This article was downloaded by: [Colorado College]On: 14 November 2014, At: 13:28Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

Local Government StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/flgs20

The Initiation of Local AuthorityReferendums: ParticipatoryMomentum or Political Tactics?The UK CaseMatis Laisney aa Institut du Monde anglophone, Université Sorbonne-Nouvelle – Paris 3 , FrancePublished online: 01 Mar 2012.

To cite this article: Matis Laisney (2012) The Initiation of Local Authority Referendums:Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? The UK Case, Local Government Studies,38:5, 639-659, DOI: 10.1080/03003930.2011.649916

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2011.649916

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressedin this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

The Initiation of Local AuthorityReferendums: ParticipatoryMomentum or Political Tactics?The UK Case

MATIS LAISNEYInstitut du Monde anglophone, Universite Sorbonne-Nouvelle – Paris 3, France

ABSTRACT Local authority-initiated referendums have been a cornerstone of the UKGovernment’s drive to improve citizen participation at the local level. Authorities haveincreasingly made use of local referendums since the 1990s, but little research has beencarried out to explain and qualify this surge. Focusing on a case study of a recentreferendum in Greater Manchester, and comparing it to other significant localreferendums, this article analyses their initiation according to Morel’s (2007)functional model. Findings reveal that referendums were most often held to smoothover divisions within local parties or assemblies, to legitimate a controversial decision orto weaken political adversaries. Local authorities therefore never employed referendumsas genuine participatory tools, but rather as a pragmatic and tactical solution to a givenpolitical problem. Consequently, the long-term impact of local referendums on citizenparticipation remains questionable.

KEY WORDS: Referendum, local authority, turnout, participation, initiation

Introduction

The use of the referendum in the United Kingdom has multiplied since the1990s. Although this statement generally applies to national referendums1, itis also true of the local referendum. Soon after the 1997 general election, theNew Labour government developed a comprehensive modernisation planfor local government, in which it qualified the local referendum as an‘important tool to give local people a bigger say’ (Office of the Deputy PrimeMinister 1998). Local referendums were understood to have a significantrole to play in raising interest in local issues, particularly in the context of

Correspondence Address: Matis Laisney, Institut du Monde anglophone, Universite Sorbonne-

Nouvelle – Paris 3, 5 rue de l’Ecole de Medecine, Paris 75006, France.

E-mail: m.laisney@gmail.com

Local Government StudiesVol. 38, No. 5, 639–659, October 2012

ISSN 0300-3930 Print/1743-9388 Online � 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2011.649916

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

falling turnouts at local elections (Wollmann 2000, p. 39, Bu�cek and Smith2000, p. 7). Indeed, between 1976 and 1995, the average voting turnout atUK local elections stood below the European average, at 40% (Emmersonand Hall 1998, p. 26). The UK is not an isolated case. Lawrence LeDucargued that low turnouts have become a sign of a ‘democratic malaise’among citizens, which he describes as a ‘widespread feeling that govern-ments have become disengaged and remote’ (2003, p. 20). Referendums haveincreasingly been used worldwide partly in response to this lack of trust inpolitical institutions (LeDuc 2003, p. 20, Qvortrup 2005, p. 1–2).

With the initiation and organisation of the referendum left entirely attheir discretion, UK local authorities have held referendums on variousissues, ranging from congestion charging and council tax levels to thecreation of directly-elected mayors. This multiplication raises the questionof whether the referendums were truly organised in a spirit of democraticrenewal, designed to give local citizens a ‘bigger say’, or whether otherreasons were at stake. In other words, what prompted local authorities todelegate their decision-making power on a one-off basis to ordinary citizens?

A number of researchers have dealt with the question of referendumcauses, albeit only on a national scale. Bjorklund (1982) focused onreferendums held in Nordic countries, and Breuer (2009) studied the use ofgovernment-initiated referendums in Latin America. Morel (2001, 2007)designed a generic classification model in which she identified four mainfunctions of the referendum: (1) a mediation function, enabling a politicalparty, government or coalition to remain united; (2) an agenda function,allowing a party or government to avoid any split on a contentious issue inthe run-up to an election; (3) a legislative function, used by a governmentwhen it cannot pass a law through the normal parliamentary process andchooses instead to refer the issue to the people; and (4) a legitimatingfunction, through which a government attempts to give popular acceptanceto a specific issue, whether it is supported by them or not. Morel identifiedtwo further uses, the first being particularly linked to referendum practicein France. The power-reinforcing referendum (5) is used by politicians inleading positions (presidents, prime ministers, party leaders) in order toreinforce their popularity. The politically obligatory referendum (6) is a typeof referendum that is imposed on governments, either because of theexistence of precedents, or because of strong external pressure to hold areferendum. Qvortrup (2006) applied Morel’s model to national referen-dums in the UK. His classification revealed that the referendum had mostoften been used as an expedient way for parties and governments to shirkinternal division and avoid unpopularity in an electoral context. In addition,no referendum had really ever been used as an incentive to citizenparticipation (Qvortrup 2006, p. 70). A similar assessment was made in1975 by Williams and Greenaway on local referendums introduced bycentral government for very particular issues, such as the sale of alcohol onSundays in Wales (cf. Williams and Greenaway 1975, p. 256).

640 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

This paper uses Morel’s classification model in order to determine themain motivations behind the initiation of referendums by local authorities.Morel’s categories are preferred to Qvortrup’s insofar as they constitute theoriginal classification model, providing clear delimitations between theabove-mentioned categories. Local authorities’ motivations are analysed intwo sections. Based on official reports, newspaper articles and previousliterature, the first section deals with referendums held prior to 2008, theyear the Greater Manchester referendum was organised. The second sectionis a case study of the Greater Manchester congestion charge referendum, onwhich little empirical research has yet been carried out. This case study isbased on data from semi-structured interviews conducted with two localofficials in Manchester, and from the analysis of official reports andnewspaper articles. Findings from these two sections are then assessed anddiscussed with regard to the view that referendums initiated by representa-tive institutions are considered as less democratic than citizen-initiated ones(Bu�cek and Smith 2000, p. 7).

1. Local referendums held prior to 2008

Excluding referendums on directly-elected mayors, seven referendums wereheld by local authorities prior to the Greater Manchester one. Out of theseseven referendums, five were organised on council tax levels. The other twotook place in Scotland on very distinct topics: the privatisation of waterservices and the introduction of a congestion charge. Referendums ondirectly-elected mayors have been more frequent, with over twenty of themheld in 2001 and 2002, but it should be remembered that they formed anintegral part of the Labour Government’s policy of local governance reformin the early 2000s (Rallings and Thrasher 2002, Sandford 2004, Copus2009). Their initiation is therefore considered in a separate sub-section.

