The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of … of Patani replaced many elements of the Hindu-Buddhist culture ... the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago

The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of thePhilippinesAuthor(s): Syed Serajul IslamSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May, 1998), pp. 441-456Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645502Accessed: 19-09-2016 22:51 UTC

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THE ISLAMIC INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN PATANI OF THAILAND AND MINDANAO OF THE PHILIPPINES

Syed Serajul Islam

In recent years the apparent success of the Mindanao

Moros in the Philippines and the failure of the Patani Malay Muslims in Thai-

land raises an important question: what has led to the relative success of the

Moros and the failure of the Malay Muslims? In the late 1960s, Samuel Hunt-

ington stated that a revolution or a violent separatist movement occurs in a

political system that is incapable of accommodating the democratic participa-

tion of the separatist group.1 According to some scholars, however, a separa-

tist movement may rise up due to "relative deprivation," the determination of

an ethnic group to retain control of their own culture, language, and terri-

tory," "manipulation of ethnic sentiment by ethnic minority elites for promot-

ing their own career and status," or a combination of factors.2 Whatever the

historical, political, or social circumstances of a separatist movement, Hunt-

ington argues that in order to be successful it must be led by a political organ-

ization headed by strong leaders able to mobilize both internal and external

supports. A competing view is offered by Ted Gurr. In a recent study, he

argued that the success of a separatist movement depends on four factors: (i)

Syed Serajul Islam is Associate Professor in the Department of Polit-

ical Science, International Islamic University, Selangor, Malaysia.

? 1998 by The Regents of the University of California

1. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1968).

2. For details, see Michael Hechter, The Celtic Fringe in British National Development

(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1975); Walker Connor, "Eco or Ethno-national-

ism?" Ethnic and Racial Studies 7:3 (July 1984), pp. 342-59; Anthony Birch, "Minorities Na-

tionalist Movement and Theories of Political Integration," World Politics 30:3 (1978), pp.

325-44; Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981);

Cynthia Enloe, "Ethnic Diversity: The Potential for Conflict," in Diversity and Development in

Southeast Asia, eds. Guy J. Pauker et al. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977); and David Brown,

"From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations," Pacific Affairs 61 (1988), pp. 51-71.

441


442 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 5, MAY 1998

the severity of the separatist group's "relative deprivation"; (ii) the applica-

tion of "sustained force" by the regime against the separatist group; (iii) the

cohesiveness of the group; and (iv) international support.3

Three common propositions can be derived from both Huntington's and

Gurr's analyses. First, if the state uses too much force and other socioeco-

nomic and political measures to suppress the minority group, that group will

feel more alienated and frustrated and aspiring minority elites will exploit this

sentiment to gain support for the separatist movement. Second, a movement

is likely to be successful if it is led by a cohesive political organization under

a strong leadership. Finally, the separatist group must be able to mobilize

both internal and external support.

Do these theoretical propositions apply in the cases of the Muslims in

Thailand and the Philippines? The Muslims in both countries are religious

minorities constituting nearly the same percentage of the total population

(5.5% in Thailand and 6% in the Philippines). The dominant religious group

in Thailand is Buddhist, and in the Philippines, Catholic. In both countries,

the Muslims are concentrated in a defined geographical area bordered by the

same Muslim state, Malaysia. Since the end of the Second World War, the

Muslims in both countries have made demands for an independent Islamic

state (dar al-Islam) and initiated guerrilla insurgency movements. After half

a century of struggle, the Philippine Moros appear to have been successful in

achieving partial "autonomy" if not independence. In recent months, negoti-

ations between the government of then-President Ramos and the Moro rebels

suggested that further concessions would be forthcoming. On the other hand,

the Patani Muslims in Thailand have been unable to achieve either autonomy

or an independent dar al-Islam. The question is: why? To answer this query,

it is essential to look at the historical roots of the two movements and then to

their contemporary nature. It is against the backdrop of such historical and

contemporary developments that one can assess the relative success of the

Moros and the failure of the Malay Muslims in achieving their desired goals.

The Roots of Conflict The Southeast Asian region has been influenced by different external forces

in the course of its long history. In the first centuries of the Christian era, the

sprawl of the Indian and Chinese civilizations stretched into the region. Sub-

sequently, the Arabs and Europeans entered the area. The arrival of various

external groups contributed to the growth of heterogeneity in the region's

societies. Southeast Asia's initial contact with Islam is undoubtedly a by-

3. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno Political Conflicts (Washing- ton, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), pp. 123-38.


SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 443

product of Arab trade in the region; Arab traders are believed to have brought

the religion to the region as early as the eighth century.

