The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia's Evolving China PolicyAuthor(s): Bobo LoSource: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 80, No. 2,Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Mar., 2004), pp. 295-309Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International AffairsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569243Accessed: 02/11/2010 20:06

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The long sunset of strategic partnership:

Russia's evolving China policy

BOBO LO

In the 1997 'Joint declaration on a multipolar world and the formation of a new international order', then Russian president Boris Yeltsin and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin announced their commitment to develop a 'part- nership ... for the purpose of strategic interaction in the twenty-first century'.I The statement was widely seen not only as a challenge to American 'hege- monism', but also as confirmation of the qualitatively new relationship that had emerged between Moscow and Beijing after the end of the Cold War.2 The negative legacy of historical irredentism, civilizational prejudices and strategic suspicions appeared to be giving way to a new era of constructive engagement and positive-sum cooperation, based on shared political, security and economic interests.

Some seven years later, it is time to assess how far the Yeltsin-Jiang vision of enhanced strategic interaction has been realized, and to consider the likely evolution of a relationship that continues to be characterized by profound contradictions and uncertainties. As Vladimir Putin prepares to enter his second presidential term, what does the future hold for Moscow and Beijing: a lasting, if imperfect, partnership on the basis of convergent perceptions and priorities; or a gradual but inexorable slide into strategic enmity? The outcome has enor- mous importance, not only in defining the relationship between two of the world's major powers, but also in shaping a Russian foreign policy struggling to come to terms with changing global realities and seismic strategic shifts.

This article has three main aims. The first is to review the strengths and weaknesses in the strategic partnership between Russia and China as it has developed in the decade or so since the fall of the Soviet Union. The second is to examine the influence of Moscow's larger strategic calculus after 9/I on Russian policy and attitudes towards China. Finally, the article looks ahead to the future of the bilateral relationship, seen through the prism of three critical

Rossiiskie vesti, 25 April 1997, p. 2. 2 Sherman W. Gamett, 'Limited partnership', in Sherman W. Garnett, ed., Rapprochement or rivalry?

Russia-China relations in a changing Asia (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. I.

International Affairs 80, 2 (2004) 295-309

Bobo Lo

issues: the routeing of the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline, crisis management on the Korean peninsula, and strategic involvement in Central Asia.

A success story

The development of the relationship with China is arguably the greatest Russian

foreign policy success of the post-Soviet period. During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, when Russia's international status and influence were in decline on

nearly all fronts, the 'strategic partnership' with Beijing represented a notable exception to the rule.3 Under Vladimir Putin the gains of the I99os have been consolidated, and there is genuine substance to the official claim that relations are at an all-time high,4 particularly after the signing of the Treaty of Good-

Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation in July 2001.s

The positives are evident across the board. First, the two countries have near-identical views regarding the desired structure of the post-Cold War inter- national order. Both emphasize the primacy of the UN in global decision-

making and the precedence of national sovereignty over western conceptions of 'humanitarian intervention' and 'limited sovereignty'. They aspire to a 'multi-

polar' world in which a few great powers-the United States, Russia, western

Europe, China, India, Japan-make the big decisions. This elitist vision is the

modern-day successor of the Concert of Europe in the early nineteenth

century, and diametrically opposed to the unipolar order associated with a

hegemonic America. Moscow and Beijing also share many security interests and threat percep-

tions, from an attachment to geopolitical concepts such as spheres of influence and the balance of power to a common view of the post-9/I I international

security agenda.6 They have adopted similar positions on the war against terror, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and international conflict management, most recently in the context of Iraq.7 They are suppor- tive of each other's direct security concerns. Beijing has publicly backed Putin over his handling of the Chechen conflict, while Moscow has reciprocated on Chinese efforts to suppress separatism in Xinjiang and Tibet and has given its

unequivocal support to the 'One China' policy towards Taiwan. Both have a

major stake in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The record of achievement is even more impressive in respect of the bilateral

agenda. Somewhat remarkably, given the historical record, there are currently no serious disagreements. Formerly contentious issues such as demarcation of the 4,300okm common border and Chinese 'illegal migration' into the Russian

3 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy (London and Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Blackwell, 2003), p. 26.

4 Vladimir Putin, cited in 'China-Russia "closer than ever"', BBC news report, 27 May 2003, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/293 86i8.stm.

5 Joint declaration of Putin and Hu Jintao, Moscow, 27 May 2003, http://www.ln.rmid.ru/brp_4.nsf. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.

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Far East (RFE) have been largely defused.8 The two countries have also reached a tacit understanding over their respective roles in Central Asia. With Beijing effectively conceding Russia's leading position,9 the threat of a renewed Great Game in the region has been deferred.

