THE MILITARY STRATEGYOF THE

P. F. L. P.

INFORMATION DEPARTMENTP. F. L P.BEIRUT1970

Preface

With this book, the P.F.L.P. InformationDepartment begins publication of a series deal-ing with significant topics related to Palesti-nian resistance thought and to the problems ofthe resistance.

It is of concern to us to put it on recordthat this booklet on the Military Thought ofthe Popular Front for the Liberation of Pa-lestine ought to be considered as a continuationof the report issued in 1969 by the PopularFront regarding its political and organizationalstrategy, which has been published in bookform under the title '«A Strategy for the Libe-ration of Palestine.)) This is due to the fact thatthe military thought of the Popular Front forthe Liberation of Palestine proceeds directlyfrom the ideological, class and organizationalundertaking which forms the foundation of the

committment of the Popular Front as expres

sed in its above-mentioned political and organjzational report.

Of course, this contribution which has beenmade possible by the initiative of Al-Hadaf* jsaimed primarily at deepening, and enlargingupon, progressive resistance thought and strat-egy. It is intended to be submitted to the massesand the fighters as part of the intense revolu-tionary discussion Which is taking place inmany circles. This discussion aims at enriching

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revolutionary thinking, establishing it firmly,and ensuring the continuation of the struggleuntil victory is achieved over the oppressorsof the people.

P.F.L.P.Information Department

* Al-Hadaf: official organ of the Popular Frontfor the Liberation of Palestine, published inBeirut since July, 1969.

Effectiveness of theResistance Movement.

Al-Hadaf: «How do you rate the effectivenessof present commando action from the militarypoint of view, with reference to its tasks at thisstage and to its future possibilities?))Answer: «Commando action began in its pre-sent form and dimensions after June, 1967 asa direct response to the aggression; as a popularexpression — both Palestinian and Arab — ofthe rejection of that defeat. Nevertheless, wecannot but mention with esteem the fact thatal-Fath, Abtal al-'Awda, Shabab al-Tha'r andthe Palestine Liberation Front had already

established themselves on the Arab-Isra

front before the defeat. However, the ba-'beginnings and organizational structures ^veloped after the defeat. Even those which hadarisen before June 5th had not taken on thejbroad form or dimensions until after June 5tk

This means that the resistance movementbegan as a reaction. But were conditions readyfor the start of this movement or not ?The answer to this question delineates the devloprnentof the movement or, rather, the road on whichit presently proceeds.

Conditions were not completely ripe for thestart of an organized, deep-rooted, far-reachingresistance movement. Only one of those condi-tions was present, i.e., the existence of aggres-sion. However, at the time, it wasn't possibleto speak of postponing the resistance unti l theobjective conditions had ripened in the tradi-tional sense, and only then begin to resist.Not at all. That was impossible, and indeedwould have been a crime. For the principle oflegitimate defense prescribes reacting to ag-gression promptly and with all possible means.whatever the circumstances.

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also means that the resistance13 lf since its beginnings and until

movement i se^ ̂ evolution of those pre-no\v, has no even created conditions fa-

pment of action, trans-from a nationalist reac-

a comprehensive war of liberation.

We mean, when we speak of pre-conditions,ndard of political maturity of the Pa-

and Arab masses, the level of the for-Of cadres within the resistance move-

,nt the level of the formation of fighters, thesituation of the party, and of the political andthe mass organizational formations which un-derlie this form of resistance and which are itssupporters and the soil from which its materialand spiritual vigor is drawn. The preparationof these organizational formations is one typeof development in this sort of resistance.

If we consider the Palestinian resistancemovement on the basis of the assumption thatits existence and continuation is a form of vic-tory in this sort of war, when we look upon thedeepening of the roots of the resistance within

the ranks of the masses, the development of ucadres and its fighters, and their armameil^preparation and training, we find that the retistance movement has taken extensive ster»forward, and that it has proceeded on the es-sential path toward forming the appropriate

instrument capable of governing those corujj.tions favorable to the creation of a genuine po. Ipular war of liberation.

There are some who say that the war of lj.beration has already begun and that we havebegun advancing within the war of liberationfrom one phase to another. Were we to considerthe resistance movement from this angle, wewould see it in a way totally different from ourprevious view which sees it as a revolutionarynucleus which fosters a climate leading to thecreation of a revolutionary force to undertakethe advancement of revolutionary action andthe launching of a popular war of liberation.))

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The Resistance Movementand its Effect Upon the Enemy. I

Al-Hadaf: «The preceding refers to the presentstatus of the resistance movement, its tasks andits horizons. We will return to this subject laterin greater detail. But what about the resistancemovement at its current level, with referenceto its effect upon the enemy? And what is thescope of its present form of confrontation?))

Answer: «We can divide the effects of the re-sistance movement on the enemy into its psy-chological, material and military aspects.

On the psychological level, the Israeli milj.tary always aims at reassuring the Israeli citi-zen that it is capable of protecting him, his life

his survival and his economic advancementthrough the suppression of any enemy.

After June 5th and the quick victory whichIsrael effected, various long-range aims of thewar were supposed to materialize, aims whichmay be summarized as the implementation ofsecurity and stability for the Israeli citizen.However, the resistance movement has prevent-ed Israel from realizing that aim and from be-nefitting from its victory. — It deprived her ofthe fruit of victory — peace of mind within Is-rael, whether in terms of military expendituresor of the disruption of development programs,etc. The resistance movement, through its blowsat ecpnomic and civil targets within the terri-tories occupied in the 1948 and 1967 wars, hasbeen able to render that peace of mind and se-curity absolutely non-existent. Consequently,it has put the Israeli military in a constantlydifficult position before its citizens. Of course,the resistance has not reached the point of ren-dering it impotent, as it sometimes reacts to

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activities with sudden operationsborders of the Arab states

largely a» . ,, ,h h claim to support the commandos in «in-ritrating» and training. But the truth of the

tter is that Israel has not been able to directma bi0ws at the commandos themselves be-

use as small, mobile forces, they work in se-t in dispersed areas, carry out their attacks

after having gathered together, and then im-mediately scatter. Thus they do not provide theenemy with a target large enough to enable himto concentrate in order to hit it. Moreover, thefact that the resistance movement is not con-centrated in a given place and does not assumedefensive positions (in fact it has not yet reachedthe stage which would allow it to maintain de-fensive positions) prevents the enemy from de-livering a crushing blow. This, in turn, compelsthe enemy to direct retaliatory blows at Arabborders in order to show its citizens that it isresponding. But the truth of the matter is thatit is not responding to the commandos as muchas it is «responding» to those peaceful citizenswho are on those borders adjacent to the areasof commando movement from their bases out-

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side, to within the occupied territories. Israeicalls this movement infiltration. It is, in fac^the return of citizens who left their land due tooverpowering force, to the land which is legit},mately theirs, across illegitimate borders whichdivide the Arab people. This concludes the dis.cussion of the psychological aspects of the ef-fect of the resistance movement on Israel.

As for the material and military aspectsthere is the matter of the defence line, or thewarning line, which Israel has extended alongthe borders to prevent the commondos fromentering from barbed wire to simple electricalinstallations, to various forms of entrench-ments. A very small part is electronic. Contraryto what the Israelis claim regarding theirhaving installed elcetronic devices on a widescale, these devices are in fact limited, electric-al warning devices, forming the largest part.All these devices, of whatever type, cost thosestates which install them, large amounts ofmoney. The Maurice line, the McNamara lineand the other defense lines of this type areacknowledged as being financially exorbitantburdens.

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Moreover, from the standpoint of guardinglines, continuous motorized patrols and

' ed ambushes throughout the night andlong periods of the day also, cost the Israelis

Ttary expenditures, which were not neces-piior to the growth of commando action.

In the past, the border guards and farmersf the settlements were capable of giving suit-

able warning to Israeli units concentrated inthe rear, at an operational and tactical distancesufficient to strike at any infiltrators when ne-cessary. At the present time, however, the re-sidents of the settlements are no longer ableto undertake this task. Due to this situa-tion, Israel has been compelled to give up oneaspect of her former tactics, which was to as-semble striking forces at fixed spots, and hasbeen forced to detail a part of those forces. Shehas not detailed all her forces, of course, for shestill has mobile and motorized forces in the rearto carry out counterstrikes. But she has beenforced to use at least part of her troops as mo-torized patrols in setting widespread am-bushes, in the long run, a wearing operation,srael would not have had to resort to this were

it not for her fear of the establishment of con-tacts between the interior and the exterior.

Add to this the fact that Israel, in order todominate all the areas lying within the occu-pied territories, and especially those occupiedafter the June war, is compelled to distributeher forces in a superficial occupation throughuse of the «quadrangle» tactic. This tactic isbased on motorized units separated at fixed dis-tances and covering all intervening ground witha network of land posts. These posts are intouch with airborne troops or aircraft whichare capable of responding immediately andswiftly to any infiltration into the occupied ter-ritories. This counters the guerrilla practice ofachievng a tactcal superiority of 5 to 1 despitean overall strategic inferiority of 1 to 5. Thisis done so that once a guerrilla force has en-tered and been observed at a given site, that«quadrangle» zeros-in so as to overcome the lo-cal supremacy of the commandos who had in-tended to use that supremacy against a fixedtarget. The combat ratio thus becomes reversedin favor of the forces opposing the guerrillas.And in this way, Israel tries to counter local

guerrilla supremacy in given locations.

