Upload
abuabdur-razzaqal-misri
View
228
Download
1
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
1/25
Maisonneuve Larose
The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in EgyptAuthor(s): Amalia LevanoniSource: Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990), pp. 121-144Published by: Maisonneuve & LaroseStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595777.
Accessed: 03/02/2015 16:18
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Maisonneuve & Laroseis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Studia Islamica.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=malhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1595777?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1595777?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mal8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
2/25
THE
MAMLUKS'
ASCENT TO POWER
IN
EGYPT*
I.
From
the
very beginning
of the
Ayyubid
dynasty, Ayyubid
rulers
established
units of Mamluks for
military
service. These
units were often ble
to
enthrone r dethronerulers
n
certain
cases
but nowhere
did
they
claim
authority
for
hemselvesas
they
did
in
Egypt
in 1250. The ascent of the Mamluks to
power
n
Egypt
was
connected
with an
important
shift from
the
Ayyubid pattern
of
rulership.
Al-S.lih
Najm
al-Din
Ayyfib,
the last dominant
Ayyubidruler n Egypt (1240-1249), introduced a new patternof
rulership oncerning
he
composition
of the
army,
the nomination
of
people
to
prominent
positions
in the
state
and court
regulations(').
This
new
pattern
of
rulership granted
al-Salih
Ayyfib
n autocratic-centralized
regime
which
suited his
authori-
tative and
ambitious
personality
nd
protected
his rule
against
the
intrigues
of his rival
Ayyubbid
relatives(2).
This
new
pattern
of
rulership,
however,
undermined the traditional
Ayyubid
patterns
of
rule as
it facilitatedthe
cooperation
between the
administration
and the army n their ttemptto actually governthe state after l-
.Slih
Ayyfib's
death. The
cooperation
between
these two sectors
(*)
I
would like
to thank Professor
Michael
Winter
of
Tel
Aviv
University,
Dr.
Butrus
Abu Manneh
of
Haifa
University,
Professor Nehemia
Levtzion
of
the
Hebrew
University
f
Jerusalem
and Professor
P.
M. Holt
who read
this
paper
and
commented
on it
during
its various
stages
of
preparation.
(1)
R.
S.
Humphreys,
From
Saladin
to the
Mongols,
Albany,
1977
(hence-
Saladin)
pp.
1-13,
67-75.
R.
S.
Humphreys,
The
emergence
of
the Mamluk
army , Studia Islamica 45, 1977, pp. 67-100; 46, 1977, pp. 147-182 (hence The
emergence).
(2)
Ibn
Taghri
Birdi,
Jamal
al-Din
Yusiif,
al-NujaIm
al-Zdhirah
fi
Muliik
Misr
wa-al
Qdhirah,
Cairo,
1963
(hence-Nujzim),
6,
pp.
333,
335-6.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
3/25
122
A. LEVANONI
finally
paved
the
way
to
the
formal verthrow f the
Ayyubid
ine
in
Egypt.
II.
The
organization
of
the
army
of
Salah
al-Din,
founder f
the
Ayyubid dynasty,
was based
on
the
Iqt5'
system(3).
Most
army
commanders,
the
Emirs,
were
assigned
hereditary
revenues
directly
by
Salh.
al-Din
(which
assured
their
loyalty)
and
they
allocated soldiers
for
military
expeditions
in
return. Under this
system,
most of
the soldiers
in
Sal~h
al-Din's
army,
with the
exception
of
the
IHalqah,
the Sultan's
body-guard,
were under the
Emirs' direct command. The
heterogeneous composition
of the
Emir class,mostlyKurdish and Turkmanor Turkish Mamluksand
a
few of
Salh.
al-Din's
relatives,
also
contributed to
the
army's
loyalty
to
Salh.
al-Din
and
thus,
he
cleverly
maintained the
balance
of
power
between the ambitions
of
the various
ethnic
groups
of
this class. After
Salh.
al-Din's
death these
principles
of
control
became the formula
guaranteeing Ayyubid's
control
of
their
armies(4).
Al-S.lih
Ayyib
was the first
Ayyubid
Sultan
to base most
of his
army
on the Mamluk
element.
Even
before
his
ascent to the
throne,duringthe lifetimeof his father, he Sultan al-Kamil, he
took
advantage
of his
position
as heir to the
Egyptian
throne,
to
use
the
treasury
to
build
up
a
Mamluk unit. Accused
by
his
brother l-'Adil
of
ntending
o seize
power
he was
appointed
by
his
father o be
governor
of
Hisn
Kaifa
and
his brother ook his
place
as
heir
to the
Egyptian
throne.
Al-S.lih
Ayyfib
resumed his
attempts
at
strengthening
is
power
and took over the northern
regions
of
al-Kimil's
kingdom
after the
death of
their
governor,
Shams al-Din
Sawlb
al-'Adili. He then built
up
a
strong rmy
by
purchasing Mamluks and accepting Kurds and Khawarizimians
into
his
army(5).
(3)
Concerning
this
method see:
C.
Cahen,
L'6volution
de
l'iqta'
du
Ixe
au
xiile
si'cle , Annales,
Economics,
Societies,
Civilisations,
Vol.
8, 1953,
p.
45-48.
(4)
Saladin,
p.
16-17, 18, 34-35,
38. The
Emergence,
p.
89-90.
H. A.
R.
Gibb,
The armies
of
Saladin ,
in
Saladin: Studies
in
Islamic
History
ed.)
YusOf
Ibish,
Beirut, 1974,
p.
140.
(5)
C.
Cahen,
'La
Chronique
des
Ayyubids'
d'al-Makin
b.
al-'Amid ,
Bulletin
d'etudesorientalesde l'InstitutFrangais de Damas, Tome XV, 1955-1957 (hence
al-Makin),
pp.
139,
140, 142,
148-149.
See also:
al-Maqrizi,
Ahmad
b.
'Ali,
Kitab al-Suliik
li-Ma'rifa
Duwal
al-Muliik,
ed.
Muhammad
Mustafa Ziysdah,
Cairo,
1934
(hence-Sulak),
Vol.
I,
p.
238,
240,
243, 247,
255,
339.
Ibn
al-Dawfdari,
'Abd
A11h
b.
Aybak,
Kanz al-Durar
wa-Jd-
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
4/25
THE
MAMLUKS'
ASCENT TO POWER IN EGYPT
123
Following
al-Kamil's
death,
during
the
short
period
he ruled
Damascus
(January 1239/Spring
240),
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
ought
both
his Ayyubidrivals in Syria and Palestine forcontrol of Syria and
his brother l-'Adil
for
ontrolof the
Egyptian
Sultanate.
During
a
military
expedition,
al-S.lih.
Ayyfib
lost Damascus to his
Ayyubid
rivals
through deception.
His
army,
numbering
some
6,000
soldiers
deserted
him,
leaving
him
with his
Mamluks,
and
some non-Mamluk
officials.
Forsaken
by
his
army,
al-.Slih
yyfib,
captured
and
imprisoned
at
al-Karak
by
his
cousin
al-NMsir
5'ud
ibn
al-Mu'azzam,
shared his
imprisonment
with
two
of his Mamluks
-
his
maid-servant
Shajar
al-Durr and
Baybars
al-Bunduqd~ri. Other Mamluks, too, remained faithful o him,
staying
at al-Karak
until
his release from
prison(6).
mi'
al-Ghurar,
d. 'Abd
al-Fattih.
'Ashur,
Cairo 1972
(hence
-
al-Dawadiri),
Vol.
7,
p.
308, 309, 316,
319.
Ibn
W5sil,
Muhammad
Ibn
S5lim,
Mufarrij
al-Kurab
ft
Akhbdr
BaniAyyib.
Ms.
BibliothBque
Nationale
(Paris),
Arabe
No. 1703
(hence
B.N.
1703),
fol. 71 B
and
Ms.
Biblioth6que
Nationale
(Paris)
Arabe No. 1702
(hence
B.N.
1702),
fol.
304B,
305A,
321A.
Al-Yfi'i,
.Hasan
b.
Ibrahim, Kildb Jdmi' al-Tawdrfkh,
Ms.
Bibliotheque
Nationale, Arabe,
No. 1543
(hence-al-Y~fi'i),
fol.
71B,
73B. It
is
actually
al-
'Ayni's
'Iqd
al-Juman
fi
T5rikh
Ahl
al-Zamln.
