Issue 4/5 - 2006 – “The Military in/and the Regions” and “The Women and

/ in the Military”

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction by Anne Colin Lebedev & Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (4/5 issue editors) “Military and Security Structures in/and the Regions”

• Geir Hønneland, “Power Institutions and International Collaboration on the Kola Peninsula”.

• Alexander Salagaev, Alexander Shashkin & Aleksey Konnov, “One Hand Washes Another: Informal Ties Between Organized Criminal Groups and Law-Enforcement Agencies in Russia”.

“Women in/and the Military”

• Pavel Shcherbinin, « Солдатские жены в XVIII – начале XX в.: опыт реконструкции социального статуса, правового положения, социокультурного облика, поведения и настроений » [Soldiers’ wives from the XVIIIth to the XXth century : the reconstruction experience of social and legal status, sociocultural character, behavior and sentiments]

• Christine Eifler, Das unterschätzte Potenzial: Soldatinnen in den russischen Streitkräften [The

Underestimate Potential: Female Soldiers in the Russian Military]

• Aigi Resetnikova, “Women in Policing in a Transforming Organization: the Case of the Estonian Police”

Annex to "Women in/and the Military"

• Women in the Military and Power Structures in Russia, the Soviet-Union and Post-Soviet Societies : A Selected Bibliography

Book Reviews "Women in/and the Military" (2 titles)

• Svetlana Alexievitch, La guerre n’a pas un visage de femme [Svetlana Aleksievich, U voiny ne zhenskoe litso, Moskva : Pal’mira 2004] [The face of war is not feminin], Paris : Presses de la Renaissance, 2004, 399 pages. Reviewed by Vincent Porteret

• " Людмила Альперн, Сон и явь женской тюрьмы, Санкт-Петербург: Алетейя, Серия «Гендерные исследования» [Liudmila Al’pern, Dream and reality in women’s prisons], 2004, 446 с."Reviewed by Anton Oleynik

Book Reviews - General (7 titles)

• " David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Bruce W. Menning, eds., Reforming the Tsar's Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004. " Reviewed by David Stone

• " Catherine Merridale, Ivan's War, the Red Army 1939-1945, London: Faber and Faber, 2005,

396 pages. " Reviewed by Joris Van Bladel

• " David Wolff et Gaël Moullec, Le KGB et les pays baltes, 1959-1991 [The KGB and the Baltic states], Belin, Collection Histoire et Société Temps Présents, 2005, 240 pages. " Reviewed by Nadine Marie-Schwartzenberg (in French)

• " Stephen L. Webber and Jennifer G. Mathers eds., Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006, 277 pages. " Reviewed by Robert V. Barylski

• " David J. Betz, Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe, RoutledgeCurzon Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series 2, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. ix + 203 pages. " Reviewed by Jennifer G. Mathers

• " John Norris, Collision Course: NATO, Russian and Kosovo (foreword by Strobe Talbott). Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2005. 333 pages. " Reviewed by Guillaume Colin

• " Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (Eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe – Process and Progress, DCAF – Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces/ LIT, 2004. " Reviewed by Gorazd Meško and Branko Lobnikar

Introduction by Anne Colin Lebedev and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (4/5 Issue Editors)

We are pleased to introduce to you our double issue 4/5 devoted to “Military and Security Structures in/and the Regions” and “Women in/and the Military”

“Military and Security Structures in/and the Regions” The questions related to power ministries are often adressed from the “central power” point of view and therefore often fail to take into account the forces - state forces or non state forces - which exist on a local level, this is why we have devoted this first section to the relation of military and security structures in /and the regions. In the first article, the relations between civilian authorities and power ministries in the framework of international cooperative projects in the Kola Peninsula are explored by G. Honneland. In the second article, A. Salagaev, A. Shashkin and A. Konnov, through in-depth interviews, look at the informal ties existing between members of organized criminal groups and representatives of law-enforcement agencies in Tatarstan.

“Women in/and the Military” Because women have played and still play a many-sided role in the military and in military life, we have asked P. Shcherbinin to study the social role of soldiers’ wives from the XVIIIth century to the beginning of the XXth century. As for today, the participation of women inside the military and the power structures remains controversial and question gender roles and societal evolution as a whole. Ch. Eifler gives us an overview of the role of women in the Russian military and an analysis of the discourses on gender roles produced both by military leaders and female soldiers. The case of women in Estonian police forces, developped by A. Resetnikova, shows that the role of women in power forces says a lot about a broader behaviour, about the general evolution of post-Soviet societies.

Bibliography We would like to draw your attention to the bibliography (Women in the Military and Power Structures in Russia, the Soviet-Union and post-Soviet societies : A Selected Bibliography) which gathers sources in Russian, English and French on “armed forces and women” in Imperial Russia, the Soviet-Union and the post-Soviet states. A special section devoted to the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee has also been compiled.

