The Making of “World-Class” Delhi: Relations Between Street Hawkers and the New Middle Class

The Making of “World-Class” Delhi:Relations Between Street Hawkers

and the New Middle Class

Seth SchindlerInstitut für Asien- und Afrikawissenschaften, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany;

[email protected]

Abstract: Urban India is undergoing transformation as formal electoral politics increas-ingly favors the new middle class. Scholarship tends to compartmentalize the politics ofthe new middle class and the poor, and this article focuses on inter-class relations. Byfocusing on relations between street hawkers and the newmiddle class in Delhi, I show thatrather than engaging in zero-sum conflicts over urban space, conflict is typically over theterms of its use. The analysis shows that these classes are interdependent; the poor dependon the new middle class for their livelihoods, and the lifestyles of new middle class areenabled by services provided by the poor. While the poor enable and participate in Delhi’stransformation into a so-called “world-class” city, the reconciliation of competing visions ofurbanization—one geared toward social reproduction and the other subsistence—is what isat stake in contemporary inter-class relations.

Keywords: Delhi, India, new middle class, informal service sector, urban governance

IntroductionThe transformation of Indian metropolises in recent years has been the subject ofmuch scholarly research. This “urban turn” (Prakash 2002; Rao 2006) has typicallycast urban transformation as part of broader changes in India’s political economysince economic reforms were launched in earnest in the early 1990s. India’s “new”

political economy is characterized by an alliance between bureaucratic and businesselites whose overriding objective is the pursuit of economic growth (Kohli 2012),and Corbridge and Harriss (2000) have argued that this growth coalition representsan “elite revolt” because it rejects social-oriented goals such as poverty reduction.The urban-based “new” middle class that has emerged as a result of economicreforms provides support for growth-oriented policies, and has embraced a vision oftransforming metropolises into so-called “world-class” cities (Chatterjee 2004;Fernandes 2006; Ghertner 2011a; Srivastava 2009).The new middle class is increasingly politically assertive, and on the one hand it

remains skeptical of the government (Chatterjee 2008) while on the other hand itsassociations enjoy privileged access to government officials (Ellis 2012; Ghertner2011a; Ranganathan 2012). The political empowerment of the new middle classhas come at the expense of the poor’s political influence, whose participation informal politics is often dismissed by critics as “vote bank politics” (Benjamin 2008).The restructuring of local political systems in ways that minimize the urban poor’saccess to formal political machinery is what Gidwani and Reddy (2011:1640) refer

Antipode Vol. 00 No. 0 2013 ISSN 0066-4812, pp 1–17 doi: 10.1111/anti.12054© 2013 The Author. Antipode © 2013 Antipode Foundation Ltd.

to as a “post-development social formation”. They argue that the nature of state-poorinteractions has become “fitful, contractual and individualized” (1640). These trendsconverge in the metropolis, the transformation of which is a manifestation of India’snew political economy and the restructuring of state–society relations.Scholarship on urbanization in India tends to overlook the changingnature of urban

poverty in India, as the poor in many cities are increasingly turning to the informalservice sector (ISS) for their livelihoods. The Delhi government is committed to facili-tating the growth of the service sector, which has become the “backbone” of the localeconomy, and it is predominantly informal (GNCTD2005;Ministry of UrbanDevelop-ment 2006). The ISS includes street hawkers, wastepickers, drivers, domestic servants,gardeners, cycle rickshaw pullers, clothes washers, etc. Its growth can be attributed tothe closure of so-called hazardous industries—ie factories, both formal and informal,that were in violation of the city’s master plan—whose laborers were “pushed” intothe ISS. Alternatively, demand for services from the new middle class has “pulled”the poor into the ISS. In the context of India’s post-reform political economy andpost-development social formation, the new middle class and urban poor aredrawn together in ways that render them interdependent—their interaction allowsthe new middle class to practice particular lifestyles, while the urban poor are ableto secure livelihoods.I introduce empirical evidence fromDelhi, and I explore how street hawkers interact

with associations of the newmiddle class, a resident welfare association and a markettraders’ association, respectively. Existing research on street hawkers in the globalSouth focuses on how they form associations in order to exert control over urbanspace and mitigate the risk of eviction (Crossa 2009; Lindell 2008; Lyon 2003;Swanson 2007). Much of this literature focuses on how hawkers’ associations eitherconfront or evade municipal authorities. Furthermore, a significant amount ofscholarly literature has highlighted the anti-poor attitude of India’s new middle class,but the actual relationship between the newmiddle class and the urban poor is oftenoverlooked in favor of examining their respective interactions with the state. By focus-ing on the relationship between street hawkers and the newmiddle class, I challengethe notion that their relationship is inherently fraught with antagonism. This researchshows that zero-sum conflicts over space are rare, and instead low-intensity strugglesunfoldwithin space over the terms of its use. Then associations of the newmiddle classdo not seek to exclude street hawkers from their environs entirely, but rather they seekto regulate the poor’s access to space and their circulation. Thus, street hawkers gainaccess to urban space—albeit on restrictive terms—through their relations with associ-ations of themiddle class, and in this way they are able to influence ongoing processesof urban transformation and participate in the making of the “world-class” city. Thesefindings are consistentwith a growing body of scholarly literature that focuses on howvisions of urbanization are shaped through interactions (Martin 2003; Pierce, Martinand Murphy 2010; Simone 2001; Watson 2009), and I demonstrate that this processis more than simply coming to terms over differences of opinion regarding whatconstitutes a desirable urban environment. Instead, urban transformation is shapedand constrained as the symbolic needs of the new middle class are reconciled withthe material needs of the urban poor. The former requires the production of“world-class” space within which its members can display particular behavioral