See:
Catalogue
des
Manuscrits
Arabes
de
la
Bibliotheque
Nationale,
De
Slane,
1883. T.
1,
p.
291.
Ibn
al-Wardi,
Zayn
al-Din
Umar,
Tatimmat
l-Mukhtasarfi
Akhb'r
l-Bashar,
ed.
Ahmad
Rif'at
al-Badrawi,
Beyrouth
1970,
Vol. 8
(hence
-
Ibn
al-Wardi),
p.
232,
242.
Ibn
Khalikin,
AbO
al-'Abbls
Shams
al-Din
Ahmad
b.
Muhammad,
Wafaydt
l-
A'ydn
wa
Anbd'
Abnd'
al-Zamdn.
Ed.
Muhammad
Muhyi
al-Din
'Abd
al-Hamid,
Cairo 1948
(hence
Ibn
Khalikan),
Vol.
4,
p.
173;
5,
p.
302.
(6)
Sulk,
1,
p.
238, 280-288,
316. See
also: Ibn
Duqmlq,
Ibrfhim
ibn
Muhammad, Kitab al-Jawhar al-Thamrn ft Siyar al-Khulafa'
wa-al-Saldt.n,odleian
Library
(Oxford).
Ms.
Digby
No. 28
(hence
-
Duqmiq),
fol.
88A.
B.N.,
1702,
fol.
323B-329A,
330A, 331A, 1703,
fol.
15B, 16B, 17A,
19B. Ibn
Khalikln,
4,
p.
174,
175;
5,
p.
302.
Al-YWfi'i,
ol.
72A,
81B.
Al-Makin,
p.
147, 150,
151. Ibn
al-Wardi,
p.
246,
254.
Al-Dawadlri,
7,
p.
337.
Nujilm
6,
p.
307. See also:
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
Sibt b.
'Abd
Allah.
Mir'dt
al-Zaman,
ed.
J. R.
Wett,
Chicago,
1907
(hence-
Ibn
al-Jawzi),
pp.
479-480,
481.
As
well as:
al-Yinini,
Qutb
al-Din
b.
Muhammad,
Dhayl
Mir'dt
al-Zamdn,
Tab'
Wizarat al-Ma'arif
lil-Huklimah
al-Hindiyyah,
1954
(hence
al-
Yfnini),
1,
p.
141.
As well as:
Ibn
'Abd
al-Z5hir, al-QAdi
Muhji
al-Din,
Al-Rawd
al-Zahir
fi
Strat al Malik
al-Zdhir,
part
of which has been
published
in
: Fatima
Sadeque, Bybars of Egypt,Pakistan, 1956 (hence-Srat al-Zdhir),p. 3. Al-Safadi,
al-.Hasan
b. 'Abd
Allih,
Nuzhat
al-Mdlik
wa-al-Mulfik
-
Mukhtasar
Strat
man wala
Misr
min
al-Mulfik.
Ms.
British
Museum
(London)
Oriental and Printed
Books,
add. 23326
(hence
al-*afadi),
fol.
60A-60B.
Ibn
Asbst,
Hamzah
b.
Ah
mad,
Musannaf
Kitdb
al-Td'rikh,
Ms. Vaticane
Biblioteca, Vaticana,
Vat.
Arabe 270
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
5/25
124 A. LEVANONI
When
al-S1lih
Ayyfib
ascended to the
Egyptian
throne
he
trusted
no
military
lement that had
previously
ervedhim
except
his own Mamluks. He did not even trust the al-Kfmiliyyah,his
father's
Mamluk
unit,
that had
brought
him into
power.
He
therfore
worked hard to build
up
a Mamluk
army
which would
be
faithful
o no one
but
himself(7).
Already
at
the end
of
his first
ear
as ruler he
began
purchasing
Turkish
Mamluks (8).
The number
of Mamluks
purchased
by
al-
S.lih
Ayyfib
uring
his
reign
nd
the
composition
of
theirunits are
hard to
estimate(9).
Historical sources are
not
clear
with
regard
to the
possible
existence
of
other
Mamluk bodies
at
his
service
besides the Bahriyyah,his elite unit.
Al-Dawidari
notes that all
Mamluks
n
al-S.lih
Ayyfib's
ervice were called
al-S.lihiyyah,
the
Bahriyyah
being only
one
unit(10).
In
Mufarrij
al-Kurihb,
bn
Wasil distinguishes
ime and
again
between the
Bahriyyah
and
the
Jamdariyyah,
both Mamluk units
serving
al-Salih
Ayyfib.
He
remarks hat both
were
fightingmilitary
nits( ).
Our
sources do
not mentionthe numberof
al-S.lih's
Mamluks,
yet they
note
that,
at its
outset,
al-Bahriyyah
was manned
by
about
one thousand
Mamluks(12).
Ibn
Wasif
notes that
al-Silih.
Ayyfib
brought
a
(hence
-
Ibn
Asbat),
fol. 59B.
Abu
al-Fid5,
'Imld
al-Din
Ism'il,
Kildb
al-
Mukhtasar
fi
Akhbdr
l-Bashar,
al-Matba'ah
al-Husayniyyah
al-Misriyyah
hence
Abfi
al-Fid5),
vol.
3,
p.
172.
Al-Maqrizi, Taqi
al-Din
Ahmad
b.
'All,
Kildb
al-Mawd'iz
wa-l'ltibdr
ft
dhikr
l-
Khitat
wa-al-Athdr,
Misr,
1325
(hence
Khilat),
vol.
3,
p.
384.
(7)
Al-Dawldari,
7,
p.
370.
Al-Makin,
p.
152,
153. B.N.
1702,
fol.
337A,
340A,
B,
359B.
1703,
fol. 27A.
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
515.
Ibn
Duqmiq,
fol.
88B-
89A. Sulak, 1, p. 300.
(8)
Ibn
Duqmiq,
fol.
89B. See
also:
B.N., 1702,
fol.
324A.
Al-Makin,
p.
152.
Abu-1
Fid5,
p.
167. Ibn
Asbat,
fol.
62B.
Al-Dawadari,
7,
p.
343.
NujCm
6,
pp.
307,
320.
Ibn
Wasif
Shah,
Ibrahim
al-Misri,
Kildb Jawdhir
l-BuhiCr
wa
Waqdi'
al-UmCr
wa
'Ajd'ib
al-Duhbr
wa
Akhbar
al-Diydr
al-Misriyyah,
British
Museum
(London),
Oriental Ms. No.
OR. 25731
(hence
Ibn
Wasif),
fol.
59A,
60A.
(9)
D.
Ayalon,
Aspects
of the
Mamluk
phenomenon
Der
Islam,
54/1,
1977,
(hence-Aspects
No.
1)
p.
25.
(10)
Al-Dawld
ri,
7,
p.
376; 8,
p.
25.
(11)
B.N.
1702,
fol.
377B;
1703,
fol.
75B, 78B,
81B,
85A, 87B,
88B,
97A,
103B. Sulak, 1, p. 371.
(12)
Ibn
Duqmaq,
fol.
89A. Ibn
Wasif,
fol.
59A.
Such a number
was
considerable for
hat time.
See:
D.
Ayalon,
Aspects
of
the
Mamluk
Phenonenon,
The
Importance
of the
Mamluk
Institution ,
Der
Islam,
53/2,
1976
(hence-
Aspects
No.
2),
p.
197.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
6/25
THE
MAMLUKS' ASCENT TO
POWER IN
EGYPT
125
thousand
Mamluks
in
1241-2,
and
bought
more
later(13).
At
al-Slih
Ayyfib's
death,
the
Bahriyya
was
composed
of
at
least two
thousand cavalry(14). The sources, however, are very clear in
regard
to the
composition
of
al-.Slih
Ayyfb's
army,
which
mainly
consisted of
Turkish
Mamluks
purchased
by
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
bove
and
beyond
those of
his
Ayyubid
predecessors(15).
Al-S.lih
Ayyfib
began
to
consolidate his
Mamluks as
a
military
elite
by
passing
down
their
qt5'
to
their
childrenor
Khushdishes:
When one of
his
Mamluks
died,
leaving
a
son,
he
gave
him
his father's
IqtA'.
If
he had no
son,
he
gave
it to
his
Khushdash (16).