Book Reviews Finally, we would like to point out the book reviews: two of them are directly related to the “Women in/and the Military” topic. The others concern different periods of the military/power structures history (Imperial Russia, 2WW, the Soviet period and contemporary history) as well as different geographical areas (Russia and the CIS, Central and Eastern Europe). We hope you will find this double issue of interest and we are looking forward to your reactions and remarks.

Anna Colin-Lebedev (4/5th issue editor) Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (4/5th issue editor)

“The Military in / and the Regions”

Geir Hønneland

Director of the Russian and Polar Programme, the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway

Power Institutions and International Collaboration on the Kola Peninsula

Abstract

The article discusses how international cooperative projects have contributed to increased interaction between civilian authorities and the military or other power agencies in Murmansk Oblast. The cases of fisheries enforcement, nuclear safety and the fight against communicable diseases, especially tuberculosis in prisons, are reviewed. The main lesson is that international collaboration ventures can sometimes provide arenas for initiating new coordination patterns that would otherwise not have evolved. Occasionally, the international project is simply the pretext necessary for changing a situation that both civilian and power agencies view as irrational. Whether these changes are fundamental and structural, however, remains to be seen.

Introduction The Kola Peninsula in the north-western corner of the Russian Federation was one of the most heavily militarized regions of the world a couple of decades ago. Still home to the Russian Northern Fleet, it is assumed that the influence of the military and other power institutions is more significant here than elsewhere in Russia. On the other hand, the region has since the end of the Cold War been drawn into an extensive network of international collaboration of a civilian nature with its Scandinavian neighbours. The Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) was established in 1993 between several North European states and regional administrative entities in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia1. The aim is to encourage interaction across the old East–West divide in the European North, and the partnership involves collaborative projects in a number of sectors, ranging from trade and industry to student exchange and indigenous issues2. In addition, wide-ranging bilateral cooperation schemes have developed between Russia and the Scandinavian countries to solve particular problems or meet particular challenges in the North. Notably, the valuable fish resources of the adjacent Barents Sea are managed bilaterally by Norway and Russia, and various Western states have taken upon themselves to help to alleviate the environmental problems on the Kola Peninsula. 1 The partnership has a national and a regional tier, formally including several regional entities in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts and the Republic of Karelia were the original members from the Russian side. Nenets Autonomous Okrug, located on the territory of Arkhangelsk Oblast, became a member in its own right in 1997. The Republic of Komi was included in the collaboration in 2002. The BEAR collaboration at national level includes Denmark, Iceland and the European Commission, in addition to the countries that participate at the regional level. 2 For discussions of the BEAR collaboration, see O.S. Stokke and O. Tunander (eds), The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe, SAGE Publications, London and Thousand Oaks, CA, 1994; G. Flikke (ed.), The Barents Region Revisited, The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, 1998. A more recent discussion in Norwegian is found in G. Hønneland, Barentsbrytninger: norsk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen [‘“Barents Breaking”: Norwegian Foreign Policy in the North after the Cold War’], Høyskoleforlaget/Norwegian Academic Press, Kristiansand, 2005.

This article describes how international collaboration has affected the relationship

between the military or other power institutions and ‘civilian’ authorities in the region in three issue areas: fisheries management (where the Federal Border Service was given responsibility for enforcement at sea in 1998), nuclear safety (where the Northern Fleet is responsible for some of the gravest problems), and the fight against communicable diseases (where the involvement of prison authorities under the Ministry of Justice is necessary for effective treatment)3. To place the discussion in a wider perspective, we first give a brief presentation of the Kola Peninsula and civil–military relations in the area.

Murmansk Oblast in brief Murmansk Oblast, covering the geographical area of the Kola Peninsula, is a prime example of the Soviet industrial and military adventure. While permanent settlements had been established in the sixteenth century, the Kola Peninsula was inhabited by only a few thousand people when the First World War started. By the end of the Cold War, it had the world’s largest number of nuclear warheads, it was the country’s most developed fish-processing region – and it had become infamous for its environmental degradation.

The lack of ice-free ports in European Russia, except for those in the Black and Baltic

Seas where the Russian fleets could easily be cut off at narrow straits, prompted the construction of the Murman Railway, which reached the Kola Fjord in 1916. The same year the supply port of Romanov-na-Murmane was founded at the railway terminus. In 1917, its name was changed to Murmansk. The development of fisheries was a main priority at the outset. Towards the end of the Soviet era, Murmansk had the largest fish-processing plant in the Soviet Union; some 80,000 people were working in the region’s fishing industry; and total catches amounted to 1.5 mill. tonnes annually.

The Soviet Northern Fleet was established in 1933. For more than two decades, it

remained the smallest of the Soviet Navy’s four fleets. In the 1950s, a period of expansion set in, which coincided with the onset of the Soviet struggle to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. The country’s first nuclear-powered submarine was stationed at Zapadnaya Litsa on the Kola Peninsula in 1958. Over the ensuing decade, the Northern Fleet continued to expand, acquiring a large number of nuclear-powered submarines. By the late 1960s, it had surpassed the other Soviet naval fleets in size and significance.

