The Iraq Insurgency - Pilgrims Group

Trends in Insurgent Attacks 2

Insurgent Groups 4

The Killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 6

Political Aims of the Insurgency 7

Political Context 7

The Threat of Civil War 9

Attitudes to Reconstruction 9

Scenarios for the Future 10

September 2006

Pilgrims has compiled this report, drawing on information from a variety of media, open and privileged sources.

Any feedback on this report is most welcome and should be addressed to: Email: [email protected] Tel: +44 (0) 1483 228 784.

The aim of this report is to provide clients with a strategically based overview of the currentinsurgency and an assessment of its future course.

The Iraq Insurgency

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Trends in Insurgent Attacks

Statistical analysis of attacks byIraqi insurgents suffers from anumber of problems.

The Iraqi government no longer publicises thenumber of Iraqi deaths, while the US onlyrecords its own casualties. The figures typicallydo not identify those responsible for killings,whether insurgents, party militias or criminalelements. The most recent estimates of the totalnumber of Iraqi civilian casualties since 2003range from 33,000 to over 85,000. Coalitioncounts of losses also tend to underplay theamount of sabotage and criminal damage, whilethe losses of Iraqi military and police forcesreceive less focused attention. Estimates ofinsurgent losses remain unreliable, a result of thecontinued failure to extend intelligence networksinto their ranks. Although the statistics illustratepeaks and troughs in insurgent attacks, they donot provide a basis from which to extrapolateany real conclusions about underlying trends inthe insurgency, much less make judgementsabout whether the insurgents or the US is“winning” the conflict.

The figures available are worth considering asthey provide the only empirical source ofinformation on the scale and intensity of theinsurgency. The total number of attacks increasedfrom 26,496 in 2004 to 34,131 in 2005 – anincrease of 29%. The number of attacks surgedprior to the January 2005 elections, fell backthereafter, but surged again in April 2005; sincethen the number of effective (not overall) attackshas remained at a fairly constant level of 24%.Some sources note that apparent drops ininsurgent attacks for some months are accountedfor by a change of target (e.g. Iraqi instead of US)– and hence not reflected in the figures – ratherthan an absolute decline in the level of violence.The problems of using diverse sets of statistics inan attempt to ‘measure’ the extent of theinsurgency was highlighted by a report by the USNational Intelligence Council, leaked to Newsweekin May 2005, which said that available figurescame from so many different sources, compiledin such different ways, that drawing an overallconclusion from the statistics was impossible.Broadly speaking, insurgents have shifted thefocus of their attacks from US forces to Iraqis.673 US troops were killed in 2005, down from714 in 2004; the number of US wounded alsodropped by 29% from 2004 to 2005. This waspartly because there have been no recent largescale urban battles, such as Fallujah in 2004,partly because insurgents have chosen to targetmore vulnerable Iraqi victims to gain morepolitical capital and partly because someinsurgent elements are seeking to pursue asectarian agenda within Iraq.

The majority of insurgent attacks are concentratedin a relatively limited geographical area. The fourgovernorates which experience by far the majorityof incidents are Baghdad, Al-Anbar, Salah al-Dinand Ninawa. 59% of US casualties are sufferedin the Baghdad and Al-Anbar provinces.

Suicide attacks have become an increasinglyfrequent feature of the insurgency. Whereas thenumber of car bombs doubled from 2004 to2005, the number of suicide car bombsquadrupled in the same period. The number ofsuicide attacks involving a bomber carryingexplosives stood at 7 in 2004, but had increasedto 67 in 2005. The use of suicide bombers insituations where other means of attack (e.g.unmanned roadside bombs) would have beenequally as effective suggests that the practice isbeing used for ideological or publicity reasonsrather than out of tactical necessity.