Al-S.lih
Ayyfib
lso
took
great
care
to
reserve
most Iqtf'It solely forhis Mamluks: Whenever he imprisoned n
Emir,
he
gave
his
land to
one of his
Mamluks;
he
also
bestowed the
title of Emir
upon
him,
so
that most
Emirs of
the state
were his
Mamluks (17).
Al-S5lih
Ayyfib
made no
change
in
the
Iqt5'
system
established
by
Salfh
al-Din,
yet
the
concentration f
the
positions
of
military
Emirs in
the hands of
the Turkish
Mamluks
finally
ndermined
he
balance
between the various
ethnic
groups
common in
the
Ayyubid
armies
by
consolidating
full
militarypower
n
Egypt
into
the Mamluks' hands. By founding n armywhich was ethnically
homogeneous,
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
had
further
bandoned the
custom
common in
Islamic
countries wherein
the
co-existence
of
varied
elements
n
the
army
were
considered
a
vital
element
in
retaining
equilibrium
and
maintaining oyalty
to the
regime(18).
(13)
Ibn
Wasif,
fol.
59A,
60A.
(14)
Khilat,
3,
p.
484.
Sulafk,
1,
p.
370.
(15) B.N. 1702, fol.359B; 1703, fol. 37B. Ibn
Asb.t,
fol.62B. Sulfk, vol. 1,
p.
300.
Al-Dawd5fri,
7,
p.
370.
Nujiam
6,
p.
331. Ibn
Wasif,
fol.
60A. Ibn
Duqmaq,
fol. 90a.
Al-Yfi'i,
fol. 110A.
Purchasing
a
large
quantity
of
Mamluks was
then
made
possible
since
the
Tatars who
came,
conquered
the lands of
the East
and North and
treated
the
Kipchaks violently.
They
killed
them,
captured
their sons
and sold
them,
so
merchants
brought
them to
the lands
(of
Islam)...
Ibn
Duqmaq,
fol. 93B.
(16)
Al-Dawidari, 7,
pp.
470-471.
Al-YW'fi'i,
ol.
84B. B.N.
1703,
fol.
35B.
For Khushdash
see D.
Ayalon,
L'esclavage
du
Mamlouk ,
Oriental
Notes and
Studies,
No.
1, Jerusalem,
1951,
pp.
29-31.
(17)
Sulak,
1,
p.
300. See
also:
Khilat,
3,
p.
384.
Abii-l
Fidi,
p.
179.
Nujam 6, pp. 319, 320, 331. Ibn Duqmaq, fol.90A. Ibn Asbat, fol.62A.
Al-Safadi,
fol. 62A. Ibn
al-Wardi,
p.
263.
(18)
Aspects
No.
1,
pp.
30-31.
Aspects
No.
2,
p.
207.
Saladin,
p.
304,
The
Emergence,
p.
149
as
well
as: C. E.
Bosworth,
The
Ghaznavids,
Edinburgh,
1963,
p.
108.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
7/25
126
A. LEVANONI
The Khawarizmis
serving
under
al-.Slih
Ayyfib
n
Syria
were
then the
only
body
in
Islamic countries
whose
power equalled
that
of the Mamluks in Egypt. Yet in 1246 the Khawarizmis were
defeated
by
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
when
they
tried to rebel
against
him,
and attacked
Damascus under the
inspiration
of
al-S.lih
Ismd'il,
the
Ayyubid
ruler of Ba'al Bek.
They
never restored their
power
and once
the
Khwarizimis had been
beaten,
the
superiority
of
the
Egyptian
Mamluks over
the
Muslim armies
was un-
questioned(19).
The
reports
of the unrestrained treatment
by
the
Turkish Mamluks of
the
local
population
in
Egypt
indicates
their
gaining
of
the
upper
hand
in
al-Silih
Ayyfib's army,
thus
compelling
al-.Slih
Ayyfib to isolate them from the local
population(20).
In
addition to
introducing hanges
into the
composition
of
the
army,
al-.Slih
Ayyfib
was also concerned with the
new rules
n
the
government
and administration.
Towards
the
end of his
life,
Saldh
al-Din had
striven to
consolidate
a
confederation
of
the
autonomous
emirates headed
by
members of
the
Ayyubid family,
who
passed
them
on from father to son. These emirates
had
grown
out
of
Salh.
al-Din's
acceptance
of
the
demand made
by
membersof his family o give thema shareinthegovernment, nd
allot them their
own territories.
Salih
al-Din
was both
head of
the
confederation
and
its
consolidating
element.
He
thus
laid
the
foundation
for the rule of the
Ayyubid dynasty,
following
the
method
earlier used
by
the
Zangis
and the
Seljuks.
Salh.
al-Din
appointed
his own heir
as
ruler
of
Damacus, himself,
taying
in
Egypt
in order
to
secure his
domination
of
the entire
kingdom
and
thus
determining
he subservience
of
Syria
to
Egypt(21).
Following
Saldh
al-Din's
death,
there
was no
unifyingAyyubid
figure
esides al-'Adil I,
yet
the basic elementsof
Ayyubid
rule laid
down
by
Salh,
al-Din
remained
in
practice. Ayyubids despite
their
rivalry,
were
guided
by
the norm
according
to
which
mainly
Ayyubs
were
given
prominent
government
positions.
They
also
(19)
Sulaik,
1,
p.
324.
Al-Dawadari, 7,
p.
358.
Al-Makin,
p.
156.
Ibn
al-
Wardi,
p.
257.
Abfi-l
Fida,
p.
175.
Nujam
6,
pp.
325-326. Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p. 507. B.N. 1702, fol.346B-347A.
(20)
Sulaik,
1,
p.
301
(editor's
note),
p.
340. Ibn
Wasif,
fol.
59A.
B.N.
1703,
fol.
67B.
See also D.
Ayalon,
Le
r6gimentBahriya
dans
l'arm6e
mamelouke ,
Revue des
ltudes
Islamiques,
Paris, 1951,
p.
134.
(21)
Saladin, 34-35, 67,
69, 74-75, 80,
85.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
8/25
THE
MAMLUKS'
ASCENT TO
POWER IN
EGYPT
127
refrainedfrom
hedding
Ayyubid
blood.
Similarly,
hey
kept
the
nominal subservience of
Damascus
to Cairo
intact(22).
Al-Silih
Ayyfibdid not adhere to these principles due to his cold and
calculating
character
and his
hostile attitude to
his
Ayyubid
rivals
who had
inflicted
political
troubles
upon
him
by
their internal
intrigues
before he ascended
the
Eyptian
throne. When he
took
power,
he did
not hesitate
to
spill
their blood
during
his
political
struggle against
them.
Thus
he murdered his
brother
al-'Adil
for
fear
that
he
might
be taken
out
of
prison
during
his
absence
and
made
Sultan. He thus
established
a
pattern
later to be
used
by
his
Mamluk Emirs
when
they
overthrew his own son
Tfirdnshah(23). Ibn al-Jawzi, provides us with a finedescription
of
the
link
between
the
precedence
created
by
al-.Slih
Ayyfib's
murderof his
brother,
nd his own son
murdered
by
his
Mamluks:
Those who murdered
[Tfirdnshih]
were
four ..
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
had
said
to
Muhsin,
Go
to
prison
to
my
brother l-'Adil and
take
along
some Mamluks
to
strangle
him
..
They
went to
him
and
strangled
him.
Then
Allah
put
his son
at
their
mercy,
so
they
killed
him,
molesting
him
as
severely
as he had done
to his
brother
24).
In order to build up centralised control,
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
conferred
the
most
prominent positions
in
his
state
upon
his
confidants who had been
faithful
to
him,
rather than
to the
Ayyubids.
Al-.Slih
Ayyfib's
confidants,
unlike
the
Ayyubids
could
not set
up
claims
to
the throne
as
they
were
personally
faithful o
him
and
depended
on
him
for
their
nomination.
Following
his
conquest
of Damascus
(Autumn
1245),
al-S.lih
yyfib
appointed
Mu'Tn
al-Din
Ibn
Shaykh
to
be his
deputy
there,
rather than
appoint
an
Ayyubid
as his
predecessors
had
done. When Mu'in al-Din entered Damascus, he even fulfilled
several
of
the Sultan's
functions,
uch as
issuing
decrees
concerning
Iqt1'
assignment
and
nomination
for
prominent
positions(25).