The civilian sector of the post-war economy in the oblast came to be dominated by heavy industry. Entire towns – like Nikel, Monchegorsk, Apatity and Kirovsk – were built from scratch around large mining, metallurgical and chemical enterprises. Many of these industrial centres were constructed along the Murman Railway, which still constitutes the infrastructural backbone of the Kola Peninsula. Non-ferrous mining and metallurgy (primarily nickel and copper) and fertilizer production from mined phosphates are particularly important.

The industrialization of the Kola Peninsula involved mass immigration to the area, mainly from the rest of Russia as well as from Ukraine and Belorussiia. By the end of the Soviet period, the population of Murmansk Oblast had reached nearly 1.2 mill. Immigrants were attracted by a number of advantages granted to the inhabitants of the Soviet North,

3 The article builds on several years’ field studies in Murmansk Oblast. It summarizes findings from studies of various political sectors; more detailed reference to primary data can be found in literature by the author referred to in the endnotes.

including higher wages, a lower retirement age and subsidized holidays at Black Sea resorts. The standard of living was well above the Soviet average, but many still regarded it as a temporary place of residence rather than as their permanent home, and returned to their former areas of residence upon retirement. Personnel turnover was particularly high in fisheries and the military sector.

Much changed with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic

reforms. Many people lost their savings in the early 1990s inflation and were no longer in a financial position to buy a home in more temperate parts of Russia when they retired. Most of the previous privileges related to working in the North disappeared. Nevertheless, reduced birth rate and increased out-migration among younger people caused the population of Murmansk Oblast to drop to below one million around the turn of the millennium.

Most sectors of the economy experienced serious changes during the 1990s. Russian

fishermen started to deliver their catches abroad, so the land-based processing of fish in Murmansk nearly came to a halt by the mid-1990s. Total catches also declined by more than 50 per cent since Russian shipowners could no longer afford to send their vessels to long-distance fishing in the waters off Africa and South America. In the military sector, the number of vessels in the Northern Fleet has been more than halved since 1991, largely as a result of international disarmament obligations. Further, reduced budget allocations made it difficult for the Northern Fleet to carry out the planned maintenance of vessels still in operation, which has led to considerable problems at the region’s four or five large naval shipyards. Strikes and social unrest in the housing towns around these shipyards became a recurrent theme in regional media in the late 1990s.

Much attention has been given to the environmental problems of Murmansk Oblast

since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The nickel smelters in Nikel and Monchegorsk emit large quantities of sulphur dioxide (SO2), causing considerable acid precipitation both on the Kola Peninsula and in the neighbouring Nordic countries. The Northern Fleet and the Murmansk Shipping Company, the owner of the nuclear-powered ice-breakers stationed in Murmansk, had been experiencing capacity problems for storing radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel since the 1960s. Up until 1992, parts of this waste were dumped in the Barents and Kara Seas. The decommissioning of naval vessels since the late 1980s increased the problem. First, the existing infrastructure allows for the de-fuelling of only a handful of submarines a year. Second, existing intermediate storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and for liquid and solid waste have long since been filled to capacity, which means that large amounts of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste are stored under unsatisfactory conditions. Third, the spent nuclear fuel intended for reprocessing has been leaving the region very slowly, partly because of limited infrastructure for transporting it.

Along with the general betterment of the Russian economy since the crisis of 1998, the

social and economic situation in Murmansk Oblast has also improved. Population size continues to decline and the environmental problems are far from solved, but high hopes are attached to the future development of oil and gas in the Barents Sea4.

4 The largest field so far discovered on the Barents shelf – the Shtokmanovskoe gas and condensate field – is one of the largest offshore gas fields in the world. For a discussion of possible effects of offshore oil and gas development on the regional economy of north-western Russia, see B. Brunstad et al., Big Oil Playground, Russian Bear Preserve or European Periphery? The Russian Barents Sea Region towards 2015, Eburon Academic Publishers, Delft, 2004.

Figure 1 The Kola Peninsula/Murmansk Oblast

Civil–military relations on the Kola Peninsula During the Soviet era, there was little interaction between the military and civilian sectors of Murmansk Oblast.5 The two structures relied on separate communication infrastructures, and the majority of the servicemen with their families lived either in military towns or settlements built to serve the naval or air bases, or on the territory of the garrison where they served. For all practical purposes, the military was “a state within the state”. Has this traditionally strict compartmentalization been relaxed in the post-Soviet period?

