The Louisiana Manifesto of 1768

The Louisiana Manifesto of 1768

B y the Treaty of Fountainebleau, signed November 3, 1762, Franceceded to Spain all of Louisiana west of the Mississippi River. In the

following spring the Treaty of Paris yielded to England all of Louisianaeast of the Mississippi. The French diplomats saved New Orleans forSpain by holding it as part of an island cut off from the rest of the EastBank of the Mississippi by the Iberville (Manchac) River, LakeMaurepas, Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne.

Spain tarried in taking possession of her Louisiana. Only in March of1766 did Governor Antonio de Ulloa arrive in New Orleans-but with-out Spanish troops. When the weary French soldiers in Louisiana de-clined the invitation to re-enlist for service under Spain, Ulloa refrainedfrom taking formal possession of the colony. Some decisions he didmake, some orders he did give, but only through Charles-PhilippeAubry, the senior French military officer in the ceded colony.

On the sensitive matters of Louisiana ' s currency and of Spanish mer-cantile regulations any governor of the new regime could have expecteddifficulty. Ulloa, scientist by profession and meticulous by training, wasunable to impose scientific order on the shifting givens of the politicalsituation. The home government tarried in providing the means for asolid colonial administration in Louisiana. After two and a half years oftension the conseil superieur in New Orleans, stirred by a variety of mo-tives, expelled Governor Ulloa at the end of October 1768.

The Superior Council of Louisiana, in its fateful expulsion decree ofOctober 29, 1768, affirmed that the colonists ' lives, fortune and honorwere at stake as they sought to retain forever the sweet, inviolable title ofFrench citizenship. ' One is reminded of the Declaration of Indepen-dence of 1776 in which the delegates of the Continental Congresspledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor. The Anglo-Americans succeeded in attaining their goal, the Louisianans did not.

Practically unknown in United States and Latin American historiog-raphy, the Louisiana rising has always figured prominently in generalhistories of Louisiana, and has also been the object of particular studies,for example John Preston Moore ' s monograph Revolt in Louisiana 1766-1770. 2

But can one go so far as to say that this rising of 1768, although notwidely known, was the first revolution of American colonists against a

1. Ordonnance, p. 9. Printed copy in Paris, Archives des Colonies, C 13 A 48, f. 233-244.2. Baton Rouge, 1976.

248 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

European power? Spanish America had seen some rebellious move-ments before the struggles of the early 1800s which led to indepen-dence. Already in the sixteenth century the encornenderos had reactedviolently to the New Laws (1542) of Charles V. Yet the colonials did notreject the royal authority as such or claim to "reassume " a right of self-de

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termination which belonged to them by natural law.When in sixteenth-century Mexico an heir of Cortez thought of a sep-

arate kingdom, he thought in terms of feudal inheritance and of militarypower rather than in terms of government by consent of the governed.When Spanish-American comuneros resisted royal authority and au-thorities, their motivation lay in their rights as guaranteed by that sameroyal authority.

It is, of course, beyond the scope of this present study to examine allrevolts in Spanish America. Some of them doubtless involved active par-ticipants and general population that outnumbered the Louisianians of1768. The question to be asked, though, is whether those risings aimedat any more than an insistence, backed by violent protest, on rights with-in the positive law of Spain or on alleviation of economic suffering.

For example, in the decade prior to the Louisiana revolution therewere vehement protests in Chile that followed upon a 1753 tightening ofthe royal monopoly; violent agitation broke out again in 1766 for thesame reason, but the action was contained by calling up the local militiaand by increasing military patrols. 3 These Chilean protests were pre-cisely that-protests not revolutions. It was rather after the Louisianarevolution of 1768-I do not say because of it-that revolutionary fer-ment increased in Spanish America.

It seems therefore that the Louisiana rising of 1768 was the first revo-lution of American colonists against a European power in which the par-ticipants claimed self-determination based upon the natural-law princi-ple of government-by-the-consent-of-the-governed.

Antonio de Ulloa had already encountered colonial discontent. In thework he co-authored with Jorge Juan-Noticias secretas de America(1768)-there is a keen description of the mutual hostility between theborn-in-America criollo and the born-in-Spain peninsular.4 -

Ulloa, then, must not have been astonished when the merchants ofNew Orleans began to grumble. Experience had prepared him to facediscontent in Louisiana ' s Creoles and natives of France who had livedlong enough in the colony to feel and "become" Creole. Yet both theSpanish governor in New Orleans and the government ministers in

3. Sergio Villalobos R., "Opposition to Imperial Taxation" in R.A. Humphreys and JohnLynch, The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions, 1808-1826 (New York, 1965), 125.4. Francisco A. Encina, "The Basis of Spanish American Independence, " in Humphreysand Lynch, op. cit., 245.

THE LOUISIANA MANIFESTO OF 1768 249

Spain were astonished at the audacity of Louisianians ' declarations andactions. Spain for the first time faced self-determination in its Americanempire.

With or without Ideas

It is not the aim of this present article to narrate the revolution,analyze its dynamics or assess its effects. The single purpose is to providenew light on a question that has in the past usually been answered in aquite different way. The focus here is strictly on the revolution 's ideas:

Did the Creoles of colonial Louisiana have political theories? Did therevolutionaries of 1768 have an ideological basis for their actions? Gen-erally, historians have given a negative response or simply ignored thequestion because there was, they judged, no affirmative answer. Someauthors recognize that the Louisianians had "dreams" and "plans"but at-tribute no political philosophy to them. 5 The insurgents ' motivation hasusually been classified in two categories, namely French national senti-ment and commercial self-defense. (These are, in fact, two themes thatreceive emphasis in the decree of October 29, 1768.) In this context theesteemed J.G. Taylor in Louisiana: A Bicentennial History tersely de-clared: "The Louisiana rebels had no idea of self-government. "6 Yetthere are those who say that revolutions simply do not occur withoutideas. "No ideas, no revolution, " as Crane Brinton succinctly puts it. 7

Alc&e Fortier (1856-1914), who published his History of Louisiana in1904, attributed a political philosophy to the revolutionaries of 1768.And presented them as leaders of a united people who would have setupa republic in Louisiana, if that had been possible. The patriotic Creoleauthor did not seem to realize how divided were the sentiments in thecolony, nor did he recognize that in all probability the republicans werefew indeed. He hailed the Louisiana leaders with filiopietistic fervor:"They gave Louisiana the glory of having thought of establishing a re-publican form of government in America several years before Jeffersonwrote his immortal Declaration of Independence, which gave birth toour United States. " Yet, except for the documentation of the fact that a

5. "La Louisiane fut la premiere colonie americaine qui songea a secouer le joug euro-peen. ": Charles Gayarre, Histoire de la Louisiane (New Orleans, 1847) II.

" So the dream of a rudimentary republic began to fade out. " Henry E. Chambers, AHistory of Louisiana (Chicago and New York, 1925), I 280-283.

Garnie William McGinty, A History of Louisiana (New York, 1949/1951), 69. AntoineBernard, Histoire de la Louisiane (Quebec, 1953), 163. Charles L. Dufour, Ten Flags inthe Wind. The Story of Louisiana (New York, 1967), 106.6. (New York and Nashville, 1976), 21.7. The Anatomy of Revolution (New York, 1965), 49 of Vintage edition.


republic was considered by the Louisianians as one of the possibilitiesfor their future, Fortier had no archival sources at his disposal concern-ing the political ideas.

Although later twentieth-century historians have been loath to attri-bute ideas to the Louisiana revolutionaries of 1768, there were two nota-ble exceptions-Roger P. McCutcheon and Jo Ann Carrigan-whothought that the conspirators were not without political theory andmaturity.

In his research on colonial Louisiana libraries, McCutcheon foundthat titles were rarely given in the inventories of estates prepared at thetime of succession. Usually general terms like "books " or "libraries" suf-ficed for the recorders of possessions. However, in an inventory of thePrevost estate prepared in 1769, he met a detailed list and discoveredpolitically interesting titles. Prevost 's "books included Montesquieu,Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau and the like. It is by no means merely fancifulto suppose, as has been done, that the abortive revolution in New Or-leans in 1768 may be traced to the same revolutionary writers who influ-enced the Declaration of Independence nine [sic] years later. "8 As forthe Anglo-Americans ' ideas, it is better to look to English sources ratherthan French. Moreover, when those English sources drew upon conti-nental thinkers it was from fonts created far earlier than the works ofPrevost ' s authors. Nonetheless, what McCutcheon showed was that theFrench colonial Louisianians had access to the multiplying treatises thatwere bringing Europeans back to the more traditional concept ofmonarchs that had prevailed prior to the age of absolutism, namely thatthe monarch is bound by contract.

Carrigan, in her extensive commentary on Alcee Fortier ' s History ofLouisiana (Reprint edition, Baton Rouge, 1966), developed the role ofthe Conseil Superieur in colonial Louisiana. In one statement sheopened horizons beyond the point she had reached: "An intensive studyof the Superior Council throughout its various stages of developmentmight well yield some interesting insights into the evolution of an inde-pendent spirit among propertied French Louisianians-not altogetherdifferent from the political maturity which developed on a much broaderscale in the American colonies. "9 Her expressions are more sober thanthose of the author she was commenting upon, but she had a historian ' sintuition that ideas were there. Carrigan was on an interesting track.

The conseil superieur of Louisiana had a mixture of administrative,legislative and judicial powers. Like a parlement of France it regis-

8. Roger P. McCutcheon, "Libraries in New Orleans, 1771-1833, " Louisiana HistoricalQuarterly 20 (1937) 152-158.9. I, 319.


tered government decrees, but, unlike the parlements, was not strongenough to refuse the registering of legislation. Within limited areas itsmembers legislated local ordinances. The members were appointed bythe royal government in Versailles after receiving recommendationsfrom Louisiana concerning the leading colonists. In general, the councilmembers carried on their work according to French custom law withoutinvocation of theories of government. More than once during theeighteenth century the parletnent of Paris, composed of judges whoheld their posts by purchase, behaved as though it were composed ofthose who had been elected by constituents. The conseil superieur ofLouisiana contented itself with its very modest self-government dutiesuntil 1768.

Thus both McCutcheon and Carrigan suggested, albeit without thefervor of Fortier, that Louisiana in its uprising of 1768 may indeed havehad ideological currents equivalent to those of the Atlantic Coast col-onies, but both were unable at the time they wrote to provide furtherevidence concerning political thought in Louisiana of the 1760s. If only adocument could be found that would include a list of grievances, a decla-ration of rights and a philosophical justification of the Revolution of Oc-tober 1768! Aside from the legal ordonnance or decree, the only state-ment printed by the Louisianians during those eventful days was the 21-page Memoire des Habitan[t]s et Negocian[t]s de la Louisianne, sur1 'Evenement du 29 octobre 1768, but this pamphlet stopped short ofex-pressing basic political theory. While defending their action, the leadersand authors were cautious, and cautioned to be still more cautious, theyamended the publication they had already released.

The Memoire

In that first printing of the Memoire 300 copies were produced, butthey were recalled after three or four days. Colonists were requested toreturn copies for destruction. After a sentence insulting to Spain was re-moved, a second edition was put forth. It was Aubry who persuaded theleaders, for the common good and their own, to suppress the anti-Spanish lines, and to adopt, at least in print, a more moderate position.'°In private, Aubry with no illusions reported reality to the Minister ofColonies in France: "Although it appears in the arret that it is only thegovernor who is attacked, I dare assure you that there is a conspiracyagainst him and his nation in general. "it

The first printing of the Memoire, the recalled version, had gone

10. Aubrey to Minister, Dec. 24, 1768, Paris, Archives des Colonies, C 13 A 48, f. 38v.11. Dec. 20, 1768, Paris, Archives des Colonies, C 13 A 48, f. 32.


beyond denouncing "M. Ulloa, loaded with our hatred, which he has sojustly deserved," and had asked rhetorically: "Cannot his nation re-proach him with having failed in the rules of the Spanish policy, which,gentle and insinuating in the beginning, becomes tyrannical only whenthe yoke has been imposed?" The expurgated edition sneered at Ulloaalone and spared the Spanish nation: "As he is loaded with our hatred,which he has so justly deserved, his nation may reproach him again withhaving failed in the rules of policy, by forcing us to fear the Spanish gov-ernment. " 12

The printed Memoire concentrates on commerce, and avoids politi-cal philosophy. Spanish trade laws promulgated by Ulloa were destined,it affirmed, to wreck trade with the Indians and thereby bring on thehostility of the tribes. Since Spanish colonies could outdo Louisiana ' sproduction of timber, tars, cotton and tobacco, the restriction ofLouisiana trade to within the Spanish circuit would be fatal to the col-ony. Analyzing international trade, the memorialists judged thatLouisiana was of little or no use to Spain, but of great value to France.