Pilgrims – Special Report – September 2006 – © Pilgrims Group Ltd2

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The number and effectiveness of attacks usingImprovised Explosive Devices (IEDs) increasedsignificantly throughout 2005. Although the IEDsused at the start of the insurgency were crudedevices, most often based on pressure-detonationdevices detailed in old US field manuals andtranslated into Arabic, by mid-2005 theinsurgents had developed increasinglysophisticated devices. A fairly consistent level of40% of IEDs are located and disarmed bycoalition forces, though the insurgents havebenefitted from adopting technology used byLebanon’s Hizbullah in the 1980s and, accordingto some reports, technology transferred to themby Iran. Insurgents are now reported to havelearned to cluster anti-tank mines and use largecharges (e.g. 500lb) explosives in IEDs.

The number of assassinations, kidnappings andsectarian killings continues to rise, though noreliable statistics are available to measure thescale of the problem. In 2005, nearly 3000 Iraqiofficials were killed by insurgents. The total numberof casualties attributable to the insurgency isimpossible to separate from deaths resulting fromcrime, tribal feuds or sectarian reprisals for earlierkillings or intimidation. The phenomenon ofmultiple killings followed by the dumping of thebodies in obscure locations (including rivers andminor villages) seems to be on the increase,though some sources suggest that the majority ofsuch murders occur in Baghdad.

Persistent attacks on the Iraqi oil infrastructurehave retarded the country’s ability to develop itsown source of income and generate funds to bechannelled into security, jobs and development,hence compounding an already difficult situation.After falling to 1.73 million barrels/day in January2006 – the lowest figure since September 2003 –production climbed slowly back up to 2.0 mbd inMarch 2006. The Iraqi Ministry of Oil has a short-term production target of 2.5 mbd, a figurewhich the industry has not managed to get closeto since September and October 2004.

Pilgrims – Special Report – September 2006 – © Pilgrims Group Ltd


Iraqi youths watch a burningoil pipeline near Taji. Insurgentsblew up the main pipelinefeeding crude oil from thenorthern oil fields of Kirkuk toa refinery in the southernBaghdad suburb of Dora andstopping the flow of oil.

(AP Photo/Ahmed Al-Dulimi)

Insurgent Groups

It is still correct to say that the“Iraq Insurgency” is not aunified movement with anidentifiable leadership hierarchyor logistical infrastructure.

It can perhaps best be characterised as a chaoticassortment of diverse groups with varyingdegrees of organisation, effectiveness andstrategic vision. Nevertheless, over the pastcouple of years it has been possible to identifyfour major groupings within the insurgency,groups which have developed what appear to be relatively coherent positions on theoccupation and the strategies they espouse tooppose it. These main groups have spentconsiderable time and energy developing themeans by which they communicate their positionto their followers: mostly via internet sites, videoand audio recordings and the publication ofjournals and magazines.

The most important of these groups are:

Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (the Organisation of Al-Qaeda inMespotamia)

Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna (The Army of the Companions of the Sunna)

Al-Jaish al-Islami fi’l-‘Iraq (The Islamic Army in Iraq)

Al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li’l-Muqawama al-‘Iraqiyya (The Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance)

Islamic Jihad Brigades of Muhammad’s Army

Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (theOrganisation of Al-Qaeda in Mespotamia),founded by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,is by far the most nefarious of the Iraqi insurgentgroups. Formerly named al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad(Monotheism and Jihad), the group is thought tohave been established while Zarqawi was basedin Iraqi Kurdistan from 2001-2003, where USofficials believe he made contact with the Ansaral-Islam organisation at the request of the al-Qaeda leadership. Tanzim al-Qa’ida is thought tobe responsible for the videotaped beheading ofAmerican engineer Eugene Armstrong in late2004, as well as for a host of similar murdersacross the country. The group’s influence is oftenthought to to extend beyond Iraq: Jordanianauthorities accuse Zarqawi of masterminding thekilling of USAID worker Lawrence Folley inOctober 2002 and the Amman hotel bombings inNovember 2005; Jordanian courts have given himthe death sentence in absentia. Zarqawi was alsoimplicated in the Madrid and Casablancabombings. Some analysts suggest that Tanzim al-Qaída is a loose-knit association of smallergroups, rather than a coherent organisation, andargue that its importance to the insurgency hasbeen exaggerated by the US for political reasons.Nevertheless, the group claims to have some 15“brigades” operating under its aegis andmaintains a fairly consistent, hardline politicalposition in its communiqués. Although Tanzim al-Qa’ida has been categorised by Washington asan organisation of “foreigners”, in 2005 itappeared to have taken significant steps to bringIraqis into its ranks, though its sectarian agendaand horrific tactics have not been universallywelcomed by all members of the insurgency.

Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna (The Army of theCompanions of the Sunna) is thought to havegrown from the fragments of Ansar al-Islam (theCompanions of Islam), a Kurdish Islamist group firstformed in Iraqi Kurdistan in late 2001 under thename Jund al-Islam. Ansar al-Islam was attackedand effectively destroyed by PUK peshmerga forces,supported by US Special Forces and air strikes, inMarch 2003,; has extended its activities to Baghdad.The US has repeatedly connected Ansar al-Islam to anumber of attacks, including the 19 August 2003bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad. Thegroup claimed responsibility for the 1 February 2004simultaneous attacks on PUK and KDP offices inIrbil, and the 17 March 2004 bombing of theMount Lebanon Hotel in Baghdad. Nevertheless,many independent analysts are sceptical that thissmall Kurdish group would have been capable of



developing its infrastructure to the extent suggestedby the US – especially after its ranks were decimatedduring the war. The 12 January 2005 assassinationof Sheikh Mahmoud al-Maidani, representative ofShia spiritual leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani in themainly Sunni town of Salman Pak, was claimed by agroup named Ansar al-Islam; the group also claimedresponsibility for a number of kidnappingsthroughout 2005. What appears to be the group’ssuccessor organisation, going by the name of Ansaral-Sunna, claims to have 16 “brigades”, issues dailycommuniqués and ran a website until it was closeddown, presumably by the US, in late 2005.

Al-Jaish al-Islami fi’l-‘Iraq (The Islamic Army inIraq) claims to comprise thirteen “brigades” andhas an active internet presence. It combinesreligiousity with a fierce nationalism: the names ofits brigades include not only the familiar Caliphs andother religious figures, but also include famous Arabpolitical leaders from Islamic history.

Al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li’l-Muqawama al-‘Iraqiyya (The Islamic Front for the IraqiResistance), also known by its acronym ‘Jami’(meaning a mosque, or a gathering). Some reportssuggest this organisation is even less than a “loose-knit network” of smaller groups and describe it assomething like a PR organisation for numerouslesser bodies, such as the Salah al-Din Brigades.

Other groups appear at frequent intervals, thoughmany of these seem to be short-lived associations oflocal elements banding together in pursuit ofcriminal purposes, rather than in favour of thepolitical objective of ending the occupation. In othercases, they may be either offshoots of existinggroups or else fronts for organizations seeking toadd to the confusion. The proliferation of thesesmaller groups means it is impossible to say whichof them might eventually come to play a major rolein the insurgency. The known smaller groups include:

Islamic Jihad Brigades of Muhammad’s Army,an umbrella organization thought to incorporatenearly a dozen smaller groups; it claimedresponsibility for the April 2003 bombing of the UNheadquarters in Baghdad and for shelling coalitionpositions, including the CPA headquarters. Jaish al-Ta’ifa al-Mansoura claims three brigades, whileJaish al-Rashidin claims six. Al-MujahidinBrigades sent a videotape to Al-Jazeera television,broadcast on 10 May 2004, claiming that all thoseworking for Arab and foreign companies in Basrawould be targeted for kidnappings and killings. TheIslamic Movement for the Mujahidin of Iraq claimed

to the Associated Press in October 2004 that itgrouped together over 18 Sunni militant groups inwestern Iraq; it killed an Italian hostage inDecember 2004. The Salah Al-Din Brigades claimedresponsibility for attacks on at least seven Iraqipolicemen in the Ramadi area in early 2004 andwas still active in late 2005.