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patterns that serve as the basis of class membership, while the latter require access tothe same space in order to earn livelihoods.In the following section I review scholarship on the politics of India’s new middle

class and urban poor, in the context of the post-reform political economy and thereworking of state–society relations. In the third section I situate street hawking withinthe cityscape of Indian metropolises and present two case studies in which associa-tions of the new middle class interact with hawkers. Finally, I elaborate on how theserelations impact the transformation of urban space.

The Compartmentalized Politics of India’s New MiddleClass and Urban PoorThere is a general consensus that a newmiddle class emerged in India after economicreforms began in earnest in 1991 (Baviskar and Ray 2011; Brosius 2010; Fernandes2006; Gupta 2000; Varma 1998). According to Fernandes (2011:69) “its newnessrefers to a process of production of a distinctive social and political identity thatrepresents and lays claim to the benefits of liberalization”. By capturing the economicbenefits of liberalization, the new middle class has been able to develop a new socialand political identity, which is, according to Varma (1998; see Fernandes 2006), basedon securing access to exclusive spaces within which its members practice massconsumption and self-indulgent lifestyles. Scholarly literature on the politics of thenewmiddle class indicates that its acts as a class-for-itself as it seeks to transform urbanspace in ways that naturalize its class position and allow for the practice of class-defining lifestyles, but this literature overwhelmingly focuses on how it engages thestate (Baud and Nainan 2008; Benjamin 2008; Ellis 2012; Ghertner 2011a). Scholarshave shown that in conflicts related to the occupation of land, the new middle classtypically takes legal action to force municipal authorities to evict squatters and demol-ish their dwellings, rather than engage the poor directly (Bhan 2009; Ghertner 2011b;Padhi 2007). Alternatively, scholarly literature on the politics of the urban poor hasfocused on how marginalized populations strategically engage the state in order tosecure entitlements (Appadurai 2002; Chatterjee 2004; Gupta 2012). By focusing ontheir respective engagements with the state, much of this literature compartmentalizesthe politics of the newmiddle class and the poor, and overlooks their direct interaction.The state has loomed large over the study of Indian politics and society, and it is

largely portrayed as encompassing the terrain within which politics is practiced.Kaviraj (2010) argues that planners and politicians in the post-independence erapresupposed an inherent plasticity of Indian society, and the state was viewed asthe main agent of social change. As a result, rather than confront each other directly,classes in India commonly sought to gain power within the state, control stateresources or make political claims against the state (see Bardhan 1984). Rudolphand Rudolph (1987:23) argue that the Nehruvian state was a “third actor”, whosedomination of “industrial and finance capital as well as employment in the organizedeconomy” served to mediate the relationship between capital and labor.India’s brief suspension of civil liberties between 1975 and 1977 ended with

elections that paved the way for popular politics to invigorate Indian electoral politics(Chatterjee 2004:49). Although organized labor never recovered after the Emergency

The Making of “World-Class” Delhi 3


(Rajagopal 2011), claimsmade against the state from a host of identity groups steadilyincreased and eventually skyrocketed in the 1990s (Menon and Nigam 2008 [2007]).There was a backlash against this “democratic upsurge” (Kaviraj 2010:34) thatCorbridge and Harriss (2000:120) term an “elite revolt”. This revolt constitutes afundamental re-working of state–society relations based on a “legitimation of violencearound the processes of accumulation and regulation” (Corbridge and Harriss2000:161) and the emergence of an urban-oriented political economy that favorselites and the new middle class (Kohli 2012: 41–60).Gidwani and Reddy (2011) refer to these emergent state–society relations as a

“post-development social formation” and the socio-spatial consequences of thisregime are evident in cities as governments at all levels have enthusiastically endorsedurban transformation. A discourse of creating “world-class” cities informs urbanrenewal initiatives (Dupont 2011; Banerjee-Guha 2010; I Chatterjee 2011). The defini-tion of world class is subjective because it operates according to a logic of aestheticismrather than calculable zoning laws (Ghertner 2011c), and it informs policy documentssuch as the most recent master plan (Delhi Development Authority 2009). The world-class city discourse is manifested in urban renewal projects and beautification drives inthe form of parks, shopping malls, sports stadia and mega-projects (Dupont 2011;Baviskar 2011; Siemiatycki 2006; Taguchi 2013; Voyce 2007).The new middle class has embraced this image of an orderly “world-class” post-