This form of fanning out, or superficial oc-cupation, wears down the enemy and causesthe over-extension of his forces, impedes train-ing and prevents the existence of a basic as-sembled striking force. Until the present time,however, the enemy continues to maintainstriking forces and is able to carry out counter-attacks on the state level. The resistance move-ment has not, until now, been able to disperseall the Israeli forces throughout Palestine in the«quadrangular» form, nor has it been able toengage the Israeli army in its entirety. This, ofcourse, is one of the future aims of the resist-ance movement.

It is well-known that guerrilla warfare de-rives benefit from the dilemma which the ene-my faces:

— either to occupy the entire area with aquadrangular network, dispersing hisforces and destroying every guerrillagroup which penetrates within this area,thereby weakening himself in a way

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which enables guerrilla forces to strikeat any of his dispersed units.

— or to adopt another solution, which wouldbe to concentrate in order to respond tothe blows of the revolutionary army,thereby leaving some areas vacant. This,however, provides the guerrillas withthe opportunity to occupy and dominatethese areas and thus to haras sthe enemyand strike at his rear.

This anxiety and contradiction with whichevery army trying to resist guerrilla warfarelives, this wavering between dispersion in a«quadrangular» network and concentrating inthe form of striking forces for counterattack,has clearly not yet seized the Israeli army. Thisis due to the fact that the guerrillas have notyet grown sufficiently ,either materially or nu-merically within the interior (although theycertainly will eventually) to necessitate suchsweeping dispersion. Nor has the Israeli armyyet found itself endangered by an offensiveaimed at its weak points, which would force it

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to concentrate and thereby leaving scope forthe guerrillas to work freely in some locales

In the coming development of the guerril-las, after their expansion and the broadening oftheir assaults in the interior, they will un-doubtedly coerce the Israeli army into suchover-extension. At that point, any organizedrevolutionary force (in the sense that it is mold-ed and trained in systematic form, has revolu-tionary cadres and leadership, or springs fromthe guerrillas and is joined to the revolutionaryarmy) would be capable of striking at the enemyin any locale. Thus, whenever the enemy con-centrates to deal the revolutionary forces ablow, the guerrillas would work from behindwith ease, cutting off its lines of communi-cation. At that point, the enemy would fall in-to the dilemma which would ultimately anni-hilate it and, we would finally enter into thefinal phase of guerrilla warfare.

It is possible to summarize all this by say-ing that the Arab resistance movement harras-ses the enemy and adds a great deal of bitter-ness to the taste of his victory, thereby depriv-

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ing him of much of what he aims at achieving.But the continued growth of the movement, thedevelopment of its methods, the gradual in-crease of its cadres, and the expansion of itsrange of operations will enable it to create thenecessary climate for a popular war of libera-tion. This war has not yet started, but it in-evitably will, with the cooperation of the guer-rillas from whom the revolutionary army willdevelop under the guidance of their cadres.»

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Guerrilla Warfareand the Enemy.

Al-Hadaf: «The general concept raised by thistopic leads to the question: from what we seeof the activities of the resistance movement andof regular military activity, it appears at firstglance that the enemy's army employs some-thing resembling guerrilla warfare more thanregular armies ordinarily do. This is not true ofregular Arab military activity. Indeed, the ene-my sometimes appears in touch with the prin-ciples of guerrilla warfare even more than dothe operations of the resistance movement it-self. For example, the enemy attacks isolated

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positions with large forces, it carries out opera-tions of kidnapping and assault which resemblethe tactic of «infiltration» counseled by theprinciples of guerrilla warfare, and indeed car-ries out such operations more often than classi-cal assaults. Is this conception of the enemy'sactivity sound? And, if so, how is it to be in-terpreted?»

Answer: «The truth of the matter is that theenemy does not follow the methods of guerrillawarfare, but rather, follows the tactic of specialunits, which resembles guerrilla activity. Thedifference between these tactics and the meth-ods of guerrilla warfare is like the differencebetween a just and an unjust war — the differ-ence being that guerrilla activity is bound tothe masses, while operations of suppression aredirected against the masses. The distinctivefactor is psychological and a matter of morale,and not specifically technical. Like the differ-ence between military activity which threatensand that which liberates, although both are, infact, suppressive operations, their fundamentalroots differ. Ambushing, attacking forward po-sitions, patrolling, assaulting isolated posts with

airborne troops, kidnapping people, etc., all the-se operations are the same from the tacticalstandpoint. But either guerillas utilize suchtactics while relying on the masses in execu-tion of a strategy of liberation, or suppressivearmies or special forces prepared to fight theguerillas use them. And in this situation thosetactics are tantamount to a special operationin the service of a strategy of aggression.

The Israeli forces are presently reactingagainst the Arab countries by means of spe-cialized operations. In the past, these operationshad been those of the military units, with thosedoing the fighting having been chosen fromamong the best elements. .Later they became adetachment or squad of troops chosen from thearmored corps or from amphibious troops, toundertake assigned assaults. All these types oftroops, now joined by helicopter-borne troops,consist of very highly trained forces, chosenfrom among the physically strongest soldiers.longest-prepared psychologically, and highlytrained technicaly, specialized in shootingand hand-to-hand combat in order to carry outsuch operations as those at the Beirut Airport.

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southern Lebanon, south of the Dead Sea, etc.»

Al-Hadaf: «But why are we not capable of car-rying out such operations, either on the com-mando or regular army levels?»

Answer: «On the Commando level, we maynotice that all operations which the enemy un-dertakes spring from the same spirit. The spiritof the specialized operation. The spirit of theraid or the ambush. Or a fixed force assemblingagainst a small objective to strike at it swiftlyand then withdraw. However, the existing ca-pabilities of the Arab guerrillas presently activeare at variance with those of the Israeli armyfrom the standpoint of training, the existenceof air and helicopter means of transport, or thenumber of armored vehicles undertaking strikesat a small target and then returning.

But from the tactical standpoint, they areon the same level. So that when a group of com-mandos undertake to enter the occupied terri-tories from the outside, or assembles from with-in and carries out an assault on a guard postor sets up an ambush for a group of vehicles,

within the limits of its capabilities, it, in fact,undertakes to apply the principles of smallspecalized operations. When the standards ofthe Arab guerrillas are raised — numerically,in training and in arms — they will, of course,move to a stage higher than that of merely sett-ing- up ambushes for moving vehicles. That isto say, they will set up the ambush and willalso capture some of those vehicles, utilizingtheir weapons, taking their men prisoner, ordestroying what had not previously been des-troyed. And rather than assaulting a small post,they will attack an airport. At that point, theseoperations will take on an expanded and largerform.

As for the reason that the Arab armies do notcarry out such operations, this is because they,in their basic formation and until the present,have been defensive armies. Throughout allphases from 1948 till the present, they have con-sisted of forces concentrated on the bordersto guard against aggression. Whereas the Is-raelis were always carrying out acts of aggres-sion, the Arab armies — if they were able —would simply carry out acts of prevention.

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Arab strategy has been static and defensiveto the extreme. Even its defense has been anon-dynamic one, a stationary defense antici-pating a blow without knowing when it wouldcome. And when it did come, this defense wouldrespond to it with gunfire and not with mobility!

All the hostilities which Israel has carriedout against the Arab borders have been of thiskind : a swift attacking operation, carrying outits assignment then withdrawing, and met onlywith defensive fire from the Arabs. The Arabarmies would be called up for a period butafter a time would return to their normal de-fensive status without responding to Israel'saggressive act with a deterring one.

This follows from the fact that the Arabmilitary apparatus, throughout this period oftime, has been unable to put into effect thepolicy required to fit, a policy of liberation. Ithas not been predisposed towards escalation andachievement for the purpose of a confrontationof wide scope — and is incapable of acknow-ledging that before the masses.

coming to power, of its overthrow of the oldsystems and its accusation against those sys-tems of their inability to liberate or to showa bold front, is that it is capable of liberating.In fact, it is not. This feat of confronting the ene-my and of being frank with the masses has al-ways caused its position to be one oriented to-wards covering up matters, preventing the ex-pansion of any entanglement, and non-escala-tion. As long as the enemy would merely strikeand not advance, the matter would stop there.And if the enemy withdrew, this would bedeemed as tantamount to having wrapped upthe issue!

The Arab armies have not advanced offen-sively at all. They have not trained for far-ranging offensive operations. Rather, theirtraining and spirit have been defensive. Anddue to the danger of the overthrow of govern-ments, one eye has always been directed inwardsand the other outwards. Their eye directed in-wards aims to maintain power, while the otherattempts to halt the enemy.

The justification of its existence, of its Contrary to this, the Israeli army, ever

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since its inception has been an offensiverelying on the surprise blow and the conceptthat if it does not strike first, it will be struckThus, it strikes according to the principle thatthe best method of defense is a good offence.

This type of offensive attitude takes rootwith time within the fighters, and trainingevolves on the basis of the offense. The enemyknows that Arab circumstances do not permitArab armies to undertake offensive action.Consequently, it strikes at a suitable site, aim-ing its blows and raising the morale of its armyand population, knowing full well that therewill be no response or counterblow. Were it ex-pecting the contrary, it would not have under-taken that sort of adventure which it mountswhenever it sees that it is propitious—quickforays aimed at raising the level of morale ofits soldiers and people, carried out in full con-fidence that the Arab military apparatus willnot move against it.

If we consider the ratio of paratroopers andcommandos in proportion to the number oisoldiers in the Israeli army in comparison withthat in the Arab armies, we would find that the

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ratio in the Arab armies is very small, whereasit is very high within the Israeli army.