One of the most conspicuous features related to the military presence in the area is the existence of six ‘closed towns’ on the Kola Peninsula. In 1992, the Law on Closed Administrative-Territorial Formations was introduced to regulate the status of some forty formerly closed cities in the Russian Federation. The previously so-secret cities were now ‘opened’ or subjected to a ‘civilianization’ in the sense that their existence was officially admitted. They were now included on ordinary maps and given civilian names instead of their previous numbered designations. A closed administrative-territorial formation, a ZATO in its Russian abbreviation (zakrytoe administrativno-territorial’noe obrazovanie), differs from ordinary military bases inasmuch as it is a political and administrative entity (at the local level) in its own right, with its own civilian authorities. On the other hand, it is not subordinate to the subject of the Russian Federation on whose territory it is located, but is

5 For a thorough – although no longer quite up-to-date – discussion of civil–military relations in the region, see G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Integration vs. Autonomy: Civil–Military Relations on the Kola Peninsula, Ashgate, Aldershot and Brookfield, VT, 1999.

directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defence.6 Further, a ZATO is allowed to keep all its tax revenues for itself, and its inhabitants enjoy special privileges in the social sphere7.

Murmansk Oblast is the federal subject in Russia with the highest number of ZATOs.8

There are six of them, all serving as residence towns for the naval bases and workers within the region’s naval shipyards. Zaozersk (formerly Murmansk-150) is located southeast of the Rybachii Peninsula close to the Norwegian border; Skalistyi (formerly Murmansk-130), Snezhnogorsk (formerly Murmansk-60), Poliarnyi and Vidiaevo are on the western side and Severomorsk on the eastern side of the Kola Fjord, all just north of Murmansk City. Together they have a population of some 150,000, with Severomorsk accounting for about one half of this total.

The general picture is that, despite some moves towards increased civil–military

integration, the old partition remains. Distance largely limits integration to the military settlements that are located in the vicinity of Murmansk – Severomorsk and, to some extent, also Polyarnyi, Snezhnogorsk, Vidiaevo and Skalistyi. Here it should be noted that ZATO status is related mainly to financial, not security factors. Severomorsk, Polyarnyi and Vidiaevo were all given this status several years after the ZATO regime was established, and their chief argument – which had the backing of regional authorities – was that the Ministry of Defence should take financial responsibility for these largely military settlements. While ZATO status is generally perceived as a financial security for the towns, the inhabitants of the ZATOs on the Kola Peninsula experienced considerable hardship in the late 1990s due to the strained economy of the Northern Fleet and of the naval shipyards in the region.

Military units have increasingly come to rely on local or regional authorities or civilian enterprises for material support. A conspicuous illustration of this dependence is the practice whereby civilian institutions and enterprises literally sponsor military units. The institution or enterprise in question ‘adopts’ the unit and agrees to provide material support. The practice of adoption took on new proportions in 1997, when Governor Yuriy Yevdokimov invited all the regions of Russia to sponsor the submarine of the Northern Fleet. The ties between region and vessel are strengthened by renaming the vessel after the sponsoring region and manning it with draftees from that particular part of Russia. Apparently, this campaign has been a great success.

The military sector has proven more of a burden than blessing to Murmansk Oblast in the post-Soviet period.9 In addition to the palpable environmental degradation left by radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, the region’s civilian sector was not left untouched by the social problems affecting the ZATOs and military garrisons in the late 1990s. Regional authorities, local authorities outside the ZATOs and civilian enterprises and organizations

6 The ten so-called ‘nuclear cities’, located mainly in the Ural and Volga regions, were subordinate to the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) until the 2004 reorganization of Russian federal bureaucracy (under the Ministry of Industry and Energy since then). 7 For further presentations of the ZATO regime, see R.H. Rowland, “Russia’s Secret Cities”, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 37, #7, Fall 1996, pp. 426–462; G. Brock, “Public Finance in the ZATO Archipelago”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, #6, Fall 1998, pp. 1065–1081. 8 The closed cities of Murmansk Oblast are further presented in G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, “Closed Cities on the Kola Peninsula: From Autonomy to Integration?”, Polar Geography, Vol. 22, #4, Fall 1998, pp. 231–248. 9 For a further discussion of this topic, see A.K. Jørgensen, “The Military Sector: Federal Responsibility – Regional Concern”, in G. Centre–Periphery Relations in Russia. The Case of the Northwestern Regions, G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud Eds., Ashgate, 2001.

took it upon themselves to provide the military units and settlements with material assistance. However, this burden would have been far heavier if the ZATOs had not been financed by the Ministry of Defence.

The military presence on the Kola Peninsula also represents a problem for the regional

economy in the sense that it makes access to military zones or ZATOs for non-residents, especially foreigners but also Russians, more difficult. A recurrent obstacle in the nuclear safety collaboration between Norway and Russia (see below) has been the refusal of Russian authorities to grant Norwegians access to storage sites for nuclear waste located within ZATOs or even more restricted zones.10 Collaborative projects involving the Norwegian fishing industry and the small fishing community of Teriberka on the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula have been hampered, as this village is administratively part of the ZATO of Severomorsk. Likewise, joint fishery-research cruises in the Russian zone of the Barents Sea – a tradition dating back several decades, and central to the management regime for the Barents Sea fisheries – came to a halt in the late 1990s in acquiescence to protests from the Northern Fleet11.