Economic ties, too-once the weakest dimension of the strategic partnership -have expanded in recent years. Two-way official trade has nearly tripled during Putin's first presidential term, from US$5.7 billion in I999 to US$I 5.7 billion in

2003.I? And this is before factoring in 'unregistered trade', estimated at around US$io billion." Moreover, a commercial relationship once dependent on arms transfers and shuttle commerce has shown signs of diversifying.12 In addition to cooperation in civilian nuclear energy and space technology, there is growing interest in trans-Asian infrastructural and especially energy (oil and gas) projects.'3

Such achievements are matched by the proliferation of institutional links. High- level bilateral meetings have become much more frequent, acquiring some of the routine character of Russia's regular summits with the United States and Euro- pean Union. There is considerable interaction between respective ministries, militaries and economic entities. The institutional framework is further buttressed by both countries' participation in regional multilateral organizations-the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This layer of multilateralism has helped consolidate gains in the bilateral relationship, particu- larly in the area of confidence-building measures (CBMs) along the former Sino- Soviet border,14 while offering useful insulation in the event of future tensions.

8 Today's figures for the number of Chinese in the RFE are relatively modest, particularly compared to estimates in the I99os, some of which went as high as 2 million. 'Based on all the available data, the Chinese population in the Far Eastern district cannot exceed Ioo,ooo people ... One could not find any villages or settlements in the region with a predominant Chinese population'. See Vilya Gelbras, 'Chinese migration to the Russian Far East: a view from Moscow', in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., Humanflows across borders in northeast Asia, proceedings of a seminar held at United Nations University, Tokyo, 20-21 Nov. 2002 (Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://www.miis.edu/rcenters-ceas-pub-html), p. I43.

9 Robert Legvold, 'Great power stakes in Central Asia', in Robert Legvold, ed., Thinking strategically: the major powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian nexus (Cambridge, MA and London: American Academy of Arts and Sciences/MIT Press, 2003), p. 34.

IO Russian foreign ministry press releases, 'O Rossiisko-kitaiskom torgovo-ekonomicheskim sotrudnichestve', 22 Nov. 2002, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf; 'O razvitii rossiisko-kitaiskogo torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva', 30 Jan. 2004, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf.

" Joint press conference of Vladimir Putin and HuJintao in Moscow, 27 May 2003, http://www.ln/mid.ru/bl.nsf I2 The bulk of'unregistered trade' comprises transactions by shuttle traders (chelnoki), so called because they

criss-cross the border to sell their wares. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable secrecy regarding the level of Russian arms transfers, although most estimates put this at around US$I-I.5 billion per annum a relatively modest proportion of total bilateral trade.

I3 In 2002, for example, Russia exported 3 million tonnes of oil to China: Putin's comments at joint press conference with Hujintao, Moscow, 27 May 2003, http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf. In addition to the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline project, there are also reasonable prospects of natural gas development in the Kovykta field near Lake Baikal: see 'RUSIA petroleum, CNPC and KOGAS complete Kovykta international feasibility study', Insight TNK-BP, Dec. 2003, p. 6.

14 As a result of two agreements reached in I996-7, the five countries adjoining the former Sino-Soviet border-Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan-undertook not to carry out threatening military activity against one another. The agreements imposed ceilings on the number of ground troops and certain types of military equipment permitted in a Iookm-wide frontier zone. For a useful summary of the agreements see Jennifer Anderson, The limits of Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: Oxford University Press/International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 40-2.

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An imperfect relationship Nevertheless, for all its successes, the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership has become the target of increasingly negative comment and speculation. Some of this is linked to Moscow's changing strategic calculus in the post-9/I I world, a subject that will be discussed below. But there are also critical weaknesses in the bilateral dynamic itself, which the progress of the past decade has masked, but not eliminated. While relations may have reached a high point, it is clear that 'there is still a long way to go to the "peak".'I5 This climate of uncertainty is, if

anything, heightened by the pre-eminent position of China in Moscow's 'Asian view'. Just as the overall western focus of Russian foreign policy does not imply a pro-western outlook, so Moscow's Sinocentrism in Asia does not necessarily signify a favourable disposition towards China. China is Russia's principal 'partner' and its main gateway to the Asia-Pacific region, yet also major strategic competitor and potential security threat. In short, Russia's China policy reflects

larger contradictions and paradoxes in Moscow's approach to international affairs. A number of issues will require careful handling if the two countries are to

safeguard the gains of recent times, let alone make good on the Yeltsin-Jiang vision of 'strategic interaction' for the twenty-first century. The oldest and most fundamental problem is historical baggage dating back to the Mongol invasion of Muscovy in the thirteenth century. Although the connection between the medi- eval Mongols and today's Han Chinese is tenuous at best, this past trauma lies at the heart of the anti-Chinese attitudes of many Russians. The image of a 'yellow peril' sweeping into the Russian Far East and further west remains a powerful one, both across the elite and among the general population.'6 Such atavistic

prejudices have been fuelled by fears of Chinese irredentism regarding territories lost under the 'unequal treaties' of the nineteenth century,17 and by the steady depopulation of the RFE, whose population has declined to less than 7 million. I8

In fact, these insecurities are not the result of Chinese actions and policies, but a reflection of internal Russian problems. Putin's concerns that Chinese could become the lingua franca of the RFE are directed at the failure of the Russian authorities-central and local-to regenerate the region.19 Possible remedies, such as incentives to encourage migration from European Russia and from ethnic Russians in the Baltic states and Central Asia,20 have not been