The Patani Raya in Thailand

Until 1786, greater Patani had been an independent kingdom. Originally the

ancient kingdom of Langkasuka, the name was changed to the kingdom of

Patani at some point in the 14th century. It was an important commercial

center for Asian and European traders. Hinduism and Buddhism seem to

have been practiced until the adoption of Islam as the state religion in the

15th century. Arab merchants had spread the religion throughout the area

between the 12th and 15th centuries side by side with their trade activities,

and large numbers of people converted. However, the most significant devel-

opment in its spread occurred when the king of Patani himself embraced Is-

lam and declared his kingdom to be an Islamic state in 1457. The

Islamization of Patani replaced many elements of the Hindu-Buddhist culture

and its institutions. The Muslim religious elites (ulamas) came to dominate

the kingdom's sociopolitical system. The Muslim dynasty was abolished in

1786 when Patani was conquered by the king of Siam. The Siamese govern-

ment divided Patani into seven provinces both for administrative purposes as

well as to weaken Muslim power. The provinces were governed by ap-

pointed bureaucrats under a centralized administrative structure. There were

sporadic rebellions in protest of the administrative reforms, but the Siamese

government forces were strong enough to suppress them.

Nonetheless, such rebellious activity and later external pressure from the British in Burma did make Siamese government control over Patani uncertain

through the end of the 19th century. Control was finally consolidated with

the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. The British renounced the extraterritori-

ality rights it had claimed previously and recognized Siam's governance of

the province, though such came at the cost of conceding control of four other

Malay states to the European power. The firm guarantee of Siamese control

over Patani allowed the government to take various measures aimed at weak-

ening the Islamic identity of the people in Patani in order to develop, in

David Brown's version, "the mono-ethnic character of the state."4 The government first replaced the Islamic Shariah and adat laws with Siamese law.

Second, an act was passed in 1921 that required all children to attend Sia-

mese primary schools, institutions designed to offer a secular education

where the medium of instruction was the Thai language. Thus, the local

pondoks (Islamic schools) were closed, an action that "undermined the very roots of the lamas' power."5 Third, administration was further centralized

4. Brown, "From Peripheral Communities," p. 52.

5. Ibid.



by reorganizing the seven provinces into three-Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat

(now four, including Satun)-and replacing the local rulers with Thai gover-

nors. This change led to the loss of political power of the traditional aristo-

crats. Fourth, during the Second World War, the Phibun regime issued the

Thai Customs Decree prohibiting the "wearing of sarongs, the use of Malay

[Muslim] names and the Malay language," which angered the common people. At the end of the war, Patani's districts and local governments were

brought under the direct control of Bangkok.

All these measures were attempts to integrate Patani Muslims into the

larger framework of Thailand, and they created serious resentment among

them. The traditional elite and pondok religious teachers were very unhappy and objected to the introduction of secular education and the Thai language in

schools. Haji Sulong, president of the Islamic Religious Council, submitted a

seven-point demand to the Thai government. It called for (i) the "appoint-

ment of a single individual with full powers to govern the four [Patani] prov-

inces . . . this individual to be local-born in one of the four provinces ... and

to be elected by the people"; (ii) 80% of government servants in those prov-

inces to profess the Muslim religion; (iii) Malay and Siamese to be the offi-

cial languages; (iv) Malay to be the medium of instruction in the primary

schools; (v) Islamic law to be recognized and enforced in a separate Muslim

court other than the civil court; (vi) any revenue and income derived from the

four provinces to be utilized within them; and (vii) the formation of a Muslim

Board.6 As a consequence of making this demand, Haji Sulong and his asso-

ciates were arrested and charged with treason. At the end of the Second

World War, the Patani separatist movement was brought under control by the

Thai state through military intervention.

The Mindanao Region in the Philippines

The Mindanao region in the Philippines, once an independent kingdom, con-

sisted of indigenous tribes. Islam came to this kingdom at the same time that

it appeared in Siam. Arab traders preached Islam in this land but established

their permanent settlements only at the end of the 13th century. Over the

next century, the Muslims established their sultanate, and by the end of the

14th century the Islamization process had reached the point where being a

Muslim became an acceptable passport into the community. In 1565 the Spanish arrived and initiated a series of attacks on the Muslim sultanates in

the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. These

attacks continued for the next 350 years. Although the Spanish failed to oc-

cupy the region, they did establish a few garrisons in the area. Moreover, the

6. Lukman Thaib, Political Dimension of Islam in Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur: National

University of Malaysia, 1996), p. 96.



rest of the Philippines came under their control and they were successful in

converting the local people to Catholicism.

