled monuments. In most cases bridge replacement is neither desirablenor necessary.

11.2 Well maintained bridges with scour protection are more likely to be able to withstand severe floodingimpacts than those in a poor state of repair with little foundation protection. Therefore, the processproposed in paragraph 10.1 should be used to identify bridges at risk and works should be undertaken toreduce their vulnerability.

11.3 The cost of such measures is unknown and could not be estimated without completion of the initialphase of assessment. However, the cost is likely to be small in comparison with the asset value of the nationalbridge stock.


12. Recommendations

12.1 Bridge owners should be reminded of the importance of carrying out regular inspections of theirbridges in accordance with the Code of Practice for the Management of Highway Structures and the BridgeInspection Manual.

12.2 Consideration should be given to the creation of a national database of bridges (as exists in somecountries) which would include data on vulnerability to flood damage.

12.3 Guidance should be provided to bridge owners on carrying out an assessment of their bridge stockto determine which bridges could be subject to severe flooding and to consider their vulnerability to damage.This will require input from other government agencies such as DEFRA and the Environment Agency.

12.4 The Government should provide ring fenced funding to reduce the backlog of bridge maintenanceand to implement a prioritised programme of flood protection works.

12.5 Highway Authorities should be required to prepare emergency plans for flooding events occurringat sites of bridges known to be vulnerable to flood damage.

12.6 As part of a strategy of adapting to climate change the design requirements for bridges overwaterways subject to severe flooding should be reviewed with particular attention paid to design storm levelsand debris impact loading on lightweight structures.

12.7 The Government should support the development of a methodology for risk ranking investment inhighway network maintenance and improvement schemes. Pending the introduction of such an approach,the Department for Transport should ring fence the indicative allocations of bridge funding that areincorporated into the highway maintenance block allocations.

12.8 The UK Roads Liaison Group is asked to consider including advice on the assessment of flood riskin its Code of Practice for the Management of Highway Structures.

February 2010

Assessment of Bridge Vulnerability of Flood Damage—Outline Proposal

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March 2010


Memorandum from UK Roads Liaison Group (BIC 03)

1. Transport Committee.

1.1 The House of Commons Transport Committee has invited interested parties to submit writtenevidence by Tuesday 19 January 2010 relating to the recent severe floods in Cumbria. The Committee willinquire into the impact of flooding on bridges and other transport infrastructure. The Committee isparticularly interested to receive answers to their four questions shown below.

1.2 This submission is from the UK Roads Liaison Group [UKRLG]. The Group was formed in 2001 andbrings together national and local government from across the UK to consider roads, infrastructureengineering and operational matters. The link to the UKRLG website is:—http://www.ukroadsliaisongroup.org .

Any queries regarding this submission should be directed to the secretary of UK Roads Liaison Group.

2. Events

2.1 In November 2009 Cumbria experienced extreme levels of rainfall resulting in severe flooding acrossthe county. Three highway road bridges collapsed and many others have suVered loss of parapets, damageto retaining walls and scouring of foundations. Several highway footbridges have suVered total or partialcollapse. More than 200 “public right of way” footbridges have collapsed or are in need of repair.

2.2 Calva road bridge in Workington was so badly damaged that it has been condemned and will haveto be replaced. One of the piers of this masonry arch structure has settled causing structural cracking to thearch span.

2.3 A number of other road and foot bridges were closed as safety precautions, causing massive traveldisruption. The town of Workington was eVectively split into two, with people having to take lengthydetours to reach the town centre and children unable to attend school.

2.4 A temporary footbridge in Workington was constructed by The Royal Engineers and opened on7 December. The bridge was named “The Barker Crossing” after the policeman who died when theNorthside bridge collapsed on 20 November. Network Rail further improved local connections inWorkington by opening a temporary rail station on the north side of the River Derwent and providing afree shuttle service between North & South Workington.

2.5 Cumbria County Council is carrying out an extensive programme of bridge inspections to determinethe extent of damage to their 1,500 highway “over water” road bridges and 1,600 “public right of way”footbridges.

3. Transport Committee Question 1


3.1 There were several diVerent causes for the bridge failures in Cumbria. A van floating down the riveris suspected of causing a footbridge failure in Cockermouth, while the failure of masonry arch bridges mayhave been caused by impact with debris, the lateral pressure of water or scouring of foundations. Severalbridges had their parapets removed by water flowing at unprecedented levels and speeds.

3.2 Anecdotal reports from local sources suggest that the vast volume of water sweeping through riverswas the main factor rather than any structural flaws or maintenance needs in individual bridges.

4. Question 2 Part 1

How likely is it that the recent experiences in Cumbria would be repeated in other parts of the country in theevent of similar weather conditions?

4.1 There are about 66,000 highway bridges in England and thousands more bridges owned by rail andother transport operators. Local highway authorities in England are responsible for 57,000 bridges whilethe Highways Agency has 8,500 bridges on the motorway and trunk road networks (Surveyor BridgesConference, 2007).

4.2 Many of these bridges are similar to those recently aVected in Cumbria, so are likely to be vulnerablein the event of “similar weather conditions” occurring elsewhere. The extent of the diYculties caused wouldbe dependent on many factors including the topography of the area and the location of centres ofpopulation. The problems in Cumbria were exacerbated by fast flowing water associated with the steep andhilly nature of the terrain.



How well protected are the country’s bridges to cope with the type of flooding events seen in Cumbria?

5.1 Bridges are managed in the manner deemed appropriate by their owner. For highway bridges inEngland, the domain of Highways Agency and local highway authorities, bridges are subject to amanagement regime comprising inspection, assessment of load-carrying capacity and maintenance.

5.2 Most highway authorities follow the guidelines for bridge inspection set out in the code of practicefor bridges “Management of Highway Structures”. The “code” recommends that bridges are subjected to“general” inspections [typically every two years] and “principal” inspections [typically every six years].These inspections may lead to the identification of maintenance works, while assessments will reveal if thestructure needs strengthening to carry the traYc loads required.

5.3 The code also indicates when a “special” inspection might be required eg “following a flood or highriver flow to check for scour or other damage”.

5.4 Although the need for repair, strengthening or improvement works might be identified by bridgeinspection, the implementation of such works is subject to the availability of funding, the agreement of otheragencies, the need to undertake other high priority “safety” work and other programme commitments.



6.1 In the event of “similar weather conditions” occurring elsewhere it is likely that other areas of thecountry would be aVected in similar fashion.

6.2 As realised recently in Cumbria, bridges are of great social and economic importance and theirunavailability can lead to severe long term disruption to local communities.

7. Question 3


7.1 Many of the nation’s roads are vulnerable to severe flooding events, especially those in low-lyingareas, crossing watercourses or running adjacent to bodies of water. Alternative routes may be available insome areas, but may necessitate long detours for traYc. Flood damage may aVect a road’s constructionlayers, earthworks and drainage system.

7.2 In order to determine whether a particular section of road is adequately protected, the highwayauthority should seek information and advice from other agencies—perhaps including DEFRA,Environment Agency and the National Flood Agency—on the likelihood, type and location of theanticipated more frequent severe flooding events. If needed, the Authority should then assess and plan formitigation measures in consultation with Environment Agency.

7.3 Flooding of roads that does not flood properties but has a major impact upon communities wouldbe rare, but could occur in exceptional circumstances. The cost of providing a causeway or other structurewould be expensive and Environment Agency may not allow this as river flow could be restricted. Some areasof the country have river flood plains that permit flooding of roads and fields where alternative routes areavailable.

7.4 Railway lines may also be vulnerable when sited in similar situations to those described above. Thissubmission makes no further comment on this facet of transportation as others [eg Network Rail] areconsidered better placed to comment.

7.5 Vital public utilities such as water supply, gas, electricity, telephone and sewage disposal are associatedwith the transport infrastructure and can be severely disrupted and damaged by flooding. Most StatutoryUndertakers’ equipment is in the public highway and bridges are used as a means to cross rivers. If a bridgeis badly damaged it is inevitable that it would have an impact upon the SU equipment and thecommunities served.

7.6 A similar risk assessment process to that described above for roads is needed to determine thevulnerability of the service. The utility companies might then ensure that they have alternate means ofdelivery.


What measures, if any, should the Government take to better protect bridges from flooding events?

8.1 Survey of bridges—Government may wish to see a national survey of bridges considered at risk fromflooding. From the survey a risk ranking analysis could be used to identify a prioritised inspectionprogramme. The inspections and analysis would determine the capability of each structure to withstandflood events, with particular attention paid to the integrity and suYciency of bridge foundations. This courseof action had been suggested after the floods of 2007.


8.2 Dr John Chatterton of the Flood Hazard Research Centre, commissioned by the government to studythe 2007 floods, said a national register of bridges was “maybe something that ought to be investigated”. Hesaid the register should include details of bridges’ structural strength and vulnerability to flooding, enablingauthorities to take an early decision on which ones should be closed in extreme weather. Modern databasescould allow for a standard format for this but for more than one provider to develop and market.

8.3 Dr Chatterton said: “In the aftermath of this failing it may be prudent to get some structuralengineering surveys of bridges at highest risk. We look at the structural integrity of dams and reservoirs. Iwould suggest there should be a reflection on the structural integrity and the ability of bridges to withstandhydraulic loading of this sort of magnitude.”

8.4 Government might wish to seek advice on the value of undertaking other works adjacent to riverbridges to control or regularize water flows, contain debris, etc. The nature and timing of any works to riverbridges is subject to the agreement of Environment Agency and—in the case of “listed” and “scheduled”bridges—English Heritage.

8.5 Risk assessment across the highway network—Highway Authorities strive to maintain and operatetheir highway networks to provide customers with an appropriate level of service at optimum cost. Due tovarious constraints—including the availability of funding and the need to phase works to minimizedisruption to the network—there is a need to prioritise proposed schemes for inclusion in implementationprogrammes. The prioritisation process may take account of various factors including safety, economy,environment, political and cost.

8.6 Authorities would benefit from the use of a systematic and formal framework for identifying,analysing, assessing, comparing and ranking “safety” risks on the highway network. Using such anapproach would provide the authority with a documented “audit trail” of this aspect of the scheme selectionprocess. Hazards on a highway network might be placed in several categories including :

— TraYc & Road Safety—location, road category, traYc volume and speed.

— General Highway—road alignment, sight lines, vehicle containment systems, surface defects,falling trees and collapse of lamp posts.

— Structures—overloading of bridges, inadequate parapets, collision with bridge supports, scouringof bridge supports and failure of retaining walls.

— Natural—landslides, flooding and extreme weather.

8.7 There is no formal way of comparing the risks at a site in one category with that in another. A unifiedsystem would facilitate risk ranking across the whole of a highway network on a consistent basis and providemanagers with a tool to assist the decision making process.


Is there a need for the Government to undertake a significant building programme to renew or replace bridges?What would be the estimated costs of such action?

9.1 At the annual “Surveyor” bridges conference in 2007, an indication was made of the extent and costof the “backlog” of works needed to highway bridges belonging to local highway authorities in England. Itwas estimated that, at April 2007, 18,100 schemes needed to be implemented at an anticipated cost of£2.4 billion.

9.2 If the authorities have been able to use their full LTP “bridge” allocations—the allocations are notring-fenced—the current “backlog” is circa £1.8 billion [allocations 2007–08 £233 million,2008–09 £193 million and 2009–10 £205 million]. At this rate of funding it is estimated that the bridges“backlog” will not be overcome until 2019 (Surveyor Bridges Conference, 2007).

9.3 The Committee may recall that on 12 February 2003 Minister for Transport John Spellar MP told theHOC Transport Committee that “Government is committed to tackling the backlogs in local carriageway,footway, bridge and street lighting maintenance by 2011” (Select Committee on Transport Fifth Report,2003).

9.4 The schemes above included strengthening, widening and significant maintenance projects but nospecific exercise had been done to determine the extent and cost of works needed for “flood protection” toriver bridges.