'5 Mikhail Margelov, 'Russian-Chinese relations: at their peak?', International Affairs (Moscow), 49: 6, 2003, p. 91. I6 Dmitri Trenin, Russia's China problem (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

I999), P. 9. I7 As a result of the 'unequal treaties' of Aigun (I858) and Peking (I86o), China ceded about 1.5 million sq

km of territory, including the present-day regions of Primorye, Khabarovsk, Amur and Birobidzhan. i8 According to Yurii Obriadin, Deputy Presidential Plenipotentiary for the Far Eastern Federal District,

the population of the RFE has fallen from 8 million to 6.7 million during the past decade. See 'Population in Far East dropping fast', Pravda.ru website, I3 Nov. 2003, http://newsfromrussia.com/ main/2003 / I I / 3/51197.html.

I9 Putin's comments, cited in Rouben Azizian, 'The optimists have the lead, for now: Russia's China debate', special assessment (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Dec. 2003), p. 6.

20 Dmitri Trenin, The end of Eurasia: Russia on the border between geopolitics and globalization (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 200I), p. 218.

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seriously attempted. In the meantime, local inhabitants are leaving in droves in

response to living conditions miserable even by Russian standards. Unfortun-

ately, in the absence of any early prospect of improvement (let alone a lasting solution), the Chinese serve as convenient scapegoat and bogeyman.

At a more generalized level, there exists a cultural divide that frequently obscures and undermines commonalities of interest. Many Russians, even advocates of strategic partnership, subscribe to the image of Russia as a 'civiliza- tional barrier' against the barbarian 'East'.2' Although these days the principal danger is seen as Islamic radicalism emanating from the south, the very concept of Russia as a guardian of 'western' values inhibits rapprochement with China. It fosters a superiority complex that many Chinese find unwarranted in a state

they view as economically backward, militarily crippled and of diminishing international influence.22

The combination of historical fears and political/civilizational stereotyping has reinforced an extant West-centrism in both Russia and China. As a con-

sequence, the strategic partnership carries the whiff of second class. This is

especially true in Moscow, where relations with America, western Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) absorb considerably more attention and resources. Such relativism detracts from the bilateral relationship in two ways. In the first place, it sometimes translates into a careless attitude towards the strategic concerns of the other. For example, the Putin administration has made significant commitments in its external relations-notably endorsement of the American military presence in Central Asia post-9/I I and strategic arms agree- ments with Washington-after only minimal consultation with Beijing.23 Second, Russia and China have to some extent become competitors for western favour, whether in the form of foreign investment, political approbation or advantageous security arrangements.24

This sense of competition is rendered more acute by perceptions of the rapidly changing balance between the two states. The startling pace of China's modernization raises the spectre of an increasingly ambitious Beijing, intent not only on maximizing its influence in areas, such as Central Asia, that have tradi- tionally fallen within Moscow's pale, but also one day reviving its territorial claims on the RFE.25 In this connection, there has been an upsurge in concerns within Russia about Chinese rearmament and the contribution of Russian

2I As one western commentator has put it, 'Russian analysis often treats China as a strategic partner, but rarely as a political or cultural equal': E. Wayne Merry, 'Moscow's retreat and Beijing's rise as regional great power', Problems of Post-Communism 50: 3, May/June 2003, p. 22.

22 This was a common refrain of Chinese diplomats and journalists when the author worked at the Australian embassy in Moscow during the late I990s.

23 Merry comments that Putin's support for the US post-9/I I 'caused genuine consternation in Beijing': see Merry, 'Moscow's retreat', p. 29. The Chinese are also known to have been unhappy with the fait accompli of the Russia-US Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in May 2002, as well as with Moscow's relaxed attitude towards American abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

24 Rajan Menon and Charles E. Ziegler, 'The balance of power and US foreign policy interests in the Russian Far East', in Judith Thornton and Charles E. Ziegler, eds, Russia's Far East: a region at risk (Seattle and London: National Bureau of Asian Research/University of Washington Press, 2002), p. 39.

25 Trenin, The end of Eurasia, p. 220.

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weapons and weapons technologies to this build-up.26 The 'China threat', which had appeared to be more notional and long-term than direct, is now seen as looming more rapidly than anyone had anticipated.

In this complex ideational and psychological climate, there is ample scope for dormant differences to flare up again. Settlement of the common border, Chinese 'migration' into the RFE, strategic and economic involvement in Central Asia, and Russian arms transfers are all issues on which an apparently stable accom- modation could unravel, especially given the intrusion of other elements into the mix. In China, political instability arising from internal power struggles or economic recession could stimulate a nationalist revanche, provoke widespread disorder and lead to unregulated large-scale population movements in the border regions.27 In Russia, economic stagnation and the revival of nationalism and feelings of derzhavnost (sense of 'great power' status) might engender more assertive, less flexible attitudes towards China. The last twelve months have already witnessed a noticeably more vigorous Russian approach to defending 'zones of

special interest' in the FSU.28 In the end, it should be remembered that many bilateral differences between Russia and China have not been settled definitively, but only neutralized for the time being. Their quiescence is a function of the

positive atmosphere and momentum in the relationship, rather than proof that the current state of affairs is necessarily viewed as satisfactory by either side.