At present, even after some inroads havebeen made in paratrooper and commando tac-tics, now that there are helicoptor-borne com-mandos and amphibious or similar units, wesee that the number of helicopters and the de-gree of training in their use within the Arabarmies is still meager when compared to that ofthe Israeli army.

On the other hand, Israel is presently mak-ing an effort to obtain a quantity of large air-craft and helicopters for the transport of air-borne and helicoptor-borne troops, especiallyafter having considered the incorporation of theinfantry within the paratroopers or helicoptor-borne troops, thus having the entire army car-ried either by vehicles or helicopters.

All these matters regarding the Israeli ar-my proceed, of course, from the basic Israelitenet, the basic Israeli strategic convictionfounded on manceuver along internal lines, aspracticed by every state encircled from a num-ber of directions by various powers, and whose

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terrain is small. It is compelled to respond toand to strike at a number of fronts. Consequent-ly, its forces must be capable of mobility fromone front to another before the latter has be-come active. Thus, Israel moves against andstrikes at the first front, usually the strongestone, then returns to settle accounts with theother fronts, having already pinned them downbefore striking at the first.

In order to enable any state to carry outsuch a plan, as did Germany in World Wars Iand II, and as did Israel in the 1948 war andeven more clearly in 1967, its forces must allbe highly mobile.

After the 1967 war, it became clear to theIsraeli military that the expansion which itmanaged to achieve within the occupied terri-tories necessitated more than troops merelycarried by land, or armored or borne by half-tracks. Rather it was also necessary for her tohave large, helicoptor-borne striking forces ona wide scale.

The problem of transport from the Syrianto the Egyptian fronts has now been exacerbat-

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j since the distances have been multiplied andthe desert land of Sinai is unsuitable for trans-port operations by armored cars or vehicles. Astransporting these troops from the Egyptianfront to the Syrian one and vice versa has be-come more difficult, the airborne forces in Is-rael have undergone development from specialforces to support land offenses into those forcesundertaking the offense itself.

This is the fundamental reason which hasenabled the Israeli army to carry out this formof warfare. As for the Arab armies, by theirpsychological and material formation, theirstructure, the quantity of their aircraft, ,theirvehicles and their special forces, they are in-capable of undertaking such military opera-tions. The Arab tenet of offense is unclear,whereas the tenet of aggression is the basis ofthe structure of the Israeli army.

We must at this point mention a develop-ment which has occurred within the Egyptianspecial forces after the June war of 1967, a de-velopment which has enabled various Egyptianunits to carry out special amphibious, airborne

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or land operations against isolated Israeli out-posts in Sinai. However, we must here considerthese units realistically and objectively, andinclude in our appraisal and assessments thedifference between units which have previous-ly achieved numerous victories over a periodof twenty years and those belonging to an armyexposed to two large, consecutive defeats with-in a short period of time.»

The Forms of technologyin the Confrontation.

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Al-Hadaf: «Is this simply a technological mat-ter? Or is it a matter bound to^and emanatingfrom a clear, existing political notion or ideo-logy? That is, have the Arab armies, and to alesser degree the guerrillas, been incapable ofadvancing this spirit of systematic offense intheir actual circumstances? Is this current mi-litary difference merely a technical matter, ordoes it proceed from far-reaching political andsocial causes?»

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Answer: «The spirit of daring, offensive sacrjv ^fice latent within the commandos, the psychol0.gical and mental roots from which commandoaction stems, their categorical rejection of thedefeat, their rush to plunge into the battle 0{liberation, the operations of confrontation car*ried out by the commandos in spite of their be-ing small — all this has confirmed that they en-joy that creative spirit of offense. I am cer-tain that what prevents the commandos froinundertaking operations resembling the special}.zed ones of the Israelis is merely a material im.pediment, as represented in weaponry, equip-ment, and the standards of training and com-mand. All the commando organizations willmake an attempt to overcome these materialimpediments in the course of their develop-ment.

As for the Arab armies, the tenet of de-fense, of reaction, of preventing the wideningof entanglements, the absence of a comprehen-sive plan for a full-scale war of liberation, theloss of the spirit of enterprise and daring of theArab establishments — all this prevents theexistence of such operations. For Israel, the

'rit of aggressive expansionism and the basicjitical concept, as represented by a clear

•jgology, has been transmitted to the armedforces which were constructed on an offensive,Aggressive and daring basis. All this was beforeJune 5th. After this date it is clear that theEgyptian army in particular began to embracethis offensive spirit well. It is true that it wasdefeated. It is also true that to enable the armyto make the transition from defeat, to standingfirm, to victory, it must have small successivevictories at the beginning, in order to regainself-confidence and to rebuild its cadres. Duringthe period from June 1967 until the present, theEgyptian army has been able, with the aid ofSoviet experts as well as other experts from thesocialist countries, to rebuild the army. They ha-ve also been able to move to undertaking daringoperations unheard of before June 5th; cross-ing and landing operations have begun, as wellas specialized operations which the army car-ried out in the unoccupied areas between thetwo armies, in order to obtain information orto effect quick strikes and occupy significantpositions. All these things the Egyptian army

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has attained and has been able to effectuate i^a way different from the rest of the Arab ar-mies. Although this development is undoubted-ly taking place within the other Arab armiesas well, what has occurred within the Egyptianarmy is more visible.

With regard to the other Arab armies, thisis taking place on a relatively lower level. Andall that, of course, follows from the strength ofthe impetus coming from behind. The army actsin accordance with political conviction. And theboldness of that political conviction, or its in-troversion flows from its confidence in whetherthe masses are behind it or not, whether theyare able to stand firm no matter what,the ex-tent of the struggle, or whether the internalfront is urifirm. From these beginnings,the tenet of offense and daring are created.This is present on the Egyptian front in newform. Thus, we see that the Israelis carry outan amphibious operation, while the Egyptiansundertake the occupation of a control post; thenthe Israelis undertake a strike, and the Egypt-ians respond with a raid.

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That is, the blows are successive. The Israelis,f course, would not permit the Egyptians to

have the last blow, or word. Rather, there is al-urays a blow and a counterblow. Continuous en-gagements. There is never a strike, then generalsilence and non-response. In other words, fromthe purely tactical standpoint, the Arab armiesare not deficient in that type of training. Thissort of warfare does not require a technical le-vel higher than that of some of the officers inthe Arab countries, whether in the Syrian armywhich includes instructors trained in bothEastern and Western countries, or in the Jor-danian army which has been trained accordingto the British doctrine. For the British wereamong the first masters of commando action inWorld War II. That is to say, it is as-sumed that all armies possess the technicalknowledge necessary to undertake such opera-tions. There remains the long-range view ofthat army, the creation of special forces withinit, the proportion of those forces, and the start-ing of daring operations, in the knowledge thatall those Arab armies based upon the Sovietdoctrine are not supposed to follow the princi-

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pie of defense, believing only in the principk fof offense as the sole means of war. For the So,viet doctrine, according to which the cadres j*the Syrian, Egyptian and other Arab armies

were trained in the .Socialist countries, main,tains that the principle of offense is fundamen.ltal, while that of defense is a temporary phasewhich the army might benefit from to upsetthe enemy's equilibrium while anticipating theoffensive. It is the phase which precedes the!offense.andthusit is not considered as a detensiveone. The offense" is basic, while the defense mustbe a dynamic and daring one, where raids and re-connaissance activities go on, so that there isno silence. For silence gives the fighter the im-pression of the lessening of tension which, hiturn, develops into a static defense. And staticdefense, according to military principle, yieldsnothing but more defeats. It is presupposed,from the standpoint of Soviet military doctrineas adopted by the Arab armies, that those ar-rmies are both offensive and daring ones. Theability of these armies to assimilate and imple-ment that doctrine, however, is another matterLikewise, the entire political mentality and cir-

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^stances at the back of these armies are thefactors which determine whether and when(it•s possible to utilize that doctrine.

The fact that these armies do not under-take such activities does not necessarily conceala weakness in technology or training. Rather,this weakness emanates from the contradictionBetween the power of the apparatus (the army)and the spirit which sets that apparatus in mo-tion (politics).))

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The Confrontation, the Armiesand the Organizations.

Al-Hadaf :«This would mean, then, that as longas there exists the technological ability and doc-trine of the offense with which the Arab armiesare supposed to be injected, the problem willcome to the point of being solved. Throughoutthe past twenty years, however, the situationhas ultimately wound up in a state of impotence,failure and collapse. This is clear from what ishappening now on the borders and has led usto conclude • that there exist other factors be-sides the technological one, or the vision of anofficer or a leader; i.e., the matter of organi-

zation. We certainly don't mean to say that theorganization of the Israeli state is what provi-jes her with her military prowess, for, in ourconception, there exist in Israel,expansionist in-centives which every militarist, imperialist andfascist organization of the past century has had.gut with regard to the Arab systems, there isno such connection between the nature of thosesystems and the competence of their plans forliberation or their orientation or conceptions,go, is military competence dependent upon ide-ological and political factors, and the orienta-tion of a system of the underdeveloped worldvis-a-vis the challenges of a developed and su-perior state? What are the problems in thisconnection?))

Answer: «The problems are not techonological-If the struggle was between the Arab statesas part of the developing world and Israel as abase and bridgehead of the advanced, imperial-ist world within the«third world», we could saythat the difference might be technological. Butthe truth of the matter is that Israel does notfight with Israeli weapons, nor do the Arabs

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fight with Arab weapons. The struggle is notbetween Arab and Israeli industry, as it was,for example, between German and French in.dustry, a matter in which the one which equipsits army with better weaponry has an advant-age over the other.