9.5 Local authorities were encouraged to produce TAMPS as part of LTP2 guidance. As these areprepared understanding will improve of the investment and timescale needed to bring networks up to thestandards which each local authority wishes to deliver.

10. Bridges and Transport Networks.

10.1 Bridges are extremely valuable publicly-owned assets—the 57,000 local authority bridges in Englandare worth circa £24 billion (Surveyor Bridges Conference, 2007). They are key elements in the local andnational transport networks, whose importance was set out in 2005 by the Government in their publication“Maintaining a Vital Asset”.


10.2 “Good transport is essential for a successful economy and society. It provides access to jobs, servicesand schools, gets goods to the shops and allows us to make the most of our free time. Local roads are at theheart of the transport network, and have a key role to play in ensuring that transport delivers the servicespeople need or want.”

10.3 “The highway network is the largest and most visible community asset for which local authoritiesare responsible. It is used daily by the majority of people and is fundamental to the economic, social andenvironmental well being of the community. It helps to shape the character and quality of the local areasthat it serves and makes an important contribution to wider local authority priorities, includingregeneration, social inclusion, community safety, education and health.”

10.4 Appropriate systems, guidance and levels of funding need to be provided to minimise the chancesof other bridges being aVected in similar fashion to that witnessed in Cumbria in November 2009.

10.5 The proposal to require Transport Asset Valuation as part of the Whole Government Accounting(WAG) will provide evidence of the change in condition of its whole transport asset, and long terminvestment in transport assets are vital to the local community.

11. Safety

11.1 Owners endeavour to keep their bridges available to traYc in order that transport disruption isavoided, but their prime concern is for the safety of all concerned, including minimising any danger to:

— road users from bridge collapse;

— those policing the network during a flood event, and

— those inspecting the bridges and keeping them clear of debris.

11.2 The bridge collapses in Cumbria resulted in the death of PC Bill Barker while he was on duty atNorthside bridge in Workington. If a bridge were to collapse into a raging river while still in use by traYcthe consequences could be even more tragic.

11.3 The collapse of bridges in service is comparatively rare, but can be associated with extensive loss oflife. In the USA, 13 people were killed and 145 injured when the I-35W Minneapolis Bridge collapsedsuddenly on 1 August 2007.

11.4 A section of Malahide bridge over the Broadmeadow Estuary, near Dublin on the “Irish Rail”network, collapsed on 21 August 2009 just minutes after a commuter train had passed. The partial collapsewas due to an intermediate support having been undermined by scour.

12. Vulnerability

12.1 There are circa 27,000 masonry arch bridges owned by English local highway authorities. Most ofthese are between 100 and 200 years old and were built to carry horses and carts—rather diVerent from theheavier and more frequent loading experienced today.

12.2 These structures have served us well, but some may be vulnerable in extreme flood conditions forvarious reasons including:

— They were built to carry vertical load and were not anticipated to experience the severe horizontalloading imposed by high water levels.

— The bridge foundations may not be robust by today’s standards, due to the practical diYculties offounding at a deep enough level.

12.3 If intense rainfall events become more frequent, the events seen in Cumbria are likely to be repeatedaround the country unless action is taken.

13. Summary

13.1 The flooding in Cumbria in November 2009 resulted in the death of a policeman as he tried to assistand protect others.

13.2 The flooding caused—and continues to cause—severe disruption to the lives of the localcommunities.

13.3 The events demonstrated the importance of the local transport networks and the crucial role thatbridges play.

13.4 There are thousands of bridges around the country that would be vulnerable to similar extremeweather events.

13.5 UK Roads Liaison Group suggests a series of recommendations in the next section of thissubmission.


14. Recommendations

14.1 UKRLG recommends that bridge owners, highway authorities and service companies should seekinformation and advice from and published by other agencies—perhaps including DEFRA, EnvironmentAgency and the National Flood Agency—on the likelihood, type and location of the anticipated morefrequent “intense rainfall events”.

14.2 The Group recommends that bridge owners should implement a survey of at-risk bridges and aprioritised programme of inspections to determine what “flood protection” works are needed.

14.3 The Group further recommends that where guidance is updated it should include advice on “Riskacross the highway network” to assist transport authorities in preparing their works programmes.

14.4 UKRLG recommends that local authorities should consider as part of their preparation of TAMPsthe investment required to bring their highway network up to their planned standard.

14.5 As a result of this inquiry and other developments, UKRLG will wish to examine how their suite ofcodes of practice takes account of climate change.

References:

Select Committee on Transport—Fifth Report, 2003.http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmtran/407/40705.htm<note43

Surveyor Bridges Conference, 2007: presentation “Strengthening Our Position” by Greg Perks on14 March 2007.

Executive Summary

A. Transport Committee

1.1 The House of Commons Transport Committee has invited interested parties to submit writtenevidence by Tuesday 19 January 2010 relating to the recent severe floods in Cumbria. The Committee willinquire into the impact of flooding on bridges and other transport infrastructure.

1.2 This submission is from the UK Roads Liaison Group [UKRLG].

B. Summary

2.1 The flooding in Cumbria in November 2009 resulted in the death of a policeman as he tried to assistand protect others.

2.2 The flooding caused—and continues to cause—severe disruption to the lives of the local communities.

2.3 The events demonstrated the importance of the local transport networks and the crucial role thatbridges play.

2.4 There are thousands of bridges around the country that would be vulnerable to similar extremeweather events.

2.5 UK Roads Liaison Group suggests a series of recommendations in the next section of this submission.

C. Recommendations

3.1 UKRLG recommends that bridge owners, highway authorities and service companies should seekinformation and advice from and published by other agencies—perhaps including DEFRA, EnvironmentAgency and the National Flood Agency—on the likelihood, type and location of the anticipated morefrequent “intense rainfall events”.

3.2 The Group recommends that bridge owners should implement a survey of at-risk bridges and aprioritised programme of inspections to determine what “flood protection” works are needed.

3.3 The Group further recommends that where guidance is updated it should include advice on “Riskacross the highway network” to assist transport authorities in preparing their works programmes.

3.4 UKRLG recommends that local authorities should consider as part of their preparation of TAMPsthe investment required to bring their highway network up to their planned standard.

3.5 As a result of this inquiry and other developments, UKRLG will wish to examine how their suite ofcodes of practice take account of climate change.

January 2010


Memorandum from Cumbria County Council (BIC 04)

Further to your request for evidence to the Transport Committee on the recent flooding in Cumbria I havepleasure in enclosing Cumbria’s Initial response at Appendix 1.

The unprecedented rainfall in Cumbria on the night of 19/20 November 2009 brought immediatedevastation to communities across the county, with homes and businesses flooded and damaged, essentialinfrastructure destroyed and the loss of the life of a policeman in the collapse of Workington’s NorthsideBridge. The floods have left a legacy of essential repairs to the transport infrastructure, the scale of whichwas obvious from the outset but is now being understood in detail. Hidden impacts of accelerateddeterioration on future maintenance will continue to emerge for some time. There are concerns that extremeweather events such as this are likely to become increasing common as a direct eVect of climate change.

During, and in the immediate aftermath of the flooding, the county’s emergency services, council staV andothers worked round the clock and day in and day out to save lives and safeguard property. We believe thatthe well coordinated emergency response and dedicated work of people on the ground reduced the impacton communities and has shortened the time to move from response to recovery phase of dealing with theflooding and its eVects. The council is now leading the recovery programme to reinstate not only thetransport but also economic, environment and welfare infrastructure and has a well developed programmeand delivery structure to achieve this recovery.

We have been glad to receive the visits of the Prime Minister and other representatives of government andtheir pledges to assist in the recovery from the flooding and we welcome the opportunity to add our firsthand experience of the flood as it unfolded and how the aftermath has been dealt with.

While much of the flood damage was spectacular and had severe immediate impacts, including thecomplete loss of road and rights of way bridges and road surfaces, the extent of the direct damage is stillemerging as inspections are completed. It will be some time before the full picture of damage is known andthe behaviour of the structures aVected fully understood. Further damage will continue to be found as winterconditions ease and the eVect on sub structure becomes apparent. The full extent of the eVects of the floodingon the county’s highway and transport infrastructure will not be fully understood for months or even yearsand the impact in terms of accelerated deterioration will be very diYcult to assess. What this means inrelation to future potential flood events also requires understanding and the County Council welcomes theTransport Committee’s review of what can be learnt from our experience.

Our transport networks including roads and rights of way are critical to the economic vitality, social well-being and quality of life in a deeply rural county with dispersed settlements like Cumbria. Key industrialand manufacturing areas have been badly aVected by the loss of bridges in Workington in terms of accessto the strategic road network. The network of public footpaths and bridleways, which has been badlycompromised by the flooding is a critical element of the county’s tourism oVer on which the economydepends. Given this importance it is critical in our view that the potential of floods to impact on economicand social welfare via the transport and communications network is understood. Furthermore, it is not justthe immediate eVects that are important but the long term impact on the ability of the Council to meet it’sand central government’s goals and objectives for transport.

The flooding event makes us more aware than ever of the need to have put in place measures to improveresilience to extreme weather conditions that are among the consequences of climate change.

We are ready to deliver a programme of recovery, repair and replacement works that will bring Cumbria’shighway and transport infrastructure back into the condition it was before the floods, replacing with modernequivalent form and seeking value for money and future resilience in each project. It is our view that thisprogramme should be encouraged to design out the extreme impacts that we have seen wrought by the floodson communications and residents’ lives and that Government should to support this financially.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the cooperation and help provided by the Department forTransport, Government OYce in the North West and the DfT’s consultants Atkins and Parsons BrinkerhoV,in support of our response to the flooding. We hope that the detail we provide here will assist in yourachieving a view on the importance of future proofing the UK’s transport network against future floodevents.

APPENDIX 1

1. The Flooding Emergency

1.1 On Thursday 19 November 2009 heavy rain began to fall and continued through the night into Friday20 November. Over 300 mm (12 inches) of rain fell in parts of Cumbria in 24 hours—a UK record. Cumbria’smountainous topography meant that very soon afterwards rivers across the sub-region were in full floodwith the run oV from the high fells and already saturated low lying areas.

1.2 Water levels rose significantly over a short period of time in the lakes and in rivers leading from them,most spectacularly in the Derwent valley: flooding parts of Keswick; demolishing and severely damagingtwo road bridges in Cockermouth leading to their closure, demolishing a key footbridge and inundatinglarge parts of the town centre; and finally overwhelming the Calva Bridge at Workington causing structuraldamage requiring its closure and destroying completely the Northside bridge and Navvies footbridge. At astroke this severed the A596 and A597 connections across Workington and to the A66 trunk road and cut


the community in two. A further footbridge linking the banks of the River Derwent was destroyed withinthe port. Sadly the collapse of the Northside Bridge resulted in the death of Police Constable Barker,thankfully the only direct fatality of the floods.

1.3 Elsewhere across the county, while flooding was less dramatic it nevertheless flooded and closed roadsand damaged bridges resulting in their longer term temporary closure. Homes and businesses were floodedand damaged and power supplies and telecommunications interrupted including contact with theemergency services.

1.4 In Keswick, Cockermouth and Ulverston substantial numbers of people were evacuated byemergency services, mountain rescue, RNLI and RAF to emergency centres and will remain in temporaryaccommodation for months. Every business in Cockermouth Main Street was flooded, the road surfaceeVectively destroyed and emergency procedures were put in place to prevent injury to people or propertyafter the flood water has subsided.

1.5 Across the whole County considerable damage was endured by the County’s road and rights of waybridge stock with significant damage caused to abutments and piers.

2. The Initial Response

2.1 The county’s highway maintenance teams and passenger transport and rights of way teams respondedvery quickly to the flooding crisis providing immediate support to the police and fire and rescue services.Gold and Silver Command centres were established immediately and highways and transport staVparticipated in the coordination of the emergency response through the planned joint approach.

