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UN-WIDER ConferenceACCRA, 05-06 October 2017
The Impact of Foreign Aid on Migration - Revisited
Mauro Lanati*, Rainer Thiele***Migration Policy Centre, EUI
**Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Outline
• Introduction
• Stylized Facts
• Theory and Empirical Literature
• Our contribution: Estimates
• Conclusions & Further Research
Impact of Foreign Aid on Migration Flows
Topic: Why it's relevant
(i) The influence of overseas development aid on emigration is an issue of some
intrinsic interest, but its intellectual interest is dwarfed by its relevance to the policy
debate over the last twenty years (Parsons Winters (2014))
(ii) Nowadays, with the refugee crises and the arrival of thousands of migrants on
the South-European coasts, a new migration policy has become a political priority
for the EU and there's growing pressure to find a way to effectively and collectively
manage the migration flows.
(iii) In this context, increasing foreign aid is seen by some politicians in several EU
countries as a key recipe to stem migration flows from developing countries.
Britain needs to spend more of its budget on helping stabilise countries
so that it doesn’t have to fish migrants out of Mediterranean (June 2015
the UK Defence Secretary; The Guardian, 21st June 2015).
We must also continue our political and development action to improve
the living conditions in the countries of origin, working with them there,
so that people do not have to flee their homes (Jose Manuel Barroso 9th
October 2013, EU Commission)
Stylized Facts (1) – Aid is IncreasingSource: OECD data, Qian (2014)
Stylized Facts (2) – Aid Allocation / Interests of DonorsSource: Qian (2014)
Stylized Facts (3) – Aid DependencySource: OECD
Stylized Facts (4) – Aid is HeterogeneousNon-Transferred Aid Source: OECD data, Qian (2014)
Aid as Determinant of Migration
But Foreign Aid does actually reduce migration flows?
Theory: the impact of foreign aid on migration is subject to
contrasting forces and its net effect in practice is not clear cut.
• 1 Income (or welfare) Channel (-)
• 2 Budgetary Constraint Channel (+)
Empirics: In the empirical literature there seems to be some
agreement on the positive effect of foreign aid on migration
flows i.e. the results confirm the hypothesis of the view that
foreign aid doesn't reduce migration flows in poor countries.
Empirical Literature(i) Faini and Venturini (1993) postulates that income growth (induced by aid
inflows) may fail to stem emigration because it relaxes credit constraints, which
tend to be especially binding in poorer contexts. Inverted U shape hypothesis.
(ii) Lucas (2005) At a global level, Lucas (2005) estimates a regression of aid
inflows per head on emigration together with a few control variables, on a
sample of 77 developing countries over 1995-2000. He shows a significantly
positive relationship.
(iii) Berthelemy et al. (2009): cross section with both bilateral aid (Network
Channel, or attraction effect) and recipient's total aid, have significantly
positive impacts on migration.
(iv) Moullan (2013) who examines the impact of foreign health aid on the
emigration rates of physicians found a negative impact of health aid on
emigration. This is still in line with the concept of hump-shaped migration
patterns.
Migration HumpAuthors’estimates
-8-6
-4-2
02
6 8 10 12Log GDP per capita
Log Emigration Rate Fitted values
Our ContributionBuilding on Berthelemy et al. (2009), but improving it in many respects:
• Pooling time-series and cross-section data instead of using a pure cross section,
which attenuates econometric problems concerning the identification of causal
effects (multilateral resistance of migration)
• Migrant flows rather than stocks in the dependent variable. These stocks are
inserted as additional regressor to better identify the network channel.
• We derive our econometric specification from a gravity model of international
migration (microfoundation, Beine and Parsons (2015)).
• We run separate regressions for poorer and richer recipient countries, which
enables us to test whether the budgetary constraint channel is indeed relevant at
low levels of per capita income.
• We control for time-varying, origin-specific covariates of migration decisions,
such as environmental factors and the presence of conflicts.
ODA and Emigration – Whole SampleAuthors’estimates
-8-6
-4-2
02
10 15 20 25Log Total ODA by Recipient
Log Emigration Rate Fitted values
ODA and Emigration – by Classes of GDPAuthors’estimates
Below Median (0-50th) Above Median (51th-100th)
-8-6
-4-2
0
10 15 20 25Log Total ODA by Recipient
Log Emigration Rate Fitted values-1
0-8
-6-4
-20
10 15 20 25
Log ODA Total ODA by Recipient
Log Emigration Rate Fitted values
Gravity Model for International Migration
Building on Beine and Parsons (2015): bilateral migration rates as function of
proxies for bilateral migration costs and time varying origin specific determinants of
migration.
Because our primary focus is upon Aggregate ODA at origin, we use appropriate
fixed effects and dummies to capture the impact of destination-specific factors and
time-invariant origin factors.
Benchmark Estimates
Disaggregating
Yearly Cross Sections
Conclusions
• In contrast to the previous literature, our empirical results point to a
robust negative relationship between aggregate aid received and
emigration rates.
• We also find that, at the level of individual donors, (positive) network
effects and (negative) income effects of aid on migration tend to cancel
out, which suggests that (negative) spillovers from one donor’s aid to
another donor’s immigration rates play a significant role.
• Taken together, this gives the impression that policymakers in rich
countries are right to view foreign aid as an appropriate instrument to
curb the flow of migrants, but that they would have to act collectively.
Limits
• It has to be noted, that the aggregate results presented here can only provide a very
rough guide for policymaking, because of the heterogeneous impacts of different
types of foreign aid, which we illustrate by drawing a distinction between the effects
of humanitarian and non-humanitarian aid.
• We are focusing on Legal Migration (for data availability), which still provides an
indication of the change in the decision to migrate but leaves out all the cross country
irregular flows as well as internal migration.
Further Research
Next topic is to focus on donors, in particular:
(1) How their commitment in terms of ODA allocation is reacting to the migration
crises, especially whether the pattern of ODA allocation is changing according to the
number of hosted refugees.
(2) The role of migrants’ networks in exerting political pressure for aid allocation.
Thanks