With attention focused upon Ulloa, the Memoire presented his poli-cies as arbitrary, as tending to foster the wealth of the few to whom hewould grant privileges. His decisions were shown as clumsy, as creatingrisks and losses for ships at the mouth of the river. Impetuosity and self-interest, tyranny and vexation, these were listed as hallmarks of Ulloa ' sadministrative activity.

Only in one passage did the printed Memoire extol political initiativein defense of traditional rights:

What would be reprehensible, then, in the decision which the conductand the vexations of M. Ulloa have made us take? What wrong have wedone in shaking off a foreign yoke, which the hand that imposed it ren-dered still more overwhelming? What wrong have we done, finally,in claiming back our laws, our country, our sovereign, to vow to himthe perseverance of our love? Are, then, those praiseworthy attemptswithout an example in our history? More than one town of France,province even-Quercy, Rouergue, Gascony, Cahors, Montauban-have they not several times broken the English yoke with fury, or re-fused their fetters with constancy? In vain did the treaties, thecessions, the orders, even renewed, of our kings attempt sometimeswhat the fortune of English arms was nevertheless incapable of achiev-ing; and that noble resistance to the will of the natural sovereigns, far

12. Alcee Fortier, History of Louisiana, I, 198, 204-205. Jose Melchior de Acosta, "Rela-tion diaria ... " in M. Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Histdricos de la Florida y la Luisiana(Madrid, 1913), 288. Marc de Villiers du Terrage, Les Dernieres annees de la Louisianefrancaise (Paris, [1903]), 274.


from exciting the sovereigns ' anger, awakened their tenderness, at-tracted their assistance, and effected a complete deliverance. is

This passage is packed with meaning. Every line could be expandedinto a paragraph, a page or more. There is here a jejune summary ofpolitical thought and historical reflection. Yet it is too jejune to havemerited for the 1768 revolutionaries the attribution of ideology. It wastoo little for historians to go on.

Recently, however, a document has come to light-and is now pre-sented in these pages-which provides a well-argued philosophical andlegal defense of the colonists ' actions in opposition to Ulloa and in favorof their self-determination. This manifesto seems to have escaped the at-tention of all authors who have previously studied the Revolution of1768.

14

The document did not go into print. Two manuscript copies havecome down to us. One is the French original: "Manifeste des habitants,negociants et colons de la province de la Louisianne au sujet de la revo-lution qui est arrive[e] le 29 8bre 1768."

The other is a Spanish translation, obviously made for Spanish offi-cials to examine. We know from the subsequent trial of the leaders thatthere were other writings which aimed at proving the legality of the ac-tions taken. But when Governor Alejandro Reilly arrived to put downthe rising, the revolutionaries were doubtless prompt to destroy com-promising papers; in word and in action they tried to minimize the e-vents and to minimize their participation in whatever it was that hadhappened. Furthermore, it is a matter of record that the public execu-tioner, upon orders of O ' Reilly, burned material adjudged seditious. i5Hence it should not be surprising that we find only this rare specimen,and that we find it in the government ' s own archives.

The Memoire that did go into print was, as shown above, a muchmilder document. From the subsequent interrogation of the leaders weknow that a number of secret meetings took place prior to the publicmeeting of the Superior Council on October 29, 1768. In the lengthydiscussions it is probable that the participants brought forth varioustheoretical and practical positions. However, when the time came forpublishing a Memoire, the more pragmatic, the more "diplomatic" posi-

13. Fortier, History of Louisiana I, 199-200.14. On March 26, 1976, at the Annual Meeting of the Louisiana Historical Association, Iread a paper which presented and analyzed the Manifesto. Dr. Preston Moore, whose vol-ume on the revolution of 1768 was about to go to press, learned of the Manifesto via theLHA program and referred to it in his Revolt in Louisiana, 172.15. Proces-verbal, Oct. 26, 1769, Archivo General de Indias, Papules de Cuba, 171A, f.308v.


tion carried the day. The aim of the memorialists was to win as muchsupport in France as possible; the aim was to offend as few as possible inEurope and in the colony. So the more ideological-minded of the partici-pants obtained the inclusion of only the brief passage cited above. Howmuch more they had to say we can learn from the Manifesto that did notgo into print. (Hereafter in these pages this French manuscript "Man-ifeste" will be referred to as the Manifesto.)

The original French text of the Manifesto and the contemporarySpanish translation are found in Legajo 1054 of the Papeles de Cuba inthe Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain.


MANIFESTOOF THE PLANTERS, MERCHANTS AND COLONISTS OFTHE PROVINCE OF LOUISIANAIN REGARD TO THE REVOLUTION WHICH OCCURRED29 OCTOBER 1768.*

The Revolution which occurred in Louisiana in the last days of themonth of October of 1768 is not only a proof of the love which the Frenchhave ever borne their natural sovereign but also a new example of thelaw of nations put into practice, law sacred and inviolable, used even in

the primordial times of the universe, and transmitted to our time by suretradition and uninterrupted custom. Without being obliged to have re-course to epochs foreign to our nation, the history of our monarchy by it-self furnishes us more than one proof concerning the adherence of thebody politic to its members, and of the members to the body politic, aswell as of the power of the sovereigns regarding the alienation of theseprovinces, and of the rights of these provinces when returned to theirnatural liberty.

It was indeed sufficient for the inhabitants of Louisiana to have ad-dressed their petitions and their memoirs to their monarch, sole compe-tent judge whom they should recognize in these present circumstances.For no one will dare to say that they should subject their actions to mas-ters other than him whom birth has given them, and whose rule theyclaim. But since the colony considers itself to be in need of proving in theeyes of the nations that it has committed nothing that violates the naturallaws and the law of nations which they follow s-indeed, that the colonyhas done no more than conform itself to the examples of many othercities and provinces, which history tells us of-we have judged that wecould succeed therein by rendering manifest the principles of those sa-cred rights upon which the inhabitants based their conduct. 2

*Translation reprinted with the permission of the Director of the Archivo General de In-dias, Seville, Spain.1. A definition of "natural law" as given by Grotius: " Natural Law is the dictate of rightreason, which shows that a given act, because it does or does not correspond to rational na-ture itself, contains moral turpitude or moral obligation, and shows consequently that suchan act is forbidden or commanded by God the author of nature. " De lure Belli ac Pacis, I,1, x, 1 (Translation of C.E.O' N.) The "natural law" and the " law of nation"-droit desgens-are only partially distinguishable. The second term embraces the applications ofnatural law to states, and conveys the nuance that this law of nature is recognized by thegens. See also note 7 below.2. This determination "to prove in the eyes of the nations " the justice of their action calls tomind the statement in the 1776 Declaration of Independence that "a decent respect to theopinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to theseparation. "


What is legally done is well done. Quod jure fit, bene ft. 3 Whateveris legal is good-irrefragable axiom, and drawn from the purest of mor-als. When then one shall have developed this precept of the law of na-ture, as ancient as the nations themselves, who indeed could declarethemselves openly partisans of a foreign nation, to be preferred to theirown, and renounce their being, so to speak, in renouncing voluntarilytheir natural liberty, their patriotic customs, their civil and nationalname?4 In order to leave no doubt remaining about the truth of theseprinciples which are going to be developed, it is necessary to say in ad-vance that they are extracted from the writings of Grotius, Puffendorf,Wolff, etc. 5 The works of these philosophers, whose productions dohonor to the human mind, are the pure sources where we have drawnour maxims. One learns therein what citizens owe to the fatherland, onelearns to respect the laws, to serve prince and country, to live and dievirtuously.

A nation, according to the accepted definition, is a political body, or asociety of men united together to obtain advantages in common and thegeneral security for the united multitude. 6 This is called a civil associa-tion. The principal effect of this association is to submit each citizen tothe authority of the entire body, in everything that can interest the gen-eral welfare, and the exercise of this authority is remitted to the handseither of sovereigns in monarchies or of magistrates in republican states,without, however, the body politic ceasing to be the proprietor.

This body is governed, moreover, by laws which are of two different

3. "Whatever is done in accord with law is rightly done. " (Ius means both law and right.)This tersely phrased axiom is found in slightly longer form in the list of axioms of A. Bar-bosa, Tractatus Varii (Lyon, 1655): " lure suo qui utitul; neminiheft iniuriam. " [Who usesa right does no injury thereby to any one.] (Axiom cxxxv, on p. 89). Also (Axiom cxxxvi, onp. 92): "Lege permittente quod fit, dicitur juste et beneferi" [When the law permits whatis done, then it is justly and rightly done.] When I consulted the late Otis Robleda, S.J.,professor of Roman and Canon Law of the Gregorian University, on this point, he tracedthe simplified axiom to formulations in the Justinian Code, Digesta (Pandectae), L, 17, 151and 155.4. Natural liberty: Various philosophies, in their explanations of the origin of political au-thority, postulate a moment, either real or hypothetical, in which the individual personsurrenders a primitive liberty so as to join in the organized society ' s provision for the com-mon weal.5. On Grotius, Puffendorf, Wolff and soon to be mentioned Vattel, see below, pp. 273-275.6. In giving this definition of nation, the Manifesto seems to be drawing on Vattel, LeDroit des Gens, Preliminaires, 1-in Paris 1830 edition, vol. I, p. 37: "Les Nations ouEtats sontdes corps politiques, des societes d ' hommes unis ensemble pour procurer leursalut et leur avantage, a forces reunies. " [Nations or states are political bodies, societies ofmen who have joined together in order to secure by united efforts their well-being and ad-vantage.]


kinds. Inasmuch as they derive from two different institutions; one kindis called the law of nations, the other is named civil law. As for the latterwhich are peculiar to the nation which made them, they have only aweak connection with the purpose of this opus. But rather it is regardingthe law of nations, and particularly that which the noted Grotius callsnatural and internal-it is on this invariable principle that the colonybases itself, and since this law is universal, it is according to this very lawthat it claims to justify its conduct in the eyes of the universe.

That law is defined as universal and unchanging whose maxims all na-tions follow, and whose principles are founded on the nature of things,and in particular on the nature of man. I say that this law is unchange-able, that is to say that nothing can revoke it or alter it, either in tenor orin extent. ? For, serving as a rule to natural society, it is as stable and con-stant as nature itself. Moreover, all men are interested in maintaining itin its constancy and stability, for, as Vattel remarks in his treatise on thelaw of nations, this law so greatly influences the general welfare that, if itwere ever permitted to depart from it, no people could assure itself ofworking solidly towards well-being and survival, no matter what meas-ures it might take. Further, all men have a perfect right that is born withthem to everything which tends to this goal. It is a privilege which theybring along in being born. It is the patrimony of nature.

It is the right which every nation enjoys and of which it cannot bestripped radically, whether by force or by its consent, or by the intro-duction of sovereignty itself. It is indeed true that some unfortunate cir-cumstances can suspend the exercise of it, but when the nation is re-turned to its natural and primitive state and liberty, it is evident that it isat the same time returned to the law of nations, to its primitive rightwhich seems thus to be reborn from ashes.

Further, this universal law 's fundamental principle, the one uponwhich civil association rests, the one which has served as foundation, isthe intimate and reciprocal adherence of the body politic to its mem-bers, and of the members to the body politic. This principle alone willfurnish material for two points which we propose to discuss in thiswork.8 As for the first point, we will apply ourselves to proving the obli-gation to which the entire nation is bound, of preserving its members.