There are the Arab weaponscoming from the Socialist Countries whichare likewise industrially advanced. The wea-pons from both sides are at a correspondinglevel of excellence. It is true that Israel manu-factures some light weapons, improves uponsome heavy equipment, and is now diligentlytrying to attain independence in weapons ma-nufacture. The possibilities of using weaponry,of patrolling and of training are not impossibletasks, however, but rather, are quite possible.The Arab establishments have implementedthese for a period of time, while Israel has al-ways done so.

But the issue here, as we have already said,is the political thought which exists behind theuse of those weapons. We have noted that theIsraeli political notion is one of expansionism

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ncl the creation of a Zionist state, but we doOt see that the Arab states likewise possesspolitical strategy upon which to build long-

range military planning. Rather, there are only«plans» which are always no more than reac-tions to the situation. Moreover, the organiza-tion of these Arab establishments since 1948until the present has not been along the onlylines which would allow them to coalesce withthe masses: their requesting everything fromthe masses, the masses granting everything tothem while having the utmost confidence inthem, to the point where they participate in aprotracted war which might escalate to an un-limited extent, and which may necessitate greatsacrifices and agonies. All the while, the inter-nal front remains firmly cohesive, and con-tinues to support combat action, etc. On thecontrary, we note that there is a system, an ar-my and a people, sometimes interlocking andsometimes not, consulting it sometimes andsometimes not.

Further, if we wanted to look upon thebattle as a struggle between underdevelopedcountries as part of the «third world» against, a

41

spearhead implanted by the advanced imperial,ist world, then it is incumbant upon the Arab Istates and the«third world»to practise some formof fighting which corresponds to their under.development. This is so because their technolo-gical ability is not sufficient to confront Ameri-can technology, knowing, as we have said, thefact that we have access to Soviet weaponryand technology, equal in quality and quantityto that which they possess.

Whenever the underdeveloped countries of the

«third world» confront advanced states, theyuse the strategy of . a protracted war. Such astrategy requires a people ready to bear all itsstipulations and imbued with a deep-rooted andradical doctrine which makes them believe thatthis war is in their interest, and that the leader-ship in" power is part of them, acts on their be-half, and does not constitute a petrified classabove them. At that point, it is within theircapacity to conduct a long-term war in whichthey might exhaust their more advanced foe,while simultaneously upsetting the balance ofpower, with they themselves undertaking thecounterattack.

Throughout this period, which might lastf T tens of years, if there is not absolute coales-

nce between the leadership and the masses,.. js impossible to hold out. If there did exist

absolute coalescence, the ability to hold outwould thereby continue throughout that perioduntil the enemy was exhausted. And after theexhaustion of the enemy, it would be possibleto upset the balance of power. Until such ex-haustion has been completed, however, in thefirst phases, there will be many losses, agoniesand sacrifices which the people must bear.

The existence of the ideology of a givenclass, that of the proletarian masses, is in thepossession of the people and the establishmentThe existence of the fateful bond between themasses and the state, as represented by classunity, is the factor which permits the continua-tion of the struggle for a long period of time:the period of a protracted war, carried on untilsuch time when the enemy is exhausted and thebalance of power is upset.

On the other hand, as long as there doesn'texist in the countries surrounding Israel this

42

type of state, in which the masses are coalescedwith their leadership, and where the leadershipthrows itself into the struggle with all its powerbecause of its knowledge that the masses arefully behind it: countries whose leadership isprepared to hold out before a rough way of lifeand to carry out continuous assaults, to exposeitself to an unsettled life and to killing for tensof years; and as long as what does exist con-sists of establishments and armies that are neu-tralized by simply being defeated; then theissue will remain one of building up the army.Once again Israel will advance and annihilateeach army separately. That will be followed bya period of stagnation and then a period of re-building along the same lines. Then anotherstrike, and another period of stagnation, andso on.

What is needed is a people completely mo-bilized and armed, so that when Israel strikesat the army, there will be a gun in each homeand a grenade in the pocket of each citizen. TheIsraeli army, at that point, would be unable toenter any city, or at least not until having paidthe price. Even an attempt to occupy a village,

ould not be achieved without sustaining gravelosses. Over a period of time, this would makejt possible to exhaust the enemy in preparationfor the counterattack.

At the present time, however, it is suffi-cient for the enemy army to strike and occupyaS it wills, and there is nothing to wear it outin the long run. It has no borders at which itmust halt, except for those drawn for it by itsallies, • the imperialists, in their plans, or theborders of «the furthermost administrative ex-tent», at which every army is compelled to stopby virtue of administrative requirements.

The solution is neither in technology nor isit in training, but exists rather, within the basicstructure of Arab society. Is it prepared for war?Is it a cohesive class formation in which eachindividual senses that he is not subject to anyexploitation, that he is bound to the soil andthus defends it, fighting while confident thatstruggle is in his own interests, and that thereis no one covertly conspiring against him? Along-term war cannot continue and triumph aslong as a class exists which benefit's from rul-

4445

ing and another class exists which is subie

to exploitation. Nor can it do so as long as ,,class which so benefits acquires all gains H ?

ing peacetime, and then obliges the exploitclass to pay the price with its blood in the tnidof the.hell of the struggle.

^***************

46

Necessity of Marxism - Leninismfor the Fighter.

Al-Hadaf: «Let us return to the subject of theresistance movement and guerrilla warfare.There appears to be a missing link here, whichwould pull all the parts of this picture toge-ther. It seems possible to us to point that linkout by asking the limited question: is it neces-sary, even from the purely military standpoint,that the fighter in a guerrilla war be a Marxist-Leninist within the framework of the presentconfrontation and its historical circumstances.Militarily speaking, what is the relationship be-tween Marxism-Leninism and liberation wars"J»

47

Answer: «The Popular Front does what is with. Iin its capability, to develop its role in the resist, fance movement, and to proceed from its pre.sent role to a more evolved phase in the guer-1rilla war. However much the issue develops,within guerrilla warfare, we must bear in mindthat reaching the point of a popular war of \\,\n requires the following: guerrilla war.I

fare plus psychological warfare. For a popular!war of liberation consists of a revolutionary!war which utilizes an indirect revolutionarystrategy which depends, according to Lenin,upon «postponing activities until such time as;

the demoralization of the enemy is permitted'by directing the decisive blow against it withease.»

The answer here is directed towards psy-lchological warfare, which aims at the follow-ing:

1. to demoralize the enemy and to frag-ment it materially, - while draining it'in the long-run until it is ready for thedecisive blow, and

throughout the long operation of ex-hausting the enemy, since that opera-tion, materially and morale-wise, as iswell-known, is a reciprocal one. Thus,to demoralize the enemy, it is necessaryto begin with a psychological war, ca-pable of creating internal contradictionswithin it, in order to call up one of itsclasses, that of the proletariat, againstthe state of exploitation exercisedagainst it and the Arabs.

In order for our morale to hold out despitethe length of time it takes to drain the enemy,so that there is no decline of morale which con-tradicts the successive setbacks, the agonies andthe difficulties, and so that the fighter does notreach the point of losing hope, there must be atheory. A theory is necessary in order to ener-vate the enemy, while at the same time prevent-'ing discouragement during the psychologicalwar, itself a basic component in transformingguerrilla warfare into a popular war of libera-tion.

2. preserving our own state of morale But why Marxism-Leninism specifically?

49

Why must the fighter necessarily be a MarxistLeninist? And why does the Popular Front assume a Marxist-Leninist stance, in the sens?that it induces all its rank and file and its ca,dres to embrace Marxist theory?

The answer is that the Popular Front pr0,ceeds along this definitive course on the basisof a socio-political evalution. The Popular Frontconsiders the proletariat class — workers, pea.sants, residents of the refugee camps and theimpoverished — as the substance of the revolu-tion, its instrument, its fuel and its objective. Itis thus incumbent upon us to adopt that theorywhich makes the interests of that class,its ownin the revolution. Likewise, class unity and thecoalescence of the leadership with the rank andfile, of which we have spoken in the previoussection, as two basic pre-conditions for a long-term war and for its continuation, can be ac-complished only after having reached a highdegree of class awareness and understandingof the class theory which advocates revolution— i.e.. that of Marxism-Leninism. This does not

- mean that Marxism-Leninism is no more thana tool with which to achieve victory. Rather,

50

,t jg simultaneously the tool and the objective.tool to achieve victory for the purpose of re-

cturing a society after the victory on the! sis of Marxism-Leninism, itself an objective.

In short, if we want to keep the spark ofevolution burning in_spite of all difficultiesnd setbacks, if we do not want our revolution

to be simply a spontaneous outburst without arange of vision, and if we want to be preparedfor a revolutionary war of long duration whichis based on psychological warfare, then theguerrilla must embrace a theory. Thus, in viewof the fact that the proletariat class is the sub-stance of our revolution, then our theory is in-evitably the theory of the proletariat: Marxism-Leninism.»

