The Internationalization of the Brazilian Public ... · (2020) 14 (1) e0008 – 1/35 The Internationalization of the Brazilian Public Prosecutor’s Office: Anti ... professionals

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TheInternationalizationoftheBrazilianPublicProsecutor’sOffice:Anti-CorruptionandCorporate

Investmentsinthe2000s1

FabianoEngelmann1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5720-3832

EduardodeMouraMenuzzi1

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3653-8796

1UniversidadeFederaldoRioGrandedoSul,Post-GraduationProgramofPoliticalScience,PortoAlegre/RS,Brazil

The success of different categories of legalprofessionalsinbuildingpositionsofstatepowerinBrazilsincetheendofthemilitaryregimeisinlinewiththelegitimationofmodels of law and international cooperation. This articlefocuses on the connections betweenBrazilian legal actors andthe international ‘fight against corruption’. By looking at theinternational connections of Brazil’s Public Prosecutor’sOffice(MPF),we aim to show how the promotion of anti-corruptionmodelsof lawistheresultofcorporatecooperationstrategies.We cite as evidence overseas travel by MPF agents and theirconnectionswith the international field in recent decades.Westartbyanalyzingcooperationdocumentsand thenattempt totrace the MPF’s pathway towards internationalization duringthe2000s.Keywords:Internationalization;judicialelite;publicprosecutor’s0ffice;cooperation;anti-corruption.

http://doi/10.1590/1981-3821202000010006Fordatareplication,see:https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/7XURZ5Correspondence:FabianoEngelman.E-mail:[email protected].

______________________________________________________________________________________________1This article results from a Research Project funded by the National Council for Scientific andTechnologicalDevelopment(CNPq).

The Internationalization of the BrazilianPublic Prosecutor’s Office: Anti-CorruptionandCorporateInvestmentsinthe2000s

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ule of law formats within countries that moved from military to

democratic regimes in the 1980s were influenced by a twofold

process.Ontheonehand,thereweretheinternationalmovementsthattookpart

intheresistancetothemilitaryandinthereconstructionofthejuridical-political

order. Among themwere pro-human rights NGOs and development cooperation

agencies involvedin ‘exportingdemocracy’(DEZALAYandGARTH,2002).Onthe

otherhand,theprocessofreconstructionoftheruleoflawprovidedopportunities

for reproduction strategies, with new symbolic investments and functions for

judicial elites arising as part of transition processes and the drawing up of new

constitutions. In the decades following the end of the military regimes, these

groups strove to build independent power bases anchored in the courts, public

ministries,andtheexpansionofstatebureaucracythatwerepermeatedbymodels

ofrespectforlegalrules(BOURDIEU,2012;ENGELMANN,2017).

Brazil is one of the most representative cases in South America of the

successofjudicialelitesinbuildingsuchpowerbasesinademocraticregime.This

article focusesonwhatweunderstandtobeasecondmoment in thisprocessof

the riseof legalpractitionerswithin thepower space, following the construction

and accumulation of political and symbolic capital in judicial institutions during

theperiodsubsequenttore-democratization.

The scenario involves connections between autonomous institutions,

especially thePublicProsecutor’sOffice, and internationalmovements thatdrive

theanti-corruptionagenda.Weintendtoshowthatthisinternationalconnection

is a relevant dimension for understanding both the corporate

empowerment of attorneys-general and, in general, the conditions of

appropriation and legitimation of this agenda in the domestic space. In the

corporatesense,anti-corruptionmovementshavehelped legitimizetheexpertise

of those engaged in prosecution actions against politicians by reaffirming the

independence and institutional and symbolic strength of judicial institutions.

Similarly, international factors have influenced the institutional designs,

lawsandbureaucraticstructuresthathaveflourishedinBrazilaroundthe

anti-corruptionagenda,aswellasthecoursesofactiontakenbythelargestanti-

R

Fabiano Engelmann & Eduardo de MouraMenuzzi

(2020)14(1)e0008–3/35

corruptionoperationsofthelastdecadeinwhichthecentralactorswereagentsof

thejudiciary.

Thisprocessinvolvedasecondgenerationoflegalspecialistsrecruitedfor

statecareersfromthe2000s2whodidnotparticipateintheconstitutionaldebates

andcorporatebattlesofthefirstdecadeafterthemilitaryregime.This‘consolidation’

of thepoliticalpowerof judicial actors in recentdecadesoccurred through their

greater autonomy vis-à-vis the political space. Their actions differ greatly from

those of the ‘gentleman politicians of law’ (DEZALAY and GARTH, 2002;

ENGELMANN, 2006) or themagistrates’ and prosecutors’ associationswho took

partintheConstituentAssembly(MACIELandKOERNER,2014)andwerepresent

inpoliticallifethroughoutthe1990s(ARANTES,2002;ENGELMANN,2006).Their

political and corporate activism sought to promote democracy and social

justice through the creation of important relational axeswith international

humanrightsmovements3.Internalmovementsinthelegalfieldalsoreinforced

thistendency,suchasthefoundingoftheAssociationofJudgesforDemocracy

in 1991 and the alternative law movement (1990 to 1995) which sought to

deconstruct the ‘neutrality’ of the law and involve judicial institutions in the

politicaldebateandresistancetotheneoliberalagendaoftheCollorandCardoso

governments(seeENGELMANN,2006).

In our period, institutions endowed with considerable autonomy and

consolidated power established relationships with both internal political

movementsandtheinternationalspace.Oneofthestrategiescanbefoundinthe

anti-corruptionmovementsthatoccupiedthecenteroftheBrazilianpoliticalagendain

ourperiod.Thediscourseofcleaninguppoliticsandthe‘fightagainstcorruption’

______________________________________________________________________________________________2Althoughfurtherandmoreextensivestudiesareneeded,a‘generationeffect’intheincreaseoftheanti-corruption agenda in the Public Prosecution Service may be postulated from an analysis of theprofessional and academic pathways of the prosecutors who have led the anti-corruptionoperationtaskforcesandhavebeenpartofinstitutionalinternationalizationmovementsoverthelastdecade.

3Inrecentyears,thecontradictionbetweentheMPF’spoliticalactivismanditsjudicialactivismhasprogressively intensified,resulting in theexternalizationofagenuine intergenerationalconflict.In2019,theOfficeoftheFederalProsecutorforCitizen’sRights,anMPFbodycomposedofpublicprosecutorswho joinedthe institution in the1980sand90s, issuedastatementonthe leaksofconversationsbetweenprosecutors involved inOperationLava Jato, to theeffect that ‘efforts totacklecorruptionneedtocomplywithhumanrightsstandards’(MINISTÉRIOPÚBLICOFEDERAL,2019b (FEDERAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE)) and emphasizing the importance of dueprocessandfreedomofthepress.


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has been bandied about frequently in the course of battles between political

groups throughout Brazilian history (PINTO, 2011). We should not, however,

dismisssuchdiscourseasamereside-effectoftheelectoralcycle;itisimportantto

verify the structural factors that fostered the genesis, development and

enhancement of this phenomenon. Our hypothesis is that in the Brazil of the

2000s,theseelementsappearintheexpansionofconnectionsbetweenlegalelites

intheJudiciary,thePublicProsecutor’sOfficeand,toalesserextent,thebureaucracies

of the Executive and the international space of anti-corruption agencies and

bodies. This is not to say that the internationalization of the anti-corruption

agenda is a causal determinant of the reorientation of the agenda of

Brazilian judicial institutions. But rather that due to structural similarities

between national arrangements (DEZALAY and GARTH, 2002) there is a clear

correspondence between the political and corporate strategies of certain legal

elitesandtheexpansionof the internationalanti-corruptionagenda.Thisagenda

penetrates the national power space on different fronts, including during the

drafting and passing of anti-corruption laws, increases in related budgets

(ARANTES, 2015) and political investment during Lula’s two mandates, as

describedinthebook‘TheLulaGovernmentandtheFightagainstCorruption’by

JorgeHage(2010).