2.2 In the 24 hours following the rainfall, teams from across the Highways and Transport Divisioncommenced the inspection of the road and rights of way network looking for and making safe damage, aswell as putting up closures and reopening roads as flood water levels began to drop. At the same timetransport teams worked with bus and train operators and Network Rail to put in place temporary publictransport services and facilities to meet the needs of communities cut oV from essential services. In addition,all of the bridges carrying roads over water were checked for visible damage and further inspections madeas necessary. Approximately 1,600 structures were checked during this exercise.

2.3 On Thursday 19 November the County Council activated its Strategic Recover Coordination Groupand began mobilisation of four recover sub-groups comprising Welfare, Economy, Infrastructure andEnvironment. These recognised the importance of ensuring that peoples emergency well-being wasprotected, that the immediate economic impacts were assessed and assistance provided and critically thatessential infrastructure, including transport networks were made safe and repaired to enable communitiesto return to normality as soon as possible. As these groups progressed the significance of transportinfrastructure and the importance of its maintenance was increasingly obvious.

2.4 The council’s information team coordinated and published information from a range of sources,ensuring that the county council website was able to provide useful, up to date information about closuresand disruption on the network. This information was also used by the local media to keep the publicinformed of progress. A new page was created for the County Council’s website showing the locations ofall closures. This was continuously updated throughout the emergency.

2.5 The council’s Chief Executive used her emergency powers to allow urgent spending on immediateresponses in a timely way.

3. Prioritising Flood Damage Repairs

3.1 When flood warnings were first received immediate instructions were issued to check all ongoingbridge works and any temporary bridge structures or works close to water courses to assess theirvulnerability and put in place measures to increase resilience as appropriate. A further instruction was issuedto check all bridges at risk of water damage as soon as the full impact of the event was understood. Thoserequiring a more thorough and detailed inspection were identified during this process. Principal BridgeInspections were carried out on a number of bridges before they were re-opened to traYc. A limited numberremain closed, but remedial measures have been designed, and we are awaiting suitable conditions whenunderwater repairs can be carried out.

3.2 Highway engineers started checking all structures along the county’s 7,700km road network on20 November in order to establish the full impact of the flood and these were completed by the end of thefirst week after the floods. By end of the second week, diving inspections had been carried out as conditionsallowed, aimed at reopening five strategic road bridges that had been closed to traYc. By week three, a riskbased framework for more detailed bridge inspections and schedule of repair had been put in place. Thiswork led to the development of a prioritised programme of work and an estimate of the cost of thisprogramme and therefore the amount of Local Transport Plan work requiring deferral whilst flood damagerepairs take priority.

3.3 In addition to flood damage to the main highway network there was considerable damage to parts ofthe County’s 7,500 km of public rights of way. Flood related damage, including riverbank collapse, surfacewashout and major damage to bridges and stepping stones, has been identified by inspections to haveaVected almost 300 individual public paths.


3.4 Work began immediately to provide relief from the impacts of the flooding with the County Councilspending around £1.5 million on emergency assistance and repair in the first weeks of the emergency. TheCouncil’s Cabinet approved funding mechanisms for the flood recovery on 17 December 2009. This includedboth revenue and capital items and identified bridge works in Workington and highway repairs as highpriorities.

3.5 Schemes have been ranked according to urgency, as: 1. Immediate—requires immediate action in theinterest of safety. Likely to require temporary measures followed by permanent repair 2. Essential—actionrequired to maintain infrastructure and ensure accessibility and public safety to ensure return to normality3. Desirable—Should be done, currently creates no danger to infrastructure and public safety Within thelatter categories, schemes have been prioritised in accordance with the County’s draft functional hierarchy.

3.6 The council has worked with its term consultant Capita Symonds and contractor Amey supportedby the Highways Agency, Connect Roads, and other specialist engineering firms to identify defects and todesign the most appropriate, value-for-money solutions.

4. Long Term Impacts on the Condition of the Network

4.1 Achieving steady state condition of the highway network is a priority for Cumbria’s Local TransportPlan (LTP). The condition targets that are set out in LTP are challenging but considered achievable, and arebased on deterioration modelling techniques and an indicative budget plan. The council and its strategicpartners have made good progress in achieving the Plan targets.

4.2 The flooding experienced in November 2009 will have a severe impact on the County’s ability to reachthe targets it has set within the LTP. To date, significant lengths of flood damaged network have beenidentified and prioritised for repair. However, it is also anticipated that further sections, which have not beenidentified as requiring immediate emergency response, will have sustained suYcient damage to increasefuture deterioration rates. This means that far greater lengths of the network are anticipated to become inneed of urgent repair after future surveys sooner than our current lifecycle plans have predicted.

4.3 The majority of this damage will be from the scouring eVect of water running along and across theroad during the flooding and from the weakening of the road foundations caused when they becamesaturated. It is anticipated that the full eVect of this damage will become increasingly apparent throughoutthe winter months as the freeze—thaw action and further rain start to break up the weakened surface layers.A comparison of pot hole records will be maintained to provide future evidence of this accelerateddeterioration.

4.4 As well as accelerated defects on the carriageway it is anticipated that additional burden will be placedon future bridges and structures budgets as defects inaccessible through current inspection regimes becauseof high water levels become apparent. A comprehensive programme of inspections is being carried out,including diving inspections, to identify vulnerable locations and reduce the likelihood of unexpectedsignificant issues.

4.5 Rock and soil slopes adjacent to the highway were also inspected. Some movement has occurred asa result of the floods and sites are being assessed for repair or further inspection/monitoring. This accelerateddeterioration is now a major concern.

5. The Scale of Flood Damage and Response

5.1 In terms of impacts on the transport network the most significant eVects were seen in the destructionand severe damage to the county’s road and public rights of way bridges. Three significant road bridges werelost completely and around 20 others were temporarily closed (some remaining closed) because of evidenceof structural damage. Elsewhere roads were inundated as drainage was overwhelmed and surface water run-oV overtook the highway. Across the Lake District and other rural areas 244 rights of way bridges weredamaged or lost and in some cases the surfaces of rights of way were destroyed.

5.2 County highway and rights of way oYcers were on the ground from the onset of the emergency andalmost immediately began the task of investigating and determining the impact of the floods on the fabricof the highway network. At the same time a series of actions were taken by transport oYcers of the council,the railway industry and bus companies to try to overcome new obstacles to movement caused by the floods.This included re-routed and new local bus services in Keswick and Cockermouth, provision of a new stationnorth of Workington and rail shuttle service, a temporary footbridge across the Derwent at Workington andfeeder bus services, car parks and walking and cycling routes.

5.3 The loss of functionality previously provided by the bridges in Workington severed the communityand necessitated a forty mile round trip to access work, schools, healthcare and shopping. These journeyswere previously of the order of a mile or two via the bridges. This has placed huge time penalties on everydaytrips with some journey times increasing by up to two hours in the peak. The time penalty incurred by theadditional distances is compounded by traYc congestion throughout the day and very long queues ofvehicles in peak periods on the diversionary routes which have insuYcient capacity to accommodate thediverted traYc. There has been a less well documented eVect of keeping closed smaller roads and bridges toprevent rat running and the consequent further collapse of roads and bridges.


5.4 Businesses in Workington and elsewhere have been very badly aVected as shopping has been deferredor diverted. In addition the loss of the bridges cut the direct route from the port of Workington andsurrounding industrial areas to the A66 adding substantial economic costs to industry. More widely, tourismhas been hit hard in part by the news images of the floods and damage and partly through closures on therights of way network which is a key attraction in the Lake District and across Cumbria.

5.5 Damage to carriageways and footways was severe particularly in Allerdale and South Lakeland areas.The scale of the flooding experienced in Cumbria has again demonstrated the vulnerability of highwaysurfaces to extreme flood events. The damage associated with inundation of this scale is diYcult to avoid.This risk may exist across the country and may require mitigation by protecting the highway from floodingin the first place. How realistic this is given the historic nature of our highway network in the UK and thesettlement pattern it supports is open to debate.

5.6 Finally as well as other damage to utility infrastructure it is estimated that in excess of £6.75 millionof flood damage occurred to the Port of Workington a key economic transportation hub for the region.

6. Response to the Questions Posed in the Call for Evidence

Response to Question 1


6.1 The current view is that the bridge failures were due to the considerable lateral pressure of water andthe impact of debris or scouring of foundations. All of the bridges for which the County Council takesresponsibility for maintenance have been the subject of a rolling programme of inspections commensuratewith the County’s duty as highway authority and a programme of routine proactive and reactivemaintenance was in place in accordance with the national code of practice “Management of HighwayStructures” as published by the UK Roads Liaison Group.

6.2 The causes behind the destruction and significant damage to the aVected structures can only beconjecture at this stage although the bridges so impacted were clearly subjected to significant forces fromflood water and the debris that it carried. It is expected that there were diVerent causes for diVerent failures,for example, a Ford Transit van floating down the river is suspected of triggering a footbridge failure inCockermouth, whereas the failure of masonry arch bridges could be either impacts with other debris,pressure of water or foundation scour. Several bridges had their parapets removed by water flowing overthe top of the bridges at unprecedented levels and speeds. It is not yet clear whether factors of age, designor condition is at the heart of these issues, this is subject to ongoing investigation.


How likely is it that the recent experiences in Cumbria would be repeated in other parts of the country in theevent of similar weather conditions? How well protected are the country’s bridges to cope with the type offlooding events seen in Cumbria? What would be the implications if we continued as “business-as-usual”?

6.3 It is impossible to say whether this pattern of damage would be repeated elsewhere, however it maybe prudent to note that any estuarial towns or cities with settlements on both banks and limited crossingpoints would have the potential to suVer the impacts seen in Workington. It is notable that those bridgeswhich suVered most were located where the water could not flow around them, for example by flowing intofields on the upstream side, over the road, and rejoining the main channel downstream. In Cumbria therewere a combination factors including the levels of rainfall falling onto saturated ground, the bridge types, thesmall number and location of crossing points, the nature of the centres of population and the mountainoustopography. The number of areas where these conditions could co-exist is likely to be limited and couldbe assessed.

6.4 The approach of continuing business as usual will increase the risk of future catastrophic failures asseen in Cumbria due to the increasing likelihood of extreme weather conditions as a result of climate change.There is a clear need to put in place measures to further improve resilience to the eVects of climate change.

6.5 If we continue as business as usual and do not take measures to protect existing or new property andbuild into them prevention measures the cost of repair or replacement will be significant. The cost estimateto address highway infrastructure along is heading towards £40m let alone the cost to households and localbusinesses.



6.6 All relatively low-lying roads are vulnerable, along with those crossing watercourses or runningadjacent to bodies of water. In many places in Cumbria either the road or railway forms the first line of seadefences and run alongside lakes and rivers. This situation requires an approach to maintenance that takesinto account this dual role and consequent vulnerability of transport infrastructure.


6.7 Another aspect of this emergency has been the recognition of the important role bridges and otherstructures play in carrying vital communications cabling, gas, electricity and other utility supplies tocommunities. Much of this was lost with the collapse of Workington’s two major bridges and alternativesproved hard to provide immediately.


What measures, if any, should the Government take to better protect bridges from flooding events? Is there aneed for the Government to undertake a significant building programme to renew or replace bridges? Whatwould be the estimated costs of such action?

6.8 The cost of replacing all bridges (for example) over a certain age would be prohibitive in terms of bothfinance and heritage. It would however be worthwhile to carry out an exercise to identify the bridges whichwould be most vulnerable to undue water pressure. The replacement of these could be assessed financiallydepending on the level of risk.

6.9 In terms of engineering measures, solutions that may be appropriate to consider in any nationalapproach include the use of structures in the river bed upstream of cutwaters to funnel debris through thearches. These could be permanent installations or temporary systems for forecast high rainfall events. Thiswould reduce the likelihood of trees striking the bridge or creating partial dams adding pressure to thestructure.

6.10 The economic impact of the loss of crossings should be considered in regional and local strategicplanning documents and we would question whether a “business as usual” approach is adequate. It wouldbe prudent to point transport authorities towards consideration of flood risk and contingency planning (asappropriate) in their statutory Local Transport Plans as well as in Local Development Frameworks andother planning documents. This would form emerging good practice in relation to mitigating the eVects onpeoples’ lives of extreme weather caused by climate change.