In 1898, the U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War led to the transfer

of the Philippines to U.S. control. Despite the fact that Mindanao and Sulu

were never under complete Spanish control, the areas were included in the

cession. The Muslim population fought several bloody battles to resist the

American occupation and on August 20, 1899, the sultan of Sulu finally

signed the Bates Treaty with the Americans. The treaty acknowledged the

sultan's authority to govern his people and recognized some local authority.

But it was too short-lived to produce any good results, for it was abrogated

suddenly in 1902. A policy of direct rule was imposed; the Moro Province

was created and brought under the direct control of the colonial government

in Manila.

Once direct rule had been imposed on Moro, the colonial government

adopted a "policy of attraction" in the area to "develop, to civilize and to

educate" the public. This policy had disastrous consequences. The govern-

ment introduced a secular system of education and non-Muslim teachers were

appointed to the Moro schools. This was seen as a direct blow to the author-

ity of the traditional religious teachers. Muslims generally refused to send

their children to secular schools, leading to significant illiteracy. To integrate

the province into the larger framework of the Philippines, the U.S. colonial

government encouraged non-Muslims from other parts of the Philippines to

settle in Moro Province. The government provided loans to those settlers

who lacked funds, and between 1903 and 1906 increased the number of acres

of land given to settlers from 40 to 200. In 1902, a Land Registration Act

was passed to determine the extent of private landholdings in the country.

This was followed by Public Lands Acts of 1905, 1913, 1914, and 1919.

These gradually claimed all lands in the Philippines as state property, though

individuals could apply for private ownership. The Moros lost ownership of

their ancestral lands. According to the Act of 1919, a Christian Filipino

could apply for private ownership of up to 24 hectares of land while a non-

Christian could request only 10.7 This led to the beginning of "legalized land grabbing" in Mindanao. Finally, the government encouraged foreign corpo-

rations to operate in Mindanao, which resulted in an upsurge in agrobusi-

nesses owned and managed by transnational corporations.

All these programs created a deep sense of frustration in the minds of Mus-

lims in the Mindanao and Sulu region. Immediately before Independence in

1946, the Moro leaders submitted a memorandum to the U.S. government

stating "we do not want to be included in the Philippines Independence. For

once independence is launched, there will be trouble between us and the

7. C. A. Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Manila: St. Mary's Publishing, 1978), p. 113.



Christian Filipinos because from time immemorial these two peoples have

not lived harmoniously.... It is not proper [for two antagonistic] peoples [to]

live together under one flag."8 The U.S. did not accept the proposal. Thus,

in 1946 the newly independent Philippines had two major religious commu-

nities in the Sulu-Mindanao region, the Muslims and the Catholics.

Contemporary Developments At the time of the Second World War, the Muslims in both Mindanao and

Patani hoped to gain an autonomous status, if not complete independence.

However, this did not occur and so resistance movements started in both

Thailand and the Philippines whose goal was to establish in their respective

regions an independent dar al-Islam.

Thailand

In the initial post-war period, the Thai government adopted a policy of ac-

commodation toward the Muslims. However, the state penetration in pre-war

years into the civil society of Patani Muslims, together with the absence of

political participation of Patani elites and especially the arrest of Haji Sulong

in the late 1940s, contributed to the Dusun Nyiur incident, a violent clash

between the Thai police and the Patani Muslims.9

The Thai government was able to suppress the revolt but the political situa-

tion in Patani remained very tense in the 1950s. In 1948, the government

declared a state of emergency, an act that reinforced the Patani Muslim per-

ception of the Thai nation as an "alien state."10 Once the emergency ended,

Tengku Abdul Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong, in 1959 formed an underground organization, Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP, or Patani

National Liberation Front), that drew support from traditional aristocrats as

well as the religious elite. The organization's objective was complete inde-

pendence and the establishment of an Islamic state. It adopted a strategy of

armed guerilla warfare and, consequently, intermittent violent clashes oc-

cuffed between government forces and BNPP cadres throughout the 1960s.

A fall in rubber prices led to a decline in the Patani economy in the late

1960s. This led to a fall in the region's per capita income compared to that of

the rest of Thailand.1" Muslims believed that "the central government thinks

8. Pute Rahimah Makol-Abdul, "Colonialism and Change: The Case of Muslims in the Philip-

pines," JIMMA 17:2 (October 1997), p. 319.

9. It was estimated that 1,100 Muslims and 30 policeman were killed in the incident. See W.

K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of South-

ern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 67.