Russia's evolving strategic calculus29

At a time when both countries, and global affairs more generally, are in profound transition, the strategic partnership is a dynamic rather than a static pheno- menon, not founded in eternal 'truths' and principles, but flexible in response to events and emerging international trends. As the Kremlin's reaction to 9/I I and its aftermath showed, Russian strategic calculus is susceptible to rapid and signi- ficant adjustments. The tensions and ambiguities in Russian-Chinese relations cannot therefore be understood in an isolated bilateral context, but need to be considered against the setting of Putin's overall management of foreign policy in an unstable international environment.

Since coming to power in January 2000 Putin has pursued a 'multivectored'

foreign policy, based on the premise that Russia can be 'friends' with all countries.

26 See Andrew C. Kuchins, 'Limits of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership', in Andrew C. Kuchins, ed., Russia after the fall (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 212-13.

27 Trenin, Russia's China problem, p. 33. See also Viktor N. Pavliatenko, 'Russian security in the Asia- Pacific region: the dangers of isolation', in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov and Koji Watanabe, eds, Russia and East Asia: the 21st century security environment (Armonk, NY and London: EastWest Institute and M. E. Sharpe, I999), p. 28.

28 In 2003 Moscow undertook a number of concrete steps to reassert its presence in former Soviet Central Asia, including the formalization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the establishment of a military base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.

29 The term 'strategic calculus' does not imply here a logical or even rationalized process, but rather signifies the basket of predispositional influences-rational and irrational, logical and atavistic-that shape Russia's approach to geostrategic and political-military questions.

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In practice, he has been very successful in realizing this ambitious design. Compared to the Yeltsin years, Moscow today has functional relations with Washington and the major west European capitals; it has built on its strategic partnerships with Beijing and New Delhi; it is much more effective in pro- jecting Russian influence in the FSU; and its ties with the Islamic world have survived the brutal conduct of the Chechen war and participation in the American-led coalition against international terrorism.30

However, over the past i 8 months this multifaceted approach has come under some strain. Belying the rhetoric about a universal civilization confronting common threats, the post-9/ ii world is anything but united, with even the concept of a unitary West under attack. Despite agreement in principle about the menace posed by international terrorism and WMD proliferation, and the importance of cooperation in conflict management, these priorities mean very different things to different countries. Thus, for Russia international terrorism is about Chechnya rather than Al-Qaeda, a commitment to non-proliferation does not preclude nuclear exports to Iran, and conflict management is above all the responsibility of the major powers-rather than one 'hyperpower'- operating through the structures and mechanisms of the United Nations.

In a shifting international system, Putin finds himself under increasing pressure to make critical choices; and one of the most difficult of these concerns China. In theory, a cosy relationship with Beijing is not incompatible with the West-centric focus of contemporary Russian foreign policy. With its public commitment to 'multivectoralism', Moscow can (and does) claim to assign equal importance to East and West. And it has even imparted some substance to this assertion, for example timing summits with the non-western powers immedi- ately before or after meetings with George Bush and other western leaders.31 But Putin's room for manoeuvre is contracting. China's apparently inevitable ascent as the next superpower, the continuing global primacy of the United States, and Russian strategic sensitivities on many fronts are combining to create an environment in which he may no longer be able successfully to portray Russia as all things to all people in a rosy, positive-sum conception of international affairs.

In this context, China assumes an importance that extends well beyond the bilateral, highlighting a larger dilemma in Russia's relationship to the outside world. In a very real sense, contrasting attitudes towards the partnership with Beijing reflect a continuing struggle for Russia's foreign policy soul: integration (albeit highly qualified) with the West against an ambivalent approach charac- terized by alternating cooperation and competition, particularly with the United

30 Putin's depiction of Russian foreign policy as multivectored has been much aided by his flexible use of civilizational labelling according to time and place. Thus Russia is European in dealings with Europe, Asian in Asia, transatlantic strategic partner with the United States, and a Muslim nation when participating at the summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference.

3I For example, the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization followed the Russia-US and Russia-NATO summits in May-June 2002. One year later, Hu Jintao's six-day visit to Russia preceded Putin's St Petersburg meetings with George Bush, Tony Blair and EU leaders.

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States, and the pursuit of closer ties with the major non-western powers- China, India and the Muslim world.32

What might otherwise be an abstract discourse is transformed into the concrete by the presence of several critical catalysts. The most important is the emerging strategic rivalry between the United States and China. Although forecasts that the gulf in military capabilities between the two will be bridged some time around 202033 are scarcely credible, the pace of China's economic development may in time generate a more aggressive foreign policy posture in Beijing-not only in connection with Taiwan but also throughout the Asia-Pacific and

beyond.34 Even if such predictions prove unfounded or exaggerated, American concerns about China's enhanced military capacities may still push Washington into an increasingly tough policy of containment. In such a scenario, the Kremlin would have to balance the strategic partnership with China against the need to avoid collateral damage from being on the 'wrong' side-as, for example, occurred during the Iraq war.35 As in the aftermath of 9/I I, when George Bush first outlined his Manichaean vision of the world, Russia's place and influence in the world may depend on making the right choice.

