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The Japanese Constitution and Its Economic Policy Consequences. Conference on the Japanese Constitution Panel on the Constitution’s Influence on Japan’s Global Relations The University of Michigan April 15, 2011. Jun Saito, Ph D Assistant Professor Department of Political Science - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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The Japanese Constitution and Its Economic Policy Consequences
Conference on the Japanese ConstitutionPanel on the Constitution’s Influence on Japan’s Global Relations
The University of MichiganApril 15, 2011
Jun Saito, Ph DAssistant Professor
Department of Political ScienceYale University
Outline
1. Constitution and Economic Policy
2. Japanese Constitution and Econ Policy
3. LDP as an Endogenous Party
4. Exchange Rate Regime and the LDP
5. Political Instability and Bicameralism
6. Conclusions
1. Constitution and Economic Policy
• Variation in constitutional design– Presidentialism vs. parliamentalism– Electoral institutions– Intergovernmental relations
• Outcomes– Structure of commitment and mechanism of
leadership selection– Party vs. individual– Programatic vs. clientelistic– Trade policy– Pork barrel
2. Japanese Constitution and Economic Policy
• Parliamentalism + Bicameralism– Policy change happens iff the incumbent party
wins three consecutive elections. – Otherwise, policy gridlock
• Unitarism – Large spending by local governments + small
revenue base– Soft budget constraint– Local politicians as campaigners
3. LDP as an Endogenous Party
• Early postwar Parliament– Instability and low legislative productivity– Frequent party switching– Over-nomination of candidates
• One big conservative party– Long-term dominance predicted– Institutional safeguard– LDP as a regime of “perverse accountability”
4050
60
50 60 70 80 90 00 10Election Year
LDP's Pred. LDP LDP + Coalition
LD
P V
ote
Sha
re (
%)
2040
6080
50 60 70 80 90 00 10Election Year
LDP's Pred. LDP LDP + Coalition Majority
Low
er H
ouse
Sea
t Sha
re (
%)
Votes
Seats
Theory of the LDP
• Perverse accountability– Voters’ expectation of the long-term grip of
power– Voters competed against each other and held
themselves accountable to the LDP
• Outcome– Machine politics, interest group politics– Delegation to the bureaucracy
Japanese Ballot
斉藤
淳
11
2040
6080
100
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000Municipal Population in thousands
Max
imum
Ass
embl
y S
ize
jiji NfNfNNf )(
Merging municipalities reduces overall no. of Municipal assembly members.
Municipal Assembly Size as a Concave Function of Municipal Population
02
04
06
08
0
1 10 100 1,000Municipal Population in thousands
LDP (Actual) (Lowess) Komei (Actual) (Lowess)
1998 Upper House PR Vote Share
3602
33703282 3272 3256
1847
1,50
02,
000
2,50
03,
000
3,50
0N
umbe
r of
Mun
icip
aliti
es
Jan-1960 Jan-1970 Jan-1980 Jan-1990 Jan-2000 Mar-2006Year
13
No. Municipalities
4050
60
50 60 70 80 90 00 10Election Year
LDP's Pred. LDP LDP + Coalition
LD
P V
ote
Sha
re (
%)
2040
6080
50 60 70 80 90 00 10Election Year
LDP's Pred. LDP LDP + Coalition Majority
Low
er H
ouse
Sea
t Sha
re (
%)
Votes
Seats
4. Exchange Rate and the LDP
• Mundell-Fleming Model– Fixed exchange rate: fiscal expansion
effective– Floating exchange rate: monetary expansion
effective (fiscal ineffective unless accompanied by monetary expansion)
• Electoral implications– Fiscal – targeted spending– Monetary – not so
-30
36
55 60 70 80 90 00 09Year
All Observations Lower House Elections
Eco
nom
ic G
row
th R
ate
(%)
Business Cycles and Elections
1955 195819601963 19671969
1972 1976
197919801983
1986
1990
19931996
200020032005
2009100
150
200
300
360
55 60 70 80 90 00 09Year
All Obs HR Election
Exc
hang
e R
ate
($1
=JP
Y,
log
sca
le) Exchange Rate and Election
5. Political Instability and Bicameralism
• Lower House– SNTV (1947-1993)– SMD + PR (1996 - )
• Upper House– District + Nationwide
46
810
1214
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009Election Year
Lower House
Upper House
Mal
appo
rtio
nmen
t Ind
ex (%
)
Loosemore-Hanby Index weighted by # of seats
Upper House and Political Instability
• Upper House electoral loss and leadership change– Miki, Hashimoto, Abe
• Coalition politics– Preference outliers and Futenma Base
• Commitment to non-change
6. Conclusions
• Bicameralism and political instability– One-party dominance as functional needs– “Big coalition” with fragile leadership structure– Clientelism vs. stability
• Constitutional reform– Removal of Sangiin or introduction of fixed-
term executive (effectively presidential institution)