10. Singapore Free Press, July 28, 1948.

11. David Brown, "From Peripheral Communities," p. 66. Between 1962 and 1968 rubber

prices fell by 27% and rubber output by 32%.



in terms of taxes and duties which can be extracted from the region [rather]

than in terms of investment and technical support, and the region's tin and

rubber resources are siphoned off by Thai Buddhists and the Thai Chinese." 12

Concurrently, many Patani youth who had been educated in Egypt, Pakistan, and India now found on their return that the government was reluctant to

employ them. These factors combined to make them politically active sepa-

ratists. They differed in their orientation from the traditional aristocrats and

were also divided among themselves between Islamists and secularists. The

Islamists founded an organization, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN, or Na-

tional Revolutionary Front), whose aim was to establish the Islamic Republic

of Patani. The BRN's base of support lay mainly in the pondoks. The secu-

larists formed the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), which claimed that it had an "invisible government" whose tactic was to work by ambush.13 Many recent Patani university graduates as well as their fellows studying abroad supported this organization. Both organizations considered

the Thai government to be an "internal colonial" power with which compro-

mise was impossible; the only option was to achieve Patani independence

through armed struggle. However, the two groups did not coordinate their

activities, choosing to pursue their guerilla actions independently.

In response to the Patani separatist movement, Thai government launched

a series of military operations against the guerillas while adopting a policy of

accommodating certain demands. In 1961, the government repealed the Thai Customs Decree and allowed pondok schools to continue provided they of-

fered both secular and Islamic education. The Patani Muslims were also al-

lowed to keep Muslim names. In the 1970s, the government offered some

special privileges to Muslims. These included quotas for admissions of Mus-

lims to the universities and government bureaucracy, the establishment of

National and Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs, study tours to Bangkok

for Muslims at government expense, and the creation of the position of chu-

larajmontri, or state councilor for Islamic Affairs. Finally, the government

initiated massive economic projects to construct roads, schools, colleges, and

universities in the Muslim majority provinces. With respect to agriculture, the rubber plantation owners were given incentives to replace old trees with a

high-yield variety. An irrigation system and flood control projects were started in the region. Not all of these government programs have been

12. Astri Suhrke, "Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand," Asian Sur-

vey 17:3 (1977), p. 241.

13. The term "invisible government" was used by some Muslim villagers to describe the

fronts. See Lukman Thaib, Political Dimensions, p. 108. Fatin Ismail, a Patani Muslim from an

aristocratic family and the niece of a former movement leader, informed me that the strength of

the "invisible government" varies widely from area to area as the fronts lack coordination. Au-

thor interview, June 15, 1997.



viewed positively by Muslims. Instead, many perceive such measures as

tricks of the Thai government to penetrate Patani culture, economy, and soci-

ety. Guerilla activities continue. An aspiring elite still seeks the complete

independence of Patani and the creation of a dar al-Islam. The opposition

movement has remained factionalized, however. In late 1997, activists across

the political spectrum joined to form an underground organization called the

Council of the Muslim People of Patani (MPRMP). Taking inspiration from

the Moros' success (discussed below), they sought to pressure the Thai gov-

ernment to come to an understanding with the Patani Muslims.14 The strategy remains the same, i.e., guerilla attacks on police stations and government

offices. Since the Council is quite new, it is difficult to predict the success of

the organization.

The Philippines

The Moros continued their struggle for an independent Mindanao in the post-

Independence Philippines. Rather than accommodating the demands of the

Moros, the new Philippine government continued colonial policy and adopted

further repressive measures. It encouraged the further migration of Christian

population into Mindanao. By the 1960s, the influx of settlers from northern

and central Philippines made the Moros a virtual minority. A substantial in-

flow of domestic and foreign investment led to the transfer of wealth from

Mindanao to other parts of the country. The Filipino government, like the

colonial administration before it, passed a series of laws to legitimize its ex- propriation of lands traditionally owned by the Muslim population for reset-

tlement projects and plantation agriculture. Many lost their lands to Catholic

settlers. Violent clashes between Catholics and local Muslims became a reg-

ular occurrence. Riots broke out in various parts of the region. Although the

Moro elites were co-opted by the state, the gradual deterioration of the condi-

tion of the Muslims together with the 1968 Jabaidah massacre led to the for-

mation of the Muslims (Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968,

and this group declared Mindanao's independence.15

In response to the MIM declaration, the Catholics launched the anti-Moro

Ilaga Movement, a group whose activities culminated in the June 19, 1971,

massacre of some 70 Muslims in a mosque at Bario Manili, North Cotabato.

14. This is according to a former Patani Muslim activist, Abdul Rahman Awang. Author

interview, July 30, 1997.

15. Lela Nobel, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," Pacific Affairs 49:3

(1976), p. 405. The Jabaidah massacre took place in March 1968. At that time, the Filipino Army

was allegedly putting a group of Muslims through secret commando-style training called

"jabaidah." Their mission would be to agitate among the people of Sabah and North Borneo to

demand annexation by the Philippines. When the Moros refused to undertake the mission, they

were summarily shot for mutineering.