Power institutions and international collaboration

Fisheries enforcement

The main fish stocks of the Barents Sea have been managed jointly by Norway and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation since 1976. At the time, negotiations at the third UN Law of the Sea Conference had established the principle of 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones, and the principle that coastal states cooperate in managing fish stocks straddling between their respective economic zones. Hence, the fisheries management collaboration between the Soviet Union/Russian Federation follows from the countries’ obligations according to the law of the sea.

In the Joint Russian–Norwegian Fisheries Commission – the institutional hub of the collaboration – the two countries agree on total quotas, which are then shared between them according to fixed distribution keys. (The most important stocks are shared 50–50.) In 1993, this collaboration was extended to include also enforcement of fisheries regulations, after a massive Russian overfishing had been documented the year before. Main responsibility for the enforcement collaboration was given to the newly established Russian–Norwegian Permanent Committee for Fisheries Regulation and Enforcement Collaboration, subordinate to the Joint Commission12.

Exchange of information between the enforcement bodies of the two countries started

immediately. The most important measure was supplying information on Russian catches landed in Norway to the Russian enforcement authorities. Russian overfishing in 1992 had occurred because Russian vessels had been landing increasing shares of their catches in 10 On one occasion, the Governor of Murmansk Oblast promised the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs access to the storage site in Andreyeva Bay. However, the Norwegians soon realized that the Governor was in no position to influence the federal authorities with the remit to make this decision. 11 It is generally assumed that the Northern Fleet uses applications for such joint cruises as an opportunity to legitimize its own existence within the Russian bureaucracy, i.e. to contribute to maintaining the Cold War image of East–West antagonism in the Barents Sea. 12 The enforcement partnership is further discussed in G. Hønneland, “Enforcement Co-operation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea Fisheries”, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 31, #3, Fall 2000, pp. 249–267.

Norwegian ports, and the Russian authorities were unable to keep track of these landings. As a result of the enforcement cooperation between Norway and Russia, landing data were now automatically conveyed from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries to the Russian regional enforcement body, Murmanrybvod (‘Murmansk fisheries inspection service’). Additionally, routines were established for the informal exchange of information between the Norwegian Coast Guard and Murmanrybvod about the situation at sea. The Permanent Committee also administered the exchange of personnel (inspectors and observers) and was engaged in coordinating regulation and enforcement activities in the two countries more generally.

On the Russian side, fisheries management has traditionally been the sole responsibility of the ‘fishery complex’ of the Soviet/Russian bureaucracy. During the final years of Soviet rule, the Ministry of Fishing Industry was responsible for all aspects of fisheries management. When the Soviet Union was dissolved and the Russian Federation established, the State Committee for Fisheries appeared as the responsible body of governance at the federal level. State committees were independent bodies of governance at the level immediately below that of a ministry, i.e. not subordinate to a ministry, but without representation on the cabinet. A department within the State Committee, Glavrybvod (‘main fisheries inspection service’), was responsible for enforcement and surveillance in the fisheries sector.

In August 1997, responsibility for enforcement at sea was transferred from the State Committee for Fisheries and Glavrybvod to the Federal Border Service.13 The decision to strip the Committee of responsibility for enforcement was followed by a media campaign – obviously arranged by the ‘power agencies’ and, many would have it, the presidential administration – depicting it as corrupt and hence unfit for this type of task.14 However, the decision met with fierce resistance throughout the fishing industry and was not implemented until one year later, in July 1998. In the North, the Murmansk State Inspection of the Federal Border Service was established to take care of fisheries enforcement. The old regional inspection body, Murmanrybvod, was not willing to relinquish its traditional tasks without a fight: it succeeded in retaining responsibility for inspections in port and in international convention areas, the processing of catch information from the fishing vessels, and the opening and closing of fishing grounds with excessive intermingling of undersized fish. The Federal Border Service was left with one task: inspections in the Russian economic zone, which makes little sense if it is not coordinated with the remaining enforcement activities15.

The Federal Border Service was given representation on the Russian delegation to the

Permanent Committee for Fisheries Regulation and Enforcement Collaboration with Norway in 1999. At first, the Border Service representative was obviously not ‘accepted’ by the other

13 A ‘service’ (sluzhba) was also an independent federal agency immediately below ministry level. Although often referred to as a ‘military’ agency, the Federal Border Service was not answerable to the Ministry of Defence. In spring 2003, it was incorporated into the Federal Security Service (FSB). For the sake of clarity, the tern ‘Federal Border Service’ is maintained in this article. 14 An example is the massive headline on the front page of Izvestiia on 12 September 1997: “The Mafia Has Beaten the Fishery Inspection. Can the Border Guard Beat the Mafia?” 15 Finding out how much fish is on board a fishing vessel, for instance, has a purpose only if this information can be compared against what the vessel has reported to fisheries management authorities about its catches. As the situation was in the late 1990s in the Russian part of the Barents Sea, one agency was responsible for inspections in the economic zone – where most fishing activities take place – and another for receiving and processing catch information reported by the vessels themselves. The activities were not coordinated and the information was not shared between the two agencies.