A number of other organisations are oftendescribed by the press as forming part of the Iraqiinsurgency, though they differ from the abovegroups in that they are typically “legitimate” bodieswith a presence within the political structures ofpost-Saddam Iraq, or in that they are grassrootsorganisations with widespread popular support,rather than a clandestine, members-only network.Such groups include:

Jaish al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army) is the informal“militia” which follows firebrand Shia clericMuqtada al-Sadr. Estimated to be comprised ofbetween 6,000 and 10,000 men, the loose-knitbody is mainly formed of increasinglyexperienced Shia from poorer urban centres. In the US Department of Defence’s quarterlyreport, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq(November 2006), highlighted the group as‘currently having the greatest negative affect onthe security situation in Iraq’ and have ‘replacedal-Qaeda in Iraq as the most dangerous accelerantof potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence inIraq.’ The group also has significant influencewithin the political sphere, with 30 MPs and 6cabinet members loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr.

The Badr Organization (formerly known as theBadr Corps) is the military wing of SCIRI, one ofIraq’s main Shia political parties which has traditionallyhad close ties with Iran. SCIRI leaders seized theopportunity presented to them by the Shia successin the January 2005 elections to manoeuvre theirpeople into key positions in the Ministry of theInterior. From April 2005 Interior Minister BayanJabr oversaw efforts to repress the primarily Sunniinsurgency, which allegedly included the creationof a number of elite commando units – Wolf,Hawk, Volcano, Two Rivers – accused by someSunni figures of acting as death squads andoperating secret detention centres. Allegationsof harassment of Sunni areas, summaryexecutions and the torturing of prisoners havefed the anger of Sunni communities anddeepened their feelings of disempowerment inan Iraq now dominated by the Shia.

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The Killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leaderof Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Biladal-Rafidayn (the Organisationof Al-Qaeda in Mespotamia),was killed by a US Air Forcebombing of an isolatedfarmhouse near Baqubah,north of Baghdad, on 7 June.

The air strike took place after the capture ofQasim al ‘Ani, one of the organisation’scommanders in Baghdad, on 4 June. Al ‘Ani’sarrest reportedly provided intelligence which, inaddition to leading the US to Zarqawi, resulted ina series of raids on at least 17 locations acrosscentral Iraq which provided what a US militaryspokesman described as a “treasure trove” ofdocumentation on the Al Qaeda organization inIraq. Lebanon’s al Nahhar newspaper reportedthat Iranian intelligence had worked with the USto locate Zarqawi, but the story was notcorroborated by other sources and seemsunlikely given Zarqawi’s known hostility to IraqiShias, much less Iranian ones.

The Iraqi and US governments were keen topoint out the impact that Zarqawi’s death wouldhave on Tanzim al Qa’ida in Iraq. Iraqi NationalSecurity Advisor Muwaffaq al Ruba’i announcedthat documents and computer drives obtainedfrom the house Zarqawi was staying in hadprovided the means for Iraqi and US securityforces to ‘dismantle’ the organisation. In the firstweek following his death, US-led forcesundertook some 450 raids on the basis of thenew intelligence, killing over 100 militants andleading to the arrest of over 750 people. Ruba’isaid the documents revealed that the group wasin poor shape in terms of its training, weaponsand media. One document released to the presssuggested that Tanzim al Qaeda was seeking todraw the US into a conflict with Iran, thoughdoubt was cast on its authenticity by someanalysts, who noted linguistic inconsistencieswith previous statements from the organization.

Despite the blow dealt to the organization bythe death of Zarqawi, it was quick to reassure its

followers it remained a player in the insurgency.A statement posted on the internet on 11 Junedeclared that it would seek vengeance for thedeath of its leader. The US military subsequentlyannounced that a man named Abu Ayyub alMasri had assumed Zarqawi’s position as theleader of Tanzim al Qa’ida, though a statementfrom the organisation said that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir had been appointed. The US authoritiesbelieve that the two names are bothpseudonyms used by the same individual. AbuAyyub al Masri is known to have trained inAfghanistan and is believed to have formed thefirst al Qaeda cell in Baghdad.