7. Vattel defines the "law of nations " as the application to states of the natural law. Sincethe latter "is unchangeable, founded as it is on nature, and in particular on the nature ofman, it follows therefrom that the law of nations is immutable." Le Droit des Gens, Pre-liminaire, 8-in Paris 1830 edition, I, 41. (Translation of C.E.O'N.) Provisions there are,therefore, from which nations cannot dispense themselves even by a mutually agreedupon treaty (Ibid., 9).8. -Here we find the Manifesto' s plan of argument. There are two basic points: I. The dutyof the body politic toward citizens. II. The duty of the citizens to preserve the body politic.


We will develop the rights of the sovereign on this article, and those ofthe nation itself in regard to the sovereign. As for the second point, it willbe useful to sketch the adherence of the members to the general body,the duties of the citizens toward the fatherland, and lastly the rules bywhich they should regulate their conduct in cases which involve thecommon cause.

But before entering upon the subject matter, there arises a questionopen to some difficulties, to wit, whether the colonies adhere essentiallyto the body politic of the nation with respect to the colonists, andwhether they are comprised within the domains of the state with respectto the land.' The first point of this question is decided with proof fromGrotius, Lib. 2, cap. 9, par. 7, De Jure Belli et Pacis. He proves that, inthe case of a people that has done nothing more than change place or re-gion, it does not cease to be still the same people or to form a body withthe whole nation. While they keep the same government, the samename and the same laws-although in another hemisphere-there is noroom to doubt that the colonies adhere to the body politic through theinhabitants who occupy them.

But the question whether the colony is part of the territory or domainof the state in regard to the land seems to be a thornier one, and it is thediscovery of America which gave rise to it. At first it would seem that theland belongs to the natives of the region, that the European colonieswhich have been established there have only a precarious possessionwhich they preserve by force or by friendly relations. Hence it wouldfollow that the lands would not form part of the domain or territory of thestate, and that, in disposing of them, the sovereign would be giving awaynothing that belongs to the state in full and real proprietorship.

But, if one gives attention to the fact that by the law of nature and ofnations, all men being under the obligation to cultivate the land, and todraw from it their subsistence, no one can attribute to himself more ter-rain than he has need of, without usurping the goods of others, one willunderstand easily that the European nations, too constrained at home,could legitimately appropriate vacant lands which the natives neitherneeded nor cultivated. They had the right to take possession of lands andto settle them for the reason that the earth does not belong exclusively tothis or that people but to the whole human race. The first occupant canby natural law make his own any deserted and abandoned region, which

9. This digression will serve to prove that what is said of the bond between nation and citi-zens can be affirmed with equal right of the bond between nation and colonists. ThusGrotius in De lure Belli et Pacis, II, 9, vii: " But if a people migrates from its site, whetherfreely on account of famine or other evils, or forced to do so, as were the Carthaginians inthe Third Punic War, if the self-image remains, it does not cease to be a people. " (Transla-tion of C. E. O'N. )


will become again "no one 's property (res nullius, Justinian says), if everhe himself abandons it. 10 Join to these truths the practical usage in theFrench and English colonies of buying from the region 's natives thelands needed, whenever already occupied by them, and there will nolonger be any room to doubt that the colonies are of the domain and ofthe territory of the state, subject consequently to the national lawswhich preserve the territory.

Let us move on to discuss the two proposed points, the first of whichis to prove the adherence of the body politic to its members, and the at-tention which it ought to have to preserve them if it does not wish toperish itself."

By the act of civil association, of which we spoke above, and whichforms the primitive constitution of every nation, of every people, ofevery empire, each individual has along with the entire body the obliga-tion to seek always the common good, and the body in general is pledgedto protect the member, to defend him, and to safeguard the means forhim to reach his well-being. The joining together of men, the formationof towns and cities, the establishment of provinces and states, has noother principle, no other origin, no other base. If therefore each one inparticular ought to contribute to the conservation of the entire nation, itis just that the nation, on its side, watch attentively for the conservationof its members, who make up its force and its welfare, both because ofthe reciprocity of the pact of political society which obliges thereto, andbecause of the fact that in losing 'some one of its members, it is itselfweakened and endangered.

Consequently the nation cannot abandon a province, a city or even anindividual who forms part of it unless necessity constrains it to do so, orthe strongest reason for the public safety make of the step an unavoida-ble requirement.

But cannot the absolute power of the sovereign unsettle the politicalharmony and destroy this mutual commitment? Delicate question, inwhich we must not confound fact and law. Let us see what in law isknown on the subject.

First, it is proper to distinguish, with Grotius, whether the sovereignholds the states by election or whether he has obtained them by succes-

10. Res nu/bus: "property of no one. " Justinian Code, Corpus Iuris Civilas, Institutiones,Libel. Secundus, I, 12: "Quod enim ante nullius est, id ratione occupanti conceditur."[What previously was the property of no one is by reason conceded to the one who oc-cupies it.]11. Concluding the digression, the author turns now to the two main points of the ar-gumentation. The lines that follow are a paraphrase of Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, I, ii, 16-17-in Paris 1830 edition, I, 60-61.


sion. 12 In the first case it is indubitable that the prince cannot alienate ordismember any of these provinces, for he is only the usufructuary. Thisright belongs to the people alone, and it cannot be exercised even by thepeople, except in some extraordinary cases, without violating the pact ofcivil association. But in the second case the prince can, according to hiswill, and without the consent of the state-all of whose rights he unitesin his person-dispose of those rights which the state had over the saidcities or provinces, provided nonetheless that the fundamental laws ofthe kingdom do not take this faculty away from him. 13

Without going in search of what has taken place among our neighborsin this regard, let us examine what law has been in use in France for alltime, and which must be in use today. It is incontestable that a law as an-cient as the kingdom itself limits the power of the sovereign from beingable to dismember or to alienate his provinces without the concurrenceof the nation or of its representatives. 14 Our history furnishes us severalexamples of this. Is

The testament of Charlemagne was not valid except in so far as it wasconfirmed by the French lords. It was, however, not an alienationstrictly so called he was making of this empire but an equitable divisionamong his three sons. He recognized, though, that the dismembermentof his states was hardly in conformity with the laws of the kingdom; hetook care to call the lords together for the reception of his testament andconfirmation of the division. And in order to compensate the people insome fashion for the dismemberment he was making of his states and forthe breach he was making in their right of union, he left to them the lib-erty of choosing a master after the death of these princes, provided that

12. Grotius treats this matter in De lure Belli et Pacis, I, III, xi-xii and in II, VI, iii. Thesecond class of states would be those that had surrendered to a conqueror or, to avoid someevil, had given themselves to a prince for protection. Even in this case some conditionsmay have been included in the submission which would preclude dismemberment. What-ever may be the case of these second-category states, the Manifesto goes on to show thatthe relationship of the French with their sovereign belongs to the first class.13. Vattel, although not cited here by name, has a pertinent statement on the basic sourceand extent of the prince ' s authority; "Le prince tient son autorite de la Nation; it en a pre-cisement autant qu'elle a voulu lui en confier. " Le Droit des Gens, I, iv, 45. A footnotecites Juan de Mariana, De Rege et regis institutione, I, v.14. The political philosophy of the Manifesto holds that between the universal natural lawand the national positive law there is an enduring fundamental law by which the sovereignis also bound. Cf. Martyn P. Thompson, "The History of Fundamental Law in PoliticalThought from the French Wars of Religion to the American Revolution," American His-torical Review 91 (1986) 1103-1128.15. The use of " we " and " our" in referring to French history does not necessarily mean thatthe author of the Manifesto is himself French. He is writing in the name of colonists thegreat majority of whom were French, and all of whom had recognized French sovereignty.


he be of royal blood. Abrege chronologique de Mr. le President Henaut,annee 806.

16

Louis the Debonair, his son and successor, makes a different divisionof his states. He gives Aquitaine to Charles his son. 17 The nobles refuseto obey Charles, and take arms to remove themselves from his domina-tion. As is pointed out by Grotius, Lib. 1, Chap. par. 13, althoughthese princes and several others later on bequeathed their states by tes-tament, this disposition was a recommendation for the people ratherthan a true alienation or a dismemberment done by authority, but underthe third dynasty, all these divisions, all these dismemberments ceased.Hugh Capet and his successors, with a prudence from which they neverdeparted, looked always toward reuniting to the crown whatever hadbeen detached, and they succeeded in uniting the entire nation underone prince.

We will not speak here of the testament of Charles VI, which hascaused so many tears and so much blood to be shed in France. 18 Foreven without recourse to the laws of the kingdom which rendered nullthis disposition, it is sufficient to bring forward the insanity into whichthis prince had fallen. But, if one wishes to have striking examples of theperpetual adherence of the provinces to the entire body of the Frenchmonarchy, the treaties of Bretigny between John and Edward III, 19 andof Madrid between Francis I and Charles V leave us nothing more to bedesired 20 John, made prisoner in the Battle of Poitiers, cannot obtain

16. Charles-Jean-Francois Henault, Nouvel Abrege Chronologique de 1 'Histoire deFrance. I consulted the fifth edition, published by Prault in Paris in 1756. Henault (1685-1770) was " president"-that is to say " presiding magistrate "-of the "Premiere chambreaux enquetes. " The text cited here is found in vol. I (of three), 69.

Henault treats the subsequent complex partitions of the empire during the years 835-838. The mentioned reaction of the lords of Aquitaine is recounted in the year 838 (Paris,1756 ed., vol. I, 79).17. "Charles his son " is Charles the Bald, son of Louis and Judith of Bavaria.18. Charles VI, who for years had suffered mental illness, disinherited his son, and ar-ranged for the marriage of his daughter with Henry V of England. The Treaty of Troyes (22May 1420) stipulated that after the death of Charles VI the two kingdoms would be per-petually united under Henry V and his heirs.19. The Treaty of Bretigny, signed 8 May 1360, which ended the first phase of theHundred Years War, cut in half the losses of the text signed in London the previous year byJean le Bon. King Edward III of England, in exchange for renouncing the claim to thethrone of France as well as lordship over several counties, received the port of Calais, theduchy of Aquitaine and a number of southern fiefs, among them Poitou, Guyenne, Gas-cogne, Quercy and Rouergues. Leon Mirot, Manuel de Geographie Historique'do laFrance, 2 vols. (Paris, 1948) I, 176-177.20. The Treaty of Madrid, signed 13 January 1526, ended the first war between Francis Iand Charles V. Francis, taken prisoner at Pavia, was brought to Madrid, Grave illness andimpatience led to his concluding a treaty whereby France ceded Burgundy. Ratificationwas to be given by the Estates General of France and by the Estates of Burgundy. The first


his deliverance except on the hardest of conditions. The first treaty,negotiated in England in 1359, by which he alienated several of his prov-inces, stirs up all France, and the Estates of the Kingdom refuse to ac-cept it. Finally, the next year the Treaty of Bretigny was concluded, bywhich Edward was placed in possession of Guyenne, etc., but, as thewise Duverge says, 21 the Commissioners of the King reserve to them-selves [or: for him] the sovereignty over the states and the subjects insuch fashion that Edward was really nothing but an usufructuary. TheCommissioners of the King of England offered no opposition to the re-serve contained in these clauses even though by the Treaty of BretignyJohn was supposed to renounce the said sovereignty, so true is it that bycommon law the parts of the body politic are inalienable.

Francis, made prisoner in like manner at Pavia, ceded to Charles V bythe Treaty of Madrid the Duchy of Burgundy in exchange for his deliver-ance, but the Notables of France, assembled in Coignac, says Meserais,Tome 2, page 458, concluded all with one voice that the authority of theprince did not extend so far as to dismember the crown.

22 The Treatywas declared null, as being contrary to the fundamental laws of the king-dom, and when the Viceroy of Naples came to ask the King for ratifica-tion-M. Hainaut says at the year 1526-the response he received wasto be brought into the assembly of the deputies of Burgundy,. who de-clared to His Majesty that they would not consent to the cession whichhe had made of this duchy, that, never having been subject to any crownother than that of France, they would die in that obedience, and that, ifthe king abandoned them, they would take up arms and would forcethemselves to be put in liberty rather than pass from one subjection to

act of Francis after repatriation was to denounce the treaty as void because it was obtainedunder violence. The Deputies of Burgundy, assembled at Cognac, protested the aliena-tion of Burgundy. At Paris in 1527 the treaty was rejected in the assembly of a lit dejustice.