The ‘fight against corruption’ became, during the 2000s, an international

cause,propagatedbytheUnitedStatesandthroughstandardsupheldbytheOECD,

the UN and the World Bank, all of which induced the proliferation of

domesticlawsinthenationalspace(TOURINHO,2018),andtheexpansion

of complianceprogramsvia economic regulations4. In general terms, theagenda

was legitimized in the national power space with help from the moral and

economic doctrines propagated by think tanks, transparency NGOs, investment

riskassessmentagenciesanddevelopmentbanks(ENGELMANN,2018,2017).The

strength of these prescriptions is evident in the expansion of anti-corruption

agencieswithvariedfunctions,whicharelegitimizedandinsertedintothespaceof______________________________________________________________________________________________4Therelationshipbetweenthesebodiesandanti-corruptionmovementscanbeseeninaseriesofinstitutional documents, such as those of the OECD (2014a; 2014b), theWORLD BANK (2012;2000)andUSAID/USAGENCYFORINTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENT(1999).


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political struggles (SOUZA, 2010). Institutional and symbolic claims of

independencefromrulersarefueledbyawholesetofinternationalprescriptions

and constitute thekeyelementof the successof theseendeavors in thenational

politicalspace.

Within theBrazilian framework, the Judiciary and thePublic Prosecutor’s

Officehavebecomecommandcentersforthedisseminationoftheanti-corruption

catechisminmultipleconnectionprofiles.Thelinksthatreinforcethepositionsof

those working to advance the anti-corruption agenda within these institutions

range from technical legal cooperation related to anti-corruption operations, to

cooperation agreements linking judicial institutions with NGOs, OECD working

groups and other international bodies. Likewise, the proliferation of spaces

dedicatedtoacademictrainingandthedisseminationofideasaroundanti-corruption

is indicativeof the consolidationof thisdoctrine. It is essential toconsider

thewhole process of import-export of ideas,models of operation and corporate

conceptions(ENGELMANN,2017).

Startingoutfromthisbroadframework,thistextintendstorevealthebasis

of these connections in the caseof theFederalPublicProsecutor’sOffice and its

internationalpartners.Ourhypothesisisthattheanti-corruptionagendahashada

dislocatingeffectofBrazilianpolitical-judicialactivism.Inotherwords,thepenetration

of international initiatives acquires symbolic and institutional strength by

aligning itself with the corporate investments of judicial institutions

and otherbureaucracies thathavebenefited fromaccumulated institutionaland

symboliccapitaloverthelasttwodecades.

Forapoliticalsociologyofanti-corruption

Expandingasacatechismthatappealstothestrengthofmoralideasand

thetechnicalrationalityofglobalmarkets, ‘anti-corruption’anchorsitselfinthespace

of national power through the transformation of the law, the creation of anti-

corruption agencies and public transparency. The literature on anti-corruption

programsandinitiativespointstotheexperiencesofregimetransitioninEastern

European countries from the1990s onwards as representative of the expanding

phenomenonofagenciespromotingthisagenda(SCHERRERetal.,2009;SMILOV,

2009;SOUZA,2010).Severalworkshavedemonstratedhowthese initiativesare


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leveraged in the course of domestic political struggles and election campaigns.

They also show how certain political forces connect themselves to NGOs and

international bodies (DJALILI, 2000; FARAVEL-GARRIGUES, 2009; HEURTAUX,

2009; PUJAS, 2000). Such studies highlight the importance of taking into

consideration the import-export logic of these movements and not simply

attributingthephenomenato‘externalpressure’onthespaceofdomesticpower.

Thescenariosofmobilizationofvariousactorsarounda‘policyjudgment’5

resultfromacombinationoffactors,wherebylegalelitesundertakerealcrusades

for the ‘moral rectification of politics’ anchored in their position in State power

structures(BOURDIEU,2012).Inthiscontext,theforceofthelawisleveragedina

political operation (BOURDIEU, 1981; ENGELMANN, 2018) with the central

objective of subjecting elected representatives to criminal punishments. This

practiceisknowninthefieldofinternationalrelationsaslawfare6.Itconsistsof

themanipulateduseoflegalrulesagainstpoliticalopponents,mostcommonly

in the US. Anti-corruption operations run by government-related prosecutors

targetpoliticalopponents. IntheBraziliancase, thephenomenonacquiresavery

specificcharacteristic.Lawfareactorsareacategoryofagentsembeddedinstate

power that have structurally gained a great measure of independence from

politicalpressure.

A key area of research on this phenomenon concerns anti-corruption

operations. More specifically, the ‘hyper-activism’ of judicial agents and control

bureaucracies enhanced by the mediatization of political and financial scandals.

StudiesofthemostfamousEuropeancasesofthe1990s,suchas‘OperazioneMani

Pulite’inItaly(BRIQUET,2001;VAUCHEZ,2004)andthescandalsthatresultedin

the sentencing of politicians in France (ROUSSEL, 2002; VAUCHEZ, 2017) and

Spain (PUJAS, 2000) have shown how this works. Their authors discuss

the political meanings of these operations and to what extent they fit into the

______________________________________________________________________________________________5Thenotionoflawfareisabroadoneandisalsoemployedbyauthorswhodiscussthesocialbasisof the relationship betweenmorality and politics, such as in research on how voters perceivecorruptionandpoliticianswhoaresentencedincourt.SeeLascoumesandNagels(2015).

6Formoreontheconceptoflawfare,seeAnsah(2010).


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frameworkofstructuralchangesinthepositionofjudicialinstitutionsinthespace

ofpower.

Looking at the French case, Roussel (2002) highlights importance of

considering the autonomization of judicial institutions in relation to political

power,withtheweakeningoftiesofsolidaritybetweenjudgesandpoliticiansand

the emergence of an autonomous judiciary. This process favors a newmodel of

professionalexcellencethatincludestheinterventionofmagistratesinthepolitical

space from the ‘outside’ legitimated as ‘defense of general interests’. These

processesofempowermentandeducationarebolsteredbythepenetrationofthe

concept of transparency into both the media and state power. Lascoumes and

Nagels (2015) draw attention to a historical pattern of weak penalization of

politicalandfinancialeliteslinkedtoFrenchcorruptioncases.Theyemphasizethe

small number of cases sent to court by the administrative authorities that

supervise the crimes of large companies. Among the causes of this phenomenon

aredisputesoverinvestigativepowerbetweenthejudiciaryandtheregulatorsof

thebureaucracyaswellasamodelcharacterizedbyrelativelysmallerautonomy

intermsofjudicialresourcesinrelationtothepoliticalspace.

Corroborating the hypotheses of Briquet (2001), Roussel (2002)

Lascoumes and Nagels (2015) highlight three key factors that deserve to be

considered in order to understand the involvement of judicial agents and civil

servants inprocesses involving financialandpoliticalelites.First,adherencetoa

professionalcultureofindependencestronglyassociatedwithlegalprerogatives.This

is followed by legalism opposed to favoritism for elites. This legalism does not

mean‘obediencetothesystem’,butapointfromwhichprosecutorsinterpretfacts

and breakwith the conservative routine of a priori protection for elites. Finally,

LascoumesandNagels (2015)pointout thatanotherpotentiating factorof ‘anti-

corruption’ operations is the organization ofwork and the division of roles that

have evolved within the judiciary, police and administrative-financial control

bureaucracies.

Thespreadofthe‘anti-corruption’gospelinjudicialinstitutionsandstate

bureaucracies and its overlap with political battles in an importer country of

political and legal models (BADIE, 1992) presents a complex challenge. An

understandingof the logicssurroundingthestrategiesandtacticsof this import-


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exportmovementandtheiroverlapwithnationalpowergameshasbecomecrucial.

AsDezalayandGarth(2002)andEngelmann(2017)demonstrate,thedualplayof

legal elites that attempt to reinforce or rebuild positions in the national power

spaceinSouthAmericaisanimportantstartingpointforunderstandingwhatisat

stakewhenStatemodelsareimported.