members of his delegation, who were all from the traditional “fisheries complex”16. The Norwegian delegation, for its part, saw the challenge in conveying Norwegian experience from coordinating fisheries enforcement between a civilian Directorate of Fisheries and a military Coast Guard. Gradually the tension between the Border Service and Murmanrybvod loosened up, within the Permanent Committee and outside it, and the two agencies started coordinating their activities. While it would probably be an exaggeration to attribute this only to the cooperation with Norway, the Russian delegates confirmed that the Permanent Committee provided an arena where representatives of various Russian agencies could ‘learn to know each other’ outside their everyday life back home in Murmansk. Further, Norwegian experience from similar civil–military coordination in fisheries enforcement proved fruitful in the situation that had developed in Russia.

Nuclear safety

During the 1990s, the radiation threat from north-western Russia caused considerable public concern in the Nordic countries, especially in Norway. Hazards were perceived to emanate from unsatisfactory storage of large quantities of radioactive waste, decommissioned nuclear submarines awaiting dismantling, and the continued working of Kola Nuclear Power Plant at Polyarnye Zori. This led to the establishment of several international collaborative arrangements, both bilateral and multilateral, aimed at reducing that threat. A Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety in areas adjacent to Norway’s borders was established in 1995. A Framework Agreement on Nuclear Safety was signed between Norway and Russia and a Joint Commission to oversee its implementation set up in 1998.

At the multilateral level, the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation was signed by Russia and several Western states in 2003. More important from a financial point of view is that the G7 in 2002 pledged to raise USD 20 billion over the following ten years for non-proliferation projects, chiefly in Russia. The decommissioning of nuclear submarines on the Kola Peninsula is among the priority issues of this initiative.

The nuclear safety collaboration between Russia and Norway is mainly found in the

following four clusters: i) at state level between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian federal energy authorities; ii) between the two states’ Ministries of Defence (mainly through the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation that Norway, Russia and the US established in 1996), iii) through the Joint Russian–Norwegian Environmental Protection Commission, established in 1988; and iv) in the more technical nuclear safety cooperation between radiation protection authorities in the two countries. From the Norwegian side, the Plan of Action has been the financial muscle of the collaboration, supporting projects related to safety at nuclear installations (nuclear power plants, civilian and naval nuclear powered vessels and reprocessing facilities, unsatisfactory management and storage of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel and various arms-related environmental hazards. Some € 125 mill. have so far been allotted to the Plan of Action, which includes such high-profiled projects as the upgrading of the Kola nuclear power plant at Polyarnye Zori, expansion of the effluent treatment facility for liquid radioactive waste in Murmansk, building of a specialized railway rolling stock for transport of spent nuclear fuel, and removal of damaged fuel from

16 For instance, he had to take his issues direct to the Norwegian delegation leader since his own delegation, dominated by people from the ‘fishery complex’, would not accept his views as representing the Russian side; author’s own observations.

the north-west Russian icebreaker fleet’s old storage vessel for radioactive waste, the Lepse (the vessel itself contaminated by radioactivity) 17.

Overall, the collaboration between Norway and Russia in nuclear safety has been far

more problematic than the two countries’ cooperation in fisheries management. Most problems are found in the high-profile constructions projects mentioned above, which have also taken the lion’s share of the funds under the Norwegian Plan of Action. The Lepse project is extremely difficult in technical terms and has so far not really got off the ground. The railway rolling stocks were actually built, but disagreement about their ownership arose when they were completed. The effluent treatment facility for liquid radioactive waste in Murmansk was long considered a success story of the Plan of Action, but the opening of the facility was postponed time and again. Eventually, it seems it will never be put to work. The issue of liability has been a recurrent problem in many construction projects, as has disagreement about technical solutions. As far as finance is concerned, many Norwegian project partners (and Russian ones, too) oppose the lack of transparency in Russian project implementation and rumours of corruption are widespread.