21. "Le sage Duverge" is doubtless Gilbert Saulnier du Verdier, author of Abrege de I 'his-take de France. The work, which was first published in Paris in 1652, went through sev-eral editions. I have examined the pertinent pages in Tome II of the 1663 and of the 1673editions, but the words quoted in the Manifesto are not found there. Du Verdier alteredpassages in successive editions. The author of the Manifesto may have had in his handssome other edition of this nowadays quite rare opus.22. Francis I, back in France, affirmed " that the promises made in prison are null, ... thatthe laws of the Kingdom did not permit him to cut off any part of it. He spoke thus to theambassadors at his court; he wrote the same to the Pope, to the King of England, and to theVenetians. The Assembly of Notables which he convoked at Cognac answered the same,and the Estates of Burgundy absolutely refused to change lords although in appearance heurged them to with all his power. " Francois Eudes de Mezeray, Abrege Chronologique de

1 'Histoire de France, 6 vols. (Amsterdam, 1688) IV, 542. [Translation of C.E.O ' N.] (Theedition I used is in duodecimo. The Manifesto's author must have used an in-quarto edi-tion.)


another (Meserai, Tome 2, page 458). Nothing more laudable and plaus-ible than this hearty resolution of the deputies of Burgundy.

The reason given by Grotius is full of good judgment, namely that themembers are not for sale, and in order for the alienation of a province tobe valid, it must consent thereto, because those who united themselvesto form a state have contracted a perpetual and immortal society overwhich the sovereign presides, and which he ought not break without theconsent of the body and of its parts. 23 Besides, he goes on to say, theparts do not depend on the body politic as the members depend on thenatural body. The body of which there is question here is of a completelydifferent species. Being formed by the will of men, its authority overmen as well as that of the sovereign who exercises it ought to be meas-ured according to this first primitive will. But one cannot presume thatthis will was such that the body had a right to cut off its parts so as to putthem in the power of another. But, someone will say, can the sovereignnot securely and without the consent of his subjects dispose of the land ofthe territory of the province while leaving to the inhabitants the optionof withdrawing if the new domination displeases them? Of course not.Because it is as much against the law of nations as against the good ofstates and against sound policy to make fugitives out of citizens estab-lished in their homes, for this would be to put them in the harsh neces-sity of selling and of alienating their property at a time when they haveno desire of doing so. For the territory which belongs in its totality to thestate belongs in its parts to individual citizens in full and entire pro-prietorship. But it is against the law of nature and of nations to exposemen to the sad alternative of either recognizing a power which they havenot chosen for themselves or of stripping themselves of their patrimonialproperty, and of leaving the place that saw them born. Calamity and hor -

rible vexation-that Virgil speaks of in these terms: Nos patriamfugim us. Nos dulces linquim us agros.

24

It must therefore be held as certain, as Vattel remarks, that there is nosovereignty properly so called which is alienable in whole or in part. 25 It

23. Two lines in the middle of page 13 of the French original have been reconstructedwith the aid of the Spanish translation. The passage of Grotius referred to is found in Delure Belli et Pads, II, VI, iv.24. "

Nos patriae fines et dulcia linquimus arva, Nospatriam fugimus." Ecloga I, lin. 3-4.[ We are leaving behind the boundaries and sweet fields of our homeland; Our fatherlandwe are fleeing.] (Translation of C. E. O ' N.) The Non before dulces in the manuscript is ob-viously an error, where Nos was intended.25. The Vattel passage referred to is found in Le Droit des Gens, I, v, 69. The historicalexamples of Rome and Russia are also drawn from Vattel.

For Vattel, if the people do not freely submit to a conqueror, the state of war continuesin some fashion. However, outside of war, after a transfer ofsovereignty that was an abuseof power, a people may choose to submit in order to avoid worse conditions. The juridicalprinciple is not destroyed by acceptance of the new rule.


matters little that Roman history furnishes us the example of someprinces who bequeathed their provinces to the Roman people. For, be-sides the fact that the consent of the subjects might have concurred,there is also the fact that force which brings about a de facto dominationis incapable of ever destroying their right (de jute) to the contrary.

26

Vis-a-vis so powerful a legatee, had the subject people on the other handany alternative other than that of submitting? But, to cite valid exam-ples, it would be necessary to bring up the case of a people who had re-sisted in a similar situation and whose conduct had been universally con-demned.

Peter Allexiovits made use of an absolute despotism. 27 He made itserve for the reforming of his subjects. He changed everything amongthem, their customs, even their dress. And what was much more diffi-cult to carry out, he destroyed their superstitions. It is difficult to cite asovereign who was better obeyed. But, the same author asks, do you

think that, if he had dismembered his states in favor of the Sultan or ofsome other neighboring power, he would have found his subjects so sub-missive as not to resist, and would the Russians then have been consid-ered as obstinate? What absurdity! What a shocking thought!

When therefore a state or a sovereign cedes and alienates a province,it is much less an alienation according to the intention of the giver than ayielding up in which the state or the sovereign turns the province over toitself. The sovereign can indeed divest himself of all the rights he holdsover it in favor of another power. But the city or the province which isthus given up and dismembered from the body to which it was unitedhas no obligation to admit the new master. The province is from thatvery moment returned to itself, and it reenters upon its natural rights,whereby without its participation neither its liberty nor its property canbe traded, whatever may be the advantages such a deal could produce.And if it be possible for the province to defend this liberty against himwho would want to subject it, the resistance is legitimate. Rouergue,Quercy and several provinces and cities of France have at different timesmade these glorious efforts. 28 Their zeal, their perseverance, their vig-orous defense earned them in the end the advantage of remaining underthe lordship of their sovereign and of continuing ever to be united withand joined on to the body of their nation.

26. In the middle of page 15 of the French original a line has been lost. The crease of fold-ing, helped by the ink, tore the paper.27. Peter Alekseevich (1672.4725) becomes Tsar Peter I "the Great. "

28. During the Hundred Years War, Quercy and Rouergue figured regularly in thetreaties between the King of France and the King of England. This paragraph is one of themost cogent in the entire Manifesto.


If that be the case, someone will say, then no treaty of peace is firmand effective. For there are few in which one power does not cede toanother some cities or some provinces. I respond that as far as the state isconcerned, the treaty is valid. But in regard to the ceded city or prov-ince, it has, as we have said, the right to accept or to refuse, the right tosubmit or to free itself. It is the outcome of battles which settles suchquestions, and although the sword can silence the law of nations on thispoint, the law, although silent, is none the less unchangeable and impre-scriptible. The law can be applied at any time, and it is precisely to re-move this right that the new masters always call upon the new subjectsto take the oath of allegiance-which would be idle and superfluous ifthe peoples were legitimately bound by cessions and by conquest.

From all these principles, linked to the striking examples, it followsincontrovertibly that the enterprise formed by the citizens of Louisianaand carried out last October 29 and the days following in order to with-draw themselves from a foreign domination had nothing in it that wasnot praiseworthy and legitimate. 29 Ceded to His Catholic Majesty. by aspecial treaty signed at Fontainebleau in 1762, the colony looked only insorrow upon the project of its separation from the monarchical body towhich it was united. 30 However, a respectful deference made it show allpossible respect toward the officers of a prince of Bourbon blood. 31 But,without accepting the new domination, the colonists temporized as longas possible until the danger of imminent and certain ruin did not anylonger permit keeping to this policy of circumspection. Returned to itsnatural rights and liberty by the abandonment which its sovereign wasmaking, the colony was without contradiction empowered to accept orto refuse the law which a foreign power offered. This is what results fromthe principles which were established and proven above.

But supposing that the colony was ever of a mind to accept, did it nothave the right to make its pact and treaty of submission, and to placetherein the type of clause it might have judged fitting to its needs and itswelfare? Was it not so authorized by the law of nature and of nations?

29. On 29 October 1768 the Superior Council of Louisiana declared that Ulloa, withouthaving presented credentials to the Council,.. had unlawfully exercised authority. For thepublic peace the Council ordered him to leave the colony within three days.30. After the fall of Quebec (1759) the French monarchy realized that it could no longerprotect Louisiana against English encroachment or seizure. During France ' s negotiationswith England that led to the Treaty of Paris of 1763, French and Spanish diplomatsreached an agreement at Fontainebleau (3 November 1762) whereby France ceded toSpain all of Louisiana west of the Mississippi along with New Orleans and the island onwhich the colonial capital stood.31. Charles III (1716-1788), who succeeded to the throne of Spain in 1759, was the son ofPhilip V of Spain and the great-grandson of Louis XIV of France.


And what was it asking for after all? Nothing more than the preservationof its laws, its privileges, its commerce, that is to say, the preservation ofits being. Far from conforming to such legitimate requests, to which itwas indispensable to subscribe, the envoy of His Catholic Majestytreated as seditious the representations which were made to him. And,giving the name of crime to requests which the law authorized, he em-ployed the most insulting menaces towards the representatives of thecolony. After such irregular conduct on his part, was it then necessary tomaintain restraint any longer? And can one attribute this restraint to anymotive other than the respect with which our hearts were imbued forthe sovereign who had sent him?

But, someone will ask, why did you not make him show his creden-tials? Why did the magistrates of the Council suffer him to trespass upontheir rights? Why did you delay so long in sending him away?

What connection can all these objections have with the cause of thepeople? And how could the public discern the goodness and justice ofthose objections? For, regarding the first question, it is clear that itwould have been quite useless to make him show his credentials, whichwe were not yet prepared to obey, and the exercise of which we soonformed the firm resolution to oppose when we saw him reject with somuch haughtiness the very preliminaries of the pact of submission.

As for the second question, it must be said that the jurisdiction andthe rights of a sovereign tribunal are imprescriptible. 32 To the magis-trates of his courts the sovereign has entrusted a portion of his very ownroyal prerogative. But the royal prerogative is inalienable, immutable,imprescriptible. Therefore, whatever may have been the endeavors ofM. Ulloa, one cannot say that he usurped and acquired for himself eventhe least of the rights of the court [[i.e. Conseil Superieur]], but onlythat he performed some acts offensive to its authority. Therefore thesame court was empowered to hasten or to postpone retribution.

Finally, regarding the last point, it is clear that it mattered quite littlewhether this officer, with or without credentials, remained a long orshort time among us, since he was adjudged to have no other rank and noother recognized and admitted power than of simply a private person,and it would matter little that he were still there if his maneuvers had notbeen tending toward the total ruin of the colony. 33 It is incontestable

32. The author of the Manifesto takes care to show that the Superior Council did not shareauthority with Spanish Governor-elect Antonio de Ulloa. Nor could any tacit consent in-troduce legal prescription.33. The Manifesto' s tone and content change at this point. The presentation becomesmore emotional. The attention is on Louisiana and Louisianians, on their loyalty and on itsadvantages to the mother country.


that the sojourn of M. Ulloa in this province was marked with no author-ity. It is the French flag which has always flown over our public squareand at the head of our militia. It is the French flag which has always beenraised on our ships.

It is under this banner and under this standard-as respectable in oureyes as the royal pennant was in the days of our ancestors-that we wishto live and die. Born in happier times and under a rule so sweet and soglorious, is it to be thought that the French settled on the continent havelost anything of the zeal and of the ardor of their ancestors? The nobleperseverance of our fathers in times of calamity, their inviolable attach-ment to the fatherland, their love for their natural sovereign are inviola-ble laws which it is indispensable for us to follow.

Especially in more serene and tranquil days, far from being a burdento the state which was abandoning us, we dare to say that we are useful toit, perhaps even necessary. 34 Our colony is among the destinations of itsshipping. Our commerce assures a certain market for its manufacturing,and on the return voyage contributes raw materials. Our activity has al-ways made the name of France known and respected in the upper part ofthe Mississippi, and in the vast region watered by the Missouri, the Ar-kansas River, the Red River, etc. Our ardor, in fine, which awaits onlythe orders of our prince to blaze forth, can at the first signal serve to re-cover for the state the immense possessions which the fate of arms tookaway in the last war. 35

Fortunate are we if our sovereign deigns to accept the pledges andthe fidelity of a colony which under his empire drew up no complaint ex-cept in the moment in which it saw itself about to be separated from thatempire! More fortunate still if our feeble efforts could ever contribute tothe glory of his reign, to the prosperity of his arms!