Inthislight,theanti-corruptionfightassumesgreatcentralityinthe‘rule

of law’ and ‘good governance’ promoted by US think tanks (ABELSON, 2006;

ENGELMANN,2017,2018;McGANN,2017;MEDVETZ,2012;ROCHA,2015).This

movement of ideas is connected to the internationalization of the regulations

governing the activities of transnational US corporations by the 1977 Foreign

Corrupt Practices Act, which boosted the prescriptions for conformity and the

strengtheningofanti-corruptionauthorities(FAVAREL-GARRIGUES,2009).

Inthetermsofthisgeneraldiscussion,theresearchunderlyingthisarticle

startsoutwith amore systematicunderstandingof the institutional cooperation

networksthatlinkjudicialagentswiththeinternationalanti-corruptionspace.We

startedoutbylookingatinternationaltreatiesandagreementsparticipatedinby

theBrazilian government, theFederalPublicProsecutor’sOffice and theFederal

Judiciary. In addition to cooperation documents, we looked at reports on

cooperationandtheinternationalcirculationoftheagentsleadingtheprocessas

sources.Thegoalherewas to identify recurringpatterns thatwouldallowus to

clarifylinkswiththeinternationalspace.Wetookanespeciallyprobinglookat

theFederalPublicProsecutor’sOffice’sinvolvementininternationalcooperation.One

key source were the records of leave for travel abroad taken by public

prosecutors between 2008 and 2018. This gave us a broader picture of

destinationcountriesaswellastheprofileofthemostfrequentlyrecurringanti-

corruption-relatedevents.

Internationalcooperationandinvestmentsbythelegalelite

International anti-corruption cooperation involves building a space for

formal and informal prescriptions, networks and agreements between NGOs,

international organizations, development agencies and legal and police

professionals.Atthenationalendofthisspace,stand-outfeaturesincludethe


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specialization of agents of the Judicial branch and the Public Prosecutor’s

Office,andtheemergenceofautonomoustransparencyandcontrolagencies.The

1977 US Congress approval of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

represented an important milestone in the internationalization of the ‘anti-

corruption’ catechism7. Initially controversial within the OECD due to its

scope ‘beyond the nation state’, this US initiative strongly influenced the

subsequent approval of the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention of 1997, which

came into force in1999.The introductionofOECDprogramsand initiatives is in

linewith the trainingandactivismworkof theNGOTransparency International,

foundedin1993(COEURDRAY,2004).Otherprogramsderivingfromthe2003UN

Conventionweresubsequently introduced.TheUN, throughUNODC,hasspurred

the adoption of national laws contributing to the expansion of ‘anti-corruption

agencies’ by fostering of legal and police expertise garnered from ‘anti-drug’

programs(Table05).

Inthe1990s,withleadershipfromtheWorldBankandtheIMF,financial

agencies also included anti-corruption prescriptions in ‘good governance’

models. The proliferation in the 2000s of specific international agreements and

programs for technical cooperation and training is another area that deserves

attention.Theseprogramsareanchoredinvariousentitiesandpenetratethe

national spaceby facilitating agreements in less formalizednetworkswith

the agents that increasingly circulate in this space, or even by reproduction of

equivalentprogramsbynationalagencies.

Theconditionsforthesuccessoftheseprescriptionsinthenationalspace

varyaccordingtothemobilizationstrategiesandpoliticalusestowhichtheyare

put by groups and agents interested in reinforcing or maintaining

positions in thespaceofpower.Even if initiativeprofilescanbe identified, the

overlap between internationalized formal and informal networks is an important

element. Transparency International, for example, acts in the construction of the

______________________________________________________________________________________________7ThisFCPAprohibitspaymentstoforeigngovernmentofficials,foreignpoliticalpartiesand/orcandidatesforforeignpoliticalofficeinexchangeforcommercialoreconomicadvantage.ItappliesnotonlytoUS-basedcompaniesorcompaniesotherwisesubjecttoUSlaw,butalsotoUSlistedcompaniesandothercompaniesthatengageincorruptiononUSterritory.


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anti-corruption catechism through thediffusionof publications and the

construction of measurement indicators that mobilize the discourse of

the‘independence’ofNGOsandthescientificfield.Toreinforcethisdoctrine,itacts

while anchored in the share of state power held by anti-corruption agencies,

judiciaries and public ministries in concluding cooperation agreements for

consultancy on the use of public resources, as in thecaseofBrazil’sMPFand

NationalJusticeCouncil(CNJ).Wecanalsomentionthethinktanksthatpromotethe

fight against corruption as an instrument for promoting the rule of law

(ENGELMANN, 2017). These guide strategies towards members of national

agencies,magistratesandprosecutorsbyconferringawardsordistinctions,orby

financing lecturesandpublications ina spaceof “construction, reproductionand

circulation of ideas designed to shape public debate based on the principle of

legitimacy”(SVARTAMANN,2018,p.131).

AnotherimportantmovementrelatestotheactionsoftheUnitedNations

OfficeonDrugs andCrime (UNODC). In1997, theUNODC8promotedprojects in

various countries that focused on ‘anti-corruption strategies’. In addition to the

dissemination of its prescriptions, the UNODC Global Program seeks to ‘identify

examplesandbestpractices’developedonanationalscalethatcancontributeto

an ‘international strategy’ in terms of anti-corruption. The program serves as a

focalpoint for thevarious fieldofficesaround theworldandplaysan important

role in standardizing police operations methodology. In this sense, it provides

models of investigation, interrogation and international legal cooperation and

transfersexpertiseacquiredsincethe1970sinthefightagainstorganizedcrimeto

thesphereofcriminalizationofcorruption(ANDREASandNADELMAN,2006).

WithinthescopeoftheUNODC,theJudicialIntegrityGroup9,createdafter

meetingsofheadsofthejudicialbranchesofgovernmentinvariouscountries,has

theobjectiveofbringingtogether judgesanddisseminatingprinciplesofconduct

relatedtoanti-corruptionprescriptions.Anotherimportantfrontforstrengthening

cohesion between moral prescriptions, expertise and law is the movement to

create trainingand information-sharingnetworksbetweenagencies.Encouraged

______________________________________________________________________________________________8UNOfficededicatedtofightingcrimeanddrugtrafficking.9SeeNaçõesUnidas(2008(UNITEDNATIONS))andInternationalTransparency(2007).


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by OECD and UN conventions, the ‘autonomous anti-corruption agency’ model

formspartoftheprescriptionsoftheseinternationalmovements.Representative

examplesincludetheinformalnetworkscreatedin2001withintheframeworkof

theEuropeanUnion,EuropeanPartnersAgainstCorruption(EPAC)andtheAnti-

CorruptionAgencyNetwork(ANCORAGENET)establishedin2006.

TheEuropeanContact-PointNetworkAgainstCorruption(EACN),created

by the European Commission, brings together leaders from various agencies

anchoredinthenationalpowerofEuropeancountries.Inthissamedimensionwe

canalsobementiontheEuropeanAnti-FraudOffice(OLAF),aspecializedfinancial

fraudunit created in1999, and theGroupof StatesagainstCorruption (GRECO),

linked to the European Council, which brings together representatives from

member states. Among academic actions for specific training purposes, wemay

includetheInternationalAnti-CorruptionAcademy(IACA),whichhasagreements

with the Brazilian Public Prosecution Service for training on techniques and

prescriptions.AninternationalinitiativecreatedinBeijingin2003,theInternational

Association of Anti-corruption Authorities (IAACA), is also indicative of the

activitiesofinter-agencynetworks.

In 2011, the OECD launched the CleanGovBiz program. This initiative

focuses on public administration and state institutions and guides the

development of instruments to combat corruption. According to the OECD,

CleanGovBizisastrategicpriorityfortheorganizationandispartoftheG20Anti-

Corruption Action Plan, which has set out biennial goals since 2010. It was

preceded by the Declaration on Propriety, Integrity and Transparency in the

ConductofInternationalBusinessandFinance(thePITDeclaration)of2009.This

aimstoencouragecountriestopromoteimprovementsinbusinessenvironments

through cleaner and more efficient markets and more transparent government

systems.A setof ‘tools’, called ‘theToolkit’ areprovidedaspartof theplan, and

show,amongother things,howprocurementprocesses canbe improvedorhow

governmentactorscanencouragecompaniestoadoptcomplianceguidelinesand

reformnational judicial systems to ensure the cooperationof judges inhanding

downsentencesincorruptioncases.