industrial city, and has supported the creation of secure aesthetic spaces of controlledmass consumption and leisure (Chatterjee 2004; Fernandes 2006; Srivastava 2009).The Municipal Corporation of Delhi has encouraged associational politics of thenewmiddle class by creating a platform called Bhagidariwhere resident welfare asso-ciations engage directly with municipal authorities (Srivastava 2009). Ghertner(2011a) shows how Bhagidari serves as an institutional arena in which residents canidentify localized “nuisances” (ie the encroachment of a particular stretch of sidewalkor park by the poor) which require municipal-led “development” interventions (seeGhertner 2011b). This exclusive institutional linkage between government officialsand associations of the newmiddle class takes place at the expense of the urban poor’sparticipation in formal politics (see Ellis 2012; Ghertner 2011a; Ranganathan 2012).India’s urban poor have historically participated in a variety of political spheres and

engaged with a diverse range of state and non-state actors in order to secure theconditions of survival. Elites derisively refer to the participation of the urban poor inelectoral politics as “vote bank politics” (Benjamin 2000, 2008), and this may explainthe drive to gentrify the state. In contrast to formal politics that unfold in a clearlydemarcated and institutionalized civil society, the urban poor frequently participatein unruly and spontaneous popular politics that “outstrips or overflows the formalinstitutions of the political process” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:252). Indeed,Chakrabarty (2007:52) argues that popular forms of protest and the staging of eventssuch as the “gherao-ing” of government officials, is “the very stuff of politics itself” incontemporary India. Chatterjee (2004:41, 2008, 2011) terms this terrain “politicalsociety”, ie the sphere of actually existing “democratic politics as it takes place onthe ground in India”. He argues that in contrast to civil society in which rights-bearingcitizens participate in formal politics through associations, in political society popula-tion groups seek entitlements based on their shared legally defined status, which they

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invest with “moral attributes as a community” (2004:59). For example, in order tosecure access to a range of urban amenities and services—ie healthcare, subsidizedfood, education for their children—the poor must engage with an array of govern-ment departments, andmay seek the support of sympathetic NGOs or the patronageof vote-seeking politicians (Harriss 2008 [2006]; Jha, Rao and Woolcock 2007).This conceptualization of a clear distinction between the politics of the newmiddle

class that takes place in civil society and the politics of the urban poor in political soci-ety undoubtedly reflects the everyday reality in which people evolve unique strategiesfor making political claims structured by their differentiated subjectivities, resourcesand access to formal political machinery. However, by compartmentalizing thesedifferent spheres of politics, instances in which they intersect and classes confrontone another directly could be overlooked. This is an important line of inquiry becauseinteractions between the newmiddle class and the urban poor are intensifying for tworeasons. First, one consequence of the ongoing gentrification of the state in the post-development social formation is that issues which would have previously been medi-ated by the state are increasingly bringing classes into direct contact. Contestationsover the use of urban space in the context of rapid urban transformation commonlyoverflow the mechanisms established by the state to contain conflict (eg appellatecourts that deal exclusively with squatters and vendors), and involve multiple classes(see Anjaria 2011; Harriss 2008 [2006]). Second, in Delhi the poor are increasinglyturning to the informal service sector (ISS) for their livelihoods and either sell theirlabor directly to members of the new middle class (eg personal drivers, domesticservants, nannies, security guards, gardeners, cycle rickshaw pullers, dhobis, etc.), orare self-employed but depend on the consumption of the newmiddle class (eg streethawkers and wastepickers). Enterprises in the ISS are typically labor intensive, operateon small margins and are characterized by low productivity. It is difficult to quantifythe size of the ISS in Delhi, but according to a report released by the Government ofDelhi, the “service sector is the backbone of Delhi’s economy”, and while it providesemployment to 54% of the workforce it is predominantly informal (GNCTD2005:1). A comprehensive definition of the ISS is elusive—in the Delhi government’s2005 survey the largest sub-sector of the informal service sector (23) is “other commu-nity, social and personal services”, which includes shoe shiners, clothes washers andwastepickers, but inexplicably excludes “individuals serving as housemaids, cooks,gardeners, governesses, babysitters, chowkidars, night watchmen, etc.” (20). Never-theless, the survey highlighted significant trends. First, 80% of ISS enterprises wereclassified as “own account enterprises”, which are runwithout hired labor (13). Theseenterprises operatewith few assets (47), and amore recent survey by theGovernmentof the National Capital Territory of Delhi found that only 5.67% of these enterprisesconsider “shortage of capital” a serious problem (GNCTD 2010:61). This is mostlikely because ISS enterprises lack productive outlets for capital, and instead themost important means of production for ISS workers is urban space which mustbe in proximity to their clientele (ie the new middle class). In contrast to theproduction of goods in the informal sector which is commonly home based(Sanyal and Bhattacharyya 2009), this recent survey found that 79% of ISS enter-prises operate outside of workers’ homes, and 14% lack a fixed location and aremobile (GNCTD 2010:9).