At
(22)
B.N.
1702,
fol.
320B,
326B-329A.
Al-Safadi,
fol.
60A-60B.
Al-Dawfdfri,
7,
p.
332,
334,
335-338.
See
Saladin,
pp.
368-469.
(23)
Al-Yfinini,1,
p.
187.
Al-Makin,
p.
157,
159.
Nujim,
6,
p.
312. Ibn al-
Jawzi,
pp.
512-513.
(24)
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
520.
See also:
Sulak, 1,
pp.
360-361.
Nujiim
6,
pp.
312,
372.
Al-Makin,
p.
152-153,
159. B.N.
1703,
fol.
29A; 1702,
fol.
336B,
339A-B.
(25)
Abfi
Shamah, Shihab al-Din 'Abd al-Rahmin Isma'Tl,Tarajtm Rijdl al-
Qarnayn,
ed.
'Izzat
al-'Attir
al-Husayni,
Beyrouth,
1974,
vols. 6-7
(hence
Abfi
Shamah),
p.
176.
Sulak,
1,
p.
321.
Nujam
vol.
6,
p.
324.
B.N.
1703,
fol.
48B,
51A,
51B:
1702,
fol.
350B-351A.
Al-Makin,
pp.
155-156.
Al-Dhahabi,
Muhammad b.
Ahmad,
Al-'Ibar
fi
Khabar man
Ghabar,
ed.
al-
Munjid,
Kuwayt,
1960-1966,
vol.
5.
(hence-
al-Dhahabi),
pp.
175-176.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
9/25
128 A. LEVANONI
Mu'in al-Din's
death,
al-Sflih Ayyfib
ontinued
nominatingpeople
from
among
his chief officials
for
prominent
positions
in
Damascus(26). Among these Husim al-Din Ibn abi 'All was the
most
distinguished personality(27).
Al-Slih
Ayyfib
gave
him
command
of
the
army
situated
in
Syria,
in
addition to
extensive
executive
power.
Al-.Slih
Ayyfib
subdivided the
regions
he had
conquered
in
Syria,
Palestine
and Trans-Jordan nto
provinces
and
nominated
governors,
Nuwwdb,
over
them.
These
governors,
ike the
gover-
nor
of
Damascus,
were
directly
responsible
to the Sultan. It
should be noted here that these
arrangements
later
became
characteristicof the Mamluk period, either unchanged or only
slightlychanged(28).
In
Egypt
al-Sflih
Ayyfib
delegated
authority
to
functionaries,
secluding
himself
n
his
palace
or
leaving
the
country
to
go
on
military
expeditions(29).
Both
Mu'in;
al-Din Ibn
Shaykh
and
his
successor
Hussm
al-Din
Ibn
Abi
Ali
enjoyed
al-Sflih
Ayyfib's
full
confidencewhen
each served as
the
Sultan's
vice-regent,
Nd'ib al-
Saltanah,
so much so
that
he made each
in
turn
replace
him
in
the
Sultan's
pavilion,
al-dihlfz
l-sultdnf.
Although
al-S.lih
Ayyfib's
intentionin doing this was to demonstratehis presence in the
country,
he
went
so far as
to
allow his
prominent
avorites
o
enjoy
participation
in
royal
ceremonies.
In
the
case of
Mu'in
al-Din,
al-.Slih
Ayyfib
trusted
him with the Sultan's
pavilion
and
treasures
when he was
at the head
of
the
conquering
army
in
Palestine
in
1244
actually giving
him his own
position (3?).
When
IHusim
al-Din
stayed
at
al-S.lihiyya
in
1250 he fulfilled
the Sultan's
functions (31).
(26)
Al-Tawashi
Shihab al-Din was nominated as the Sultan's
vice-regent
t the
Damascus
Qal'ah (B.N.,
1703,
fol.
51B; 1702,
fol.
350B-351A.
Al-YA'fi'i,
fol.
102B.
Al-Makin,
p.
156).
Husam
al-Din was nominated
as
vice-regent
f the
city
of
Damascus
(al-Makin,
p.
156).
Jam~l
al-Din
Ibn
Matriah
eplaced
Hushm
al-
Din in
1246
(al-Makin,
p.
157).
Then Jamal
al-Din Ibn
Yaghmfir
was nominated
to the same office
al-Yifi'i
fol.
106B. B.N.
1702,
fol.
356B.
Al-Makin,
p.
158).
(27)
He
gained
al-Salih
Ayyfib's
full
confidence
hanks
to his
being
one of
the
few to have
stayed
with him
following
his downfall.
.Hushm
al-Din had been
imprisoned
at
Ba'al
Bek
for his
loyalty
to
al-.Slih
Ayyib.
Nujfim
6,
pp.
321,
326.
Al-Dawfdari,
7,
p.
359.
Sulark,
1,
p.
314,
321,
326,
332.
B.N.
1702,
fol.
322B, 357B; 1703,
fol.
22A, 45A,
60A.
(28)
Sulak, 1,
pp.
318,
320, 329,
338.
Al-Makin,
pp.
149, 156,
157,
158.
1703,
fol. 52A.
Al-Y5'fi'i,
fol. 104A.
Saladin,
pp.
298,
299.
(29)
Nujam
6,
p.
331.
Sulak, 1,
pp.
306-307, 318-319, 321,
330.
(30)
Sulak, 1,
pp.
318-319.
See also:
al-Makin,
p.
155.
(31)
Sulalk,
1,
p.
330. See also:
B.N.,
1702,
fol.
353A,
354B.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
10/25
THE MAMLUKS' ASCENT TO POWER
IN EGYPT
129
The
position
of
Shajar
al-Durr,
who was first
al-.Slih
Ayyfib's
slave
and
later
his
wife,
is the best
example
of the
extensive
authoritybestowed by
al-S.lih
Ayyfibupon those fewpeople that
he trusted. Needless to
say
that
Shajar
al-Durr's
position
in al-
S.lih
Ayyfib's
kingdom
was
a rare
exception
in
Islam as
women
never
enjoyed
formal
positions
in
the courts. She
ran
the
kingdom
affairs
during
his
[al-S.lih
Ayyfib's]
bsence on
military
expeditions.
Her
orders were
obeyed,
her decrees
were carried
out and
she
signed
with the seal of Umm
Khalil (32).
In
addition
to the broad
ruling
authority
she also
enjoyed
also
extensive
influenceover
the
army
since she was
familiar
with
his
[al-S.lihyyfib's]character and the positions of his Emirs and Mamluk-
s
1
3).
Al-S.lih
Ayyfib
ntroduced
court
regulations
preventing
direct
contact between
himself
and
position-holders
ower
than
that
of
the
top
officials
n his
kingdom.
Such
officialswere
not
accepted
by
the
Sultan,
but would discuss
the
requests
[that
they
had
addressed
to
the
Sultan]
with the
courtiers,
nd he
[al-.Slih
Ayyfib]
would
sign
them as confirmed
by
the clerks in
charge
of
correspondence 34).
III.
Al-.Slih
Ayyfb's
court
regulations
and his
system
of
bestowing
authority
on
people
close to
him,
did
not
cope
with
the
rule
of
maintaining
direct
connection
between the Sultan
and
the
army
and
the
bureaucracy,
that
Salh.
al-Din had been so
keen on
maintaining.
This did
not
endanger
al-S.lih
Ayyfib's position
personally,
because of his
strong
authority
and
the
loyalty
of
the
Mamluk units
with
which
he
surroundedhimself.
However,
when
he
grew gravely
ll,
later
dying
n
the
midst
of
the crisis
created
by
the Franks' invasion of Egypt (April 1249), a vacuum was created
and
his
government
procedures
and
the
homogeneous
composition
of his
army
enabled his officials
o take over
the
running
of the
kingdom's
affairs,
eaving
Tfirdnsh~h,
al-S.lih
Ayyfb's
son and
legitimate
heir,
as ruler
in
name
only.
Shajar
al-Durr
concealed
al-S.lih
Ayyfib's
death
in
the
middle of
the
war
against
the
Franks
(November
1249)
until
she
(32) Ibn Wasif, fol.64B, see also: Ibn Duqmaq, fol. 92A. Nujfim6,
p.
373. See also:
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
pp.
514,
515.
(33)
Strat
al-Zdhir,
p.
5.
(34)
Nujam,
6,
p.