A second major factor is Russia's growing emphasis on strategic diversity in

Asia, specifically reducing its dependence on China to promote its interests in the

region. Although in the past Beijing's cooperation has been vital in facilitating Russian membership of organizations such as APEC and the ARF, there is a belief that China often acts in ways that effectively, if discreetly, work against Russian interests.36 Accordingly, the case for strategic diversity has become more urgent than ever-not in the classical sense of balancing East and West, but in the sense of shifting towards a less Sinocentric approach in Asia.

The idea of such diversity is not new; it was implicit, for example, in Yeltsin's attempts during the 199os to reach an accommodation with Japan over the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories. There was talk that Russia might become the 'swing' power in north-east Asia between China and Japan and, more fancifully, between China and the United States.37 Today, however, such notions have given ground to a more practical, economically based vision of strategic diversity, as illustrated by the debate over whether to build the Angarsk oil pipeline to Daqing in northern China or favour a longer route extending to the Russian port city of Nakhodka. In important respects, the Daqing route is

32 It should be emphasized that Putin's interpretation of'integration' is highly selective. There is a basic

unwillingness to accept the loss of sovereignty and freedom of manoeuvre entailed in subordinating national identity to a larger persona. See Lo, Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy, p. 60.

33 Margelov, 'Russian-Chinese relations', pp. 80, 85. 34 See Denny Roy, 'China's reaction to American predominance', Survival 45: 3, Autumn 2003, p. 74. 35 In fact, Putin emerged relatively unscathed from the Iraq crisis. He was fortunate-or skilful enough-

that the Russian position appeared almost invariably to be more accommodating than that of the French and the Germans.

36 Trenin, Russia's China probleni, p. 28. 37 See Georgii Bovt and Alexander Chudodeev, 'Obeshschannogo tri goda zhdut', Segodnya, 4 Nov. I997,

p. 4; also Rajan Menon, 'Russo-Japanese relations: implications for Northeast Asian security', in Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds, Imperial decline: Russia's changing role in Asia (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 142.

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economically more viable: as well as being cheaper and logistically easier, its

planned capacity is better suited to the estimated volume of oil to be carried from the east Siberian oilfields.38 But such considerations are counterbalanced

by concern that Russia could be held hostage by a China exploiting its position as monopoly customer-as Turkey did over Blue Stream gas.39 The Nakhodka

option, by contrast, opens up the entire Asia-Pacific market to Russian oil

exports-not only China, but also Japan, South Korea and the South-East Asian 'tigers'.40 In this schema, the development of transnational energy (and infra-

structural) projects would become the main conduit through which Russia could establish itself as an influential player in the region, rather than as a mere raw materials appendage.4'

The importance of strategic diversity has been accentuated by the changing balance of power between Russia and China, alluded to earlier. The threat is not that Beijing will attempt to exploit this to regain its former lands in the RFE or challenge Moscow's leading role in Central Asia. For the time being, China's focus will remain firmly centred on other priorities-internal modernization, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea.42 The advantages of the 'rear-to-rear' arrangement,43 whereby stability along the Russian-Chinese border frees both to concentrate on more pressing concerns elsewhere, still hold good.

But Chinese resurgence does present Moscow with a dilemma regarding the long-term future of the strategic partnership. Does Russia accept the 'inevit- able', namely, that the changing balance of power will lead to a reversal in roles and its demotion to junior status within the partnership? Or does it move instead to embrace the West, including its Asian members (Japan, South Korea), in order to mitigate China's growing strength-a shift that would involve downgrading 'partnership' relations with Beijing? The implications of this choice are not merely bilateral and regional. They go to the heart of what role and place Russia envisages for itself in the strategic map of the twenty-first century. If the answer is, as Putin has often suggested, that its destiny is as a global power-as opposed to an essentially regional player with some global interests-then the comfort of a multivectored foreign policy could give way to overt competitive tensions between two aspiring world powers.

38 John Helmer, 'Japan misdirects lobbying for Russian oil', Russia Journal, 8 July 2003, http:// www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml.

39 Sergei Pletnev, 'U Putina est shans prevzoiti Khu Tsintao v vostochnoi diplomatii', 26 May 2003, http:// www.strana.ru/print/i8i997.html. Under the Blue Stream project, Moscow and Ankara agreed to transport Russian natural gas to Turkey via the Black Sea. Although it was originally envisaged (in 1997) that the pipeline would eventually deliver I6 billion cubic metres per annum, the Turkish government subsequently used its position as sole customer to pressure the Russians to agree to considerably reduced levels.

40 See Margelov, 'Russian-Chinese relations', p. 87. 4I Ibid., p. 90. 42 Menon and Ziegler, 'The balance of power', p. 49. 43 Alexei D. Voskressenski, 'Russia's evolving grand strategy toward China', in Garnett, ed., Rapprochement

or rivalry?, p. 13 1.

