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African Security Review

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The Islamist challenge: Nigeria s Boko Haram crisis explained

Freedom C. Onuoha

Online publication date: 12 July 2010

To cite this Article Onuoha, Freedom C.(2010) 'The Islamist challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis explained', AfricanSecurity Review, 19: 2, 54 — 67

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ISSN 1024-6029 print / 2154-0128 online© 2010 Institute for Security StudiesDOI: 10.1080/10246029.2010.503061http://www.informaworld.com

African Security Review 19.2, June 2010, 54–67

Freedom C Onuoha isa research fellow atthe African Centre forStrategic Research andStudies (ACSRS) ofthe National DefenceCollege, Abuja,Nigeria ([email protected])

The Islamist challenge:

Nigeria’s Boko Haram

crisis explained

Freedom C Onuoha

Introduction

Since the return of democracy to Nigeria in May 1999, the deteriorating internal security

situation has been a source of growing concern to the Nigerian government, its hapless

citizens and the international community. In just a decade criminal violence in the

form of, among others, kidnapping, militancy, a religious crisis and armed robbery has

assumed frightening dimensions.

Of particular concern is the increasing incidence of religious violence which is

threatening public order and human security in Nigeria. Indeed, the disturbing rise in

religious extremism which has resulted in incidents such as the Sharia crisis in some

northern states in 2000 and the Miss World riots in 2002 portend grave danger to the

Keywords Boko Haram, extrajudicial killing, Mohammed Yusuf, Nigeria, radical sect, religious violence, terrorism, unemployment



Essay 55

existence of Nigeria as a state. It is worrisome that over 10 000 people died in religious

violence in Nigeria between 1999 and 2003,1 and more religious violence has occurred

since then. The Boko Haram uprising has added to the number of people who have been

killed, displaced or orphaned by religious violence in Nigeria.

This article examines the Boko Haram crisis that engulfed four northern states in

Nigeria in July 2009. It highlights the historical evolution of the Boko Haram sect and

its violent philosophy, discusses the major contentious issues arising from the crisis, and

proffers measures that could help alleviate religious violence in Nigeria.

Understanding the Boko Haram sect

It is pertinent at this juncture to look at the evolution of the Boko Haram sect, who

its leader was, its membership, and the philosophy of the sect. By so doing, we can

better appreciate their peculiar attitude towards other people and their perception of the

Nigerian state.

Evolution

The exact date of the emergence of the Boko Haram sect is mired in controversy,

especially if one relies on media accounts. However, according to the Nigerian Directorof Defence Information, Colonel Mohammed Yerima, the sect has existed since 1995,

under the name of Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra.2 It was then led by Abubakah Lawan,

who later left the country for studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia.

The sect has subsequently flourished under various names like the Nigerian Taliban,

Yusufiyyah sect, and Boko Haram. The name ‘Nigerian Taliban’ is used in a derogatary

sence by the local people who despise the philosophy and teachings of the sect. Although

the sect is fashioned like the Taliban in Afghanistan, it is widely believed that it has no

formal links with its Afghan counterpart.

Boko Haram first took up arms against state security forces on 24 December 2003 when

it attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns of Geiam and Kanamma in

Yobe State. Members occupied the two buildings for several days, hoisting the flag of

Afghanistan’s Taliban movement over the camps. A joint operation of soldiers and police

dislodged the group after killing 18 and arresting dozens of its members.3 On 31 December

2003 Boko Haram left the village and dispersed into other northern states after inscribing

the word ‘Taliban’ on a captured vehicle.4 In 2004 it established a base called ‘Afghanistan’

in Kanamma village in northern Yobe State, on the border with the Republic of Niger.5

The activities of the sect became more worrisome from 2004 when students – especially

in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states like the University of Maiduguri; Ramat



56 African Security Review 19.2 Institute for Security Studies

Polytechnic, Maiduguri; Federal Polytechnic, Damaturu; and others, who constituted

the sect’s members – withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and joined the

group for Quaranic lessons and preaching’.6 On 21 September 2004 members attacked

Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealingarms and ammunition. Members later set the Gwoza police station ablaze. A few weeks

later the police launched a counterattack on the sect during which 24 members were

killed and 22 assault rifles and large quantities of ammunition were recovered.7

Apart from a few isolated skirmishes with the police, the sect received marginal attention

until the middle of 2007 and again in 2008 when their militant activities came under

surveillance by security operatives in Abuja.8

Boko Haram under the leadership of Yusuf

The Boko Haram sect was led by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf until his death just after the

riots of July 2009. Yusuf was born on 29 January 1970 and hailed from Girgir village

in the Jalasko local government area of Yobe State. He had four wives and 12 children.