1.1 Referendums on council issues. In 1981, Coventry was the first localauthority to initiate a large-scale referendum on the issue of council taxlevels. Lee (2007, p. 169) revealed that the city’s Labour-controlled councilcould not choose between budget cuts and a dramatic increase in the counciltax rate. It was therefore an internal political conflict between left and rightthat eventually triggered the decision to hold a referendum. As such, theCoventry referendum was employed by the authorities as a mediatingdevice. The local electorate rejected the tax increase and the referendum,which had been poorly advertised, produced a weak turnout of 26%.Electors were asked whether they would prefer to ‘reduce expenditure onservices to minimise loss of grant’ or to ‘maintain services and increase therates to offset the loss of grant’ (Jowell et al. 1984, p. 3). As Jowell shows,this question was overly simplified and did not take into account ‘the varietyof options that the council itself was faced with’ (1984, p. 3). The councilpresented electors with two alternatives with no room for discussion about

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 641

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

which services should be cut, for example. It is therefore no wonder thatthe electorate itself gave a very simple answer. Arguably, the council’sapproach to the question was symptomatic of the mediating function of thereferendum: the referendum was mainly used as a solution to a politicalconflict, with little thought given to the way citizens could be adequatelyconsulted on council tax rates.

The second referendum on council tax levels took place in 1999 in MiltonKeynes. The local authority’s approach to the referendum was seeminglydifferent to Coventry’s. Indeed, the Labour council argued at the time that ithad chosen the referendum as part of an innovative approach to citizenparticipation (Milton Keynes Council 1999, Snelson 1999 p. 4), and haddecided to present electors with a range of options, allowing them to choosebetween three levels of tax increases (5%, 9.8% or 15%). No ‘zero’ optionwas offered as it was clear that council tax needed to go up in MiltonKeynes. Council tax levels in the area were 10% below the national averageand the council’s government grant was too small to cover the needs of afast-growing population. The council was seen by central government asspending too much and a spending limit had been imposed in 1997–98,making council tax rates fall and compounding the budget situation. Theonly way out of this predicament was to increase council tax, but in order todo that the council had to run a public consultation. Indeed, as Snelson(1999, p. 5) explains:

A consultation paper on local government finance [. . .] suggested thatforthcoming legislation would lead to central spending controls beingrelaxed where a local referendum demonstrated public support for asubstantial increase in council tax. The local Labour Party accordinglywrote into its [1998] manifesto a promise to ‘hold a local referendumon increasing council spending in the event of the abolition ofcapping’.

In addition, Snelson’s report revealed that ‘the Council felt that demon-strable public support for a sizeable increase would help convince theGovernment that its budget should not be capped’. In that respect, theMilton Keynes referendum fulfilled a legitimation function insofar as itenabled the government to support a decision which ran counter to theparty’s national policy of controlling ‘excessive council tax rises’ (LabourParty, 1997). Besides, it allowed Milton Keynes Council to make apotentially divisive issue popularly accepted by the electorate. 46% of theelectorate went for the middle option, while the highest increase received23% of the vote, and the lowest 30%. It should be noted that the localLabour Party had campaigned actively for the middle option. Turnout washigh with 44.7% of the electorate having voted, a higher figure than the 26%obtained at the local elections a year earlier. In particular, Snelson notesthat the referendum probably had a positive impact on citizen participation

642 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

since turnout at the following local election (held the same year) was betterthan at previous elections (1999, p. 17). In any case, the Milton Keynesreferendum was primarily a pragmatic solution to the council’s criticalsituation, rather than a particular commitment to local participation.Moreover, the experience remained a one-off in that local authority.

The other three referendums on council tax levels, which were organisedin 2001 in Bristol and in 2001 and 2002 in the London borough of Croydon,followed the Milton Keynes pattern, but for different reasons. In Bristol, theCouncil offered the electorate four increases: a 0%, 2%, 4% and 6%increase. Unlike Milton Keynes, council tax in Bristol was one of the highestin England, because of high spending on education services. Yet the localauthority was faced with government targets asking for further budgetincreases in education. This policy put the Labour-ruled council in asituation where ‘continuing to meet the targets for increases in schoolsbudgets would increase the disparity between the funding of the educationservice and of other services, and would result in a significant increase in thecouncil tax’ (Bristol City Council 2000, p. 5). Such targets were partlyresented by the council, and tax would have to go up by 4% in order to meetthe government’s objectives. A referendum gave the council the opportunityto legitimate such a rise, while also relieving them from government targets.Moreover, a 0% rise was made available to electors since there was a ‘bodyof opinion’ (both within and outside the council) who felt that tax levelscould be frozen for another year (BBC Bristol 2000). Despite this, thecouncil and the local Labour Party did not advocate a particular option,unlike Milton Keynes. 54% of voters opted for a 0% rise, while theaccumulation of votes for a tax increase reached 46%. The turnout of 40%was slightly above that of the local election held a year later, in 2002 (36%),but was disappointing given the availability of postal, phone and (a first inlocal government) internet voting.

In Croydon, the two referendums also took place in a context of pressure,this time from the Greater London Assembly. While the Mayor of Londonwanted the Labour-controlled council to increase its tax rate substantially(reportedly by 15.2% in 2002), the council refused to go this way. Bothreferendums offered voters three levels of increase (from 2% to 5% in 2001and from 3.65% to 6.65% in 2002). Mirroring Bristol, voters over-whelmingly chose the lowest increases in both referendums. Turnouts of30% in 2001 and 35% in 2002 were slightly lower than at the local electionof 1998, despite the presence of postal, telephone and internet voting.Commenting on the outcome, the leader of Croydon Council said that it wasa clear signal that Croydon voters opposed ‘the Mayor [of London]’sextravagance’ (Local Government Chronicle 2002). The decision to hold areferendum in Croydon was therefore taken in a context of political conflictbetween the local and central authority, and can be seen as a way for thecouncil to enhance the legitimacy of a decision they resented. In general,council tax referendums were about ‘authorising increased spending’

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 643

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

(Thompson 2001), whether the council was overtly in favour of it (as inMilton Keynes), or officially neutral but not embracing it (as in Bristol orCroydon). In any case, the rationale behind the referendum went beyond thesimple act of surveying the local population and was clearly influenced bythe political environment of the time.