6.11 One final thought is that consideration may have to be given to better understanding the correlationbetween infrastructure repair costs and alternative transportation and utility provision when trying toidentify the full economic impact of events such as this.

Conclusion

Cumbria is still at a relatively early stage in assessing the full impact of the floods. We hope to completethe Flood Recovery Plan in the next few weeks. We would be happy to share a copy with the Committee indue course as this will have the impact assessment completed as part of the plan. In addition we are happyto provide additional information should the committee require it.

January 2010

Memorandum from English Heritage (BIC 05)

Summary

1. Cumbria is celebrated for its historic environment, a vital part of its continuing economic vitality, andover 350 designated historic bridges contribute to this important and highly valued aspect of the County’sidentity. We appreciate that a thorough investigation into the causes of bridge collapse in Cumbria andconsideration of whether their susceptibility to failure was due to structural flaws, age or state ofmaintenance is necessary, and fully support the proposal. However, we note that the Terms of Referencemention that in Cumbria, some structures built in the 19th century are considered to have reached the endof their expected life span and that nationally, there are thousands of bridges over 100 years old. Thissuggests that age may be considered a significant factor. We believe it has yet to be demonstrated that thereis any direct relationship between the age of a bridge and its risk of failure. We hope the investigation willconsider each structure according to its individual characteristics (particularly those that are of national,regional or local significance with respect to their historic character) and the level of risk and mitigation isapportioned according to a comprehensive evaluation of fabric, repair, location and historic significancerather than simply the age of the structure.

Introduction

2. English Heritage is a Non-Departmental Public Body established under the National Heritage Act1983 to help protect the historic environment of England and promote awareness, understanding andenjoyment of it. We are the Government’s statutory adviser on the historic environment and although weare sponsored by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, our funding agreement is co-signed by theDepartment for the Environment, Food and Rural AVairs and Communities and Local Government.


Detailed Points

3. Obviously, safety is the prime decision-making factor and we recognise that adaptation of somehistoric bridges may be necessary to limit their future risk of failure during severe flood event and have nointention of challenging the principle of adaptation or even removal where evidence clearly demonstratesan unacceptable level of risk is caused by some aspect of an historic bridge. We would, however, wish to beinvolved in discussions at the earliest opportunity to achieve an appropriate level of mitigation.

4. The following points are oVered in answer to the questions posed by the Terms of Reference.

5. What were the causes of the collapse of the bridges in Cumbria? To what extent were the collapses causedby structural flaws, the age or state of maintenance of the bridges?

The causes of the collapse of some bridges in Cumbria have yet to be fully understood. Workington Bridgemay have failed because the piers were undermined by the flood water rather than any inherent structuralflaw within the structure. Many historic bridges are founded partly on piers that are built in the river bedas against some more modern structures which span the river from bank to bank. Many historic bridges haveproved to be very resilient over time, with the historic bridge in the centre of Cockermouth having survivednumerous floods during its long life including the most recent exceptional event. There should not thereforebe an assumption that older bridges built diVerently from those of today are necessarily more vulnerable todamage or collapse as a result of flooding.

6. How likely is it that the recent experiences in Cumbria would be repeated in other parts of the country inthe event of similar weather conditions? How well protected are the country’s bridges to cope with the type offlooding events seen in Cumbria? What would be the implications if we continued as “business-as-usual”?

Bridge collapse in England is very rare because they are generally kept in a good state of repair and manywill have survived earlier flood events. It seems unlikely that the risk of future bridge collapse can beaccurately modelled. The huge cost of replacing large numbers of bridges when their chances of collapse arevery small would seem to be poor use of public money. However, much smaller sums spent assessing and,where chances of collapse are higher than average, adapting existing structures and their surroundingenvironments would seem to oVer a more realistic way forward. This approach not only limits costs to thepublic purse, but also ensures national and local government achieve their objectives of the protection andmanagement of the historic environment.

7. To what extent is the nation’s other transport infrastructure, such as roads and railway lines, adequatelyprotected against severe flooding events?

We have no comments to make in relation to this issue.

8. What measures, if any, should the Government take to better protect bridges and transport infrastructurefrom flooding events? Is there a need for the Government to undertake a significant building programme to renewor replace bridges? What would be the estimated costs of such action?

There is a need to avoid a knee jerk reaction to take down historic bridges and replace them with modernstructures. We suggest there should be a sequential approach to testing the resilience of bridges:

(a) identify those rivers where major flood events could pose a problem. There are many watercourseswhere, even in extreme conditions, bridges are unlikely to be vulnerable;

(b) in vulnerable areas assess the ability of bridges to withstand major floods;

(c) on the basis of this assessment determine what, if any, action may be needed to increase theresilience of existing structures. For example it may be that protective work around the foot of piersin the river bed could reduce the risk of undermining;

(d) only if the evidence clearly demonstrates that an existing historic bridge cannot be made secureenough to withstand flooding should consideration be given to taking down and replacement. Weanticipate that in the vast majority of cases action to improve the resilience of existing structureswill be possible and is likely to be more cost eVective than demolition and new build, and

(e) if there is no alternative to the demolition and new build of an historic bridge and/or a bridge inan area of distinctive historic character and appearance, any new design should be appropriate tothis context. This does not necessarily mean replication of existing structures and materials, but itis essential to have an understanding of historic context to inform new design.

9. In some cases existing historic bridges have replaced earlier structures at the same crossing point.Significant archaeological evidence for these structures can survive, and can be damaged by protective worksand new build. The need to assess the archaeological implications of improvement schemes and to mitigateharm needs to be built into the planning of such works. The same applies to standing structures which arebeing strengthened and repaired, while in those cases where demolition is unavoidable a full record of theexisting structure should be made.


10. Over 350 bridges in Cumbria are designated historic environment assets (Listed Buildings and/orScheduled Monuments) and as such are under statutory protection because of their special historic interest.In addition to these there will be historic bridges that are not designated but are of regional or localsignificance. Whilst age is certainly not the only or main factor considered when designating such structures,they will by definition be considered elderly according to the Terms of Reference. This compounds ourconcern that a consideration of the failure risk should be based on a comprehensive evaluation of the fabricand context of the structures, not just their age.

January 2010

Memorandum from Network Rail (BIC 06)

Executive Summary

1. This submission describes Network Rail’s asset portfolio, the impacts of flooding generally on theseassets and how Network Rail and its predecessors have, for 20 years, developed and improved theunderstanding of flood risks and their eVect on the rail infrastructure.

2. Network Rail’s response to the Cumbria flood event is described. Overall, both the infrastructure andsystems stood up well. Two bridges were aVected and railway lines closed because of the flood risk. Thoselines were reopened quickly owing to past risk assessment work and knowledge of the condition of thestructures.

3. The evolution of Network Rail’s bridge management processes, in particular for water hazards, is alsodescribed.

4. The Transport Select Committee’s questions are answered, and the following Network Railrecommendations are put forward in response to Question 4 on what measures the Government should taketo better protect bridges and transport infrastructure from flooding events:

— The Government should work with the OYce of Rail Regulation and Network Rail to explore theways in which the regulatory funding regime can further support climate change adaptation on therailway and improved railway asset resilience. Analysis to determine adequate levels of fundingshould be based upon levels of risk;

— The proposed Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of CriticalInfrastructure to Disruption from Natural Hazards should advocate a risk-based, systemsapproach to protecting transport infrastructure at risk from flooding and other natural hazards;

— All transport infrastructure providers should be made more aware of the level of risk to theiroperations from extreme flood events and the consequent impacts on others (ie: systems risks). Thelessons learned from the flooding in 2007 and 2009 should be promulgated across the engineeringcommunity and those responsible for critical infrastructure management. This could be done, forexample, through the national, regional and local structures and strategies proposed in the Floodand Water Management Bill;

— Infrastructure hazard or vulnerability maps should be developed as part of the national and localflooding risk strategies and asset registers proposed in the Flood and Water Management Billcurrently going through Parliament and building upon the Environment Agency’s flood risk mapsand surface water flood risk maps;

— Network Rail has serious concerns about the proposal in the Flood and Water Management Billto designate rail assets that aVect flood or coastal erosion. Such designation must not underminethe primary purpose of our assets, and

— Network Rail built a satellite station at Workington, Cumbria in just five days to servecommunities cut oV by the recent flooding. In future, such projects should be made easier to deliverand fund with minimum regulatory intervention.

Introduction

5. Network Rail is the “not for dividend” owner and operator of Britain’s railway infrastructure, whichincludes the tracks, signals, tunnels, bridges, viaducts, level crossings. Network Rail owns the stations andmanage the largest 18.

6. Network Rail has an asset base comprising some 2,500 stations, 31,000km of track, 43,000 bridges,23,000 culverts, 240km of defended coastal railway and 10,000km of earthworks.

7. A significant number of those assets are designed and constructed to withstand extreme weatherconditions, including flooding.

8. In order to manage safety during extreme weather events, Network Rail has well established plans andprocedures in place to both respond to flooding and provide as much infrastructure resilience and servicecontinuity as possible under currently experienced weather patterns.


9. Network Rail is also embarking on further protection of railway assets, some of which are 170 yearsold, from the impact of extreme weather conditions, by investing some £160 million between 2009 and2014 on railway drainage.

10. Network Rail has part-funded research into flooding resilience and resistance for critical assets.1

11. We have also jointly funded research conducted through UIC (International Association of Railways)into the adaptation of infrastructure to climate change.

Network Rail’s Response to Events in Cumbria

12. On Thursday 19 November the Cumbrian Coast line was flooded between Carlisle and Aspatria andthe line closed until the morning of the Friday.

13. On Friday 20 November the Down West Coast Main Line was closed in the Southwaite area, betweenPenrith and Carlisle at 03.00 where a landslip obstructed the line. Following clearance the line reopenedsome five hours later, and traYc passed under restricted speed.

14. On Friday 20 November a 5mph speed restriction was imposed on the Down Main line at CaldewJunction, approximately three miles north of Carlisle due to flooding. At 05.52 both lines were blocked asthe water level increased. At 09.45 a 20mph speed restriction was imposed on both lines over the RiverCaldew bridge due to high water levels.

15. On the same day the River Derwent viaduct at Workington on the Cumbrian Coast line had beenclosed at 06.00 owing to floodwaters. The bridge was reopened to traYc that afternoon when water levelshad fallen.

16. This bridge provided the link between the northern and southern parts of Workington that were cutoV following the collapse of the highway bridges and enabled the setting up of a rail service to rejoin thelocal community.

17. Network Rail built a satellite station facility at Workington in Cumbria in just five days to servecommunities cut oV by the flooding. Free shuttle trains now connect Workington, which was left with nodirect road connection after the floods in November, with people north of the River Derwent.2

18. The need for such emergency stations during periods of flooding may increase in future. Regulatory/statutory obligations should be suYciently flexible to allow Network Rail, and other relevant organisations,to react quickly to changing circumstances.

Network Rail’s Bridge Management

19. All Network Rail structures, including its bridges, receive routine examinations to assess theircontinued fitness for purpose. It is normal for bridges to receive annual examinations and a risk-basedprogramme of detailed examinations is in place. Bridges over water receive examinations of the underwaterparts at three-year intervals.

20. Fast flowing rivers, particularly under flood conditions, present a particular challenge to railwaybridges that traverse them and railway embankments adjacent to them. Bridge failures at Glanrhyd (1987)and Inverness (1989) highlighted the vulnerability of structures from the eVects of floodwaters. In both cases,water scoured away the river bed beneath the foundations of bridges which resulted in their collapse, withfatal consequences at Glanrhyd.

21. Scour is a particularly important problem to address at railway structures for two principal reasons.One is the braking distance required for a trains which require up to 11

4 miles to come to a standstill owingto their momentum. They can travel at up to 125mph and some weigh in excess of 3,000 tonnes. The otheris the way scour action can create a sudden loss of support to a structure—sometimes without any apparentsigns being noticeable at track level.