The government tried to co-opt MIM's top leaders by providing them with

high positions in the administration. This disappointed many young MIM

cadres who abandoned the organization and, led by a university graduate, Nur

Misuari, went on to form the militant Moro National Liberation Front

(MNLF). The organization's main objective was the complete liberation of

the Moros' homeland. The MNLF attracted the support of large numbers of

Filipino Muslims who considered the movement to be spearheading a jihad

against the Marcos regime. The MNLF opened an armed wing, the Bangso

Moro Army (BMA), consisting of militant Muslim youths and they engaged

in guerilla warfare against the Philippines Army. The MNLF also sought the

support of the overseas Muslims and reported their grievances to the Organi-

zation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). When President Marcos declared

martial law in 1972, the MNLF continued its activities underground.

Thousands of people lost their lives and property in the armed struggle in

Mindanao.

In spite of the Marcos regime's tactics, the consequences of the armed

struggle aroused the concern of the OIC countries over the conditions of

Muslims in the Philippines. A delegation of four foreign ministers from

Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia visited the Philippines to discuss

the situation of the Muslims there with the Marcos government. The involve-

ment of the Muslim states eventually culminated in the signing of the Tripoli

Agreement on December 23, 1976, in Tripoli, Libya. This agreement pro-

vided for the creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao consisting of 13

provinces and nine cities. In return, the MNLF was forced to reduce its de-

mand for complete independence to autonomy, settling for a peace that would

keep the Bangsomoro homeland part of the Republic of the Philippines.

However, after returning home the Marcos government interpreted "auton-

omy" as an internal matter that should be solved within the framework of the

national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. Marcos in-

sisted that the attainment of autonomy was subject to the Philippine constitu-

tional process. This required that a referendum be held to determine which

among the provinces and cities claimed in the Tripoli Agreement should be

included in the autonomous region.16 The MNLF strenuously objected to this plan and consequently the ceasefire that had been declared collapsed. Fighting resumed in late 1977 and MNLF leader Nur Misuari went into exile

in the Middle East.

The breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement undermined the credibility of the

MNLF leadership. Misuari was challenged by the chairman of MNLF's For-

16. The 13 provinces included the five (Maguindano, Lanao, Del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and

Tawi-Tawi) with absolute Muslim majorities. The total population of the Sulu and Mindanao

regions had a large Catholic majority. There are now 14 provinces.



eign Affairs Bureau, Hashim Salamat. He accused Misuari of being a failure,

corrupt, and a communist sympathizer.17 Shortly thereafter, he broke away

from the mainstream MNLF and established the Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF). Salamat claimed, "We want an Islamic political system and

way of life and can be achieved through effective Da'wah, Tarbiyyah, and

Jihad."18 The MNLF and MILF conducted simultaneous guerilla warfare

campaigns against the Marcos regime. In the 1980s, both provided strong

support to Corazon Aquino when she led the mass upheavals for democratic

government. In return, Aquino promised to grant autonomy to the Mindanao

region if elected. After assuming office in 1986, President Aquino offered a

new Constitution and declared the establishment of the Autonomous Regions

in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The MNLF was dissatisfied with this, how-

ever, as it granted autonomy to only four provinces, not the 13 provinces and

nine cities indicated in the Tripoli Agreement. Misuari called on the MNLF' s

various factions to unite and renew their armed struggle for a sovereign

Bangsomoro Republic. 19

The ascendance of Fidel Ramos to the presidency of the Philippines in

1992 gave Misuari renewed hope to recoup his shattered prestige. President

Ramos opened negotiations with the MNLF, and in 1996 an agreement was

signed making the MNLF the overseer of economic development projects in

all provinces in Mindanao for three years. The Southern Philippines Council

for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was established with Misuari as the

region' s governor directly under President Ramos. The Ramos-MNLF agree-

ment appears to have brought peace in the Philippines by ending the armed

struggle in Mindano. Many of Southeast Asia's leaders felt great relief; for

example, Indonesian President Suharto commented that

[t]he peaceful solution to the conflict in the Southern Philippines could serve to

prove before the international community that conflicts within the region could be

solved by the region or the community of nations concerned using their own re-

sources, their creativity and their determination to achieve peace. In fact, I would

not be surprised if analysts of international politics would see in the peace process

in the Southern Philippines valuable lessons with possibly some applications else-

where.20

17. R. J. May, "The Religious Factor in Three Minority Movements: The Moro in the Philip-

pines, the Malays of Thailand, and Indonesia's West Papuas," JIMMA 12:2 (July 1991), p. 309.