331.
See
especially:
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
515. See
also:
1703,
fol.
67A, 74B;
1702,
fol.
359B-360A.
Al-Ydfi'i,
fol.
109A.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
11/25
130
A.
LEVANONI
was assured
of
the
support
of
the
army,
and
important
officials,
n
putting
Tfirinshih
on his father's
throne.
She shared her
secret
with
al-Tawishi Jamil
al-Din
Muhsin,
who had been in
charge
of
al-.Slih
Ayyfib's
Mamluks.
Shajar
al-Durr and
al-Tawishi
Muhsin
needed the
cooperation
of Fakhr al-Din Ibn
Shaykh
al-Shuyfikh(3)
who was the chief commander
of
the
army
stationed
in
Damietta,
since it
was
in
his
power
to unite the
army
in
time
of
crisis,
although
he was
not of the Mamluk
class(36).
With
Fakhr al-Din's
knowledge,
the
Emirs
stationed
facing
the Franks were
called
to
obey
al-S.lih
Ayyfib's
decree(37)
making
them swear
allegiance
to
him
and his son
after
him,givingFakhr al-Din command over the
army
and its
Atdbakiyyah,
s
well
as
running
he affairs
of
the
kingdom (38).
A
similar decree
concerning
the oath
of
allegiance
to be
given by
the honoraries
and soldiers
of
the
state (39)
n
Cairo
was
given
to the
Emir
Husim
al-Din,
the Sultan's
vice-regent
in
Cairo. The
swearing
of
allegiance
in
Cairo
was
attended
by
Egypt's
chief
Qidi,
Sadr
al-
Din Yusfif
Ibn
Muhsin
and
the
Qfdi Bahi'
al-Din
Zuhayr,
the
secretary
n
charge
of
the
correspondence
Bureau,
Kalib
al-Insha
'(40).
Once the army,
the
judicial bureaucracy
and
government
institutions
had all
given
their
consent,
Fakhr
al-Din
started
carrying
out the Sultan's
functions(41).
Study
of our sources reveals
that those
people
who
cooperated
in
keeping
al-Silih
Ayyfib's
death
secret until
Tfirinshih
was
brought
to
Egypt
were divided into two
groups
with
basically
contradictory
interests.
The
conflicting
nterests
of the two
(35) Concerning his history, see: B.N., 1703, fol.77A; 1702, fol.340A,
363A. Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
500.
Al-Dawadiri,
7,
pp.
359,
374.
Nuji~m,
6,
p.
320. Ibn
al-Wardi,
p.
258.
Suliak,
1,
p.
309,
322,
324,
327,
328, 331,
335.
(36)
B.N.,
1702,
fol.
362A-B.
Al-YMi'i,
fol.
110A-B.
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
514-
515.
Sulik,
1,
pp.
322,
342-343.
(37)
This
decree,
like those that
followed,
may
be assumed to have
been
forged
by
a
servant of
al-.Slih
Ayyfib.
See:
B.N.,
1703,
fol.
77A.
Ibn
al-Wardi,
p.
264.
Suliak,
1,
p.
344,
or else
by Shajar
al-Durr
herself.
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
515.
B.N., 1702,
fol.
362B,
1703,
fol.
76B-77A.
Nujiam,
6,
p.
374.
(38)
SulMk,
1,
p.
343.
See
also:
Ibn
al-Wardi,
p.
264.
B.N.,
1703,
fol.
76B;
1702,
fol.
362B.
On the
aidbakiyyah
bearer
in
the
Ayyubid
ruling
system,
see
al-Qalqashandi, vol. 4, p. 18. For examples, see: Saladin, pp. 54, 60, 112, 155.
(39)
Al-Dawfd~ri,
7,
p.
374.
B.N., 1702,
fol.
362B;
1703,
fol.
76B-77A.
(40)
B.N.
1703,
fol. 77A.
(41)
Op.
cit.,
1702,
fol.
362A-B.
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
516.
Al-Yfi'i,
fol.
l l0A.
Sulak, 1,
pp.
343-344,
345.
Al-Daw5dari,
7,
p.
375.
Al-Makin,
p.
159.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
12/25
THE MAMLUKS' ASCENT TO POWER
IN EGYPT
131
groups
and the
illegitimate way
in
which
Shajar
al-Durr
chose to
act,
indicate that
Tfirinshih's
inauguration
primarily
erved the
personal interestsof those who made himSultan. Shajar al-Durr
and
al-TawishT Jamil
al-Din
Muhsin
belonged
to the
Mamluk
institution
that had
been
the corner-stone of
al-S.lih
Ayyfb's
rule.
As mentioned
above,
Shajar
al-Durr had
enjoyed
extensive
authority
for
running
state
affairs,
whereas
al-Tawishi
Muhsin
held
the
sensitive
and
extremely
powerful
role of
running
both the
Mamluk units and
al-S.lih
Ayyfb's
retinue(42).
Since both were
part
of the late
Sultan's
Mamluk institution
nd
would
both
have
had to be
replaced
by
the
ascending
Sultan's new Mamluks
according to the norms of the Mamluk system(43), hey were
interested
n
helping
Tfirinshih
ascend
the
throne,
thus
guaran-
teeing
the new Sultan's
dependence
on them.
TOfirnshih's
unstable character
and
his lack of
familiarity
with the
Egyptian
political
system
further
ncouraged
them.
Unlike
Shajar
al-Durr and
al-Taw~shi
Muhsin,
Fakhr al-Din
Ibn
Shaykh
al-Shuyfikh
was a
political
rival of
al-S.lih
Ayyfb.
Fakhr al-Din
had
already toyed
with the
idea
of
taking power
when
al-S.lih
Ayyfb
ascended the throne
-
thanks to the
power
held by his family and his own popularity.
Al-S.lih
Ayyfb,
although having
once
imprisoned
Fakhr al-Din and
placing
him
under house
arrest,
ater
managed
to
use Fakhr al-Din's
power
to
promote
his own rule. He
appointed
him
as chief commander of
his
army
and showered
presents
upon
him( ).
Yet
deep-rooted
mistrust
between the two
still
existed.
It
sprang up
when
Fakhr
al-Din,
appointed by
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
to
protect
Damietta,
abandoned the
city
with its arsenals
and
military
supplies
to the
Franks when
they
attacked
his
camp.
Al-.Slih
Ayyfb
bore
Fakhr al-Din a grudgeforwhat he had done, but did not punish
him,
since the time
allowed
nothing
but
to forebear
and close
one's
eyes .
Ibn
al-Furit
notes
that if
al-.Slih
Ayyfb
had not
(42)
B.N., 1702,
fol.
362A; 1703,
fol.
75B.
AI-Yfifi,
fol.
O10A.
Suliik, 1,
p.
343.
(43) D. Ayalon, Studies on the Structureof the MamlukArmy ,Bulletinofthe
School
of
Oriental and
African
Studies,
XV/2,
1953,
pp.
206-208.
(44)
B.N., 1702,
fol.
340, 363A;
1703,
fol.
77A,
78B.
Suliik, 1,
pp.
309, 322, 324,
327,
328,
331,
335.
Nujiim,
6,
p.
320.
AI-Dawfddri,
7,
pp.
359,
374.
Ibn
al-
Jawzi,
p.
500,
Ibn
al-Wardi,
p.
258.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
13/25
132
A.
LEVANONI
died,
he would
surely
executed
him
when
the
battle was
over(45).
The
people
whom Fakhr al-Din had chosen
as
confidants
when
he was appointed Aldbakal-'Asakirhad been expelled by al-S5lih
Ayyfib.
BahW'
al-Din
Zuhayr
had been
expelled by
al-Sfliih
Ayyfib
from his
position
as
Katib
al-inshd'
due to
an affair for
whichhe bore
him a
grudge (4e)
ut Fakhr
al-Din restored
im
to
his former
position.
Jamil
al-Din
Ibn
Matrfih
had
been
removed
y
al-Silih
Ayyfib
rom
is
position
s the Sultan'svice-
regent
in
Damascus,
yet
later he was to become
Fakhr
al-
Din's close
friend(47).
Needless to
say,
all
three
were free-born
Muslims(48).
This made
their commitment o
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
somewhat ess obligatoryhan that of members f the Mamluk
establishment.