22. Because of the dangers presented, every railway bridge over water (of which there are around 4,400),and every significant embankment adjacent to a watercourse has been assessed to determine its susceptibilityto scour and other water hazards such as river-borne debris and hydrostatic pressure on the bridgesuperstructure. This risk assessment exercise on bridges was completed in the late 1980s and hassubsequently been further refined.

23. While many bridges identified as being at significant risk have had engineered scour protectionmeasures installed, some of these and others at risk still require special precautions which are described inNetwork Rail’s Flood Action Plans.

24. Flood Action Plans describe the response required and the action to be taken in response to receiptof a flood warnings, such as those issued by the Environment Agency (EA). These plans are specific toindividual structures across the rail network and together they apply to some five hundred bridges, beingthose ranked at “higher risk”.

1 This can be found at: www.ciria.org/service/research information/AM/ContentManagerNet/Default.aspx?Section%

research information&Template%/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID%89&ContentID%141612 Timelapse footage of the construction of the station can be found on Network Rail’s website at www.networkrail.co.uk.


25. Flood warnings issued by the EA are communicated to Network Rail Control Centres and theresponse will vary according to the severity of the warning and the individual structure aVected.

26. During times when Network Rail monitors flooding situations, for instance, railway staV makepreparatory arrangements for patrolling lines at risk and may visit and inspect particular bridges. When aFlood Warning has been received, certain bridges will be examined periodically or continuously for signs ofscour or other hazards and railway lines will be closed to traYc where closure criteria are met. If a SevereFlood Warning is received, more structures and lines will be aVected and further line closures would beexpected.

27. It is normal practice to send observers to at-risk structures who are then expected to monitor waterlevels until a “line closure” mark is reached. In some cases, particular structures might be at such high riskthat line closures will be made automatically on receipt of a flood warning.

28. In Cumbria, the two bridges aVected by the flood were known to be at a lesser risk from scour owingto the presence of deep foundations, and the lines were closed because of the hazard of water pressure ortrack flooding.

29. For more information on risk assessment procedures refer to the Construction Industry Research andInformation Association (CIRIA) Report C551 Manual on scour at bridges and other hydraulicstructures.3

Response to the Committee’s Specific Questions


30. It is apparent that the causes of collapse were varied; floating debris (including, in one instance, a van)precipitated the collapse of a footbridge, scouring of foundations and water pressure on parapets are knowncauses of failure.

31. While structural flaws, state of maintenance and age may have contributed to failure, it is thoughtthat the sheer velocity and depth of the water was the main cause.

32. For masonry and brick arch bridges, the eVects of water when it rises above the arch opening cangive rise to loading conditions with which the structure would never have been designed to cope. With watercascading over parapets, the “downstream” parapet can be toppled taking with it the spandrel walls, whichcan quickly lead to total collapse of the structure as the arch fill is easily scoured out from downstream.

33. Raised flood defences along rivers have the eVect of keeping water in the river channel rather thanallowing it to spill into the flood plain, with consequent higher water levels than might have been expected.

How likely is it that the recent experiences in Cumbria would be repeated in other parts of the country in theevent of similar weather conditions? How well protected are the country’s bridges to cope with the type offlooding events seen in Cumbria? What would be the implications if we continued as “business-as-usual”?

34. Similar weather conditions have been experienced in other parts of the country, most notably in thesummer of 2007. Other examples are the autumns of 2002 and 2009 in the north east of Scotland, Easter1998 in the Midlands, in the Borders region in 1948 and the event in Wales in 1987 when the Glanrhyd bridgecollapsed.

35. The experiences of 2007 and 2009 showed that Network Rail’s infrastructure and systems stood upwell when compared to other asset owners’ experiences. In 2007 there were 42 significant earthworks failures,one scour-damaged bridge and two other major line closures from scour risk but without structural damage.

36. Network Rail has undertaken risk assessments for flood eVects on railway bridges, coastal andestuarine railways and earthworks and produced fluvial flood risk maps for major routes.

37. Furthermore, risk assessment and examination carried out in the late 1980s and early 1990s riskprovided better knowledge of the risk to rail bridges over water, and from this knowledge a prioritised scourprotection programme was instituted.

38. Network Rail’s plans to further improve knowledge and processes to manage the risks associated withflooding and have studied the potential changes in fluvial regimes that will impact upon our water hazardmanagement processes with the potential to impact on the level of service provided to our customers. As aresult, Network Rail will be seeking arrangements through the regulatory negotiations and review inadvance of the next five-year rail regulatory period (control period 5, or CP5, which runs from April 2014 toMarch 2019) to provide adequate climate change adaptation measures for railway infrastructure within thefinal settlement.

3 Available at www.ciria.org/SERVICE/Home/core/orders/product.aspx?catid%6&prodid%49



39. See response to question 2 above. It should also be noted that system resilience has become animportant issue, and how, for example, rail transport relies upon power and telecommunications and onother transport modes (for maintenance, construction and for custom). There is currently much interest ininfrastructure and flooding generally and specifically on infrastructure critical to the working of the UK.

40. The Committee will be aware of the Cabinet OYce’s consultation on Critical Infrastructure to whichNetwork Rail will be responding.4

41. It is hoped that the Cabinet OYce work in this area, and the CIRIA report on Flooding Resilienceand Resistance for Critical Infrastructure, as well as the current Flood and Water Management Bill goingthrough Parliament, will change the way the flood authorities such as local authorities, the regions and theEnvironment Agency view transport infrastructure as the emphasis over the past 20 years has been onprotecting property rather than systems.

What measures, if any, should the Government take to better protect bridges and transport infrastructure fromflooding events? Is there a need for the Government to undertake a significant building programme to renew orreplace bridges? What would be the estimated costs of such action?

42. Climate change impacts will significantly aVect rail infrastructure as extreme floods become morefrequent. Government should work with the OYce of Rail Regulation and Network Rail to explore the waysin which the regulatory funding regime can better support climate change adaptation and improved railwayasset resilience. For example, “improved resilience of critical infrastructure” should be incorporated into theplanning for the next five year rail funding and regulatory period, control period 5. Issues that need to beaddressed include funding, licence obligations, performance measures, development of assessment tools anddevelopment of resilience improvement plan. Analysis would be required to determine adequate levels offunding which should be based on risk levels. Network Rail believes this risk analysis should be part of theCabinet OYce’s Natural Hazards Team’s work.

43. The proposed Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of CriticalInfrastructure to Disruption from Natural Hazards should advocate a risk-based, systems approach toprotecting transport infrastructure at risk from flooding and other natural hazards. Funding mechanismswould need to be developed and perhaps could be sourced from a National Infrastructure Bank as proposedby the Institution of Civil Engineers.

44. An early step for consideration should be the development of infrastructure hazard or vulnerabilitymaps, building upon the Environment Agency’s flood risk maps and surface water flood risk maps. Someanalysis would be required to determine adequate levels of funding, and these should be based upon thelevels of risk.

45. The magnitude of the Cumbria flood event should be reviewed against any presence of flood defences;constraining rivers within their channels may lead to much higher than normal river levels to create anabnormal loading situation on masonry bridges.

46. Transport infrastructure owners should become more aware of the level of risk to their operationsfrom extreme flood events and the consequent impacts on others (ie: systems risks).

47. More generally, the lessons learned from the flooding in 2007 and 2009 should be promulgated acrossthe engineering community and those responsible for critical infrastructure management.

48. This awareness raising could be done through the national, regional and local structures and floodrisk strategies proposed in the Flood and Water Management Bill currently going through parliament.

49. Network Rail has serious concerns about the proposal in the Flood and Water Management Bill todesignate rail assets as flood defences. In the case of railway infrastructure, it is designed solely for theoperation of the railway, not to defend against flooding. It is wholly inappropriate to designate rail assetsas such, to require Network Rail to seek permission from a designating authority when altering, removingor replacing assets or for a designating authority to take any responsibility or powers away from NetworkRail for them. Such designation must not undermine the primary purpose of these assets to allow the safe,eYcient and reliable operation of the railway.

50. Infrastructure hazard or vulnerability maps should be developed, as part of the national and localflooding strategies and asset registers proposed in the Flood and Water Management Bill and building uponthe Environment Agency’s flood risk maps and surface water flood risk maps.

51. Network Rail would also like any available knowledge on areas at risk from surface water floodingto be made available at a regional level to transport infrastructure managers. This would allow planning forpotential safety and operational issues at a strategic level.

4 Consultation on a Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure toDisruption from Natural Hazards, available at www.cabinetoYce.gov.uk/ukresilience/news/sfps-consultation.aspx.


52. Any lessons learned from the investigations into the damage suVered to the bridges in Cumbria, ontransport infrastructure, and transport systems ought to be promulgated across the engineering communityand across those responsible for infrastructure management.

53. Following the construction of a satellite station at Workington, Cumbria in just 5 days to servecommunities cut oV by the recent flooding, Network Rail looks forward to discussing how such projectscan be easily delivered and funded with minimum regulatory intervention, recognising the enormous publicbenefit they can deliver.

January 2010

Memorandum from the Environment Agency (BIC 07)

Summary

Floods can cause serious damage to important energy, water, communication and transportinfrastructure. These impacts were demonstrated in Cumbria during November 2009 followingunprecedented levels of rainfall. Our gauging station at Seathwaite Farm recorded 314mm over the 24 hoursup to 1am on Friday 20 November—a record for the UK. The rain fell on already saturated ground andthis resulted in severe flooding in Cumbria. The flooding caused the destruction of two large road bridgesin Workington.

1.0 Introduction

1.1 The Environment Agency is the main delivery body for the management of flood and coastal erosionrisks in England and Wales. Our responsibilities include carrying out and funding works that reduce floodrisk from rivers and the sea, providing flood warnings to the public and emergency responders, and helpingpeople understand their flood risk and to take appropriate action. We provide government with a strategicoverview across all sources of flooding and coastal erosion in England, and assist the Welsh AssemblyGovernment to take a similar approach in Wales.

1.2 The Environment Agency provides information on flood risk and advises on the impact of anyproposed mitigation measures. Our Catchment Flood Management Plans provide high level information oncritical infrastructure by identifying individual sites with a greater than one in 100 year chance of flooding.

1.3 Service operators are best placed to assess the resilience of essential transport infrastructure andsupplies such as electricity, water and gas. With the use of our flood risk data, operators can work out whatdegree of flooding will cause asset failure, and combine this information with information about how criticalthe asset is, and if there are other means within a network of keeping services going in the event of flooding.

2.0 What were the causes of the collapse of the bridges in Cumbria? To what extent were the collapses causedby structural flaws, the age or state of maintenance of the bridges?

This does not fall within our remit or expertise.

3.0 How likely is it that the recent experiences in Cumbria would be repeated in other parts of the country inthe event of similar weather conditions? How well protected are the country’s bridges to cope with the type offlooding events seen in Cumbria? What would be the implications if we continued as “business as usual”?

3.1 The Environment Agency is not in a position to comment on the ability of the country’s bridges towithstand particular scale events. However, when considering the impact of flooding on bridges, it isimportant to also consider that some bridges and other large pieces of infrastructure can, in their presentlocation and form, impede the dispersal of flood water in a way that causes further damage to property andcommunities. This can even extend to other elements of transport infrastructure, such as erosion of approachembankments to a bridge.

3.2 The level of rainfall recorded in Cumbria in late November 2009 was unprecedented. However,climate change will increase the risk of extreme weather events. This means that infrastructure and defencesare likely to be more frequently tested by extreme weather events in the future.

4.0 To what extent is the nation’s other transport infrastructure, such as roads and railway lines, adequatelyprotected against severe flooding events?