The young Yusuf was a secondary school drop-out who received a Quranic education in

the Chad and Niger republics, where he imbibed his radical ideology. His radical stance

generated friction between himself and other moderate Islamic scholars like the late Jafa

Adam, Sheik Abba Aji and Yahaya Jingir. His association with the sect was also a source

of marital friction and one of his wives, Zainab, informed Tell magazine that ‘we werealways quarrelling with him anytime I brought up the issue of his membership of the

Yusufiyyah [Boko Haram] sect in the last six years’.9

Mohammed Yusuf held a benighted view of the world and science and in an interview

with the BBC he completely rejected the idea that the world is round, the theory of

Darwinism, and the process of rain. These to him ran contrary to the beliefs of Islam

and the teaching of Allah. ‘Like rain, we believe it is a creation of God rather than an

evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain,’10 he argued. He did not

believe in the Nigerian constitution and the flag either.

Yusuf lived in affluence and was fairly well educated in the Western sense, although most

of his sect members lived in abject poverty.11 Members also had to pay a daily levy of 100

naira to their leader. This provided the basic source of funding for the sect, in addition to

donations from politicians, government officials and other individuals or organisations

within Nigeria.12

The sect was also alleged to be receiving funds from outside Nigeria. In 2007, for instance,

Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Damagun (a Muslim cleric who supposedlybelonged to a group dubbed the ‘Nigerian Taliban’)13 were tried for terrorism-related

offences. Mohammed Damagun was arraigned in a federal high court in Abuja on three



Essay 57

charges, namely belonging to the Nigerian Taliban, receiving a total of US$300 000

from al-Qaeda to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism, and aiding

terrorists in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf was arraigned on five charges, among which

was receiving monies from al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to recruit terrorists who would attack residences of foreigners, especially Americans living in Nigeria.14

Yusuf was acquitted, but in 2008 he and some of his members were again arrested by security

operatives and handed over to the Inspector-General of Police for prosecution. They were

released on bail by an Abuja High Court on 20 January 2009.15 Between 2007 and April

2009 some members of the sect (such as Bukar Shekau from the Niger Republic) were

arrested in Kano and Borno and either deported or handed over to the police for prosecution.

Unfortunately, these disciples usually found their way back into Nigerian society.

Philosophy and membership

The philosophy of the sect is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam. Orthodox Islam

in their interpretation abhors Western education and working in the civil service. This

explains why the sect is popularly known as the Boko Haram, literally meaning ‘Western

education is a sin’.16 However, a statement allegedly released by the acting leader of Boko

Haram, Mallam Sanni Umaru, rejected such a notion:

Boko Haram does not in any way mean ‘Western education is a sin’ as theinfidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means ‘Western

Civilisation’ is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the

impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West

… which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of

Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education

but not determined by Western education.17

Although their philosophical worldview is uncertain, their ideological mission is quite

obvious, namely to overthrow the Nigerian state and then impose strict Islamic Sharialaw in the entire country. A member of the sect has stated that their mission was to ‘clean

the [Nigerian] system which is polluted by Western education and uphold Sharia all

over the country’.18 They are motivated by the conviction that the Nigerian state is filled

with social vices, thus ‘the best thing for a devout Muslim to do was to “migrate” from

the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society

devoid of political corruption and moral deprivation’.19 Non-members were therefore

considered kuffar (disbelievers; those who deny the truth) or fasiqun (wrong-doers).20

Its members usually wear turbans, grow full beards and live in communities.21

BokoHaram draws its members mainly from disaffected youths and unemployed graduates,

although it does also have some well-educated, wealthy and influential people as




members. For instance, Alhaji Buji Fai, an ex-commissioner in Borno State, and Kadiru

Atiku, a former university lecturer, are known to be members of the sect. The sect

has over 280 000 members across the 19 states of northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad and

Sudan.22

It is feared that the sect could regroup in the future to unleash another roundof terror.