The well-known Russian lack of horizontal integration between governing agencies,

and the high level of conflict between them, is visible also in nuclear safety issues. Since the 1990s, major lines of conflict have run between the federal and regional authorities, between the civilian and military sector, and between environmental agencies and ‘user groups’. In particular, the ‘nuclear complex’ agencies such as the former Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) (see note 6) have repeatedly sought to curb the competence of the federal radiation safety authority18. Working relations seem to be characterized by a modus vivendi between individuals who have been forced, largely due to international projects, to maintain a certain level of contact with each other. To some extent, intra-agency collaboration on nuclear safety on the Kola Peninsula has been formalized. For example, in 1998 an agreement was signed between Minatom and the administration of Murmansk Oblast on cooperation in the treatment of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Two years later, a more general agreement was concluded on coordination of activities within the sphere of nuclear safety between Murmansk Oblast administration and a range of federal agencies present in the region, including the Northern Fleet. In 1999, a Committee for Conversion and Nuclear Radiation Safety was established at the Murmansk Oblast administration to coordinate activities in the field. Again, while the international collaboration may not take full credit for getting various Russian agencies to join forces – and Russian bodies of governance do get new incentives to fight when Western assistance involves big money19 – coordination of the activities of various agencies, and the involvement of the Northern Fleet in particular, has been imposed largely through projects financed from abroad. 17 For a presentation of the most important projects, see G. Hønneland and A. Moe, “Joint Russian–Norwegian Nuclear Safety Initiatives: A Research Note”, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 42, #8, Fall 2001, pp. 615–621. A more comprehensive discussion of the nuclear safety cooperation between Russia and the West in the European North is found in G. Hønneland, Russia and the West: Environmental Co-operation and Conflict, Routledge, London and New York, 2003. 18 Until the 2004 reorganization of the federal bureaucracy, the federal radiation safety authority was Gosatomnadzor. In connection with the reorganization, this agency was merged with parts of the more general environmental bureaucracy in the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Surveillance (Rostekhnadzor); see G. Hønneland and J.H. Jørgensen, “Federal Environmental Governance and the Russian North”, Polar Geography, Vol. 29, #1, Spring 2005, pp. 27–42. 19 They even get new incentives not to complete projects as long as the money kept flowing in, it can be argued; see R.G. Darst, Smokestack Diplomacy: Cooperation and Conflict in East–West Environmental Politics, MIT Press, Cambridge and London, 2001. For a discussion of ‘the environmental blackmail discourse’ applied to the nuclear safety projects between Norway and Russia, see Hønneland, 2003, op.cit. note 17.

The fight against communicable diseases

In the late 1990s, the health situation in north-western Russia caused serious concern among medical experts and officials in the Nordic countries. Tuberculosis, which in Western societies had been more or less eliminated or at least controlled effectively, was re-emerging, and an HIV/AIDS epidemic was looming. To meet this challenge, the Barents Health Programme was established in 1999 under the auspices of the BEAR collaboration. Two years later, the Task Force on Communicable Disease Control in the Baltic Sea Region was set up by the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The fact that the initiative and most of the financing came from Norway gave the programme a geographical bias towards north-western Russia, i.e. Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, despite its ‘Baltic’ designation.20 The Barents Health Programme covers various aspects of health collaboration with Russia, but with a main focus on communicable diseases, tuberculosis in particular.21 From 2001 to 2004, the Task Force implemented approximately 200 projects in fields such as tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and public health reform in the north-western parts of Russia and the Baltic states. In 2004, Task Force activities were subsumed under the EU Northern Dimension programme. The health collaboration between north-western Russia and the Nordic countries is generally considered successful, although it is still to early to evaluate the medical effectiveness of the programmes. There has been some reluctance among federal Russian health authorities, e.g. to the expressed intention of the Nordic countries to contribute to the introduction of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) tuberculosis strategy DOTS (directly observed treatment with short-course chemotherapy) in Russia. This strategy deviates sharply from the Soviet tuberculosis tradition, with its emphasis on institutionalization of patients, individualized treatment regimes and surgery. Interestingly, the north-west Russian regions introduced the DOTS strategy despite this reluctance, and even opposition in some cases, from federal authorities. To a large extent, this can probably be explained by the fact that Western governments offered financial resources that federal Russian authorities were not able to provide.

A major problem in the fight against communicable diseases in Russia is the lack of integration among various governing agencies, and in particular the reluctance of ‘uniformed services’ to work together with the civilian health-care authorities. For example, more than a dozen federal agencies – among them the Ministries of Health, Justice, Railroads, Interior, Defence, Merchant Marine, River Transportation, Oil and Gas and Civil Aviation – had their own tuberculosis programmes, working independently of the tuberculosis strategy of the health authorities proper. Nowhere is the problem more palpable than in the prisons, which are the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice.

The overcrowded Russian prisons, with ineffective ventilation systems and usually

poor hygiene, are a breeding ground for tuberculosis. The relatively high prevalence of HIV caused by intravenous drug use and other high-risk behaviour increases the likelihood of 20 The Task Force on Communicable Disease Control in the Baltic Sea Region is discussed in G. Hønneland and L. Rowe, Health as International Politics: Combating Communicable Diseases in the Baltic Sea Region, Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2004; the Barents Health Programme in G. Hønneland and A. Moe, Evaluation of the Barents Health Programme: Project Selection and Implementation, FNI Report 7/2002, the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, 2002. East–West collaboration on communicable disease control in the region more widely is discussed in G. Hønneland and L. Rowe, “Western vs. Post-Soviet Medicine: Fighting Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS in North-West Russia and the Baltic States”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 21, #3, Fall 2005, pp. 395–415. 21 The first Barents Health Programme ran from 1999 to 2003. A new programme has been set up for the period 2004–2007.

further infections, or the progression of inert to active and contagious tuberculosis. The infected inmates are not only a danger to each other. Prison sentences last only so long, and sooner or later infected prisoners are released. It is vital that the civilian health services be kept informed of prison conditions, as infected inmates will soon become their patients. Effective control of communicable diseases requires well-developed surveillance systems that can enable resources to be put in place where they will do most good. Reliable surveillance cannot be achieved if a major infection source – the prisons – will not cooperate with the civilian health authorities.