4.1 Potential flood damage to roads and railways is diYcult to predict accurately at a national level. Thevulnerability of roads and railways varies considerably depending upon their location and construction, andthe costs associated with disruption depend upon the availability of alternative routes and services. We knowhowever from major floods, such as in autumn 2000, that the damages to roads and railways can besignificant. During the 2007 floods 10,000 people were trapped on the M5 motorway and other roads andrailway facilities had to be closed.


4.2 Our 2008 National Flood Risk Assessment identifies the number and types of importantinfrastructure and public services in flood risk areas. Our assessment is that in England about 10% of mainroads and 21% of railways are at flood risk. In Wales 11% of main roads and 33% of railways are in floodrisk areas.

5.0 What measures, if any, should the Government take to better protect bridges and transport infrastructurefrom flooding events? Is there a need for the Government to undertake a significant building programme to renewor replace bridges? What would be the estimate costs?

5.1 As well as the impact of flooding on bridges, the reverse impact of bridges and transport infrastructureon flood risk also needs to be considered. The Environment Agency are involved in approving any specificproposals to repair or build new bridges over statutory “main rivers”, while the drainage department of localauthorities will consider proposals on smaller watercourses (principally through the Water Resources Act1991 Section 109, Land Drainage Act 1991 Section 23, and Highways Act 1980 Section 339). We workalongside highway authorities or rail companies to ensure these works take account of flood risk in thelocation. Bridge design requirements are very site specific, however we would typically expect major newbridges to be able to pass a flood with an annual probability of occurrence of 1% (1 in 100) with no diVerencein water levels between the upstream and downstream sides (aZux), taking account of climate change. Forstructures such as new roads crossing flood plains, there may need to be additional flood arches in bridgeapproaches, to ensure no adverse eVect on flood risk. Where bridges are to be re-built, we acknowledge thenature of the existing structure, but seek improvements to flood management commensurate with the natureof repairs. This inevitably depends on the specific nature of the repair, but can include raising the deck ofthe bridge above the highest water level lowering the bed level of the river at, and on either side of the bridge(particularly when scour protection is being installed there), providing additional flood openings, andremoving redundant piers, debris and other obstructions from the river.

5.2 Our relationships with transport providers are generally good in considering proposals for new andrepaired structures. We deal with Network Rail, local authorities in their role as statutory highwayauthorities, the Highways Agency in England, and Transport Wales. We have worked with the HighwaysAgency on previous editions of the Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (http://www.standardsforhighways.co.uk/dmrb/vol11/section3/11s3p10.pdf) addressing flood and water pollutionrisk, and this document is widely used by local authorities and the devolved administrations. We recently(November 2009) signed a detailed memorandum of understanding with the Highways Agency, whichincludes working arrangements taking account of the complex legal provisions regarding highwayinfrastructure and management of flood risk. We also hope that some of these complexities can be reducedin forthcoming legislation, particularly any follow up to the Flood and Water Management Bill, which iscurrently being debated in Parliament.

5.3 Following the 2007 summer floods, the Pitt Review recommended establishing a systematicprogramme to protect critical infrastructure from natural hazards, such as flooding. Recommendation53 stated “A specific duty should be placed on economic regulators to build resilience in criticalinfrastructure”.

5.4 The Natural Hazards Team in the Cabinet OYce is currently assessing the resilience of nine keysectors, including transportation to flooding. The team recommend the adoption of an initial minimumstandard for the resilience of critical national infrastructure and essential services of one in 200 annualprobability against flooding from all sources, and that reviews are undertaken every six years to ensure thatthis standard is maintained over time. They are consulting on the level of this standard (consultation closes18 January). The Environment Agency is preparing its response to the consultation. Each Sector is alsopreparing a Sector Resilience plan to document progress within the Sector to improve resilience fromflooding. During 2010, the Natural Hazards Team will be producing a National Resilience Plan.

5.5 The Environment Agency has no powers to demand infrastructure operators take action to mitigateflood risk. However, by working with us and sharing information between Local Resilience Forum Partnersand specifically infrastructure operators, we can better understand the risks they face, provide appropriateand timely warnings so they can take actions to reduce the impact of flooding on critical assets. We providea specific flood warning service for organisations such as Network Rail who operate a bridge inspectionservice for their railway bridges triggered by our flood warnings. If thresholds are reached then speedrestrictions or closures are put in place until site inspections have been undertaken. The EnvironmentAgency is currently developing a tailored flood warning service known as Flood Warnings for Infrastructureand would encourage other operators with assets or networks of assets to take up the service. All operatorsneed to assess their vulnerability to flood risk and take appropriate action. To date we have seen aninconsistent approach from operators around the country with no significant increase in resistance orresilience projects.

5.6 Guidance will be produced for regulators by the Natural Hazards Team to enable them to supporteVectively a national programme of cross-sector resilience-building from all natural hazards. This willinclude measures to ensure that key utilities and public services take responsibility for protecting theiroperations from the consequences of flooding. The identification and delivery of measures to improve theresilience of critical infrastructure is partly dependent on regulatory review cycles (in the regulated sectors)and hence funding availability. This should form part of a wider climate change proofing of critical


infrastructure, facilities and services. The Flood and Water Management Bill should help in this regard.Clause 13 of the Bill establishes a duty for relevant authorities to cooperate with local authorities and theEnvironment Agency to share information relevant to the management of flood risk from all sources to assistlong term emergency and spatial planning.

January 2010

Memorandum from the Department for Transport (BIC 08)

Executive Summary

This memorandum sets out the Department’s work to encourage local authorities to care for theirhighways structures in a systematic way, so that disruptions such as occurred in Cumbria in November2009 can be minimized. It describes the on-going action taken by the Highways Agency to ensure theresilience of its structures. It notes what other transport organisations, such as Network Rail, are taking inthis area. It concludes that, while extreme weather events are certain to recur, the nation’s transportinfrastructure providers have tools to ensure that their assets are suitably resilient. However, theGovernment recognises that providers work in a dynamic environment. Therefore there is a need forcontinuous development on resilience, for which the Government has and continues to provide bridgeowners with support.

The Impact of Flooding on Bridges and other Transport Infrastructure in Cumbria

Introduction

1. The damage to Cumbria’s transport infrastructure in November 2009 was caused by the highest levelof rainfall measured in the UK over a 24-hour period since records began. The measures needed to allowthe county’s economy to recover have yet to be definitively assessed, but are likely to require significantinvestment in repairs and reconstruction.

2. This memorandum sets out an account of how the Department for Transport assists local authoritiesto manage their highway assets, including supporting them in responding to the damage caused by severeenvironmental events; how the Highways Agency takes account of such events in maintaining its ownnetwork; and how the Department supports other transport organisations.

Background

3. There are approximately 300,000 kilometres of publicly maintainable highway in England, more than98% of it maintainable by local highway authorities, the remainder maintained by the Highways Agency.Network Rail maintains 31,000 kilometres of track. No central record of the number of highway bridges iskept, but data from local authorities indicate that there are approximately 65,000 road bridges in the country.These vary from small footbridges of a few metres span to large iconic structures such as Tower Bridge inLondon or the Gateshead Millennium Bridge. Network Rail is responsible for some 40,000 bridges.5

Highways and rail infrastructure also includes tunnels, retaining walls (whether supporting the way itself orholding back land above it), embankments and cuttings.

4. Local highway authorities and the Highways Agency have a duty, under section 41 of the HighwaysAct 1980, to maintain the highways in their charge.6 This duty includes maintenance of the bridges andother structures that form part of the highway. The Act does not set out what standards should be appliedin maintaining the highway, but the courts have built up a body of case law.

Government financial support for local authority highways

5. The 1998 White Paper, A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone,7 recognized that there hadbeen considerable underinvestment in local highways, and promised increased funding as part of the LocalTransport Plan (LTP) process. As part of DfT funding of LTPs, £6.5 billion of capital has been allocatedto English local highway authorities (outside London) over the 10 year period, 2001–02 to 2010–11. Theseallocations have been based on formulae that take into account authorities’ road, bridge and street lightingasset inventories.

6. LTP capital allocations for highways maintenance do not identify the highways or supportinginfrastructure on which the money is to be spent (indeed, the funding is not ring-fenced to transport). It isfor each local authority to determine what funding is needed and where it should be applied (although

5 Not all highways infrastructure belongs to the local highway authority. Many road bridges over rail lines, for example, arethe property of Network Rail, with an agreement between the two parties as to the apportionment of costs. Some structures(such as the Humber Bridge or the Medway Tunnel) are owned by separate bodies.

6 That is, those roads which the highway authority has recorded (in a register kept under s36 of the Act) as roads maintainableat public expense. Publicly maintainable highways do not include public rights ofway or private streets, whichmay themselveshave bridges or other infrastructure.

7 DETR (1998), A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone (Cm 3950); available from www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/whitepapers/previous/anewdealfortransportbetterfo5695


maintenance schemes costing more than £5 million can be funded separately as major projects). Since2008–09 funding allocations to individual local authorities for highways maintenance have been made aspart of the Regional Funding Allocation process. It is for each region to decide how to balance allocationsfor highways maintenance against other capital demands.

7. Revenue Support Grant (RSG), provided by the Department for Communities and Local Governmentto support authorities’ revenue expenditure is also available to support highways maintenance activities. Nospecific amount of RSG is determined by central government as being for highways; it is for each localauthority to determine how much to allocate, in accordance with local knowledge, needs and priorities.

8. Nor is it central government’s role to determine what is the “right” amount for local authorities to bespending on their networks. Only each local authority itself is in a position to make those judgements, takinginto account local needs and knowledge of their highway network. In particular, this includes decisions onthe balance of highways maintenance funding between bridges and other parts of the network.

Departmental support in response to emergency damage to infrastructure

9. The Department has a long-standing policy of assisting local authorities that have suVered significantdamage as a result of unforeseeable environmental events.8 This is in addition to any funding madeavailable by the Department for Communities and Local Government under the Bellwin arrangements forclear-up costs. Due to the unpredictability of these events, the Department does not hold a contingency fundagainst such events. Funding is found by locating underspends elsewhere or by delaying or cancelling otherprojects. Over the past decade, the Department has provided more than £85 million to local highwayauthorities to assist them with recovery.

10. The Department expects authorities to make provision for environmental damage to their networks,and has stipulated that each authority should be expected to meet costs up to a sum equivalent to 15% of theLTP capital settlement in the year in which the event occurred. This ensures that authorities take a prudentapproach to budgeting and they are incentivised to appropriately maintain their transport infrastructure.

11. Since the summer 2007 floods, the Department has provided engineering consultancy support toaVected local authorities, to help them to determine whether they might have a claim, to assist them withthe preparation of a claim and help them decide what would be the best measures to restore the operationalcapability of their network.

12. Since November, the Government has provided Cumbria County Council with funding for theerection of a temporary footbridge, the Barker Crossing at Workington, and continue to work with CumbriaCounty Council to identify funding requirements. The DfT has also provided funding for short-term projectmanagement support (in addition to that noted in the previous paragraph); as well as for the additional railservices, shuttle services and fare subsidies in Workington. In addition, throughout the emergency theHighways Agency (through its Service Provider) supported the County by installing road closures, andproviding signage, vehicles and other specialist equipment.

What caused the bridge collapses in Cumbria?

13. It will be for Cumbria County Council to determine the precise reasons for the collapse of the threeroad bridges and three footbridges that occurred in November 2009. However, in essence the collapses werecaused by the sheer volume of fluvial water scouring the bridge foundations.

14. It is important to distinguish between maintaining structures to cope with expected levels of water,and designing for rare and unpredictable events. Although many of the country’s road bridges are more thana century old, this of itself does not imply that they are unsafe or not fit for purpose. Even for the neweststructures, it is not possible and may not be desirable from a value-for-money perspective, to design outevery possible risk of infrastructure damage or collapse following an extreme weather event. Aproportionate, risk-based approach is needed.

Understanding the asset in normal conditions

15. Proper asset management is essential to ensuring that highway assets are properly maintained; andthe foundation of asset management is good inventory data of the carriageways, footways, streetlights,bridges and other structures that the highways authority is responsible for. The Department, to assist localauthorities in their preparation for the move to Whole of Government Accounts (WGA), has made available£32 million to English authorities to develop their inventory data across the whole highway asset.