The Boko Haram revolt in perspective

The Boko Haram revolt lasted from 26 to 30 July 2009. Fighting started on 26 July in

Bauchi, Bauchi State, after the police arrested several suspected leaders of the Islamist

sect.23 In retaliation the members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station

in Bauchi. The group was also reacting to the refusal of the Bauchi state government

to allow it the freedom to publicly preach its religion and recruit more people to thesect. The state government actually adopted this stance because it feared an outbreak of

religious violence in view of the radical ideology propounded by the Boko Haram. The

attack on the Dutsen Tanshi police station was the curtain raiser for a wave of unrest

that spread through four states in the next four days. However, a reinforcement of armed

policemen and soldiers repelled the attack on the police station and arrested members of

the sect in neighbouring areas.

Source: Author’s elaboration

Figure 1 Map of Nigeria showing the states in which Boko Haram launched attacks

Sokoto

Kebbi

Niger

Kwara

Oyo

Ogun

Osun

Lagos

Ondo

Edo

Delta

Rivers

Imo Abia Cross-River

Enugu

Benue

Anam-bra

Kogi

PlateauAbuja

Taraba

Bauchi

Adamawa

Borno

Yobe Jigawa

Kano

Katsina

Kaduna

Zamfara

AkwaIbom

Ekiti

Bayelsa

Used to denote statesattacked by the sect

Nassarawa

Gombe

Ebonyi



Essay 59

President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua mandated all the national security agencies to contain

the crisis, directing that ‘security be beefed up in all neighbouring states and security

personnel placed on full alert to ensure that the attacks by misguided elements do not

spread elsewhere’.24 However, the unrest spread to the Borno, Kano, and Yobe states (see

figure 1) within a few hours of the presidential directive being announced.

In Damaturu, the capital of Yobe State, the fundamentalists attacked police stations inthe early hours of 27 July, forcing the state government to impose a curfew to prevent

the crisis from escalating and spilling over to neighbouring states. In Potiskum town

members of the sect attacked and destroyed several public properties, including the

police area command centre (see table 1 for a summary of attacks by the sect).

In Kano State, Boko Haram members attacked Wudil police station, injuring five

policemen, including CSP Sagir Idris, a divisional police officer. They stole some rifles,

including two AK47s. The police killed three of the fundamentalists and arrested 33

others, including some Chadians who could speak neither English nor Hausa.25

Thisgave credence to the suspicion that the sect’s members are foreign nationals from

neighbouring Chad and Niger.

Table 1 Some Boko Haram attacks

Date State Town(s) Targets attacked Comments

26 July 2009 Bauchi BauchiDutsen Tanshi policestation

They destroyed the policestation; over 40 sectmembers were killed andover 200 arrested

26–27 July 2009 Borno

Maiduguri,Lamisula,

andGamboru

State police headquarters,Police Mobile Collegebarracks, maximumsecurity prison,National Directorate of Employment, Makerapolice station and severalchurches

A sergeant, a prison wardenand five police officerson training at the college were killed, more than30 vehicles and a numberof churches and mosquesburnt, and the inmates ofthe prison freed

27 July 2009 YobeDamaturu

andPotiskum

Police area command,Federal Road SafetyCommission office,Calvary Baptist Churchand National PopulationCommission

Three policemen and afire service staff member were killed while sevenpolicemen sustainedserious injuries; they alsofreed suspects in policecustody

27 July 2009 Kano Wudil Wudil police station

The sect injured thedivisional police officer anda mobile policeman whilethree members of the sect

were killedSource: Author’s compilation.




In Borno State, Boko Haram members attacked the police headquarters and other structures

in Maiduguri. They gained access to the Police Mobile College and also burnt down nine

houses and killed some policemen. For the five days the mayhem lasted, the city of Maiduguri

witnessed the fiercest battles, not surprising given that it was the sect’s stronghold. They alsoattacked mosques and churches, setting ablaze over 30 vehicles (three at the Celestial Church,

11 at Elysian Yan’Uwa, 19 at the Deeper Life Bible Church and five at the National Evangelical

Church Mission).26 They also razed Lamisula and Gamboru police stations.