Our transports of love for his august person hardly permit us to ex-press ourselves on the deplorable state of this colony and the unfortu-nate extremity to which our city is reduced. From movements of sin-cerest zeal which make our hearts soar upon most gratifying hope, it isindeed sad to pass to outbursts of keenest sorrow which plunge and sub-merge our hearts into pits of frightful bitterness. Our possessions haveno more value, and our marketplace is almost without specie. Thenerve, the bond of commerce is, so to speak, annihilated. It is true thatby wisdom and inventiveness we have resolved to remedy that calamity,and every measure has been taken towards that effect. Or at least we are

34. Louisiana, argues the Manifesto, offers the mother country great advantages in thecontext of mercantilism.35. The "immense possessions " lost by France in the Seven Years War (1756-1763) in-cluded Canada and the part of Louisiana which lay east of the Mississippi River.


able to assure ourselves that there remains little more that could bedone. But who caused us all these disasters? Without contradiction it isthe Spanish administration.

36

Before the arrival of M. Ulloa the former paper money of the King cir-culated on the marketplace, and, although it suffered a certain discredit,it facilitated commerce, and was a resilient instrument of business. M.Ulloa decided to have it withdrawn, in spite of the representations thatwere made to him. 37 He had doubtless heard tell that . poverty bringsdown power and discourages activity. A shrewd policy, ` tis true, but afalse policy, one which is adopted only by barbarians. The usurper ofPersia, the famous Tamukulikant3 8 commonly said that he would reducefive families to one lone stew pot, that is to say he would render his sub-jects so poor that only in common would five families possess that utensilof low cost. Horrible maxim, which contributed only to diminish hisglory, and made him detested by the universe.

This great reformer M. Ulloa, does he not explain his actions in al-most the same way? From the first days of his arrival he said coarse clothwas sufficient for our purposes. It was necessary to give up cloth of Hol-land. At most there were only four households where wheat breadshould be eaten, and he set out to make the others get used to corntortillas.

Finally the paper money was withdrawn from circulation. A sad timewhich wiped out, so to speak, a total of seven million [livres?] circulatingin commerce. But sadder still was the period of the introduction ofSpanish paper which M. Ulloa effected by his staff, against every law andevery usage of Spain, a currency whose authorization seems uncertain,which, however, we received in good faith, and which is already losinghalf of its face value.

Was it in order to hobble us, and bind us more tightly to the yoke thathe introduced this paper? Who doubts it? But did he have orders to actthus? We are morally certain of the contrary-unless he had two sets oforders. Whatever the case, he succeeded perfectly in making us fear allSpanish government.

Please God, let this not be aimed at the nation. Every Spaniard who

36. After mentioning the "gouvernement espagnol" the Manifesto insists that it was theindividual Ulloa and his policies that were to blame. Indeed the Manifesto accuses Ulloa ofcontravening Spanish law and practice.37. The governments of France and Spain disagreed over the funding of Louisiana for theyears 1763, 1764, and 1765. Ulloa tried to solve the problem of devalued paper money byintroducing some solid Spanish specie. However, the valuable coins disappeared in accordwith " Gresham 's Law. "

38. Timur Lenk, Tamerlane. The notoriously cruel Mongol conqueror from Samarkandcleared Persia of opposition in the 1380s.


has no insignia of authority can come among us, as we have publicly de-clared. He will always experience the same marks of respect.

The second point which we proposed to discuss has for its object theduties of the citizen toward the fatherland, a rich and precious topic, aninexhaustible treasure for mind and heart.39 Here it will suffice to skimthe surface since every man, born virtuous, can on this subject supplywith abundance of feeling for the insufficiency of this presentation. Bythe term "fatherland " we do not mean only the place which saw us bornbut also the state of which we are members. The reciprocity of the civiland political commitment obliges every citizen to work for the good ofhis compatriots, and since this association of which we have spokenabove has for its principal object the general conservation and growththrough the union of individual forces, he cannot refuse to cooperatetherein with all his power, without failing in an obligation all the moresacred as it derives from the law of nature.

In being born man contracts this debt which he is obliged to pay everyday of his life, and to which he ought to sacrifice his dearest interests.Far from being able to plot or to scheme against the fatherland, he can-not even cravenly abandon it in danger and place himself in safety whenhe ought to hasten to its aid. In the first case he is a traitor; in the secondhe is a disgraced deserter whom the state has a right to punish severely. Isay more: in an unjust war it is not even then permitted to take up armsagainst the fatherland. The only option that is left to him is to remain incomplete neutrality, if the injustice of the public cause is absolutely evi -

dent and perfectly demonstrated. For it is not for citizens to judge thebody politic, it is rather the body which has the right to judge the citizen.In fine, although vengeance be of natural right, it is not permitted tocarry it out against the fatherland, whatever be its errors and even its in-justice. 40 It is a terrible crime to plot in the mind, and it is attemptedparricide to dare to undertake such an enterprise. In a word, all the ac-tions of the citizens ought to have no other purpose than the service ofthe state. Placed in unequal stations, endowed with different talents,more or less favored by fortune, men are nonetheless all bound to carryout this service, since all are capable of doing so in proportionate degreeby rendering their ability, whatever it be, tributary of the commongood. Newton, Descartes, Leibniz served and shed luster upon theirfatherland by their works. George d'Amboise, Sully, Colbert by their

39. After lengthy treatment of Point I the Manifesto takes up only now-and quitebriefly-Point II.40. In these few ominous lines the author of the Manifesto carries a germ of Jacobinism(the individual crushed by the majority), of " Decaturism" ( " my country right or wrong"),and totalitarianism (the individual existing for the state).


application to political life. 41 Vespucci, Le Maire, Cabral, Magellan bytheir exploits. The farmer, the serf, the merchant, the artisan dolikewise. In a word, every act of every station in life can and ought be re-lated to the common good, but the great tribute which all men are capa-ble of giving and which they cannot refuse to give to the fatherland istheir life and their blood. When the good of the country demands it,they ought to sacrifice for its preservation the days which this commonmother has given them. Striking examples, found in both ancient andmodern history, prove these grand truths.

Codrus, king of Athens, devotes himself to the city state, and goes insearch of his death, upon which, he believes according to the oracle, thewell-being of this people depends.

42

The consul Brutus ceases being father in order to remain citizen; inhis heart duty wins out over nature, and he sacrifices for the saving ofRome his victorious son, the hope and honor of his family. 43

Regulus exposes himself to the most terrible torments rather than en-dorse a treaty upon which his deliverance depends, but which the herobelieves to be disadvantageous to his fatherland.

44

The Roman orator, the learned Tullius, recalled from exile, forgetsthe ills and outrage which the people and the senate did him, and busieshimself only about their welfare.

45

The scion of the Coucis [Guiscard?] banished from Syracuse, comesback at the moment when Suleiman must be combatted. Syracuse is de-livered, and among its dying defenders Tancred is discovered.4

6

41. Isaac Newton (1642-1727), mathematician, physicist.Rene Descartes (1596-1650), mathematician, philosopher.G.W. von Leibniz (1646-1716), mathematician and philosopher.George d 'Amboise (1460-1510), minister under Louis XII.Maximilien de Bethune, duc de Sully (1560-1641), minister under Henri IV.Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), minister under Louis XIV.Amerigo Vespucci (1451-4512), explorer and mapmaker.Jakob Le Maire (1585-1616), explorer.Pedro Alvarez Cabral (1460-1526?), explorer who claimed Brazil for Portugal.Ferdinand Magellan (1480?-1521), explorer.

42. Codros: Last of legendary kings of Athens (eleventh century B.C.). An oracle hadpromised victory to the Dorians on condition that the King of Athens not be killed. Cod -

ros, disguised as a farmer, went to his death at the hands of a Dorian soldier. The enemyfled. Athens was saved.43. Brutus, sixth-century B.C. consul of Rome. At the beginning of the republic he sen-tenced his own two sons to death as traitors after they had conspired to restore the monar-chy.44. Marcus Atilius Regulus, Roman consul. Captured by the Carthaginians in 255 B.C., hewas sent with an embassy to Rome. Judging the peace terms disadvantageous, he spokeagainst them; then he returned with the Carthaginian legates to captivity, torture anddeath.45. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.).46. Tancred: fictional hero in Voltaire ' s tragedy Tancrede (1760), set in eleventh-centurySicily.


Twelve hundred brave Swiss attack the army of Sigismond, sixtythousand strong. 4 ' At St. Jacques near Basel all perished, save twelve,but their fatherland is guaranteed against a ruinous invasion, and theenemy whom they fought cannot help giving them praise. The twelvewho escaped, on the contrary, are regarded by their compatriots as cow-ards who preferred a shameful life to the glory of dying for their country.

Vicinkelvic [Winkelried], a gentleman of Underval [Unterwald], inthe battle of Sempach, seeing that the Swiss cannot break through theheavily armed Austrians, whose tightly drawn up battalion presents afront covered with iron and bristling with lances- "My friends," he says," I am going to give my life to procure victory for you. Only this: I com-mend my family to you. " He advances at that very moment at the head ofhis troop, arranged in a triangle, and, grabbing as many pikes as he canseize, he opens a passage through that terrifying battalion for those whoare following him. He falls, pierced with a thousand cuts, but the Aus-trians, thrown into disorder and encumbered by their armor, arebeaten. The Swiss, inferior in number and poorly armed, remain victori-ous. The name of this hero, dear to the nation, will be respected as longas the nation endures.

48

One cannot give praise too great or honor too high to these generouscitizens who, not content with not failing in their common duties towardthe fatherland, are still further capable of attempting noble deeds and ofmaking the greatest sacrifices for it. But for the same reason there is nomark of infamy sufficiently branding to lay upon those who would becapable of harming the fatherland. 49

"He who renders himself guilty of so horrible and so detestable acrime," says Vattel, Liv. 1, chap. 11, "breaks the most sacred commit-ments, and falls into the darkest perfidy, since they abuse the confi-dence of their fellow citizens, and treat as enemies those who had a rightto expect from them only help and service. One finds, " he continues,"traitors to the fatherland only among men who are moved solely by thegrossest of interests, who look out immediately for themselves alone and

47. Sigismund of Tirol (1426-1496).Saint-Jacques: In August of 1444 at Sankt Jacob an der Birs the Swiss held back an army

of French mercenaries whom the Hapsburg Emperor Frederick III had obtained fromCharles VII of France. The Swiss, outnumbered ten to one, resisted until only a fewwounded survivors remained. The French mercenaries withdrew.48. Arnold Winkelried, according to tradition, led the Swiss charge against the Austriansat the Battle of Sempach (July 1386), and died in the fashion described by the Manifesto.The victory assured Swiss independence. These two Swiss historical examples are found inVattel, Le Droit des Gens: Battle of Sankt Jakob-I, xv, 190. Winkelried-I, xi, 124.49. Therefore, runs the argument, let no Louisianian or Frenchman of France take uparms against the Louisiana colonists.


whose heart is incapable of any sentiment of affection for others. So theyare justly detested by everybody and regarded as the most infamous ofscoundrels. "50

To what dishonor, therefore, to what withering scorn would everysubject expose himself who would not be sufficiently attached to hisprince and to his fatherland to enter upon the common cause, and tocontribute with all his power to make it succeed? What risk would notany citizen incur who would unite with a foreign nation, and would carrymadness so far as to take up arms in its favor to force his compatriots toreceive a law which, returned to their natural liberty, they are in theirright to refuse?

Let us draw the curtain over these hideous topics which, properlyspeaking, are only phantoms. Concerned only with the general welfareof this colony being born anew, let us give ourselves to the flatteringhope of still being the subjects of Louis the Well Beloved. How can oneimagine that our august prince, who has ever shown himself the father ofhis peoples and who makes his own happiness consist of their felicity,will reject devotion as sincere as ours? Given back to itself by the Ces-sion and returned to its natural liberty, the colony had the right tochoose a master for itself, but it did not take hold of this right except to dohomage to its true sovereign and to cry out for his rule. The unanimity ofour intentions in that regard, the firm resolve we have to make the great-est sacrifices for that purpose, the legitimacy of our cause, everything, infine, assures us and carries us forward on our way toward that result. Ev-erything in our conduct is legitimate. Everything has been carried outwith legal procedure. Everything, in fine, is an authentic proof of ourzeal, of our love, of our respect for our king.