In line with international programs, the National Program for the

DisseminationofInternationalLegalCooperation(GrotiusBrazil),withafocuson


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anti-corruption training of civil servants, was instituted in 2010. It promotes

everything from technical training courses to academic publications and

universityextensionprograms focusedon legal cooperation. Itwasemployed in

various regions acrossBrazil10. TheAnnualReport of theNational Secretariat of

Justice11 and the 10th Commemorative Report on the National Strategy for the

FightagainstCorruptionandMoneyLaundering(ENCCLA)12,theNationalTraining

and Training Program for the Fight against Corruption and Money Laundering

(PNDL)havearecordofconductingcoursesinpartnershipwithseveralBrazilian

institutionsandhadtrained364agentsby2012.

TheinternationalcirculationofMPFagents:theSecretariatofInternational

Cooperationandtheinternationalexchangesofpublicprosecutors

Over thecourseof the2000sand2010s,national cooperation initiatives

onanti-corruption13sawconsiderableadvances.Ontheonehand,wefindspecific

lawsresultingfrominternationalagreementsthatpointtotechnicalcooperationin

combating money laundering and asset recovery. On the other hand, there are

broaderscopelawsthathaveadirectimpactontherepositioningofthelegalelite

that circulate among thepublic andprivate sectors (Table01), suchas thePlea-

Bargaining Law and the Anti-Corruption Law, both from 2013 (ENGELMANN,

2017).

It is important to analyze the cooperation agreements that link the

national space of justice institutions and government bureaucracies to the

international anti-corruption space. Such analysis reveals the connections that

anchor the prescriptions of international networks, NGOs, programs and

organizations in the field of national power. The expansion of these

agreements in the2000shighlights at least twophenomenainthelegalfield

(Table 02). First, it expands the international circulation of Brazilian state

______________________________________________________________________________________________10SeedetailsintheBrazilreport(2011).11SeedetailsintheBrazilreport(2012a).12SeeBrazilReport(2012b). 13For furtherdetailsoncooperationagreementsseethe followingdocuments fromtheMinistériode Relações Exteriores (2015a; 2015b (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS)), International Anti-Corruption Academy (2016) and Rede Ibero-Americana de Cooperação Internacional (2011(IBERO-AMERICANINTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONNETWORK)).


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functionaries around new doctrinal and technical conceptions of law.This

impacts not only on the strategic direction of institutions such as the Public

Prosecutor’s Office, but also on internal anti-corruption operations through the

adoption of penal negotiationmodels, asset recovery techniques (and recovered

asset management) and intensified data sharing, as well as the adoption of an

‘internationalanti-corruptionregime’tocombatmoney-launderinginthenational

space(TOURINHO,2018).

Table01.Anti-CorruptionLawsinthe2000s2000 FiscalResponsibilityLaw SupplementaryLawNº1012000 CrimesagainstPublicFinancesLaw LawNº10,0282001 Lawontheconfidentialityofthe

operationsoffinancialinstitutionsSupplementaryLawNº105

2002 ElectronicNotificationLaw LawNº10,520ofJuly2009 TransparencyLaw SupplementaryLawNº1312010 CleanSlateLaw SupplementaryLawNº1352011 AccesstoInformationLaw LawNº12,5272013 PleaBargainingLaw LawNº12,8502013 Anti-corruptionLaw LawNº12,8462016 Anti-terrorismLaw LawNº13,2602016 State-ownedenterpriseliabilityLaw LawNº13,3032017 Tenmeasuresagainstcorruption PL4850/2016–PLC27/2017(inprogress)2019 Anti-crimePackage PLNº881/2019,PLNo.882/2019andPLP

No.38/2019Source:Elaboratedbytheauthor’sbasedonDiárioOficial(2000-2018).

In a general sense, the most concrete result is that the networks for

sharingtechnicalresearchinformationwereexpandedtoaninternationalscale.

Secondly,theinternationalagreementsareinlinewiththeinternalcorporate

movements of different categories of legal professionals. In particular, the

categories positioned in spaces at claim autonomy from politicians and leaders,

suchastheComptrollerGeneraloftheUnion(CGU),theGeneralAdvocacyofthe

Union (AGU), the Federal Police and the Public Defender of the Union (DPU)14.

Thesecategoriespursuetheguaranteesprerogativesofindependenceobtainedby

theJudiciaryandthePublicProsecutor’sOfficesincetheendofthemilitaryregime

(seeARANTES,2015).

______________________________________________________________________________________________14Regarding the controversial attempt by DPU agents to involve the MPF in the fight againstcorruption,seethepublicdebatebetweenSãoPauloStatePublicDefenderMarcosViníciusMansoLopesGomes(2018)andRiodeJaneiroStatePublicDefenderElisaCruz(2018).


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Table02.InternationalagreementswithBrazilianparticipationinthe2000s Date Summaryofagreement(objective,responsiblebody,resultsand

actions)Inter-AmericanConventionagainstCorruption(CaracasConvention)OAS

1996PromulgatedinBrazilbyDecreeNº4,410,2002

PromoteandstrengthenthedevelopmentbyeachStatePartyofthemechanismsnecessarytoprevent,detect,punishanderadicatecorruption.Promote,facilitate,andregulatecooperationamongStatePartiestoensuretheeffectivenessofmeasuresandactionstakentoprevent,detect,punish,anderadicatecorruptionintheexerciseofpublicfunctions,aswellasactsofcorruptionspecificallylinkedtotheexerciseofpublicfunctions.Partner:governmentofBrazil.

ConventionontheFightagainsttheCorruptionofForeignPublicOfficialsOECD

1997PromulgatedinBrazilbyDecreeNº3,678of11/2000

Takeallnecessarystepstoestablishthatunderitslawsitisacriminaloffenseforanypersonintentionallytooffer,promiseorgiveanyimproperfinancialorotheradvantage,eitherdirectlyorthroughintermediaries,fromaforeignpublicofficial,totheofficialinquestionortothirdparties.Partner:governmentofBrazil.

CooperationagreementFinancialActionTaskForceofLatinAmerica(GAFILAT)

2000 GAFILATisaregionalgroupthatbelongstotheinternationalnetworkofagenciesdedicatedtopreventingandcombatingmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing.ThecoreofthisnetworkistheOECD-basedFATF,locatedinParis,whichissuesthe40Recommendations-theinternationalstandards-thatallitsmembercountriesarerequiredtoimplementintheirnationallaws.Partner:governmentofBrazil.TheMPFbecameanofficialmemberofthenetworkin2014.

UNConventionagainstCorruption,inInternationalCommercialTransactionsUN

2003PromulgatedinBrazilbyDecreeNº5,687of2006

01.Promoteandstrengthenmeasurestopreventandcombatcorruptionmoreeffectivelyandefficiently;02.Promote,facilitateandsupportinternationalcooperationandtechnicalassistanceinpreventingandcombatingcorruption,includingassetrecovery;03.Promoteintegrity,accountabilityandpropermanagementofpublicaffairsandproperty.Partner:governmentofBrazil.

TheIbero-AmericanPublicProsecutorTrainingNetwork(RECAMPI)andtheIbero-AmericanNetworkforInternationalLegalCooperation(IberRede)

SignedinMadrid2010

01.ThepurposeofthisFrameworkAgreementistolaydownthegeneralbasisforcollaborationbetweenthePartiesinvolvedinareasofcommoninterest.02.Tofacilitatethiscollaboration,thePartiesundertaketoinformeachotheraboutthelinesofactionidentifiedasprioritiesineachperiod,andtheactivitiesthatwilldevelopthem.03.ThePartiesagreetodevelopanannualActionPlanwiththisFrameworkAgreementandtheprioritiesidentifiedbyeachofthemforthatperiodasthegeneralbasisforcollaboration,inwhichtheyshallsetoutthemostappropriateformforsaidcollaborationaswellasthespecificactivitiestheyaretoperform.Partner:FederalPublicProsecutor’sOffice.