The mayhem was eventually contained by the joint operations of the police and military,

coordinated by the Borno State special security task force, in Operation Flush. On 28 July the

operation, led by Colonel Ben Ahanotu, carried out a heavy bombardment of Mohammed

Yusuf’s residence in Maiduguri. Two days later Mohammed Yusuf was finally captured

in his residence where he was hiding in a goat pen. After a few hours in police custody, Yusuf was murdered in what appeared to have been an extrajudicial killing, although police

officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape.27 The ensuing controversy over

his killing compelled the commander of the operation, Colonel Ben Ahanotu, to emphasise

that ‘he had personally captured Mr Yusuf and handed him over to the chief of police in

Maiduguri’.28 Consequently, President Yar’Adua directed the National Security Advisor to

probe the killing of the sect’s leader. (At the time of going to press, I was unable to confirm

whether the advisor had completed and submitted a report to the president.)29

By the time the uprising was over, some 3 500 people were internally displaced, morethan 1 264 children orphaned, and over 392 women widowed. In addition, 28 policemen

and five prison warders, as well as an undisclosed number of soldiers, had been killed.

Properties destroyed include 48 buildings, three primary schools, more than 12 churches

and a magistrate’s court.30 In addition, security forces freed about 180 women and

children believed to have been deceived by their husbands and teachers that they were in

Maiduguri to attend a religious function.31

Reection on some contentious issues

Unlike past religious crises in the country, which have consisted predominantly of clashes

between Christians and Muslims, the Boko Haram crisis consisted of a clash between

an extremist sect and state security forces in an episode that resembled the Maitatsine

revolts of the 1980s.32 However, the uniqueness of the Boko Haram incident is to be

found in the debates or controversies it generated. These issues are discussed below.

Intelligence failure versus political will

A major controversy about the outbreak of the Boko Haram crisis revolved around

whether the violence resulted from intelligence failure or lack of political will by the



Essay 61

Nigerian government to act proactively in order to forestall the incident. Intelligence

failure can be blamed when state security and intelligence agencies are unable to obtain,

collate, assess and disseminate intelligence that would inform on proactive steps to be

taken by the authority to forestall the actual outbreak of a crisis. In the wake of the crisisa journalist with Daily Trust newspaper, Mannir Dan Ali, noted that ‘the whole situation

seems to be a failure of intelligence, a failure of the security forces to act before matters

reached the point that they have now reached’.33

However, in the context of the revelation that security agencies had actually submitted

dozens of reports on Boko Haram to the Nigerian federal government34 before the wave

of killings, such assertion becomes unfounded. On this matter the Christian Association

of Nigeria (CAN) scathingly criticised the way the Nigerian government, especially the

Borno State government, handled the threat:

Government paid deaf ears to the 21 security threats and reports by the

SSS [State Security Services] for two years purely out of complicity, and

sympathy for the fundamental objectives of the Boko Haram sect, but only

reacted when government felt its own security was threatened.35

One could therefore conclude that the outbreak of the uprising was a lack of political

will to nip a condition propitious to crisis in the bud, rather than a dearth of security

information on the possibility of an uprising.

Legal justice versus jungle justice

The second controversy relates to the tension between two forms of justice in Nigeria,

namely legal justice and jungle justice. While legal justice condemns all forms of extra-

judicial killing, jungle justice upholds immediate execution of a suspect without a formal

trial. The murder of Mohammed Yusuf stemmed from this situation.

Shortly after Yusuf was killed, the Minister for Information and Communications,Professor Dora Akunyili, stated that the Nigerian government did not condone the

killing. However, she also declared that ‘what is important is that he [Mohammed

Yusuf] has been taken out of the way, to stop him using people to cause mayhem’.36 A

similar sentiment was expressed by the Governor of Bauchi State, Isa Yuguda:

Today we are celebrating that we have been able to see the end of the problem

[the death of Yusuf] ... we pre-empted them [Boko Haram sect] right and

we struck at the right time; that was why we were able to get them.37

Although statements of public officials tend to rationalise jungle justice while at the

same time conceding its illegality, civil society organisations and a cross-section of the




Nigerian public advocated for a fair trial for suspects. The civil society organisations

accordingly openly criticised the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf, arguing that his murder

denied the public the opportunity to obtain information about the sect’s financiers,

foreign accomplices and network profile.