Analysts do not share the US and Iraqigovernments’ optimism that the death ofZarqawi marks a turning point in the campaignagainst the insurgency. Many note that Zarqawi’sreal significance to the insurgency was much lessthan that attributed to him by Washington,which found it more convenient to emphasizethe role of a foreign militant than acknowledgethe true extent of Iraqi participation in theinsurgency against the occupation. Several otherinsurgent groups actually refused to work withZarqawi’s organization, which they accused ofthe indiscriminate killing of Iraqis, the incitementof sectarian conflict and the use of unnecessarilybloody tactics.

The future of Tanzim al Qa’ida will bedetermined as much by the direction its newleaders decide to adopt as by the success of USand Iraqi military operations against it. So longas there remains a pool of Iraqis and foreignmilitants willing to join the organization, then itwill be able to regenerate any capability lost tocounter-insurgency operations. Possibly ofgreater significance is whether the new leaderdecides to adhere to Zarqawi’s firmly anti-Shiasectarian agenda, which was making theorganization unpopular with the mainstream ofthe insurgency, or whether he decides to step upefforts to “Iraqify” the organization, by reducingits reliance on foreign militant participation. Thefact that Zarqawi’s replacement is Egyptian bornmay suggest a continuation of the group’sprevious policies, rather than their modification.



Political Aims of the Insurgency

Although the popular mediamay speak of the threat of anIslamic Iraq should the USwithdraw, the main insurgentgroups have so far been carefulnot to elaborate any politicalvision of the future should theirmilitary activities eventually resultin the end of the occupation.

This was a prudent decision, as it has meant thevarious insurgent groups have been able to focustheir energies on waging jihad rather thandiscussing potentially divisive political agendas.Furthermore, the salafi strain of Islam to whichthe majority of the groups tend to subscribe isessentially concerned with the moral status ofthe individual, rather than addressing thequestion of how the community as a wholeshould be organised. As such, the insurgentscommuniqués give voice to an unsophisticateddiscourse of opposition to the occupation anddo not feel obliged to outline an alternativevision for Iraq.

The main insurgent groups mentioned earlierhave consistently rejected any suggestion thatthey should take part in the political process inIraq or that they should “negotiate” with theUS. Their communiqués often denounce Iraqi’spoliticians, who claim to be close to them or tobe their representatives. US sources haveconfirmed that there have been talks with someinsurgent groups, though a recent survey of Iraqijihadist literature by the International CrisisGroup fails to find any hint of compromise intheir discourse – a possibility which they mightbe expected to communicate to their supportersif they were genuinely considering such a move.

Political Context

The elections of December2005 did little to calm theinsurgency.

The insurgents disavow any ties with groups thathave chosen to take part in the political system,which they see as tainted by the involvement ofinfidels and deliberately biased by the US infavour of the Shia. Nevertheless, the hardlineattitude during the January 2005 elections thatsome groups demonstrated – Tanzim al-Qa’idanotably called for polling stations and voters tobe targeted for attack – was modified in theDecember elections in favour of threateningattacks against those who were overly involvedin promoting the elections, rather than all voters.Other groups urged a boycott and a campaignof what they described as civil disobedience.Such a shift suggests that the insurgents remainsensitive to the broader trends of Iraqi publicopinion in support of the elections and that theyare concerned not to overly alienate theirgrassroots support.

The prolonged failure of Iraqi politicians to agreethe composition of the new coalitiongovernment – which went on for some fourmonths after the polls – indirectly aided theinsurgents’ cause. It meant that Iraq continues tolack any sense of progress or normality andsuggested that the insurgents might have beenright to criticize political leaders that many Iraqisalready regarded critically. The absence of agovernment prolonged the sense of anomaly –the feeling that things are not yet “back tonormal” – that the insurgents wished toencourage and exploit. Although a PrimeMinister, Nouri al-Maliki, was finally agreed, theprolonged delay in making appointments to keygovernment positions such as Ministers ofDefence and the Interior and National SecurityAdvisor was unlikely to inspire much confidencethat the new government will be able to dealwith the insurgency in a decisive manner. The death of Zarqawi, claimed by the Malikigovernment as a major success, may havegained it some new supporters, but subsequentmajor attacks in Kirkuk, Baghdad and elsewheremeant this honeymoon was short-lived.