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Date Summaryofagreement(objective,responsiblebody,resultsandactions)

MultilateralConventiononMutualAdministrativeAssistanceinTaxMattersOECD

2011PromulgatedinBrazilbyDecreeNº8,84208/2016

ThePartiesshallprovideeachotherwithadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters.Thisassistanceshallcover,whereapplicable,measurestakenbyjudicialbodies.Saidadministrativeassistanceincludes01.theexchangeofinformation,includingsimultaneoustaxauditsandparticipationintaxauditscarriedoutabroad;02.thecollectionoftaxcredits,includingprecautionarymeasures;and03.thenotificationofdocuments.

CooperationagreementInternationalAnti-CorruptionAcademy(IACA)

2013CGU2016CNMP

Thecooperationtakesplacebetweenagencieswiththevoluntaryexchangeofinformationfromanon-exclusivedatabase.Formsofcooperationincludecreationofandsupportformutualanti-corruptionprojects;meetingstoevaluatestrategies;exchangeofinformationandresults,especiallyinregardtoactivitiesofcommoninterest;commitmenttopromotetraining;andmutualassistance.Partner:NationalCouncilofthePublicProsecutor’sOffice(CNMP)andGeneralComptrolleroftheUnion(CGU).

CooperationagreementTransparencyInternationalandMPF

2014 Shareknowledgeonareasofcorruptionpreventionandpublictransparency.TransparencyInternationalofferedtoprovideassistancefreeofchargeintheJ&Fcase.Partner:FederalPublicProsecutor’sOffice.

MPFandWorldBankMemorandumofUnderstanding

2015 FacilitateinformationanddataexchangeinthefightagainstfraudandcorruptioninWorldBankfundedprojects.

CNJandTransparencyInternationalCooperationAgreement

2017 Focusonpromotinganti-corruptionpracticeswithinthejudiciary.Theinstitutionsenvisagepresentingaworkplandetailingactivitiesrangingfromtrainingjudgesontopicssuchasanti-corruptiontoprotectingvictimsandwitnesses.ThepartnershipinvolvestheexchangeofexperiencesbetweentheinternationalentityandtheBrazilianbody.Partner:NationalJusticeCouncil(CNJ).

TransparencyInternationalandMPFCooperationAgreement

December2017

Establishaworkscheduleandguidelinesforinvestingpartofthecompany’sleniencyfinesintosocialanti-corruptionprojects.Partner:FederalPublicProsecutor’sOffice.

Source:Elaboratedbytheauthor’sbasedonEngelmann(2018).

The establishment of internationalization channels for these institutions

andagencies in thespaceopenedbyanti-corruptionactivism, forgesacorporate

paththatgoesfarbeyondtheoriginalprerogativessetforthinthelawsofthe1988

Constitution.Thereinforcementofprerogativesofinvestigationandsupervisionof

the political field comes from ‘interpretation’, proposed laws and technical

specializationintheseinstitutionsandagenciesthroughoutthe2000s.Inaddition,

itbenefits fromincreasedresources,asthe ‘nationalanti-corruptioncamp’

mediates international prescriptions that acquire the force of law (ARANTES,


(2020)14(1)e0008–16/35

2015), a program that unites the media, moral entrepreneurs, business

associations, international NGOs and their local reproducers (ENGELMANN,

2017, 2018). In this regard, it is interesting to note the comparative data from

studies on the ‘scandalization’ of politics,which reveal the unequal treatment of

theExecutive,LegislativeandJudiciarypowersandthePublicProsecutor’sOffice,

and empirical evidence on the complex effects of the association between the

mainstreammedia and the justice system inBrazil’s democracy (FERES JÚNIOR,

MELO,andBARBABELA,2018;FERESJÚNIOR,BARBABELA,andBACHINI,2018).

According to Saraiva (2016), the increasing investment of MPF staff in

convention-related meetings intensified the exchange of information between

themandtheirinternationalcounterparts,aswellasamongpublicservants

fromrelatedbodiesinothercountries,police,taxauthoritiesandadministrative

controlbodies.

Closercontacts,inthissense,arecentraltotheimprovementofcooperation

channelsindependentoftheBraziliangovernment15(Table03).Inaddition

to participating in working groups linked to international conventions and

agencies, theMPF expanded its relationshipwith Transparency International by

participating in the production of its annual reports. Likewise, another way in

whichtheMPFparticipatesininternationalforaisthroughcollaborationinstudies

conductedbydifferentbodiesaimedatimprovingpublicandprivatemechanisms

inthisarea.

The participation, especially of the MPF, in cooperation programs

highlights the internationalization of methods that involve operating profiles

derived in many cases from counter-trafficking models. Apart from technical

cooperation, some of these agreements relate directly to the creation of ‘anti-

corruption laws’ in the national space during the 2000s. The MPF is a

representative case due to its central importance. It began its more

systematic anti-corruptionactivitywith thecreation,in2005,oftheCenterfor

International Legal Cooperation (CCJ). From the end of 2009, the MPF began______________________________________________________________________________________________15In2015,theheadquartersoftheSecretariatforInternationalCooperationestablishedagrouptoset up a legal liaison officewith the French government. The resulting office included the onlyliaisonmagistrateinBrazilabletoexpediterequestsformutualassistancebetweentheMPFandtheFrenchjudiciary(MINISTÉRIOPÚBLICOFEDERAL,2015).


(2020)14(1)e0008–17/35

strategicallymonitoring compliancewith international conventions, as highlighted

bySaraiva(2016),byconductinginternationalinsertionassessmentthatindicates

theautonomyofinitiativesinrelationtotheExecutive:

Theretofore, the MPF had been occasionally invited to attendmeetings of international bodies on the subject, usually when somebranchoftheExecutive(especiallytheMinistryofForeignAffairs,theCGUor the Ministry of Justice) considered its presence relevant. Startingfrom 2009, Gurgel Santos (General Prosecutor at the time) beganincreasing the frequency with which representatives we appointed toOECD,UNandOASmeetingsthatdealtwithanti-corruptionconventions.InJuly 2010, a working group was set up specifically for MPFrepresentation at thesebodies,whichwas to complement theworkofthe ASCJI. With General Prosecutor Rodrigo Janot taking office inSeptember2013, the InternationalLegalCooperationSecretariat(SCI)wascreated, andplace under the responsibility of amemberwith exclusivededication to legal cooperation (...). Subsequently, an Executive Groupwas set up in view of the need for frequent conventions and otherinternationalevents(SARAIVA,2016,p.207).

In the 2010s, two cooperation agreements were made with the NGO

Transparency International. The first, more generic, agreement, signed in 2014

related to ‘knowledge sharing’. In 2017, the second agreement, which aimed at

conductinganti-corruptioncampaignswiththeuseofpartoftheassetsrecovered

in theoperations. Inparticular, theamountsobtained fromthe fines imposedon

companies foundguiltyofcorruptionpractices.Thus,onecanobservethat

inadditiontothecirculationofprescriptionsfromtheinternationalspaceand

theestablishmentofautonomousrelationships,fundswerealsosetuptoleverage

cooperationwith international bodies.This connection reveals theMPF’s role as

formulatorandexecutorofpublicpolicyinthedistributionofthesefunds16.

Theseinitiativeswereaccompaniedbythecreationofnationallyanchored

actions.InSeptember2015,theNationalCouncilofthePublicProsecutionService

(CNPMP)createdtheNationalAnti-CorruptionForum(FNCC)17.Thisconstitutesa

______________________________________________________________________________________________16Onwhichsubject,itisinterestingtonotetheannouncementfromtheFederalPublicProsecutor’sOffice(2019c)thatithadcreatedofafoundationresponsiblefordefiningthecriteriaforallocatingthesefunds,andthatthosecomingfromitsagreementwithPetrobraswouldsoonbeavailable.