Indeed, the circumstances surrounding Yusuf’s death have raised speculations on why

he was killed, with three possible explanations being mooted. First, that some powerful

sponsors of the sect, who may have feared that the leader would expose them, influenced

the police to eliminate him. Second, that the police may have killed him in retribution

for the casualties they had suffered during the clashes. The third scenario is that after

the series of arrests of Yusuf, some individuals may have decided that he should be

eliminated simply because he would otherwise again receive bail and disappear.38

Any or all of these explanations may account for his execution, but the fact remains that the

Nigerian police in recent times has gained notoriety for the summary execution of both

criminal suspects and innocent citizens.39 Hence, the true reason behind Yusuf’s killing

will only be ascertained if the NSA produces a comprehensive report on the circumstances

surrounding his death. However, there is doubt about the possibility of such a report

materialising, given the way critical inquiries have been handled in Nigeria in the past.

Ideological values versus material circumstances

Another interesting aspect revealed by the crisis was the stark contrast between the

ideological values espoused by the sect and the material circumstances of their leader. While

the sect abhors Western civilisation and its trappings, the lifestyle of Mohammed Yusuf

featured all the trappings of Western life and good living – his life was Western in all but

name. He lived in affluence while the majority of his followers suffered abject poverty and

were forbidden to work in the formal sector of the Nigerian economy. According to Tell

magazine, ‘food items found in Yusuf’s house contrasted sharply with his beliefs as many

were imported canned foods compared to date fruits eaten by his followers’.40 This situation

is as confounding to most observers of the activities of the sect as it is to the kith and kinof Yusuf’s foot soldiers. It does, however, provide an outstanding example of ‘how people

[especially Nigerian youths] can be completely deluded and how such people can delude

others in the conviction that they are actually doing great service to the nation’.41

At the same time, it should be noted that the leadership failure in Nigeria is at the root of

the crisis. The political elite have failed to judiciously utilise public resources to address

acute human security vulnerabilities in the country. Given the high rates of poverty and

unemployment among the youth,42 especially in northern Nigeria, ‘many Muslims are

becoming increasingly sceptical about a system that has brought them little benefit andhas served well the interests of the established political elite’.43 Most members of the sect

were young boys and girls who migrated from the rural areas to urban areas in search of a



Essay 63

better livelihood. Given the lack of employment opportunities in the cities, many end up

contributing to ethno-religious conflicts in these areas. It is therefore easy to appreciate how

the Boko Haram could provide the disenchanted with a platform from which to attack the

system which they believe is largely responsible for their situation.

Extremist group versus sleeper terrorist cell

Another contentious issue was whether the group is a purely fundamentalist sect or a

sleeper terrorist cell. In recent times, there has been a growing apprehension among

Western diplomats that a Nigerian al-Qaeda sleeper cell may launch attacks on Western

interests on the country.44 Indeed, the ‘presence of an al-Qaeda branch operating across

the Sahara Desert in Mauritania, Morocco, Mali and Niger and Nigeria’s porous borders

has sharpened such fears’.45

Since September 11, US defence and intelligence officials havefocused on radical Islamic groups in Nigeria and their potential to threaten US national

security. One assessment conducted jointly by the Department of Defence and USAID in

2006 concluded that it ‘found little evidence that there is an active and growing terrorist

threat in northern Nigeria’.46

Against this backdrop the Boko Haram uprising generated concerns about possible

connections with an international terrorist group. A common conclusion is that ‘there is

no evidence of any links between Boko Haram and international terrorist networks such as

al-Qaida’.47

Despite this conclusion there remain critical questions that need to be answeredby the Nigerian government, and especially by its security agencies. Two of these are: Why

and how did some members of the sect travel outside Nigeria to receive training? And,

more importantly, what kind of training did they receive?