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Resilience and continuity

Notwithstanding the impact of a larger strategic calculus on the bilateral relationship, eventual confrontation between Moscow and Beijing is far from certain. There may be some sharpening of individual policy differences and even a deterioration in the overall atmosphere. But there are also countervailing considerations that suggest the partnership may prove surprisingly resilient in the face of conventional strategic logic.

The most crucial of these is that the relationship is clearly established on the basis of common interests rather than 'shared values' or ideological stereotypes. Neither Moscow nor Beijing is dewy-eyed about the quality of their coopera- tion, and both are careful to distinguish today's partnership from the so-called 'unbreakable friendship' of the Stalin-Mao era. Despite the occasionally flowery rhetoric, this is a realist (and even cynical) union of interests, not a love-in. Its limitations are well understood and expectations correspondingly well managed.

Second, although Putin's choices may be narrowing, he will attempt to sustain his positive-sum approach to international relations for as long as he can. In the event of further Russia-US rapprochement and heightened Sino-American tensions, Putin will nonetheless maintain close ties with China. In this context, his stubborn resistance to American pressure over nuclear energy cooperation with Iran offers an instructive precedent, demonstrating that Moscow will not give ground easily, even when a western 'rational actor' perspective might suggest otherwise.

Third, China remains the most promising political, economic and security partner for Russia in Asia. There are few real alternatives. The Japan 'option', touted by some, continues to be more theoretical than real. Moscow and

Tokyo are no nearer to clearing the road-block of the territorial dispute; bilateral trade is less than a fifth of the turnover between Russia and China;44 there are significant differences on a number of issues, including Asian theatre missile defence and post-conflict management in Iraq; Tokyo is viewed as

Washington's staunchest ally in the region; and Moscow fears that an econo-

mically resurgent Japan could become ever more aggressive in pursuing its

foreign policy interests.45 Fourth, notwithstanding Russian unease about China's ascent, the strategic

and security implications of this phenomenon are poorly defined and understood. For example, the prospect of China's bridging the gap in military capabilities remains a distant one. There is an underlying assumption-albeit less confident than before-that Russia will retain a significant nuclear and conventional military

44 In 2003 a three-year decline in Russian-Japanese trade was reversed, with turnover back to nearly US$5 billion (up from US$4.2 billion in 2002): 'Rossiisko-yaponskie otnosheniya', 28 Jan. 2004, http:// www.ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf. However, this improvement is unimpressive when compared to the

burgeoning commercial ties between Russia and China, which, taking into account unregistered trade, are now worth over US$25 billion.

45 Merry, 'Moscow's retreat', p. 29.

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superiority for some time.46 Meanwhile, the economic (and political) benefits of large arms sales continue to outweigh the hypothetical possibility that China may, one day, use these same weapons and their technologies against Russia.47

Fifth, even accepting that China represents the principal long-term threat to Russia's security, it is a huge leap to conclude from this that the optimal response is a policy of confrontation or containment, with or without other powers. Despite occasionally grandiose claims of influence, Russian policy-makers recognize their country's limited strategic weight, especially in the Asia-Pacific

region. Dabbling in balance-of-power games of 'triangularism' could rebound dangerously, fomenting anti-Russian sentiment in Beijing without obtaining any adequate quid pro quo from the United States (let alone Japan).48 It is worth recalling in this connection that many in Moscow are bitter about Washington's perceived ingratitude in return for Putin's support-his 'strategic choice'49-in the aftermath of 9/II. With no particular reason to trust in American good intentions, the natural course is to tread warily, avoiding com- mitments unless absolutely necessary.

Indeed, there is a compelling argument that the best way of neutralizing the 'China threat' is to tie Beijing more closely into trans-Asian energy and infra- structural projects, facilitating the transformation of the RFE into a commer-

cially lucrative region in whose stability all parties have a stake. The accelerated development of local infrastructure that might result from such collaboration could attract Russian people and investment into sparsely populated regions, thereby defusing a seemingly intractable security problem. On a broader macro- economic level, the proliferation of bilateral commercial links-not just in oil and gas, but also in space cooperation, atomic energy and civil aviation-gives Russia a strong security as well as economic interest in maintaining good relations.

Finally, although some observers have identified the impact of generational change as a potentially negative factor in Russian-Chinese relations,50 the

46 The vast disparity in nuclear weapons potential is reflected in the fact that Russia is committed by the May 2002 SORT agreement to reducing its strategic weapons stocks to 1,700-2,200 warheads; all this while China has an estimated 20-25 strategic warheads. As for conventional warfare capabilities, few analysts believe that China could launch a successful amphibious operation against Taiwan today, even if the US military were to stand aside.

47 China's purchase of Russian arms makes it dependent on Moscow for spare parts and ammunition, while various commentators have also suggested that Russia tends to sell a better class of weaponry to India. Although the transfer of Russian military technologies to the PLA (People's Liberation Army) means that China will, eventually, be able to make its own weapons, Moscow would still retain substantial inside knowledge, certainly more than would be the case if China were to buy from other sources. See Azizian, 'The optimists have the lead', pp. 6-7.