17ThedetaileddocumentsandevaluationsoftheMPF’scooperationagreementswithTransparencyInternational,aswellastheinitiativesoftheNationalCorruptionForummaybeconsultedontheinstitutionalwebsiteoftheNationalCouncilofthePublicProsecutionService.


(2020)14(1)e0008–18/35

‘political’ action on the part of theMPF and appears as a centralizing space for

discourse circulation. It involves initiatives that transcend the organization’s

sphereofactionandengagewiththespaceofanti-corruptionactivism.According

to its founding document, its objective is “to foment debate and the

constructionofpreventionandrepressioninitiativeswithintheBrazilianFederal

PublicProsecutionServiceintendifferentaxesofaction”(CONSELHONACIONAL

DOMINISTÉRIOPÚBLICO,2015).Theseinitiativesinclude:Transparencyandthe

LawonAccess to Information, internalcontroland theprofessionalizationof the

public administration, educational campaigns, training for social control,

legislativemeasuresandeducationalprojects.

Table03.ProfilesoflinksestablishedininternationalagreementsConnections Commitments-betweentheBraziliangovernmentandforeigngovernments-betweentheBraziliangovernmentandinternationalbodies(OECD,UNandOAS)-betweenjudicialorcontrolinstitutions(CGU/MPF/Revenue)andcounterpartorganizationsorinstitutions-betweentheFederalPublicProsecutor’sOfficeandNationalJusticeCouncilandTransparencyInternational

-commitmenttoimplementing‘measures’tocontrolandcombatcorruption-commitmenttocriminalizingcorruptioninthepublicsector(transformingitintoacriminalmatter)-commitmenttosharingfiscalandtaxdata,etc-commitmenttocombatingmoneylaunderingand-thesharingofinformationonthisthemecommitmentto‘anti-corruption’training-trainingofjudges,prosecutors,civilservants,advisoryserviceontherecoveryofassetsrecoveredduringanti-corruptionoperations

Source:Elaboratedbytheauthor’sbasedonMinistryofForeignAffairs(2015a;2015b;2018)andBrazilianPublicProsecutor’sOffice(2015;2016;2018).

Initsconditionasanintermediateeliteentity(BADIE,1992),thesuccess

oftheMPFreinforcesitsroleassponsoroftherecommendationsofinternational

agencies in national political processes. In 2015, the President of the

Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Roger Wikins, visited General Prosecutor

RodrigoJanot,andalertedhimtothefactthattheabsenceofeffectivemeasuresto

criminalize terrorist organizations could lead to the imposition of economic

sanctionsonBrazil.Asaresultof themeeting, thePGRforwarded letters to

theOfficeofthePresident,theChamberofDeputies,theMinistryofJusticeandthe

Federal Senate recommending that an Anti-Terrorism Law be put in place as a

matter of urgency. To close the international circuit in that year, the measures

adoptedbytheMPFatthedomesticlevelwerepresentedatameetingoftheFATF

in Austria (MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL, 2015). In 2016, Law Nº 13,260


(2020)14(1)e0008–19/35

defined the concept of terrorism and a terrorist organization and established

investigativeandproceduralprovisions.

The international community lavished rewards on theMPF. On the one

hand,internationalrecognitionofitsprivilegedstatusasanevaluatorintheanti-

corruption system: in 2015, public prosecutors participated in the evaluation

mechanisms of the international anti-corruption systems of Suriname

(MESISIC/OAS),Antigua,Barbuda(IRG/UNCAC),Sweden,Spain(WGB/OECD),and

Canada (FATF) (MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL, 2015). On the other,

international awards and foreign media appearances, widely reproduced in the

‘field of scandals’ (GRÜN, 2018) in Brazil. In 2015, General Prosecutor Rodrigo

Janotislistedamong100globalthinkersbyForeignPolicy,amagazinespecializing

in international politics. In 2017, the prosecutors Deltan Dallagnol, Carlos

Fernando do Santos Lima and Roberson Pozzobon represented Operation Lava

Jatoat theannualawardceremonyof theGlobal InvestigationsReview(GIR),an

agencythatspecializesininternationalinvestigations.In2018,LavaJatoprosecutors

inParaná,RiodeJaneiroandBrasiliareceivedtheSpecialAchievementAwardofthe

InternationalAssociationofProsecutors(AFFONSO,2017;BRANDTandAFFONSO,

2018;COUTINHO,2015;MINISTÉRIOPÚBLICOFEDERAL,2018c,2017f).

At the domestic level, theMPF’s strategy of primacy in the fight against

corruptionhas facilitated recognitionof its centralposition in theBrazilian

anti-corruption system, and has carved it out a role as the central authority for

internationalcooperationrequests inrespectofcriminalmatterspursuanttothe

Convention on Judicial Assistance betweenMember States of the Community of

PortugueseSpeakingCountriesinCriminalMatters.Thisinvolvesallrequestsfrom

theBrazilianprosecutortoAngola,CapeVerde,Guinea-Bissau,EquatorialGuinea,

Mozambique,SãoTomeandPrincipeandEastTimor(BRASIL,2016;MINISTÉRIO

PÚBLICOFEDERAL,2016).

Theanalysisoftheprofessionalandacademicpathwaysanddataofthe22

federal prosecutors belonging to the Support Group of the MPF Secretariat for

InternationalCooperationcreatedin2013,whichrepresentsthecontinuityofthe

2005initiatives,makesimportantinferencespossible.TheSecretariat’strajectory

corroborates the hypothesis of a cumulative specialization over the last fifteen

yearstowardsamodeloflegalcooperationinwhichtheMPFactsindependentlyof


(2020)14(1)e0008–20/35

government institutions.Most of themembers of this group graduatedwith law

degrees during the 1990s, half of them between 1998 and 2001. Entry into the

MPFoccurredforthemostpartbetweenthesecondhalfofthe1990sandtheearly

2000s,nearlyadecadeafterthepromulgationofthenewConstitution.

This was a generation of prosecutors who had not participated in the

formationoftheMPFinthedecadesubsequenttothedemocratictransition.This

meansthat theyhadnotparticipated in the internaldiscussionsabout theMPF’s

‘role in democracy’ during the 1990s, which was very much a continuation of

constitutional debate (ARANTES, 2002; ENGELMANN, 2007; MACIEL and

KOERNER,2014).Mostofthemembersofthegroupcanboastamaster’sdegreeor

a PhD, half ofwhichwere obtained abroad, in Spain or theUnited States. Those

withthehighestacademicqualificationsarealsopartoftheregionalMPFtraining

schools and, in some cases, are university professors. This, in addition to their

variousbooksandarticlesonlegalissues,indicatessomedegreeofinvestmentin

the theoreticaldebateand the trainingof expertson themes linked to theMPF’s

activities. Even though their publications deal with various aspects of law, the

theme of criminal legal cooperation is clearly predominant among the books,

dissertationsanddoctoraltheses.Themaintopicsincludecomplianceandspecific

issuesrelatedto‘fightingcorruption’.

Connectionsandinsertionintotheinternational‘anti-corruption’space

Foreign tripsundertakenbyprosecutorsprovide anotherprism through

whichtoobserve the intensificationof theautonomous internationaleddies

flowingaroundtheMPFinthe2000s.Travelprofilesprovideimportantcluesthat

corroborate the connections between internationally circulating institutional

strategiesandtheprosecutors’investmentsinexpertiseandnetworksofexchange.In

ordertoobtainarepresentativeoverviewoftheinternationalcirculationofstate

prosecutors,we built a database of information covering the period 2008-2018,

extracted by consulting all the editions of the Official Gazette, in which 878

authorizationsforattendanceatoverseaseventswerepublished.Weselectedtrips

relatedtoinstitutionalcooperationintheprosecutionofcrimeandthemesfalling

withinthescopeof‘anti-corruption’.Weexcludedexchangetripsderivingdirectly


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from the status of prosecutor, such as the completion of postgraduate courses

abroad,fromthisstudy(Graph01).