The events of July 2009 suggest that the sect’s members were involved in indoctrination training

and training in the production of improvised explosive devices.48 It was alleged that their

weapons included surface-to-air rocket launchers, improvised explosive devices, detonators,

grenades, general purpose machine guns (GPMGs), AK47s, dane guns, pistols, daggers,

machetes, catapults, clubs, several bags of potassium nitrate used for making explosives, andover 1 000 locally fabricated plastic cylinders that can be used to manufacture guns.49 Although

the group has been categorised as an extremist religious sect, the fact that some of its members

have received training in Afghanistan and Mauritania, coupled with the large number of

small arms and weapons recovered from them, raises more questions. Therefore it may not be

entirely wrong to conclude that the sect is more than merely an extremist group.

Measures for combating religious violence

In view of the danger that religious violence poses to Nigeria’s corporate existence, it is

pertinent at this juncture to proffer some recommendations. The following measures,




although hardly exhaustive, would contribute to suppressing religious violence and

extremism in Nigeria.

Nigeria’s electoral system should be overhauled to ensure the emergence of credible■

leaders at all levels of government. This is because almost all the violent religious

crises in the country are directly or indirectly related to the failure of governance,

especially on the part of the political leadership. The existence of a credible electoral

process would guarantee the emergence of a more responsive and accountable political

leadership capable of preventing or managing conflicts.

The leaders of the Nigerian state need to develop the political will to act on reports■

of commissions or panels set up in the aftermath of violent conflicts. The archives of

the Nigerian government are full of reports of panels that investigated past religiouscrises in the country. The government’s inability to bring perpetrators of violence to

trial to serve as a deterrent for others is one of the reasons why religious violence has

continued unabated. Thus, mustering the political will to act on the recommendations

of panels is critical for suppressing religious extremism in Nigeria.

The Nigerian government should deal with the underlying factors, such as widespread■

poverty, unemployment and socio-political exclusion, which make people favourably

disposed towards criminal violence. It must embark on effective poverty alleviation

and human capital development programmes through a massive planned investmentin public works like power, rail and road rehabilitation and construction, and large-

scale farming. The government should take the lead in the development of small-

and medium-sized industries by means of a well-designed micro-credit scheme that

would create jobs and alleviate poverty. The revitalisation of the country’s ailing

industries is equally critical in creating job opportunities for the large numbers of

unemployed youths.

The Nigerian government should strengthen border security arrangements, including■

enhanced intra- and inter-state collaboration among security/intelligence agencies. Emphasis should therefore be placed on monitoring illegal migration, strengthening

the mechanisms for containing the illicit production and circulation of small arms and

light weapons and a greater exchange of information. Also, the security agencies must

be encouraged to initiate robust, cooperative partnerships with border communities

to encourage them to volunteer useful information to security/intelligence agencies

regarding unwholesome developments within their communities.

The government, in partnership with civil society groups and faith-based■

organisations, must undertake serious peace education at all levels in Nigeria: primary,secondary and tertiary. Civil society organisations involved in promoting inter-

religious cooperation and peace education must be encouraged by the government






(eds), Democracy and development in Nigeria: social issues and external relations, Lagos: Concept Publications,

2006, 147.

8 Interview with an officer of the State Security Service, Abuja, 9 September 2009.

9 Cited in Lawal, Rage of the puritans, 38.

10 Ibid.11 Lawal, Rage of the puritans, 34.

12 Interview with a security agent with the Nigerian Defence Intelligence Agency, 1 September 2009.

13 J Peter Pham, Strategic interests, World Defense Review, 1 February 2007, http://worlddefensereview.com/pham020107.shtml (accessed 7 June 2010).

14 Tajudeen Suleiman, Terrorism unsettles the North, 24.

15 Taiwo and Olugbode, Boko Haram leader killed, 4.

16 Joe Boyle, Nigeria’s Taliban enigma, BBC News , 31 July 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8172270.stm (accessed 5 August 2009).

17 See Nigeria: Boko Haram resurrects, declares total jihad, Vanguard, 14 August 2009, http://allafrica.com/ stories/200908140646.html (accessed 16 August 2009).