It
was not
surprising,
herefore,
hat both
Shajar
al-Durr
nd
Jamil
al-Din
Muhsin
made Fakhr al-Din
bring
Tfirinshah
back
from
Hisn
Kaifa and were on their
guard
against
his intentions
by
inciting
he Mamluks
gainst
him
whenever
hey hought
hat
he
meant
to
take
over the
rule(49).
Shajar
al-Durr seems
not to have taken
IHushm
l-Din
Ibn Abi
All into
her
confidence
n
spite
of his
prominent osition,
mainly
because of his devotion to
Tfirinshah,
which stemmed from his
former
relationship
with
al-Silih Ayyfib
which was reflected n
several
events
related
to
Tfirinshah's
arrival in
Egypt.
First,
Hushm
al-Din had
begged
al-.Slih
Ayyfb
to
bring
Tfiranshih
back
on timefrom
isn
Kaifa to
Egypt
s
part
of
his
preparation
or he
throne(50).
econd,
he was
quick
to act
to
bring
him to
Egypt
(45)
Ibn
al-Furat,
p.
19.
Sulak, 1,
p.
336.
B.N.,
1702,
p.
356B.
357A-B;
1703, fol. 63B-64B. Ibn Asbat, fol. 62A. De Joinvillewho describedLouis IX's
expedition
to Damietta
in
his memoires laims
that Fakhr al-Din deserted the
city,
for
he
thought
the Sultan died. Villehardouin and
de
Joinville,
Memories
of
the
Crusaders,
trs. F.
Marzials, London, 1957,
p.
175.
See also:
al-Yafi'T,
fol.
108B.
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
513.
(46)
B.N.,
1703,
fol.
71B; 1702,
fol. 363B.
Al-Yfinini,
1,
p.
185.
Sulak,
1,
p.
343.
Concerning
his
history,
ee:
B.N.,
1703,
fol. 71A-B.
Al-YnTini,
1,
pp.
184-189.
(47)
B.N.,
1702,
fol.
362B,
363B;
1703,
fol.
72B, 73B, 77A,
78A.
Sulak,
1,
pp.
332,
343-344,
345.
Ibn
Khalikin,
5,
pp.
302-303.
Ibn
al-Wardi,
p.
260.
Al-
Yfinini,
1,
p.
198.
Al-Makin,
p.
158.
(48) B.N., 1703, fol.6A, 21B, 24A, 82B.
(49)
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
515.
B.N.,
1703,
fol.
75B, 77A, 77B,
78A;
1702,
fol. 364A.
Al-Dawdiri,
7,
pp.
373-374.
(50)
Sulak, 1,
p.
360.
B.N.,
1702,
fol.
359A-B,
361B-362A,
364A.
Al-Y~fii,
fol.
98A-B,
113A.
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
500.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
14/25
THE MAMLUKS' ASCENT TO POWER
IN
EGYPT
133
following
l-SAlih
Ayyfib's
death
and his
messenger
was the first
o
reach
Tfirnshih
at
Hisn
Kaifa with
a
letter
urging
him
to come to
Egypt lest he lose the throne. Third, when he learnt that the
Sultan's
decrees were
forged,
he
imprisoned
al-'Adil',s
14
year
old
son,
the
Prince
al-Mughith
n
order
to
protect
Tfirinshih's
reign
from Fakhr al-Din's ambitions.
He feared that Fakhr al-Din
would
practically
rule
Egypt
through
the nominal rule
of
al-
Mughith(51).
Last but not
least,
even
after
Tfirinshfh
had
deposed
him from he
vice-regency,
e tried to defendhim
against
the
rebel Mamluks at
Ffris Kfir(52).
It seems that
Shajar
al-Durr
and
al-Tawashi
Muhsin
used a
political play in choosingFakhr al-Din,
Tfirnshah's
politicalrival,
to
play
a
part
in his ascent to
the
sultanate
ratherthan
.Husim
al-
Din,
his faithful
lly. They
thus increased
Tfirinshah's
depen-
dence
on
them,
since
they
alone could
restrain Fakhr al-Din's
aspirations.
On his
way
to
Egypt,
Tfiranshih
planned
to kill
Fakhr
al-Din
for
fear
of
his
ambitions.
He was
greatly
relieved
when he
heard of Fakhr al-Din's
death,
during
a
sudden attack
by
the Franks
on the
Muslims near
al-Mansfirah (9th
February
1250).
Upon
Fakhr al-Din's
death a new
aidbak
was not
nominated and
Shajar
al-Durr took over
military
affairs in
addition to the
treasury
ffairswhich
she
already
controlled.
It is
reported
that all matters
n
the
kingdom
were run
by Shajar
al-
Durr even before
Tfirinshah
reached
Egypt(53).
When
Tfirinshih
came to
Egypt
(23rd
February
1250),
he
adopted
his father's
policy
with
regard
to
ruling
patterns.
Like
his fatherbefore
him,
he
was
suspicious
of
his
Ayyubid
rivals,
and
relentlessly
strove to drive them out of
Egypt.
He
removed
al-Mughith
Fakhr al-Din
'Umar
Ibn
al-'Adil and
Fath
al-Din
Hasan
Ibn al-'Aziz to
jails
in Shaubak and
Damascus( ).
(51)
Sulak, 1,
pp.
344,
345-346.
Nujam,
6,
p.
372.
B.N., 1703,
fol.
77B, 78A,
78B; 1702,
363B.
(52)
Op.
cit.,
1703,
fol.
8B,
90A.
Suliik,
1,
p.
358.
(53)
AI-Yafi'i,
fol.
lllA,
113A.
Sulik, 1,
p.
351,
353.
Khitat, 3,
385. Ibn al-
Furst,
p.
39.
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
520,
Ibn
Wasif,
fol. 61B.
Al-DawadAri,
7,
p.
382. See also: Ibn
Habib
al-Hasan
b.
'Umar,
Kitdb
Durral
al-Asidk
fT
Dawlat al-
Alrak,
Biblioth6que
Nationale,
Ms.
Arabe,
No. 1719.
Cod. Arabe 688
(hence-
Ibn
Habib), fol.3B. Concerning hajar al-Durr's running he state affairs, ee: Ibn al-
'Ibri,
Ghrighuryus
bfi-l-Faraj,
Td'rikh
Mukhtasar
al-Duwal,
ed. Father
Anton
Salihani,
Beyrouth
1890,
p.
454.
(54)
B.N., 1703,
fol. 93B. Ibn
Khalikin,
5,
p.
178.
Sulik,
1,
p.
358.
Nujaim,
6,
p.
312.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
15/25
134 A.
LEVANONI
He maintained the
government
and
administrative
framework
established
by
his
father nd continued to
appoint non-Ayyubids
to key positions. In Damascus he retained Jamal al-Din Ibri
Yaghmfr
as vice-
regent(55).
In
Egypt
he
kept
Hushm
al-Din
as
vice-regent
for
about two
months,
but later dismissed
him,
replacing
him
by
Jamil
al-Din
Aqfish
al-Najibi( ).
Tfirinshih
also
adopted
his father's method
of
bestowing authority
on
officials,
outdoing
him
by surrounding
himself
with courtiers.
He
kept
away
from
people
more than his father had
done (57),
was one comment.
Like
al-S.lih Ayyfb
before
him,
Tfiranshah,
too,
strove
to
strengthen
his
power by introducing
his confidants into the
regime(58).
He
promoted
the
young
military
Emirs
leaving
the
older ones behind. Yet
Tirinshah
lacked his father's
political
wisdom,
as
he failed to
recognize
he resultsof the
changes
brought
about
by
his father'snew
rulingpatterns,
wherein he
political
and
military
powers
accumulated
in
the hands of his father's
confidants. Whereas
al-S5lih
Ayyib
knew
how
to
destroy
the
centers of
power
of the
previous
rule
gradually
and
tactically,
Tfirnshih
set about
removing
he veteran
army
Emirs
and
people
belonging
to the
previous
reign
as soon as the
fight gainst
the
Franks was over: He
wished
to establish his
kingdom
at the
beginning
.. When his fatherwished to
establish a new order in
his
kingdom,
he did so
gradually
and over a
long period (59).
Tfiranshih
accompanied
his
actions with a torrentof childish
threats
against
the
Bahriyya
veteran
Emirs
and
Shajar
al-Durr,
so
that the
latter were
able
to
anticipate
his
intentions,
ismiss them
or,
perhaps,
even eliminate
them(60).
Needless to
say,
Tfirinshih
had
great
trouble
carrying
out his
threat,
since
Shajar
al-Durr
controlled both the
treasury
and the
army.
Tfirinshah
had not
managed
to build
up
a Mamluk unit of his own
when he
was
murdered
by
the
Bahriyya
Emirs
instigated
by
Shajar
al-Durr
during
his
stay
in
his
army
camp
at
Ffris
Kfir
(5th
May
(55)
Sulfk,
1,
p.
352.
B.N.
1703,
fol.81A.
(56)
Sulik, 1,
p.
354,
358.
B.N.
1703,
fol.
84A, 88B,
1702,
fol. 372A-B.
(57)
Sulik, 1,
p.
359.
Nuja2m,
6,
p.
370.
(58)
Sulfk,
1,
p.
359.
AI-Dawfddri,
7,
p.
382. Ibn
Wasif,
fol.
61B.
B.N.,
1703, fol. 87B-88A.
(59)
B.N., 1703,
fol.
89A; 1702,
fol. 371B.
Ibn
Duqmaq
fol.
88B-89A.
(60)
When
Tfirnshfh
got
drunk,
he
would
chop
off
andle-tops
with his
sword,
maning
each one
for
Bahriyyah
Emir,
declaring
he
would do the same
to all of his
father's Mamluk
Emirs
(al-YfiT,
fol.
113A).
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
16/25
THE
MAMLUKS' ASCENT
TO POWER IN
EGYPT
135
1250)(6).
Yet it
seems
that
although
Toirnsh5h's
conduct
made the
administration
and
army
personnaly
resent
him,
it
did not sufficiently ustify the overthrow of
Ayyubid
rule in
Egypt.
There
had been
Ayyubid
rulers who
had
conducted
themselves in
a
similar
fashion;
they
had,
indeed,
been over-
thrown,
but were
substituted
by
other
Ayyubid
rulers.
Moreover,
such
substitutions
had
taken
place
with
Ayyubid
aid
and
encouragement.
Thus,
for
example,
al-SAlih
Ayyfib
had
been
invited to
rule
n
Egypt,
replacing
his brother
l-'Adil,
as
the
result
of
cooperation
between
al-Kimiliyyah,
al-Kamil's
Mamluks,
and
al-Nisir
D5'ud,
the
governor
of
al-Karak(62).
This
exampleindicates that
al-.Slih
Ayyfib's
new
patterns
of
ruling
had
paved
the
way
to
undermining
he
line
of
Ayyfib;
Tfiranshah's
conduct
served
as
a
catalyst
for
a
process
that
had
started
prior
to
his
arrival in
Egypt.
Circumstances on
al-.Slih
Ayyfib's
arrival in
Egypt
differed from
those
prevailing
there
on
the
arrival of
Tfirnshlh.
Whereas
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
had
found
a
balanced
ruling
system
n
Egypt
following
he
rulingpatterns
established
by
Salih
al-Din,
Tfirinshih
found
a
crystallized
coalition of
involved
administration and
militarypersonalities eager
to
preserve
the
favours
they
had obtained
during
al-S.lih
Ayyfib's
ife-time.
A
further
ndication
that
al-S.lih
Ayyfib's
new
ruling patterns
which
originated
n
Egypt
served as the main
element
conducive to
the
overthrow
f
Ayyubids may
be found n
Damascus
during
the
period
following
he
Mamluk
revolt in
Egypt. Ayyubid
control
over
Syria
had weakened due
to the new
ruling patterns
established
by al-Slih
Ayyfib.
As mentioned
earlier,
he
had
appointed
non-Ayyubidgovernors
directlyresponsible
to him
over
his Syrian provinces and had also stationed a Salihite Mamluk
army
there.
All
these
might
have
made
Damascus
identify
with
the
Mamluk rebellion
n
Egypt.
Yet,
factors
n
Damascus refused
to
recognize
the
rebels,
and,
upon
learning
of
Tfirinshih's
death,
(61)
Following
his
murder,
the
HIalqah,
Tfirinshih's
Mamluk
body-guard,
numbering
ome
fifty
men
B.N.,
1702,
fol.
364B;
1703,
fol.
79A,
90A)
as
well
as
his
personal
servant
and
retinue,
escaped
(Ibn
al-Furdt,
p.
42.
B.N.,
1703,
fol. 91A.
Al-Makin,
p.
160. Abfi
Shfmah,
p.
185,
Ibn
Wasif,
fol.
61B).
(62) Compare Sulak, 1, pp. 357-359 with: Ibn Duqmiq, fol.86B-87A. Al-
Makin,
p.
148.
B.N.,
1702,
fol.
352B.
Compare
also al-'Adil's
conduct on the throne
(op.
cit.,
1703,
fol.
7A)
with
Tfirknshih's
(op.
cii., 1702,
fol.
327A;
1703,
fol.
87B,
89A).
Al-Dawiddri,
7,
p.
339.
See
also:
Ibn
Duqmiq,
fol.
88A.
AI-Yfnini,
1,
160.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
17/25
136
A.
LEVANONI
ensured
that
Damascus receive another
Ayyubid
ruler,
al-Ndsir
Salh.
al-Din
Yusfif(as).
Circumstancesprevailing n Damascus duringthat periodmust
have
been closer to the
traditional
Ayyubid ruling
pattern
than to
those
established
by
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
n
Egypt.
The
structureof
the Damascus
army
was
heterogeneous
and still retained a
large
group
of Kurdish
Emirs out of the
Qaymariyyah.
As
mentioned,
this
army
structure
guaranteed
the
balance
typical
of
Ayyubid
armies and
ensured the
strong probability
of the
Ayyubid's
dynasty's
rule. Unlike the
position
n
Egypt,
Tfirnshah
retained
direct hold over the Damascene
treasury,
consequently
enjoying
both administrative nd military upport(64). Prior to his arrival
in
Egypt,
Tfirnshah
bestowed
privileges
on the Damascus
administration,
and
distributed all the
money
in the Damascus
treasury,
300,000
dinars in
all,
among
the
military
Emirs
of
Damascus,
adding
more
money
that he had to send for from l-
Karak(86).
When
Tfirnshih
arrived
in
Egypt
the
pragmatic
policy
laid down
by
Sal.h
al-Din
for
Ayyubid
rule had
already
gone.
Unfortunately
orthe
Ayyubids,
Tfirinshih's
conduct was
not concerned
with
restoring
the old
Ayyubid
order
but
with
consolidating
his
personal
rule
by adopting
his father's
patterns
of
rule. Thus the nominal removal
of
the
Ayyubids
was
a
question
of time and
the
time
was
ripe following
he Mamluk
victory
over
the Franks
in the
battle
of
al-Mansfirah(66).
IV. Mamluk
victory
over the Franks
in
the
battle of
al-
Mansfirah,
gained
in
spite
of the absence of
an
Ayyubid
sultan,
gave
the Mamluks
not
only
a claim to
the
traditional
title of
defenders
of Islam but also
a
moral basis for their demand
to
continue
al-.Slih
Ayyfib'srulingpatterns in Egypt. It laid the
foundation
for
retainingkey positions
n
the hands of the
Sfilihite
centers
of
power,
or rather
those
of
Shajar
al-Dur and the
(63)
B.N.,
1703,
fol. 93B.
Abii-I
Fidd,
p.
183,
AI-Daw~ddri,
7,
pp.
385-
386.
Sulak,
1,
pp.
366-367.
(64)
B.N., 1702,
pp.
374A-B; 1703,
fol.
81A,
98B-99A.
Al-Yafi'i,
fol.
114A.
Al-DawAdAri,
,
pp.
385-386.
Sulalk,
1,
p.
366.
Al-Makin,
pp.
159-160.
Ibn
al-
Ibri, p. 354, al-Yfinini,1, p. 55.
(65)
B.N., 1702,
fol.
366A-B,
370A; 1703,
fol.
79B,
81A.
Al-Ydfi'i,
fol.
llOB,
112B. Ibn
al-Jawzi,
pp.
514,
516.
Sulilk, 1,
p.
352.
(66)
Ibn
al-Jawzi,
p.
517.
Sulak,
366-367.
Khitat,
3,
p.
385.
Al-Dawfddri,
7,
p.