Al-Hadaf: «You mentioned previously that thepresent stage is one of building the fighting ap-paratus of the revolution and of creating a re-volutionary climate. In your estimation, whatare the tasks which will present themselves du-ring the coming period, with regard to the ra-lationship of the resistance movement to thepresent social-political reality, and to those

51

areas which are nominated to become the re-volutionary centers in the near future, such asthe East Bank and south Lebanon? How willthe Popular Front approach those tasks? Andhow will it attempt to perform them with re-gard to its relationship with the villagers ana ithe masses, and with regard to the existing ;

socio-economic reality?*

Answer: «The Popular Front considers the crea-tion of a revolutionary climate to mean the pre-paration and the cultivation of a proper ground-;work for the revolution. In view of the fact thatthe Popular Front considers the workers, thepeasants and the residents of the refugee campsas the basic implement and the genuine fuel ofthe revolution, it takes it upon itself to con-struct its political and military organizations, tothe widest extent possible, in the midst of this!class. It simultaneously attempts to attractwhatever sections possible of the petit bour-goisie, and to induce revolutionary intellectualsto leave their' class positions and to join thestruggle along with the dispossessed classes.

This is on the level of the rank and file.for the political and .military cadres, the

groundwork has already been laid among them,LO that they might take up their duties within

"the popular war of liberation.

It is true that the creation of a revolutinaryclimate will be accomplished by means of orga-nization. However, it will also be accomplishedby means of political education campaigns andthe political stimulation of all the people. Allthe people will not come to enter the organiza-tional setup,autoniatically,but, rather, there willremain sectors which merely endorse it. Makingthe masses aware and arming them for the pur-pose of creating a revolutinary climate in thisarea is a basic part of the program of the Po-pular Front. During this time, it will be neces-sary to conclude alliances with groups of theprogressive petit bourgoisie, in addition to deep-rooted alliances with those leftist groups with-in the resistance movement, as well as thosewithin the entire Arab area, for the sake ofproducing a leftist nucleus around which themasses can rally to create that climate. As forthe scope of activity of the Popular Front and

52 53

whether it will limit itself to the occupied ter-ritories and the East Bank or whether it willexpand to south Lebanon and other areas, it ispossible to say without breaching security, thatthe Popular Front is already active within theoccupied territories, as well as within some sur-rounding Arab areas. Moreover, the range ofits activity will expand to comprise all that ter-ritory surrounding Palestine, and that areawhich may become part of the «Arab Hanoi»in the future.

In this fashion, with the continuation of thebattle within the occupied territories, and thecontinuaion of assaults on the Imperialist-Israelienemy everywhere, and by mobilizing the re-volutionary masses all over the Arab world tobecome the support of the resistance movementits propogators and its backbone, the move-ment will not be depleted of its capacities, ac-tivity and political backing.

By means of all this, the Popular Front willignite the fires of revolution, protect it, and in-lduce the popular masses to reject the defeatand the fact, whether of occupation or of the

rArab reality which had led to the occupation,jror the occupation would not have been possi-ble were it not for that Arab reality. Thus, therejection is threefold: the rejection of the oc-cupation, as well as its roots; the rejection ofthat system which caused the defeat; and therejection of that class structure which has ob-structed the development of a popular war ofliberation.))

54 55

The Resistance Movementand its Effect Upon the Enemy. II

Al-Hadaf: «With regard to the controversialrelationship between the resistance movementand the enemy in the process of the struggle,has the resistance movement, during the periodbetween June 1967 and the present, produced apolitical effect upon Israeli society, has it deep-ened the contradictions within it, and what arethe possibilities for the future?*)

Answer: «The relationship between the enemyand the liberation movement exists within theframework of the Arab-Israeli issue, as was

clearly manifested after the June 5th war inparticular. It has now been tangibly confirmedthat Israel is a military and economic center,whose basis is a chauvinistic, reactionary men-tality and which uses fascism and aggression asa basic doctrine to achieve expansionist objec-tives on Arab soil. On the other hand, the Arabsare the owners of the land, and seek peace withhonor. Israel, however, is an aggressive nucleuswhich rejects this and, as one would expect,obstructs any genuine opportunities for peace.

This issue has become clear to the socialist r

countries and to the countries of the «thirdworld» which have not been exposed toZionist deception: Likewise, revolutionary intel-lectuals in the West have begun to sense thatin fact an enmity exists, and that the June warwas an escalation of that enmity. Accordingly,those intellectuals have begun to sense themeaning of the Arab national liberation move-ment and its horizons.

This movement of change has only slowlybeen transmitted to the West, but is beingtransmitted even more slowly within Israeli so-ciety.

56 57

If Western societies consist of a climatewhich is of only average receptivity to notionsrelated to the Arab-Israeli struggle, this is soby force of their origins, their interests and the Iantecedent notions which they have inherited,Israeli society consists of a soil unreceptiveto quick results. This is not because it is fun-1damentally unreceptive to such cultivation only]

but because of the effects Israeli propogandawhich has gone on unopposed for a long periodof time, and which has been reinforced by de-ceptions and confessional, chauvinist matters.!All this has contributed to the emergence of an IIsraeli inferiority complex, to fear, and to afeeling of danger.

Then the 5th of June came along to upsettheir conceptions, and to fill them with feel-ings of arrogance and insolence.

These things have rendered even the Israeli;proletariat^ that class whose interest lies in thetermination of the Israeli entity, of little ef-ficacy. It thus engages only in passive resist-!ance, and plays a two-fold role: it exploits theArabs and oppresses them, while it, itself, if

exploited by imperialism, capitalism and Zion-ism, even more severely. It is like the Germanworking and peasant classes during World,War II who served expansionist German ca-pitalism, while grinding underfoot members oftheir own classes belonging to other nationali-ties.

It may be that this Israeli class, in the lastanalysis, has no intention of resisting Zionism.This does not mean, however, that it is a hope-less case. For through the continuation of theresistance movement, its escalation and its pre-sentation of a draft for a democratic Palestinianstate, meaning the mutual co-existence of themembers of all creeds in a socialist, democ-ratic state, then hopes in this sphere will grow.

Even though the continued presentation ofthis plan has not yet led to fruitful results,nevertheless, after the progressive nature ofthe resistance movement has seeped in, andafter having convinced certain sectors that itis not at all fascist or chauvinistic, it is possiblefor it to reach deep pockets within Israeli so-ciety, not to mention the Arab pockets in those

58 59

territories occupied before June 5, 1967. Someof those sectors will then act positively, while

some others will continue to wait it out. Andwhen the time comes for the counter-offensiveof the revolutionary forces to begin, thesepockets will go into action and work behindenemy lines, helping to fragment this hostilesociety, thereby dissipating its power. The for-mation of those pockets is proceeding satisfac-torily. Moreover, the counter-offensive has notyet begun, which thus makes them appear tobe smaller than their actual size.»

Arab Horizons of thePalestinian Resistance Movement.

Al-Hadaf: «As long as the question has beenraised regarding the controversial relationshipbetween the resistance forces and the enemy,there is another question, actually previouslyraised, regarding a similarly controversial rela-tionship between the Palestinian resistancemovement and the Arab national movement.The relationship between the solution to theproblem of the liberation of Palestine and thedestruction of that old, defeated society, makesit seem that the bond between the Palestinianresistance movement and the Arab national

60 61

movement is unavoidable. In the first Place.what is the military conception of that relati0

ship and, secondly, what is its political "tion?» :P- AI'

reAnswer: «With respect to the Palestiniansistance movement, there exist a numbertendencies which present the Arab-Israeii

• struggle as one between the Palestinians andthe Israelis in the area. These tendencies assertthat this struggle bears no relation to the Arabsituation, or that the Arab situation is inde-pendent of the issue, at least at the presenttime. We must consider the matter to be a Pa-lestinian one and fight the enemy within theoccupied territories. The error here is clearlytwo-fold:

1. It renders the issue an exclusively Pa-lestinian one, and the struggle a Palesti-nian-Israeli one, and

2. It ignores the fact that the cause of thispresent reality is the Arab reality in itsentirety, and does not visualize the es-sential underlying causes of that Pa-lestinian reality.

62

truth of the matter is that it is impos-isolate the Arab-Israeli struggle from

""Tb circumstances as a whole. Any attempt to.der the battle simply a Palestinian one aids

' se dissonant voices which appear from time! time in some Arab countries for the purposef making their territory off-limits to resist-

' ,ce activity. In addition, it renders the battle• capable of producing long-range results. Like-,.jSe, the battle, on the part of Israel, is notigainst the Palestinian people alone. It is truethat the Palestinian people are those who losttheir land. But there are territories belongingto other Arab countries which are also occupied.And there are plans to occupy other lands aswell.

Seen in this light, the battle becomes acomprehensively Arab one, and is thus relatedto the presently existing Arab systems, as isseen from the viewpoint which raises the fol-lowing inquiries: 'Do these systems, by theirexistence and practices aid the cause of libera-tion or not? Do they aid the prospect of holdingout or not? Are they part of the battle or partof those forces which are carrying out the

63

struggle or not? Do they attract to theitispart of the battle or part of those forcesare carrying out the struggle or not? D0 t)draw to themselves part of the Israeli Wa ey

fort and the Israeli army or not?'It is from- this angle that we must crmc.-j, , . llibic%

the issue.

The Popular Front does not consider HIbattle as an exclusively Palestinian one. Ratheit sees it as an Arab one. It also discerns th'horizons of this battle. If it is made to be anArab one in which the masses participate andwhich the entire Arab region pushes itself in.to, with the Arab people putting into it all jts

potentialities — human, psychological, econo-mic and the capacity for guerrilla warfare, ifthere was a «Hanoi» in a state adjacent to oc-cupied Palestine which would permit an Arab«Viet Cong» to arise and engage in daily clasheswith the enemy in the entire Arab area — atthat point, it would be possible to enter a war

of long duration.