The Threat of Civil War

The international media hasfocused on the recent surge ofsectarian killings in Iraq, mainlybetween the Arab Shia andArab Sunni communities.

Some insurgent groups have long espoused acampaign against Iraqi Shia: Tanzim al-Qa’ida, inparticular, is noted for this position. Even so,Tanzim al-Qa’ida never directly refers to attacksagainst the Shia, instead employing euphemismssuch as al-Rawafid (“those who refuse”) – a historical epithet for the Shia dating back tothe early Islamic period. Zarqawi himself deniedaccusations that he was encouraging attacksagainst Iraqi Shia and blamed the US for fosteringsuch beliefs. Nevertheless, his followers – indeed,most Iraqis – had little difficulty deciphering hiseuphemisms and understood the meaningbehind the words. Other elements within theinsurgency disagreed with Zarqawi’s policy ofattacking Shia targets; they noted that Zarqawiwas not Iraqi and did not understand the localcontext. Such observations encouraged Tanzimal-Qa’ida to bring more Iraqis into its ranks, todeflect such criticisms, though it remains to beseen which direction Zarqawi’s successor will take.

Sectarian tensions are running higher than everbefore in Iraq. This is in part a counter-reactionto decades of enforced Sunni dominance andShia repression under Saddam Hussein and inpart a consequence of understandable butentirely avoidable decisions made by the US as itsought to develop new political structures forpost-Saddam Iraq. Washington’s desire to havefair representation for all ethnic and religiousgroups encouraged political groups to mobilisealong those same lines to compete for a role ingovernment. Ministries were seen as beingdistributed to particular sects, which led to themusing government resources to feed their ownnetworks of patronage. The constitutional rightto devolve power to the Kurdish north, andpotentially to a group of Shia governorates inthe south, also fuelled sectarian issues. Shiadomination of the state security apparatus hasled to Sunni complaints of discrimination,intimidation and even reprisal killings forinsurgent attacks or alleged sympathies.

Nevertheless, Iraq remains some way away fromthe intra-communal model of civil war, as seenfor example in the former Yugoslavia in the1990s. For the moment, sectarian killings are asporadic phenomenon which does not have thesupport of most Iraqis. Shia religious leaderssuch as Ayatollah Ali Sistani have urged theircommunities to show restraint and to resist thetemptation for revenge. However, as the attackscontinue, popular anger will inevitably increaseand the calls of moderates like Sistani may wellgo unheeded. The existence of sect-based militiasand military groups within supposedly nationalstate institutions does not bode well for thefuture, should such killings continue. The threatof civil war, Lebanese style, is a very real one.



An Iraqi soldier guards a group ofsuspected insurgents at an Iraqimilitary camp west of Baghdad.

(AP Photo/Mohammed Uraibi)

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Attitudes to Reconstruction

The growth of the insurgency,the absence of infrastructuralimprovements and the failureto improve Iraq’s economicsituation has contributed to awidespread disillusionment withthe reconstruction process.

The inability of the reconstruction effort to dealwith even the most basic problems of water andelectricity provision, not to mention thesquabbling between Iraqi political leaders overpositions in the new government, has led to thegrowth of cynicism and fatalism regarding thefuture. Whilst the majority of Iraqis may notsupport the armed insurgency, which they blamefor the increasing levels of violence, neither dothey seem to support the continued occupationof Iraq by foreign forces which are unable toguarantee their security, much less successfullyreconstruct their economy.

Although it is impossible to determine the size ofthe insurgency with any accuracy, coalitionestimates have hovered around the 15,000 –20,000 level since May 2004. Prior to that, thecoalition systematically understated the extent ofthe resistance they were facing, claiming thatthe insurgents were a hardcore group ofextremists numbering less than 5,000 in total.Since the start of the occupation, Washingtonhas chosen to emphasize the role played byforeign elements in the insurgency. This hasallowed them to portray the conflict as part ofthe wider war on global terrorism, with the Iraqinsurgency being represented as a magnet for al-Qaida supporters throughout the Middle East,rather than an Iraqi-led phenomenon whichmight undermine US claims of local approval forthe reconstruction project.