In March 1994, the Scottish region of Strathclyde, then controlled byLabour, organised a referendum on the issue of water privatisation. Localservices privatisation had been a central plank of John Major’s policy, andwas heavily resented by the Labour Party who saw it as an attempt toundermine their traditionally strong base in Scotland (McConnell 2004,p. 5). Regional Labour councillors and MPs, as well as other organisations,launched a campaign against water privatisation and pushed for theorganisation of a referendum on the issue (McNulty 2010, Crooks 1996,p. 246). The Strathclyde referendum was thus a tactical means to opposegovernment plans. With a ‘no’ vote to water privatisation, the regionalauthorities could prove that the government had lost the voters’ confidenceon their policy, which could in turn further undermine the Conservatives’authority on a regional and (potentially) national scale. In that respect, thefact that regional council elections took place in May of the same yearshould not be overlooked. The Strathclyde case may therefore be defined asa tactical ‘opposition referendum’, a category that is mentioned by Qvortrup(2006, p. 65) and Morel (2001). As such, it is used in this paper as a separateand fully-fledged category, even if it is not explicitly mentioned in Morel’sclassification model. The unpopularity of Major’s policy was confirmedthrough a ‘no’ vote to privatisation expressed by 70% of the electorate, ahigh turnout compared to the 44.4% obtained at the 1994 regional election(45% in 1990).

Conversely, the referendum organised in 2005 by the City of Edinburghon the introduction of a congestion charge was used as a defensivemechanism. Rye et al. (2008) revealed in their study of the referendum thatEdinburgh’s Labour-ruled council, whose majority was at the time verymarginal, chose to run a referendum in order to avoid potential politicaldamage in the local election that was due to take place in May 2003. Thus,the Edinburgh referendum was ‘a politically expedient way to distancethe then ruling Labour group from making a decision on the congestioncharging scheme’ (Rye et al. 2008, p. 654). This electorally-motivateddecision highlights the agenda function fulfilled by the Edinburghreferendum, which is described by Morel as ‘when the official stand of aparty or a leader on an issue is unpopular in some sections of its electorate’or when an issue is removed ‘from a forthcoming electoral campaign’because, ‘if debated, [it] would reveal and intensify divisions within a partyor an alliance’ (2007, p. 1047). The Edinburgh referendum produced a 62%turnout, which was higher than at the 2003 local elections held on the sameday as the Scottish Parliament elections (turnout of 51.8%). The congestioncharge was overwhelmingly rejected by 74% of voters.

644 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

1.2 Referendums on directly-elected mayors. Referendums on directly-elected mayors stand apart from the other cases. Their formalorganisation – question wording, campaigning issues, etc. – is regulatedby central government through the Local Government Act 2000, whichis not the case for other local referendums. Such referendums, wheninitiated by local authorities2, only came about when these authoritieschose a model of governance with a directly-elected mayor. Otheroptions were made available to them by central government, inparticular an indirectly-elected leader-cabinet model. June 2002 was thedeadline fixed by the government for local authorities to submit theirchoice of governance model, which had to be justified by public supportfor a particular option. As Rallings and Thrasher (2009) show, only 22referendums were organised by local authorities, out of over 300 eligiblelocal authorities. Most authorities did not hold mayoral referendumsbecause the results of their consultation showed support for non-mayoral options, which required no referendums. The few who heldreferendums did so for two reasons. First, public consultations hadrevealed strong support for a mayoral option, which generally occurredin authorities with existing problems of governance (Rallings andThrasher 2009, Sandford 2004, p. 7–8). In that context, authorities didnot have much of a choice. Second, governmental pressure to holdreferendums was particularly high at that time. The mayoral option wasoften unpopular with local authorities and some of them organisedreferendums with great reluctance (Game 2002). In Southwark, thecouncil initially refused to hold a referendum after the publicconsultation but was forced to do so by central government (Rallingsand Thrasher, 2002, p. 70). For Sandford, some authorities simplybowed ‘to the inevitable in holding a referendum’ (2004, p. 21). In thatsense, mayoral referendums initiated by local authorities were ‘politicallyobligatory’. Morel (2007, p. 1056) describes this type of referendum asthe ‘result of an inescapable pressure – either normative or by externalactors’, the alternative being ‘strong criticism’ and ‘negative politicalfallout’.

Table 1.1. Local authority-initiated referendums held prior to 2008

Localauthority Date Topic

Turnout(%)

Turnout (%)local election Outcome

Coventry Aug. 1981 Council tax increase 26.0 n. a. NoStrathclyde March 1994 Water privatisation 70.0 44.4 NoMilton K Feb. 1999 Council tax levels 45.0 32.0 9.8% increaseBristol Jan.–Feb. 2001 Council tax levels 40.0 36.0 0% increaseCroydon Feb. 2001/2002 Council tax levels 30.0/35.0 35.0 Lowest

increasesEdinburgh Feb. 2005 Congestion charge 61.8 51.8 No

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 645

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Table 1.2 shows that out of 22 cases only eight resulted in the creation of adirectly-elected mayor. Results are not more encouraging for citizen-initiated mayoral referendums, with five ‘yes’ results out of 16 referendumsheld to date (Table 1.3). Turnouts were also disappointing, with localauthority referendums revealing a mean of 28.3%, three percentage pointsbelow the average for local elections (31.7%). Interestingly, the meanturnout for citizen-initiated referendums is even lower, at 26.8%. Thenegative outcomes can be explained by the presence of strong ‘no’campaigns in authorities led by mainstream political parties (Copus, 2009,p. 4–5). Low turnouts were most often a sign of disinterest in governancearrangements from the local electorate, as Rallings and Thrasher (2002, p.75) and Sandford (2004, p. 4–5) show. Although other factors such as theextent of campaigning have to be considered, low turnouts for citizen-initiated referendums also seem to highlight this general lack of interest.

So far, the analysis of local authority referendums has revealed that theirinitiation was mainly politically motivated. In many cases, the decision wastaken either on the basis of electoral considerations (the Edinburghreferendum), the legitimation of a controversial stance (council taxreferendums), external pressure (directly-elected mayors) or as a strategicway to strengthen the authority of a political group (water privatisation inStrathclyde).