'

50. This quotation from Vattel is underlined in the original manuscript of the Manifesto.51. Conclusion. The Cession of 1762 brought into question the pact of civil association.However, the sovereign, as shown above, cannot alienate a part of the body politic withoutthe consent of the citizens. So the colonists had been returned to the philosophical state of"natural liberty. " The colonists have decided to choose neither autonomy nor foreignruler. Rather their choice is to remain attached to Louis XV, the Well Beloved, and to thebody politic of the French monarchy. Thus, after putting forward its legal rights in the con-text of natural and international law, the first American revolutionary "Declaration"chooses not independence but rather continued association in dependence.


Analysis of the Manifesto

The Manifesto shows from the very start a lively, clearly understoodpatriotism. The French of the eighteenth century maintained a loyaltyto the person of the King rather than to the abstraction of the patrie.They were subjects of the monarch rather than citizens of a state.

It was the monarchy which had developed a centralized governmentand extended the boundaries of France. It was the monarchy that as-sured order and rights within the society whose component categories inturn supported the monarchy. Various procedures had evolved whichexercised control on the so-called absolute monarchy. The monarch andhis ministers had to govern according to basic laws and regional customs.Moreover, the fundamental medieval concept that the monarch ' s au-thority was derived from the people had, at a certain level of thought,withstood the sixteenth-century revival of ancient Roman law which hadexalted the will of the prince.

The Louisianians ' Manifesto shows that in the tense weeks andmonths following October 29, 1768, they discussed the philosophicalideas and the historical applications that were part of the mainstream ofEurope's political culture, This document is one particular affirmation ofthe natural-law thesis that government is derived from the consent ofthe governed.

Philosophy

Philosophers invoked by name to sustain "the truth of these princi-ples " are Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Emmerich von Vattel andChristian Wolff,

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) continued the Scholastic philosophy tradi-tion that reached back through centuries of European thought. He de-veloped his particular version of natural-law thought in the context ofProtestant northern Europe. He defined natural law as the "dictate ofright reason which points out that an act, according as it is or is not inconformity with rational [and social] nature, has in it a quality of moralbaseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act iseither forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God. " 16

A faithful believer himself, Grotius insisted that even one who did notbelieve in God should accept the natural law. God, is, God cannot notbe, but even if one imagined that He did not exist, the natural law wouldnot therefore go away; this view is part of Grotius ' prolegomena. i7

16. De lure Belli ac Pacis, lib. I, cap. 1, par. x, 1.17. Ibid., Prelegomena, 11.


Living his life through Europe 's bitter Thirty Years ' War, Grotiussought to systematize international law and ground it upon natural law.He urged the nations to observe a rule of law even in the midst of cruelstrife.

Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694), less successful in philosophy andlaw than Grotius, wound up practically fusing natural law with interna-tional law and with the positive civil law within nations.

Emmerich von Vattel (1714-1767) is as much appreciated by theLouisiana Manifesto as the more renowned Grotius. Vattel, a native ofCouvet, Neuchatel, was born at the time when this canton of Switzer-land was part of the domain of the king of Prussia. After studies inGeneva and Basel, the young aspirant secured employment with theElector of Saxony, whom he served for a time as counsellor in the em-bassy at Bern, and for a time in Dresden as a counsellor of the Elector.When his health was failing, he returned to Neuchatel, where he died at53 years of age.

Vattel was less a philosopher than a summarizer and popularizer. Onebiographer gave this assessment: "Vattel summed up the knowledge ofGrotius, who was deeper but not clear; the knowledge of Pufendorf, whowas more methodical but not exempt from excessive niceties; the knowl-edge of Wolff, whose errors he rectified while following him as master.That was the best thing Vattel could do in composing a basic book at thetime he wrote. "18 The Manifesto of 1768 is clearly indebted to Vattel ' scompilation Le Droit des Gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle, pub-lished in 1758.

Christian Wolff (1679-1754) enters the Manifesto only through Vat-tel, who translated the German philosopher ' s Latin treatise on naturallaw into French. There is no direct quotation from Wolff in theLouisiana document; he is, however, named along with the three previ-ous authors.

The particular distinctiveness ofeach of the four cited writers is of nosignificance to the author of the Manifesto. What is cited from them isthe perennial theme rather than the specific modification of that themeby a given author. They are borrowed from for what they have to say inthe broad, deep European natural-law tradition.

Grotius was familiar with the work of Francisco de Vittoria (c. 1483-1546), the Spanish Dominican "father of international law, " and with' thewritings of the Jesuits Juan de Mariana, Roberto Bellarmino and Fran -

cisco Suarez, who were of the generation preceding Grotius ' s.Of John Locke (1632-1704) there is no sign in the Manifesto ' s

18. M. Avenel, "Vattel" in Nouvelle Biographie Generale, 46 vols. (Paris, 1862-1870), 45,999.


thought; he was of the generation after Grotius, and, although he madehis mark in England, he had no effect on the sources of the Manifesto. SoPrevost ' s library, mentioned above, may have informed some of the col-onials of Lockean and Rousseauvian ideas, but there is no clear connec-tion between them and the Revolution of 1768.

One might ask why, in the Franco-Spanish context of Louisiana, theauthor of the Manifesto cited no Spanish author, such as FranciscoSuarez (1548-1617). For example, in his study of the origin of law, pub-lished in 1612, Suarez gave a strong, concise enunciation of the doctrineof popular sovereignty: "Whenever political authority is found in an in-dividual or prince, it must have emanated directly or remotely from thepeople or community according to some legitimate and established title,and, if it is to be just, it cannot be otherwise obtained.

"19

The explanation of the omission of such strong support from a Spanishauthor may lie in the lack of knowledge or in the lack of availability of theopus. The more likely explanation, however, is the fact that Suarez was amember of the Society of Jesus. Whatever may have been the library re-sources available in New Orleans, and whatever may have been the edu-cational background of the author of the Manifesto, it would have beenutterly counterproductive to quote a Jesuit at a time when the two Bour-bon monarchies had just suppressed the Jesuit Order in the home coun-try and in the colonies.

The Manifesto also failed to cite a most telling line which the authormust have seen in his copy of Vattel: "The prince holds his authorityfrom the nation; he has precisely as much authority as the nation has cho-sen to confer upon him. "20 In making this statement Vattel cited a para-graph in Juan de Mariana 's study of the nature of monarchy. 21 Howevercogent and pertinent were this passage and the volume referred to byVattel, it would have been impolitic for the author of the Manifesto toplace himself in the company of the Jesuit Juan de Mariana.

Social Compact

The concept of contractual relationship between the governed andtheir ruler was a commonplace in the history of European political think-ing. This relationship constitutes a key element in the argumentation ofthe Manifesto.

"A nation, " as defined by the Manifesto, "is a society of men united to-gether to procure general advantages and security for the united multi-

19. De Legibus, III, iv, 2.20. Le Droit des gens, I, iv, 45.21. De Rege et Regis Institutione, I, v.


tude. . . . The principal effect of this association is to submit each citizento the authority of the entire body in everything that can interest thegeneral welfare. "22 But the Creoles recognized that the body politic as awhole could not govern. They accepted the traditional wisdom wherebythe whole body must delegate to a few or to one the actual exercise of thepolitical authority created by the association. "The exercise of this au-thority is remitted to the hands, either of sovereigns in monarchies, ormagistrates in republican states, without, however, the body politicceasing to be the proprietor, "

23

This last point is of great doctrinal significance; the body politic as awhole remains the ultimate proprietor of the authority which, for thesake of efficient functioning, it must entrust to an individual or to a groupto exercise.

Although the Manifesto considers a passing from a theoretical state-of-nature-without-organization to a state of political association, thisidea is expressed in broad natural-law terms. There is no allusion toJean-Jacques Rousseau, whose Contrat Social had appeared in 1762.

Law and Obligations

Like the Anglo-American Declaration of Independence that lay al-most eight years in the future, this declaration expressed a concern forinternational public opinion. The colonists, it maintained, need onlyhave petitioned Louis XV. "But since the colony considers itself to be inneed of proving in the eyes of the nations that it has committed nothingthat violates the natural law and the law of nations, . . . we have judgedthat we could succeed therein by rendering manifest the principles ofthose sacred rights upon which the inhabitants based their conduct, " 24

Law, they claimed, was the basis of their conduct. They were not vio-lating law, they were observing it. First, there is the natural law, univer-sal to all mankind of all centuries; it is the code of conduct that is rootedin the very nature of being human. Next, there is the law of nations, theaccepted code of conduct that has evolved with the common wisdom andconsent of the community of nations. The action in New Orleans is pre-sented as one more example in history of putting into practice thistwofold "law, sacred and inviolable, used even in primordial times of theuniverse, and transmitted to ours by sure tradition and uninterrupted

22. Manifesto, p. 3. Page citations refer to the pages of the French manuscript.23. Ibid.24. Ibid., 1-2. Although the Manifesto, by using and, distinguishes between "natural law"and "law of nations" (droit des gens), the two terms are practically identical in the rest ofthe document.


custom. "25 Thirdly, within any given nation a corpus of law must be leg-islated for the governance of that particular nation, with its particularpreferences; this is called the civil law.

26

The Manifesto insists upon the reciprocal obligations that bind thebody politic to its members, and the members to the body. Colonists,however far they migrate from the mother country, remain a part of thebody. Mere geographical distance does not cut the mutual bonds ofduty. And Grotius is cited in support of this provision of the law of na-tions. 27

As for the land of America, the question must be asked to whom it be-longs. To the indigenous population, it would seem. Yes, but only to theextent that the Indians occupy and till the land. Thus argues the Man-ifesto. Whatever is vacant land can be occupied by the first who come tooccupy and cultivate it. For by the natural law the earth belongs to allhumans indifferently until definite areas are occupied by peoples and in-dividuals. Hence the Europeans could and did legitimately occupy va-cant American lands. Moreover, when desired lands were occupied al-ready, the Europeans paid a purchase price to the Indians. Thus, theAmerican colonies form part of the European mother-country ' s bodypolitic; the bond exists in and through the colonists who occupied thelands rather than through the lands as such. But both settlers and landsare integral parts of the nation, with inherent relationships and consequences.28

Mutual association in forming a nation aims at the common good. Thebody as a whole, the Manifesto insists, must protect the member andprocure its well-being. By member is meant a town, a city, or a prov-ince. 29 So we see, the Manifesto avoids Hobbesian individualism orthat concept of dog-eat-dog fear that would drive citizens into a leviathanstate. Rather does the Louisiana doctrine have a broad, traditional basein medieval thought; there is a corporate sense of cooperation of indi-viduals and groups toward a common welfare. Obligations are reciprocalin the association; after incorporation there can be no one-way arbitraryact of domination-or of alienation.

"Consequently it [the political society] cannot abandon a province, acity, nor even an individual who forms part of it, unless necessity con-strains it to do so, or the strongest reasons for the public safety makes ofthe step an inevitable law. "30

25. Ibid., 1.26. Ibid., 3-4.27. Ibid., 6. Grotius, De lure Belli ac Pacis, II, 9, vii.28. Manifesto, 7-8.29. Ibid., 8.30. Ibid., 9.


Before reaching the conclusions one must draw when abandonmentdoes occur in a case of necessity and inevitability, the Manifesto discus-ses a question the reader may well have in mind: Cannot a Sovereign dis-solve the political bond? "Delicate question, " admits the Manifesto,wherein one must "not confound fact and law. "

The Manifesto, invoking Grotius, distinguishes between sovereigntyvia election and sovereignty via inheritance. "In the first case it is in-dubitable that the prince cannot alienate or dismember any of theseprovinces, for he is only the usufructuary. The right belongs to thepeople alone, and it cannot be exercised even [by them] except in someextraordinary cases without violating the pact of civil association. But inthe second case the prince can, according to his will and without the con-sent of the State-all of whose rights he unites in his person-dispose ofthose rights which he has over the said cities or provinces, providednonetheless that the fundamental laws of the Kingdom do not deprivehim of this faculty.