18. Rogiberto Tigalo, "Peace in His Time," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5,

1996, p. 24.

19. David G. Timberman, "The Philippines in 1989: A Good Year Turns Sour," Asian Survey

30:2 (February 1990), p. 26.

20. Farish A. Noor, "Hopefully the End of a Long Crusade," Impact International (London),

October 1996, p. 7.



Despite the appearance that the Philippine's Moro problem was under con-

trol, MILF leader Hashim Salamat declared in 1996 that while autonomy in

the Bangsomoro region was a feasible first step to independence, its effec-

tiveness would depend upon the type of autonomy and the personalities of

those involved in running the region. Salamat believed that the only viable

solution to the plight of the Moros was complete independence and the estab-

lishment of an Islamic state. Thus, despite the MNLF's seeming break-

through, the MILF remained engaged in armed struggle and so President

Ramos opened negotiations with the group. In his sixth State of the Nation

Address given on July 28, 1997, he stated that steps had been taken toward

opening peace talks with the MILF. The government promised that "all leg-

islative measures aiming to promote economic and social conditions of the

Muslim indigenous cultural group in the country will be given priority.

These include measures to recognize the ancestral domain of Muslim and

cultural minorities."21 President Ramos hoped the peace agreement would be signed in the near future and end Mindanao's decade-old social unrest. Both

the government and MILF pledged in late 1997 that the peace agreement

would be signed before January 30, 1998, declaring, "We are one final step away from an agreement that would guarantee an enduring peace in Min-

danao."22

The Results: Success and Failure The long struggles of the Malay Muslims and the Moros to create a dar al-

Islam have had different outcomes. While the Moros have succeeded in

achieving at least partial regional autonomy, the Muslims in Thailand have

not. What factors are responsible for the relative success in the Philippines

and the failure in Thailand? These different outcomes can be examined by

looking at the extent of deprivation felt by the Muslims in both countries, the

institutional strength of the revolutionary organizations, and mobilization of

political support both at home and abroad.

The Degree of Deprivation

In both Thailand and the Philippines, the minority Muslims have been de-

prived in many respects for a long period of time. However, the degree of

deprivation is much lower in Thailand than in the Philippines, and the sense

of deprivation is correspondingly much deeper among the Moros than among

their Patani counterparts. This fact has resulted in making the Moros more aggressive in their struggle. In fact, the level of social, economic, and polit-

21. Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 2, 1997, p. 8.

22. Mindanao Cross (Cotabato City), August 2, 1997, p. 8. See also New Straits Times (Ku-

ala Lumpur), December 29, 1997, p. 1.



ical subjugation is much lower in Patani than in Mindanao. In Patani, the

Thai government is interested mainly in political domination and not in reli-

gious conversion, i.e., the "Buddhification" of Patani society by transferring

Buddhists there from other parts of Thailand. In Mindanao, governments

since the Spanish colonial period have been interested in both political domination and religious conversion. The domination continued after Indepen-

dence as thousands of Catholics migrated to Mindanao at the government's

urging. The Moros now constitute only 22% of the population in their own

homeland. Today much of the wealth in Mindanao belongs either to

Catholics or foreign investors. In contrast, no such land grabs took place in

Patani and so the Malay Muslims' armed struggle lacked the communal as-

pect present in Mindanao.

Economically, Patani has encountered less exploitation than Mindanao.

Patani Raya is rich in rubber plantations and other natural resources, and the

government initiated several projects to improve the socioeconomic condi-

tions of the people and enhance the loyalty of the Muslims toward the Thai

government.23 In the Mindanao region-much bigger than Patani24 and the Philippines's richest area in terms of natural and mineral resources-efforts

have been made from the very beginning to exploit the resources for the

benefit of industries in the northern Philippines. The flow of investment has

exacerbated a growing economic disparity between the Catholic majority and

the Muslims. After Independence, various multinational corporations were

invited to set up industries in Mindanao that geared production to meet the

requirements of the export market rather than local needs. It became a major

area for earning foreign exchange for the Philippines. This pattern of eco-

nomic development disrupted the Moro economic order by replacing subsis-

tence production with export-oriented production and pushed the Moros to

the economic periphery. The government believed that, with the declining wealth of the Moros, the Moro nationalist movement would collapse in the

long run. In fact, the government's policy made the Moros more aggressive.

Politically speaking, while the Thai government took many steps to earn

the loyalty of the Muslims in Patani Raya, the Philippine government adopted

repressive measures in Mindanao. From the beginning, the government

adopted integrative and assimilationist policies through a "control model." A commission for national integration was established in 1957, but rather than

earning the loyalty of the Moros, its activities only deepened their sense of

23. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, p. 165. In fact, Dr. Imtiaz, a professor of Religion at

Sonkhla University, informed me that "nowadays whatever we ask the government we get."

