KEYNOTE ADDRESSES

FROM THE VIRTUAL DIPLOMACY CONFERENCE

The Information Revolution and InternationalConflict Management

RICHARD H. SOLOMON

Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy

WALTER B. WRISTON

Diplomacy in the Information Age

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

UNITED STATESINSTITUTE OF PEACE

Key Points v

Foreword ix

1 The Information Revolution and International 1

Conflict Management

Richard H. Solomon

2 Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy 6

Walter B. Wriston

3 Diplomacy in the Information Age 12

George P. Shultz

Notes 17

About the Authors 18

About the Institute 19

CONTENTS

Solomon, “The Information Revolution andInternational Conflict Management”

- “Virtual Diplomacy” is an Institute of Peace projectdesigned to explore how the global InformationRevolution—today’s explosive growth of telecom-munications and information processing capabili-ties—is transforming international relations. Thisexploration proceeds from a review of the effectsof the new information technologies on organiza-tions and the way they do business. Its goal is toassess the significance of these developments incommunications technologies for managing inter-national conflict. What we mean by “Virtual Diplo-macy” is political, social, and economic interac-tions that are mediated through electronic meansrather than face-to-face communication.

- New communications technologies are pro-foundly altering the pace and pattern of conflictsituations just as they are facilitating new forms ofsocial organization. What “Virtual Diplomacy” istrying to do is anticipate how society will evolvealong the complex international pathways of theWorld Wide Web, the Internet, the global infor-mation superhighway, and explore how new in-formation technologies can be used to manageconflict more effectively.

- It may be too early to assess the long-term impacton contemporary society of computer-managed

information networks and associated systems ofinformation collection, analysis, and communica-tion and storage, yet we can already see some oftheir profound—and, at times, contradictory—ef-fects on social organization and action: decentral-ization and centralization, fragmentation andintegration, transparency, mobilization and ratio-nalization, acceleration, and “virtuality.”

- An underlying theme of “Virtual Diplomacy” ishow the traditional notion of state sovereignty isno longer relevant to the way the world of thetwenty-first century will work. Today, in almostany part of the world, publics can be mobilizedthrough radio, telephones, fax machines, and theInternet, creating “virtual,” or electronic, commu-nities that are basically divorced from notions of aterritorially defined political community.

- The world is transparent now in a way it has neverbeen; we can “see” developments in almost anypart of the world. We are becoming overloadedwith information gathered through all sorts of ve-hicles, sensors, and people who are able to bringtogether through networked communicationstheir views of the world. This visibility makes itpossible for many more people to take action, butit also presents decision makers with an informa-tion glut that they are just beginning to learn howto manage.

- The Information Revolution is taking the initiativein policymaking away from governments. Howpolicymakers react to and cope with the fact thattheir hands are being forced by the mass media—the so-called “CNN effect”—has created a new setof challenges for governance and diplomacy. Inaddition, the information that is empowering pri-vate sector individuals and groups means thatnonstate actors are playing an increasingly promi-nent and autonomous role in the ways that gov-ernments interact with their citizens and withother governments.

- Communications technologies, in and of them-selves, cannot play the role of third-party media-tors in a conflict situation; hardware and softwareare merely instruments of action. Yet they do facil-itate interaction and significantly enhance theexchange of the substance of communication.“Virtual Diplomacy” is an effort to assess the ways

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KEY POINTS

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that these technologies can help mediate thecommunication processes that are essential toconflict management and resolution.

Wriston, “Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy”

- We are in the midst of a revolution. A revolutionby definition causes old power structures tocrumble and new ones to rise. The catalyst—butnot the cause—has always been technologicalchange. Now, as in revolutions past, technology isprofoundly affecting the sovereignty of govern-ments, the world economy, and military strategy.

- Sovereignty, the power of a nation to stop othersfrom interfering in its internal affairs, is rapidlyeroding. Today special interest groups of allkinds, from terrorists to human rights activists,bypass government-based communications chan-nels in their efforts to further their own crusades.

- The convergence of computers and telecommuni-cations has made us into a global community,ready or not. For the first time in history, rich andpoor, north and south, east and west, city andcountryside are linked in a global electronic net-work of shared images in real time. Ideas moveacross borders as if they did not exist. Indeed, timezones are becoming more important than borders.

- A global village will have global customs. Deny-ing people human rights or democratic freedomsno longer means denying them abstractions theyhave never experienced, but violating the estab-lished customs of the village.

- The flood of real-time data has also transformedthe international economy. The depth of the globalmarket renders economic theory based on nationalmarkets suspect. The market is a giant voting ma-chine that records in real time the judgments oftraders all over the world about American diplo-matic, fiscal, and monetary policies. It has createdan information standard that is far more rapid anddraconian than the gold standard ever was.

- Information technology has also produced a newnonmaterial source of wealth: information. Thenew economic powerhouses are masters not ofhuge material resources, but of ideas and technol-ogy. The powerful economies of Singapore and

Hong Kong, countries with virtually no physicalassets, demonstrate the growing irrelevance ofterritory to wealth. This shift in the basis of gener-ating wealth requires a different kind of manage-ment structure and mindset, and affects not onlyindividual companies but entire nations.

- These changes affect not only the civilian produc-tion machine on which our economic strengthrests, but also our military capabilities. The U.S.military today is a spectacular example of the re-placement of physical assets by information. Infor-mation, to be sure, has often made the differencebetween victory and defeat. Where is the enemylocated? How many troops are involved? How arethey armed? What is new is the ease and accuracywith which such questions can be answered.

- Reliance on information technologies also hasdangerous downsides. The American informationinfrastructure, in the words of the recent Report ofthe Defense Science Board Task Force on Informa-tion Warfare, is “vulnerable to attack” and “createsa tunnel of vulnerability previously unrealized inthe history of conflict.” Rogue states and groupscan conduct information warfare even though theydo not command a large military establishment.

- Because so much change in the current revolu-tion is driven by technology, our task in master-ing these new forces is made more complex bythe difficulty of communicating across disci-plines. Diplomats, trained in the humanities, of-ten seem to validate C. P. Snow’s famous lectureon “Two Cultures,” in which he argues that scien-tists and humanists are ignorant of each other’sknowledge and are content to stay that way.

- There is still no substitute for courage and leader-ship in confronting the new problems and oppor-tunities that our world presents. What haschanged dramatically is the amount of informa-tion available to our policymakers. One hopesthat the data processed by the minds of traineddiplomats will produce real knowledge, and withenough experience, wisdom.

Shultz, “Diplomacy in the Information Age”

- Diplomacy is the method—some might say theart—by which relations between nations are

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managed. It is the manner, as distinct from thecontent, of foreign policy. Many dividends willcome from thinking about the interaction of newvolumes and flows of information with the objec-tives countries seek and their means of gettingthere. Indeed, much has changed in diplomacyover the years, but much remains the same.

- Most negotiations—exercises in diplomacy—arenot one-time events, but part of a process that willhave ups and downs. As such, relationshipsshould be constructed with long-term considera-tions in mind. Nevertheless, the reality is that ma-jor powers will interact over time, so short-termtensions need careful—and sometimes confronta-tional—treatment. Negotiation has to be aboutsomething that matters. And it has to be forsomething that counts. In recent years, however,we have seen the rise of the idea that anythingand everything can be negotiated.

- Good diplomacy relies on accurate informationthat is relevant; sifting out that information is cru-cial. So is the process of analyzing what the infor-mation means, and there is no substitute for“touch and feel” in these processes. The diplomaton the spot, respected, well-connected, and lin-guistically comfortable, can make essential con-tributions.

- Information technology cannot replace soliddiplomatic reporting. It is important to distin-guish between excellent means of communica-tion and excellent communication. Computersoffer the former, and educated men and womencan manage the latter. We need to have the disci-pline to hold our fire until solid and thoughtfulreporting—diplomatic reporting—comes in. Whenthe media are closing foreign bureaus, it is exactlythe wrong time for the U.S. government to beclosing and consolidating embassies and con-sulates abroad.

- The private sector and individuals now have ac-cess to information that was once available onlyto a few government agencies, but it doesn’t re-place the insightful analysis of the diplomat on

the spot—the foreign service officer. You just can’tget the total feel for it by looking at a computerscreen half a world away. We need both: the for-eign service officer on the ground and the ex-panding circle of analysts around the world. Theyneed each other.

- Information is everywhere and widely availableto the citizenry generally, not just government of-ficials. So the government no longer has a mo-nopoly over information. Of course, questionsabound: What information is reliable? What is in-correct, misleading, or slanted? Who can tellwithout some independent checks?

- The media, particularly television, play a largerrole than ever. After all, they are in the informa-tion business and have developed the skills ofquickly gathering information and sorting outwhat is newsworthy. The possibilities of distor-tions, let alone selectivity, mean that an indepen-dent base of information is essential. Even so, thecompelling image on the screen—accurate ornot—can have a powerful impact on the citizenry.

- The Information Age should enhance accountabil-ity in diplomacy as well as in most other activities.In the field of diplomacy, what you do and say isincreasingly in the public domain. The quality ofyour decisions and your capacity to execute themeffectively is also increasingly on display.

- Speed is another characteristic of diplomacy inthe Information Age. When combined with thewide access to information, prevalent even now,the pressure is on for rapid reactions, for opera-tion in real time. It is especially at such times thata set of strategic ideas can pay off handsomely infacilitating not only quick, but good, decisions.

- No doubt the way the world works has changedpermanently and dramatically. Yet, when it comesto the conduct of diplomacy, many key attributesremain. This conference is a much needed start atthinking through how the new affects the old andvice versa. From such a new platform of under-standing, our diplomacy can be strong and true.

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After averting the forty-year-old threat of nu-clear annihilation, the world today faces a lessdeadly but much more complex challenge.

Many have written about the marvels of the Informa-tion Revolution, but one important dimension of thisera has so far eluded a comprehensive discussion: therevolution’s impact on statecraft and, more broadly,on how nations interact in an age of rapidly changinginformation and communications technologies.

Expanding and increasingly integrated global mar-kets, new international actors, pervasive computernetworks, and global news media that provoke instantpolicy responses to a growing number of internationalcrises all pose a distinct challenge to governments.How to respond? How can we begin to build a coher-ent, supportable post–Cold War foreign policy thataddresses new domestic and international securityconcerns arising from the exponential growth andspread of such technology? How can U.S. diplomacyand statecraft draw on the nation’s technological edgeto promote its international leadership role?

These observations only touch on the profoundimpact of communication and information technolo-gies in shaping the global environment as we enterthe new millennium. The myriad issues stemmingfrom today’s rapid technological growth have somany profound implications for U.S. foreign policythat the United States Institute of Peace decided to es-tablish an ongoing project to examine these issues in

depth. After two years of effort, including a prelimi-nary conference on “Managing Communication,” theInstitute convened a major international gathering onthe theme of “Virtual Diplomacy: The Global Com-munications Revolution and International ConflictManagement.” The conference, held April 1–2, 1997,brought together leaders in business, industry, acade-mia, U.S. foreign-policy making agencies, interna-tional and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),media, and the U.S. military to explore their mutualconcerns and common missions in an increasinglycomplex era of global change and to discuss howthese technologies have changed their roles in theconduct of global affairs.

Presented in this Peaceworks is a representativeportion of the conference’s ongoing conversation,provided by the conference’s keynote speakers: Insti-tute president Richard H. Solomon, former assistantsecretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs,who opened the conference with a conceptualoverview of the Virtual Diplomacy project; WalterWriston, former chairman and CEO of Citicorp/Citibank; and former secretary of state George Shultz,professor of international economics at Stanford Uni-versity’s Graduate School of Business and a distin-guished fellow at the Hoover Institution. Each in hisown right captures the best thinking of several com-munities represented at the conference.

In its twelve-year history, the United States Insti-tute of Peace has played an important role in bringingtogether diverse communities—governmental andnongovernmental, foreign and domestic—to explorealternative ways of managing international conflict.The objective is to expand each community’s knowl-edge of the others, thereby enriching their commonunderstanding of specific issues in and approaches tomanaging international conflict. In the Institute’stenth anniversary conference, entitled “ManagingChaos,” the role expanded, leading the Institute to ex-plore the practical uses of new technologies for thesenew conflict managers.

“Managing Chaos” illustrated the pivotal role thatthe new conflict managers play in international con-flict resolution and the need for improved coordina-tion of effort, both within the NGO community andbetween governmental and international organiza-tions, in responding to humanitarian crises across theglobe. Participants in this and a follow-on conference,“Managing Communications,” sponsored jointly withthe National Defense University on June 20, 1996,drew attention to the disparity between the potential

FOREWORD

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for cooperation promised by new information tech-nologies and the challenges organizations face in em-ploying these tools effectively.

Drawing on the discussions at both conferences,the Institute conceived the Virtual Diplomacy projectas a programmatic means to explore the long-term is-sues involved in the changing nature of internationalrelations and, more immediately, to help statecraft’spractitioners understand and apply new informationtechnologies in preventing, managing, and resolvinginternational conflict. Specifically, the goal of the Vir-tual Diplomacy project is to demonstrate how thesetechnologies can help ameliorate international con-flict at specific “entry points” along the conflict contin-uum—starting from preventive diplomacy through theprocess of rebuilding and strengthening civil societyin postconflict situations.

It is not too much to say that digital media proto-cols have become the lingua franca of the new worldorder, linking diverse cultures, economies, and politi-cal systems and creating new relationships that disre-gard conventional boundaries and hierarchies.Teleconferencing, computer-mediated communica-tions, and personal media technologies have ex-panded opportunities for communication acrossgeopolitical boundaries and time zones, increasingthe number of actors who can influence the evolutionof conflicts and the speed at which events progressfrom potential problem to deadly crisis.

Jean-Marie Guehenno, author of The End of theNation-State, describes the Information Age as “impe-rial,” in the sense of a “virtual” society too vast to con-stitute a political entity—a world that is at once unifiedand without a center. Power bases, he predicts, areshifting from territory and material wealth to “accessi-bility,” that is, constant access to a vast global elec-tronic network. What follows from this premise canonly be described as the turning upside down of inter-national political structures: Territory as the primarybasis of power in the international system is on theway out, while a yet-to-be-identified integrator ofglobal networks is on the way in. The power of infor-mation technology, harnessed by the commercialworld, has created and now enforces global relation-ships. To be sure, the speed and universality of globalcommunications has accelerated these developments.

The unnerving result for foreign affairs practition-ers, however, is that although technological forceshave decentralized decision making to a remarkabledegree, those same forces are simultaneously reshap-ing the global environment into borderless, networked

communities. In such an environment, it is hard to de-fine a “national” policy: more actors have more accessto foreign-policy making, but the hierarchy and politi-cal authority to execute the decisions has becomemore diffuse at the same time. Localization and global-ization by such transnational media as the Internetand other information networks is changing the char-acter and governance of the nation-state. Nationalidentities and allegiances are fragmenting along eth-nic, religious, and cultural lines; and global markets,not political borders, are coming more and more to de-termine economic regulation and growth. In the midstof such global forces, diplomacy faces new challengesand new opportunities in the conduct of foreign affairsand the management of international conflict.

Nonstate actors have recognized the power of thesenew forces and have assumed effective and efficientadministration of global networks. Jessica Mathewspoints to a “power shift that is transferring part of arole once uniquely attached to governments—namely,framing international policy and law—to outsiders,represented by nongovernmental organizations” andattributes their new leverage in international affairs tothe growth and availability of new technologies:“NGOs can now yank an issue from the third orfourth tier of official interest and push it to the top.Once there, backed by sufficient public pressure, is-sues can move with a speed foreign to usual diplo-matic practice. Information and communicationstechnology is crucial.”1

Such change in the international environment hasposed a distinct challenge to global leadership anddiplomacy. Much discussion has focused on the newsmedia as the most powerful nonstate actors in the in-ternational arena today—a phenomenon referred to asthe “CNN effect.” (A United Nations diplomat re-cently lamented that the Cable News Network has be-come the sixth permanent member of the SecurityCouncil.) In an increasingly pluralistic internationalclimate, consensus-building is the primary means togalvanize action among nation-states. Nevertheless,instantaneous media coverage makes the painstakingdiplomatic work of building one multilateral agendaout of many unilateral policies increasingly difficultfor heads of state, who are now vulnerable on twofronts—their own domestic agenda versus an oftencontradictory international agenda.

Despite their pervasiveness, these new globalforces have not eclipsed U.S. leadership. In a recent is-sue of Wired, the trend-setting organ of the digerati,Peter Schwartz and Peter Leyden concluded: “Today,

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the United States has a . . . crucial leadership role toplay. . . . Americans are fundamentally shaping thecore technologies and infrastructure that will be at thefoundation of the 21st century. . . . American corpora-tions are the first to adopt the new technologies andadapt to the changing economic realities. As a nation,the U.S. is figuring out how to finesse the new modelof high quality economic growth driven by new tech-nologies.”2

Thirty-six years have passed since George Shultzfirst identified the profound effect computers wouldhave on management, but the foreign-policy commu-nity is just now beginning to exploit the opportunitiesoffered by the new information technologies. The crit-ical factor is understanding how best to integratethese tools to develop enhanced strategies to meet theincreasing demands on organizations in this newglobal environment. The best and fastest integrationwill determine which institutions sink or swim. Theymust pay now for the planning and implementationof appropriate information technology infrastructuresor pay much more later for not having done so.Government agencies are no exception. Budgetarypressures and the demands for more effective man-agement will force government agencies to adoptinformation technologies in order to manage anincreased work load and exponentially faster turn-around times.

“Virtual Diplomacy” is an effort to help govern-mental and nongovernmental foreign affairspractitioners understand how best to use these toolsto cope with the new global forces. Organizationsmust respond to the challenge of going beyond vener-able but outdated Cold War concepts that have in-formed their missions for decades. In short, they mustrely on a creative resourcefulness in responding to thenew international environment by, in effect, mimick-ing that environment, organizing themselves to actand respond as a network of information resources.

In this Peaceworks, each of the keynote speakers atthe “Virtual Diplomacy” conference issues an appealto the foreign affairs community, identifying specificchallenges as well as new approaches to help us adaptto a more complex global environment. They presagethe coming of a revolution in diplomacy, in the wayinternational affairs are managed. Although thespeakers address the issue of diplomacy and rapidtechnological change from different perspectives, acommon theme appears: The years ahead will requireleadership, courage, imagination, and a sense of re-solve from foreign-policy makers and practitioners asthey confront the perils and promise of the Informa-tion Revolution’s impact on international relations.

SHERYL BROWN

DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS

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The vision behind “Virtual Diplomacy” has ahistory of several decades, and while theUnited States Institute of Peace is a third-gen-

eration observer in assessing the evolution of the In-formation Revolution as it impacts on internationalrelations, we believe this conference is the culmina-tion of what we have been thinking and writingabout—directly and indirectly—for many years.

It was 1977 when I first heard someone use theterm “Information Revolution.” I was working at theRAND Corporation at the time, and one of the mem-bers of RAND’s board of directors was Walt Wriston,then the CEO of Citicorp. As those of you who haveread his book The Twilight of Sovereignty know,Wriston was far-thinking in terms of seeing the im-pact of satellite communications on the workings ofthe global financial system.

Another of my seniors who was also ahead of thegame in seeing the connection between the Informa-tion Revolution and diplomacy is former secretary ofstate George Shultz. I began running the State Depart-ment’s Policy Planning Staff in 1986 and discoveredthat Shultz had already begun to speak out about theimpact of the Information Revolution on global af-fairs—he gave several speeches on the subject in

1985–86. Yet, despite his prescience on this topic, theState Department—constrained by declining budgetsand comfortable with well-established ways of con-ducting diplomacy—was slow to respond to the possi-bilities of the new information technologies.

One of the things “Virtual Diplomacy” will exam-ine is why the government has been sluggish, relativeto the private sector, in adopting the advanced tech-nologies of information processing and communica-tions. In that regard, we are honored that two of theintellectual godfathers of “Virtual Diplomacy,” whohave served as exemplars in the worlds of diplomacyand international banking, are participants in this en-terprise. For the Institute, “Virtual Diplomacy” is thefulfillment of a two-year effort to focus our small butflexible institution on some of the leading-edge issuesthat link the Information Revolution to foreign affairs.The Institute staff who have sparked this enterprise,providing vision and organizational drive, are SherylBrown, director of our Office of Communications;Margarita Studemeister, director of the Library Pro-gram; and Bob Schmitt, our chief information officer.They are due credit for mobilizing the intellectual tal-ent for this conference and structuring its agenda.

As Harriet Hentges, the Institute’s executive vicepresident, noted in her welcome, “Virtual Diplomacy”involves an effort to explore nothing less than how theInformation Revolution is transforming our world. Butour main objective is to carry that assessment beyondthe issue of the effects of new information technolo-gies on organizations and the way they do business toan exploration of the significance of these develop-ments for managing international conflict. This is theissue at the core of the Institute’s charter. Congress es-tablished the Institute in 1984 with the mandate tostrengthen our national capabilities for resolving inter-national conflict without recourse to war and violence,and we seek to do this through programs of research,education, and training. Our objective in “VirtualDiplomacy” is to assess how the global InformationRevolution is creating new possibilities for preventing,managing, and resolving international conflict.

What does “Virtual Diplomacy” mean? Some of mycolleagues are uncomfortable with the notion of “vir-tual reality” or “virtual” this-or-that, because it impliesa lack of reality. To put it simply, what we mean by“Virtual Diplomacy” is social, economic, and political

1THE INFORMATION

REVOLUTION AND

INTERNATIONAL

CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT

Richard H. Solomon

This essay is an expanded version of Institute president Richard Solomon’s introductory remarks for the opening of the “Virtual Diplo-macy” conference. The essay draws from his prepared remarks and from a formal overview paper, which is available on the Institute’sweb site at: www.usip.org.

interactions that are mediated through electronicmeans rather than face-to-face communication.

THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Today’s Information Revolution has been a centuryand a half in coming, and the technologies that consti-tute the focus of “Virtual Diplomacy” are a compositeof innovations that have evolved since the earliesttimes of our republic:

- The telegraph. We all know that the Americancontinent was developed in the nineteenth cen-tury along the telegraph lines that reached out tothe West.

- Photography. Many of us will recall the Civil Warphotographs of Matthew Brady. But what we may

not remember is that the first use of overheadphotography in a wartime situation occurred dur-ing the Civil War, using the “satellites” of that era—hot air balloons.

- The telephone, which was commercialized at theend of the nineteenth century; radio; televisionjust before World War II; then the postwar inno-vations of the computer, the transistor, inte-grated circuits that made possibleminiaturization; the communication satellite,fiber optics, and radio-satellite circuits that arenow making possible global cellular phone ser-vice; and the development of packet switching,which is the basis of the “netted” communica-tions of the Internet and the World Wide Web.

These technological developments occurred sequen-tially and largely independent of one another. Today

they are integrated into multimedia systems of com-munication that have global reach and are available at remarkably low cost. And that mix of technologiesand their worldwide and inexpensive availability iswhat is bringing about such a fundamental transfor-mation in the way we communicate. In terms of ourconcerns in this conference, however, the significanceis not the technology, but the way these communica-tions systems are transforming the structure of do-mestic and international social and political systems,reshaping the way we all do business and interactwith government. In that regard, several general ob-servations readily come to mind.

Innovations in technology have long been recog-nized as drivers of social change, and the dynamics ofcommunication and conflict are central to processesof change. Thus, new technologies of communica-tions are profoundly altering the pace and pattern ofconflict situations just as they are facilitating newforms of social organization.

The innovation ofmore efficient modes ofcommunication has madepossible ever higher lev-els of social organiza-tion—from the tribe to thenation-state to worldwidemarkets and the globalvillage. Warfare also hasevolved by exploiting thepossibilities of new com-munications technolo-

gies, from the smoke signal to the drum and flag totoday’s computer and satellite-mediated communica-tions systems. What “Virtual Diplomacy” is trying todo is anticipate how society will evolve along the com-plex international pathways of the World Wide Web,the Internet, the global information superhighway,and explore how new information technologies canbe used to manage conflict more effectively.

It may be too early to assess the long-term impacton contemporary society of computer-managed infor-mation networks and associated systems of informa-tion collection, analysis, and communication andstorage, yet we can already see some of their pro-found—and, at times, contradictory—effects on socialorganization and action:

- Decentralization and centralization. The newtechnologies are producing a “flattening” of

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Innovations in technology have long been

recognized as drivers of social change, and the

dynamics of communication and conflict are

central to processes of change.

bureaucratic structures as more readily accessibleinformation and lateral communications systems,such as e-mail, reduce the need for hierarchy andmiddle management, permitting those “on theground” to take informed and organized action.At the same time, however, more accurate and ac-cessible information gives those in senior leader-ship positions the ability to act directly if theychoose to do so, increasing their effectiveness—and also their personal accountability.

- Fragmentation and integration. The new tech-nologies tend to have a fragmenting effect on so-cial organization, facilitating the creation of“virtual,” or electronically linked, communities ofshared interests along lines of language, religionand race, work function, and specialized activities.In such communities, there are no notions ofbonds to political authority or physical territory.That said, networks also integrate these communi-ties and make possible coordinated action despitetheir spatial separation. The impact of these newpatterns of association on politics, as single-issueconstituencies begin to play a larger role in rela-tion to multiple-issue, territorially based commu-nities, is a matter of growing interest andspeculation.1

- Transparency. The Information Revolution,above all, is making the world more “visible” bypromoting the collection, analysis, and dissemi-nation of information on just about anything ofinterest to anyone. In matters of international pol-itics this has meant, for example, bringing intothe open previously classified information abouta nation’s weapons systems that was gathered byreconnaissance satellites and other electronic col-lection methods, or making available instanta-neously and globally information about humanrights abuses—from Timor to Tian An Men. Trans-parency facilitates arms control regimes, democ-ratization, and political accountability. It is alsocreating for decision makers the challenges ofhow to cope with information overload and pres-sures for early action before information has beenfully analyzed and assessed.

- Mobilization and rationalization. Informationcan mobilize people to act, and the most intenseaction is usually driven by emotional responses.Televised images of starving refugees or civilians

being shot by riot police build public pressureson governments to “Don’t just stand there, dosomething!” even if a more considered initialreaction might be “Don’t just do something,stand there!” (and take time to assess the situa-tion and plan the most effective course of action).At the same time, information—accurate informa-tion—can have a rationalizing effect on behavior.Ongoing assessments of the media’s impact onU.S. foreign policy indicate that the tension be-tween the emotionally mobilizing and rationaliz-ing effects of more readily available informationabout world events is a dynamic unlikely to be re-solved any time soon.2

- Acceleration. The Information Revolution hasdistorting effects on society, in much the sameway that hypergravity does strange things to timeand space. Global satellite and computer-medi-ated communications systems have eliminatedthe constraints of distance and time zones on in-ternational financial markets. Satellite-basedGlobal Positioning Systems are giving militaries,peacekeepers, and humanitarian relief organiza-tions precise information about the physical loca-tion of objects—with evident benefits for targetingprecision-guided munitions or locating refugeepopulations, water resources, airstrips, and sup-ply warehouses. For foreign-policy decision mak-ers, instantaneously available information aboutglobal events is accelerating the pace at which de-cisions must be made. More generally, informa-tion and its increasingly wider and more rapidtransmission are accelerating the pace of all hu-man interactions, speeding up processes of scien-tific innovation, commercial exchange, and socialchange. At the same time, people who are sur-rounded by such technologies are struggling tocontrol the pace of life at a tolerable level andlimit information overload.

- Virtuality. One of the buzz phrases of the Informa-tion Revolution is “virtual reality.” This conceptinitially referred to computerized simulations ofreal locations. “Virtual Diplomacy,” however, isreal diplomacy—in the sense of authoritativeinteractions between officials of different govern-ments—but it is “virtual” in that the exchanges areelectronic rather than face-to-face. We are early in the process of learning the many effects of in-teracting electronically across national and cul-

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tural boundaries, across distance and time, andunderstanding the implications for internationalrelations of managing conflict by “virtual” means.We know that electronic communications workbetter if the participants already “know” eachother through prior direct physical interaction.Yet we can anticipate that as the era of electroniccommunication advances, our interactions withpeople will be increasingly “virtual” as opposed tophysical.3

THE “VIRTUAL COMMUNITY” VERSUS THE NATION-STATE

What we do not know, and what “Virtual Diplomacy”is designed to help us explore, is whether we canlearn to deal with the enduring human capacity forconflict in less destructive ways through the “virtual”processes of information gathering, analysis, andcommunications that are the pathways of the globalinformation infrastructure.

An underlying theme of “Virtual Diplomacy” ishow the notion of state sovereignty—once measuredby the three-mile range of the cannonball in definingthe extent of a state’s control of its borders—is nolonger relevant to the way the world of the twenty-first century will work. Walt Wriston wrote more thana decade ago about the way that central banks havelost control of monetary policy because of instanta-neous global communications. And today, in almostany part of the world, publics can be mobilizedthrough radio, telephones, fax machines, and the In-ternet, creating “virtual,” or electronic, communitiesthat are basically divorced from notions of a territori-ally defined political community.

In our daily lives, we all experience the way thesetechnologies are compacting time and space. When Iwas ambassador in the Philippines, I worked a two-dayworkday everyday because of the time shift betweenManila and Washington across a dozen time zones. Iworked a regular day in Manila and then a second dayback in Washington using a variety of electronic formsof communication—the phone, telex cables, and thefax machine. The daily rhythm of life and work is beingprofoundly transformed by these technologies.

The wide availability of information and the meansto communicate it are empowering previously unor-ganized or just locally organized individuals, therebycreating the notion of a “virtual community”—real

people, but people who interact through electronicmeans rather than face-to-face.

The world is transparent now in a way it has neverbeen. It is transparent in the sense that we can “see”developments in almost any part of the world. We arebecoming overloaded with information gatheredthrough all sorts of vehicles, sensors, and people whoare able to bring together through networked com-munications their views of the world. This visibilitymakes it possible for many more people to take ac-tion, but it also presents decision makers with an in-formation glut that they are just beginning to learnhow to manage.

The Information Revolution is taking the initiativein policymaking away from governments. We allknow about the “CNN effect.” If you go into almostany foreign affairs office of any government, a televi-sion set will be on; global television provides the mostupdated news. How policymakers react to and copewith the fact that their hands are being forced by themass media has created a new set of challenges forgovernance and diplomacy. In addition, the informa-tion that is empowering private sector individuals andgroups means that nonstate actors are playing an in-creasingly prominent and autonomous role in theways that governments interact with their citizens andwith other governments in the international realm.

As we look to the future, the notion of a “virtual soci-ety” means, as Nicholas Negroponte put it in his bookBeing Digital, that we will be interacting more throughour electronic interfaces than through atoms, throughdirect physical contact. And it is in that sense that “Vir-tual Diplomacy” explores the way that states and soci-eties now interact through these electronic media.

COMMUNICATION AND CONFLICT

Now, why should the United States Institute of Peacebe interested in these communications technologies?The short answer is than an understanding of socialconflict requires understanding the dynamics of com-munication. Normal or healthy relations among indi-viduals and societies are characterized by open,relatively rational communications with relatively in-frequent misunderstandings and low levels of dis-trust. Conversely, some of the clearest indicators of anemerging conflict situation are “misunderstandings”and misreadings of attention, or imputations of hos-tile motives to the other party; at worst, these indica-tors involve demonizing a potential adversary orprojecting one’s own hostility or malevolent inten-

4

tions onto the opponent. The move to overt conflict isusually accompanied by a breakdown in directcommunications between the parties. The standardresponse when you get into a difficult situation withanother country is recalling your ambassador for con-sultations, breaking off the formal channel of commu-nication just when the situation is getting hot—a“natural,” but potentially counterproductive aspect ofa confrontation.

Management of conflict situations requires special,protected channels of communications between ad-versaries, channels that are trusted as to accuracy, in-tent, and authority to keep the conflict from gettingout of control. For example, during the Cuban MissileCrisis, informal channels of communication involvingjournalists, military attachés,and intelligence officersspontaneously arose, linkingthe Kennedy White Houseand the Khrushchev leader-ship in the Kremlin. Thesechannels played a crucialrole in one of the majorcrises of the Cold War era, attimes distorting communica-tion of intent through decep-tive actions, at other timesensuring that contact did not totally break down andproviding a degree of control over events.

The effort to de-escalate or resolve conflict usuallyrequires, or is facilitated by, the intervention of a thirdparty or mediator who helps to reestablish brokencommunication links and begin the process ofreestablishing trust. A good example of this process isthe Nixon administration’s use of its working relation-ship with Pakistani president Yahya Khan in 1970–71as the intermediary between Washington and Beijing.Yahya Khan vouched for the good intentions of twoleaderships that had been locked in confrontation fordecades and helped them establish a secure channelof communication by which to begin the process ofnormalizing relations. Reconciliation among partiesto a conflict is usually facilitated by a neutral yet sym-pathetic third party who can help begin the process ofdissipating the emotional burdens of conflict andreestablishing rational communication.

Communications technologies, in and of them-selves, cannot play the role of third-party mediators in a conflict situation; hardware and software aremerely instruments of action. Yet they do facilitate in-teraction and significantly enhance the exchange ofthe substance of communication. In that regard, Ishould call attention to one of the conference’s ex-hibits, the so-called “power scene” technology that fa-cilitated the Dayton negotiations on a Bosnia peaceagreement by exposing the parties in the negotiationto the complexities of the physical terrain over whichthey were trying to craft a settlement.

Communications technologies can help establishrational estimates of an adversary’s preparation forcombat, when the tendency in a preconflict situation

is to impute capabilities that are commensurate withassessments of the opposing side’s ill will. Recall thesignificance of the overflight surveillance program us-ing U-2 aircraft during the early years of the Kennedyadministration. At first, the U-2 photographs allevi-ated concerns about a “missile gap” between theUnited States and the Soviet Union. Later on, how-ever, U-2 photographs confirmed the Soviet missiledeployments that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In sum, “Virtual Diplomacy” is an effort to assessthe ways that these technologies can help mediate thecommunication processes that are essential to con-flict management and resolution. We will be success-ful in this endeavor if we leave you with a betterunderstanding of the impact of the Information Revo-lution and its technologies on the society that willemerge in the twenty-first century and if we come tosome greater insight about how we can use these tech-nologies to better deal with international conflict—to

5

Communications technologies, in and of

themselves, cannot play the role of third-

party mediators in a conflict situation; hardware

and software are merely instruments of action.

An American historian once wrote, “Peace isthe mastery of great forces; it is not the solu-tion of a problem.”1 Great new forces are at

work in the world, and if we are to master them, thebeginning of wisdom is to recognize that the world ischanging dramatically and at unprecedented speed.We are in the midst of a revolution. A revolution by de-finition causes old power structures to crumble andnew ones to rise. The catalyst—but not the cause—hasalways been technological change. Now, as in revolu-tions past, technology is profoundly affecting the sov-ereignty of governments, the world economy, andmilitary strategy.

THE THIRD TECHNOLOGICALREVOLUTION

We are now living in the midst of the third great revo-lution in history. When the principle of the lever wasapplied to make a plow, the Agricultural Revolutionwas born, and the power of nomadic tribal chiefs de-clined. When, centuries later, men substituted thepower of water, steam, and electricity for animal mus-cle, the Industrial Revolution was born. Both of thesemassive changes took centuries to unfold. Eachcaused a shift in the power structure. Today the

marriage of computers and telecommunications hasushered in the Information Age, which is as differentfrom the Industrial Age as that period was from theAgricultural Age. Information technology has demol-ished time and distance. Instead of realizing Orwell’svision of Big Brother watching the citizen, the thirdrevolution enables the citizen to watch Big Brother.And so the virus of freedom, for which there is no anti-dote, is spread by electronic networks to the four cor-ners of the earth.

History is strewn with wonderful inventions. Mostof them were designed to solve specific problems: thewheel to move things, engines to supply power, clocksand compasses to tell time and direction. The inven-tions that made possible the Information Revolutionwere different. They changed the way we solve prob-lems. When Johann Gutenberg pioneered movabletype in Europe in 1436, and when Intel designed theintegrated circuit in the 1970s, the way we record,store, access, and peruse knowledge made quantumleaps forward and affected not only how we do ourjobs, but what we do.

These two events were just as important as theysound. Gutenberg broke the monopoly of the monkswho copied manuscripts by hand and guarded themjealously. They understood that knowledge was powerand sometimes chained books to the shelves. In TheDiscoverers, Daniel Boorstin cites a twelfth-centurymanuscript inscription: “This book belongs to themonastery of St. Mary of Robert’s Bridge, whoevershall steal it from this house, or mutilate it, let him beforever cursed. Amen.” Contrast that mindset with theability of a researcher anywhere in the world with acomputer and a modem to tap into the entire databaseof the Library of Congress, the Bibliothèque deFrance, or the British Library. In today’s parlance, thischange constitutes a paradigm shift.

George Gilder explains that “the key to paradigmshifts is the collapse of formerly pivotal scarcities, therise of new forms of abundance, and the onset of newscarcities. Successful innovators use these new formsof abundance to redress the emergent shortages.”2

The enormous use of timber for railroad ties and tres-tles as American railroads pushed west causedTheodore Roosevelt to declare a national shortage oftimber, which was soon replaced by an abundance ofconcrete, iron, and steel. Shortly thereafter, electricityand steam power overcame looming shortages of

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BITS, BYTES, AND

DIPLOMACY

Walter B. Wriston

Mr. Wriston’s address, delivered at the Institute’s “Virtual Diplomacy” conference on April 1, 1997, was based on his article that appearsin the September/October 1997 issue of Foreign Affairs. The article is reprinted here with permission.

labor and materials. The recent alleged shortage ofbroadcast frequencies caused electronic engineers toexpand the spectrum’s useful frequencies through in-novation. This cycle has continued throughout his-tory. In the three pillars of the order that resultedfrom the Industrial Revolution, national sovereignty,national economies, and military power, the Informa-tion Revolution has increased the power of individu-als and outmoded old hierarchies.

A GLOBAL VILLAGE

Sovereignty, the power of a nation to stop others frominterfering in its internal affairs, is rapidly eroding.When Woodrow Wilson went to Paris to negotiate theTreaty of Versailles, he ordered his postmaster-gen-eral, Albert Burleson, to assume control over alltransatlantic cable lines in order to censor the newsfrom Europe. Today no one and no nation can stopthe flow of information across national borders.

During the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein pro-posed what was viewed in Washington as a phonypeace settlement. President Bush had to convey thatjudgment to the twenty-six nations in the coalition. Asformer White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwaterremembers, the “quickest and most effective way wasCNN, because all countries in the world had it andwere watching it on a real-time basis . . . and twentyminutes after we got the proposal . . . I went on na-tional television . . . to tell the twenty-six members . . .that the war was continuing.” In this and many otherinstances, the elite foreign-policy establishment andits government-to-government communications werebypassed. No highly trained foreign service officermeticulously drafted a note, no secretary of statesigned it, and no American ambassadors called on foreign ministers to deliver the message. The UnitedStates entrusted a vital diplomatic message in themidst of a war to a private television company seen bythe whole world. Wilson’s strategy was to control theflow of information by fiat, while Bush realized thatsince he could not beat the world information freemarket, he had better join it.

Today special interest groups of all kinds, from ter-rorists to human rights activists, bypass government-based communications channels. In The News Mediain National and International Conflicts, Andrew Arnoexplains that when relations sour between two coun-tries, “it is often more a matter of strained relations be-tween centers of interest than whole countries.” We

have seen these forces at work from South Africa to Ko-rea as one pressure group after another steps aroundnational governments to further its own crusade.

The convergence of computers and telecommuni-cations has made us into a global community, readyor not. For the first time in history, rich and poor,north and south, east and west, city and countrysideare linked in a global electronic network of shared im-ages in real time. Ideas move across borders as if theydid not exist. Indeed, time zones are becoming moreimportant than borders.

Small villages are known as efficient marketplacesof ideas. A village will quickly share news of any inno-vation, and if anyone gets a raise or new privileges,everyone similarly situated will soon be pressing forthe same. And why not? These people are just like me,the villagers say. Why should I not have what theyhave? The Internet carries conversations between mil-lions of people without regard to gender, race, orcolor. The impact of a global conversation, like that of a village conversation, is enormous—and it is multi-plied many times.

A global village will have global customs. Denyingpeople human rights or democratic freedoms nolonger means denying them abstractions they havenever experienced, but violating the established cus-toms of the village. It hardly matters that only a mi-nority of the world’s people enjoy such freedoms orthe prosperity that goes with them; these are now thebenchmarks. More and more people around theworld are demanding more say in their own destiny.Once people are convinced that this is possible, anenormous burden of proof falls on those who woulddeny them.

The global conversation puts pressure on sover-eign governments that over time will influence politi-cal processes all over the world. The InformationRevolution is thus profoundly threatening to thepower structures of the world, and with good reason.In Prague in 1988 the first protesters in the streetslooked into CNN cameras and chanted at the riot po-lice, “The world sees you!” And it did. It was an anom-aly of history that other Eastern Europeans watchedthe revolution on CNN relayed by a Russian satelliteand mustered the courage to rebel against their ownsovereigns. All this has confirmed Abraham Lincoln’ssentiment, expressed on his way to his first inaugura-tion, that the American Declaration of Independence“gave liberty not alone to the people of this country,but hope to all the world, for all future time.” At the

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time Lincoln spoke, his words were heard by only ahandful of people. It is a testament to his presciencethat changes he could not have imagined havebrought his words, and freedom itself, to unprece-dented portions of humanity.

A NEW SOURCE OF WEALTH

The flood of real-time data has also transformed theinternational economy. The depth of the global mar-ket renders economic theory based on nationalmarkets suspect. In the world’s financial markets, sov-ereign governments have lost the ability to influencethe price others will pay for their currency on any-thing but a momentary basis. When I started in thebanking business, the total foreign exchange marketin New York was only about $50 million. If the Fed-eral Reserve called Citibank or Chase and instructedthem to sell $10 million, an order that size couldmove the market. Today, the market is $1 trillion, andcentral bank intervention in foreign exchange be-comes an expensive exercise in futility. The market isa giant voting machine that records in real time thejudgments of traders all over the world about Ameri-can diplomatic, fiscal, and monetary policies. It hascreated an information standard that is far more rapidand draconian than the gold standard ever was. Mo-ments after a president announces a policy in theRose Garden, the market’s judgment is reflected inthe price of the dollar.

Information technology has also produced a newsource of wealth that is not material; it is informa-tion—knowledge applied to work to create value.When we apply it to new tasks, we create innovation.The pursuit of wealth is now largely the pursuit of in-formation and its application to the means of produc-tion. The rules, customs, skills, and talents necessaryto uncover, capture, produce, preserve, and exploit in-formation are now humankind’s most important.Competition for the best information has replacedcompetition for the best farmland or coal fields. Infact, the appetite for annexing territory has already at-tenuated, and major powers have withdrawn frompreviously occupied territories.

The new economic powerhouses are masters not ofhuge material resources, but of ideas and technology.The way the market values companies is instructive: itnow places a higher value on intellectual capital thanon hard assets like bricks and mortar. Microsoft, withonly a relatively small amount of fixed assets, now has

a market capitalization well in excess of Ford, GeneralMotors, and Chrysler combined, all of which havehuge installed bases. The powerful economies of Sin-gapore and Hong Kong, countries with virtually nophysical assets, demonstrate the growing irrelevanceof territory to wealth. This shift requires a differentkind of management structure and mindset, and af-fects not only individual companies but entire nations.

The changing perception of what constitutes anasset poses huge problems in expanding or evenmaintaining the power of government. Unlike land orindustrial plants, information resources are notbound to geography, nor easily taxed and controlledby government. In an economy that consists largely ofinformation products, the government’s power to taxand regulate dwindles. Our laws and systems of mea-surement are becoming artifacts of another age. BillGates, with the skills to write and market a complexsoftware system that can produce $1 billion of rev-enue, can walk past a customs officer anywhere in theworld with nothing of “value” to declare, but his wifemight have to pay duty on her new ring. Bad dataproduces bad decisions and leaves us puzzled as towhy old policies no longer work. The measures of theindustrial society, which count the number of railroadbrakemen but do not record the number of computerprogrammers, highlight a growing problem in settingpolicy. As DNA research reveals more precise under-standings about the way a living organism functionsthan gross observations of developed biological -structures, so we need more precise measures of hownations and companies function in our new envir-onment.

INFORMATION DOMINANCE

These changes affect not only the civilian productionmachine on which our economic strength rests, butalso our military capabilities. In science, there used tobe two ways to proceed: the first was to construct atheory, and the second was to conduct a physical ex-periment. Today we have a third: computer simula-tion. In the Persian Gulf War, for example, young,basically inexperienced Americans defeated Iraq’sfeared Republican Guards. A retired colonel askedone commander: “How do you account for your dra-matic success, when not a single officer or man in yourentire outfit ever had combat experience?” “But wewere experienced,” said the commander, “We hadfought such engagements six times before in complete

8

battle simulation at the National Training Center andin Germany.”3 The U.S. military today is a spectacularexample of the replacement of physical assets by in-formation. Information, to be sure, has often made thedifference between victory and defeat. Where is theenemy located? How many troops are involved? Howare they armed? What is new is the ease and accuracywith which such questions can be answered.

Military intelligence has become much more com-plex and even has a new name: “information domi-nance.” Today Apache helicopters flying over Bosniaupload detailed pictures of action on the ground to asatellite, record them with a video camera, or beamthem directly to local headquarters. Videos takenfrom the air verify the Dayton Accords. Major GeneralWilliam Nash observed that in Bosnia, “We don’thave arguments. We hand them pictures, and theymove their tanks.” This is a long way from 1943, whenanalysts were hunting through the stacks of the Li-brary of Congress for maps and photographs of possi-ble German targets for allied bombers, since few, ifany, were available in theWar Department. Todayeven the ground troops onpatrol are equipped withnight vision goggles and usea hand-held Global Position-ing System device to pin-point their exact positionfrom satellites. Because thesoil is strewn with mines,knowing exactly where you are is a matter of life anddeath even when there is no fighting. Mines that havebeen located by an airborne mine detection systemare exploded by remotely controlled drone Panthertanks. And so in the military as in civilian life, infor-mation in all its forms is replacing hard assets.

Reliance on information technology also has dan-gerous downsides. The American information infra-structure, in the words of the recent Report of theDefense Science Board Task Force on InformationWarfare, is “vulnerable to attack” and “creates a tunnelof vulnerability previously unrealized in the history ofconflict.” Rogue states and groups can conduct infor-mation warfare even though they do not command alarge military establishment. Today we are witnessingguerrilla warfare, ethnic conflicts, and active terroristgroups. As the Task Force notes, “Offensive informa-tion warfare is attractive to many because it is cheap inrelation to the cost of developing, maintaining, and

using advanced military capabilities. It may cost littleto suborn an insider, create false information, manip-ulate information, or launch malicious logic-basedweapons against an information system connected tothe globally shared telecommunications infrastruc-ture. The latter is particularly attractive; the latest in-formation on how to exploit many of the designattributes and security flaws of commercial computersoftware is freely available on the Internet.”4 Adver-saries, both real and potential, have a lot to work withsince the Department of Defense has over two millioncomputers, over 10,000 local-area networks, and over100 long-distance networks that coordinate and im-plement every element of its missions, from weaponsdesign to battlefield management. During the calen-dar year 1995, up to 200,000 intrusions may havebeen made into the DOD’s unclassified computers.These intruders “have modified, stolen and destroyeddata and software and shut down computers and net-works.” Effective diplomacy at critical junctures in anyage is backed by the knowledge that if all else fails,

military force can be used to attain national goals.Therefore, vulnerability to an attack on informa-

tion infrastructure is attracting the attention of a presi-dential commission and numerous task forces. Butwith about 90 percent of our military traffic movingover public computer networks, it is increasingly hardto tell the military from the civilian infrastructure. Thebureaucratic distinctions between intelligence andlaw enforcement, between permitted surveillance athome and abroad, may be unsuited for informationwarfare. There are no borders in cyberspace to man-date these distinctions. The smallest nation, terroristgroup, or drug cartel could hire a computer program-mer to plant a Trojan horse virus in software, takedown a vital network, or cause a missile to misfire.Voltaire said: “God is always for the big battalions.” Inthis new world he may be wrong. The United States’increasing reliance on massive networks may make itmore, not less, vulnerable.

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Rogue states and groups can conduct

information warfare even though they do

not command a large military establishment.

It may even be unclear what constitutes an act ofwar. If U.S. satellites suddenly go blind and the tele-phone network on the eastern seaboard goes down, itis possible that the United States could not even iden-tify the enemy. Its strategic stockpile of weaponswould be of little use. There would be no big factoryto bomb—only a person somewhere writing software.The possibility of an electronic Pearl Harbor hassparked a debate on how to counter that threat. TheCommission on Critical Infrastructure Protection es-tablished by President Clinton’s executive order is astep in the right direction and has been described inSenate testimony “as the equivalent of the Manhattan

Project.” It will work at the crossroads of the FirstAmendment and national security, at the vortex ofpersonal privacy through encryption and the Na-tional Security Agency’s desire to breach it, and at thefrontier of what Sun Tzu two millennia ago describedas “vanquishing the enemy without fighting.”

VIRTUAL LEADERSHIP

We live in revolutionary times, as did the FoundingFathers. They exhibited a keen interest in technol-ogy—provision for copyright and patent protectionwas written into the Constitution itself. This provi-sion was implemented by an act of Congress in 1790creating a patent board consisting of the secretary ofstate, the secretary of war, and the attorney general. Itwas a prestigious group: Thomas Jefferson, HenryKnox, and Edmund Randolph. That board is longgone, and the schism between the diplomat and thescientist has grown wider over the years at the verytime it is becoming more and more important that thetwo understand each other. Because so much changein the current revolution is driven by technology, ourtask in mastering these new forces is made morecomplex by the difficulty of communicating acrossdisciplines. Diplomats, trained in the humanities,often tend to validate C. P. Snow’s famous lecture on

“Two Cultures,” in which he argued that scientistsand humanists are ignorant of each other’s knowl-edge and are content to stay that way. Many diplo-matic historians have tended to minimize or evenignore the impact of scientific discoveries on thecourse of history, preferring instead to follow thegreat man theory or look for the historical tides thatcarry the world along. Indeed, the indexes of manystandard texts on diplomatic history do not even in-clude the words “technology” or “economics.”

An expert is a person with great knowledge about alegacy system—indeed there are no experts on the fu-ture. Henry Kissinger observed in Diplomacy that

“most foreign policies thathistory has marked highly,in whatever country, havebeen originated by leaderswho were opposed by ex-perts. It is, after all, the re-sponsibility of the expert tooperate the familiar and thatof the leader to transcend it.”During World War I, an aide-

de-camp to British Field Marshal Douglas Haig, afterseeing a tank demonstration, commented, “The ideathat cavalry will be replaced by these iron coaches isabsurd. It is little short of treasonous.” In the UnitedStates, the ridicule and court-martial of Brigadier Gen-eral Billy Mitchell, when he postulated the impor-tance of air power by offering to sink a battleship, isinstructive. Secretary of War Newton D. Bakerthought so little of the idea that he was “willing tostand on the bridge of a battleship while that nitwittries to hit it from the air.” Indeed this recurring phe-nomenon was encapsulated in Arthur Clark’s FirstLaw, cited in his Profiles of the Future: “When a dis-tinguished but elderly scientist states that somethingis possible he is almost certainly right. When he statesthat something is impossible, he is very probablywrong.” In the case of U.S. national security, a refusalto take note of real change in the world is a recipe fordisaster.

The new technology will not go away—it will onlyget better in accordance with Moore’s Law, whichpostulates that microchips will double in density andspeed every eighteen months. Bandwidth will groweven faster. The third technological revolution hasbrought about immense global prosperity. Contraryto the doomsayers who postulated that the worldwould run out of resources by the year 2000, it is

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What has changed dramatically is the

amount of information available to

our policymakers.

difficult to find a single commodity that is worth morein real terms today than it was ten years ago. Knowl-edge, once an ornament displayed by the rich andpowerful at conferences, now combines with manage-ment skills to produce wealth. The vast increase ofknowledge has brought with it a huge increase in theability to manipulate matter, enhancing its value bythe power of the mind and generating new productsand substances unknown in nature and undreamedof only a few years ago. In the past, when the methodof creating wealth changed, old power structures lostinfluence, new ones arose, and every facet of societywas affected. As we can already see the beginning ofthat process in this revolution, one can postulate thatin the next few decades the attraction and manage-ment of intellectual capital will determine which

institutions and nations will survive and prosper, andwhich will not.

But despite all of the advances of science and theways in which it is changing the world, science doesnot remake the human mind or alter the power of thehuman spirit. There is still no substitute for courageand leadership in confronting the new problems andopportunities that our world presents. What haschanged dramatically is the amount of informationavailable to our policymakers. One hopes that the dataprocessed by the minds of trained diplomats will pro-duce real knowledge, and with enough experience,wisdom. Wisdom has always been in short supply, butit will be sorely needed in the years ahead, because inthe words of former president Richard Nixon, “Onlypeople can solve problems people create.”

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Virtual Diplomacy: Does that mean diplomacywithout presence? I’m uneasy. So I take mysubject to be, “How to Conduct Diplomacy

in the Increasingly Pervasive and Globalized Informa-tion Age.” To summarize my view, lots has changed,lots remains the same, and lots of dividends will comefrom thought about the interaction of new volumesand flows of information with the objectives countriesseek and their means of getting there.

I come at this subject against a long background ofinterest in the impact of information technology on or-ganizations and on how work gets done. Three andone-half decades ago, I edited a book entitled Manage-ment Organization and the Computer. I issued awake-up call to management: Realize the vast implica-tions of what is on the horizon and look beyond keep-ing track of payrolls, personnel records, and otherroutine activities. And when I was secretary of state, Ispoke in 1985 on “The Shape, Scope, and Conse-quences of the Age of Information.” So I have longbeen impressed with the importance of the Informa-tion Revolution. Nevertheless, some important ele-ments in the practice of diplomacy have not changed.Meg Greenfield addressed this point in more generalterms: “Decked out in our ever newer skills and abili-ties and seemingly magical potential, facing the glow-ing screens of our new life, soaring above the earth,

bouncing back from a long dreaded and once mortaldisease, guess what? It’s the same old us.”1

So let me set out some aspects of diplomacy thatstill remain in place, then identify key changesbrought on by the Information Revolution, and finallyoffer some thoughts on what to make of it all.

WHAT REMAINS THE SAME

Diplomacy is the method—some might say the art—bywhich relations between nations are managed. It is themanner, as distinct from the content, of foreign policy.

And the diplomat? He or she must truly representus. To make this point, when swearing in new ambas-sadors, I used to take them over to the big globe in thesecretary of state’s office and ask them to point outtheir country. Almost invariably they would rotate theglobe and point to their post, wherever in the world. Iwould then tell them that when I made this request toSenator Mike Mansfield, then American ambassadorto Japan, he spun the globe and put his finger on theUnited States and said, “This is my country!”

First, diplomacy is a fundamental human activity,conducted between people as well as among nations.There are many kinds of diplomats. Sir Francis Bacon,as the Renaissance reached England, expressed hisviews in his essay “Of Negotiating”: “Put little or noth-ing in writing, deal face to face where a man’s eyeupon the countenance of him with whom he speakethmay give him a direction how far to go.” And Baconwould pick different personalities for different diplo-matic jobs: “bold men for expostulation, fair-spokenmen for persuasion, crafty men for inquiry and obser-vation, forward and absurd (i.e., unyielding) men forbusiness that doth not well bear out itself.” So theproper diplomat must be suited to the mission.

Second, diplomats must speak with authority for thenation, otherwise no one will deal with them seriously:toyed with, perhaps; used as a conduit for exaggera-tions; or ignored. True diplomats build and nurturetheir bases of authority, recognizing that a great bulk ofthe work related to diplomacy takes place within, asdistinct from between, the constituencies involved.

Third, the good diplomat wants to know that theother party speaks with authority, so a true agreementcan be reached. When this is not so, or when gamesare played about the structure of authority, or whenauthority is inherently diffused, the task of the diplo-mat is much more difficult.

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George P. Shultz

3DIPLOMACY IN THE

INFORMATION AGE

13

Fourth, the relationships involved in diplomatic ex-changes (for example, alliances) must offer the possi-bility of benefit to all the parties concerned. So theremust be stakes worth the effort.

Fifth, most negotiations—exercises in diplomacy—are not one-time events, but part of a process. Theprocess will have ups and downs, which must be un-derstood. As such, relationships should be con-structed with long-term considerations in mind. I donot mean making the relationship itself the center ofconcern and attention; that only turns it into a bar-gaining chip. The quality of a relationship will be a re-flection of the parties’ ability to solve problems andtake advantage of opportunities. Nevertheless, the re-ality is that major powers will interact over time, soshort-term tensions need careful—and sometimes con-frontational—treatment.

I know something about negotiation. I started outin the field of labor-management negotiations back inthe days when that was the big league as far as negotia-tion goes. Now there is a time to negotiate and a timeto refrain from negotiation. There are principles thatgive your negotiation backbone. Negotiation has to beabout something that matters. And it has to be forsomething that counts. But in recent years we haveseen the emergence of the idea that anything andeverything can be negotiated.

We have seen it asserted that everyone has legiti-mate needs and concerns and that if only those needsare understood and addressed, then a successful out-come can be negotiated. From this framework of refer-ence, we have recently seen principles negotiatedaway. We have seen violence rewarded with a seat atthe negotiating table. We have seen dictators legit-imized as negotiating partners, rogue states given in-ternational recognition, and amnesty granted towrongdoers. We have seen hard-won internationalstandards set aside—all for the sake of getting a negoti-ated agreement. We have seen negotiators make dealsthey know won’t be honored—thus poisoning the wellfor future negotiations in other times of need. Theseare not cases of true negotiation, but just cheap, quickfixes that push the problems down the road, whereeventually somebody else will have to try to solvethem, but with diplomatic tools that have been cor-rupted by the misuse and abuse that we have wit-nessed recently.

Sixth, good diplomacy relies on accurate infor-mation that is relevant; sifting out that information is crucial. So is the process of analyzing what the

information means, and there is no substitute for“touch and feel” in these processes. The diplomat onthe spot, respected, well-connected, and linguisticallycomfortable, can make essential contributions.

Writing careful dispatches back home has alwaysbeen a key diplomatic skill. It’s an art. It sounds easy,but it isn’t. Reporting has to be solid and well-consid-ered. It has to emerge from deep experience and agood understanding of the society reported on. Aboveall, it has to be completely accurate—no colors, noemotions, no advocacy. Fact and commentary must beruthlessly segregated.

We are told that embassy reporting is no longerneeded today, that CNN does it faster and better.That’s journalism—and that’s great; I’m all for it. It’sfast-breaking, faster than any embassy can match. Butit’s not diplomatic reporting. As Admiral Jon Howeused to say, “The first intelligence reports are almostalways wrong.” And television journalism is not uni-versal. It focuses on places and topics the editors thinkthe viewers are interested in. That’s not at all the samelist of things that may affect our national interest. Andit depends on the availability of videotape and filmfootage. Look at the difference in coverage betweenBob Dole falling off a speaker’s platform in broad day-light in front of the cameras, and Bill Clinton fallingdown the stairs in the dead of night.

Information technology cannot replace solid diplo-matic reporting. It is important to distinguish betweenexcellent means of communication and excellent com-munication. Computers offer the former, and edu-cated men and women can manage the latter. We needto have the discipline to hold our fire until solid andthoughtful reporting—diplomatic reporting—comes in.We need to urge American administrations to stop de-priving diplomatic reporting of its most valuable ad-vantage—universality of coverage. When the media areclosing foreign bureaus, it is exactly the wrong timefor the U.S. government to be closing and consolidat-ing embassies and consulates abroad.

The Information Age brings us an overwhelmingflood of material, and that’s wonderful. But the job ofsorting it out and making sense of it gets harder andharder. We have, and we need to maintain, a competi-tion among analysts—at the Central IntelligenceAgency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the StateDepartment’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.The private sector and individuals now have access toinformation that was once available only to a few gov-ernment agencies. The New York Times recently ran a

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story about “Johnson’s Russia List,” an Internetservice that posts all sorts of documents from thatcountry as well as opinions and commentary fromWestern and Russian observers. So everybody can getinto the analysis act. That’s good, but does it replacethe insightful analysis of the diplomat on the spot—the foreign service officer assigned to Moscow? No,not in my experience. Only a Russian can make a Rus-sian’s judgment. And a lot of Russians, in the aggre-gate, can move that society one way or the other. Butonly our people, who are right there, walking aroundin Moscow with them, can provide insight into whatthis flood of material means. You just can’t get the to-tal feel for it by looking at a computer screen half aworld away. We need both: the foreign service officeron the ground and the expanding circle of analystsaround the world. They need each other.

Seventh, skillful diplomacy requires attention evenwhen there are no acute problems or burning oppor-tunities. I call this “gardening.” You get the weeds outwhen they are small. In such a way, you also build con-fidence and understanding. Then, when a crisis arises,you have a clear and solid base from which to work.

Eighth, a set of strategic ideas is essential. Withoutthem, you don’t know where you are going. Withthem, you have the foundation for the kind of cumu-lative knowledge needed to cope with the almost con-stant mini-crises. Also, when you must act quicklyand decisively, you have guideposts on which to rely.

Then there is the essential interplay betweenstrength and diplomacy. Diplomacy withoutstrength—military and economic—is fruitless; butstrength without diplomacy is unsustainable, particu-larly in the modern era, when citizens want theirleaders to demonstrate that they are searching for so-lutions. It is significant that permanent embassiesarose at the same time as permanent armies. Onecould be regarded as the antidote of the other.

Strength and diplomacy have always gone together—and still do.

Finally, after all is said and done, someone mustproduce good judgment, have some steel in theirbackbone when the going gets rough, and exercisecommon sense at those times when most others, eventhe vaunted media folks, are losing their sense of di-rection, if not their heads. So once again, as MegGreenfield put it, in the end, “It’s the same old us.”

WHAT’S NEW AND DIFFERENT

Information is everywhere and widely available to thecitizenry generally, not just government officials. Sothe government no longer has a monopoly over infor-mation. Of course, questions abound: What informa-tion is reliable? What is incorrect, misleading, or

slanted? Who can tell with-out some independentchecks?

Information movesaround at terrific speed. Thispoint is dramatic when ap-plied to financial markets,which react almost instanta-neously to important break-ing news. As Walter Wristonlong ago put it, “World mar-kets now operate on an in-formation standard.” But the

raw material of diplomacy is also information: gettingit, assessing it, putting it into the system for the bene-fit or puzzlement of others.

The world is much more open than ever before.Even the leaders of closed, authoritarian societieshave a hard time keeping any important developmentto themselves or keeping their own citizens fromknowing what is going on inside, let alone outside,their borders. And any society that aspires to be a part of the modern world simply cannot maintain aclosed, compartmentalized system.

Borders mean less because information and ideasflow across them, whether the government likes it ornot. Sovereignty is still a clear and powerful concept,but its meaning has been altered. Regions and nation-alities transcend borders, as do religious and ethnicties. The foreign minister of Hungary once pointed outto me that Hungary is the only country in the worldcompletely surrounded by Hungarians. That is not theresult of the Information Age, but the force of this factand its impact have been sharply altered by it. The

Of course, questions abound: What

information is reliable? What is incorrect,

misleading, or slanted? Who can tell without some

independent checks?

15

result is increased complexity in international rela-tions, only enhancing the importance of a presence onthe ground that understands the nuance of develop-ments.

The media, particularly television, play a larger rolethan ever. After all, they are in the information busi-ness and have developed the skills of quickly gather-ing information and sorting out what is newsworthy.Sometimes, the pictures are dramatic and as real aslife itself. I remember the extreme difficulty of han-dling the terrorists who took over TWA Flight 847 in1985 because the American media and their cameraswere not only covering the crisis, they also were giv-ing the terrorists every opportunity to propagandizetheir views. But I also remember how dramatic thescenes of mass protest in the Philippines on CNNwere in 1986 and also how beneficial they were in en-couraging President Marcos to leave office.

My views on the media’s role in foreign affairs areheavily influenced by the notion of “quantum diplo-macy,” for which I must credit a physicist friend atStanford, Sid Drell. An axiom of quantum theory isthat when you observe and measure some piece of asystem, you inevitably disturb the whole system. Sothe process of observation itself is a cause of change.That is all too often the case when a TV camera is rightin the middle of some chaotic event, trying to captureits essence objectively. Quantum diplomacy holdsthat true reality is hard to record. So the possibilitiesof distortions, let alone selectivity, mean that an inde-pendent base of information is essential. Even so, thecompelling image on the screen—accurate or not—canhave a powerful impact on the citizenry.

DIPLOMACY’S FUTURE IN THEINFORMATION AGE

In this age of openness and transparency, we need tothink in fresh terms about the collection and analysisof the information needed to inform and carry out ourdiplomatic objectives. Of course, the photographicand electronic intelligence we have relied on for solong should continue. We should also be prepared toexploit what can be gleaned from the Internet. Be-yond that, what we need to know about most coun-tries is readily available from open sources.

I see no reason to continue with the notion thatevery embassy should have a station, with all the ex-tra expense and exposure that brings. Clandestinehuman intelligence collection will still be needed in

some countries and in a few critical areas, such as ter-rorism. Such collection efforts should be specificallytasked and, therefore, managed carefully yet aggres-sively to yield the best results.

I also favor more, not fewer, small consulates oper-ated on an open basis. A few trained people on theground can help in the analytical, as well as collec-tion, functions. A small, open consulate also can beoperated relatively inexpensively. The expense comeswith the full station and all the accompanying secu-rity and secrecy apparatus.

Regarding diplomats, the struggle for position tospeak with authority for our country will be more dif-ficult. The secretary of state, to pick an example atrandom, must struggle not only with colleagues in theexecutive branch and with members of Congress, butwith groups with widely diverse, sometimes even con-flicting, agendas who will parlay their access to infor-mation into a bid to command attention. A lot ofmeeting and listening will be in order, and a lot ofcontact with home constituencies will be needed. Thejob of the State Department’s spokesperson will growmore important and therefore should draw people ofhigh caliber to the task.

The people our diplomats must deal with will havesimilar problems. How well are they coping? Can theydeliver on a commitment? These will be constantquestions in the years to come.

There are always people who simply bypass offi-cialdom and take it upon themselves to speak for thecountry. The expanded openness of the internationalrealm will probably encourage that kind of behavior.Such interventions must be dealt with firmly, even if aformer president or secretary of state is the personconducting the unofficial effort. I had to tell the Sovi-ets repeatedly and forcefully that Armand Hammerdid not speak for the president—and to tell Hammerto butt out.

In any case, the secretary of state will have to ex-pend tremendous intellectual energy to keep up withthe increased flow of information and will have tobring more people into even earlier phases of the ana-lytical and decision-making process. More consensus-building skills will be needed.

The Information Age should enhance accountabil-ity in diplomacy as well as in most other activities.Personally, I am leery of the bail-out mentality that in-formed the International Monetary Fund’s formationof a new $40 billion facility to handle “future Mexi-cos.” Accountability is absolutely necessary in our

16

fast-moving world of global finance. I like the way theBank of England handled Barings and the way Cali-fornia Governor Pete Wilson managed Orange Coun-ty’s debt crisis. People and organizations that makelarge mistakes should have to live with them.

In the field of diplomacy, what you do and say is in-creasingly in the public domain. The quality of yourdecisions and your capacity to execute them effec-tively is also increasingly on display. This spotlight,unnerving to some degree, should result in improvedperformance—and accountability is the source ofpower for the spotlight.

Speed is another characteristic of diplomacy in theInformation Age. When combined with the wide ac-cess to information, prevalent even now, the pressureis on for rapid reactions, for operation in real time. Ofcourse, you need not let the pace of information paceyour decisions, but there are times when there ishardly any alternative. It is especially at such timesthat a set of strategic ideas can pay off handsomely infacilitating not only quick, but good, decisions.

One of my concerns in this age of instant commu-nication, often by telephone or e-mail, is the problemof record keeping. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihanput it well: “The true diplomat is aware of how muchsubsequently depends on what clearly can be estab-lished to have taken place. If it seems simple in thearchives, try it in the maelstrom.” I hope this issue ofrecord keeping eventually receives more attention. Insome ways, the vast memories of computers automati-cally help with this problem. But there are also big in-centives, in what is also an age of litigation, to erasememories and purge records—or not keep records atall. We need to be careful, lest we become a societywithout a history.

No doubt the way the world works has changedpermanently and dramatically. Yet, when it comes tothe conduct of diplomacy, many key attributes re-main. This conference is a much needed start at think-ing through how the new affects the old and viceversa. Only from such a new platform of understand-ing can our diplomacy be strong and true.

Foreword

1. Washington Post, January 21, 1997.

2. “The Long Boom” (July 1997).

Solomon, “The Information Revolution and International

Conflict Management”

1. See Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1995); and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberocracy isComing,” The Information Society 8, no. 4 (1992):243–96.

2. This issue was discussed in a session of the “VirtualDiplomacy” conference on April 2. See also TedKoppel, “The Global Information Revolution andTV News,” in Keynote Addresses from the “Man-aging Chaos” Conference, Peaceworks no. 3(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace,February 1995), 11–15; Warren P. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influ-ence on Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.:United States Institute of Peace Press, 1977); andJohanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War: Is MediaTechnology Driving International Politics? (NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).

3. As Nicholas Negroponte would put it, the interac-tion will be between electrons as opposed to atoms.

See his Being Digital (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1995).

Wriston, “Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy”

1. Henry M. Wriston, Prepare for Peace (New York:Harper & Bros., 1941), 237.

2. George Gilder, “Over the Paradigm Cliff,” ASAP(February 1997): 29.

3. Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The Rise of a Neo-Bi-ological Civilization (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wes-ley, 1994), 246.

4. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Forceon Information Warfare (November 1996), 8.

Shultz, “Diplomacy in the Information Age”

1. Newsweek, January 27, 1997.

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NOTES

19

Sheryl J. Brown is director of communications at theUnited States Institute of Peace. She came to the Insti-tute after serving as deputy associate director ofBoston University’s Institute for Democratic Commu-nication (based in Washington, D.C.) in 1988–89.Prior to that, she was a fellow at the Institute for Philo-sophic Studies at the University of Dallas (1973–85),and director of the library at the Northwood Institutein Texas (1979–81). Brown has written and editedvarious publications on foreign and public policy is-sues, philosophy, and literature, and was coeditor ofResolving Third World Conflicts: Challenges for aNew Era (United States Institute of Peace Press,1992). Since 1991, she has been an instructor of classi-cal Greek history at Georgetown University.

George P. Shultz served as the sixtieth U.S. secretaryof state from 1982 to 1987. He has been a professor ofindustrial relations on the faculties of the Massachu-setts Institute of Technology, the University ofChicago Graduate School of Business, and StanfordUniversity. Shultz’s other government positions in-clude senior staff economist on the Eisenhower ad-ministration’s Council of Economic Advisors,secretary of labor and director of the Office of Man-agement and Budget in the Nixon administration, sec-retary of the treasury and chairman of the Council onEconomic Policy from 1972 to 1974, and chairman ofPresident Reagan’s Economic Policy Advisory Board.From 1974 until his appointment as secretary of state,he was president of the Bechtel Group. Shultz wasawarded the Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highestcivilian honor, in 1989. In that year, he rejoined Stan-ford University’s faculty as professor of internationaleconomics at the Graduate School of Business and asa distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution. Hispublications include Turmoil and Triumph: My Yearsas Secretary of State (1993), Economic Policy Be-yond the Headlines (1978), and Management Orga-nization and the Computer (1960).

Richard H. Solomon has been president of theUnited States Institute of Peace since 1993. As assis-tant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairsfrom 1989 to 1992, he negotiated the first UN “Perma-nent Five” peacemaking agreement for Cambodia,had a leading role in the dialogue on nuclear issuesamong the United States and South and North Korea,helped establish the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-tion (APEC) forum, and led U.S. negotiations withJapan, Mongolia, and Vietnam on important bilateralmatters. In 1992–93, Solomon served as U.S. ambas-sador to the Philippines, coordinating the closure ofU.S. naval bases and developing a new framework forbilateral and regional security cooperation. He previ-ously served as director of policy planning at the De-partment of State (1986–89) and senior staff memberof the National Security Council (1971–76), where hewas involved in the process of normalizing relationswith the People’s Republic of China. From 1976 to1986, he was head of the social science department atthe RAND Corporation. In 1995, Solomon wasawarded the State Department’s Foreign AffairsAward for Public Service for his role in obtaining in-ternational agreement for, and fostering the imple-mentation of, the UN peace plan for Cambodia.

Walter B. Wriston retired as chairman and chief exec-utive officer of Citicorp and its principal subsidiary,Citibank, N.A., in 1984, after serving as CEO for sev-enteen years and in various other positions with thecompany for thirty-eight years. Following a year’s ser-vice as a U.S. State Department officer and a four-yeartour with the U.S. Army during World War II, Wristonjoined Citibank in 1946 as a junior inspector in theComptroller’s Division. He was assigned to the Na-tional Division in 1949, becoming an assistant vicepresident in 1952 and a vice president in 1954. Wris-ton joined the bank’s Overseas Division in 1956, wasnamed a senior vice president in 1958, and was ap-pointed executive vice president in 1960. Wriston be-came president and CEO of the bank in 1967 and ofthe corporation when it was formed in 1968; he wasappointed chairman in 1970. He was chairman ofPresident Reagan’s Economic Policy Advisory Board,a member and chairman of the Business Council, anda co-chairman and policy committee member of theBusiness Roundtable. Wriston’s published works in-clude Risk and Other Four-Letter Words and TheTwilight of Sovereignty.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

21

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created byCongress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, includingresearch grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services,publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the Presi-dent of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. CrockerVice Chairman: Max M. KampelmanPresident: Richard H. SolomonExecutive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State

Richard A. Chilcoat, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; President, National Defense University

Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

OTHER TITLES IN THE PEACEWORKS SERIES

Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the Aegean, and Regional Stability,by Tozun Bahcheli, Theodore A. Couloumbis, and Patricia Carley (No. 17, August 1997)

U.S. Responses to Self-Determination Movements: Strategies for Nonviolent Outcomes andAlternatives to Secession, by Patricia Carley (No. 16, July 1997)

Creative Approaches to Managing Conflict in Africa: Findings from USIP-Funded Projects,edited by David R. Smock (No. 15, April 1997)

Police Functions in Peace Operations, by Roxane D. V. Sismanidis (No. 14, March 1997)

Can Foreign Aid Moderate Ethnic Conflict? by Milton J. Esman (No. 13, March 1997)

Training for Peace Operations: The U.S. Army Adapts to the Post–Cold War World, by J. Michael Hardesty and Jason D. Ellis (No. 12, February 1997)

Zaire: Predicament and Prospects, by J. C. Willame et al. (No. 11, January 1997)

State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, andChile, by Wendy Hunter (No. 10, October 1996)

Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism, by Denis McLean(No. 9, June 1996)

Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis, by Vesna Pesic (No. 8, April 1996)

Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession, by PatriciaCarley (No. 7, March 1996)

Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa, by David R. Smock (No. 6, February 1996)

NGOs and Conflict Management, by Pamela R. Aall (No. 5, February 1996)

Sources of Conflict: G. M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” andRobert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming Anarchy’ and the Nation-State under Siege” (No. 4, August 1995)

Keynote Addresses from the “Managing Chaos” Conference: Les Aspin on “Challenges toValues-Based Military Intervention,” and Ted Koppel on “The Global Information Revolutionand TV News” (No. 3, February 1995)

Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity, by Nancy Lubin (No. 2, February1995)

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, by Patricia Carley (No. 1, January 1995)

Peaceworks No. 18. First published September 1997.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors or conference participants alone. They donot necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

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OF RELATED INTEREST

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues of directrelevance to information and communications technology and its impact on diplomacy andforeign-policy making.

RECENT INSTITUTE REPORTS INCLUDE:

Managing Communications: Lessons from Interventions in Africa (Special Report, March 1997)

NGOs and Conflict Management, by Pamela R. Aall (Peaceworks No. 5, February 1996)

Sources of Conflict: G. M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” andRobert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming Anarchy’ and the Nation-State under Siege” (Peaceworks No. 4, August 1995)

Keynote Addresses from the “Managing Chaos” Conference: Les Aspin on “Challenges toValues-Based Military Intervention,” and Ted Koppel on “The Global Information Revolutionand TV News” (Peaceworks No. 3, February 1995)

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RECENT BOOKS FROM USIP PRESS INCLUDE:

Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations, by Warren P. Strobel (1997)

Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, edited by ChesterA. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (1996)

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