The Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns, 1862-1863

8/20/2019 The Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns, 1862-1863

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The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

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CMH Pub 75–6

Cover: Detail from Battle of Antietam ,by Thure de Thulstrup (Library of Congress)


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by Perry D. Jamieson

Bradord A. Wineman

Center o Military History United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015

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Introduction

Although over one hundred fify years have passed since thestart o the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues tomatter. Te orces unleashed by that war were immensely destruc-tive because o the significant issues involved: the existence o the

Union, the end o slavery, and the very uture o the nation. Tewar remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with oversix hundred thousand killed in the course o the our-year struggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the AmericanCivil War was no exception. Te seeds o the conflict were sownin the earliest days o the republic’s ounding, primarily over theexistence o slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict canbegin without the conscious decisions o those engaged in the

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way topaper over the division o the country into two camps: one thatwas dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limitits spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “hal slaveand hal ree,” and that could not stand.

Regardless o the actors tearing the nation asunder, thesoldiers on each side o the struggle went to war or personalreasons: looking or adventure, being caught up in the passions

and emotions o their peers, believing in the Union, avoringstates’ rights, or even justiying the simple schoolyard dynamico being convinced that they were “worth” three o the soldierson the other side. Nor can we overlook the actor that some wentto war to prove their manhood. Tis has been, and continuesto be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the proes-sion o arms. Soldiers join or many reasons but ofen stay in thefight because o their comrades and because they do not want to

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues o national impact shrinkto nothing in the intensely personal world o cannon shell andminié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly andonly culminated with the conquest o the rebellious Conederacy,


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the preservation o the Union, and the end o slavery. Tesecampaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared incommemoration o our national sacrifices, seek to rememberthat war and honor those in the United States Army who died topreserve the Union and ree the slaves as well as to tell the story othose American soldiers who ought or the Conederacy despitethe inherently flawed nature o their cause. Te Civil War was ourgreatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study andcontemplation.

RICHARD W. SEWAR, PH.D.Chie o Military History


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The Maryland andFredericksburg Campaigns

1862–1863

Strategic Setting

By the late summer o 1862, the American Civil War haddragged on longer than anyone on either side had expectedwhen the irst volunteers marched to war in April 1861. Aterlosing the opening battles at First Bull Run and Wilson’sCreek, U.S. orces enjoyed a measure o success. Union armiesand navies had advanced along the ennessee and MississippiRivers and won signiicant victories at Forts Henry and

Donelson, and at Shiloh, Pea Ridge, and Glorieta Pass. heyhad captured the important cities o Memphis and Nashville,ennessee; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Corinth, Mississippi.Most importantly, or the Union they had secured Maryland,Missouri, Kentucky, and the New Mexico erritory, as wellas areas o ennessee, Arkansas, Virginia, North and SouthCarolina, Georgia, and Florida.

Although 1862 began with promise elsewhere, Federal

armies ailed to make substantial gains in Virginia. BetweenMarch and June, Conederate orces deeated troops o Maj.Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks’ Department o the Shenandoahand Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont’s Mountain Department orcontrol o the Shenandoah Valley. From March to May, Maj.

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Gen. George B. McClellan sluggishly advanced the Army o thePotomac, the principal U.S. land orce in the Eastern heater, tothe outskirts o the Conederate capital at Richmond, Virginia,but altered on the verge o success. Ater General Robert E.Lee assumed command o the Conederate Army o NorthernVirginia rom the wounded General Joseph E. Johnston on 1June, he took advantage o McClellan’s hesitation. In the SevenDays’ Battles rom 25 June to 1 July, Lee launched a serieso ierce attacks that orced McClellan to retreat down theVirginia Peninsula to his bases on the James River. Althoughthe Army o the Potomac halted the rebel onslaught at MalvernHill, President Abraham Lincoln ordered a withdrawal to sae-

guard Washington in August, thereby bringing the PeninsulaCampaign to an inglorious end. Having secured the Conederatecapital, Lee continued his oensive and deeated Maj. Gen. JohnPope’s Union Army o Virginia—reinorced with elements romthe Army o the Potomac—at the Second Battle o Bull Run,twenty-ive miles southwest o Washington, D.C., on 28–30August. he Union battle cry “On to Richmond!” had thus arproved hollow as Conederate orces wrested the initiative in

the East.On 3 September, Lee

sought Conederate PresidentJefferson Davis’ approval tocross the Potomac River andinvade the North. Te generalbelieved that the weakened anddemoralized state o Union

orces ollowing their recentdeeats provided his army anideal opportunity or offen-sive action. Operationally, Leesought to destroy the Baltimoreand Ohio Railroad, a vital east-west Union supply line; imposethe burden o sustaining his

army on Northern armlands,possibly into Pennsylvania;and encourage Maryland tosecede. Davis recognized themerits o Lee’s proposal, and

General McClellan(Library of Congress)


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considering that an immediate invasion might enhance thechances or gaining French and British recognition o an inde-pendent Conederacy, Davis quickly gave his assent (see Map 1).

On 4 September, as bands played “Maryland, My Maryland,”an anthem written by Marylander James Ryder Randall, whoselyrics implored his native state to secede, the first units o Maj.Gen. Daniel H. Hill’s Conederate division crossed the PotomacRiver into Maryland at Point o Rocks. Tey cut the Baltimoreand Ohio Railroad’s line, disrupted communications betweenWashington, D.C., and Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and advancedtoward Frederick, Maryland. Te next day, Maj. Gen. Tomas J.“Stonewall” Jackson’s Lef Wing command crossed the river at

White’s Ford, while Maj. Gen. James E. B. “Jeb” Stuart’s cavalry,screening the army’s right flank, crossed on 5 September. By 6September, Jackson occupied Frederick, where he was joinedby Lee and Maj. Gen. James Longstreet’s Right Wing one daylater. When darkness ell on 7 September, most o the Armyo Northern Virginia was camped near Frederick. Te orcenumbered about 50,000 men.

From his position at

Frederick, Lee could move tobreak up the Baltimore andOhio Railroad just south otown at Monocacy Junction;disrupt the Chesapeake andOhio Canal, whose course ranparallel to the Potomac; advanceinto Pennsylvania, eint toward

Baltimore or Philadelphia; andthreaten Washington. Despitehis proclamation to the peopleo Maryland, however, thelargely pro-Union popula-tion gave the invaders a coolreception. A small number oSouthern sympathizers turned

out with muted enthusiasm, butthe Conederate army attractedew recruits and the expectedpopular uprising never mate-rialized. Local armers and

General Jackson(Library of Congress)


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WASHINGTON, D.C.G I N I A

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Union Movement

Confederate Movement


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millers even demanded that Conederate purchasing agents paythem in U.S. currency.

Meanwhile, in Washington, the task o rebuilding Federalorces afer the twin debacles o the Peninsula and ManassasCampaigns occupied the attention o Union leaders. OverSecretary o War Edwin M. Stanton’s objections, on 2 SeptemberPresident Lincoln placed McClellan in charge o the deenses o thecapital with the specific task o putting the army back into fightingshape. Despite all his aults, McClellan seemed the best and mostreadily available choice. As the president told his secretary, JohnHay, no one could “lick these troops o ours into shape hal as wellas” McClellan.

McClellan met the challenge. He unquestionably remainedpopular with the men, prompting Lincoln to remark to Secretaryo the Navy Gideon Welles, “McClellan has the army with him.”With a minimum o delay, the general integrated the new recruitscoming to Washington, merged the units o the ormer Armyo Virginia into the Army o the Potomac, and organized a newcohesive orce o eight army corps. Despite the misgivings o

Confederate troops in Frederick, Maryland (Historical Society of Frederick County)


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his critics, McClellan restoredthe Army o the Potomac tocombat efficiency in less timethan many—including Lee—hadthought possible. Yet, by the timenews o Lee’s invasion reachedWashington, Lincoln still hadnot decided who should leadthe army in the field. Afer theleading candidate, Maj. Gen.Ambrose E. Burnside, declinedthe president’s offer, McClellan

took it upon himsel to assumecommand o troops in the field.

Directing Maj. Gen. SamuelP. Heintzelman to guard thecapital with the III and XI Corps,McClellan began marchingnorth on 4 September with about84,000 men. He ormed the

six remaining corps into threesubordinate commands and areserve. Burnside commanded the Right Wing, which consisted othe I Corps and his own IX Corps; Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner—the oldest active corps commander in the Civil War at age sixty-five—commanded his own II Corps and the XII Corps in theCenter Wing; and Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin’s VI Corps, rein-orced by an additional division, constituted the Lef Wing. Maj.

Gen. Fitz-John Porter ollowed with the V Corps as a reserve. By7 September, as the last Conederates crossed the Potomac to jointhe rest o Lee’s army at Frederick, Union advanced units reachedRockville, Maryland, just twenty-five miles away.

Loyal Marylanders cheered and raised the troops’ spirits asthe Army o the Potomac marched through their communities.Unsure o Lee’s intentions, Union leaders were concerned that theArmy o Northern Virginia would advance on Baltimore. “Ever

since the war began,” the Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser newspaper asserted in its 8 September edition, “and the[Union naval blockade] made effective, [the Conederates] have hadtheir eager eye on the supplies to be secured in this city. Tis hasbeen avowed.” McClellan thereore had Burnside advance his wing

General Burnside(Library of Congress)


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north to Brookeville to be inposition to intercept an advancein that direction. Te Generalin Chie o the Union Army,Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck,warned McClellan that Leemight also recross the Potomacto strike Washington rom thesouthwest. McClellan, thereore,kept Franklin’s command onthe north bank o the Potomacnear Seneca Creek to block that

possibility. Meanwhile, Sumner’scolumn took the direct routetoward Frederick and reachedMiddlebrook on uesday, 9September. McClellan then helda sixteen-mile ront just east oParr’s Ridge, halway betweenWashington and Frederick, and

much closer to the Army oNorthern Virginia than Lee realized. Te stage had been set or agreat conrontation.

Operations

As McClellan’s vanguard marched into Middlebrook on theninth, Lee contemplated his next move. He had assumed that when

he invaded Maryland that the Union garrisons at Martinsburg andHarpers Ferry, Virginia, would retreat, thus allowing him to shifhis line o communications west to the cover o the ShenandoahValley. Tose orces had not acted as he had anticipated, however,and he was reluctant to advance arther north while the two poststhreatened his rear. He confidently believed that he could deal withthe 10,000 men that held Harpers Ferry and a smaller number atMartinsburg, and decided to eliminate them beore resuming the

advance. On 9 September, he completed his plan or a new phaseo the campaign.Te Conederate general developed an operation in which he

divided his army into our parts. Jackson was to take three divi-sions west through Middletown, recross the Potomac to take the

General Sumner (Library of Congress)


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post at Martinsburg, and then move eastward to capture HarpersFerry. Maj. Gen. Laayette McLaws would lead his own and Maj.Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s divisions south to occupy MarylandHeights and capture any Union troops attempting to retreat north.Brig. Gen. John G. Walker would seize Loudoun Heights, on theVirginia side o the Potomac, and support McLaws and Jackson.Meanwhile, Longstreet’s wing would advance north to Hagerstown via Boonsboro to await completion o the Harpers Ferry encircle-ment. Lee assigned D. H. Hill’s division to initially ollow Longstreet,but to remain at Boonsboro to protect the army’s reserve artilleryand logistical trains. Afer the detached commands accomplishedtheir tasks, the Army o Northern Virginia would concentrate at

either Boonsboro or Hagerstown. Despite the daring division oorces and the ambitious timetable, Lee was confident o the plan’ssuccess. Lee counted on McClellan’s customary caution and thebelie that the Army o the Potomac was in a very demoralized andchaotic condition, and would probably not be prepared or offen-sive operations or another three or our weeks. I all went well, bythe time his opponent moved, Lee could be on the SusquehannaRiver threatening Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Col. Robert H.

Chilton, Lee’s assistant adjutant general, copied Lee’s plan asSpecial Orders 191, sending them on to the principal subordinatecommanders involved.

Te Conederates began leaving Frederick on 10 September.Jackson’s divisions initially marched northwestward as i headingtoward Pennsylvania, to mask the army’s true intentions, thenturned west to Williamsport. On the afernoon o the next day,his command recrossed the Potomac into Virginia. As Jackson

approached Martinsburg, Union Brig. Gen. Julius White orderedhis 2,500 troops to evacuate to Harpers Ferry, fifeen miles away,where he, despite his rank, subordinated himsel to Col. DixonS. Miles. As the Conederates converged, Colonel Miles did notevacuate as Lee expected, but prepared to hold the town. Byevening on 11 September, McLaws had gained Maryland Heightsrom the northeast, Walker occupied Loudoun Heights to thesouth, and Jackson approached Bolivar Heights rom the west, thus

surrounding the Union garrison. Lee then traveled to Hagerstownwith Longstreet’s command on the twelfh, while D. H. Hill’s fivebrigades halted at Boonsboro to act as rear guard and to watch, asnoted in Lee’s orders, “all the roads leading rom Harper’s Ferry, tointercept any Union orces that might escape.”


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As Lee entered Hagerstown, the lead Union unit in McClellan’sarmy—the IX Corps o Burnside’s wing—reached Frederick to apopular reception afer marching rom Brookeville via New Market.One New York inantryman wrote his amily that “the place wasalive with girls going around the streets in squads waving flags,singing songs & inviting the soldiers in or hot suppers.” Franklin’scolumn arrived rom the south, ollowed on 13 September by the IIand XII Corps o Sumner’s wing, and all cheered as joyously as hadtheir IX Corps comrades. McClellan’s uncharacteristically promptadvance to Frederick and the Conederates’ inability to meet Lee’sstringent timetable put the divided Conederate army in a vulner-able situation. Lee later acknowledged to Davis that McClellan had

moved “more rapidly than was convenient.”When elements o the XII Corps arrived at Frederick, Cpl.

Barton W. Mitchell and Sgt. John M. Bloss o the 27th IndianaInantry ound an envelope containing a copy o Special Orders191 wrapped around several cigars meant or General D. H. Hill.Sergeant Bloss realized that the document detailed Lee’s plan oattack “and what each division o his army was to do.” Te twononcommissioned officers took it to their regimental commander,

Col. Silas Cosgrove, who immediately carried it to Brig. Gen.George H. Gordon, their brigade commander. Gordon said whatthey ound “was worth a Mint o Money & sent it to GeneralMcClellan.”

Te intelligence gained rom the document disclosed thatLee intended to operate against Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg,but ruled out Halleck’s ear that the oray into Maryland wasmeant only to draw the Army o the Potomac north and leave

Washington vulnerable to a rapid strike rom the southwest.Discovery o the orders, at least temporarily, raised McClellan’sconfidence. “I have all the plans o the rebels,” he inormedLincoln, “and will catch them in their own trap i my men areequal to the emergency. . . . Will send you trophies.” McClellanthen boasted to Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, a brigade commander inthe I Corps, “Here is a paper with which i I cannot whip ‘BobbieLee,’ I will be willing to go home.” Still, McClellan ound room

or uncertainty. Te captured orders were now our days old andmay have been canceled, modified, or superseded. Moreover,the orders disclosed nothing about the strength o the opposingarmy. McClellan continued to overestimate, believing that heaced “not less than 120,000 men.”


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SOUTH MOUNTAIN

In order to reach Lee, McClellan needed to cross a majorbarrier, South Mountain, which was the northern extension oVirginia’s Blue Ridge Mountains. Te South Mountain range, some70 miles long with elevations exceeding 2,000 eet, could only becrossed in a ew places. Tree o these passes—urner’s, Fox’s, andCrampton’s Gaps rom north to south—thus became McClellan’simmediate objective. On the morning o Sunday, 14 September,Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno’s IX Corps o Burnside’s wing moved westrom Middletown and began reconnoitering Fox’s Gap, where theOld Sharpsburg Road crossed South Mountain (see Map 2).

Reno’s corps opened the bitter engagement when it encoun-

tered Conederate Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland’s brigade o D. H.Hill’s division. During the fighting, Garland was atally woundedand his brigade suffered more than a third o its numbers in casu-alties. Te fighting escalated in the afernoon when seven IX Corpsbrigades contested with seven brigades rom Hill’s, Brig. Gen.David R. Jones’, and Brig. Gen. John B. Hood’s divisions. Late inthe action, Reno was mortally wounded as the combat ended in atactical draw. Union casualties approached 900, and Conederate

losses were more than 1,100. Although they had to retreat romFox’s Gap, the Southerners had bought Lee some time.

Battle of South Mountain, by A. A. Fasel (Library of Congress)


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HARPERS FERRY14-15 Sep

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S O U T H M O U N T A I N A N D V I C I N I T Y

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Another sharp engagement took place one mile north nearurner’s Gap, where the National Road crossed South Mountain.Sometime afer 1630 on 14 September, Maj. Gen. Joseph “FightingJoe” Hooker led the I Corps o Burnside’s wing into action on thehigh ground east and north o the gap. When Union troops begantheir advance, an elderly woman who lived in the area waved herhands to warn the colonel o a New York regiment, “Don’t you gothere. Tere are hundreds o ’em up there. Don’t you go. Some oyou will get hurt!” Te I Corps soldiers encountered Conederatebrigades rom the divisions o D. H. Hill and Brig. Gen. DavidR. Jones, and the separate South Carolina brigade o Brig. Gen.Nathan G. “Shanks” Evans. Late in the engagement, Union General

Gibbon’s 4th, or “Black Hat,” Brigade o the 1st Division advancedalong the National Road into a head-on fight that sputtered out inthe gathering darkness. Te losses in the fighting near urner’s Gapwere roughly even with around 900 Union and 1,000 Conederatecasualties. Although the Southerners still held the pass when thefighting ended, their position had become untenable.

Meanwhile, five miles south o Fox’s Gap, the Union VICorps advanced toward Crampton’s Gap. Franklin, an overly

cautious corps commander, thought he aced more than the 1,000men—largely rom McLaws’ division—who held the gap underthe command o Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb. However, Maj. Gen.Henry W. Slocum elt differently. At about 1600, he led his Union1st Division up the slope into the gap. Te attack dislodged theConederates rom behind the cover o a stone ence. At that point,even the arrival o reinorcements could not stem the Union tide.Te remaining rebels retreated down the western slope o South

Mountain and lef the VI Corps in possession o Crampton’s Gap.With daylight ading, Franklin halted his column or the night, justsix miles rom Harpers Ferry. Te Conederates suffered almost900 and the Union about 500 casualties.

Afer darkness ell, Lee met with wing commander Longstreetand division commanders D. H. Hill and Brig. Gen. John B. Hoodnear Boonsboro. With the Union orces pressing into the SouthMountain passes, Lee decided to break off the Harpers Ferry opera-

tion, end the offensive, and return to Virginia. Concerned that aUnion advance threatened to outflank McLaws’ command, he senta dispatch at 2000 to inorm him, “Te day has gone against us.” Hecontinued, “Tis army will go by Sharpsburg and cross the [Potomac]river.” He then instructed McLaws, “It is necessary or you to abandon


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your position tonight.” Upon learning o the deeat at Crampton’sGap about two hours later, the Conederate commander inormedMcLaws that the elements o the army deployed to his north wouldretreat to Keedysville, between Boonsboro and Sharpsburg, toprotect McLaws’ withdrawal. When Lee arrived in Keedysville earlyon Monday, 15 September, he sent yet another order to McLawsstating, “We have allen back to this place, to enable you morereadily to join us. . . . [W]ithdraw immediately rom your positionon Maryland Heights, and join us here.” Lee soon decided, however,that the terrain at Keedysville was unsuitable, and he opted insteadto make a stand on the high ground around Sharpsburg, three milesaway. Afer sunrise, the army retreated along the Boonsboro Pike

and across Antietam Creek, where Lee concentrated D. H. Hill’s,Hood’s, and Jones’ divisions, and Evans’ brigade, in a deensiveposition on the armland just east o the Potomac River.

HARPERS FERRY

Meanwhile, on Sunday, 14 September, as the battles orthe South Mountain gaps unolded, Conederate orces pressedthe Union troops at Harpers Ferry rom three directions. Tat

afernoon, Southern gunners opened a heavy fire, with those oWalker’s command on Loudoun Heights proving particularlyeffective against the Union batteries. Jackson then ordered thedivisions o Brig. Gens. John R. Jones and Alexander R. Lawtonto demonstrate against the Union positions on Bolivar Heights asa diversion, while that o Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill shifed to theright toward the Shenandoah River and advanced along its westbank. As darkness ell, Hill’s men were positioned to turn the

Federal lef flank.When the morning og lited on 15 September, Conederateartillery resumed iring. Ater about an hour, Hill’s inantryadvanced against the Union lank. Sometime beore 0800,Federal battery commanders began reporting that they hadexpended all their long-range ammunition. At a council o warwith his subordinate commanders, Miles decided to surrender.Beore the white lag rose, artillery ragments mortally wounded

Miles—he would die the next day—leaving it to General Whiteto surrender the 12,500-man garrison. Although Lee was notyet aware o the all o Harpers Ferry, the victory had removeda threat to his rear and reed up a sizable portion o his armyor other duties.


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Also unknown to Lee, General McLaws had chosento ignore his army commander’s order to retreat across thePotomac. Since Franklin moved slowly on the night o 14–15September, McLaws shited two brigades rom MarylandHeights into two strong lines in Pleasant Valley, a mile and a halsouth o Crampton’s Gap. Franklin overestimated the numbero rebels beore him, and at 1100 on 15 September reportedto McClellan: “he enemy is in large orce in my ront, in twolines o battle stretching across the valley, and a large column oartillery and inantry on the right o the valley looking towardHarper’s Ferry.” Franklin continued, “It will, o course, notanswer to pursue the enemy under these circumstances.” By

that time, it was too late to go to the relie o Harpers Ferry.he events o 14–15 September—sti Southern resistance atSouth Mountain, Jackson’s capture o Harpers Ferry, McLaws’unilateral decision to urther delay the Federals rather thanwithdraw, and Franklin’s prevarication—would prove criticalin the battle that was to come.

ANTIETAM

While Franklin moved hesitantly through Crampton’s Gapon the fifeenth, other elements o the Union army respondedto McClellan’s order to pursue Lee’s army. Te Federals marchedthrough Fox’s and urner’s Gaps, down South Mountain’s slope to

Harpers Ferry (Library of Congress)


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Boonsboro and toward Sharpsburg. Having decided that the wingstructure used during the march rom Rockville had served itspurpose, McClellan disbanded the wings and directed Burnside,Franklin, and Sumner to resume command o their respectivecorps. Burnside, however, at first reused to accept the new assign-ment, believing the change had resulted rom Hooker’s request oran independent command. Te Army o the Potomac began todeploy on the high ground o the east bank o the Antietam Creekthat afernoon. Although it already presented an impressive sightto the Conederates, much o the Union army was still arrivingrom South Mountain and Keedysville when darkness ell. By1700, McClellan had established his headquarters in the two-story

brick home o Philip and Elizabeth Cost Pry. Located on a hillabout 300 yards up a lane rom the Boonsboro Pike, the positionoffered a view o the Antietam Valley. From there, McClellan andPorter studied the Conederate lines until 1730.

As Union orces concentrated against him, Lee had only threedivisions—D. H. Hill’s, D. R. Jones’, and Hood’s—at hand, with theother six still well to the south. Longstreet arrayed all his wing’sfield guns in clearly visible positions on the hills to discourage

an immediate Union attack. Lee, suffering rom the effects oa previous injury, had thus ar traveled by ambulance or mucho the campaign. Afer he spent the night o 15 September at theJacob Grove house on Sharpsburg’s town square, his staff erectedthe headquarters tents in a grove o trees on the north side othe Shepherdstown Pike just west o town on the morning o 16September. Tat morning, Lee mounted his horse or the first timesince late August. With the capture o Harpers Ferry completed,

five o the six detached divisions began returning to the army.Jackson arrived with those o Lawton, and J. R. Jones, ollowedby Walker’s division that afernoon. McLaws’ and Anderson’s divi-sions would not reach Sharpsburg until daybreak o the seven-teenth. Regardless o when they arrived, most o the reinorce-ments arrived exhausted afer a hard march. Te sixth division, A.P. Hill’s, remained at Harpers Ferry, to parole the prisoners.

Meanwhile, shortly afer 1300 on 16 September, McClellan

ordered Hooker’s I Corps across the Antietam Creek to be inposition to assault the Conederate lef, or northern, flank theollowing morning. I Lee had entertained any plans o continuingthe campaign toward Hagerstown or Williamsport, Hooker’s threedivisions, about 10,900 men, had effectively cut the Hagerstown


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Pike to close Lee’s route northward by 1800. Te XII Corps, about8,800 men commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, thencrossed the Antietam Creek and deployed about a mile to Hooker’slef rear. As the day closed, one o Hooker’s brigades engagedelements o Hood’s Conederate division in a conused firefight in astand o trees that veterans later called the East Woods. “We got allmixed up until we hardly knew each other apart in the darkness,”a member o the 5th exas Inantry recalled. Te fighting endedinconclusively in the darkness with neither side suffering heavily.

Hooker’s advance lef Lee only two options: retreat or assumethe deensive. Since retreating would admit deeat and relinquishthe initiative to McClellan, he chose to remain and fight on the

Maryland side o the Potomac. He resolved not to fight a passivebattle but to conduct an active deense, making strong counterat-tacks and seeking opportunities to wrest back the initiative andresume the offensive.

As day broke on the morning o 17 September, Lee stoodgreatly outnumbered. A diet o green corn and apples, exhaustingmarches, straggling, and casualties sustained at South Mountainhad severely reduced Conederate numbers to about 38,000 men

present and fit or duty. Te rebels were in a serious position withtheir backs against the Potomac River. I the battle went badly,retreat would prove perilously difficult, as the only viable routeback into Virginia crossed at what the local residents variouslycalled Boteler’s, Blackord’s, Pack Horse, or the ShepherdstownFord (see Map 3).

Lee’s line ran roughly north to south along a six-mile ront,with Jackson commanding the divisions on the lef, or north, and

Longstreet those on the right. Most o Stuart’s cavalry divisionscreened beyond Jackson’s lef flank to the Potomac River. TeConederates had positioned both horse and mounted artillerybatteries on the high ground called Nicodemus Heights—on thearm owned by Joseph and Mary Anne Poffenberger—to supportthe inantry o J. R. Jones’ and Lawton’s divisions in that sector.Afer Hood’s division had retired ollowing the skirmish in the EastWoods, it took a reserve position behind the simple white brick

house o worship belonging to a congregation o German BaptistBrethren, or “Dunkers.” In Longstreet’s sector, D. H. Hill’s divisionand Evans’ independent brigade held the center o the Conederateline as it continued southward. On the right, D. R. Jones’ divisiondeployed below the Boonsboro Pike, with one brigade orward


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to cover a three-arched stone bridge, alternately called the LowerBridge because it stood the arthest downstream or the RohrbachBridge or its proximity to Henry Rohrbach’s arm. Walker’sdivision anchored the extreme right o Lee’s line, with Col. Tomas. Munord’s cavalry brigade screening beyond Longstreet’s flank.McLaws’ and Anderson’s divisions initially constituted a reserve,while A. P. Hill’s remained at Harpers Ferry.

McClellan later wrote that he planned “to make the mainattack upon the enemy’s lef—at least to create a diversion inavor o the main attack, with the hope o something more byassailing the enemy’s right—and, as soon as one or both o theflank movements were ully successul, to attack their center with

any reserve I might then have on hand.” Te Army o the Potomac,like Lee’s, had lost men to straggling and combat, and althoughabout one-ourth o them were inexperienced, McClellan still hadabout 72,700 effective men. Afer initiating the action the previousafernoon, he decided to attack on 17 September and not wait orall o his units to arrive. Franklin’s VI Corps would march in romPleasant Valley at about noon, but would remain in reserve. Tesingle division o the IV Corps would not reach the battlefield

until 1100 the day afer the battle, and Brig. Gen. George Sykes’ 2dDivision o the V Corps would not get there until 19 September.

Battle of Antietam , depicting the Union charge,by Thure de Thulstrup(Library of Congress)


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When the sun rose at 0543, 17 September, the sporadicskirmishing became more sustained, and Union guns opened aheavy fire that tormented the Conederates all day. D. H. Hilllater recalled that “all the ground” in his ront “was completelycommanded by the long-range artillery o the Yankees . . . whichconcentrated their fire upon every gun that opened and soondisabled or silenced it.” As the sun burned away the morningground og, a soldier in McLaws’ division noted in his diary thatthe day became “clear and warm.” Col. John B. Gordon, a regi-mental commander in D. H. Hill’s division, recalled that it “wasclear and beautiul, with scarcely a cloud in the sky.”

At about 0600, Hooker’s I Corps attacked Lee’s lef with three

divisions. One advanced southeast through the East Woods andanother pressed south down the Hagerstown Pike, with the thirdin reserve. “We had not proceeded ar,” Hooker reported, “beoreI discovered that a heavy orce o the enemy had taken posses-sion o a corn-field . . . in my immediate ront, and rom the sun’srays alling on their bayonets projecting above the corn could seethat the field was filled with the enemy, with arms in their hands,standing apparently at ‘support arms’ ” ( Map 4).

As the I Corps struck J. R. Jones’ and Lawton’s divisionswith terrible orce, the savage fighting covered the East Woods,the Cornfield and the pasture below it on David R. and MargaretMiller’s arm, and the northern part o the West Woods. In a littleless than an hour, Hooker’s attack shattered the two Southern divi-sions and drove Lee’s lef to the brink o disaster. Summoned tostem the onslaught, the hungry men o Hood’s small, two-brigadedivision doused their cooking fires beore they could eat breakast.

Te angry veterans stormed out o the West Woods in a headlongattack along the Hagerstown Pike and into Hooker’s reservedivision at the northern end o the Cornfield. Te counterattackrestored the lef o the Conederate line, but at a rightul price.Col. William . Wofford’s brigade, or example, lost almost two-thirds o its numbers, while the 1st exas Inantry suffered a stag-gering 82 percent casualties. Hood later characterized this fight as“the most terrible clash o arms, by ar, that has occurred during

the war.”Hooker’s corps had also taken heavy losses, possibly morethan a quarter o its members killed or wounded, and needed help.Mansfield’s two-division XII Corps moved to its support, aboutthe same time, or 0730, that A. P. Hill’s division lef Harpers Ferry


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or Sharpsburg. When Hooker was wounded, Brig. Gen. GeorgeG. Meade o the 3d Division assumed command, but the I Corpswas ought out and could do no more.

When the XII Corps advanced against the remnants o J. R.Jones’, Lawton’s, and Hood’s divisions, D. H. Hill detached threeo his five brigades rom the center to bolster the endangeredflank as stunned survivors o the earlier battle retreated out othe Cornfield. As soon as his corps entered the fight, Mansfieldreceived a atal wound, and despite the conusion that ensueduntil Union 1st Division commander, Brig. Gen. Alpheus S.Williams, took over the corps, its 7,600 soldiers, many o whomlacked previous combat experience, perormed well. One division

pressed into the Cornfield and drove some o Hill’s inantrymeninto the West Woods. Te other division advanced down theSmoketown Road. wo o its brigades turned the right flank oHill’s three brigades and orced back some o the Conederatebatteries. By 0900, afer taking heavy casualties, this attack hadrun its course as well, and halted.

A relative quiet settled over the devastated fields with thearmies in a stalemate. Federal orces had driven the Conederate

lef back a short distance but had ailed to make meaningul gains,a pattern that would repeat throughout the tragic, rustrating day.Union troops had hit the rebels hard enough to cause horrific

Confederate dead on Hagerstown Pike(Library of Congress)


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casualties, but not enough toachieve decisive results.

At about 0900, the axis oUnion attack shifed, as GeneralSumner’s II Corps advancedrom east to west. With itsthree brigades deployed inclose order, Maj. Gen. JohnSedgwick’s 2d Division ledthe way. It pressed across theHagerstown Pike during thequiet period and entered the

West Woods opposed onlyby the broken remnants oJackson’s divisions that hadengaged in the morning fight.General Williams wrote shortlyafer the battle: “Not an enemyappeared. Te woods in ront were as quiet as any sylvan shadecould be.” Afer it had advanced to the ar edge o the West Woods,

Sumner halted the division acing west. Sumner later stated that heintended to move Sedgwick’s division south against the exposedConederate lef, but beore he could initiate the maneuver, Leesent McLaws’ and Walker’s divisions hurrying north toward theWest Woods. Afer McLaws’ division moved into position onSedgwick’s exposed lef, or southern, flank at around 0920, theConederates opened a withering fire. Lt. Henry W. Sanord andhis comrades o the 34th New York Inantry ound themselves

“flanked and enfiladed by a vastly superior orce.” Lt. Col. FrancisW. Palrey o the 20th Massachusetts Inantry attested, “Te resultwas not doubtul. . . . In less time than it takes to tell it, the groundwas strewn with the bodies o the dead and wounded, while theunwounded were moving off rapidly to the north.” Pvt. Roland E.Bowen o the 15th Massachusetts Inantry admitted, “All handsran or dear lie.” Sedgwick’s 5,700-man division lost 2,200 totalcasualties, o which 373 were killed, within a matter o minutes in

the West Woods (see Map 5).Although McClellan had planned or simultaneous attacksagainst his opponent’s lef and right, so that a third assault couldbreak the center, he did little to ensure that the maneuver wascarried through. Instead o sending strong orces against multiple

General Meade(Library of Congress)


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points on the thin Conederate line, Union attacks repeatedlystruck limited sectors with only one or two divisions at a time.McClellan thus permitted Lee to reposition his outnumbered andwidely separated units to meet each threat in succession. By thetime the fighting on the northern battle area quieted down at 1030,Union troops had suffered some 7,280 casualties out o 26,000troops engaged, with the Conederates losing 6,500 o the 20,100they had committed to the fight.

Shortly afer Sedgwick’s 2d Division entered the West Woods,the main action shifed southward. Union Brig. Gen. William H.French’s 3d Division o Sumner’s corps came upon the two brigadeso D. H. Hill’s division that had remained in the Conederate center.

Hill’s men were posted along a arm lane that years o heavy wagonuse, erosion, and repair had transormed into a depression, whichthe local populace called the Sunken Road and which offered itsdeenders a ready trench. As French’s division reached the highground overlooking the lane, volleys o musketry tore into theirranks. Despite the fire, French’s attack made progress until GeneralAnderson’s division went to Hill’s assistance at about 1000, and waslater joined by some o Walker’s men. Meanwhile, the II Corps’ last

uncommitted unit, Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson’s 1st Division,arrived on French’s lef. Its lead element, Brig. Gen. Tomas F.Meagher’s 2d Brigade, better known as the Irish Brigade, enteredthe savage fight or the road later named the “Bloody Lane.”

Te arrival o Richardson’s troops proved too much or therebels, and several o their regiments broke. Te two Union divi-sions cleared the retreating Conederates rom the trench. In twohours o fighting, Union orces suffered more than 2,900 casual-

ties, including the mortally wounded Richardson, rom their10,000 engaged. Te Conederates suffered even more severely,losing 2,600 out o 6,800 engaged. By 1300, except or the artil-lery not silenced by counterbattery fire, all organized Conederateresistance in that sector had ceased, but the Union advance hadalso ground to a halt. Although it offered his best opportunity todrive a wedge into the Conederate center, McClellan was unableto discern the situation amid the smoke o battle as he watched

rom his headquarters.Around 1000, while the vicious fight or the Bloody Lane tookplace, Burnside received an order, issued at 0910, that directedhim to attack Lee’s right. Although McClellan had ended thewing organization two days beore, Burnside continued to regard


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sent units to find a suitable place to cross, the fight at the bridge—like those elsewhere on the battlefield—became a stalemate.

At 1100, Sturgis’ 2d Division took over the task o securingthe bridge. With a longer artillery preparation and covering firerom the rest o the 1st Brigade, Federal Brig. Gen. James Naglesent the 2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire Inantry advancingat the double-quick in columns o our with bayonets fixed towardthe bridge. Using the Rohrersville Road, which ran along the creekrom the southeast, the units came under plunging and flankingfire rom the Georgians. Col. Ezra A. Carman o the 13th NewJersey Inantry later wrote that “ully one third o the Marylandmen went down” and the 6th New Hampshire “was badly shat-

tered.” Te units in the column lost cohesion, and another attackended in ailure.

At about 1300, Sturgis ordered Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero,commanding his division’s 2d Brigade, to press the attack on a two-regiment ront. Led by the 51st New York and 51st PennsylvaniaInantry, the brigade charged the bridge and captured it.Meanwhile, General Rodman’s Federal division had finally crossedthe Antietam Creek at Snavely’s Ford, about two miles downstream,

and turned the deenders’ right flank. Te Georgians o oombs’brigade retreated west and joined D. R. Jones’ division, the onlydivision o the Army o Northern Virginia present that had not yetengaged in the battle. Lee had no other reserves available.

Afer it had secured what became known as the BurnsideBridge, the IX Corps rested and replenished its ammunition. At1500, it advanced westward with two divisions abreast and a thirdin reserve. I the corps succeeded in driving the Conederate right,

it would block the Harpers Ferry Road and cut the Southerners’only route o retreat to Boteler’s Ford and across the Potomac River.As the Union troops pressed hard against D. R. Jones’

division and threatened the Army o Northern Virginia withdestruction, A. P. Hill’s “Light Division” reached the battlefield.Afer marching about seventeen miles rom Harpers Ferry, Hill’sdivision attacked the Union IX Corps in the lef flank. ConederateBrig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg’s South Carolina brigade collided with

Col. Edward Harland’s 2d Brigade o Rodman’s 3d Division in thecornfield o John Otto’s arm. A veteran o the 1st South CarolinaInantry described the Union troops as “in a crouching disorderlyline” as his regiment “poured into them volley afer volley, doubt-less with terrible execution.” In the ensuing battle, Rodman ell


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rom his saddle afer receiving a mortal wound in his chest, whileConederate Brig. Gen. Lawrence O. Branch died instantly o aatal head wound. As the sun set toward the Potomac River, theIX Corps retreated to positions that covered the hard-won bridgeas the fighting came to an end. Out o the 7,150 men in Jones’and A. P. Hill’s divisions, the Conederates suffered 1,120 casual-ties, while those o the IX Corps exceeded 2,600 out o the 13,800engaged. All told, Union orces had suffered 2,100 dead, 9,500wounded, and 750 captured or missing, or a total o about 12,400casualties. Te Conederates lost 1,550 killed, 7,750 wounded,and 1,020 captured or missing, or about 10,400 total casualties.Put another way, the bloodiest single-day battle in United States

history claimed 22,720 American soldiers as casualties.When the sun rose on Tursday, 18 September, the two

exhausted armies aced each other across the battlefield. TeArmy o Northern Virginia had no resh divisions. Te continuedpresence o the battle-weary Army o the Potomac, albeitstationary, exerted enough pressure to orce Lee out o Maryland.McClellan sent a telegraph message to Halleck, “Te battle oyesterday continued or ourteen hours, and until afer dark.

We held all we gained, except a portion on the extreme lef.” Heinormed Halleck that the army had suffered heavy losses, “espe-cially in general officers.” Although he concluded by predicting,

The charge at Burnside Bridge, by Edwin Forbes(Library of Congress)


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“Te battle will probably be renewed today,” it remained quiet.Tat night, the Southerners retreated across Boteler’s Ford intoVirginia. Purportedly, one unit crossed as a regimental bandbegan to play “Maryland, My Maryland,” but the soldiers quicklyshouted it down.

Lee withdrew toward Martinsburg in the northernShenandoah Valley, leaving a rear guard consisting o his reserveartillery and some inantry to discourage pursuit. A detach-ment rom Porter’s V Corps crossed the Potomac to probe theConederate deenses and captured our artillery pieces beore theend o the day. On the morning o 20 September, A. P. Hill attackedthe bridgehead just east o Shepherdstown and orced the Union

troops back across the river. One unit in combat or the first time,the 118th Pennsylvania Inantry, or Philadelphia “Corn Exchange”regiment, ound to its horror that a large number o its 1853Pattern Enfield rifles proved deective, and suffered 269 casualties,more than a third o its numbers. Afer giving brie considerationto recrossing the Potomac at Williamsport, Lee conceded that hisinvasion o the North had ailed. He decided that his army badlyneeded to recuperate and to collect and orce its many stragglers

back into the ranks. Te Maryland Campaign thus came to an end.Despite his strategic victory, McClellan was reluctant to move

until he had received all the supplies he thought necessary or a newcampaign. As he gathered strength, news arrived that Federal orcesunder Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell had rebuffed the Conederateinvasion o Kentucky at the Battle o Perryville on 8 October. Buell,however, was no more aggressive than McClellan, and a rustratedPresident Lincoln labored to get his generals to seize the initia-

tive. Afer paying a personal visit to McClellan’s headquarters inthe field, and waiting a week or the general to obey his order toadvance, the president tried to prod him by letter. Weeks passed,and afer repeated assurances that the army would move, it finallydid so, albeit slowly, on 2 November. Tree days later, convincedthat McClellan would not wage a vigorous campaign, the presidentdirected General in Chie Halleck to relieve him and to appointGeneral Burnside in his place. On 7 November, carrying the neces-

sary orders rom Secretary o War Stanton, the War Department’sadjutant general, Brig. Gen. Catharinus P. Buckingham, boarded aspecial train rom Washington or the Army o the Potomac’s fieldheadquarters. Meanwhile, lef unmolested in the Shenandoah Valleyor nearly two months, the Army o Northern Virginia had recov-


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ered its strength and spirits as conscripts and recruits had arrivedand stragglers and convalescents returned to their units (see Map 7 ).

BURNSIDE TAKES COMMAND

Arriving at Burnside’s headquarters, General Buckinghampresented him the appointment orders. o “my surprise, the shock,&c.,” recalled Buckingham, Burnside resisted accepting, partiallyout o loyalty to McClellan and partially due to his own lack osel-confidence, having twice beore declined. Afer the adjutantgeneral inormed him that McClellan would be relieved anyway

and that the only logical choice afer Burnside was his rival Hooker,Burnside reluctantly accepted the command. Perhaps Burnsidehad known best. Although he had enjoyed some success withan independent command in operations on the Carolina coast,his perormance at Antietam had lef much to be desired. Oncehe took command o the Army o the Potomac on 7 November,however, he asserted his authority immediately.

Burnside reorganized the Army o the Potomac into

three subordinate commands called Grand Divisions, eachconsisting o two corps, to emulate the structure used byNapoleon Bonaparte. He appointed Generals Sumner, Hooker,and Franklin to command the Right, Center, and Let GrandDivisions, respectively. He then planned an operation in which

Lincoln and McClellan meeting after the Battle of Antietam(Library of Congress)


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he intended to deceive Lee and move on Richmond. Part othe army would irst eint toward Culpeper, while the restmarched quickly to cross the Rappahannock River and seizeFredericksburg. Using the town as a logistical base, he wouldpush on to capture the Conederate capital—and possibly endthe war. Burnside presented his plan to Lincoln and Halleck.he president and the general in chie preerred that Burnsideadvance rapidly against Lee’s scattered orces along the lineMcClellan had initiated, but they reluctantly approved the newarmy commander’s plan. Burnside issued the necessary ordersor the delivery o pontoon bridges and stockpiles o suppliesor the upcoming campaign to the ports o Aquia Harbor and

Belle Plain on creeks o the Potomac River about ourteen andten miles north o Fredericksburg, respectively.

Te plan initially enjoyed surprising success. Burnside hadcompletely deceived Lee, compelling him to rush most o his armysouth o the North Anna River in an effort to get in position romwhich he could block the way to Richmond. When Sumner’s RightGrand Division arrived at Falmouth on the Rappahannock oppositeFredericksburg on the night o 17 November, only a Conederate

cavalry regiment, our inantry companies, and a light battery oartillery—about 400 men in all—deended the city. However, thepontoon bridges had not yet arrived, and with the water level toohigh or wagons and artillery to ord the river, Union orces couldnot exploit the opportunity the situation presented. When therest o the Army o the Potomac arrived two days later, Hookersuggested crossing at United States Ford, just a ew miles upriver.Burnside, aware o the problems McClellan had experienced when

a river had divided his orces on the Virginia Peninsula, worriedthat the high water would only permit part o his army to cross,and so he chose to wait.

Lee used the delay to his advantage and moved the first unitso his army to the high ground behind the Rappahannock, insteado some twenty miles to the south along the North Anna, as heinitially intended. Although uncomortable with this deploymentbehind Fredericksburg, President Davis rejected Lee’s sugges-

tion to hold the more tenable line arther south and closer to thecapital, lest it be viewed as a retreat beore the advancing enemy.In consequence, Lee ordered “Stonewall” Jackson to move his LefWing o the army with all possible speed rom the ShenandoahValley to join him on the Rappahannock.


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Bad roads, poor planning, a shortage o draf horses, andmiscommunication with the Quartermaster Department urtherdelayed the arrival o Federal pontoons at Falmouth until 25November. By that time, Conederate orces had prepared posi-tions that covered all the key crossing points. In the town oFredericksburg, Brig. Gen. William Barksdale’s Mississippibrigade o 1,600 men dug rifle pits and cut loopholes in housesand other buildings to contest the Union engineers’ bridgingoperation. Meanwhile, President Lincoln met with Burnsideaboard a steamer at Aquia Harbor to discuss the army’s nextmove. Te president proposed moving two smaller orces toPort Royal and the Pamunkey River southeast o Fredericksburg

to threaten Lee’s flank and rear. Burnside argued, with Halleck’ssupport, that such a move would be logistically more diffi-cult and require too much time and an unnecessary amounto coordination between orces to prove successul. Instead,Lincoln, Halleck, and Burnside examined the possibility ocrossing at Skinker’s Neck, about twelve miles downstream romFredericksburg. An engineer officer reconnoitered a suitableand lightly deended crossing site. However, the plan came to

naught when Burnside learned that elements o Jackson’s wingo the rebel army had begun to arrive in the area, and they wouldnow oppose a crossing. With his 120,000 men acing 73,000Conederates across the Rappahannock, the Union commanderrealized that he had lost all the advantages his army’s quickadvance had achieved.

Burnside’s subordinates offered alternative courses o action,which were considered and discussed or days, allowing the

Conederates even more time to improve their robust deenses.As the first week o December drew to a close, with discontent inWashington as well as within the ranks increasing, retiring intowinter quarters was not a politically easible option. Burnside hadto attack Lee beore the weather grew any worse. Where and howremained the questions.

On the evening o 9 December, Burnside called his subor-dinate commanders together at General Sumner’s headquarters

at Chatham Manor to present his plan o attack. he armywould cross at three sites simultaneously. Sumner’s Right GrandDivision would cross via two pontoon bridges at the northernend o town and on a third at the southern end o the city.Once across, Sumner would clear Fredericksburg and advance


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to dislodge the Conederates rom their deensive positions onMarye’s Heights, which dominated the elegraph and PlankRoads. Franklin’s Let Grand Division would cross using twobridges about two miles below town near the mouth o DeepRun and take control o the Richmond Stage Road. Burnsideplanned to hold Hooker’s Center Grand Division in reserve,ready to exploit the success o either o the other two. he chieo artillery, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, placed the army’s 312guns, with 147 o them on the advantageous high ground oStaord Heights, to support the crossing.

Burnside offered very ew specifics on what he expected themto do next, and when his subordinates expressed a lack o confi-

dence in the plan, he rebuffed their criticism. Despite the lack odetail, they reluctantly agreed to execute the plan to the best otheir abilities. Units began moving into position on the evening othe tenth.

FREDERICKSBURG

With so many men, horses, and equipment in motion, main-taining secrecy became impossible. At 0300 on the morning o 11

December, soldiers rom the 50th New York Volunteer Engineersregiment began moving their heavy pontoon boats down themuddy banks o Stafford Heights and into the icy waters o the

Union artillery battery at Antietam(National Park Service)


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Rappahannock. Alarm guns sounded on the opposite bank,sending Conederate soldiers scrambling to their rifle pits andortified cellars. As the unarmed engineers struggled to erecttheir bridges, rebel sharpshooters took them under fire. As thelight increased and og dissipated, the heavy musketry o therest o Barksdale’s Mississippians drove the engineers back. WithUnion inantry able to offer little support, the engineers retreated,regrouped, and tried again (see Map 8).

At noon, Burnside ordered Hunt to support the engineers

with as many heavy artillery batteries as possible to suppress theresistance. Te cannonade provided temporary relie and damagedmany o the town’s structures, but as soon as the firing ceased, therebels returned to their positions and continued harassing thebridge builders. Finally, at 1400, volunteers rom the 7th Maineand 19th Massachusetts Inantry crossed the Rappahannock inthree pontoon boats. Tey established a beachhead and drove thedeenders rom the riverbank, taking several dozen prisoners. Te

rest o the units and the 20th Massachusetts Inantry ollowedacross in short order, and the three regiments began to clear theMississippians rom Fredericksburg.

Union inantrymen took heavy casualties as they oughtstreet by street and house to house, but they orced Barksdale’s

Battle of Fredericksburg, Laying the Pontoon Bridges, by Thure de Thulstrup(New York Public Library)


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Documents

The Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns, 1862-1863