16. An asset management approach identifies all assets across a network and their condition and shouldhelp local authorities to take decisions on highways maintenance on a whole life costing basis. In decidingupon the appropriate maintenance a risk assessment should form part of decisions on the level of treatmentnecessary to maintain resilience.

8 The Department’s guidance to local authorities on making a claim for this funding is available at www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/regional/ltp/guidance/fltp/floodfundingguidance.pdf


17. Allied to inventory data is information on the condition of the asset. Local authorities are encouragedto inspect their bridges and other structures on a regular basis.9 The UK Roads Liaison Group’s code ofpractice, Maintenance of Highways Structures,10 gives guidance on devising an inspection regime. TheDepartment has work in hand to set up, on behalf of the UK Roads Liaison Group, an accreditation regimefor bridge inspectors, which will provide a common quality and competence standard for inspections. Atpresent, although some organisations have competence regimes in place, there is no widely accepted andaccredited set of key skills for bridge inspectors.

18. Structural condition can be expressed using the Bridge Condition Indices (and associated sub-indicators) developed by the Highways Agency and by local authorities. As part of the WGA accountingchanges, the Department is funding the development of a structures depreciation model, that will allow localauthorities to track the deterioration (and corresponding change in value) of their structures, at anappropriate component level.

19. The tools and techniques are being put in place to allow local authorities to set service levels for theirstructures, to assess the work that needs doing to deliver those service levels, and to plan over the long-termto schedule those works. Although the Department has long encouraged local authorities to developTransport Asset Management Plans (TAMPs), and much good work has already been done, someauthorities have only recently come to see the benefits of the asset management approach. Where work isunder way, it often concentrates on carriageways and footways, the most extensive part of the network,leaving bridges and structures for later.

Design and maintenance for the unexpected

20. No engineering structure is completely indestructible. Many of the country’s transport assets wereconstructed before engineering understanding and the process of design (in terms of structures, materialsand hydraulics) were developed in the Victorian period; and so were not constructed with specific designparameters in mind. However, even modern bridges will have a set of design parameters beyond which theywill not stand. Those parameters (which, for many highways structures, will have been set a century or moreago, and may have been imperfectly understood at the time) may not be appropriate for the expectedconditions of the future.

21. Bridges and other structures are expensive to construct and maintain, but are constructed where thealternative routes would entail much longer journeys (generally to avoid a natural obstruction such as ariver). In the case of the two bridges in Workington that were destroyed or rendered unsafe for use, thealternative routes require a detour of 25 kilometres. The vulnerability of a structure (the consequences ofits being taken out of service, together with its ability to withstand environmental pressures) can be quiteconsiderable. Yet Sir Michael Pitt noted that “at present, there is an incomplete national picture of thevulnerability of critical infrastructure to flooding”.11

22. We cannot assume that it will be worth protecting all assets equally against all risks. The Pitt Reportnoted, “reducing flood risk to critical infrastructure must be about prioritisation. The probable result oftrying to protect everything is that nothing will be protected adequately”.12 Prioritisation extends along twodimensions, understanding the engineering behaviour of transport structures under environmental stress,and understanding the socio-economic importance of the traYc flows over (and under) given structures.

23. There could be a general call for all local authorities to assess all their structures for resilience. TheGovernment suggests that, instead, a proportionate approach should be adopted. However, it is importantto note that, however proportionate, such assessments will not necessarily prevent future collapses. The PittReview noted that “while the precise scale and nature of these events varies, and extreme flows can bediYcult to measure accurately, the Review considers that for the purposes of building resilience in the criticalinfrastructure, a minimum standard of one in 200 annual probability would be a proportionate startingpoint”.13 The Cumbria floods were just such a one in 200 event; so they were within the scope of Pitt’srecommendations, but any such bridge assessment might have concluded that no strengthening werenecessary.

24. Transport structures are generally expensive to construct and maintain, and have long design lives.The fact that many bridges in this country are more than 100 years old is not of itself a cause for concern.Rather, it is a tribute to the design skills of the engineers that originally built them. However, climate changemay well lead us to reconsider the appropriate parameters for the future. Where new structures are built, as

9 The Highways Agency has in place a rigorous regime of regular bridge inspection at two-yearly intervals including a detailedprincipal inspection every six years, which is supplemented by special inspections to investigate the causes of specific defectsor after significant events such as flooding. Structural assessments are also undertaken in response to deteriorating condition,to assess the strength and load carrying capacity of bridges. Repairs, maintenance and where necessary renewal of bridges iscarried out where defects or the condition of a bridge impairs safety. Other life extending or preventative work may also beundertaken.

10 UK Roads Liaison Group (2005), Maintenance of Highways Structures, London: TSO or available fromwww.ukroadsliaisongroup.org

11 Pitt (2008), The Pitt Review: Lessons Learned from the 2007 Floods, 15.7, available from archive.cabinetoYce.gov.uk/pittreview/thepittreview.html

12 Pitt (2008), 15.2713 Pitt (2008), 15.39


in the case of replacement bridges in Workington, it will be necessary to consider not just what it would taketo withstand a one in 200 year event (say) today, but what it would take to withstand future events as therisk environment changes over the life of the asset.

Could it happen elsewhere?

25. There is no reason to suggest that Cumbria County Council is not maintaining its highways structuresadequately, or that if the exceptional levels of rainfall that fell in the county in November 2009 were to occurelsewhere, there would not be similar consequences.14 Cumbria was unfortunate in that the town ofWorkington relied on the functioning of the Northside and Calva bridges to such a critical extent.

26. That said, it is impossible to generalise as to the consequences of such an event elsewhere. Bridges areunique structures, and their necessary proximity to rivers, valleys and other natural topography means thatthey will always be more vulnerable to stress from water flows than others infrastructure will be.

27. In the light of the Pitt Review, the Highways Agency has undertaken research (with input from theEnvironment Agency) to determine where are the greatest risks of surface water floods occurring inproximity to the Agency’s network. Further research will shortly be commissioned by the Agency to identifythe areas for the greatest risks of fluvial flooding, taking account of climate change predictions, and toidentify the infrastructure likely to be aVected.

28. Most of the Highways Agency’s bridges and other structures are of relatively modern design and oftenutilise deep-piled foundations, where rivers and waterways are crossed and there are underlying soft alluvialground conditions. Such forms of structure are inherently less prone to the damaging eVects of flooding, andscour erosion undermining bridge supports. However older bridges may only have shallow foundationswhere the risk of scour erosion is consequently greater.15

29. The Highways Agency has in place a suite of standards and procedural controls over new bridgedesigns to ensure that such bridges will be safeguarded against the risks of flooding and scour erosion.However, the Agency is reviewing these design standards to ensure that they will be compatible withanticipated climate changes, and to review the eVects of scour erosion and hydraulic loads on bridgesupports, in the light of experience from Cumbria and elsewhere.

Is other infrastructure in the same position?

30. It is clear from the damage to highways networks from the summer 2007 floods, that carriagewaysand footways are also susceptible to the eVects of heavy fluvial water flows. The diVerence is that, for bridges,the damage may mean the bridge has to be closed (or is swept away); in the case of carriageways andfootways, the damage will not result in closure, but will damage the structure so that repair would, in time,become necessary sooner than otherwise.

31. Flooding is not the only environmental risk to which highways infrastructure is prone. TheDepartment is currently considering a number of claims from local authorities whose networks were morethan usually damaged by the severe winter weather in February 2009; and in 2003 several authoritiesreceived assistance when an exceptionally dry year meant that peat soils dried out, causing fen roads tobuckle and crack.

32. The bridge collapses in Cumbria were, essentially, caused by a single environmental phenomenon, theflow of excess rainwater down rivers. Lesser volumes of water could cause an equal amount of damage,perhaps more insidiously, through freeze-thaw expansion of ice if water can get inside structures or into thelower layers (known as the sub-base) of a road. A key component of highways maintenance is keeping waterout of the structure.

33. One area in which it is clear that local authorities are short on knowledge of their assets is in relationto highways drainage. This is not a factor that, as far as we know, made a diVerence in the recent events inCumbria, but understanding the capacity of their highways drainage will be a key component in authorities’ability to plan for heavy rainfall that falls within “normal” ranges. As part of arrangements to develop localauthorities’ asset management capability, the Department is funding a number of local authorities to lookat improving their drainage asset inventory and condition records.

14 The North West has, historically, had more rainfall than other parts of England; and this diVerence is forecast to beexacerbated in future years. More information about the UK Climate Change Predictions (UKCIP09) is available atwww.ukcip.org.uk/index.php

15 The Highways Agency has a system of identification of bridges at risk of scour, and procedures to ensure that they areinspected after periods of prolonged heavy rain or flooding. Since the Cumbria floods occurred, a reminder has been sent outto all the Agency’s Service Providers to ensure that these procedures are being followed rigorously. However, prior to theCumbria flooding the Agency had commenced a process of reviewing its guidance contained in BA74 “Assessment of Scourat Highway Bridges” and this will be updated in the light of the findings, again learning from the Cumbria experience, andwhere appropriate the Agency will consider installing mitigation protection measures.


Non-highway structures

34. The structural integrity and resilience to flooding of railway bridges and structures is an operationalmatter for Network Rail. The company has a risk-based approach to structural examinations, whichprovides for structures with a higher risk of failure to be inspected more frequently (typically masonrybridges and viaducts). Annual visual inspections are also conducted, and new arrangements for undertakingthis work are to become fully eVective this year.

35. Generally Network Rail’s structures funding is at an historically high level. Between 2009 and2014 Network Rail will spend £1.7 billion on civil engineering, which includes maintaining and renewingbridges, earthworks and other major structures. Some £160 million will be invested in railway drainage.Work has begun on assessing the outputs and funding required for the period 2014–19, and this will includeconsideration of emerging needs for any changes to the management of structures arising from recentflooding events.

36. Following the events in Cumbria, the independent OYce of Rail Regulation (ORR) asked NetworkRail for an update on its flood protection programme. The ORR believes that Network Rail is well-focussedon the issues. However, any proposal for a strengthening programme would need to be proportionate to therisks, oVer value for money and be aVordable, as the cost is likely to be substantial. However, given the extentof Network Rail’s estate there can be no absolute guarantee from failure in extreme weather. Network Rail’searth structures (cuttings and embankments) are particularly sensitive, as the majority were constructed inthe Victorian era, and it is not uncommon for minor failures to occur each year.

37. The unprecedented levels of rainfall in Cumbria caused major damage at the port of Workington.120,000 tonnes of debris including rocks, boulders, trees and silt were flushed into the port via the riverDerwent. The debris blocked the navigable channel and approaches in to the port. The harbour bridge, thetidal harbour and one quay collapsed. Other port infrastructure was severely damaged or compromised dueto erosion. This resulted in closure of the port to vessels although an area not aVected by flooding remainedaccessible and operational for cargo handling.

38. The port of Workington is of considerable importance locally, but it is not of strategic importance inthe same way as Dover for cross-Channel traYc or Southampton and Felixstowe for deep sea containertrades. The experience at Workington was a fairly unusual and unpredictable event. The port wasnevertheless able to establish a route to recovery fairly quickly. The port was fully reopened on 12 January.Most ports, as businesses, have business continuity and recovery plans.

39. Flooding is a relatively low risk for most UK airports as they tend to be situated on higher, well-drained land. However, there is a slightly increased flood risk for some lower-lying airports situated closer torivers or coastlines (for instance London Gatwick, London City, Belfast City). The Department’s AviationDirectorate is contributing to DEFRA’s Climate Change Adaptation initiative by working with externalstakeholders to gather information on what climate change impacts—including flooding—might have onairports.

What measures should the Government take?

40. At this stage it is not anticipated that any Highways Agency bridges will need to be renewed orreplaced as the result of flood or scour damage.16 The Agency has had detailed advice in place since 2006 toassess and manage the risk of undermining scour erosion of bridge foundations. Some 1,069 structures arecurrently so identified.