48 Ideas of strategic 'triangularism' were especially current during the Soviet period. They referred not only to the dynamic between the United States, the Soviet Union and China, but also included at various times the Chinese-Soviet-Japanese, Chinese-Soviet-Indian, Chinese-Soviet-North Korean and Chinese-Soviet-Vietnamese triangles: see Robert Legvold, 'Russia and the strategic quadrangle', in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The strategic quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press, I995), pp. 21-2.

49 Dmitri Trenin, "'Osennii marafon" Vladimira Putina i rozhdenie Rossiiskoi vneshnepoliticheskoi strategii', briefing paper, Carnegie Moscow Center, I5 Nov. 2001, p. 6.

50 See e.g. Robert H. Donaldson and John A. Donaldson, 'The arms trade in Russian-Chinese relations: identity, domestic politics, and geopolitical positioning', International Studies Quarterly 47, 2003, p. 722.

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opposite could turn out to be true. The retirement of the old Soviet-educated cohort of Chinese leaders and their succession by a more business-oriented, western-influenced generation may encourage the development of relations on a more practical basis. A leader like current Chinese President Hu Jintao is, in many respects, a better fit for Vladimir Putin than Hu's predecessor, Jiang Zemin.51 More generally, there may be scope for a measure of normative con- vergence between two statist, yet market-oriented models of government.

Litmus tests

In the post-Soviet period the trend of Russian-Chinese relations has been consistently positive, moving from a barely civil interaction into one fully meriting the often devalued title, 'strategic partnership'. Despite criticisms from some quarters, the goal of a stable and cooperative relationship with Beijing has found broad acceptance within the Russian political establishment, a choice born of the pragmatic realization that the alternative is far worse.

Over the next decade, there are unlikely to be radical changes to this think- ing. The ambiguities in the strategic partnership will remain: on the plus side, a confluence of views on many international issues, common threat perceptions, expanding economic ties; in the minus column, the burden of historical and civilizational prejudices, an increasingly dominant West-centrism in Moscow and Beijing, and Russian anxieties regarding China's rise as the next superpower.

This duality suggests that the relationship is set to move into an ambivalent, essentially transitional phase in which many of the assumptions of partnership are challenged by new realities, but in which, too, the advantages of functional, cooperative relations continue to be appreciated. The tension and interplay be- tween larger strategic considerations, on the one hand, and resilient perceptions of common bilateral interests, on the other, will shape the evolution of Russia's China policy well into the new century.

Within this overall dynamic, three issue areas will bear particular scrutiny: (i) developments over the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline; (2) security manage- ment on the Korean peninsula; and (3) strategic projection in former Soviet Central Asia. Responses to these contrasting sets of problems will provide crucial pointers as to the condition of the strategic partnership.

The Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline Few issues highlight the dual nature of the Russian-Chinese dynamic so

vividly as the pipeline debate. On the one hand, collaboration on this project reflects the determination of both countries to take their relationship up to the next level. Formerly stuck in a near-default mode, whereby the primary rationale of 'partnership'-'counterbalancing' the United States-was essentially 5' Although Hu is some ten years older than Putin, they enjoy a similar reputation for professionalism and

dynamism.

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derivative,52 these days Moscow and Beijing focus much more on relations for their own sake. In a further break from the Yeltsin years, they are also looking to change the centre of gravity in the partnership from principally political and

security-based issues (what Rajan Menon terms 'strategic convergence'53) to economic cooperation.

However, this symbolism is double-edged, and has raised the stakes all round, for ill as well as for good. Large-scale energy and infrastructural projects represent the 'future', the most promising avenue for diversifying and enriching the bilateral relationship; yet they also enhance the potential for serious disagree- ments. Differences arising from concrete decisions will not be issue-specific, but will be extrapolated to highlight the limitations and structural weaknesses of the

strategic partnership as a whole. In the event that Putin opts for the Nakhodka route, as many believe he

will,54 there will be political as well as economic ramifications. Beijing would not only take grave offence at the cancellation of prior intergovernmental under-

takings,55 but might also interpret the decision as signalling a fundamental reorientation in Putin's foreign policy-away from the geographical 'balance' of multivectoralism towards a clear strategic commitment to the West. The Chinese have already indicated that they will not readily accept Russian economic

arguments regarding customer diversification, despite their logic, and Moscow will need to handle the announcement and implementation of this decision

very carefully in order to limit the wider fall-out.56

The Korean peninsula

Moscow's interest in the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline route is motivated, it will be recalled, not only by economic considerations, but also the desire to play a

larger, more independent role in the Asia-Pacific region. The corollary of such an agenda is the need to restrain China-discreetly-from occupying too dominant a position in north-east Asian affairs, in the first instance on the Korean peninsula. To some extent, Russia sees China regionally as the analogue of the United States globally, that is, as a country with an overtly hegemonic agenda.57 Consequently, just as Moscow seeks common cause with others to dilute the exercise of American power worldwide, it may increasingly be disposed to work with the other powers in East Asia-the United States included-to restrain Beijing's strategic ambitions there.