Without this range of vision, victory would

not be possible.

64

As for the form of the states surroundingel or rather, one surrounding state which

iH participate in this form of battle andco^,hich could, by its nature, be an «Arab Hanoi»,

] fflust necessarily and inevitably be a socialiste as we said earlier. It must be a state which

'relies on the masses, which emanates from them,oelieves in their ideology, and which

*'glits for their sake effectively and in a wayenables them to back it and to make sac-

rifices for a long period of time, while confident'nl final victory for that class which carries onthe struggle.

Viewing the surrounding states and eval-uating them by this measure, that is, as towhether they are fit to be the «Arab Hanoi»,provides the horizons for the Palestinian resist-ance movement and the vision toward whichthe Popular Front aims.

Were we to find that one of those stateswas unfit to be the «Arab Hanoi», should thePalestinian resistance movement change it; issuch change the role of the Arab masses? It isnecessarily the role of the Arab masses. The

65

Arab struggle, the Palestinian resistance move-ment presently existing, create a revolutionaryclimate by showing that it is possible to con-front an oppressive power, that technologicalsuperiority is not everything, and that the tankand airplane are weapons which can be oppos-ed. In short, its role in this sphere is tantamountto being the yeast of the revolution and a schoolfor the masses in all the Arab countries, dis-playing before them that an army is, in fact, apower which can be overcome by the masses,even poorly armed masses. The lesson here isthat the Palestinian resistance movement, inspite of its numerical smallness, has seriouslyaffected the largest and most powerful army inthe region — the Israeli army — which was ca-pable of defeating the Arab armies within amatter of hours and of inflicting substantialdamage. In this sense, it constitutes an examplefor those masses qualified to carry out a revolu-tion and for every force which desires a «Ha-noi», measures each Arab state in order to de-termine whether that state is capable of beinga «Hanoi», and then takes action towards thatend.

r The continued existence of the Popularfront, its relationship with the masses and itscontinuing to hold out from day to day againstall enemies, is an objective in itself. Conse-quently, there is a controversial relationshipwith the Arab states neighboring Israel, andalso a sort of «secret debate» which is now inpractice taking place between the Palestinianresistance movement and the Arab masses —that of providing an example on the one hand,and anticipating a reaction by the Arab stateson the other.

In this connection, I would like to stresshere on the matter of «continued existence));the continued existence of the Popular Front isdeemed to be an aim in itself. This is so, be-cause continued existence in this sort of war,i.e., a war of long duration, is in itself a victory.The aim in such a war is not to be in a hurryfor victory, but rather, to postpone the decisivevictory until the exhaustion of the enemy hasbeen accomplished, and it has become incapableof warding off the final blow. As long as theresistance movement, its flame and its escala-tion continue to exist, this signifies that victory

66 67

is approaching. For its existence is a form of vic-tory, a step along the road.

Going on to answer the rest of the question,it is necessary to speak about cooperation be-tween the guerrillas and the regular armies. Onthe strategic level, as we observe from Arabmilitary writings in general, there is a "conside-rable and grave distoriton regarding this mat-ter which many have slipped into. I, myself,was among those who were thus deluded andwho, after the defeat of June 1967, did not knowhow to distinguish between their broad hopesand what part of those hopes the regular Arabarmies were in fact able to realize. They triedto deceive themselves with unrealistic notionssimply in order to cradle those hopes whichwere all that they had left. There may be inthe writing of these words an element of self-criticism which I have directed inward afterhaving found sufficient time and the atmos-phere to read up on these matters more deeply.Those who call for cooperation of the guerril-las with the regular armies, or at least withsome of them, ordinarily use as their basis — asI have done more than once — the teachings of

68

IVlao Tse Tung, Guevara and other revolution-ary theorists who call for the cooperation ofthe guerrillas with the regular armies. Most ofthem use as their basis Mao Tse Tung's teachingthat it is impossible to strangle the enemy withone hand, but rather, that will only be accom-plished wih both hands — the guerrillas on theone hand, and the regular armies on the other.

The distortion here is the result of isolat-ing this teaching from tangible reality and con-sidering it abstractly. It is certain that Mao,vvhen he said this, did not have in mind an ar-my whose nature and make-up was that ofthose presently existing around the occupiedterritories. Rather, he was speaking of an armydescended from the people and whose cadresare constituted of guerrillas who have develop-ed with time and who have grown numericallyand in weaponry, to the point of becoming aregular force in size and tactics. By its nature,its relationships, its class roots and the de-fense of its own class, it is a revolutionary armywhich has preserved its revolutionary nature.

At present, cooperation does take place be-tween the guerrillas and some of the Arab ar-

69

mies on the tactical level. As for strategic co-operation, however, this is subject to the na-ture of those armies, their range of vision, theclass which they serve, the nature of theircadres and their strategy. Is it the strategy ofa quick war, or one of long duration? Are theyqualified for such a war? All these questionsmust be answered before presenting the sub-ject of cooperation between the guerrillas andthe regular armies. As for true and deep-rootedcooperation which needs no discussion, it isthat which will exist between the guerrillas, orwhat will be left of them, and those of themwho will develop into an army in the longrun. If they continue to exist, that is — for con-tinued existence means that it is accompaniedby the development culminating in the stage oirevolutionary army which undertakes regularoperations.))

70

«The Military Base» :Its Meaning and Reality

Al-Hadaf: «The resistance movement, in thecommuniques which it has issued for the pasttwo years, has used conventional eKpressionswhich have a purely technical meaning. Herewe feel that it is necessary to examine, all theconnotations of these technical terms. We havein mind here such terms as «commando bases»,«shelling with rockets», and (darge operations)).What are the true meanings of these expres-sions and their necessary elements?))

7-1

Answer: «We Will begin with the word «bases»The «base» in the sense which it has for the Po-pular Front in particular, and for all the com-mando organizations in general, is constitutedof a group of fighters located at some site in-side or outside the occupied territories who areactively striking at the enemy. It may be a.single base aiming those blows or the concen-tration of a number of bases striking at one tar-get, in order to effectuate their temporary andlocal superiority and then to disappear. In itsdaily life, it pursues a program of military orpolitical preparation, keeping in contact withthe masses, and maintaining its own continuedexistence. For the continuation of its existenceis part of the process of creating a revolution-ary climate.

We do not require of every base or, moreexactly, it is not required of it to carry out aspecific number of military tasks during agiven period of time, since it does not simplyconstitute an assault position for special unitslocated on the borders, or what in combat is cal-led an «advanced outpost» from which raids or

72

^coiinaissance operations are sent out. Rather,is a revolutionary nucleus. What it does iniiibat is to perfom one of its tasks and take

art in destroying the enemy and creating a re-',0lutionary climate. Should circumstances re-uire it to remain stationary and to continue to

educate its members politically, to preparethem and to raise their military standards, thatt0o is a continuation of the process of creatinga revolutionary climate. Likewise, if it deepens,expands and enriches its contacts with themasses, then this is a revolutinary nucleus — ashifting nucleus, for the bases of the PopularFront move around most of the time for rea-sons related to security and danger from theair. The activities of these bases include main-taining their own existence, preparation on themiltary level and poltical education. Their verycontacts with the masses constitute the main-tenance of the spark, the flame of the revolu-tion and its continuation. Their existence isthus an objective in itself. And the ends whichthey attain in striking at the enemy are like-wise objectives in themselves.

This applies to both those bases within and

73

without the occupied territories. It goesout saying that the bases without are moremerous, while those within are fewer. Theup of those inside is more precisely secret.methods are likewise tactically, distinct frorri

those of the external bases, which practice themethods of guerrilla warfare, while the inter-nal ones apply the methods of «secret warfare»It goes without saying that we do not considerthat there is an «interior» or an<«exterior», for

we consider that the land is one and that thereis only an imaginary line demarcating theborders, no more and no less, and that half thepeople are on this side, while the other half ison the other. The land of this people is halfoccupied and the other half free. They movefrom their own land to their own land, withoutdelineating what is internal and what is exter-nal. Thus, we can say that some of those basesare within the occupied bridgehead, while someare without. There exist bases within the oc-cupied territory, and those within territory ex-posed to the risk of occupation.

These bases are not precedent-setting inthe Palestinian arena. All resistance move-

74

, historically speaking, have had their, whether within the area under occupa-

tion, or behind the lines of the enemy, or, attime5! on the borders between two states. It isinconceivable, however, to contemplate the no-tion of borders in the Arab area, for it is a singleArab territory. But examples of bases on theborders between two states in international re-volutionary experience may be furnished bythe bases in China for entering North Viet-nam, in North Vietnam to enter South Viet-nam, in France to enter Spain, in states sur-rounding Greece to enter it, etc.

The issue of the states surrounding the lo-cal of the revolution taking the position ofmere spectators, especially when they are statesbelonging to the same nation as the people re-volting and exposed to the same danger, is atheoretical issue to be rejected from the begin-ning.»

Al-Hadaf: «By this sense of the word 'bases', ameaning is thus made clear which differs fromwhat the masses are given to understandthrough most military communiques. In this

75

context, 'bases' takes on the meaning of purelymilitary barracks which carry out military ope-rations exclusively, and have no other taskOur question relates to this sort of general de-finition. What is the proper definition, or itsnecessary elements?))