Author interview, September 15, 1997.

24. The area covered by the Mindanao region accounts for 32.6% of the Philippines's total,

while that of the Patani Raya accounts for only 10% of Thailand's. Author interview, W. K. Che

Man, director of Malay Studies, National University of Malaysia, December 24, 1997.



deprivation. There was a continuous denial of participation to the newly edu-

cated elites. The Muslims had neither the chance to become part of the ruling

political elite in their region nor were any administrative jobs open to them.

In 1980, T. J. S. George wrote, "Two decades after the Philippines became

independent, Muslims in Mindanao were a devitalized people, their economic

conditions stagnant, their social conditions in jeopardy, their laws and cus-

toms in danger of disintegrating."25 The Moros had no choice but to resort to

violence and a war of attrition. In contrast, the Patani Muslims resorted to

only a low level of violence. The Thai government's policy of integration

was moderated by effective socioeconomic and political moves that have

lessened movement toward a more violent response.

Institutional Strength

A successful resistance movement also requires a stable, complex, and adapt-

able institution. No such movement can succeed if it is led by a weak organi-

zation. The Muslims in both Patani and Mindanao organized liberation fronts

but the organization behind the movement in Patani has remained weak all

along compared to that in Mindanao. While the Moro movement has always

been led by political institutions and leaders, those behind the Patani Mus-

lims' movement have been religious. Leadership in both cases came initially

from the traditional aristocrats. In Mindanao this leadership was transferred

to educated, radical, political youths, while in Patani the core remained in the

hands of religious leaders who lacked political tactics. The first two organi-

zations created in Patani collapsed within a very short span of time, and the

orthodox Islam and secularism that subsequently emerged weakened the dar

al-Islam movement there. In fact, the Patani Muslims should have been more

united than those of the Philippines because while the Muslims in Mindanao

are divided into various ethnic groups, the Patani Muslims belong to a single

one. Yet, they remained factionalized. None of the Patani organizations has

any record of inspiring significant numbers of revolutionary cadres as has

been the case with the MNLF. All the Patani revolutionary organizations

seem to be struggling against each other rather than fighting against the gov-

ernment. Liberation activities persist in Patani but they will remain weak so

long as they are not united.

On the other hand, the Moro liberation movement has always been led by a strong organization. Datu Untog Matalam, a member of a traditional aristo- crat family who had run for governor of Cotabato Province in 1967 and lost,

founded MIM with other Muslim elites in the wake of the Jabaidah massacre

to mobilize Muslim support and articulate calls for Muslim unity and auton-

25. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, p. 27; and T. J. S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of

Islam in Philippine Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 120.



omy for Mindanao. Initially, the MIM was a haven for the traditional Moro

power elite who attempted to regain their lost political prestige and power.

The rise of the MNLF was a challenge to both the traditional local elites as

well as the Philippine government. There is no doubt that the MNLF was a

very strong organization; it survived until it achieved its goal in 1996. Its

leadership came from educated youth who understood political tactics and

strategy. It is true that the MNLF's was divided later and that this resulted in

the formation of the MILF. However, there is no record of fighting between

the two. Both focused their efforts against the government forces. It is also

true that the MILF remains unhappy with mere autonomy. It still demands

complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic state in Min-

danao, and the Ramos government was compelled to open negotiations with

the MILF. Nonetheless, strong organization has always provided a cohesive

force in the Moro liberation movement.

Mass Mobilization

A revolutionary movement requires not only a strong organization but also

domestic and foreign support at a broader social level. The Patani Muslim

independence movement failed to mobilize such support either internally or

externally. At home, there is a common consciousness among the Muslims

in Patani about their identity but this consciousness needed to be translated

into reality. The lack of a strong organization made it impossible to galva-

nize the support of the masses. Leadership has remained divided between

secular and religious elites. The opposition also could not provide the masses

with an alternative source of security in the face of the Thai army. Region-

ally, the Patani Muslims have not been able to draw serious attention from

their neighbors. The Malaysian government never considered fighting Thai-

land with its strong military. It did give tacit support to Patani Muslims,

especially the Malay rulers of the Kelantan border state. However, after the

formation of ASEAN in the late 1960s, Malaysia sought better relations with

the Thai government. The Malaysian government needed its cooperation to

suppress the Communist Party of Malaysia, which was carrying out guerilla

operations from bases in southern Thailand. Internationally, the Patani Mus-

lims failed to draw any serious support from either the OIC or Muslim coun-

tries generally. Neither the major powers, especially the U.K. and the U.S.,

nor the U.N. supported the Patani Muslim cause. Thus, they have been left to

solve their problem by themselves.