"3i

The Manifesto goes on to maintain that the age-old law of France hasindeed forbidden the sovereign to alienate a part of the realm. Examplesare cited, ranging from Charlemagne to Francis I. (Interestingly, whenin the twentieth century a professor of legal history in France wants toexplain the inalienability of parts of the kingdom, he uses the very samecases and treaties, indeed almost the same words as the Manifestodrafted in New Orleans in 1768.

32)

With Grotius, the Louisiana Manifesto maintains that an alienationby testament can be only a "recommendation for the people " rather thana "dismemberment done by authority. 33 Likewise, by the law of nationsand by the custom of France, a treaty cannot alienate a province from thekingdom unless the province "consent thereto, because those whounited themselves to form a state have contracted a perpetual and im-mortal society over which the sovereign presides, and which he oughtnot break without the consent of the body and of its parts. 34 We can read-ily see the power and pertinence of this ideological point: the Treaty ofFontainebleau of 1762 cannot legally have effect without ratification insome fashion by the people of Louisiana.

In the dramatic session of October 29, 1768, the Superior Council hadargued that "the King neither could nor should dismember the prov-inces of his realm unless he were forced thereto by misfortunes in bat-tle, and since the cession of Louisiana had been made freely, without

31. Ibid.32. P.C. Timbal, Histoire des institutions et des faits sociaux (Paris, 1961), 315-316.33. Manifesto, 10-11. Grotius, De lure ..., I, 3, xiii.34. Manifesto, 13. Grotius, De lure . . ., II, 6, iv.


His Majesty having been obliged to do so, the cession ought to be re-garded as having no effect." 35 This argument, Aubry reported, was gen-erally applauded at the meeting. However, he observed, " these gentle-men [of the Council] had enough moderation not to render a decree onthat subject.

"36

But, the Manifesto asked, cannot a sovereign dispose of a territoryand leave to its inhabitants the possibility of withdrawing if the newdomination displeases them? The Manifesto answered its own questionwith a resounding "Of course not." For " it is against the law of nature andof nations to expose men to the sad alternative either to recognize apower which they have not chosen for themselves or to strip themselvesof their patrimonial goods, and to leave the place that saw them born.''''Equity and law, we see, merge to prohibit such cavalier treatment of theinhabitants of a region.

Sovereignty over a province is simply not alienable, the Louisianadocument proclaimed, invoking Emmerich von Vattel. A sovereign canindeed divest himself of sovereignty over a region. What he cannot do isdeliver that sovereignty into the hands of another ruler-without theconcurrence of the city or province which is given up. The cession of themember cut off from its former body politic imposes of itself no obliga-tion on the inhabitants to accept the new master. What actually happensin such a moment of law and history in this: "The province is from thatvery moment returned to itself, and it reenters upon its natural right,whereby, without its participation, one cannot trade either its liberty orits possessions." Moreover it would be lawful to resist and defend libertyagainst imposed subjection. 38

Nor should force pretend to create or to amend law. When there isconflict over territories, the Manifesto admitted, "it is the fate of armieswhich settles such questions. " However, "although the sword can si-lence the law of nations on this point, the law, although silent, is none-theless unchangeable and imprescriptible. "39 This is implicitly admittedwhen there is a change of regime. It is precisely to resolve the ques-tion of right that new masters always call upon new subjects to take theoath of fidelity. If cessions and conquests were binding of themselves,the Manifesto reasoned, it would be idle and superfluous to call forththis personal pledge of the inhabitants.

4o

35. Aubrey to Minister, Dec. 24, 1768, Paris, Archives des Colonies, C 13 A 48, f. 40.36. Ibid.37. Manifesto, 14.38. Ibid., 16.39. Ibid., 17.40. Ibid.


"From all these principles and examples it follows incontrovertiblythat the enterprise formed by the citizens of Louisiana and carried outlast October 29 and the days following in order to withdraw themselvesfrom a foreign domination was on every count praiseworthy and legiti-mate. . . . Returned to its natural right and liberty by the abandonmentwhich its sovereign was making, the colony was without contradictionmistress [of herself] to accept or to refuse the law which a foreign poweroffered her. "

41

The colonists were temperate and moderate as they considered theright, duties and needs of their new situation. "A respectful deferencemade them show all possible respect toward the officers of a prince ofBourbon blood. " By the law of nature and of nations they had the right toparticipate in molding the pact of submission. They sought merely theirnormal self-preservation in conserving their legal and commercial exis-tence. What spoiled the healthy evolution of a process? The Spanishenvoy "gave the name of crime to requests which the law authorized. "

Even then the colonists exercised patience and restraint because their"hearts were imbued with respect for the sovereign who had sent him. "

"Only the imminent danger of certain ruin did not permit the continuingof the policy of circumspection. "42'

Sovereignty is indivisible, the Manifesto insisted. Since the magis-trates of Louis XV were still in authority, Antonio de Ulloa was merely aprivate citizen. Only when "his maneuvers " became "pernicious for thecommon good" and "tended toward the total ruin of the colony " did theroyal Conseil Superieur require his departure. During his sojourn Ulloanever acquired any authority beyond that of a private citizen; yet he didperform some acts offensive to the Superior Council, in which was vest-ed "the royal prerogative [which] is inalienable, immutable, impre-scriptible."

43

Background: The Parlement of Paris

To understand the reasoning and the assumptions contained in theManifesto, one should recall the role of the parlement in the eighteenth-century royal government of France, for the Manifesto's "Louisiana doc-trine " reached out from the natural law to include positive law and praxisconcerning the royal tribunals (parlements).

The judges of France saw themselves as sharers in the royal authority;

41. Ibid., 17-18.42. Ibid., 18-19.43. Ibid., 19.


it was at times their duty to protect the royal authority against ill-adviseddecisions. In such cases, by refusing to register a royal act or by present-ing aremontrance theparlement claimed to shore up rather than under-mine royal authority. In this context the Superior Council judged thatno official could enter upon his functions in the colony without registryof his commission; moreover, every official had to receive with defer-ence any remontrance presented to him by the guardian of law, the Con-seil Superieur.

Sovereignty, one and indivisible, had remained French in Louisianaand was vested in the Conseil Superieur. The Manifesto argued that thiswas evident not only by the absence of any legal ceremony or documentbut also by the presence of the French flag that still flew over Louisiana'smilitia, ships and public squares. 44 Whatever happened to Ulloa hap-pened to a private citizen, to one who, according to the Superior Coun-cil, chose to remain a private citizen. 45

Just as the parlement in Paris took official notice of and registeredroyal acts, and just as this registry was a sine qua non condition of valid-ity, so the Conseil Superieur in New Orleans was the king's agency forregistry. For an appointment to an office to be valid, it had to be regis-tered. As the councillors insisted in their report to the French monarchyon the events of October of 1768, "Ulloa refused constantly to have him-self recognized and received in the legal form, without which all author-ity can be disregarded. " Whatever occurred without registry would beoutside of the law; there could be no authentically authoritative act. If anofficer were to give an order prior to registry, his order would be null.Hence, the Council argued, Ulloa acted in the manner not of governorbut usurper; indeed "he gradually lifted himself up to be an absolutedespot."

46

In France one could appeal to the parlement, the courts of law, for aninjunction against an official action by claiming that it was an abuse orthat it contravened established royal law and custom. The SuperiorCouncil, made in the image of the parlement, judged that it had thepower to suspend illegal orders. When Ulloa required ship captainsupon arrival in Louisiana to submit a cargo list and a selling price, theorder was given in the form of an ordonnance signed by Aubry and datedSeptember 7, 1766, two full years before the fateful uprising. The shipcaptains and the merchants appealed to the Conseil Superieur to sus-pend the ordonnance because " it was contrary to the usages and liberties

44. Ibid., 20.45. Ibid.46. 12/22 Nov., 1768, Paris, Archives des Colonies, C 13 A 48, f.196.


of commerce. " In the name of law, the merchants appealed against thisparticular law. "The merchants as a body ... know enough about law,and are too submissive to it, not to judge that it is their right to call uponyour [the Council ' s] authority and to lodge an appeal against [this] or-donnance. "47 The colonists maintained in 1766 that their reactionagainst the order given by Ulloa through Aubry was fully in accord withFrench legal procedure.

Later, when the leaders of the revolt of 1768 were brought to trial byGovernor Alejandro O 'Reilly, Pierre Carresses, one of the accused,similarly invoked French law: "The path of representation to the Coun-cil has in all times been open to all groups in the colony. This practicewas never forbidden. " To make a crime out of signing such a petition," the Government or the Council would have to have rendered an ordi-nance which forbade representations. "48

During the trial of the conspirators, the accused likewise harpedupon Ulloa ' s non-official status as long as the French regime remained inplace. Carresses equivalently called O 'Reilly as a witness for the de-fense: "The pomp and majesty with which Your Excellency surroundedthose two ceremonies [of possession-taking] proves that the colony re-mained French up until those two moments.

"49

Also in the trial of 1769 Nicolas Chauvin La Freniere, the former at-torney general of French colonial Louisiana, no longer prosecutor butrather one of the accused, argued in his self-defense that "Legal author-ity is always clear and recognized. Men ought to have known theirSuperiors and the laws they were subject to for them to be liable to bepunished for disobedience. . . . Authority, laws and ordinances are madeknown by solemn and public acts. Monsieur Ulloa did not wish to followthese sacred principles.

"5o

Conclusion of the Manifesto

Regardless of the philosophical and legal arguments, the revolu-tionaries-within-the-law were decidedly apprehensive in the monthsthat followed the expulsion of Ulloa. They feared that their brethren inFrance would let them be cut off from the body politic; they even fearedthat perhaps soldiers in French uniforms would assist in the cutting.Passing from the realm of ideas and of laws, the Manifesto made an emo-

47. Requetes, Sept: 8 and 10, 1766, Paris, Archives des Colonies, C 13 A 48, ff.213-217v.48. Carresses to O ' Reilly, Oct. 13, 1769, Madrid, Archivo Historico Nacional, Consejo deIndias, 20.854, f. 433v-434.49. Ibid., f. 435.50. "Memoire justificatif, " Archivo Historico Nacional, Consejo de Indias, 20.854, f. 420.


tional appeal: Loyalty to the body requires that every citizen be ready tomake sacrifices for the common cause. If ever-sad thought to think!-acitizen were not ready to suffer for the common good, at least that citizenmust never stoop so low as to pass over to the enemy. There is no basercrime than betrayal of one's own people.

Given the plight of the common welfare, each Louisianian was boundby the law of nature to rally to the common cause. To hold back-not tosupport the Superior Council 's action-would be cowardly and im-moral. Worse still would it be to aid any who tried to impose an alien lawwithout the free acceptance of the people.

51

In an earlier passage the Manifesto had exalted patriotic feeling forFrance; like their ancestors the colonists wished to live and die underFrance 's royal banner. So we should not be surprised to see that thedocument '

s finale is not a declaration of independence. Rather is it animpassioned plea to be retained as loyal subjects of Louis the Well Be-loved. Louisiana "given over to herself and returned by the cession toher natural liberty . . . had the right of choosing a master for herself, butdid not grasp this right except to do homage to her true sovereign andcall again for his rule. "52 Self-determination with government only byconsent of the governed, yes. Separation with independence, no.

The doctrine of government-by-consent-of-the-governed had beenclearly enunciated but in vain. What the Louisianians could not obtainwas government-by-consent-of-the-governing. For France firmly re-fused to continue governing Louisiana. As a result, the theorists and ac-tivists who had led the resistance had to suffer the consequences. Whowere they?

Leading Participants in the Revolution

The participants in the events of October 1768 acted as a group. Theyseem to have had no one individual leader. In the trial of the leaderswhich followed the arrival of O 'Reilly, the Spanish prosecutor Felix delRey accused each one of specific actions with relative degrees of culpa-bility, but all were charged as co-conspirators.

The leading participants were:53

Pierre Caresses, a native of Bellocq, France, forty-two years of age in1768, merchant of New Orleans. (When a participant is listed as mer-

51. Manifesto, 27-29.52. Ibid., 29.53. The names are given in alphabetical order and according to the spelling used by eachindividual in his signature as found in the trial records. Archivo Hist6rico Nacional, Con-sejo de Indias, 20.854, if. 308-355v.


chant, the term is to be read in the sense of "one who bought and soldgoods he imported and exported. ")

Nicolas Chauvin La Freniere, a native of Louisiana, forty years of agein 1768, royal procureur general (attorney general.)

Julien-Jerome Doucet, a native of Paris, twenty-eight years old in1768, New Orleans merchant and attorney.

Pierre Hardy de Boisblanc, native of Taillebourg (Saintonge),France, forty-five years of age in 1768, planter.

Pierre Marquis, forty-eight years of age in 1768, native of Neuchatel,Switzerland, but a longtime resident of Louisiana, retired military of-ficer.

Balthazar de Masan, a French-born retired military officer, who hadcome to Louisiana in 1736, 53 years of age in 1768, a wealthy merchant ofNew Orleans.

54

Jean and Joseph Milhet, brothers from Bayonne, France, respec-tively forty-three and thirty-three years of age in 1768, merchants ofNew Orleans.

Jean Baptiste Noyan, a native of New Orleans, thirty years of age in1768, a planter, Noyan was a great-nephew of Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne,Sieur de Bienville, a co-founder of the Louisiana colony.

Joseph Petit, native of Foncin (Guienne), France, 52 years of age in1768, a merchant, resident in New Orleans.

Pierre Poupet, from La Rochelle, France, was in 1768 a thirty-seven-year-old New Orleans merchant.

Author of the Memoire

Felix del Rey, the Spanish prosecutor, in his case against Doucet, waswilling to yield somewhat on one or two counts, but on one charge heheld firm, namely that Doucet was the principal author of the printedMemoire... 55

Invoking the law which prescribed capital punishment for authorshipof "notorious pamphlets directed principally against the Prince oragainst the State, " the prosecutor called for the death penalty againstDoucet.56 Del Rey argued against Doucet' s defense wherein the ac-cused-responded that others had written the more offensive clauses, forthis pretext did not exonerate Doucet who had produced a documentwhose aim was to justify the uprising. In passing, Del Rey expresseddoubt that the defense was veracious, but, if so, wondered aloud who

54. Villiers du Terrage, Dernieres annees ... , 286n.55. Testimonio, Archivo General de Indias, Papeles de Cuba, 171A, f. 296v.56. Ibid., £ 297.


was the author of the more offensive passages."Doucet testified that Bienville was the person who "principally" as-

sisted him in perfecting the draft of the Memoire. ( Doucet was referringto Ensign Louis Rolland Payen de Noyan, chevalier de Bienville, great-nephew of the co-founder of Louisiana colony). It was young Bienville,moreover, who pressed for the printing of the document; so testified theprinter.

58The fact that Chevalier de Bienville was safely outside of

Louisiana in the service of the French navy need not cast doubt on theveracity of this testimony as if it were concocted padding; his personcould not be touched, but his property could be seized-and was.

Other testimony affirms that there were several who gave a hand tothe composition of the Memoire, and that Hardy de Boisblanc stood outamong them.

59

Author of the Manifesto

In the examination of Pierre Marquis, when Prosecutor Felix del Reyasked whether the accused had tried to bring the Conseil to discuss set-ting up a republic, Marquis responded in the negative. Since, though,others must have mentioned his name in connection with repub-licanism, the Swiss ably defended himself by saying that he had onlymentioned the idea in his home during a private conversation with twoor three friends who were of the opinion that both France and Spainwould abandon Louisiana.

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Marquis parried other perilous questions of Del Rey, but was obligedto acknowledge as his a letter to Doucet of July 2, 1769, wherein hestated that he was sending a Manifesto. Marquis further had to acknowl-edge "that the manifesto referred to was a justification of what had beendone by the Conseil and the inhabitants. " 61

In so far as documentary evidence goes, one can conclude that thismanifesto of Pierre Marquis is the one we are now studying. It is, wesee, called manifesto and is distinguished from the Memoire. It is pre-cisely a justification of what had been done by the Conseil and the col-onists. It is referred to as a specific document, and not bunched with"other writings, " an expression Del Rey uses elsewhere.

There are internal features in the Manifesto which point to Marquisas the author.

57. Ibid., 297v.58. Ibid., 315v-316v.59. "Diario de Ios sucesos de la Luisiana, " in Serrano y Sanz, Documentos ..., 283.60. Testimonio, Archivo General de Indias, Papeles de Cuba, 171A, f. 65v.61. Ibid., f. 66v.


1)Political philosophers cited are from Holland, Germany and Swit-zerland, rather than from France.

2) Although, of course, historical examples are chosen from the his-tory of France concerning the rights and duties of the French king andpeople, an almost equal number of events are chosen from Swiss history.

3) The Manifesto is attentive to "republican states, " whereas mostEuropeans and European colonists thought constantly in terms ofmonarchies.

Just as Doucet' s Memoire certainly contained contributions ofothers, so Marquis ' s probably incorporated others ' observations. Basi-cally, though, this Manifesto is to be attributed to the Swiss participantin the uprising. From the date of Marquis 's above-mentioned letter toDoucet-July 2, 1769-we see that he had had about eight months toread, discuss, and reflect upon sources and ideas.

Marquis had left Europe many years earlier and in Louisiana had ledthe life of officer and then merchant. The colony was not bereft of books,but neither was scholarly reading in vogue. Given the agitation of themonths that followed October 29, 1768, Marquis did well, it must be ac-knowledged, in composing a presentable apologia based on philosophy,law and history. As amanuensis of the people, he had proceeded from hispremises of "government by consent of the governed" to a conclusionwhich proposed not a Swiss-style republic (which he might ideally haveoffered) but rather a loyal adherence to the French monarchy, a monar-chy which he had in fact long and faithfully served.

Marquis presented the Louisianians ' rights in the vocabulary of con-crete feudal contracts under the higher abstract natural law; his Man-ifesto concretized basic human rights. In choosing his conservativephraseology, he could hope for a hearing where republicanism wouldhave been rejected outright.

Villiers du Terrage hails Marquis as the first in America to attempt toestablish an independent republic. 62' He was perhaps the first, but hisattempt was measured and restrained. Only a full seven years laterwould the Anglo-Americans on the Atlantic Coast set up their republic.In Spanish America, as stated above, the republican movements camestill later.

Role of La Freniere

It was Nicolas Chauvin La Freniere, royal attorney general, who pre-sented to the Conseil Superieur the legal requete (petition for action)

62. Marc de Villiers du Terrage. Les Dernieres annees de la Louisiane &ngaise (Paris,1903), 284n. It is not clear whether the unprinted Manifesto referred to by Juan Jose deLoyola in his letter to A.M. Bucareli, July 4, 1769, is the same as Marquis ' s. AGI, Cuba1054, " Sublevacion de 1768."


which elicited the Ordonnance (decree) of October 29, 1768, and was in-corporated within it. Aubrey branded him as one of those who most con-tributed to the revolution. Yet, interestingly, Aubrey stated that it wasnot clear who precisely was the author of the "audacious " requete; its au-thorship, he reported to Versailles, was generally "attributed to the pro-cureur general [Chauvin La Freniere] and to seven or eight merchants,factious and bankrupt. "63 The briefly put central argument of the re-quete is that the Conseil has the legal competence to act, since like aparlement it is the depository where legislation and legal acts must beregistered.

The basis of Aubrey 's indignation against La Freniere was the pre-mise that above all others the procureurgeneial should have upheld le -

gality; in Aubrey's view the king ' s attorney failed in this solemn duty. Itwould have strengthened Aubrey ' s accusation to maintain that La Fre-niere was the author of the requete-as normally a procureur would be;the evidence, then, is all the stronger that the requete was not the crea-tion of La Freniere alone. The procureur 's requete must be seen as theproduct of collective deliberation wherein, prior to the public session,the participants decided exactly what the conseil would approve. Then,on October 29, 1768, that is precisely what it did approve.

To limit the authorship of La Freniere to that of being partial creatorof the official proceedings of the conseil superieur does not relegate himto a minor role. For one of O ' Reilly ' s basic questions was "Who was re-sponsible for the arres t or odonnance?"64 On the basis of the role heplayed, as documented by testimony, La Freniere was condemned todeath, one of the six leaders sentenced to capital punishment.

In the trial proceedings of 1769 La Freniere swore that he had notread the published Memoire until eight days after it was printed.

65

While one might argue that he was saying this simply to save his life, hisstatement must stand until contrary evidence appears. Similarly, it isimprobable that he had any role in the composition of the Manifesto,concerning which he was not even questioned during his trial.

Why Hitherto Undiscovered

Given the deep significance of the Manifesto and its ideas, how is itpossible that it has not merited attention from previous authors? For ex-ample, Baron Marc de Villiers du Terrage examined the events of 1768in his 1903 study entitled Les Dernieres annees de la Louisiane Fran-gaise. In 1942 Vicente Rodriguez Casado published his Los Primeros

63. Aubrey to Minister, Dec. 24, 1768, Archives des Colonies, C 13 A 48, f. 38.64. O ' Reilly to Aubrey, Aug. 19, 1769, Archives des Colonies, C 13 A 49, 11..29-30.65. "Memoire justificatif, " AHN, Consejo de Indias, 20.854, f. 421v.


aiios de dominacidn espaiiola en la Luisiana ( Madrid, Consejo Superiorde Investigaciones Cientificas), in which he responded to Villier du Ter-rage's negative assessment of Ulloa and the Spanish handling ofLouisiana. How did they miss finding the Manifesto?

Villiers du Terrage relied principally upon French archival sources.His material and his quotations show evidence of extensive work in thecolonial archives of Paris.

It was precisely in drawing upon the abundant Spanish archives thatRodriguez Casado was able to present the Louisiana transition of 1766-1769 in a totally different light. Concerning the revolution itself Rod-riguez Casado drew principally upon the ample documentation in theArchivo Histerico Nacional of Madrid. Indeed one-fifth of his opus-pp.379-482 consists of transcriptions from parts of the official trial recordsfound in Consejo de Indias, legajo 20.854. With such an overwhelmingamount of material at hand, Rodriguez Casado, had no need to seekfurther documentation for his volume. He seems not to have drawnupon the Archivo General de Indias in Seville.

In summary, although one could read in the bulky transcripts of the1769 trials that there had been an audacious Manifesto composed byMarquis, that document itself lay among other papers in other archivesin another city.

Significance of the Manifesto

Historians need to reconsider the hand-me-down presentations ofthe Louisiana Revolution of 1768. One can no longer affirm that the par-ticipants lacked doctrine-or doctrines. Nor affirm that Louisianianswere ideologically unprepared for self-government in 1768.

One must neither dismiss nor exaggerate the Louisianians' knowl-edge of self-government. Nor should one exaggerate or dismiss the sig-nificance of their actions and their role in North America. In contrastwith the population of the Thirteen Colonies, they were few. At the endof the French regime the colonists in the Mississippi Valley numberedless than 7,000, less than half of whom had been born in the colony. TheAnglo-American colonies, on the other hand, had two and a quarter mil-lion inhabitants at the time of the Louisiana revolt of 1768.

66

The Louisianians, with few exceptions, did not see independence as aviable alternative, for they could not sustain independence even if theyhad sought and obtained it. So no one would naively claim that the revoltof 1768 became the inspiration of the subsequent Anglo-American and

66. Evarts B. Greene and Virginia D. Harrington, American Population Before the Fed-eral Census of 1790 (New York, 1932), 8.


Spanish-American revolutions that led to independence. The signifi-cance of the Manifesto lies rather in its showing that Louisiana partici-pated in a political-intellectual tradition that spread over centuries andcontinents.

As the Manifesto shows, there were colonial Louisianians who under-stood the philosophy of popular sovereignty. They sustained the ideathat government required the consent of the governed in the basicsense, not in the sense of periodic elections. They had a fair acquain-tance with authors who provided a theoretical justification of their prac-tical actions. The fact that they were unsuccessful in obtaining their im-mediate goals does not mean that they were politically uninformed or in-competent. The Manifesto testifies to their knowledge and sophistica-tion. Historians of Louisiana will have to drop the oft repeated legendconcerning their political naivete. For, as a matter of fact, 1768 cameeight years before 1776.

CHARLES EDWARDS O ' NEILL

Documents

The Louisiana Manifesto of 1768