Delhi’s ISS grew as manual laborers were “pushed” into the informal service sectorafter a series of closures of informal workshops rendered them unemployed (Negi2011), and rural migrants were “pulled” by increasing demand from new middleclass (Ministry of Urban Development 2006). India’s Planning Commission formedthe Special Group on Targeting Ten Million Employment Opportunities Per Year in2002, and the group highlighted the inability of the formal sector to absorb the urbanpoor as wage laborers. It stated that “even if the organised sector grows at 20 % perannum and the private sector at 30 % per annum, their contribution to totalemployment will increase hardly by 1.5 to 2 % of the total over the Tenth Plan”(Government of India 2002:4). Thus, it is clear that the ISS is growing and increasinglycoming into contact with the new middle class. Fernandes’ (2004:2424) assertionthat the new middle class practices a “politics of forgetting of the poor and workingclasses” may be true when it comes to the laboring poor engaged in small-scaleproduction or factory work, but the poor laboring in the ISS are “unforgettable”because they are ever-present, and by providing cheap services they enable the life-styles of the new middle class (see Qayum and Ray 2011:260–261). While there is aconsensus that the attitude of new middle class is anti-poor (Fernandes 2006; Gupta2000; Varma 1998), and that the newmiddle class uses its disproportionate influencewith local officials to foster anti-poor urban renewal projects (Bhan 2009; Ghertner2011a; Padhi 2007; Srivastava 2009), there is less research on how the new middleclass and the urban poor negotiate their relationship on an everyday basis. In oneextreme example of intra-class violence that made headlines, residents of a poshcolony beat a poor young man to death for defecating in a public park that waspopular among residents of the colony (Baviskar 2003; Kishwar 2006). Extremeviolence of this sort seems to be an exception, however, as the newmiddle class seeksto regulate its interactions with the poor, rather than segregate itself completely fromthe poor. Qayum and Ray (2011:253) show that the newmiddle class seeks to engen-der a “social order where classes interact in specific ways and in specific places”(Qayum and Ray 2011:253), but imposing this socio-spatial order poses challengeseven in their own homes (253) and in elite residential colonies (Waldrop 2004). Inthe next section I seek to contribute to this literature by focusing on the interactionsbetween middle class associations and street hawkers.

Regulating the “Hawker Menace” in theWorld-Class CityThe importance of street hawkers in the day-to-day circulation of basic goods in Delhicannot be overstated. In spite of the expansion of organized retail outlets such asgrocery stores and shopping malls, retail in India is still more than 90% informal(Joseph et al. 2008). The resilience of street hawkers can be attributed to the fact thatthey are able to compete with organized retailers in terms of convenience, price andquality (on some items) (Minten, Reardon and Sutradhar 2010). While street hawkersmay be able to compete against their formal-sector rivals, Rajagopal (2001:94) showsthat according to Mumbai’s middle class, street hawkers are “a symbol of metro-politan space gone out of control”. Much existing scholarship has described therelationship between street hawkers and the new middle class as “trench warfare”

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(Bhattacharya and Sanyal 2011:42). For example, Fernandes (2004:2422) argues thatthe newmiddle class has sought to “cleanse” public space of street hawkers, and oneexample she gives is of “conflicts between the state, middle class civic organisationsand hawkers and their unions” in Mumbai. In her case study, however, it is the statethat actually polices public space. Similarly, Anjaria (2006:2140, 2011) has focusedextensively on hawkers in Mumbai and their “frequent, if not daily, interactions witha wide range of representatives of the state”, and Bandyopadhyay (2011) showshow hawkers in Kolkata devise collective strategies to represent themselves to thestate in order to bolster their claims of entitlement to public space. There is an impor-tant element missing from these accounts and that is the direct interaction betweenstreet hawkers and the new middle class.I take the political action of the new middle class as my point of departure, but

instead of focusing on its links with the state I focus on the relations of the newmiddleclass with street hawkers. I focus on the efforts of two associations that represent theinterests of the new middle class—a resident welfare association (RWA) and a markettraders’ association (MTA)—to regulate the use of urban space. As noted earlier, theMunicipal Corporation of Delhi has augmented the political power of these associa-tions through the creation of a political space in which they can interact directly withofficials, known as Bhagidari. Rather than trying to evict hawkers, however, theseorganizations seek to regulate hawkers’ use of space. In both cases hawkers cooperatein general, but they also exhibit a tendency to commitmeasured transgressions. Thus,low-intensity conflicts unfold over the terms of use of urban space, and through theireveryday use of space hawkers are able to participate in, and influence, the transfor-mation of Delhi.These findings are based on 10months of fieldwork in 2011, in which I interviewed

representatives of RWAs and MTAs in two sites.1 Furthermore, I held focus-groupdiscussions and conducted 45 interviews with street hawkers at these sites whichaveraged 20min. I returned twice in 2012 to conduct follow-up interviews. The ques-tionswere focused on the spaces inwhich the hawkersworked—how itwas identified,howmuch they had to pay to operate there, where they could and could not go, howrules were enforced, etc.