41. For the design of new Highways Agency structures crossing rivers or in flood plains, full account ismade (through discussion and agreement with the Environment Agency) of the required hydraulic capacity,allowing for the eVects of climate change. In the light of the events in Cumbria the Agency’s design standardsare in the process of being reviewed.

42. Ultimately, it must be for local authorities to assess the risk to their infrastructure, and to makeappropriate maintenance arrangements that anticipate that risk.

43. The Department believes that the work it has set in place to help local authorities to develop TAMPsand to prepare for the introduction of Whole of Government Accounts, will have benefits in the area of riskmanagement.

44. One area which the asset management approach does not currently consider is the non-engineeringcomponent of criticality (the extent to which, if the asset is taken out of service, the local economy isaVected). There are planning tools that might be adapted to assist local authorities to assess this, includingboth commercial traYc modelling tools and the accessibility tools that were developed for the second roundof LTPs.17

16 Other remedial works so far identified in Cumbria on the HA network are unlikely to exceed £1,000,000. Wider research needscurrently proposed are estimated at under £400,000.

17 For more information, see DfT (2006), Guidance on Accessibility Planning in Local Transport Plans, available fromwww.dft.gov.uk/pgr/regional/ltp/accessibility/guidance/gap/


45. In respect of ports, the Department is in the process of developing a database that provides anoverview of UK port operations including the relative importance of diVerent ports for diVerentcommodities and the scope for diversion in the event of port closures.

46. Local authority maintenance engineers have access to a range of guidance. The UK Roads LiaisonGroup’s code of practice, Management of Highway Structures,18 provides a framework for developingbridge maintenance strategies. To supplement this, in the case of specific structure types, the Departmenthas commissioned a number of structures maintenance guides from the Construction Industry Research andInformation Association (CIRIA), which give practical guidance on specific issues relating to specialiststructures.19 These demonstrate that well-constructed and maintained structures can have an indefinite life,well beyond that envisaged by the original design engineer. We are also funding research through the UKRoads Liaison Group aimed at developing automated inspection tools which can provide quantitativemeasures of condition of a structure on a consistent basis over time and into the use of a material tostrengthen steel structures.

47. As noted above, Network Rail and the ORR have begun the process of determining the railwaynetwork’s civil engineering investment needs for the next decade.

Conclusion

48. We believe that in providing funding, engineering advice and practical assistance (through the HA),the Department has acted swiftly to minimize the disruption to the county. We should record our thanks toall those who have worked hard, and are continuing to work hard to speed the recovery and restore thetransport networks in the county. We cannot eliminate the risk of future events like Cumbria.

49. The work we have undertaken to understand the maintenance requirements of older bridges, plus theon going work Government is doing;

— on tools for automating bridge inspections;

— to examine a material for strengthening steel structures;

— to develop a better understanding of maintenance needs across all highway assets and to improvetheir management by encouraging asset management planning; and

— to take forward measures to introduce common standards and an accreditation scheme for trainingof bridge inspectors;

together with the sustained levels of increased funding provided to local authorities for highwaymaintenance, should help to mitigate the economic and social impacts of any future events.

January 2010

Further memorandum from the Department for Transport (BIC 08a)

Your committee will have before it my Department’s written evidence to its inquiry into the impact offlooding on bridges and other transport infrastructure in Cumbria. However, I thought it would also behelpful to inform you that yesterday, during a visit to Workington, I announced that the Department isproviding £4.6 million to pay for a temporary road bridge over the River Derwent. The new bridge willoperate until a permanent solution is in place to cover the bridges damaged and destroyed by last year’sflooding. The temporary bridge is expected to be open by May this year.

This funding is in addition to the support my Department has already provided to help Cumbria withtheir important recovery work from the devastation caused by the flooding. My Department will continueto provide assistance to Cumbria County Council to identify what further funding is required to restore theircritical transport infrastructure.

I look forward to appearing before your committee on this matter on 10 March.

February 1010

18 UK Roads Liaison Group (2005), Management of Highway Structures, TSO or available from www.ukroadsliaisongroup.org19 CIRIA (2006), Masonry Arch Bridges: Condition, Appraisal and Remedial Treatment (C656); CIRIA (2008), Iron and Steel

Bridges: Condition Appraisal and Remedial Treatment (C664); and CIRIA (2009), Drystone Retaining Walls and theModifications: Condition Appraisal and Remedial Treatment (C676)


Supplementary memorandum from the Department for Transport (BIC 08b)

Thank you for the opportunity last Wednesday to appear before your Inquiry into the lessons to be learntfrom the Cumbria bridge collapses. I undertook to provide you with an account of the amount of assistancewe have provided to Cumbria County Council to help with their recovery.

Jointly with the Ministry of Defence, we have provided £1 million to erect the Barker Crossing temporaryfootbridge, of which the Department’s agreed costs are £382k (we also expect to have to find around afurther £200k in recovery costs when the bridge is no longer needed). Also, as I set out in my letter of10 February, I announced on 8 February that we are providing £4.6 million for the temporary road bridgenow under construction in Workington. This will cover material, design and construction costs.

A total of £844,600 has been spent (to 21 March 2010) on the rail shuttle service and longer trains. Weexpect that the outturn cost will be within the £1.2 million sum authorised to run the service to 2 May. Thetemporary station at Workington North has been funded by Network Rail without DfT funding; however,DfT contributed to signage at the station and for customer service staV to assist passengers.

To assist Cumbria County Council assess damage and prepare a bid for emergency funding to theDepartment, we are paying for on-going consultancy support. To the end of February 2010, this amountedto £12k. In addition, we provided funding support towards the total costs of £46k for supplementary short-term project management resources from December to February. The Department’s contribution will be£31,400 (excluding VAT).

In the immediate aftermath of the floods in November, the Highways Agency oVered Cumbria CountyCouncil a range of assistance in kind; elements that the Council took up included road closure signs;4x4 vehicle capability and drivers for the Council’s bridge inspectors; portable electronic Variable MessageSigns and mobile CCTV; other vehicles and plant; and lighting units/generators. The Agency also providedthe Council with an Under-Bridge Inspection Unit (a significantly large and specialised piece of machinery)which gives access to the underside of bridges. This was sourced and delivered to site, from Brighton, within12 hours of the request on 25 November 2009, and remained in place for approximately one week. Giventhat these items were drawn from the Agency’s resources as required, it is not possible identify a precise cost.

In summary, so far the Department has found £5.87 million in identifiable costs to assist Cumbria in itsrecovery. Our commitment will continue beyond the help I have listed here, for as long as the county needsit. We have recently received a further request for £1 million, to cover other highways work.

I look forward to reading the Committee’s report in due course.

March 2010

Further supplementary memorandum from the Department for Transport (BIC 08c)

I have now had an opportunity to look over the transcript of my appearance last Wednesday before yourInquiry into the lessons to be learnt from the Cumbria bridge collapses. I would like, if I may, to clarifytwo points.

With regard to local authorities’ development of Transport Asset Management Plans (TAMPs), I said[Q108] that in 2004 only 9% of local authorities were working on such Plans. I should have said nineauthorities. Later in the same answer, I noted that by 2007–08, 78% of authorities were working on a TAMP.This figure should have been 88%. Equally, in response to Q113, where I said 80% of authorities wereworking on a TAMP, that too should have read 88%. I am sorry to have misquoted figures to the Committee.It was, of course, never my intention to mislead; and I do not believe that the revised figures alter the tenorof the points I was making.

In response to Mr Martlew [Q122], I may have suggested that I thought that Cumbria County Councilhad spent 100% of the money on bridges that they should have done. A theme running through all myevidence that day was that local authorities are best placed to make decisions about the resources neededto maintain their highways assets, and that it was not for central Government to second guess what mightbe appropriate. In agreeing with Mr Martlew, I had intended to concur with the sentiment that, with a properasset management regime in place, local authorities should be in a position to spend appropriately ontheir bridges.

Thank you again for the Committee’s interest in this matter.

March 2010


Supplementary memorandum from Cumbria County Council (BIC 04a)

The Environment Agency is still analysing the level of flood return for the events of November 2009 inCumbria and expects to have the results of this work by the end of March 2010.

No single flood risk rating can be applied to the Derwent Valley area aVected by the 2009 floods. Howeverwe have been advised by the EA that they expect the flood rating data for the 2009 event to be well over onein 200 in some places and that when the results are known later this month they are likely to issue the datain a banded format (for example a rating of 1:200–400 or 1:700–900) as above 1:100 years ratings areextrapolated rather than based on actual readings over time.

March 2010

Supplementary memorandum from Cumbria County Council (BIC 04b)

This submission relates to a factual evidence provided in a response from myself, Mr Andrew Moss ofCumbria County Council, to questions 37 and 38 from Mr Eric Martlew following on from question 36 fromMr Martlew to Mr Michael Winter of ADEPT.

In his response to earlier questions (Q33 and Q35) Mr Winter refers to anecdotal evidence that highwayauthorities may not be spending the full allocation of bridges maintenance funding from the DfT.

I wish to draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that, due to a misunderstanding in the way in whichmy supporting data had been prepared, the information from me in response to Q37 and Q38 was incorrect.My response reflected the approved Cumbria County Council budget for structures maintenance inCumbria compared to the actual spend incurred in each of the preceding five years, whereas Mr Winter’scomments refer to the level of DfT settlement for bridges maintenance for highway authorities. Believing Ihad received my data from a reliable source within the County Council I had no reason to doubt it andresponded in good faith.

Had I been in possession of the correct data my response to Q37 (and my supporting comment in myresponse to Q38) would have been to say that Cumbria’s annual bridges maintenance spend is in line withthe comment put forward by Mr Winter. However, in relation to my response in Q38, after taking intoaccount this correction of fact, it remains the view in Cumbria that the current level of bridges maintenancefunding is unlikely to be a factor in the damage caused by the November 2009 floods.

I would like the Select Committee to be advised that this error occurred, was unintentional and I nowprovide the corrected response (above) to Q37 so that the Committee can give due consideration to theevidence from its questions.

March 2010

Supplementary memorandum from the Environment Agency (BIC 07a)

Thank you for the email dated 18 March, 2010 requesting further information following the request bythe Committee to write to them on the maintenance of the River Derwent near Cockermouth.

Our preliminary assessment of the magnitude of the November floods in Cumbria at our river levelrecording station just downstream of Cockermouth on the River Derwent was between a 1:600 and 1:1000years return period event. This is the same as saying that there is between a 0.16 and 0.1 percentage chanceof this flood happening in any one year. We have commissioned consultants to carry out a more detailedassessment and this may change our preliminary estimate. We expect their report in April/May of this year.

We undertake tree management in the Derwent catchment on a reactive basis, removing trees that presentan imminent increase in flood risk to people or property. This includes trees that impact on essentialstructures near or over rivers, such as bridges, that themselves could impact on the flood risk. On averagewe remove five to seven such blockages a year from the catchment.

We also undertake programmed tree maintenance in selected areas of the River Greta in Keswick, andthe Rivers Cocker and Derwent in Cockermouth. We carried out such work between November 2008 andNovember 2009. Any fallen or falling trees presenting an imminent flood risk are removed. In addition,saplings are controlled to prevent future damage to structures and reduction in channel capacity.


We do not carry out specific works to protect critical transport infrastructure as this is the responsibilityof the owner. We do give consent to works on rivers to ensure that such works do not have an adverse impacton third parties and the environment. Where transport infrastructure is within the benefit area of a flooddefence scheme we have built or propose to build to protect properties, then we include the benefits in ourscheme justification and the transport infrastructure receives protection to the design standard for thescheme. Any additional level of protection is at the discretion of the owner.

March 2010

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Documents

The impact of flooding on bridges and other transport … · 2010-03-30 · Ev 2 Transport Committee: Evidence 17 March 2010 Mr Andrew Moss, Mr Kenneth Brooks, Mr Michael Winter,