Although foreign fighters have undoubtedlyplayed a significant role in the resistance, there isevidence that some Iraqi elements resent theintrusion of outsiders into “their” battle againstthe occupation. Tanzim al-Qaida, for example,has had to react to this current of disapproval byadmitting more Iraqis to its ranks. Coalitionsources estimate the number of foreign fightersin Iraq at between 700 and 2,000 in total. Nofigures are available which allow the breakdown

by nationality of insurgents so far apprehended by the coalition; the most commonly mentionedcountries of origin are Saudi Arabia, Syria, Algeria,Yemen, Sudan, Egypt and Kuwait. A US sourcehas stated that 96% of suicide attacks are carriedout by non-Iraqi elements. This suggests thatforeign volunteers may be seen by the insurgentleadership as low-worth “shock troops”, a resource to be expended in preference to morevaluable local elements.


Abass Abu Khudair, 60,assembles caskets in his shopin Baghdad. Demand forcoffins have increased due torecent attacks by insurgentsand sectarian violence.

Abu Khudair’s productionincreased from two caskets aweek before U.S. invasion in2003 to 50, and the priceswent up from $10 to $50.

(AP Photo / Samir Mizban)

Scenarios for the Future

Steady unravelling (60% likelihood):

In the absence of any credible leadership in Iraq,the various centrifugal elements will continue topursue their own agenda, in the process furtherundermining the authority of the Iraqi state andrendering unlikely the possibility of finding asingle, national approach to solving Iraq’sproblems. The continuing lack of success ineroding the insurgency will lead to the coalitioneventually handing over to an Iraqi governmentwhose political leaders send the right messages,but who lack the authority to implement aserious political programme. Iraqi political partieswill continue to entrench the positions ofthemselves and their associates within the statebureaucracy, security services and reconstructionprojects, carving out fiefdoms within Iraq’ssupposedly national institutions. The Kurdishnorth will maintain its efforts to pull away fromthe rest of Iraq, citing its relative absence ofviolence and its putative political unity as reasonsfor it to be considered as distinct from “Arab”Iraq. The efforts of the Shia-dominatedgovernorates of the south of Iraq to increasetheir own autonomy from the centralgovernment in Baghdad may also gather steam,though at a much slower pace than the Kurdishnorth. The insurgency will continue to act as a“spoiler” for the reconstruction effort and willcontinue to act as an indicator of disapproval ofthe US-installed political system, but will remainunable to elaborate any real alternative to thedeteriorating status quo. While this “steadyunravelling” scenario may go on for some time,it may later give way to the civil war scenariooutlined below.

Full scale civil war (20% likelihood):

Civil war is presently being kept at bay in Iraq bythe religious leadership’s calls for restraint andthe absence of any broad-based communalinvolvement in the violence. Insurgent attacksalone are unlikely to cause this situation tochange, even if they continue to focus onsectarian targets. Communal tensions are morelikely to be enraged by the perception that statesecurity forces – often thinly veiled vehicles forparty political militias, organised along sectarianlines – are pursuing reprisal attacks against Sunnielements they accuse of complicity with the

insurgency. The developing influence of sect-based politics – a phenomenon initially enabledby the US approach to reconstructing Iraqipolitics – is arguably a significant variable in thelikelihood of an Iraqi civil war breaking out. Sucha conflict is likely to resemble the Lebanese civilwar, in which a bewildering array of competingmilitias with various external sponsors foughtover the future of the country.

Moves towards re-integration (20% likelihood):

Early signs that the most radical insurgent groupsmay be responding to the broad sentiments ofthe Iraqi public, exhausted by decades ofdictatorship and months of violence, may heralda movement towards the integration ofinsurgent elements into the political arena. Sucha move would be dogged by problems, withmore radical elements seeking to ruin the process.Tanzim al Qa’ida is likely to be a major spoiler inthis scenario. Even so, major concessions wouldbe required from other Iraqi groups for such aprocess of integration to happen.



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The Iraq Insurgency - Pilgrims Group