The Moro movement, on the other hand, was fairly successful in mobiliz-

ing mass support both at home and abroad. They were quite well organized,

and the Moro populace gave the MNLF wholehearted support until it

achieved some regional autonomy. Secondly, the MNLF attracted the atten-

tion of its strong neighbor, Malaysia. When the Philippines pressed territorial



claims over the Malaysian State of Sabah, the Malaysian government re-

sponded with support to the MNLF, seeing the movement as a lever to use to

resolve the Sabah issue. Since its founding, the MNLF sought to develop a

cordial relationship with Malaysia. The government of the Philippines was

aware of this. Moreover, a large number of Filipinos were working in Malay-

sia, their remittances contributing to the foreign exchange of the Philippines.

Therefore, at the urging of the Malaysian government, the Ramos administra-

tion agreed in 1996 to peace talks with the MNLF. Finally, at the interna-

tional level the Moros obtained support from Western countries, the U.N.,

and Amnesty International. There was support also from the OIC, and Mus-

lim countries consequently came forward with direct help for the Moros. At

the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Jeddah in July

1975, the MNLF was given formal recognition by the OIC. The Muslim

countries urged the Philippine government to negotiate with the MNLF's rep-

resentatives; Manila could not ignore this request because 80% of the coun-

try's oil, as well as a huge amount of foreign exchange from Filipino

overseas workers, came from the Middle East. The Tripoli Agreement was

signed due to OIC pressure and in 1996 the Mindanao problem was resolved

partially in light of that agreement.

Conclusion Some observations may be made on the basis of this comparative analysis of

the Philippines's Moro and Thailand's Patani Muslim separatist movements.

Huntington appears to be correct in stating that historical, political, and social

circumstances may lay the groundwork for a separatist movement, but such a

movement's success depends on both the state failing to accommodate the

deprived group's demands and the cohesiveness and support base of the

resistance forces. There also appears to be credence to Gurr's observation

that a separatist movement becomes aggressive only with the "greater extent of deprivation." Since the Patani Muslims had not been severely deprived by

the Thai state and lacked a strong cohesive organization and external sup-

ports, they have not been able to achieve autonomy for the region. On the

other hand, the Moros have been relatively successful because they exper-

ienced severe socioeconomic and political deprivations. Moreover, they were

led by a strong organization that achieved both domestic and foreign support.

While the Thai policy of integration was pursued through accommodation and development, the Philippine state used repression and exploitation for the

benefit of the country at the expense of the Moros. This policy led to riots

and massacres in Mindanao.

Unity based on religious identity may not necessarily lead to the success of

a movement unless the religious group in question is severely affected by

social, economic, and political deprivations. In both the Patani and Min-



danao cases, religion initially helped to form a separate identity but ulti-

mately religious unity did not make a substantial difference to the relative

success or failure of these movements. Rather, it was the magnitude of the

state's socioeconomic and political intrusions and its repression of minorities

that seem to have had much to do with the success of a separatist movement.

One may find similar trends in many other separatist movement cases. The

Sunni Muslim Berbers in Algeria and Morocco, for example, have failed in

their movements because both governments have made concessions to the

cultural interests of the Berbers and accommodated them with a degree of

economic and political powers. Similarly, the Sikhs in India's Punjab have

failed to achieve an independent Khalistan because the degree of deprivation

there is not that high; in fact, many Sikhs hold top positions in the Indian

civil and military bureaucracies. Furthermore, not all Sikhs are in favor of

independence; for example, the Akali Dal, a pro-Sikh party, does not support

the separatist cause. Consequently, the separatist movement has failed to mo-

bilize either internal or external supports. Conversely, the separatist move-

ment in Bangladesh was successful as the Bengalis were severely deprived.

The movement was led by a strong organization, the Awami League, which

was aided and supported directly by India and the Soviet Union during its

war of liberation. In contrast, the Buddhist tribals of Bangladesh's Chit-

tagong Hill Tracts have led a separatist movement that has been a failure

because the degree of deprivation is not that high. The government there has

sought political accommodation and in November 1997 signed a peace treaty

with the Shanti Bahini rebels and met their demands. Thus, though religion

or culture may provide a separatist movement with an initial bond of unity

and identity, such a movement becomes successful only if there exists ex-

treme deprivations, the movement is led by a strong and cohesive political

organization, and it earns support both at home and abroad.


Documents

The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of … of Patani replaced many elements of the Hindu-Buddhist culture ... the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago