The Michigan militia: Political engagement or political alienation?

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The Michigan militia:Political engagement orpolitical alienation?Mack Mariani aa PhD student in Political Science at theMaxwell School of Citizenship and PublicAffairs, Syracuse University,Version of record first published: 21 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Mack Mariani (1998): The Michigan militia: Politicalengagement or political alienation?, Terrorism and Political Violence, 10:4,122-148

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The Michigan Militia: Political Engagementor Political Alienation?

MACK MARIANI

The split within the Michigan Militia leadership highlights a disagreement betweencompeting factions about the role militia groups should play in the political system.Norm Olson, the deposed commander of the group, rejects political participationentirely and focuses on the militia's paramilitary role. The leadership that replaced himunder Lynn VanHuizen and Tom Wayne actively engages the political system, usingtactics resembling those of modern interest groups. Despite continued challenges toVanHuizen and Wayne's leadership, the Michigan Militia has maintained this focus.Ada Finifter's classic conception of the multiple dimensions of political alienation isutilized as a framework from which to understand these different views of politicalparticipation. Strategies that restrict or stigmatize traditional forms of politicalparticipation by militia groups may, in certain cases, increase the likelihood ofviolence and should be carefully considered in light of this risk.

The Michigan Militia was created in 1994 as an organizational structure forthe growing militia or 'patriot' movement. The group encompasses anumber of regional militias within a loosely maintained military-stylehierarchy and reports an organizational presence in 70 of Michigan's 83counties.1 By late 1994, the Michigan Militia claimed to have as many as12,000 members2 and was recognized by Soldier of Fortune magazine asone of the 'largest and best organized' militias in the United States.3

As a result of their high-profile military maneuvers, their successfulrecruiting and organization, and the media-friendly attitude of the group'sfounders, the Michigan Militia gained significant media attention in late1994 and early 1995." That attention increased exponentially after thebombing of the Alfred T. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on 19April 1995, when much of America's attention focused on the ties of twobombing suspects to the complex and conspiratorial world of the militia

This article was presented as a paper at the New York State Political Science AssociationConference in Albany, NY, 8 May 1998. It was originally developed in a seminar offered by Dr.Michael Barkun at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.I wish to thank Dr. Michael Barkun of Syracuse University, Brad Whitsel of Perm StateUniversity - Fayette, and Jean Griffin for their kind assistance in reviewing earlier versions ofthis paper and for providing comments, advice and encouragement. Any errors in style, fact orconclusion are mine alone.

Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.10, No.4 (Winter 1998), pp. 122-148PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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THE MICHIGAN MILITIA 123

movement. Nowhere was attention directed more than in Michigan, wherethe two bomb suspects, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were said tohave attended a Michigan Militia meeting.5

The focus of law enforcement, media and Congressional attention on theMichigan Militia was followed by a contentious struggle among the group'sleadership. Norm Olson, the Michigan Militia's founder, commander andbest-known media spokesman, was forced to resign his position ascommander. Subsequently, Olson sought to regain the position, but wasdefeated by Lynn VanHuizen in an election. After this defeat, Olsondistanced himself from the Michigan Militia, breaking away from the groupand forming his own militia, the Northern Michigan Regional Militia.

An examination of the actions and rhetoric of Olson and of the MichiganMilitia's new leadership since that time shows that, while their broaderworldviews remain largely the same, significant differences exist betweentheir views of the role militias play within the mainstream political system.No study has yet closely examined the contribution this difference may havemade to the split between Olson and the Michigan Militia leadership or theeffect that it may have on the future development of the militia movement.After briefly describing the circumstances surrounding Olson's split fromthe Michigan Militia in July 1995, this article will:

• examine the similar backgrounds and shared political philosophies ofNorm Olson and the new Michigan Militia leadership;

• detail the different views toward political participation held by Olsonand the present Michigan Militia leadership;

• note the maintenance of the Michigan Militia leadership's views despitea challenge from a more 'radical' faction within the group; and

• place these different worldviews within the context of multipledimensions of political alienation and discuss whether these differencesrepresent different directions for Olson and the Michigan Militia or aremerely separate stages along a shared pattern of development.

The research for this article was drawn largely from interviews with NormOlson, the founder and former commander of the Michigan Militia; TomWayne, the Chief of Staff for the Michigan Militia; and Joe Pilchak, theleader of a faction which broke away from the Michigan Militia in February1998.

Olson's Split with the Michigan Militia

The Michigan Militia faced intense law enforcement scrutiny and extremelycritical media attention in the weeks immediately following the OklahomaCity bombing. Over the objections of a majority of the group's leadership,

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124 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

then-commander Norm Olson issued a press statement alleging that theJapanese government bombed the Oklahoma City federal building inresponse to the Central Intelligence Agency's alleged involvement in gasattacks on the Japanese subway system. The group's leadership forcedOlson to resign his position as commander less than a month after thebombing.6

Following his resignation, Olson continued his association with theMichigan Militia, announcing that 'the Michigan Militia is as strong asever' and assuring the press that he would remain a member.7 Indeed, Olsonparticipated with a member of the new Michigan Militia leadership, groupspokesman Ken Adams, in testimony on the militia movement before aSenate Judiciary Subcommittee in June 1995.8

In July 1995, Olson attempted to regain the position of commander andwas defeated in an electoral contest by Lynn VanHuizen. Following thisdefeat, Olson announced his decision to split entirely from the MichiganMilitia. Olson was outspoken in his criticism of the group for 'goingmoderate' and announced the formation of the Northern Michigan RegionalMilitia to 'resurrect and re-energize what the militia initially was'.9 Inresponse, the Michigan Militia's newly elected commander, LynnVanHuizen, distanced himself from Olson, announcing that the group hadrejected Olson's 'radical views'.10

The question arises: are there substantial differences between the viewsof Olson and the Michigan Militia's new leadership that make themincompatible? Or is Olson's split merely a consequence of his failure to winan internal power struggle within the organization? A close examination ofthe public statements and organizational literature produced by theMichigan Militia and the Northern Michigan Regional Militia makes it clearthat Olson and the Michigan Militia leadership share many of the samefundamental beliefs.

Shared Backgrounds

Norm Olson and the members of the present Michigan Militia leadershipcontinue to share a largely similar view of the problems facing the nationand the goals they hope to achieve through participation in the militiamovement." Their agreement on many key points of militia doctrine hascontinued even after Olson's split with the group and in spite of increasingdifferences in other areas, detailed later in this article. The similarity of theirworldviews should not be surprising, since it was this shared outlook thatattracted each to the militia movement in the first place.

This shared outlook may have been fostered, in part, by the interests andlife experiences that Norm Olson shares with both Tom Wayne and his

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colleague, Michigan Militia Commander Lynn VanHuizen. All three areveterans. Olson served 20 years in the US Air Force, while VanHuizen andWayne both served in the US Army and saw service in Vietnam.12 Inaddition to years of shared experiences in the military culture andsignificant amounts of military training, Olson and VanHuizen share acommon profession as gun shop owners. Their connection to the firearmsindustry sheds light on their mutual interest in gun rights and deep concernsabout restrictions on firearms. Importantly, it also has very likely exposedthem to numerous 'patriot' influences, due to the proliferation of militiarecruitment and literature at firearms industry trade shows.13

Under the leadership of VanHuizen and Wayne, the Michigan Militia haspromoted a worldview that goes far beyond the widely-held belief that thefederal government has become too large, too distant and too powerful.14 Forthese leaders of the militia movement in Michigan, the American Republic isin such a deep state of crisis that average citizens must join the militiamovement in order to defend themselves against an increasingly tyrannicalgovernment and out-of-control government agents. In both his publicstatements and the literature he produces for the Northern Regional MichiganMilitia, Norm Olson makes it clear that he continues to share this view:

The militia MUST pose a tremendous threat to tyrants and terroristswho hide within the government...One may ask, 'Who would havethe power to throw off such Government?' The citizen militia ofcourse....The citizen militia are the citizens protecting themselves.15

The extent to which they share the same goals is reflected in a comparisonof the handbooks of both the Michigan Militia and Olson's group, theNorthern Michigan Regional Militia. Each contains identical languageoutlining their individual group missions and goals. Among the goals:

[to] Inform its members of local, national and global events imperilingthe Constitution and impacting the direction of the country.... [Andto] Encourage its members to stand against tyranny, globalism, moralrelativism, humanism, and the New World Order threatening toundermine our form of government and these United States ofAmerica.16

At the core of their beliefs is the idea that the growth and expansion of thefederal government since the time of the New Deal has led to the slow butcontinual usurpation of the rights and freedoms of the American people.Their views in this respect resemble the conspiracy theories circulated byEugene Schroder. Schroder claims that the Constitution has been suspendedand the rights of the people usurped since Franklin D. Roosevelt invokedmartial law powers during the Great Depression and World War II."

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Citizen militias were formed in order to avert - or, at the very least, resist- the allegedly tyrannical actions of the federal government. The frustrationwith, and fear of, the federal government that is shared by many in the'patriot' movement in Michigan is made starkly clear in an essay on theMichigan Militia web site, which states:

Every day government is getting larger and more intrusive onindividual rights. We are here to try and curb this frighteningphenomenon.... We wish to show how excessive the government isgetting, and there is no end in sight. Every year thousands of liberty-restraining regulations and laws are put into effect, each one morelimiting on the individual than the previous.18

Chief among the liberties they perceive to be in danger is the right to beararms guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the US Constitution. For the'patriot' movement, the passage of new federal gun control laws, such as theBrady Handgun Control Act and the Assault Weapons Ban, is part of anorganized effort to disarm the American people and pave the way for futuregovernment tyranny. They view gun rights as the foundation upon which allother rights are based: 'How can a free people expect to remain free fromcorruption and tyranny without any way to back themselves up? ... It is ourjob to protect what liberties we have left'.19

These militia leaders point in particular to the actions of federalgovernment agents at Waco and Ruby Ridge as evidence that federalagencies do indeed threaten the liberties of the American people. Waco andRuby Ridge are perceived as 'blatant signs of the Federal Government'swielding of unlimited power', confirming militia members' fears that theirown government was, in fact, their worst enemy and was targetingsupporters of gun rights.20 The Michigan Militia asserts that their toppriority is preventing similar instances of what they perceive to beaggression and violence against gun owners by federal agencies like theBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF). In their view, armedcitizen groups like the Michigan Militia help ensure that 'there will be nomore Wacos or Ruby Ridge events'.21

The United States government is not the only institution perceived as athreat by these militia leaders. Attention is also focused on the UnitedNations, which is viewed as 'undermining our form of government' in orderto form a 'New World Order'.22 In this view, subscribed to by many (thoughnot all) in the militia movement, the ultimate goal of the United Nations is tobecome an all-powerful one-world government, supplanting US sovereigntyand restricting the rights currently enjoyed by American citizens.

Instead of being deterred by the perception of an overwhelming nationaland global threat to their liberties, members involved in the Michigan

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Militia proclaim themselves optimistic that their efforts will provesuccessful. Their optimism is inspired by the success of the citizen militiasduring the American Revolution, which overcame great odds to defeat thewell-equipped and professionally trained British forces.

The importance that this American Revolutionary mythology has on thecurrent militia movement in Michigan cannot be overemphasized.23 Theinterest in the founding period emphatically expressed by both Wayne andOlson dramatically affects the way they view the political system and therole they see themselves playing as members of a citizen militia.24 TheMichigan Militia's leaders view themselves as the last defenders of the trueprinciples of the Revolution and the 'spiritual heirs of the Revolutionary-eracitizens who took up arms against British tyranny'.25 The indirect product ofthe Revolution of 1776, the Constitution of 1789 is seen as a near-perfectdocument which has been diminished by activist courts and self-servingpoliticians. In their view, the modern militia movement can restore theoriginal principles of the Revolution, reject the tyrannical excesses of thecurrent system and restore the American government to its 'historical,limited and constitutional function'.26 Thus, the literature of the MichiganMilitia places its members at the center of a battle for America's future:

Therefore, it is to us, the inheritors of the task begun more than twocenturies ago, to seek and secure these same ideals in the face of thesame threats expressed by Patrick Henry.27

Additionally, comparisons with the American Revolution allow militiamembers to accept their role as 'outsiders' to the mainstream culture and itsinstitutions. Militia leaders compare the public's rejection of their views tothe early experiences of their Revolutionary-era counterparts, whose viewsin opposition to the British government were initially labeled 'treasonous'.These militia leaders further believe that public opinion will shift and theirmovement will be embraced, just as the colonies' view of Revolutionaryleaders, and their British opponents, shifted during the crisis yearspreceding the Revolutionary War.28 In the words of Norm Olson:

We in America forget sometimes that men such as Samuel Adams,Patrick Henry and even George Washington were hated and despisedby many in the time of crisis...but history has a way of washing offthe dirt and looking at people more favorably. I would hope thathistory will be kind to me as well.29

Thus, possessing a self-image cloaked in the mantle of patriotism andRevolutionary-era mythology, Norm Olson and the present MichiganMilitia leadership share the fear that the federal government and the UnitedNations pose a very real threat to the liberties of American citizens. They

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are brought together further by their shared life experiences, mutual andunyielding support of gun rights, and employment in the firearms industry.Each views an armed citizenry, actively engaged in the militia movement,as an essential mechanism that is needed to secure liberties and limit thegrowth and power of government.30

But, despite this shared worldview, it is clear that significant differencesdo exist between Olson and the present Michigan Militia leadership on therole of militias in the present political system. While Olson has chosen toreject political participation in the strongest possible terms and focuseslargely on the paramilitary role served by the citizen militia, the MichiganMilitia downplays the group's paramilitary role and attempts to activelyengage the mainstream political system, albeit from the fringes.31

Understanding these differences may help explain why Olson split with theMichigan Militia in July 1995 and may shed light on the future developmentof the militia movement in Michigan.

Norm Olson: Complete Rejection of the Political System

Norm Olson and his group, the Northern Michigan Regional Militia, do notparticipate in the mainstream political process.32

The Militia has got to be a militia. It cannot be diluted into a politicalaction group or running candidates or anything else. We've got to bemilitia...Because that group (the Michigan Militia) had gone into thepolitical arena and become politically active rather than militarilyactive, I didn't want any part of it. I was taught when I was in themilitia that soldiers ought to stay out of politics.33

The differences between Olson and others in the Michigan Militia wereevident at a 15 June 1995 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing on themilitia movement. Olson wore a military-style camouflage uniform whilethe other five militia members on his panel, including another member ofthe Michigan Militia, all wore coats and ties.34 Olson's uniform helped toreinforce the message that he is a threat; a message that he desires to beheard loud and clear by the government.

When somebody says, 'well, take the uniform off and put a suit on;lay down the gun and pick up a briefcase, you can be more effective'.Well, that's the words of a politician. I don't want to change thingspolitically, even though on the large scale the militia is a politicalmovement....35

To understand why Olson has rejected political participation and why hisviews differ so radically from those of the Michigan Militia, it is necessary

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to understand how political participation fits (or in this case, doesn't fit)within his larger worldview.

Olson believes that republican governments undergo a natural evolutioncharacterized by the ever increasing growth in governmental corruption andthe increasing alienation of the people from their government. In Olson'sview, 'the ancient principle or pattern of government is that it willeventually become corrupted'. At this point, according to Olson, 'thereseems to be a clock or a natural order that brings us to a place where thepeople can no longer endure the continued abuses'. Olson believes that thisclock or natural order has a cycle of about 200 years.36 According to Olson,we are now reaching a stage where the abuses are becoming intolerable,where 'all three branches (have) become corrupted completely'.37

We are seeing, for example, the Supreme Court making laws inviolation of the legislature. We are seeing Congress winking atcorruption and being involved themselves in corruption. We areseeing a President who is ruling by executive order, by decree,circumventing the Congress altogether...And that is what'shappening. We begin to see this erosion of our democracy, where thepeople rule the government, to totalitarianism or fascism where thegovernment rules the people and we are beginning to see that moreand more.38

As this corruption intensifies, a series of steps must be taken by the peoplein response to increasing governmental corruption and tyranny: first, thevoting process; second, the threat of armed resistance; and, third, activeresistance and revolution:

...number one, the political process, through the voting box, the ballot;number two, through a threat, just threat - write that down; and three,revolution. And revolution is extreme politics. It is an extreme way ofcontrolling government. But you can also control government withthreats.39

Olson believes that the first step, the voting process, is no longer effective.40

He views corruption as so pervasive that no one who becomes part of thesystem can avoid becoming part of the problem:

We've got good men and women who are going into politics and Iapplaud their ambition. But the reality of it is that they go up toWashington and they get caught, choked in the smog of confusion andcorruption. They become caught in the gears of that machine and,there inside the machine, they can no longer extract themselves farenough to see objectively what the problem is.41

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For Olson, all groups that participate in the political process are likely to becorrupted, even militias:

I am very close to militia leaders who agree with me, who are truemilitia indeed and have not pandered to political interests. But thosewho have gone over into the political realm, who simply are what Icall 'tabletop' militia or else 'militias of ideas', I don't have anythingto do with them.42

Citizen militias become essential at the point when the voting processceases to be an effective means of controlling government. He believes wehave reached that point and that the militia must now serve two roles: forthe present, the militia must be a visible threat to the government; for thefuture, the militia must prepare to serve as the basis for the reconstructionof a better society.

Because the government is completely corrupted, the militia must serveas a threat in order to make the corrupt government 'take a deep breath andreconsider what they are doing'."

We all realize that the only way we are going to control governmentnow is through a threat that the people will rise up against it. The onlything holding back the feds, we believe, is that the people, that themilitia is still training, that we are still active and we are still well-armed.44

Just as it is the citizens' duty in the first stage to control government throughthe voting process, the visible show of force by militia at this second stageconstitutes the fulfillment of the citizens' duty to control governmentthrough 'threat'. Since the government will not feel threatened by anunderground enemy or an enemy whose strength and power isunderestimated or unknown, visibility is essential in this second stage.Being a visible threat is the only way for the militia to send the message tothe government and slow the ever-increasing levels of tyranny. For Olson,the militia 'threat' to the government is a prelude to military engagement inthe third and final stage: revolution.

You have got to be public, you have got to be open, you've got to bevisible... If you believe that what you are doing is correct and lawfulhistorically and according to the natural order, then why separate? Iwant to jump into the fray. I'm not running from a fight. I'll go wherethe sound of the battle is taking place.45

Despite the importance placed on engaging and controlling the governmentthrough a visible threat, Olson sees the course of growing tyranny - and theresponse of revolution - as inevitable. The increasingly tyrannical behavior

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of government can be slowed, but it cannot be stopped. As Olson says,'Eventually they are going to cross the line and when they do, you are goingto see more and more reprisal against the government'.46 That reprisal hasbut one final outcome: revolution:

We're simply at a point now where the dynamics of this wholebusiness are leading us to revolution - it's unavoidable now. But it hasto come...after a long train of abuses...establishes the evidence thatwe are heading toward absolute despotism then it is the people's rightand their duty to throw off that government to establish themselvesfuture guardians for their own welfare and safety. That's where we'regoing now.47

Revolution is the inevitable result of the natural political cycle, and ourpresent political system is nearing the end of that cycle. Either thegovernment will collapse under the weight of its own corruption or thepeople will revolt. In either case, an overturning of the present politicalsystem is close at hand. Olson sees the militia movement as the foundationupon which to create a new political framework after the revolution. He seesa new nation developing out of the militia movement in much the same waythat the American nation developed out of the American revolutionaries'resistance to British rule. Olson has attempted to create such a framework,calling his organization 'the Republican Provisional Government of theThird Continental Congress'.48

We're actually trying to put together a provisional government thatwill ferry us across to safety when this present regime collapses underthe weight of its own corruption.49

The militia is not only a present-day threat to limit an abusive government,but an important preparation for a future crisis Olson perceives to beimminent.50 Militias provide the framework for creation of a new politicalsystem after the collapse or overthrow of the present system.

Because Olson views the political system as completely corrupt and thegrowth of oppression inevitable, he views the collapse of that system asdesirable. That collapse will limit further abuses against the people andallow the militia movement to begin with the task of restructuring societyunder a new, and more responsive, system of government.51

The Michigan Militia: Active Engagement of the Political System

There is a stark contrast between the views of the present Michigan Militialeadership and Norm Olson on the subject of political participation. Unliketheir former commander, the Michigan Militia leadership has shown itself

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to be interested and actively involved in the mainstream political process. Infact, their paramilitary activities notwithstanding, the Michigan Militia canbe seen at times to perform functions that are similar to those of mainstreampressure groups or political parties.

Similar to mainstream pressure groups, the Michigan Militia closelyfollows legislation and disseminates information on state and federal issuesto their membership through a variety of sources, including the Internet"and a rapid fax network. Their Internet site includes links to majorgovernment web sites and lists the e-mail addresses for all USCongressional Representatives and Senators. It also includes a weeklyedition of news briefs called 'Heads Up', which summarizes stories ofinterest to those with a militia worldview.

The Michigan Militia protest of UN Day, which drew 500 in Lansing,"also mirrored the efforts of more traditional pressure groups. It is significantthat the Michigan Militia UN Day event took place at the state Capitolbecause it indicates that, like traditional pressure groups, the MichiganMilitia attempts to promote their views to a target audience of statelegislators through public demonstrations.

Members of the Michigan Militia are actively involved in politicalcampaigns as well, either as supporters for major party candidates in localand national elections or as candidates themselves on the local level.54 TheMichigan Militia leadership also reports that their members have utilizedthe recall process in an attempt to oust public officials who do not sharetheir views. In addition, the Michigan Militia leadership claims to bestepping up its level of engagement, noting increasing campaign work bymembers during the 1996 campaign.55

The views expressed by Tom Wayne, who serves as the MichiganMilitia's Executive Officer and second-in-command to Lynn VanHuizen,offer an interesting contrast to those of Olson. Like Olson, Wayne believesthe present political system is corrupt and on the verge of collapse.56

However, while Wayne views corruption as pervasive, he does not shareOlson's views that the political system is completely corrupt and that thepolitical system is completely corrupting.

For Wayne, public officials have the potential to play a significant rolein last-ditch efforts to reverse the disastrous course of the political system.

... the militia groups, the patriot groups, the Congress and thePresident is (sic) going to have to sit down and say OK, let's admit tothe American people that we've made mistakes, we're an Americanfamily and like any family you have squabbles. Well, let's sit downand solve them.57

The collapse of the political system can be avoided, but only if the

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militia movement and public officials work together to save it fromcollapse. This view, that there is still potential for meaningful reform of thepolitical system, clearly distinguishes Wayne's views from those of Olson.Since Olson sees a future where government abuses 'will only get worse',he sees only one course in front of him. But Wayne expresses a differentview:

We have two courses. The one we are trying to pursue is a peacefulsolution to complex questions. But it is going to take some peoplewith (guts) to step out and say, 'OK, let's solve this problem. Let's sitdown with all the players and come to a general consensus and let'sput a transitional government together.'58

The system can be saved, but only through quick and decisive action on thepart of government officials and militias. While Olson looks forward to thecollapse of the system as a necessary and a positive step, Wayne articulatesthe hope that actions can be taken to prevent the collapse of the system inorder to avoid a chaotic aftermath.

Now it is time for Congressmen and Senators - and there are a few inthere that are willing — to stand up and be counted. Because thealternative is chaos. We are not interested in chaos.59

The Michigan Militia: Continued Challenges

Wayne and VanHuizen's leadership of the Michigan Militia was challengedon 15 February 1998 when a breakaway faction held a meeting and issueda press release claiming to have ousted the group's leadership. Wayne andVanHuizen disputed the contention, maintaining the breakaway group hadno standing, insufficient support and links to the Christian Identitymovement. On 15 March, the breakaway faction elected Joe Pilchak, amechanical engineer from Genesee County, their state commander.60

The breakaway movement was spurred by a conflict over VanHuizenand Wayne's proposal to revise the Michigan Militia manual, which wouldhave given more power to the state command.61 As the revised manualstates, 'the only way to be truly well-regulated is to operate in a militarymanner, having clear cut rules and regulations, which is the purpose of thisre-structuring.... The lack of rules and guidelines has resulted in anundisciplined mob with as many different interpretations as there aremembers.' Reports indicate that the revised manual was a key focus ofattendees at the breakaway faction's reorganization meeting on 15 March.Joe Pilchak, state commander of the breakaway faction, complained that thenew manual 'takes the power from the county level and takes it up to the

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command staff and they end up being absolute dictators'.62

In its most controversial step, the new manual allowed the MichiganMilitia state command to remove members and conduct a background checkon new members 'to eliminate the dissention and destructive influences thatare currently threatening to destroy the Michigan Militia Corps'. Theseprovisions were necessary, argued VanHuizen, because they 'found many(militia divisions) highly infiltrated or influenced by (Christian Identity)people'.63 Olson, who generally stands in opposition to VanHuizen'sleadership, supported Wayne's claim, noting that individuals associatedwith 'fringe groups', 'leaderless resistance cells' and 'Christian Identity'were now 'causing disturbances inside the corps'.64

Pilchak, for his part, dismissed concerns about Christian Identity as 'acliche that they are attempting to use', and notes that he is not a ChristianIdentity believer. However, both Pilchak and Bruce Soloway, a spokesmanfor the breakaway group, acknowledged that some members of the groupare associated with Christian Identity. Unlike Wayne, and even Olson to alesser extent, Pilchak was reluctant to distance himself from ChristianIdentity adherents and portrays the movement as misunderstood.65

In contrast to the Michigan Militia under VanHuizen and Wayne, thebreakaway faction under Pilchak seems more willing to work with moreradical elements in the militia movement. Pilchak notes that he would workclosely with Mark Koernke (a.k.a. Mark from Michigan) and his group andacknowledges that he has appeared several times on Koernke's short-waveradio show. In addition, he does not dismiss leaderless resistance groups,saying he respects their views despite his own belief in visibility.

Though Pilchak is open to more radical segments of the movement, fromChristian Identity to Mark Koernke to leaderless resistance, he also arguesthat efforts to educate political leaders should remain an important functionof the militia. The militia can serve as both an active threat and a politicalforce, according to Pilchak, 'I think we are having an effect both ways'.66

Unlike the ouster of Norm Olson nearly three years earlier, the successof the breakaway movement of the Michigan Militia is not entirely clear-cut. Tom Wayne and Lynn VanHuizen maintain that they remain in controlof the Michigan Militia. Initial reports indicate that they do continueleadership over a substantial proportion of the group's brigades. Ongoingarguments about who controls the 'Michigan Militia' aside, the breakawayfaction is not inconsiderable and appears large enough to maintain aseparate existence. In Norm Olson's words, 'we multiply by dividing'.67

Although the Michigan Militia leadership under Wayne was challenged,it has retained its focus on political engagement.68 The moderating positionsof Wayne and VanHuizen were an issue in the further fragmentation of thegroup, at least in terms of their reluctance to work with Mark Koernke and

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their rejection of Christian Identity adherents. However, the breakawayfaction under Pilchak has not directly challenged VanHuizen and Wayne'sviews on political participation.

Ultimately, the balance Pilchak promotes in his rhetoric - acceptance ofmore radical elements and continued political engagement - may beincompatible. Thus far, however, challenges of the Michigan Militialeadership's attitudes toward political participation have not occurred.Regardless of whether such a challenge occurs, Wayne and VanHuizenremain in control of one of the largest militia groups in the nation. Despitethe challenge from the breakaway faction, Wayne continues to articulate adesire to actively engage the political system. The latest challenge mayactually have strengthened the group's commitment to such a strategy byremoving the most vocal critics from the organization.

While Olson and Wayne's views of the political system and their rolewithin it remain distinct, it is not yet clear whether Pilchak's uneasy balanceof radicalism and political activity can be maintained for any length of time.In some respects, Pilchak's position might be considered an uneasyamalgam of Olson's and Wayne's views. Ultimately, a choice may have tobe made between the more radical strategies supported by Olson and thepolitical engagement advocated by VanHuizen and Wayne. Unless itbecomes clear that Pilchak's view of the political process evolves into athoroughly distinct alternative, the different directions of the MichiganMilitia are best understood in light of the contrasting strategies of Olson andWayne.

Political Alienation and the Michigan Militia

Many scholarly efforts already provide an excellent overview of the views,activities and development of the 'citizen-militia' or 'patriot' movement inthe United States. In an effort to provide insight into the movement ingeneral, it has been necessary for these scholars to emphasize thoseactivities and ideas that are shared by participants within the movement.While these broad perspectives are essential to understanding themovement, it is useful to distinguish important differences between them.69

A close look at the rhetoric and the activities of Norm Olson and TomWayne highlights their differing views toward political participation. Thesedifferent views are particularly significant given that these militia leadersshare a very strong distrust of government officials as well as a negative andconspiratorial view of the political process. How might we betterunderstand this discontinuity?

The concept of political alienation might be useful in this regard.Political alienation, described generally in one account as 'a person's sense

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of estrangement from the politics and government of his society', isbelieved to have a significant effect on an individual's political behavior.™As Bas Denters and Peter Geurts point out,

Aspects of political alienation, like political powerlessness or distrustin government, are often conceived as theoretically importantintervening variables in the 'funnel of causality', leading from thecitizen's personal conditions (e.g. social backgrounds) to his politicalbehavior (e.g. electoral participation). Empirical research hasextensively confirmed the relevance of aspects of alienation for ourunderstanding of political participation.71

Olson and Wayne both express a general sense of political alienation, citingsimilarly conspiratorial worldviews and distrusting attitudes towardsgovernment and government officials as the driving force behind theirmilitia activities. This might help to explain why both are similarly drivento participate in the militia movement. But can the concept of politicalalienation also account for the differences in their views on participation inthe political process?

Ada Finifter's conception of political alienation may provide the mosteffective framework from which to understand these differing viewstowards political participation. In a 1970 article in the American PoliticalScience Review, Finifter argued that political alienation has multipledimensions,72 a view which remains predominant today." Finifter explicitlyaddressed the two modes of political alienation that directly relate to Olsonand Wayne. Finifter did not view each mode of alienation as independent,but considered the effect that the interaction of two different modes ofalienation might have on one individual. Finally, Finifter directly tied thedifferent modes of alienation to different types of participation, includingradical and revolutionary behavior, which seems of particular value to thisstudy.

Finifter viewed political alienation as having numerous dimensions, anddescribed at least four possible dimensions, focusing on two particular modesof political alienation: 'perceived political normlessness' and 'politicalpowerlessness'. Finifter described 'perceived political normlessness' as 'theindividual's perception that the norms or rules intended to govern politicalrelations have broken down, and that departures from prescribed behavior arecommon. A belief that officials violate legal procedures in dealing with thepublic or in arriving at policy decisions exemplifies this mode of alienation.'74

This aspect of political alienation seems to be shared by both Olson andWayne, and is evident in their shared view that the Constitution has beenundermined and that American liberties are imperiled by tyrannical forces'threatening to undermine our form of government'.

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Finifter described 'political powerlessness' as 'an individual's feelingthat he cannot affect the actions of the government'.75 Here Olson andWayne appear to differ. Olson believes that efforts to fix the system he seesas corrupt will be fruitless, while Wayne continues to see value in his effortsto change the system by working with legislators and engaging in thepolitical process.

Finifter used these dimensions of political alienation to create ahypothetical typology of powerlessness and normlessness (see Figure 1).Finifter's typology considers the effect of the interaction of these two modesof alienation on political behavior. He placed those with high levels ofpowerlessness and normlessness into the category of 'extremedisengagement', noting that 'those engaging in activities suggested in theupper left quadrant.. .have probably given up hope that the political systemwill ever be responsive to their demands. The combination of highperceived normlessness and high levels of political powerlessness seemslikely to lead to fundamental, radical rejection of established methods ofaccomplishing political goals.' Finifter placed those with low levels ofperceived normlessness and high levels of powerlessness into the 'reformorientation' category. In the reform block, the 'goals of these groups aredirected at correcting specific social conditions.... Individuals whoparticipate in these types of groups feel that the system is at least potentiallyresponsive to their efforts.'

This framework seems to be particularly appropriate for understandingthe similarities and the differences in the views and behavior of Norm Olsonand Tom Wayne. Olson and Wayne's heightened sense of 'perceivedpolitical normlessness' may facilitate their participation in non-traditionaland 'anti-government' oriented activities like the militia movement. Theirdifferent levels of political powerlessness, however, may explain theirdiffering views on their role in the political system. Olson's perception ofpowerlessness may be significant due to its interaction with his extremelyhigh political normlessness, while Wayne's relatively low sense of politicalpowerlessness may keep him focused on political engagement despite highlevels of normlessness.

Wayne and Olson might be placed at different points along thedimension of political powerlessness. Olson views participation ascompletely useless and the final stage of revolution as imminent. For Olson,the militia fulfills the role of visible threat during the current period and atthe same time offers the military strength and organization he believesnecessary for the revolution and its aftermath. Tom Wayne, expressing theMichigan Militia leadership's view, continues to see the voting process as auseful means of changing course and avoiding a collapse of the system.

Olson and Wayne might maintain their different levels of political

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FIGURE 1TYPES OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR ASSOCIATED WITH

COMBINATIONS OF TWO TYPES OF POLITICALALIENATION (HYPOTHETICAL)

Political Powerlessness

High

HighPerceivedPolitical

Normlessness

Low

Extreme DisengagementSeparatist and

revolutionary movements.Complete withdrawal.

ApathyVery low level of political

involvement.

Low

Reform OrientationProtest groupsworking within

institutionalframework.

Political IntegrationConformativeparticipation.

Source: Ada W. Finifter, 'Dimensions of Political Alienation', American Political Science Review64(1970)p.407.

powerlessness. In this event, Olson may become more radical andrevolutionary while the Michigan Militia may continue to moderate itsmessage. While this development is possible, it is also possible that thedifferences between Olson and the Michigan Militia, though significant, arepart of a common path of political development. To understand this path, itis necessary to first focus our attention on the development of Norm Olson'sviews over time. It is important to understand that Olson's completerejection of political participation is a development from his earlier views.Olson claims that he attempted in the past to bring about change through thetraditional political system, but became progressively more alienated:

I have extended the opportunity several times. I've written andconveyed.. .it would be my pleasure to sit down to talk with Senatorsand Congressmen if they were truly interested. But they haven'tbeen...76

The rejection of Olson's attempts to engage the political system left himfeeling more and more powerless:

We were slowly building bridges. We had talked with several statesenators and Congresspeople here in Michigan...[but] we began to be

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rebuked and rebuffed and mocked and laughed and scorned by thoserepresentatives...they start to get this arrogance that they are indeedthe principals that they are indeed the masters and that we are nothingmore than servants, lackeys, peasants, subjects to be pushedaround....77

But not only did the rejection of these views prove to him the system wascorrupt, it also guaranteed that the political system would never take theactions that Olson believes necessary to avoid the coming crisis:

We're ready to sit down and talk with anybody if they're truly willing[to listen]. For example, if the Senate wanted me to address it and say,Commander Olson, 'how can we avoid the coming revolution'...ifthey're really serious about the answers, which would mean aprofound change in the way America does business. But, if they wantto avoid revolution, if they were really serious, they would sit downand talk with me. But they're not serious. They want to wish this thingaway, that it's not going to happen. But it's going to happen. Believeme, it's coming.78

In Olson's view, total rejection by the political system forces him to seekother alternatives to control the government. He finds those alternatives inboth his current role as a 'threat' to the government and in a future role hesees for himself in the 'revolution'.

While very clear differences separate the current views of Olson and theMichigan Militia, future events may draw the views of the Michigan Militiacloser to those of Norm Olson. Tom Wayne, Executive Officer of theMichigan Militia, continues to hold out some hope for the political process,but observes that the collapse of the system is inevitable if the politicalsystem refuses to take the steps recommended by the Michigan Militia:

...we thoroughly expect it to [collapse] if there are not some drasticchanges and some certain people in Congress and our state legislaturethat say, 'let's take the bull by the horns'.79

Wayne describes the potential consequences:

...we held a general assembly, which, under the first amendment wehave the right to do, to peaceably assemble and petition ourgovernment for the redress of grievances. We did that. The stategovernment has never answered us formally. And what we are askingfor is a formal hearing. But, when the government continues to ignorethe problem, they invariably create the confrontation, don't they?80

Not only does Wayne acknowledge the potential for the Michigan Militia to

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shift toward Olson's worldview as a result of continued rejection by thepolitical system, he acknowledges that it is likely:

There are the Norm Olsons that want to start something. We areworking to hold them back. But someday, we aren't going to be ableto hold them back...If we don't see some changes, someone out thereis going to do something stupid.81

Discussion: Alienation, Violence and the Michigan Militia

Finifter noted that varying levels of powerlessness may not only beassociated with different degrees of participation, but with different types ofparticipation as well.82 As individuals with high levels of normlessness faceincreasingly high levels of powerlessness, they shift away from appropriatemodes of political participation and closer to open 'revolution'. WereWayne to shift towards greater levels of political powerlessness, he wouldbe more likely to engage in the types of behavior associated with the upper-left cell of Finifter's typology: withdrawal and revolution. Such a shiftwould obviously make the possibility for violent confrontation more likely.Finifter explicitly recognized the danger of political violence that couldresult from such shifts, warning:

we would expect that the type of threat to orderly system changerepresented by revolutionary movements will be correspondinglyrare, unless large numbers of people are drawn from the lower left andupper right quadrants into the upper left."

If the risks of violence increase as political powerlessness is heightened, wemay want to reconsider political strategies specifically intended tostigmatize the WayneA'anHuizen faction of the Michigan Militia or othermilitia groups that share their worldview and their desire to engage thepolitical system through traditional means. Strategies designed to shut outmilitia groups from the mainstream political process may, in certain cases,heighten the perceived political powerlessness of militia members andincrease the likelihood of violent or revolutionary behavior.

Efforts to alienate the militia movement from the mainstream wereclearly seen in the months following the Oklahoma City bombing and werenotably present in the 1996 election campaign. A number of Congressionalcandidates were harshly criticized by both their political opponents and themedia for holding meetings, attending events or communicating withmembers of militia groups. For example, one candidate in Montana wascriticized for attending the Freedom Rendezvous '96, an event attended bymilitia members, while another Republican candidate in Colorado was

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accused by his Republican primary opponent of being 'very strongly backedby the militia movement'.84

During the 1996 campaign, these criticisms from opposing candidates,who had an obvious incentive to tie their opponents to unpopular militiagroups, were often bolstered by the efforts of non-profit groups working inopposition to the militia movement. In the view of many of these 'anti-militia' groups, any communication between political figures and militiamembers gives militias 'credibility they don't deserve' and strengthens the'patriot' movement.85 In the words of the staff director for one of the manygroups outspoken in its opposition to the militia movement:

These groups seek to enter the mainstream by attaching themselves tolegitimate political figures... they create a false impression of politicalsupport by using the political process to manufacture an image ofrespectability.86

In the case of the Michigan Militia at least, strategies of stigmatizationreduce the effectiveness or eliminate the opportunity for militia members toparticipate in traditional political activities like voter organization ormeeting with their elected representatives. In such a climate of criticism,even written communication in response to a militia group's concerns ispotentially politically damaging and, thus, likely to be avoided.

In the wake of the tragic events in Oklahoma City, these criticismsundoubtedly had the effect of further stigmatizing militia views andreducing the number of members of Congress and state legislators who wereopenly responsive to some of the militia members' concerns.87 While such areaction is understandable, we must recognize that in some cases the effortto stigmatize militia members may come at a price.

With traditional forms of participation closed off, militia members mayturn to other strategies to control the government. These strategies fall underthe 'threat' or 'revolution' phases articulated by Norm Olson and, incontrast to the accepted and traditional forms of participation, are morelikely to result in violent activity or terrorism.88 Jeffrey Kaplan warns of theconsequences of 'mutual delegitimization', a process by which radicalgroups are pushed to the fringes not only by their own loss of confidence inthe prevailing regime but by efforts 'to anathematize the discourse of theradical right' by governmental and non-governmental groups.89 The'marginalization of right wing discourse leaves the adherent with only twooptions: to withdraw into the milieu of the radical right, or to resort to the"propaganda of the deed" to make his beliefs felt'.90 It is exactly this'propaganda of the deed' which we hope to avoid.

The Director of the Washington Coalition Against Censorship, BarbaraDority, in opposing efforts to increase police powers in response to the

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Oklahoma City bombing, recognizes the danger of 'suppressing the freespeech of dissidents' in the case of the militia movement. Dority writes,'Only by providing as many outlets for free speech as possible can we createthe critical safety valve needed for the venting of anger, alienation, fear, andyes, hatred. The worst possible response to these volatile emotions is tobottle them up until they explode into violence."1 Just as this outlet can belimited by overzealous federal law enforcement agencies, it can be virtuallyeliminated by the creation of a climate of opinion where public servants areprevented from even entering a dialogue with members of the militiamovement.

Dority's contention that dialogue and engagement with militia groupscan help to diffuse feelings of alienation and reduce the threat of violenceis, to be certain, a contentious one. Richard Hofstadter's classic study ofright-wing groups suggests, for instance, that political engagement bygroups from the far right might be a lost cause from the beginning. Theinterests expressed by far-right groups are, in his words, 'totallyirreconcilable, and thus by nature not susceptible to the normal politicalprocesses of bargain and compromise'.92 Political engagement by the farright and the inevitable failure of their efforts might, in Hofstadter's view,actually make the situation worse

...when the representatives of a particular political interest - perhapsbecause of the very unrealistic and unrealizable nature of theirdemands — cannot make themselves felt in the political process.Feeling that they have no access to political bargaining or the makingof decisions, they find their original conception of the world of poweras omnipotent, sinister, and malicious fully confirmed.93

James A. Aho echoes this concern, noting that while 'patriot' groups do notseem reluctant about getting involved in mainstream political activities,these efforts may enhance frustration and feelings of alienation rather thanproviding an outlet. Unmet expectations, in Aho's view, might be moredangerous than isolation:

[tjhere is little evidence that voluntary or imposed exclusion fromregular political channels has occasioned their resort to more extrememeasures. Indeed, the opposite is more likely true. Their use ofnonconventional tactics may be a sign that regular channels ofinfluence have not worked for patriots to the degree they might prefer:the theory of rising expectations paradoxical prediction that inflationof expectations precipitated by too much citizen participationaggravates dissatisfaction and unrest when demands are not met...94

But the early indications from our nation's recent experience dealing

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with the militia movement suggest that strategies of stigmatization, ratherthan eliminating the threat of violence, may be counterproductive. First,stigmatizing militias has not proved effective in reducing the number ofmilitias and may, in fact, be somewhat counterproductive. The SouthernPoverty Law Center, for instance, found that 380 armed militias existedwithin the 50 United States in 1996 and that the total number of 'extremist'groups actually increased by six per cent in 1996.95 Additionally, in the caseof the Michigan Militia, the Anti-Defamation League reports that 'despitenegative publicity since the Oklahoma City bombing, the militia movementin Michigan has enjoyed some continued success in its recruitment'.96

Second, these strategies may strengthen, rather than reduce, thedetermination of members within militia groups. As Dority notes, steppedup law-enforcement efforts against militias can 'confirm their suspicions ofa government out to get them'.97 Similarly, a climate of hostility can provideconfirmation of the militia members' view of a political system that is notonly 'corrupt' but 'corrupting' of public opinion as well.

Third, stigmatizing militia groups is likely to reduce the presence of anymoderating influences within the organizations, leaving more radicalmembers in control and bringing in increasingly radical members who areattracted by the group's 'outlaw' character. By making militia groups moreresponsive to radical views and less responsive to the concerns ofmainstream Americans, strategies of stigmatization may be making themmore dangerous than ever. Norm Olson notes the effect on his group, theNorthern Regional Michigan Militia: 'the people who remained are moreresolved and resolute, more disciplined and clear in the focus of wherethey're going and what they have to do than ever before'.98

Strategies that seek to isolate militia members might be the worst of allpossible strategies for policy makers and government officials. Increasing asense of political powerlessness among the leaders of the Michigan Militiaseems to make violence a more likely option for certain individuals withinthat group. This is not a justification of their worldview, but a fact that mustbe dealt with seriously.

While it remains uncertain whether strategies of engagement willactually reduce levels of political alienation among militia members, it iscertain that strategies of stigmatization will increase feelings of politicalpowerlessness. It may even increase levels of perceived politicalnormlessness as well. This does not mean that the political agenda of themilitia movement should be carried out. Clearly, it is unreasonable to expectthat Congress will move forward with the militia movement's top legislativepriorities. Criticism of militia views by those who disagree is certainly inorder. But, under certain circumstances, harsh criticism of traditional andaccepted forms of political participation by militia groups might serve in

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no-one's interest. We should consider the possibility that the stigmatizationof mainstream political engagement by the Michigan Militia might actuallyserve to increase the risk of future violence.99

NOTES

1. Maryann Struman, 'Militia Founder's Goal: Panthers for Detroit', Detroit News, 31 July1995.

2. John Flesher, 'Investigators Shine Light on Michigan Militia', Associated Press, as reportedin Bergen (MI) Record, 22 April 1995. In addition, Tom Wayne, the Executive Officer of theMichigan Militia, claims that the group now has 'between 12,000 and 15,000' members,Tom Wayne, interview 19 April 1997. The Anti-Defamation League called earlier claims of10,000 members by the Michigan Militia probably exaggerated, Anti-Defamation League,Armed and Dangerous: Militias Take Aim at the Federal Government (New York: Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 1994). Whatever the true figure, the ADL does share the opinionthat the Michigan Militia's membership remains strong, noting 'Despite negative publicitysince the Oklahoma City bombing, the militia movement (in Michigan) has enjoyed somecontinued success in its recruitment', Anti-Defamation League, Beyond the Bombing: TheMilitia Menace Grows (New York: ADL 1995).

3. John Flesher (note 2).4. For pre-Oklahoma City bombing stories on the Michigan Militia see, for example: Ken

Kolker, 'Michigan's Paramilitia is Growing', Grand Rapids Press, 9 Oct. 1994; BethHawkins, 'Patriot Games', Detroit Metro Times, 12-18 Oct. 1994; and Michelle Corum,'Militia Group Aims to Protect Citizens' Rights', National Public Radio, All ThingsConsidered, 5 Feb.1995.

5. For example, see 'Who Are They?' Time, 1 May 1995; Elizabeth Gleik, 'The OklahomaBlast Reveals the Paranoid Life and Times of Accused Bomber Timothy McVeigh and hisRight-Wing Associates', and 'Terror in the Heartland', U.S. News and World Report, 1 May1995.

6. John Flesher, 'Michigan Militia Founder Quits', Associated Press, as reported in DetroitNews, 21 July 1995. See also 'Militias Finding Themselves on Shaky Ground', WashingtonPost, 6 May 1995. It should be noted that that along with Olson's resignation came theresignation of Ray Southwell, an Olson confidant who also served as an officer in theMichigan Militia. Southwell had worked closely with Olson to found the organization andhad participated in the release of the controversial press statement blaming Japan for theOklahoma City bombing.