Table 1.2. Local-authority initiated mayoral referendums (2001–present)

Local authority Date Turnout (%)Turnout localelection (%) Outcome

Cheltenham 28 June 2001 31.0 32.1 NoGloucester 28 June 2001 30.8 29.8 NoWatford 12 July 2001 24.5 26.7 YesDoncaster 20 September 2001 25.4 26.2 YesKirklees 4 October 2001 13.0 31.7 NoSunderland 11 October 2001 10.0 18.8 NoBrighton and Hove 18 October 2001 31.6 39.1 NoHartlepool 18 October 2001 33.9 26.8 YesLewisham 18 October 2001 18.3 30.7 YesMiddlesbrough 18 October 2001 33.9 36.1 YesNorth Tyneside 18 October 2001 36.2 35.7 YesSedgefield 18 October 2001 33.3 33.6 NoRedditch 8 November 2001 28.3 25.2 NoDurham 20 November 2001 29.0 37.5 NoHarrow 6 December 2001 26.1 35.9 NoHarlow 24 January 2002 36.4 30.2 NoPlymouth 24 January 2002 39.8 33.3 NoNewham 31 January 2002 25.9 31.1 YesShepway 31 January 2002 36.3 35.6 NoSouthwark 31 January 2002 11.2 33.3 NoWest Devon 31 January 2002 41.8 41.5 NoHackney 2 May 2002 26.8 26.8 Yes

Mean 28.3 31.7

Source: Rallings and Thrasher 2002, p. 74–75.

646 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

2. Case study: the Greater Manchester referendum (2008)

This case study offers a detailed insight into the motivations that led to theGreater Manchester referendum and, following Stake’s (2000) argument,constitutes an appropriate point of comparison with the cases reviewed inthe first section. Findings are based on qualitative data from semi-structuredinterviews conducted face-to-face with two local officials in Manchesterand from the analysis of official reports and newspaper articles. The firstinterview (Interview 1) was conducted on 26 March 2010 with a policyadviser for the Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Authority(GMPTA, now called GMITA), the authority in charge of supervisingpublic transport delivery within the Greater Manchester metropolitancounty. The second interview (Interview 2) was conducted on 19 April 2010with the leader of the Liberal Democrat group for the borough ofManchester.3 The fact that the Liberal Democrats broadly supported thecongestion charge while unanimously calling for a referendum on the issueproved indeed interesting. The choice of a semi-structured type of interviewwas motivated by the greater flexibility offered by this technique and by theopportunity to probe deeper into specific questions (Huitt and Peabody1969, p. 28–9). Moreover, it seemed particularly suited to questions relatingto the initiation of a referendum, where multiple points are likely to beraised by the interviewee.

The Greater Manchester referendum was held as a postal ballot inNovember and December 2008 in ten metropolitan boroughs: Bolton, Bury,Oldham, Rochdale, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, Wigan, and the cities of

Table 1.3. Citizen-initiated mayoral referendums (2001–present)

Local authority Date Turnout (%) Outcome

Berwick-upon-Tweed 7 June 2001 63.8 (GE) NoBedford 21 February 2002 15.5 YesMansfield 2 May 2002 21.0 YesNewcastle-upon-Lyme 2 May 2002 31.5 NoOxford 2 May 2002 32.6 NoStoke-on-Trent 2 May 2002 26.8 YesCorby 1 October 2002 30.9 NoEaling 12 December 2002 9.8 NoCeredigion 20 May 2004 36.3 NoIsle of Wight 5 May 2005 60.4 (GE) NoFenland 14 July 2005 33.6 NoTorbay 14 July 2005 32.1 YesCrewe-Nantwich 4 May 2006 35.3 NoDarlington 27 September 2007 24.6 NoBury 3 July 2008 18.3 NoTower Hamlets 6 May 2010 62.1(GE) Yes

Mean (without GE) 26.8

(GE) General Election day

Sources: Rallings and Thrasher 2002, p. 75, Rallings and Thrasher 2009, Electoral Commission2010.

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 647

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Manchester and Salford. The electorate was asked whether a £3 billionTransport Innovation Fund (TIF) investment package in public transport,which involved a congestion charge, should be introduced. The plan wasdefeated by 78% of those who voted and the mean turnout of 53.2% acrossthe Greater Manchester boroughs was significantly higher than at the localelections held the same year (34%). The turnout was also higher than at thepostal European elections of 2004 (39.8%). When analysing the causes ofthis referendum, it should be remembered that, unlike the Edinburghreferendum, the decision to hold a referendum was taken very belatedly inthe development of the transport plan. In fact, while the decision to organisea referendum was made official in July 2008, the TIF plan had been finalisedand submitted to the Government for selection exactly one year earlier, inJuly 2007. In June 2008, Ruth Kelly, then minister for transport, announcedthat the Government was ready to support the Greater Manchester bid witha direct £1.3 billion grant from the Department for Transport, on thecondition that a congestion charge be introduced to pay for the remainingcosts incurred by the investment. For a long time, the idea of a referendum

Table 2.1. Timeline of the Greater Manchester referendum

Date Event

Autumn 2005 Greater Manchester carries out a feasibility study on a possibleimprovement of public transport in the county.

January 2006 Central government announces the creation of the TransportInnovation Fund and asks local authorities to submit projects. TheGreater Manchester authorities start work on a congestion chargingscheme.

Spring 2007 The boroughs of Stockport and Trafford express their concernsregarding the scheme. The Greater Manchester Liberal Democratsstart calling for a referendum.

Summer 2007 The AGMA carries out the first Greater Manchester-wide resident andbusiness consultation between 22 June and 16 July 2007. Resultsshow broad support for the scheme across the county.

The boroughs of Stockport (Liberal Democrat) and Trafford (Conservative)carry out their own consultations. The results contradict the AGMA’sand both councils decide not to support the plan.

31 July 2007 Submission of the TIF project by the AGMA to central government.December 2007 The borough of Bury (Conservative) backs out of the project and

officially calls for a referendum on the plan.9 June 2008 Central government announces that it is ready to support the project

financially.June–July 2008 Manchester City Council (25 June) and the AGMA (27 July) make

public the decision to organise a referendum on the TIF plan.July–October 2008 Period of large-scale consultation of Greater Manchester residents and

businesses.24 November 2008 Postal ballots are sent out to the Greater Manchester electorate. Start

of postal vote.11 December 2008 Voting deadline.12 December 2008 Publication of results. Mean turnout: 53.2%

Yes 21.2%No 78.8%

648 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

was carefully avoided by the authorities supporting the TIF bid, namely theAssociation of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA)4 and the GreaterManchester Passenger Transport Authority (GMPTA, cf. note 4). InAugust 2007, the leader of Manchester City Council even argued that areferendum could not be held since the issue was ‘too complex to beaddressed in a single, simple ‘‘yes / no’’ question’ (Manchester City Council,2007a). What led the Greater Manchester authorities to reverse their initialverdict? Did they not consider that the plan would automatically be voteddown by the electorate, as in Edinburgh? Three main points will beconsidered in order to answer these questions.