Krishna Nagar: RWA and Neighborhood PoliticsKrishna Nagar is an affluent neighborhood in south Delhi, near one of the city’s exclu-sive shopping malls, and a majority of its residents are professionals and businessowners. The RWA participates in Bhagidari, and during the course of my fieldwork acontentious election for RWA officers was held. The election pitted a group of incum-bents (there are 15 elected positions) who had been in power for approximately adecade, against a unified group of challengers. The incumbents had struck manyresidents from voter rolls for failure to pay their annual dues. Many of those deemedineligible protested that they wanted to pay dues but were not allowed; in oneextreme case a respondent said that the previous owner of his house had failed topay dues in 2006, so hewas declared ineligible. A group of residents whowere barredfrom voting filed a legal challenge and the judge decided that any resident who paid



this year’s fee (Rs 1200) could vote in the election. The residents who had secured thisinjunction from the courts subsequently entered the election and challenged theincumbents as a bloc.The RWA operated from a small building in the middle of the neighborhood, and I

arrived early on election day to observe the election and interview participants. Iconducted in-depth interviews with three members from each coalition, as well asbrief interviews with numerous voters. Each group was in agreement that parking,cleanliness, and security were the main issues facing the community. In front ofthe RWA’s small office each group of candidates arranged plastic chairs where voterscould rest and were offered soft drinks. Inside, residents in support of each coalitionlooked over each other’s shoulders as the eligibility of residents who arrived to votewas checked against RWA records. These “election officials” allowed me to observeproceedings until a minor conflict erupted as tempers flared during the mid-after-noon heat and the room was cleared by an on-duty police officer; a middle-agedman who was assisting his elderly father complete a ballot inside the RWA officewas confronted by an irate man who shouted: “You cannot assist a voter!” Thetwo ultimately had to be physically separated as they traded threats: “You shutup! I’ll box you!”All of the candidates argued that in order to improve security, the RWA needed to

impose tighter restrictions on access to the colony. Already the RWA has implementeda licensing scheme for hawkers, who pay Rs 500 per year for the right to operate in thecolony between 8 and 11 am. They receive an identification card that includes theirphotograph, address and lists any identifiable marks on their bodies. One of the can-didates complained, however, that the scheme does not work and that “the vendormenace is there, but it is not asmuch [as other places]”. This is because although signswere posted that read “no commercial activity or encroachment permitted in thispocket”, some hawkers operated inside the colony without a permit. It is possiblefor unlicensed hawkers to access the community because residents at one side ofthe community have invested in private securitywhile other gates remain unattended,and according to one RWA candidate, a result of the perceived free-riding of half thecolony is that “neighbor becomes enemy of neighbor”. The contentiousness of theseneighborhood micro-politics troubles the notion that the new middle class is ahomogenous social group with coherent policy objectives. Furthermore, it is signifi-cant that the regulation of street hawkers and other ISS workers is the issue thatfractured the veneer of cohesiveness among these residents.The formal nature of the licensing procedure for hawkers can be interpreted as an

attempt by the RWA to foster impersonal relations between members of thecommunity and hawkers, yet in practice many hawkers who received licenses hadbeenworking in the colony for years and had established a rapport with the residents.For example, one hawker said: “people know me here. I have regular customers.8–9 years I’ve been working in this colony.” Two interviewees said their fathershad also sold produce in the colony, so they have regular customers and theyhad no problems acquiring a license. These hawkers said that most residents areamicable, but they all added that it was very important to maintain a friendlyrelationship with residents. Since the licenses are not recognized by the municipalauthorities, angry residents can report hawkers to authorities if they choose: “If RWA

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complains MCD can come on site and take me away”, said one hawker. Ultimatelycomplete discretion rests with the RWA, and as one hawker explained, “the peoplewho have good behavior get selected [for a license]”.Most of the licensed hawkers approved of the licensing procedure, but other

hawkers transgressed the rules in variousways, thereby subverting the RWA’s attemptat imposing order. Some hawkersmaintained a presence just opposite the entrance ofthe colony. Here they were outside the jurisdiction of the colony but close enough toavoid scrutiny of officials who passed on the main road. They were allowed to delivergoods to customers, as long as they did not solicit door-to-door. One unlicensedhawker who openly flouted the licensing scheme admitted that he evades the securityguards, but he explained that he sells cleaning supplies, and unlike vegetable hawkerswho can predict with some accuracy how much they will sell in a day, his business isless predictable so hemust work inmultiple colonies but he cannot afford to purchasemultiple licenses. Thus, the licensing system favors hawkers whose items are indemand on a daily basis (eg fruits and vegetables). Only 15 hawkers had beenlicensed, but none of the respondents from the RWA could remember how thenumber of licenses was decided, whether this was an upper limit, or howmany appli-cations had been rejected. None of the candidates suggested banning hawkers orother ISS workers from the colony altogether, but they also did not propose toincrease the number of hawker licenses.There was a general agreement that the entry/exit of hawkers and their circulation

within the colony must be better regulated in order to improve security. Thus, thereis a shared view that hawkers simultaneously provide a useful service and pose asecurity threat. One candidate in the RWA election was particularly sympathetic tothe urban poor working in the colony: “There is no public toilet but there are at least200 servants. One of my priorities is to get a toilet made. But then there are problems.Where to build it? Who will maintain it? Then people go there and start doing some[bad] things.” This statement shows that this person is cognizant of the challengesfaced by hawkers and other service providers, but also displays apprehension thatany concessions could quickly lead to disorder and insecurity.