7. Anti-Defamation League, Beyond the Bombing (note 2).8. The Militia Movement in the United States, Senate Hearing 104-804, 15 June 1995, 104th

Congress, United States Senate, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism,Technology and Government Information, United States Government Printing Office, 1997.

9. The 'Northern Michigan Regional Militia' was originally created by Olson in 1994 andformed the basis for the larger Michigan Militia group which encompassed the NorthernMichigan group as well as other groups throughout the state. Olson's decision to re-name hisnew group the 'Northern Michigan Regional Militia' might cause some confusion, since theMichigan Militia continues to have its own branch of the same name. For the sake of clarity,any further references to the Northern Michigan Regional Militia will refer to Olson's group.

10. John Flesher (note 6).11. For detailed examinations of the origin and views of the militia movement, see Michael

Barkun, 'Oklahoma City and the Rise of Militias', in Religion and the Racist Right (ChapelHill: University of North Carolina Press 1997) Ch.13; Martin Durham, 'Preparing forArmageddon: Citizen Militias, the Patriot Movement and the Oklahoma City Bombing',Terrorism and Political Violence (hereafter TPV) 8/1 (Spring 1996); and David H. Bennett,'The Reshaping of the New Right and the Rise of the Militia Movement', in The Party of

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Fear (New York: Vintage Books 1995) Ch.16.12. The importance of the paramilitary culture that comes out of military experience is described

in James William Gibson, Warrior Dreams: Violence and Manhood in Post- Vietnam America(New York: Hill and Wang 1994).

13. Gunrights is clearly the issue that drives the militia movement and unifies most militiamembers. Its importance is outlined briefly in Anti-Defamation League, Armed andDangerous (note 2) pp. 1-3; and more extensively in David Bennett (note 11) pp.465-8. Thepotential for recruitment of militia members at gun shows is referenced in Southern PovertyLaw Center (SPLQ), False Patriots: The Threat of Antigovernment Extremists (Montgomery,AL: SPLC 1996) p.14. The prevalence of militia materials and literature at gun shows isdescribed further in Mark S. Hamm, Apocalypse in Oklahoma (Boston: NortheasternUniversity Press 1997) pp. 161-2, 170.

14. There is evidence that concern about the threat the federal government poses to individualrights and freedoms is shared by large numbers of Americans and is certainly not limited to'fringe' elements of society or militia groups. This can be seen in a number of post-Oklahoma City bombing polls, including a Los Angeles Times poll, 26 April 1995, whichasked, 'These days, do you think the activities of the federal government pose a threat to theconstitutional rights enjoyed by the average American, or not?' 45% of respondentsanswered 'Yes, pose a threat'. This and similar questions appearing in several other polls canbe found in Karl Zinsmeister, 'Indicators', American Enterprise (July/Aug. 1995).

15. Norm Olson, 'Is the Citizen Militia Lawful?' unpublished pamphlet via facsimile, 5 April1997. Emphasis in original.

16. The goals and mission of the Northern Michigan Regional Militia was found in 'TheNorthern Michigan Regional Militia Handbook', unpublished pamphlet via facsimile, 5April 1997. Emphasis in original. The identical language was also found in the MichiganMilitia handbook, which has recently been revised (see below).

17. Schroder's theories are outlined in the SPLC Intelligence Report (Spring 1997) p.15.18. Michigan Militia web site, http://mmc.cns.net/thanks.html.19. Ibid.20. Ibid.21. Norm Olson, 'Is the Citizen Militia Lawful' (note 16). Olson points to the non-violent end

of the Freemen standoff in Montana as evidence that the militia movement is already havinga desirable effect on federal law-enforcement procedures. Olson himself was very activeduring the Freemen standoff in Montana, making well publicized but unsuccessful efforts tore-supply the Freemen with food and other necessities. The Michigan Militia, on the otherhand, made several public statements distancing their group from the Freemen and Olson'sefforts in Montana. See Judy DeHaven, 'Militia Chief Prepares to Aid Freemen', DetroitNews, 1 April 1996; Jason Aders, 'Militia Chief Lands Today in Montana', Detroit News, 15April 1996; Phil Linsalata, 'State Militia Leader in Montana to see Freemen', Detroit News,16 April 1996; Phil Linsalata, 'FBI Won't Talk with Michigan militia Boss', Detroit News,17 April 1996; Phil Linsalata, 'Norman Olson Show Doesn't Play so Well in Montana',Detroit News, 19 April 1996; Phil Linsalata, 'Montana Townspeople have had enough of theFreemen', Detroit News, 21 April 1996; Len Iwanski, 'Reinforcements in Montana as Waco,Oklahoma City Anniversaries Near', Associated Press, 1 June 1996.

22. Norm Olson, 'The Northern Michigan Regional Militia Handbook' (note 17). The identicallanguage was also found in the Michigan Militia handbook prior to the controversialrevisions.

23. The public comments and literature of Michigan Militia members are strewn with referencesto the Revolutionary period. Their efforts to address political questions include numerousquotations from Revolutionary-era figures like Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, JamesMadison and Richard Henry Lee. See for example the Michigan Militia homepage athttp://mmc.cns.net/text, or Norm Olson, 'Is the Citizen Militia Lawful?' (note 16) for anumber of examples. In addition, militia members frequently compare current events with,in their view, parallel events from the Revolutionary period. For example, Olson contendedthat a militia rally planned for Washington, DC could be 'the beginning of a Concord-likeconfrontation', Anti-Defamation League, Armed and Dangerous (note 2) p.15.

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24. As Martin Durham notes, 'the adoption of the term militia is a conscious harkening back tothe American Revolution and the original Constitution', Martin Durham, 'Preparing forArmageddon' (note 11) p.68. The use of the word 'patriot' to describe members of themovement also makes the connection with the American Revolution; it energizes membersfor the cause and helps attract new members through the incorporation of familiar rhetoricand myths. This modern incorporation of the militia idea is described in Alan W. Bock,'Weekend Warriors', National Review, 29 May 1995, pp.39-42; and Andrew Branan,'Patriots or Paranoids', Ripon Forum, Jan./Feb. 1996, pp.20-22.

25. John Flesher (note 2).26. Michigan Militia web site, http://mmc.cns.net/thanks.html.27. Michigan Militia web site, http://mmc.cns.net/text/l-l.txt.28. Their comparisons with the founders' might be seen as somewhat circular, allowing them to

view any failure as a parallel to the founders' difficulties during the Revolutionary periodand, at the same time, continuing to see their victory as inevitable.

29. Norm Olson, 'Is the Citizen Militia Lawful?' (note 16).30. This concept was expressed succinctly on the Michigan Militia web site, 'Like it or not, the

only reason for a civilian or "unorganized", militia exists (sic) is in order to keep governmentin check in order that the government may remain in the hands of the people'.

31. The Executive Officer of the Michigan Militia, Tom Wayne, minimizes the importance of hisgroup's paramilitary activities, saying 'it is probably twenty percent' of what the group does.Tom Wayne, interview 19 April 1997. Wayne also acknowledges that the Michigan Militia'sefforts are not accepted by the vast majority of politicians, saying, '(We are) very stronglyinvolved in the political process and trying to do something, even though it is like goinguphill on a skateboard on Pike's Peak'. Tom Wayne, interview 19 April 1997.

32. Ken Adams, former Michigan Militia spokesman 'claims Olson's group has only about 15members', in Jason Anders, 'State Militia Prepares for Battle over Montana Freemen',Detroit News, 12 April 1996. Adams may be underestimating the size of Olson's group inorder to discredit him, but it seems clear that the actual number in Olson's group (theNorthern Michigan Regional Militia) is only a fraction of the membership of the MichiganMilitia. In an interview, Olson himself was unwilling to discuss the size of his group.