376.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
18/25
THE MAMLUKS' ASCENT TO POWER
IN
EGYPT 137
Bahriyyah
Mamluks. This is
clearly
expressed by
their
treatment
of the
struggle
hey
led
against
Tfirdnshah ver
their
position
and
his subsequent murder at their hands: When he [Tfirinshah] s
safe
and sound he'll
chop
everything
ff...
which will
eventually
lead
to
the
extinction
of
the
S.lihite
State (67).
By
the same
reasoning,
the
Bahriyyah
chose
to
make
Shajar
al-
Durr
Sultan( ).
Her
reign formally symbolized
the
continuing
rule
of
al-S.lih
Ayyfib.
Shajar
al-Durr
knew
how to
rule the
S.lihite
kingdom
n the same
way
as
al-S
lih
Ayyfib
had chosen to
rule it.
Al-S.lih
Ayyfib
had
approved
of
her
administering
he
kingdom
during
his
absence,
so that her ascent to the Sultanate
was but a direct continuation of her formal position in the
past(69).
Since she had been authorized
by
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
o rule
during
his absence
by
virtue of
being
the motherof his son
Khalil,
the Mamluks used
her
family
relation
to
al-S.lih
Ayyfib
to
symbolize
the continuation of his
rule(70).
Yet
Shajar
al-Durr's ascent
to
the Sultanate based
on
the
alliance between
her and the
Bahriyya-Jamdfriyya
Mamluks
actually
meant that the Mamluks
were
to rule
in
the
long
run,
since a
woman-ruler was an alien
idea to
the
Muslim
ruling
tradition, necessitating the co-rule of Aldbak al-'Asdkir. The
alliance between
Shajar
al-Durr and the Mamluks thus
brought
about
the revival of the role of
Aldbak al-'Asdkir,
nd its inclusion
in
the oath
of
allegiance
to
the
Sultan. Such an oath
made
the
formal
status of the
Aldbakiyya
equal
to that of
the Sultanate.
This formal
position
of the
Aldbakayya,
ndicating
the
army's
part
in the
rule,
could have
paved
the
way
to the time when the
Sultanate
would be
passed
on to
a Mamluk
figure
with no further
political
crisis.
Special
care was therefore
aken
in
the choice of
Atdbak
al-'Asdkir
during
this interim
period.
Obviously,
the role
of
Aldbak al-'Asdkir
would have
suited
one
of
the
prominent
Bahriyyah
and
Jamddriyyah
Emirs
if
they
had
had
a
single
unifying leadership.
Prominent
Emirs
such as Faris al-Din
(67)
Sirat
al-Zdhir,
p.
4.
(68)
The manner of
announcing
her ascent
to
the Sultanate was
unusual.
Compare
her ascension with those
of
Aybak
al-TurkmAni
B.N.,
1702,
fol.
376A;
1703, fol.113A) and al-AshrafMfisa Ibn Duqmaq, fol.92B-94A). For Muslims'
reaction
to
her
Sultanate
see: Ibn
Wasif,
fol.
62B.
Al-YOfi',
fol.
115A.
B.N.,
1702,
fol. 373A:
1703,
fol.
21A, 91B,
97B.
Nujim,
6,
p.
379.
(69)
B.N.,
1702,
fol. 373A.
Sfrat al-Zdhir,
p.
5.
(70)
Al-Y~fi'i,
fol.
114A.
Sulak, 1,
p.
362.
Ibn
Asb.t,
fol.
64B.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
19/25
138 A.
LEVANONI
Aqtay(71),
Rukn
al-Din
Baybars
al-Bunduqdari(72),
Sayf
al-Din
Balabin
al-Rashidi and Shams al-Din
Sunqur
al-Rfimi(73)
aspired
to be Sultan yet fear of their fighting mong themselves (74)
made them all refrain from
taking up
the
position.
Thus
they
were
eager
to choose a weak candidate forthe
Aldbakiyya
o
that
the
opportunity
o seize
it
would remain
open
forthem. The
AMd
bakiyya
was first ffered o
Hushm
al-Din;
Ibn
Abi
'All
and
once
he
refused,
t
was next offered o
al-Tawishi Shihfb
al-Din al-
Kabir,
who
also declined.
It
was
next offered o the Emir
Khass
Turk
al-Kabir who refused t as
well. The
fourth
nd final choice
was
'Izz
al-Din
Aybak
al-TurkmnTi.
When the Emir's choice fell upon Husim al-Din to be their
candidate,
they
claimed that
he
represented
al-.Slih
Ayyfib's
eign
better
than
anyone
else
in
the
Kingdom.
In
fact
this
formal
laim
was a half-truth ut
Husim
al-Din,
although
a
respectable
Emir,
was weak. When
he
was offered
he
Aldbakiyya,
he had no real
ruling
authority,
since
Tfirinshih,
about a month
prior
to his
murder,
had dismissed him
from
Niydbal
al-Sallanah(76).
Furthermore,
Husim
al-Din was a free-born Kurdish
Emir
so that his
position
in
any
army
with a
majority
of Turkish
Mamluks was rather vulnerable. There are many illustrations
for
the
vulnerability
of the Kurdish Emirs
in
the
.Slihite
army.
The
Kurdish
Emirs,
including
IjHuam
al-Din,
refrained
from
defending
Tfirinshih
on the
occasion
of his murder due to
their
weakness vis-a-vis the Mamluks of the
Bahriyya
and
Jamdariyya.
On the
11th
July
1250,
the
.Slihite
Mamluk Emirs
ordered the arrest
of some
Kurdish Emirs
in
order to
purge Egypt
of
pro-Ayyubids.
Husam
al-Din
was
very
anxious lest he
might
be
arrested and
special
messengers
were sent to assure
him that
he
would not be
harmed(76).
The
two
other Emirs offered his
position,
Shih~b
al-Din
and
Khass
Turk,
were both
Tawashiyya
Emirs,
that is to
say,
Emirs in
a
disintegrating
nit(77).
Their
not
belonging
o the
Bahriyya
and
(71)
Concerning
his
history,
ee
:
al-Yfi'i,
fol.
124B.
(72)
He was the commander
of
al-Jamddriyyah
nit.
Concerning
his
history,
see
:
Nujilm,
7,
p.
34
ff.
(73)
Al-Yfinini,
1,
p.
55.
(74) Op. cit.
(75)
B.N.,
1703,
fol.
91A-B, 1702,
fol.
373A,
375B-376A.
(76)
B.N.,
1703,
fol.
88B,
90A,
94B.
(77)
D.
Ayalon,
Studies
on
the Structure
of
the
Mamluk
Army ,
Bulletin
of
the
School
of
Oriental and
African
Studies,
vol.
XV/3, 1953, pp.
464.
This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),
20/25
THE
MAMLUKS'
ASCENT
TO
POWER IN
EGYPT
139
Jamddriyya
was well-demonstrated
n
their lack of
enthusiasm
about
fighting
or he Mamluks when the
latter
faced
the
Ayyubid
army,headed by al-NBsirYusfif, t al-Sanih on the 3rd September
1250(78).
'Izz
al-Din
Aybak
al-Turkmani was
chosen
by
the Emirs
because
he was one of the
middle-ranking
Emirs
rather
than
one
of the
prominent
ones (7').
He served as
Aldbak
al-'Asdkir
for bout
three
months,
.e.
May-
August
1250.
On
22nd
July
news reached Cairo that
al-Nisir
Yusfif had entered
Damascus
by
invitation of
Jamil
al-Din Ibn
Yaghmfir
and the
Qaymariyyah
and that the
S.lihite
Mamluk
Emirs
were
imprisoned
there
following
his entrance. Yet the
Bahriyya and
Jamdfriyyah
Emirs did not doubt their rightto
rule,
attributing
he
separation
of Damascus from
Egypt by
the
Sultanate
to its
being given
to
a
woman(s8).
They
therefore
decided to make
Aybak
al-Turkmani
Sultan
for the same reason
for
which
they
had made
him
Atabak
-
they
considered
that
he
would
be
easy
to
depose
when the
right
moment came. So
they
said,
'we'll be able
to
remove
this one when we
wish,
for
he
is
powerless
and is
one of the
middle-ranking
Emirs'
(81).
Aybak
al-Turkmani
was Sultan for
five
days.
On the
day
following
his accession ceremony, he Mamluk Emirs realized tha