Jawahar Market: MTA and Market PoliticsJawahar Market is in a dense urban neighborhood and is currently undergoing rapidtransformation as international fast food restaurants and apparel chains vie for realestate with dhabas and local retailers, some of which sell exclusive top-of-the-linesarees while others sell generic or imitation goods. It simply could not function with-out ISS workers: an army of parking attendants ensures that the smooth flow trafficdoes not turn into gridlock, and shoppers are ferried back and forth from betweenthemarket and the nearestmetro station by cycle rickshaw pullers. There are between800 and 900 shops whose owners are known as “traders”, and they occupy a contra-dictory social position; on the one hand they lack the cultural capital to work as white-collar professionals in India’s “new economy”, yet they have benefitted tremendouslyfrom India’s economic boom so if one defines the new middle class according tolifestyle and consumption patterns they are undoubtedly members. As this research



demonstrates, they share the new middle class vision of orderly urban space and likeresidents in Krishna Nagar they are divided over how to achieve this vision.There are multiple associations that claim to be the “authentic” MTA in Jawahar

Market, with no less than five traders claiming to be the “legitimate” president ofthe market. This is significant for two reasons. First, it reflects the high level of organi-zation of market traders in Delhi. They mobilized against efforts of municipal author-ities to enforce zoning regulations and close unregistered shops in 2006 (Jain 2010),and in many instances street hawkers participated in the agitations against shopclosures (Mehra 2012). Second, it shows that a range of positions exist amongshopkeepers regarding the organization of the market and the regulation of streethawking. These differences become evident asMTAs regulate the day-to-day function-ing of the market, such as parking, security and hawking.The MCD raids the market once or twice per week on average, and while the

hawkers are more mobile and can easily scatter into the surrounding alleyways, thedisplays outside shops are more difficult to dissemble. As a result, shop owners com-monly become the targets of these raids, and their mannequins and other displayitems are confiscated. Although traders whose goodswere confiscatedwere unhappyabout paying a fine and taking the time to retrieve their goods from a governmentoffice, some of them felt that their encroachment of space warranted punishment.One trader even defended the MCD:

I won’t say [the MCD] are wrong. See, the development in Delhi wasn’t very planned… Itwas very haphazard. So I believe to an extent that the fault was of the traders. It wasn’t theirplace which they started using. Though MCD is actually very hard, but they have to bebecause people are very very stubborn, they will come again.

Even some traders whose shops extend onto the sidewalks view encroachment ofpublic space as a threat to order within the market. As one trader explained: “a lotof people started encroaching so what happened? Roads became congested, parkingis lesser, and the [regular] customers stopped coming because of parking. Overall itdisturbs the dynamics of the market.” To maintain order within the market the MTAseeks to regulate hawkers.Most traders accept the presence of hawkers because they do not compete for the

same customers; hawkers tend to sell cheap goods to budget-minded customerswhile traders sell more expensive items. One trader who sold kurtas from a one-room shop agreed to an interview, but asked if I could meet him later in the day athis office a few blocks away. It turned out that he owned four shops in the market,all of which were outfitted with CCTV cameras that he could monitor from his office.He said that street hawkers do not affect his business and that there is space withinthe market for everyone: “Indian market is very vast … lots of opportunities arethere.” Furthermore, multiple traders recognized that street hawking contributesto a lively atmosphere in the market. When I asked one trader whether he thoughthawking was an important feature of the market, he explained that “Delhi markethas a kind of old-age charm about it. People love to hang out in markets, they havespicy food and a lot of things … They have all the things the family needs.” Sometraders even allow hawkers to take refuge in their shops during government raidsfor a small fee.

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There was general agreement among the traders I interviewed that there should notbe so many hawkers that customers feel besieged, hawkers should not operate directlyin front of their shops, and they should not “harass” their customers. Furthermore,hawkers who operate in this market must pay a weekly fee that varies between Rs 100and 600, depending on a number of factors such aswhat they sell, whether they displaytheir goods on the ground or are mobile, etc. Multiple hawkers claimed that the moneythey pay is shared by theMTA andpolice. In order to impose these regulations, theMTAemploys a team of private security guards to patrol themarket at all times. One securityguard said the main tasks are to prevent beggars from entering the market, maintain alookout for pickpockets, and make sure that hawkers are not “cheating” customers.This suggests that order is in place to limit hawkers from determining their own prices,and it ensures that they sell cheap products and do not compete with traders who sellmore expensive items. The same security guard explained that if he catches hawkers“cheating”, “first we explain with affection. We try andmake them understand. If thatdoesn’t work we are a little stern. There should be no cheating.” Finally, he said thatrepeat offenders are reported to police and removed from the market.Hawkers complained about particular shopkeeperswhose enforcement of the infor-

mal rules regulating their use of space they considered aggressive, as well as the rateof the weekly fee they paid to operate in the market. Overall, however, their relation-ship with the MTA cannot be described as overly contentious. During the course ofinterviews with hawkers it was common for security guards or shopkeepers to askus to move away from storefronts, and hawkers willingly complied with theserequests. One reason why hawkers agreed to the MTA regulations is that they limitedthe number of hawkers who could operate in themarket, and thereby limited compe-tition. One hawker remarked that “if they [the MTA] don’t take something from usthen everybody will flock to this place”. While traders were more or less ambivalentto hawkers who complied with the informal rules of the market and did not impacttheir enterprises, they were prepared to resist any move by authorities to curtail theirpower to regulate urban space. In one example, municipal authorities proposed ascheme to create semi-permanent stalls for hawkers within the market. One presidentof the MTA said flatly that “we will not allow [this]”. Another trader shared this senti-ment, and he explained why efforts to regulate space within the market by municipalauthorities as well as the Supreme Court—which has occasionally mandated thathawkers must be given access to space—would be unsuccessful:

Supreme Court has a vision to remove the poverty, and city [government] has a vision tobeautify the whole place so there’s not too much of synchronization between the two …

MCD does what it feels like, Supreme Court can do whatever … so there will be a lot ofconflict. I don’t think the MCD’s vision is gonna see the day of the light. Supreme Courton the other hand is a [Central] state body, it can enforce things and that can happen,but not to be executed completely … because see at the end of the day people who aregoing to execute it are still from the MCD.

Inter-Class Relations and Urban TransformationThe previous section demonstrated that in the context of the post-development socialformation and the ongoing gentrification of the state, the new middle class is



increasingly coming into contact with—and tries to regulate—workers in the ISS.India’s elite revolt may drive urban transformation and broader changes in India’spolitical economy, but it does not follow that the new middle class seeks to excludethe poor fromurban space. Furthermore, inter-class politics cannot be neatly classifiedin either civil or political society, and are not necessarily antagonistic. Instead, the newmiddle class seeks to regulate the circulation of the poor and their use of space. In thissection I seek to explain why urban space is the focal point of these interactions, andhow these interactions affect Delhi’s ongoing transformation.In the course of this research none of the members of the new middle class

suggested that hawkers should be removed from either the colony or market. Insteadof engaging in zero-sum conflicts over space, conflicts between the new middle classand the poor tend to unfold within space over the terms of its use (eg what timehawkers can operate within a colony, or how much they can charge for particularitems within a market). Thus, the new middle class seeks to manage the poor as itimposes order on Delhi’s kaleidoscopic socio-spatial cityscape. For the new middleclass this interaction determines its social reproduction in two ways. First, lifestyles ofthe new middle class are dependent on the labor of workers in the ISS (eg drivers,nannies, gardeners, security guards, domestic servants, hawkers and wastepickers).Second, the new middle class requires orderly spaces where its members can displaythe particular behavioral patterns that serve as class markers (eg shopping malls,private clubs, gated communities and office towers). Access to urban space isequally important for street hawkers and other ISS workers, but for them it is theirmost important means of subsistence and the key to their livelihoods. Thus, thisstruggle over the regulation of urban space unfolds on a terrain that hascompletely different meaning for the new middle class and the poor, and can onlybe understood through a combination of Marxian and Bourdieuian approaches ofclass formation and struggle.In Krishna Nagar the informal service sector is responsible for social reproduction;

more than 200 domestic servants ensure that residents are well fed and their housesclean, security guards protect residents and their property, drivers take residents towork and children to school, hawkers provide fresh vegetables on a daily basis, etc.The new middle class has no choice but to tolerate their presence, but the RWA seeksto regulate their use of urban space. Some hawkers may draw attention from securityguards and face expulsion, such as the unlicensed hawker selling cleaning supplies,but more common is everyday negotiation and low-level conflict over the terms ofuse of space. The licensed hawkers unanimously stated that it is important tomaintaingood relations with residents because they can have them removed by municipalauthorities or revoke their licenses. One hawker who had been removed from thecolony after an argument with a resident was forced to seek help from other residentsin order to retain his license. Struggles over when hawkers can operate in the colonyand how much they can charge do not have the potential to radically alter powerrelations. This is similar to the proletariat’s everyday contestations identified by Marx(1990 [1867]:412), over “the establishment of a normal working day [which] is …

the product of a protracted andmore or less concealed civil war between the capitalistclass and the working class”. In both instances the subordinate class seeks to better itsposition vis-à-vis those who control the means of production—in this case the means

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of subsistence—but the overall power relations inherent in the relations of productionare not significantly challenged.Given the fact that the new middle class and workers in the ISS are interdependent