Answer: «The meaning of the word 'bases' dif-fers with the make-up of each organization. Ifsome organization believes that present activi-ty should be purely military activity, then thebases in this case will be military or semi-mili-tary ones which represent outposts that performspecial tasks on a given level. But if the make-up of a resistance organization is political andmilitary, and it deems itself to be a revolution-ary nucleus more than anything else, and in aphase of preparing for a popular war of libera-tion, then the role of the fighters in that orga-nization would be simultaneously political andmilitary. The Popular Front considers its basesto be of this type, and it is possible to apply thesame assertion to those of comrades in some ofthe other organizations.

Guerrilla activity, in its relation to the

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masses, in providing them with an example andin respecting their property presents a patternfor the masses of the distinction between theguerrillas and the armies which they have pre-viously witnessed. This is especially true in thatthe bases in the vicinity of the borders sur-round themselves at all times with armed pea-sants. They arm and train them and offer me-dical services to them. With the existence ofthese bases, we are now able to witness an or-dinary armed peasant open fire on an Israelipatrol, fighting because he is committed to theland which he defends, to the weapon which hecarries, and also to the framework of the orga-nization which provides him with training and,in doses, gives him an ideological awareness. In-deed, we have come to witness the participa-tion of some of the peasants in combat patrolsin such ways guiding the fighters to trails andgiving them assistance and first aid when ne-cessary.

These bases, in this political-military form,constitute a part, a basic part, of the process ofcreating a revolutionary climate.»

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beUP

darge Operations» anb «Shelling>

Al-Hadaf: «This takes care of the term 'bases'.Now, what about such terms as 'large battles'and 'shelling with rockets'?».

Answer: «With regard to 'large operations', thesize of the operation is a question which cor-responds to the strategic evaluation of the phasethrough which the resistance movement is pas-sing. If one of the resistance organizations con-siders itself in the phase of making ready, orof beginning the first stage, or in the heart ofthe first stage, its basic concern, then, would

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to be parsimonious and wary in carrying outall operations, concentrating on one point,

Diking, and then disappearing. Only when this,tage develops will it move to the second stage^ the stage of consolidation, and then to thethird stage — the stage of the counter-offen-sive. At that point, strategic parsimony will betransformed into strategic striking. For the pur-pose of achieving strategic aims in this situa-tion, large operations will be undertaken, evenif it costs us sacrfices, since the bases will al-ready have been formed in the first phase and\vill have acquired a revolutionary impetus, andsmall successive victories will have created self-confidence. On the other hand, if successive orlarge defeats were to take place in the firststage, this might lead to extinguishing the sparkat a time when the first priority is to intesifythat spark. Thus, the resistance movement doesnot take those large operations upon itself inthe first stage but, rather, undertakes smalloperations which are one hundred percent cer-tain to be successful.

The large operations which some or-ganizations undertake, therefore, are due

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to the estimation of those organizationsthe stage through which we are currently pa

ing. Whoever estimates that we are still in thfirst stage, preparing ourselves to begin, ar

those organizations which are carrying out or-dinary activities.

The organizations which announce thatare undertaking large operations on ascale and are «going for broke» with large num.bers of commandos are those that undoubtedlyevaluate the situation as having finished withthe first stage and started the second. The sig-nificance here is not the issue of undertakinglarge operations or not, for these operationsconstitute a tactic which serves a given strate-gy. Rather, the significance lies in the use ofa tactic of one given stage in another one. Usingthe tactic of the small operation in the secondstage of guerrilla warfare is a form of hesitat-ing, while the use of the large operation in thestage of making ready, is rash and wasteful.

The basic issue here is not a matter of thelarge or the small operation, but is the defini-tion of the stage that we are passing through.

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fhe Popular Front is not of the opinion that weire already moved on to the second stage,4ch requires the large operation. If others do

jge it that way, it is their point of view.

We come now to the third expression,'shelling the enemy with long-range weapons',whether with rockets or mortars. This is onetechnique in striking at the enemy, when thatenemy has taken measures to prevent gettingnear him, or when the terrain does not permitinfiltrating to a spot near enemy positions ex-cept at night, or when hostile military targetsare surrounded by unfriendly inhabitants — aspecial situation which markedly appears andimposes itself in the Arab-Israeli war. In viewof this, reaching a military target becomes adilemma in itself, since every one of the Israeliinhabitants constitutes in this situation, a warn-ing element against the resistance movement.

Striking at long distance, then, is one meth-od. However, its use imposes one condition ofthe three which we have previously mentioned,or more than one of them at one and the sametime.

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Striking at the enemy with rockets or mor-tars constitutes one form of harrassing the ene-my, which inflicts losses upon him, exposeshim to be on constant alert, with all the ma-terial and psychological discomforts of that stateof alert.

This type of striking is in keeping with theprinciple which advocates «striking at the ene-my wherever you can, and at a time of yourown desire and choosing.» The important pointis to inflict damage upon him, to drain his blooddrop after drop until they accumulate to forma hemorrhage which will lead to anemia and,consequently, to altering the balance of powerin favor of the weak over the strong.

There is one small reservation here. When westrike at the enemy with long-range weapons,he will respond. This response will be directedtoward the bases carrying out the strike. Thus,these bases must be mobile. In addition, how-ever, the enemy will also take that shelling asa justification to occupy more land. To this,we say that the enemy has no need for justifi-cations to occupy more land. Thus, it is neces-sary for us to have forces to prevent deterrent

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activity. These are the Arab forces. So that ifshelling with rockets leads to an aggressionagainst Arab territory, this requires participa-tion from Arab territories and their armies inresponding to and deterring it.

However, this type of shelling carries withit a grave negative aspect. If the organizationwhich carries it out is not endowed with an of-fensive and daring attitude and disposition,

[this may become the easiest means by which[to strike at and inflict damages on the enemy,while subsequently sapping the spirit of enga-gement of the fighters. This situation wouldlead to the neutralization of their daring spirit.

But if the organization or its psychologicalmake-up gives it an outstandingly daring spirit,the act of shelling with rockets would then be

[a positive factor, enabling it to help in inflict-ing losses on the enemy by itself, or in coveringhit and run operations.))

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T.

«Operations Abroad»,from the Military Standpoint.

Al-Hadaf: «In the exposition of your discourseon combat, you cited the principle astrike at theenemy wherever you can, and at a time of yourown desire and choosing.)) This principle callsfor a look, from the military standpoint,at the operations outside occupied Palestinecarried out by the Popular Front. How do youview this?»

Answer: «The external operations of the Popu-lar Front proceed from the basic political policywhich the Front uses in appraising the enemy

and its camp. There are economic and psycholo-gical reasons for striking at external targets.

From the military standpoint, however,there is a principle of guerrilla warfare whichat all times confirms and demands the necessityof striking at the enemy everywhere possible,with the greatest degree of violence possible.For violence is the basic principle of war.

Striking external targets, and specificallyinterdicting aviation and maritime routes, is notseen to be striking at civilan targets as muchas at purely military ones. This is so becauseIsraeli society as presently constituted, itsuse of all civilian facilities for military pur-poses, renders every such facility a militarytarget. This was confirmed after the June war,as was the military character of El Al Airlines.As for the pilots of the airline, as part of themilitary reserves of Israel, they support its mi-litary effort. For this reason, we are able to saythat these external operations do not causeharm to civilians, but rather to military person-nel, in spite of their being in civilian clothing.For the difference between the civilian and the

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military man is the difference between thosewho use armed force and those who (do not.

Why strike outside the occupied territoriesall over the world? Why don't the Palestinianpeople exercise their right to strike withintheir occupied territories, but not the rest ofthe world? The reason is that the Palestinianpeople, unlike other peoples, were ousted fromtheir land after the occupation, and so they nolonger possess a land. And they were evictedby a conspiracy against them on the part of alarge number of states. The world, therefore,is responsible for their condition. It is unna-tural for the world to commit a crime, and thennot have to bear its consequences.

These states, due to the indifference oftheir people, took a decision to eject the Pa-lestinian people from their land; it is thereforethe responsibility of the resistance movementto keep this matter before the attention of thosepeople and to keep alive in their minds the factthat our external operations are the inevitableresult of their hostility towards the Palesti-nians, manifested through continued supportof Israel.

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Also from the military standpoint, the ef-fect of these activities is a psychological one.The Israeli soldier on the borders who is some-times able to succeed in halting the entry ofsupply, reconnaissance or combat patrols, there-

'fore increases his conviction that he is able tocontinue to do so. And so he is victorious. Butwhen he finds that there are blows falling up-on him from every direction — not necessarilyaffecting him directly, but affecting his com-patriots and his own interests — then he ques-tions whether his presence on the borders is,in fact, the final deliverance, and whether hismilitary victory is solving the problem.

Undoubtedly, the escalation of these opera-tions and their encompassing all Israeli trans-portation facilities, exposes the enemy to lossesand to its relative severance from the world,especially when it has no link by land with theworld. Thus, continuous and exacting exposureof the whole of its lines of communication todanger is seen as one way of impairing its wareffort in the long run. This is in addition to thenegative effects on the morale of the soldiers

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which accumulate "as they perceive thatare impotent in warding off that danger.

When people tell the Popular Front tostrike only within the occupied territories, itis as if they were saying, «Come on and fightyour enemy. But first, give him the chance todetermine the place and the weapon. Come onand take the bull by the horns!» No. Guerrillawarfare does not accept this logic. Nor does itaccept exposing itself to enemy strong points.It only accepts exposure to the weakest points,striking at them with maximum strength, andthen disappearing.