52 Vassily Mikheev, 'The strategy of "stability" (on the results of the i6th National Congress of the Communist Party of China)', IAIR Policy Papers I: 3, Nov. 2002, Institute for Applied International Research, Moscow, p. I2.

53 Rajan Menon, 'The strategic convergence between Russia and China', Survival 39: 2, Summer I997, p. 101. 54 Author's interviews in Moscow in October 2003. 55 As related to the author by a senior Chinese government official. 56 Alexander Lomanov, 'Russia's Chinese policy', presentation to a conference, 'Russia in the New World

Order', Lessius Hogeschool, Antwerp, 27 Nov. 2003. 57 Bobo Lo, 'Rossiiskaya politika v Vostochnoi Azii: evolyutsiya i preemstvennost', Yaderny Kontrol

(Moscow), no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 2002, p. 40.

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However, Moscow will need to preserve a delicate balance between pur- suing this ambitious objective, carving out a meaningful role for itself in multi- lateral negotiations on the Koreas, and ensuring that it is not seen to obstruct, much less challenge, the Chinese agenda. Paradoxically, Russia's position as the least influential of all the parties involved in the Korean question is to its advantage, since its weakness enables it, more or less plausibly, to put itself forward as the (relatively) disinterested facilitator of the peace process.58

Central Asia

If north-east Asia highlights the prophylactic dimension of Russia's geopolitical ambitions, then in Central Asia Moscow is engaged in a much more activist project: re-establishing itself in a traditional sphere of influence. Here, Russia sees itself as the regional hegemon, a position it is extremely reluctant to cede.59 Despite backing the Washington-led coalition against international terronrism and endorsing the American military presence in Central Asia post-9/I I, it remains acutely uncomfortable with the involvement of outside powers in the region, and will do what it can to contain this.

In relation to the United States, this means exercising 'strategic patience', waiting for Washington to lose interest-a not unreasonable hope in the light of historical experience.60 However, China's geographical proximity to Central Asia and considerable security and economic interests there mean that it will not simply 'go away'. For the moment this is not an issue, given Beijing's willing- ness to accept a secondary role and the existence of a Russian-Chinese security consensus against the threat of Islamic radicalism. But there is no guarantee that this commonality of interest will remain the dominant reality. As Russia seeks to reassert its presence and influence in the region, and China attempts to maximize its economic stake, Central Asia looms as perhaps the most likely theatre for renewed bilateral tensions.

58 Moscow's unassuming position on participation in the Korean talks was exemplified by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's comment that Russia would be happy to take a more active part in the negotiations, 'in whatever form required': press conference in St Petersburg on I June 2003, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ brp_4.nsf.

59 As Stephen Blank has noted, 'the perceptions of waning power are difficult for Russian leaders to accept and translate into policy. Russia is disinclined to accept limits on its capability to achieve its perceived vital interests': Stephen J. Blank, 'The United States and Central Asia', in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds, Central Asian security: the new international context (London and Washington DC: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Brookings Institution, 200I), p. 144.

60 Rajan Menon observes that 'the American public's support for protracted embroilment in the tumult of greater Central Asia states is liable to be thin-and without that support, it will be hard to sustain any policy that involves expenditures, setbacks, frustration and the loss of American lives.' Nevertheless, he argues, the strong American emphasis post-9/I I on the war against terror 'is likely to be durable and to dictate engagement': 'The new Great Game in Central Asia', Survival 45: 2, Summer 2003, p. 201.

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Conclusion

Many of the concerns in Russian-Chinese relations are more potential than actual. Currently, the strengths of the strategic partnership far outweigh its weaknesses and, for a while at least, relations should be resilient enough to absorb differences over the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline, the fate of the Korean

peninsula and Central Asia. In spite of the many reservations about China, few in Moscow advocate a confrontational stance towards Beijing. Not only would this jeopardize vital national interests, but a still convalescent Russia is scarcely capable of sustaining such a committal and resource-intensive approach.

However, the underlying problems in the partnership are serious and the broader international context far from immutable. The changing balance between the two countries, the growth of Chinese military power as a factor in inter- national affairs, increased strategic and economic competition: all could exacer- bate the numerous actual and potential stresses in a relationship that lacks the foundation of shared values to sustain it through periods of crisis. As the process of China's transformation from predominantly regional actor into global player gathers momentum, the divide in perceptions and priorities is likely to widen. In the ensuing climate of apprehension, Russian fears about China would find new life and be increasingly reflected in concrete policy.

Such change would not be rapid or linear, and there is no prospect of an early return to the adversarial relationship of the 196os.6I Both countries will strive- with some success-to maintain substantive, mutually beneficial ties. Neverthe- less, despite the appearance of calm and productive cooperation, new realities are intruding to highlight its limitations and weaknesses. At a time when Russian-Chinese relations are at their zenith, the ultimate paradox is that we may be witnessing the beginnings of a transformation from strategic partnership into strategic divergence.

6I The nadir of Sino-Soviet relations was reached with a series of bloody border clashes on Damansky island on the Ussuri river in March I969.

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