Theinformationavailableintheofficialrecordscontainsthenameofthe

prosecutor, his or her destination and the period of the trip. Staffing levels and

roleswerealsocataloged,allowingustocreateaprofileofprosecutorswhotravel

internationally. Analysis of travel records in our period allowed us to observe a

cleartrendofincreasedtravelfrom2015,coincidingwithOperationLavaJato.The

dataconfirmthatthemostfrequenttravelerscomefromthegroupofprosecutors

who occupy prominent positions in the Secretariat of International Cooperation.

Ourdatabasealsoshowedthatthistrendisalsopresentininter-statetripswithin

Brazil,whichisindicativeoftheproliferationofanti-corruption-linkedevents.

Graph01.Numberoftrips/year(2008-2018)

Source:Elaboratedbytheauthor’sbasedonDiáriosOficiais(2000-2018).Elaboratedbytheauthor’sbasedonDiáriosOficiais(2000-2018).

Overtheperiod2008-2018sevencountriesstandoutamongdestinations

forprosecutors:TheUnitedStates,France,Argentina,Italy,Portugal,Austria

andPeru(Table04)(Graph02).

The first feature is that the predominant connections are with the

United States and European countries. France and Portugal appear as preferred

destinations for postgraduate law teachers in the 2000s (ENGELMANN, 2009;

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


(2020)14(1)e0008–22/35

WOHNRATH, 2018). The United States is likewise the preferred destination for

partners in the largest lawfirms(ENGELMANN,2011).Thesecondfeature is the

strong presence of cooperation between South American countries. Paraguay,

Uruguay and Colombia appear shortly after the most frequent destination

countries (USA, France, Argentina, Italy, Portugal, Austria and Peru), and this

indicates the importanceof taking into consideration the sizeofSouthAmerican

networks, in terms both associative (between publicministries) and technical18.

MozambiqueistheAfricancountrythatappearsmostfrequently.

Table04.MostfrequentdestinationsforProsecutors(2008-2018)País 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TOTALUSA 02 02 03 01 02 09 26 18 23 06 90France 01 03 04 08 12 10 17 11 07 72Argentina 04 10 01 01 03 05 03 03 16 04 50Italy 01 01 02 09 17 10 09 49Portugal 01 02 05 04 07 03 03 08 02 03 38Austria 01 01 01 01 05 09 09 06 03 35Peru 03 03 08 04 08 07 33Total 06 02 15 13 13 25 39 68 76 76 39

Source:Elaboratedbytheauthor’sbasedonDiáriosOficiais(2000-2018).

It is worth mentioning the efforts to expand formal and informal

associativenetworksbetweenpublicministriesacrossSouthAmerica.In2014,the

MPFformallyjoinedtheAssetRecoveryNetworkoftheLatinAmericanFinancial

ActionTaskForce(RRAG/GAFILAT)andappointedtheSecretaryofInternational

Cooperation, Vladimir Aras, to act as a point of contact (MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO

FEDERAL,2015).

In2016,theSecretariatforInternationalCooperationandtheMPFHigher

School held a roundtable discussion in Brasília with Jaime Arellano Quintana,

Executive Director of the Justice Studies Center of the Americas (JSCA)19, on

______________________________________________________________________________________________18Geliski (2018) demonstrates the importance of associative cooperation networks in theconsolidationofpublicdefendermodels.

19The Justice Studies Center of the Americas is an international body under the inter-Americansystem (OAS). It promotes technical assistance from governments and judicial institutions inreformingthejusticesystemintheregion.ThecareerofJaimeArellanoQuintanaprovidesaclearillustrationofthewaylegalelites intheanti-corruptionsystemcirculate internationally.HeisaChilean lawyerandholds adegree from thePontificalCatholicUniversityofChile (1984-1988)andamaster’sdegreeinPublicAdministrationandPublicPolicy(1995-1996)fromtheAmericanUniversity (Washington, USA) paid for by a Fulbright scholarship and the Presidency of theRepublic ofChile scholarship.Duringhis stay in theUSA,hewas an advisor to theChileanEmbassy.


(2020)14(1)e0008–23/35

‘Procedural Reform and Public Prosecution Models in Latin America’. From the

formal perspective, the commitment made by the representatives of the Public

MinistriesofIbero-Americancountriesin2018tocreateJointInvestigationTeams

(ECI) is evidence that the institutions have increased their transnational

information exchange channels (MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL, 2018a;

TOURINHO, 2018). From the informal perspective, the political efforts by the

BrazilianMPF toprotect thepositionofmembersof the ‘Lava Jato’ task force in

Peruhighlight strategies for strengthening the relationshipsbetweenagents and

their positions in the national fields (MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL, 2019a,

2018b).

RegardinginternationalcooperationbetweenSouthAmericancountries,it

is interestingtonotetheexistenceofempiricalevidenceshowingthatUSforeign

policy bodies contributed financially to the international travel of Brazilian

prosecutors.Thiswasdonebyfinancingparticipationineventsthatpromotedthe

sharingnotonlyofanti-corruptionlessonslearnedduringOperationLavaJato,but

alsotheinternationalizationofsuchinvestigations.ThefactthattheUnited

States Embassy paid the accommodation and meal expenses of Brazilian

representativesisrecordedinUSapprovalsforsuchdisbursements20.

Analysisofthedataonparticipationineventsabroadindicatestwo

major international insertion profiles in respect of prosecutors. One is that of

participation in thematic and institutional associative networks linking Latin

Americanagents.Inmostcases,eventsarerepeatedannuallyandarestableover

the time series.The secondprofile is thatofparticipation inmore specific

anti-corruption events in the countries of the northern hemisphere. Technical

cooperationandtrainingofexpertswerepredominantactivities.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ReturningtoChilebetween1996and2006,“hebuiltavariedpubliccareerinlegislativeadvice,design and implementation of public policies in the justice sector, and the modernization andmanagement of public institutions” (CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE JUSTICIA DE LAS AMÉRICAS,2019,p94).Between2006and2010,hewaslegalmanageroftheChileanEconomicDevelopmentAgency. In 2010, he became a senior partner of the traditional firm Jara andMarin Abogados(1976), acting in the area of public law and representing the private sector before regulatorybodiesandtheComptrollerGeneraloftheRepublic.HehasbeenExecutiveDirectorofJSCAsince2014.

20SeePGROrdinancesNºs392to396ofMay10,2017,publishedintheOfficialGazetteofMay18,2017,p.94(MINISTÉRIOPÚBLICOFEDERAL,2017a,2017b,2017c,2017d,2017e).


(2020)14(1)e0008–24/35

Graph02.Evolutioncountry/yearmostfrequentdestinations

Source:Elaboratedbytheauthor’sbasedonDiáriosOficiais(2000-2018).

ThereisasignificantvolumeoftraveltovariousUN,UNODCandOECD

events. They include the OECD Anti-Corruption Working Group and the

Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against

Corruption,whichholdsregularmeetingsrelatedtotheimplementationofthe

UN Anti-Corruption Convention. Also noteworthy are the meetings of the

InternationalAssociationofAnti-CorruptionAuthorities(IAACA)andtheFinancial

ActionTaskForceonMoneyLaundering(GAFI/FATF),aswellasongoingtraining

andcooperationeventswiththeUSDepartmentofJustice.

Finalconsiderations

The increase in the international circulation of MPF staff – beyond the

group of participants in the international prosecutor cooperation core –

showshowtheinstitutionhasinvestedininternationalizationasanationalpower

strategy.ThedatashowhighercirculationthanisindicatedbytheMPF’sown

documentsoncooperation,whichcorroboratesthehypothesisofaninternational

cooperation model that does not pass through the recorded channels of the

MinistryofForeignAffairsorotherregulargovernmentchannels.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

USA

France

Argentina

Italy

Portugal

Austria

Peru


(2020)14(1)e0008–25/35

As international studies that propose a political sociology of ‘anti-

corruption’movementshaveshown,itisnecessarytoconsiderbothnationaland

international priorities to fully grasp the nature of the phenomenon. The

diversificationof international initiatives is connectedwith thedifferentpolitical

logics that condition their importation into the national power space. These

connectionsareledbyagencies,NGOsandtechnocracieswherelegalelitesplaya

keyrole.Insomecases,theroleoflargeinternationalizedlawfirmsinterestedin

changinginternalcompetitionrulesisgreaterthanthatofstateagencies–thisis

morecommoninthecaseoftheEuropeanUnion.