33. Norm Olson, interview 13 April 1997.34. 'Militiamen Tell All to Dubious Senators', Knight-Ridder News Service, as reported in

Greensboro News and Record, 16 June 1995.35. Norm Olson, interview 13 April 1997.36. Ibid.37. Ibid.38. Ibid.39. Ibid.40. As Olson articulates very clearly, saying, '...we are not going to correct this system through

the voting box. It hasn't happened.' Norm Olson, interview 13 April 1997.41. Ibid.42. Ibid.43. Ibid.44. Ibid.45. Ibid.46. Ibid.47. Ibid.48. Ibid. Olson's first attempt at a 'Third Continental Congress' was held in a south Kansas City,

Mo. Holiday Inn in October 1996 and was largely unsuccessful, drawing only 25 'patriots'.See Kim Kozlowski, 'Militia Members Prepare for Collapse', Kansas City Star, 30 Oct.1996; 'Ex Leader ofMilitia Plans 3-day Congress', Associated Press, 14 Oct. 1996; and JudyL. Thomas, 'Patriot Leaders Urge Return of Government to the People', Kansas City Star, 9June 1996.

49. Norm Olson, interview 13 April 1997.50. In Olson's words, 'The whole Titanic is going down. The whole ship is going down. So,

rather than trying to keep it afloat, it is better to prepare the lifeboats.' Norm Olson, interview

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13 April 1997.51. In Olson's words, 'We cannot initiate (the collapse) but we can certainly help it along. There

is an old adage that says don't get into your enemy's way if he is marching into the sea.'Norm Olson, interview 13 April 1997.

52. The 'Official Michigan Militia Homepage' at http:/mmc.cns.net/ includes a biography ofCommander Lynn VanHuizen.

53. Kenneth Cole, 'Michigan Militia Protests US Involvement with UN', Detroit News, 25 Oct.1995.

54. Tom Wayne, interview 19 April 1997. See also, for example, the reaction of Michigan Militiamembers to Pat Buchanan's victory in the New Hampshire Republican primary in MaryannStruman, 'Candidate's Success Gets State's Militia Groups Fired Up', Detroit News, 22 Feb.1996.

55. Tom Wayne, interview 19 April 1997.56. As Wayne predicts, 'We thoroughly expect (the system to collapse) if there are not some

drastic changes.' Tom Wayne, interview 19 April 1997.57. Ibid.58. Ibid.59. Ibid.60. For information on the feud between the VanHuizen and Wayne leadership and the

breakaway faction, see, for instance, 'Michigan Militia Groups Feuding', United PressInternational, 2 March 1998; 'Militia Extremists Challenge Leadership', Associated Press, 4March 1998; Michael Walsh, 'Faction Claims Militia Takeover', Muskegon (MI) Chronicle,17 March 1998.

61. The revised Michigan Militia manual can be found at http://militia.gen.mi.us/1-1.html. It isimportant to note that while the revision altered the structure and rules of the organization, itdid not articulate notable changes in the goals or general worldview of the group.

62. According to one reputable source on a militia watchdog discussion group, members fromtwo dozen brigades criticized the revised manual at the 15 March meeting. The importanceof the manual to the breakaway group is confirmed in my interview with Pilchak, 18 March1998.

63. Michael Walsh (note 60).64. Norm Olson, interview 13 March 1998.65. Joe Pilchak, interview 18 March 1998; Michael Walsh (note 60).66. Joe Pilchak, interview 18 March 1998.67. Norm Olson, interview 13 March 1998.68. Wayne reiterated the group's commitment to engagement of the political process in an

interview, 13 March 1998.69. Again, examinations of the origin and views of the militia movement are ably provided by a

number of scholars. See for example, Michael Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right (note11) Ch.13; also, Martin Durham (note 11); and David H. Bennett (note 11) Ch. 16.

70. R. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press 1962) p.161, as noted in William M.Mason, James S. House and Steven S. Martin, 'On the Dimensions of Political Alienation inAmerica', in Nancy Brandon Tuma (ed.), Sociological Methodology (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers 1985) p.113.

71. Bas Denters and Peter Geurts, 'Aspects of Political Alienation: An Exploration of theirDifferent Origins and Effects', Acta Politica 28/4 (1993) p.445.

72. Ada Finifter, 'Dimensions of Political Alienation,' American Political Science Review 64(1970).

73. Denters and Geurts (note 71); Priscilla Southwell, 'Throwing the Rascals Out versusThrowing in the Towel: Alienation, Support for Term Limits and Congressional VotingBehavior', Social Science Quarterly 76/4 (Dec. 1995).

74. Finifter (note 72) pp.390-91.75. Finifter (note 72) p.390.76. Norm Olson, interview 13 April 1997.77. Ibid.78. Ibid.

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79. Tom Wayne, interview 19 April 1997.80. Ibid.81. Ibid.82. Finifter (note 72) p.405.83. Finifter (note 72) p.408. Emphasis in original.84. For attention to Congressional candidate Rick Hill's attendance at an April 1996 meeting of

'Freedom Rendezvous' see McLaughlin, Billings (MT) Gazette, 24 Sept. 1996, as reportedin Hotline News Service, 25 Sept. 1996. Attention to Colorado State Representative PatSullivan's accusations against Colorado State Senator Bob Schaffer can be found in DenverPost, 28 July 1996, as reported in Hotline News Service, 30 July 1996.

85. McLaughlin (note 84). Michael Barkun, in concluding his essay on the world of militiamovements, leaves it an open question whether 'bridging phenomena' that connects militiagroups to the society-at-large will 'tame' the extremes or 'infect' the center. In his words,'One possibility is that with larger, more diverse memberships, such groups will begin toslough off their more objectionable and violence-prone characteristics. The other is that theoriginal, core ideas will remain... and will take its place as a socially sanctioned way oflooking at the world', Michael Barkun, 'Religion, Militias and Oklahoma City: The Mind ofConspiratorialists', TPV 8/1 (Spring 1996) pp.50-64.

86. McLaughlin (note 84).87. Rep. Steve Stockman, for example, received some of the harshest criticism of any member

of Congress for his ties to the militia movement, and was defeated in a December runoffelection. Although I am unaware of any public opinion poll showing that the militia issuewas key to Stockman's defeat, coverage of the Stockman race frequently referenced his 'tiesto militia groups'. See for instance Dallas Morning News, 11 Dec. 1996, as reported inHotline News Service, 11 Dec. 1996; Dallas Morning News, 8 Nov. 1996, as reported inHotline News Service, 8 Nov. 1996; Atlanta Journal/Constitution 4 Oct. 1996, as reported inHotline News Service, 9 Oct. 1996.

88. David Kopel, Research Director for the Independence Institute, articulates the idea that wehave something to lose by alienating militia groups, saying 'If dissident groups are outlawedand driven underground, then some of their members may become convinced that workingwithin the system is impossible'. David Kopel, 'Clinton's Terrifying Response to Terror',American Enterprise (July/Aug. 1995).

89. Jeffrey Kaplan, 'Right Wing Violence in North America', in Tore Bjargo (ed.), Terror fromthe Extreme Right (London: Frank Cass 1995) pp.74-5.

90. Ibid.91. Barbara Dority, 'Is the Extremist Right Entirely Wrong?' Humanist (Nov./Dec. 1995)

pp.12-15.92. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press 1979) pp.39-40.93. Ibid.94. James A. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism (Seattle:

University of Washington Press 1990) p.155.95. Gannett News Service, 'Several Groups Lash Watchdog for their Tag as Extremist',

Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, 13 April 1997.96. Anti-Defamation League, Beyond the Bombing (note 2).97. Barbara Dority (note 91) pp.12-15.98. Dennis Camire and John Hanchette, 'Terrorist Threat Lingers in U.S.', Gannett News

Service, as appeared in Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, 13 April 1997.99. It may be the case that the worldview of the patriot movement makes confrontation

extremely likely and somewhat unavoidable. Consider Martin Durham's argument in'Preparing for Armageddon' (note 11). However, we should also consider that even a shortdelay of confrontation could be to the advantage of law enforcement agencies, which can usethat time to better understand the movement and determine appropriate strategies. MichaelBarkun describes what can happen when law enforcement agencies do not understand theiradversaries in 'Millenarian Groups and Law Enforcement Agencies: The Lessons of Waco',TPV 6/1 (Spring 1994).

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Documents

The Michigan militia: Political engagement or political alienation?