18 Ardo Hazzad, Nigeria clashes kill over 50 in northeastern city, Reuters, 26 July 2009, http://www.

reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSTRE56P24N20090726 (accessed 28 July 2009).19 Olajide O Akanji, The politics of combating domestic terrorism in Nigeria, in Wafula Okumu and Anneli

Botha (eds), Domestic terrorism in Africa: defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security,

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009, 60.

20 Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria (DCCN), ‘ Boko Haram’ tragedy: frequently asked questions, Minna:

DCCN, 2009, 14.

21 Interview with a local resident in Maiduguri (Borno State), 19 September 2009.

22 Lawal, Rage of the puritans, 35.

23 Islamist attacks in Nigeria: a taste of the Taliban, The Economist, 1 August 2009, 34.

24 Religious riots spread to Kano, Yobe, Borno, Thisday, 28 July 2009, 1.

25 Ibid, 4.

26 Lawal, Rage of the puritans, 34.

27 Stephanie Schulze, Nigeria: the Boko Haram battle, 7 September 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/ Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=105612 (accessed 10 September 2009).

28 Sect leader alive when captured, BBC News, 3 August 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8180475.stm (accessed 4 August 2009).

29 Interview with an officer in the Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja, 9 December 2009.

30 News Hour report, African Independent Television, 8:30 pm news broadcast, 12 September 2009.

31 Lawami Mukairu and Abdulsalam Muhammed, Another 43 Islamic fanatics killed in Yobe, Vanguard, 30 July 2009, 5.

32 See Dan O Okanya, Religion and violence in Nigeria: the Maitatsine rebellion explained, in Dan O

Okanya (ed), Great issues in Nigerian government and politics, Enugu: Department of Political Science, Enugu

State University of Science and Technology, 1995.

33 See Boyle, Nigeria’s Taliban enigma.34 Nigeria accused of ignoring sect warnings before wave of killings, Associated Press, 2 August 2009, http://

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/nigeria-boko-haram-islamist-sect (accessed 5 August 2009).

35 Emeka Mamah, Kingsley Omonobi, Chris Ochayi, James Uwem, Northern govs meet, condemn

Boko Haram crisis, Vanguard, 4 August 2009, 34.

36 Cited by Andrew Walker, Brutal reality of Nigeria killing, BBC News , 31 July 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8178011.stm (accessed 4 August 2009).

37 Cited in Lawal, Rage of the puritans, 39.

38 Jide Ajani, Killing of Boko Haram leader, Vanguard, 9 August 2009, 11.

49 See Ikeddy Isiguzo, The police and extra-judicial killings, Vanguard, 9 August 2009, 9.

40 See Lawal, Rage of the puritans, 44.

41 Disu Kamor, Boko Haram: prohibition of knowledge and reason, The Guardian, 4 August 2009, 79.

42 Freedom C Onuoha, Youth unemployment and poverty: Connections and concerns for national

development in Nigeria, in A M Jega and H Wakili (eds), Nigeria youth: political participation and national

development, Kano: CDRAT, 2009, in press.



Essay 67

43 Dan Isaacs, Islam in Nigeria: simmering tensions, BBC News , 24 September 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3155279.stm (accessed 5 August 2009).

44 See Olusola Fabiyi, Al-Qaeda plans to bomb Nigeria – Okiro, Punch, 10 May 2008.45 Andrew Walker, Is al-Qaeda working in Nigeria? BBC News , 4 August 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/africa/8182289.stm (accessed 9 August 2009).46 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Chief of Staff Strategy Report 2(16) (December

2006), 2.

47 Schulze, Nigeria: the Boko Haram battle.

48 See Michael Olugbode, Nigeria: Boko Haram bomb expert trained in Afghanistan, 3 September 2009,

Thisday, http://allafrica.com/stories/200909030002.html (accessed 4 September 2009).

49 See Emma Ujah, Emeka Mamah, Kingsley Omonobi, Chioma Obinna and Daniel Idonor, Yar Aduaorders probe of Boko Haram killings, Vanguard, 4 August 2009, 15.

This paper was made possible by financial support from the American Political

Science Association (APSA) research grant for Africa Workshop Fellows.

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