The first point is that some boroughs within Greater Manchester wereradically opposed to the introduction of a congestion charge. The localnewspaper Manchester Evening News announced in April 2007 that theboroughs of Stockport and Trafford had concerns regarding the congestioncharging plans elaborated by the AGMA and the GMPTA (Devine 2007).Stockport, a Liberal Democrat borough, refused to back the plan, arguingthat it would suffer from the congestion charge and not benefit from theplanned transport improvements. Trafford, led by the Conservatives,opposed what was perceived as yet another plan from their Labouradversaries. Both borough councils were convinced that the plan was notsupported by their constituents, and each of them ran public consultationsin summer 2007, parallel to a county-wide one organised by the AGMA.Trafford’s Conservative Group even organised an additional consultationbased on a postal questionnaire. Results from the two councils’consultations strongly contradicted the AGMA’s. In Trafford, theCouncil’s consultation revealed that 66% of residents were opposed tothe congestion charge (Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council 2007, p. 3);in Stockport, a similarly high proportion (67%) shared this opinion (BBCNews 2007). Conversely, the consultation organised by the AGMA revealeda high rate of approval in these two boroughs (Manchester City Council,2007b). These results legitimised the opposition of Stockport and Traffordto the scheme, and led them to argue that Greater Manchester did not havea sufficient mandate to take a decision of this scope on behalf of itsresidents, thus paving the way for future referendum calls. According to theinterviewed GMPTA representative, Trafford’s council leader later becamea central figure in the campaign for the referendum (Interview 1). Duringthe 2008 referendum campaign she was, with the leader of Stockportcouncil, part of an anti-charge alliance named Stop the Charge. InDecember 2007, Bury, another Conservative-led council, came out againstthe TIF congestion charging plans and officially called for a referendum.The minutes of the relevant council meeting reveal that the referendum wasmainly supported by Conservative councillors and by an anti-chargelobbying group called Manchester Against Road Tolls (MART) (BuryBorough Council 2007, p. 329). In the same document, Bury councildeclared:

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 649

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

This Council believes that major investment in public transportinfrastructure is urgently needed in Greater Manchester for significantenvironmental and economic reasons, but rejects the attempts of theLabour Government to force congestion charging on GreaterManchester to receive the public transport investment we need [. . .].This Council requires that public support for the initiative is confirmedthrough a Greater Manchester wide consultative referendum oncongestion charging.

Calls for a referendum in Bury were clearly part of an opposition strategyfrom the Conservative Group. In comparison, Trafford’s implicit supportfor a referendum was partly the result of external pressure coming frominfluential businesses opposed to the charge. A number of letters wereindeed sent to the Trafford Council leader warning that if the congestioncharge was introduced, some businesses would not hesitate to leave theborough and relocate elsewhere (letters available on the website of TraffordCouncil). In this context, it was difficult to alienate the industry’s positionsand Trafford’s decision became both politically and economically obliga-tory. In Stockport, the wish to hold a referendum sprang from the policydeveloped by the local Liberal Democrat group, which constitutes a secondpoint of analysis.

The opposition of Stockport’s Liberal Democrat council to thecongestion charge meant that stark divisions started to emerge within theGreater Manchester Liberal Democrat group. In Interview 2, the LiberalDemocrat leader argued that the boroughs of Oldham and Rochdale, wherelarge numbers of Liberal Democrats won seats in the 2007 and 2008 localelections, held a different view from Stockport because the tramwaynetwork would be extended to their area. In proportional terms,approximately one-third of the Greater Manchester Liberal Democratgroup as a whole was opposed to the plan, because it ‘didn’t like the idea[of the charge]’, and thought ‘it was not green enough’ or because ‘they[the Labour Party] were proposing it’ (Interview 2). In the borough ofManchester itself, the balance was identical, at two-thirds for and one-thirdagainst the plan. Eventually, it was the contentious nature of the debatethat led the Greater Manchester Liberal Democrat group to back theorganisation of a referendum:

The referendum was something that we could all agree on, even if wewere urging people to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’. It was an achievable objectiveand it made sense politically to do that, even if when it actually cameto the referendum we were on different sides. And what were theoptions? Either we were all against or all in favour? Being against isa very difficult argument to make if you’re going to get a bigMetrolink [Manchester’s tramway network] improvement in your area(Interview 2).

650 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

It is under these circumstances that the official policy of the partyprogressively turned, from spring 2007, to a campaign for a referendumon the TIF transport plan. This policy did not alter the support of mostlocal Liberal Democrats for the TIF plan. Asked about his support for thecongestion charge, the Liberal Democrat leader explained that he believedthe referendum could be won with effective campaigning. So it can beargued that, unlike the Conservatives in Bury, the Liberal Democrats didnot use the referendum as an opposition tactic. Rather, the referendumhelped the Liberal Democrats come to an internal consensus and avoidedtaking a potentially divisive decision for the group. In that sense, it clearlyfulfilled a mediation function.

Yet, it should also be remembered that overcoming divisions wasnecessary in the context of local electoral contests in 2007 and 2008.Whatever their opinion on the transport plan and the congestion charge, thereferendum allowed the Liberal Democrats to campaign in the localelections without risking being associated with the congestion charge.Morel’s definition of the agenda referendum aptly describes this situation:‘the referendum served then to reassure the public that casting a ballot forthis party would not mean they were supporting a contentious political issuewith which it was identified’ (2007, p. 1047). Like the Labour Party in theStrathclyde and the Edinburgh referendums, the Liberal Democrats werethus very much aware of the impact such a decision could have on theelectorate, and indeed ‘thought it was something that would [. . .] probablyget public support’ (Interview 2).

Shortly after the Government’s decision to back the TIF bid, the leader ofthe Manchester Liberal Democrat group pointed, like the Conservatives inBury, to an apparent democratic deficit, declaring that ‘there are only threereasons why decision makers would want to avoid a referendum. Either theythink they will lose, or they think that local people won’t understand theissues, or they don’t want to relinquish the power to make the decision. I rejectall three of these reasons’ (Manchester Liberal Democrats Online 2008). Thisargument had already been used in other debates, such as the Welshdevolution project of the 1970s, with anti-devolutionist Neil Kinnock claimingthat pro-devolutionists were denying the Welsh the right to vote on their ownfuture (Bogdanor 1981, p. 51). Such a strategy ensured that anti-devolutionists‘could argue that, had it not been for them, the electorate would never havehad the chance to make its voice heard at all’ (Bogdanor 1981, p. 51). TheLiberal Democrats, as well as Conservative opponents of the plan, may havethought the same way and seen the referendum as a tool to weaken the LabourParty and reinforce their own position. Such a use of the referendum couldthen be qualified as power-reinforcing, especially since Morel describes it as ‘amore entrepreneurial use of the device’ than the mediation or agendareferendums which are only ‘intended to resolve a problematic situation’(2007, p. 1053). However, the power-reinforcing function explicitly refers tothe way a single person (a president or a prime minister) uses the referendum

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 651

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

in order to ‘enlarge his [personal] power’ (Morel 2007, p. 1050). This is hardlythe case here, since only political groups are concerned. It can however beassumed that, for the Liberal Democrats, the referendum fulfilled not one, buttwo functions: mediation and agenda.

With three boroughs (Trafford, Stockport and Bury) firmly set against theTIF plan by the end of 2007, and Liberal Democrats across the county alsocalling for a referendum, the AGMA found itself increasingly divided. Thislack of consensus was the first reason why the assembly decided to organisefor a referendum. Interviewed on the nature of the internal dispute, theGMPTA representative argued that unlike other issues, coming to aconsensus on the congestion charge proved virtually impossible. Moreover,leaving the situation without any clear agreement could have had a negativeimpact on the future of the AGMA:

In the main, a consensus has generally been reached within theAGMA. [. . .] This [the TIF project] was clearly a show-stopper [. . .].[It] was the division that everybody was most concerned about, and itwas to avoid that division that we went down the referendum route(Interview 1).

This fact was corroborated by the Liberal Democrat leader who argued thatthe referendum was a way ‘to bring together both sides of the argumentwhen the AGMA was split’ (Interview 2).

A second important factor came into play in the wake of the May 2008local elections, when the Greater Manchester authorities were bluntly madeaware of the unpopularity of the congestion charge. The most significantevent testifying to this was the defeat suffered by a Labour councillor in theborough of Salford who, incidentally, was also chairman of the GMPTA.Quite revealingly, the seat was won by the Community Action Party, whichhad campaigned against the congestion charge. The GMPTA representativeexplained the exceptional character of this result, and its impact on thepolitical community at the time:

I have never known a [local] politician lose or gain votes as a result ofwhat they have done on the GMPTA previously, because it is a secondjob. Most of their local residents don’t even know that they sit onthe GMPTA; they just see them as the local councillor. So it was quitea shock for people that this issue had reached such a level at thegrass-roots, that a representative from the Community Action Partywould be able to unseat a long-standing Salford councillor in a verytraditional Labour ward (Interview 1).

It should be no surprise that the AGMA executive, as well as other councillors,saw the referendum as a way to dig themselves out of the somewhat dangerouspit they had fallen into. The AGMA therefore advocated a county-wide

652 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

referendum as a decision-solving medium as well as as a means to avoid beingassociated with the controversial congestion charge. Just as for the LabourParty in the debate on the organisation of a referendum on the CommonMarket in 1975, the Greater Manchester referendum can essentially be seen asa ‘life raft’ for local politicians who were in favour of the transport plan (Butlerand Kitzinger 1996, p. 12). In other words, it was mainly in order to savepolitical careers and arrangements (the AGMA) that the referendum came tobe seen as a useful device.

In summary, these three points reveal various uses of the referendumwithin a single debate. Opposing the plan and calling for a referendum wasadvantageous for the Bury Conservatives, since they could blame both theLabour Government and the local Labour Party for being democraticallyunaccountable. It is a classic example of the opposition referendum. In thesame fashion, the referendum offered the Liberal Democrats the opportu-nity to shun their internal divisions on the congestion charge issue. Theycould also argue, like the Conservatives, that Labour, the leading party inGreater Manchester, was not being democratic enough. As such, they usedthe referendum as an agenda device, with a view to widening their electoralappeal. The final decision made by the Greater Manchester authorities wasstrongly influenced by the divisions within the AGMA. The referendum wasfor them a mediating device, just like the Coventry Labour group in 1981.Evidence further suggests that in the Manchester case, a strong momentumhad built up in favour of a referendum. Conservative and Liberal Democratcalls for a referendum as well as, to a limited extent, the campaign led by theanti-charge group MART, all largely influenced the AGMA in its choice.The GMPTA policy adviser remarked that it is not ‘any one thing, [. . .] it’sall of these political factors come together to push politicians’ in thedirection of the referendum (Interview 1).5 In other words, had the GreaterManchester authorities avoided a referendum, they could have been exposedto further criticism, with potentially damaging consequences for politicalcareers. Thus, in many respects, the AGMA’s decision matches Morel’sdefinition of the politically obligatory referendum (Morel 2007, p. 1056).

Table 2.2 presents the main functions of the local referendums reviewedin the first and second sections of this article. As regards the GreaterManchester referendum, only the functions characterising the final decisionmade by the Greater Manchester authorities are reported.

Table 2.2. Main functions of the local referendum in the UK

FunctionCouncil tax

levelsStrathclyde

1994Edinburgh

2005Directly

elected mayorsManchester

2008

Mediation . .Opposition .Agenda .Legitimation .Politically obligatory . .

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 653

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Conclusion

Local referendums held in the UK have all been, to a large extent, markedby political and electoral motivations. In the cases reviewed in this article,all referendums fulfilled at least one, two or more functions revealing apragmatic and tactical use of the referendum. Moreover, the case study ofthe Greater Manchester referendum showed that strong links may existbetween different functions. Indeed, it may be assumed that if a politicalgroup seeks to avoid an internal split on a contentious issue (mediationfunction), it may also see the referendum as a way to protect its electoralchances or further increase its electoral potential by not being directlyassociated with the issue at stake (agenda function). This tight relation isevidenced in the Liberal Democrats’ use of the referendum. Furthermore,the opposition referendum, which is used in order to attack or destabilisepolitical adversaries (especially in an electoral context) stands out as a toolof particular salience in some of the cases under scrutiny. This was forexample the case for the Bury Conservatives in Greater Manchester or theLabour group in Strathclyde (McNulty 2010).

In none of the cases reviewed has the local referendum genuinely beendesigned to widen local participation. In Milton Keynes, the Councilargued that the council tax referendum was part of a democratic renewalexercise, although the decision turned out to have a more pragmaticcharacter. One could also question the fact that it was only used once.The punctual use of the referendum on council tax levels, which couldsubsequently be observed in Bristol (2001) and Croydon (2001 and 2002),appears to be more reminiscent of political pragmatism than of any long-term commitment to participatory democracy. In a revealing statementon the AGMA’s decision, the GMPTA representative argued that ‘we[the AGMA] only went down the referendum route because we had to,because political pragmatism required that that was where we had to go’(Interview 1).

In this context, the democratic quality of local referendums remains animportant question, albeit difficult to answer. As has been argued in theintroduction, referendums initiated by authorities are often perceived as lessdemocratic than popular initiatives. Three main reasons underpin thisassumption: (1) the popular initiative belongs to a ‘citizen-oriented’ systemof local democracy (Vetter 2009, p. 127), giving an impression of opennessand transparency that appears less obvious for local authority-initiatedreferendums; (2) popular initiatives, as suggested by empirical evidence,have a positive effect on voter turnout (Barankay et al. 2003, Tolbert et al.2001, Smith 2002, Smith and Tolbert 2004). The hypothesis of this secondpoint is that authority-initiated referendums, on the contrary, have a morelimited impact on voter turnout; (3) Marja Sutela’s study of the localreferendum in Finland and Sweden showed that when the referendumremained ‘at the discretion of the council’, the referendum lost its original

654 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

purpose, that is to provide local citizens with their ‘own means of exertinginfluence’ on decision-making (Sutela 2001, p. 668).

In response to the first point, it can be argued that local authority-initiated referendums can contribute to making local democracy more openand transparent for, in essence, they allow citizens to take part in thedecision-making process and to control its outcome. Besides, most of thereferendums reviewed offered postal, telephone and (in some cases) internetvoting, which gave better opportunities to participate than at local elections.

The second point is more controversial. Indeed, there is so far nosubstantial proof that citizen-initiated referendums would have a betterimpact on turnouts in the UK. In fact, mayoral referendums initiated bycitizen petitions obtained lower turnouts than local authority-initiated ones.This surprising outcome (especially in the light of research by Tolbert et al.2001 and Smith and Tolbert 2004) proves that the extent of campaigningand, more importantly, the nature of the issues are equally determining forturnouts. Figure 1 shows that turnouts at referendums were generally higherthan at local elections.

Figure 1. Comparison of turnouts at referendums and at local elections.

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 655

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Yet there are also exceptions, such as mayoral referendums and counciltax referendums in Bristol and Croydon where turnouts were particularlydisappointing. This seems to confirm Rallings and Thrasher’s argument thatturnouts are higher for ‘issues that people judged as likely to have a direct,personal and (for the majority) adverse impact on their lives’ (2009). It istherefore not surprising that referendums in Strathclyde, Edinburgh andManchester produced strong turnouts. Conversely, turnouts at referendumsfor directly-elected mayors were lower than at local elections, highlightingthe lack of interest from the population for local governance arrangements.Council tax referendums produced varied results, which may come from thefact that some local authorities decided to take a strong stance in favour ofa certain option (the Labour Party in Milton Keynes), and others not(Bristol).

The third point seriously questions the impact of local authority-initiatedreferendums on the long-term participation of citizens in local affairs. Thefact that all referendums were decided for reasons of political pragmatismmeans that the decision-making process remains almost entirely under thecontrol of the local political class. In comparing national and local levels,one could argue that the local referendum remains essentially used as a‘weapon’ by politicians (Bogdanor 2009, p. 196). For this reason, the localauthority-initiated referendum has limited potential for ordinary citizens toexert real influence on local affairs. While its immediate impact on localdemocracy remains positive, it seems unable to build a momentum for along-term improvement of local citizen participation. A catalogue definingwhich issues can or cannot be the subject of a referendum would certainlybring clarity to the way local authorities initiate polls. Moreover, anextension of the citizen-initiated referendum to other topics than mayoralquestions might provide the impetus to citizen participation that has beenobserved in the United States (Tolbert et al. 2001). The petition-initiatedreferendum would arguably enhance citizens’ ability to influence localaffairs, and reduce their dependence on the political pragmatism of theirelected representatives.

Notes

1. The term ‘national’ refers to UK-wide and devolution referendums (Scotland and Wales

1979 and 1997, Northern Ireland 1973 and 1998, North-East England 2004). Some

devolution referendums, in particular the North-East one, are not national in the strictest

sense of the term but are treated as such since they were formally initiated by central

government. They are consequently not included in this study.

2. These referendums can also be initiated following a petition signed by 5% of the electorate.

3. Interview 1 was conducted and recorded at Manchester Town Hall and lasted 52 minutes,

6 seconds. Interview 2 was conducted and recorded at the South Manchester Liberal

Democrat office and lasted 19 minutes, 46 seconds.

4. The AGMA is the unelected assembly representing the 10 Greater Manchester boroughs.

Its executive is made up of the boroughs’ council leaders. The AGMA and the GMPTA are

subsequently referred to as the Greater Manchester authorities.

656 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

5. Rallings and Thrasher’s (2009) assertion that the referendum was held ‘‘following pressure

from MART’’ is therefore partially inaccurate.

References

Barankay, I., Sciarini, P. and Trechsel, A.H., 2003. Institutional openness and the use of

referendums and popular initiatives: Evidence from Swiss cantons. Swiss Political Science

Review, 9(1), 169–199.

BBC News, 2007. Authority says ‘‘no’’ to road tolls [online]. Available from: http://news.bbc.

co.uk/1/hi/england/manchester/6917094.stm [Accessed 8 June 2010].

BBC Bristol, 2000. Interview with the leader of Bristol City Council [online]. Available from:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/bristol/content/features/2001/01/16/feature2/referendum.ram [Accessed

22 November 2010].

Bjorklund, T., 1982. The demand for referendum: when does it arise and when does it succeed?.

Scandinavian Political Studies, 5(3), 237–259.

Bogdanor, V., 1981. The people and the party system: The referendum and electoral reform in

British politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bogdanor, V., 2009. The new British constitution. Oxford: Hart.

Bristol City Council, 2000. Revenue Budget and Medium Term Financial Plan, Cabinet, 14

December.

Breuer, A., 2009. The use of government-initiated referendums in Latin America. Towards a

theory of referendum causes. Revista de ciencia polıtica, 29(1), 23–55.

Bucek, J. and Smith, B., 2000. New approaches to local democracy: direct democracy, participation

and the ‘third sector’. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 18, 3–16.

Bury Borough Council, 2007, Minutes of the Council Meeting, 12 December.

Butler, D. and Kitzinger, U., 1996. The 1975 referendum. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Copus, C., 2009. English elected mayors: Developing a new form of local political leadership in

England, or moving on in the same old style? Local Governance Research Unit, De Montfort

University.

Crooks, K. A., 1996. Water Warfare in Scotland. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the

Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Anaheim, CA, 10–13 August.

Devine, P., 2007. Congestion charge latest: Stockport Council says ‘‘no’’. Stockport Express

[online]. Available from: http://www.stockportexpress.co.uk/news/s/526576_congestion_

charge_latest_stockport_council_says_no [Accessed 8 June 2010].

Electoral Commission, 2010. Directly elected mayors, Factsheet, October.

Emmerson, C. and Hall, J., 1998. Modernising local democracy: a response to the government’s

consultation process on local government. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.

Game, C., 2002. Elected mayors: more distraction than attraction. PSA Annual Conference,

April.

Huitt, R.K. and Peabody, R.L., 1969. Congress: two decades of analysis.New York: Harper and

Row.

Jowell, R., Courtenay, G., Griffin, C. and Whitehead, C., 1981. Pointers: Local government;

NHS; housing; consumers. Public Money & Management, 1(3), 3–7.

Labour Party, 1997. Manifesto. London: Labour Party.

LeDuc, L., 2003. The politics of direct democracy: referendums in global perspective.

Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press.

Lee, E., 2007. Can the British voter be trusted? The local referendum and tax reform. Public

Administration, 66(2), 165–180.

Local Government Chronicle, 2002. Croydon Votes for 3.65% Rise in Tax Referendum

[online]. Available from: http://www.lgcplus.com/lgc-news/croydon-votes-for-365-rise-in-

tax-referendum/1306053.article [Accessed 22 November 2010].

Manchester City Council, 2007a. Questions to the leader in 2007 [online]. Available from: http://

www.manchester.gov.uk/info/200033/councillors_democracy_and_elections/2742/leader_of_

the_council_councillor_richard_leese/4 [Accessed 13 August 2010].

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 657

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Manchester City Council, 2007b. Report for Resolution. 5 September.

Manchester Liberal Democrats Online, 2008. 88% want congestion charge referendum [online].

Available from: http://manchester-libdems.org.uk/news/000530/88_want_congestion_charge_

referendum.html [Accessed 12 August 2010].

McConnell, A., 2004. Has devolution transformed Scottish local government? Notes from a

small country facing common problems of governance. Paper presented to the

Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, Adelaide, Australia, 29 Septem-

ber–1 October.

McNulty, D., 2010. About Des McNulty MSP [online]. Available from: http://www.desmcnulty.

co.uk/about-des [Accessed 12 August 2010].

Milton Keynes Council, 1999. Innovations in citizen participation in government. Memorandum

presented to the Select Committee on Public Administration, 8 December.

Morel, L., 2001. The strategic use of government-sponsored referendums in liberal democracies.

In: M. Mendelsohn and A. Parkin, eds. Referendum democracy: citizens, elites, and

deliberation in referendums campaigns. New York: Palgrave, 47–64.

Morel, L., 2007. The rise of ‘‘politically obligatory’’ referendums: The 2005 French referendum

in comparative perspective. West European Politics, 30(5), 1041–1067.

Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 1998. Modern local government: in touch with the people.

White Paper.

Qvortrup, M., 2005. A comparative study of referendums: government by the people.Manchester:

Manchester University Press.

Qvortrup, M., 2006. Democracy by delegation: the decision to hold referendums in the United

Kingdom. Representation, 42(1), 59–72.

Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M., 2009. ‘‘The ‘No’s’ have it’’: using referendums in sub-national

policy-making in Britain Paper prepared for the Western Political Science Association

Conference, Vancouver, Canada.

Rallings, C., Thrasher, M. and Cowling, D., 2002. ‘Mayoral Referendums and Elections’, Local

Government Studies, 28:4, 67–90.

Rye, T., Gaunt, M. and Ison, S., 2008. Edinburgh’s congestion charging plans: An analysis

of reasons for non-implementation. Transportation Planning and Technology, 31(6), 641–

661.

Sandford, M., 2004. Elected mayors I: Political innovation, electoral systems and revitalising

democracy. Local Government Studies, 30(1), 1–21.

Smith, D.A. and Tolbert, C.J., 2004. Educated by initiative: The effects of direct democracy on

citizens and political organizations in the American states. Ann Arbor: The University of

Michigan Press.

Smith, M.A., 2002. Ballot initiatives and the democratic citizen. The Journal of Politics, 64(3),

892–903.

Snelson, G., 1999. The Milton Keynes council budget referendum: A case study. Local

Governance, 26(1), 15–30.

Stake, R.E., 2000. Case studies. In: N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, eds. Handbook of qualitative

research, 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 435–454.

Sutela, M., 2001. Comparative aspects of local direct democracy: The municipal referendum in

Finland, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland. European Public Law, 7(4), 651–670.

Thompson, J., 2001. Council tax levels put in the hands of the voters. [online]. Available from:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/council-tax-levels-put-in-the-hands-of-the-

voters-691321.html [Accessed 21 July 2010].

Tolbert, C.J., Grummel, J.A. and Smith, D.A., 2001. The effects of ballot initiatives on voter

turnout in the American states. American Politics Research, 29(6), 625–648.

Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council, 2007. Minutes of the Executive Meeting, 24 July.

Vetter, A., 2009. Citizens versus parties: Explaining institutional change in German local

government, 1989–2008. Local Government Studies, 35(1), 125–142.

658 M. Laisney

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Williams, R.J. and Greenaway, J.R., 1975. The referendum in British politics: a dissenting view.

Parliamentary Affairs, 28(3), 250–260.

Wollmann, H., 2000. Local government systems: from historic divergence towards convergence?

Great Britain, France, and Germany as comparative cases in point. Environment and

Planning C: Government and Policy, 18, 33–55.

Local Referendums: Participatory Momentum or Political Tactics? 659

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

3:28

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14