Conversely,theBraziliancaserepresentsanexampleoftheappropriation

and reworking of these norms by autonomous bureaucracies. In particular, the

FederalPublicProsecutor’sOfficestandsout inthat itsagentshavesucceededin

assertingtheircorporateandpolitical independencesincetheendofthemilitary

regime.ThelegitimacyoftheMPFasa‘corruptionfighter’benefitsfromthelarge

volume of resources secured throughout the 2000s and the symbolic capital

accumulatedsincethedraftingoftheConstitution.

Bureaucratic specialization in the Brazilian state surrounding the fight

againstcorruptionisdirectlyrelatedtotheproliferationoflawsresultingfromthe

internationalconventionswith theOECD,UN,OAS thatwereratifiedbyBrazil in

the early 2000s. Prosecutors’ corporate investments levered this framework to

strengthenthe institution’sautonomyinrelationtothegovernmentandthe

politicalspace. Inthecontextofanti-corruptionoperations,wecanseeasecond

corporate moment following the battles in the 1986 Constituent Assembly, one

aimedatthecriminalizationofpoliticalagents.

Thecapacityof theBrazilianMPF tobecome thecentralprotagonist

in this network of anti-corruption agencies constituting nuclei of autonomous

internationalcooperationinrelationtogovernmentalchannelsrevealsacomplex

phenomenoninwhichlegalelitesanchorthemselves intheinternationalizedlaw

space. This process transcends the conjuncture effects and successive police

operations that have placed judicial institutions at the center of political debate

andarelinkedtotheglobalgrowthofindependentauthoritiesandcontrolbodies.

This phenomenon is evident in the expanding international circulation of

prosecutors during the 2010s and the continued proliferation of less formal


(2020)14(1)e0008–26/35

networksaroundassociations, training seminarevents and lectures. Likewise, in

expanding formal cooperationwithpublicprosecutors inothercountries, theUS

StateDepartment,andinternationalorganizations.Theeffectsof thisprocess

deserveacontinuousdeepeningofstudiesconsideringthewiderlegalspaceand

theotheragencies connected to anti-corruption. In regard, inparticular, the

autonomy and institutional and symbolic strengthacquiredby these legal elites

and their institutionalization as a regulatory agency capable of acting against

certainpoliticalelites.

TranslatedbyRobinsonFraserSubmittedonMarch04,2019

AcceptedonOctober16,2019

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Annex

Table 05. Synopsis of main international anti-corruption actions (conventions,organizations, networks, programs and international agencies specialized in anti-corruption)

Action Origin Year ObjectiveForeignCorruptPracticesAct(FCPA)

EUA 1977 USfederallawtocombattransnationalcorruptionbycertainUS-relatedpersonsorentities.TheFCPAhastwomainprovisions,accountingprovisionsandanti-briberyprovisions.Thefirstdealwithaccountingtransparencyrequirementsandthesecondmakeitillegaltopaybribestoforeigncivilservantsforthepurposeofobtainingormaintainingbusiness.

TransparencyInternational

Germany 1993 CreatedbyformerWorldBankdirectorPeterHeigen,theagencypromotesanti-corruptionactions,publications,rankingsandcooperationprograms.Since1995,ithaspublishedanannualCorruptionPerceptionIndexwithcountryrankings

GROTIUSProgram

EuropeanUnion

1996 Promotesinternationallegalcooperationthroughthetrainingofdifferentcategoriesofjusticeprofessionals,andsupportsinitiativesbypublicinstitutionsorprivatebodies

OECDAnti-CorruptionConvention

OECD

1997 ConventionontheFightagainsttheCorruptionofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactions.Encouragesthecreationofindependentnationalagencies.

WorldBank Washington 1999 Fromtheearly2000son,corruptioncontrolhasbeenincorporatedintothenotionofgoodgovernance.TheWorldBanksupportsopinionpollsonthetopic

TheGroupofStatesagainstCorruption(GRECO)

EuropeanUnion(Council)

1999 TheobjectiveofistoimprovethecapacityofitsmemberstofightcorruptionbymonitoringcompliancewiththeCouncilofEurope’santi-corruptionstandardsthroughadynamicprocessofmutualevaluationandpeerpressure.

EuropeanAnti-FraudOffice(OLAF)

EuropeanUnion(Commission)

1999 StrengthenthescopeandeffectivenessofthefightagainstfraudandallotherillegalbehavioragainstthefinancialinterestsoftheEuropeanUnion.OLAF’smissionisnotonlytoprotecttheEU’sfinancialinterests,butalsotocombatfraud,corruptionorirregularitieswithintheEuropeaninstitutionswhenevertheymayhavefinancialconsequences.

JudicialIntegrityGroup

UN/UNODC 2000 Associationofmagistratesandjudgesthatdevelopsrulesandpoliciestostrengthentheintegrityandcapacityofthejudiciary.In2002,theJudicialIntegrityGroupapprovedtheBangalorePrinciplesofJudicialConduct,theimplementationofwhichissupportedbytheUNODC.TheGlobalJudicialIntegrityNetworkwaslaunchedin2018


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Source:Elaboratedbytheauthor’sbasedonEngelmann(2018).

Action Origin Year ObjectiveEuropeanPartnersagainstCorruption(EPAC)

EuropeanUnion

2001 Informalandindependentnetworkofover60anti-corruptionauthoritiesandpoliceoversightbodiesfromCouncilofEuropememberstates.

UNODCGlobalProgramagainstCorruption

UN 2003 Asguardianofthe2003UNConventionagainstCorruption,UNODCmaintainsacomprehensiveprogramtoassistMemberStates,especiallydevelopingcountries,toimplementtheprovisionsoftheConvention.Tothisend,itpromotestechnicalassistancedirectedtoboththepublicandprivatesectors.

InternationalAssociationofAnti-corruptionauthorities(IAACA)

Beijing 2003 ThemainobjectiveoftheorganizationistopromotetheeffectiveimplementationoftheUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption,adoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyonDecember30,2003,andtoassistanti-corruptionauthoritiesworldwideinthefightagainstcorruption.

Anti-corruptionagencynetwork(ANCORAGE-NET)

Portugal 2006 Ananti-corruptionagency(ACA)onlineresearchnetworkwhoseprimarypurposeistoprovidecomprehensiveandeasilyaccessibleinformationontheformat,operationandactivitiesofsuchbodiestopractitionersandanalystsinthefieldofcorruptioncontrol.

Europeancontact-pointnetworkagainstcorruptionEACN

EuropeanUnion

2008 Formalcooperationnetworkcomprisingaround50anti-corruptionauthoritiesfromEUMemberStates.TheEuropeanAnti-FraudOffice(OLAF)isalsoamember.TheEACNwasformallyestablishedbyaEuropeanCouncildecisionin2008,buildingontheexistingstructuresoftheEuropeanAnti-CorruptionPartners(EPAC).

Anti-corruptionWorkingGroup(ACWG)

G20 2010 Itprovidesforbi-annualactionplansrelatedtotheimplementationofanti-corruptioncooperationandtransparencyprograms.

InternationalAnti-CorruptionAcademyIACA

UN/UNDOC,OLAF,Austria

2011 Theorganizationwasestablishedonthebasisofamultilateraltreaty–theAgreementonEstablishingtheInternationalAnti-CorruptionAcademyasanInternationalOrganization.Itisfocusedonanti-corruptiontraining.Itoffersamaster’sdegreeonthissubjectatitsheadquartersinVienna

CleanGovBiz OECD

2011 CleanGovBizisaninitiativeoftheOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)thatfocusesonpublicadministration,stateinstitutionsandgovernments.Itassistsandguidesthedesignorreformofinstrumentstocombatcorruption.

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