From this point of departure, external ope-rations achieve this goal. For they face an iso-lated objective, and a sensitive one which issusceptible to the jolt. They strike swiftly, andthe blow causes losses to the enemy.

All these reasons make the Popular Frontdetermined to persist in this line of action andto escalate it. And it calls uoon the other or-ganizations to participate in this method — themethod of violence which liberates — in order

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to respond to Zionist volence, which grinds theArab masses underfoot and subjugates them.

This type of activity is also a reply to im-[perialism and its support of Israel, and consti-1 tutes a threat to its interests. So far, the re-sults have not been great. But if these opera-

• tions are escalated, and all Zionist and imper-ialist interests are exposed to serious danger,then considerable advantages will accrue, andsignificant setbacks for the enemy will resultin the long run.»

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Propaganda Consequencesof Striking at Civilians.

Al-Hadaf: «The Israeli enemy sometimes claimsthat the resistance movement places chargesand explosives in buildings, public places orparking lots which injure innocent civilians,and considers this as sabotage. Their state-ments sometimes find an echo in some circlesof world public opinion. How does the PopularFront feel about this?»

Answer: «There is a great deal of falsificationin such claims. The make-up of Israel, the formof colonialist imperialism which it practices,

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its form of mobilization and its methods makethe entire Israeli population a tool of aggres-sion. If the soldiers practice active and directsuppression, then the civilians who make up themilitary reserves, have already practiced sup-pression when they were in active service. Like-wise, they support aggression by their presencein the area, and they profit from the results ofaggression and the ejection of the original po-pulation.

The families of fighters in unjust wars or-dinarily constitute a factor opposing the aggres-sion, especially when the war drags on for along period of time. The citizens discover thatthey are losing their wealth and their sons inan unjustified war, and that any gains that arewon, benefit only a small class. The situationin Israel, however is totally different. If theAmerican soldier in Viet Nam receives inces-sant letters from his family appealing to himto renounce the war, those families in theUnited States thereby constitute a factor total-ly opposing the aggression. But in the case ofIsrael, the overwhelming majority of the fami-lies constitute one of the forces which supports

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.

the Israeli military. They form part of the hos-tile activity and are the basic justification fordrivng out the Arab populaton from the occu-pied territories. They are thus directly respon-sible for the conditions under which the Pales-tinian people have lived for more than twentyyears. In addition to this, the mere existence ofthis population structure constitutes a power-ful factor in their morale, and makes the Is-raeli soldier, while fighting, not think of re-treating as much as of protecting the familywhich he brought and settled there. Thus didthe colonialists come to the country, drive itspeople out and begin to profit from it. For thisreason, they are all equally exposed to thedanger of the reaction of the original posses-sors of the land.

There is a point which we must treat here.Why don't we at the same time inquire howIsraeli planes, during their raids on cities, areable to distinguish the civilian from the sol-dier. Doesn't the entire world know that thecasualties of air raids in all wars include.morecivilians than soldiers? And that the number ofsoldiers in general and commandos in particular

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injured or killed as a result of Israeli raids isnegligible as compared to the number of civi-lians? And this to be sure, not withstanding thedistinction between Arab civilians woundedand killed by Israeli air raids of revenge whilejn their own country, not attacking anyone andIsraeli civilians wounded and killed by com-mando activity, while they are aggressors,share in the aggression and support its exis-tence.))

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The P.F.L.P. and the PalestineArmed Struggle Command (PASC)

Al-Hadaf: « From the military standpoint,how do you feel about the lack of participationon the part of the Popular Front in the Pales-tine Armed Struggle Command? We know thepolitical position which the Popular Front hasannounced, of course. But what about the de-tails, militarily speaking?»

Answer: «If we look at this issue as a subjectby itself, then it would appear as if it were neg-ligence on the part of the Popular Front andnon-participation in the unity of the resistancemovement.

But this is not the case. It must be lookedat in terms of its political and military impli-

i cations.

Military participation in the Palestine Arm-ed Struggle Command should follow only uponthe achievement of political agreement. This isdue to the fact that, if military action is theimplement, then political policy is the soul.Only after the achievement of political agree-ment, therefore, can military participation fol-

jlow.

The question should not be why the Popu-lar Front does not join the Palestine ArmedStruggle Command, but why it does riot parti-cipate in the Palestine Liberation Organization.This is a question which the Popular Front hasanswered more than once. It has presented itsideological line, and has demanded a minimumprogram. When these things are achieved, therewill be created for the resistance movement amilitary general staff, or a single operationsroom, or a single military command for matters

I of execution and technique.

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The basic course of action at present is tostudy the possibilities for cooperation and uni-ty of commando action and the forces of theresistance movement — Palestinian or Arab —within a minimum program and agreement up-on both short-range and long-range points. Af-ter agreement is reached by the political leader-ship on these matters, creating the formula formilitary cooperation will require little effort.

With respect to what the Palestine ArmedStruggle Command has accomplished from themilitary standpoint, it is not yet possible toconsider it as constituting a general staff forthe organizations which have j o i n e d it,in spite of all the effort expended. There willbe no operations command which gives strate-gic direction to participating organizations aslong as the guerrilla war permits decentralizedaction.

The Palestine Armed Struggle Commandup to the present has not taken this line. It nowconsists of a command which restricts itself tocreating military discipline. It also contains anarrangement to solve differences among the

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; commando organizations, attempts to get ridfof discrepancies in the various communiques,i and includes an information body which issues: those communiques after the execution of ope-rations. However, it does not plan those opera-tions, nor does it gather them within the frame-

Iwork of a unified strategy.

Many devoted and aware people within thePalestine Armed Struggle Command have at-tempted to obtain the formation of an opera-tions room, military planning and other syste-matic and scientifically planned steps. Untilnow, however, they have not achieved the re-sults requested. We hope that they will be suc-

•cessful in the immediate future, since it wouldbe a beneficial step toward improving and de-veloping commando activity.))

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The Israeli Military and the Future.

Al-Hadaf: «Now that we have covered nearlyall aspects of the resistance, can we lay out abasic idea of the future probabilities on thepractical level? What do you think the nextstep of the Israeli military will be? What wouldbe its consequences?))

Answer: «The Israeli army has achieved a mi-litary victory. But it has not yet attained theobject of the war, i.e., the creation of a situa-tion of permanent peace in which it could de-vote itself to economic construction and pene-tration within the area without danger. How-

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ever, it does not want to lose those militarygains as happened in 1956 ; rather it wants topreserve them as security in maintaining theirposition of power.

The non-capitulation of the Arabs, however,and their newly-acquired tenacious stand, inpart due to the material and moral support ex-tended by the Soviet Union, China and all othersocialist and peace-loving nations, means thatthere exists the possibility of raising the stand-ard of Arab military preparedness and movingto the stage of reversing the June defeat. Andthe beginning of small, successful offensive ope-rations may lead to the raising of the people'sand the army's morale.

The expansion of commando action and itsprofound impression upon the masses, necessi-tated that Israel contemplate steps towardsachieving the following strategic objectives.

— to maintain the morale of the residents andarmy in Israel, a state of tension, and thespirit of the offense.

— to prevent the Arab armies from regainingself-confidence.

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to put the Arab people in a defensive posi-tion so that they do not advance to an offen-sive posture.

to prevent the commando movementspreading, especially in Jordan.

from

to prevent the commandos from operating inLebanon and Syria.

to prevent the commandos from penetratingdeeply within the occupied territories,to prevent the people from aiding the com-mandos, and to isolate them from each other.

to heighten the contradiction between whatis promised and what is achieved by thecommandos and the Arab governments.

and, finally, to set the commandos and theirleadership on the one hand, and the leader-ship of the Arab armies and Arab rulers onthe other, at odds, and to force them eitherto assume a negative position (not to react)or a positive one (striking at the commandoson the part of the system). Israel has in factsucceeded in heightening these last two con-tradictions and has created a wide gap among

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the fighters, which lessens their ability tohold out and brings closer the possibility ofsurrender.

The strategic objectives which serve the ob-ject of the war may be translated into the fol-lowing types of tactical missions:1. to carry out small, powerful strikes in de-

signated places by means of air-bornetroops.

2. to occupy parts of neighboring territories inorder to «purge» them of the commandos,and then to withdraw immediately.

3. to occupy areas which are isolated, in ordernot to arouse world reaction, and then towithdraw immediately afterward.

4. to continue offensive operations, and not tomove into a defensive position.

5. to threaten the neighboring Arab countrieswith deterrent air strikes, in order to pre-vent commando activity from developingroots amongst the masses.

6. to fragment morale, and to attempt to sow

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dissension among the various commando or-ganizations, or between the organizationsand the Arab states.

7 to increase the blowing up of homes andforced emigration, along with increased re-warding of collaborators.

For these missions, Israel uses troops ofspecial units, such as airborne commandos, frog-men and armored forces to the level of the bri-gade, in addition to the air force which enterswithout opposition the air space of Jordan, Le-banon, Syria and, with some difficulty, Egypt.

However, it would not be feasible for Is-rael to occupy territory and remain there, atleast not as long as the Big Four continue tomeet, and as long as there exist possibilities fora peaceful solution, or, more aptly, a capitula-tionist solution.

On the other hand, should all these possi-bilities disappear — that being due to the pres-sure of a mass movement — and the meetingsof the Big Four be suspended, then Israel wouldbe compelled to plunge into another war and

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to occupy new objectives, in order to attain thesecurity which she has not achieved. And willnot!»