and must co-exist within the same space, members of the new middle class mustdistinguish themselves by displaying cultural capital that serves as a basis of classmembership. According to Pierre Bourdieu (1984:102) objective economic criteria,such as a person’s income, are proxies for “a whole set of subsidiary characteristicswhich may function, in the form of tacit requirements, as real principles of selectionor exclusion without ever being formally stated”. These “subsidiary characteristics”are practices whereby individuals display skills and awareness, ie cultural capital, thatserve as the key distinctions upon which claims to class membership are based. Thisfield of struggle was most evident in Jawahar Market which is frequented by a mixedclientele, including “big people” (bari bari log) with considerable disposable income,as well as budget-minded consumers. Hawkers are occasionally able to appropriatethe behavior of the new middle class and misrepresent themselves as more affluentshoppers. One hawker explained that once a raid commences he simply puts hisgoods in a bag and poses as a shopper to avoid harassment by authorities: “[Themunicipal authorities] never take my stuff, they come, I put it in my pack. Who willknow whether I’m a shopper or not?” Another incident illustrates the complexity ofself-representation more poignantly. Oncewhile I was conversing with the proprietorof a nearby restaurant during lunch two hawkers entered who I had previouslyinterviewed. They were brothers, between 13 and 16 years old, and they sold saranwrap; everyday they purchased 50 rolls wholesale that they sold in the market. Theyhad apparently stashed their merchandise somewhere and in their t-shirts and shortsthey were indistinguishable from bari bari log. They became visibly nervouswhen theysaw me and took a table at the opposite end of the restaurant; I posed a threat as Icould identify them as street hawkers. I misunderstood their nervousness, thinkinginstead that they were unsure of how to communicate with me, and in an effort toput them at ease I approached them and offered to buy them lunch. After observingour conversation, the proprietor asked how I knew them andwhen I explained hewasboth dumbfounded and amused; he exclaimed that they were regulars and that theyhad told him that their father was a businessman. Further, he explained that theynever ordered the cheapest samosas like some of themore price-conscious customers.In summary, street hawkers and other ISS workers struggle against the new

middle class in two ways. First, they seek to improve the terms of their use of spacethrough everyday negotiations. Second, they access knowledge and symbolicresources in the course of their work which occasionally allows them to makeconvincing claims to membership in the new middle class. Through both of thesetypes of struggles street hawkers are able to maintain livelihoods and make a claimof belonging in the world-class city. More broadly, the ISS undoubtedly has a placein the world-class city washing designer clothes, chauffeuring foreign cars, nurtur-ing middle class children, keeping watch over world-class spaces at night, and sell-ing basic consumer goods. Therefore, the question is not “whose world-class city?”since it is by nature inhabited by both the new middle class and the new urbanpoor, but rather “whose world classness?” The imposition of a particular vision ofurbanization that is either geared toward social reproduction or material



subsistence—or their reconciliation—is what is at stake in contemporary inter-classrelations between the new middle class and the new urban poor.

ConclusionUrban transformation in India’s post-economic reform era is a contingent process.While urbanization in India is known for its divergence from master plans (Roy2009), the restructuring of state–society relations in ways that empower the newmiddle class at the expense of the poor has led some scholars to posit that the Indianmetropolis may become bourgeois at last (Chatterjee 2004). The anti-poor politics ofthe new middle class have been the subject of much scholarly research, andalternatively scholars have focused on how the poor secure entitlements through theirengagement with municipal governments. Instead of comparing the compar-tmentalized politics of these classes, this article has shed light on inter-class politicsand relations, whose frequency is increasing and form is changing given the growthof the informal service sector. I have sought to demonstrate how interactions betweenassociations of the new middle class and street hawkers impact ongoing processes ofurban transformation. Instead of using its political power to exclude the urban poorfrom the city in toto, the new middle class attempts to manage its interaction withthe poor by regulating their use of urban space.Understanding the relations between street hawkers and the new middle class

requires both Marxian and Bourdieuian understandings of class. The strugglebetween classes unfolds on an everyday basis, and cannot be characterized as “trenchwarfare” where each side seeks the eradication of the other, because they are co-constitutive and mutually interdependent.The new middle class requires the production of world-class spaces where its

members can display the particular behavioral characteristics that affirm their classmembership. By employing domestic servants and other informal service providersmembers of the new middle class affirm their class membership, so rather thanexclude the poor the new middle class seeks to regulate their use of space. The regu-lations that the newmiddle class associations impose on street hawkers includewhenand where they can operate, what they can sell and howmuch they can charge, howthey must behave, etc. Through the imposition of these regulations the new middleclass attempts to prevent space from becoming “disorderly”, and simultaneouslyensures that they maintain access to the services and convenience offered by streethawkers.Street hawkers agree to regulation in principle because it allows them to access

urban space, and when conflict erupts it is typically over the terms of use of urbanspace, rather than simply over urban space. For street hawkers and other workers inthe ISS, urban space is their most important means of subsistence. By maintainingaccess to prime space near their clientele—ie the new middle class—street hawkersare able to subsist in the city. In the course of their interactions with the new middleclass, the poor are able to gain access to cultural capital with which they occasionallymake convincing claims to belonging in the world-class city.In this article I have not drawn attention to the victimization of the urban poor that

routinely occurs in the course of urban transformation, such as slum demolitions,

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much of which is supported by the new middle class. I do not intend to downplaythese instances in which the state and the poor enter into conflict over space, but Iargue that it is equally important to recognize how the interactions between thenew middle class and the poor influence urban transformation. The urban poor’sstruggles to remain in the city and maintain access to urban space demonstrates awillingness to participate in—instead of simply resist—urban transformation. WhileDelhi will undoubtedly be the site of ambitious mega-projects in the future, itstransformation will also continue to be influenced by interactions between the newmiddle class and the urban poor.

Endnote1 I have given these places pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of respondents.

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Documents

The Making of “World-Class” Delhi: Relations Between Street Hawkers and the New Middle Class