In Murmansk Oblast, as in the other regions of north-western Russia, such

coordination was introduced only with the international collaboration projects. A central precondition for the Western aid was that the various agencies of the state – in particular, the prison authorities and the civilian health-care service – started to cooperate. In my interviews with representatives of the civilian health-care systems in the region during 2002–03, it was frequently stated that collaboration with the prison authorities would have been unthinkable only a year or two earlier.22 My interviewees emphasized that the prison authorities are a prestigious, uniformed federal body of governance, whereas the civilian health authorities are merely subordinate to regional authorities and generally consist of underpaid female doctors. In other words: the prison authorities would most likely have found it beneath their dignity to work together with the civilian health care service – a nuance often missed by Western donors. Nevertheless, donors entering the scene could immediately see the meaninglessness in discharging inmates with active tuberculosis without informing the civilian health-care authorities, or in not coordinating treatment schemes performed by the various Russian tuberculosis services.23 The Western-financed projects offered an arena – or a pretext, so to speak – for changing this situation. In my interviews with representatives of the prison authorities of north-western Russia, most people said that it was high time, and that nothing had happened before due to the ‘mentality’ of their predecessors.

Conclusions Traditionally, Murmansk Oblast has had a heavy military presence and, as a result of its strategic importance, presumably a more than average heavy presence of other power institutions as well. Due to the general compartmentalization of Soviet/Russian politics – and the high prestige of the military and other uniformed services in particular – the Northern Fleet, the military base towns, other military units and the various power ministries have to varying extents been ‘states within the state’ on the Kola Peninsula.

The end of the Cold War has changed this situation. While the Northern Fleet has not lost its strategic significance, the division has gradually been relaxed, if it has not disappeared altogether. The military base towns are still closed, but they are no longer secret. The military units have increasingly come to rely on the civilian authorities and enterprises for material support – the adoption campaign of the Northern Fleet’s submarines by Russian cities and companies being a case in point. Moreover, the military and other power institutions have had to accept the ‘invasion’ of the Kola Peninsula by civilian authorities and foreign sponsors

22 The interviews were performed together with my colleagues Arild Moe and Lars Rowe for evaluations of the Barents Health Programme and the Task Force on Communicable Disease Control in the Baltic Sea Region; see publications listed in note 20. 23 The lack of coordination of treatment schemes is a main reason for the alarming growth in multi-drug resistant tuberculosis in Russia.

keen on solving the environmental problems created during the Soviet period, as well as the new social problems that developed during the economic hardships of the 1990s.

The coordination of civilian, military and foreign activities has been most problematic

in the nuclear safety sector. This is hardly surprising, since radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel are largely located on military ground. The Northern Fleet has accepted civilian and foreign involvement in the decommissioning of nuclear submarines, but has repeatedly denied foreign experts access to storage sites. Generally, however, such international nuclear safety projects have significantly increased coordination between military and civilian agencies on the Russian side.

The inclusion of the Federal Border Service in fisheries enforcement and the prison

authorities under the Ministry of Justice in the fight against tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS has been less problematic, although the Border Service was initially not welcomed by the civilian fisheries inspection service. In health care, the situation was apparently the opposite: the female-dominated regional health-care service had not been considered as a ‘suitable’ cooperation partner by the far more prestigious, uniformed prison service under the Ministry of Justice. In both cases, international collaboration ventures provided arenas for initiating coordination patterns that otherwise might not have evolved. In fisheries enforcement, representatives of the Federal Border Service and the civilian inspection service under the State Committee for Fisheries had the opportunity to get acquainted at the Permanent Committee’s regular sessions at secluded hotels in northern Norway. Norwegian experience with coordinating enforcement activities between a civilian Directorate of Fisheries and a military Coast Guard probably also proved useful. In the fight against communicable diseases, the partnership between a power institution and civilian authorities came even more easily, although it might perhaps not have materialized without the intervention of foreign experts. Representatives of the prison health-care services have no good explanation as to why cooperation with civilian health-care officials had not come about earlier, other than the ‘mentality’ of their old leaders. Seen from this angle, the international projects provided the necessary pretext for concluding partnerships nobody would otherwise have taken the initiative to set up.

So, what can we learn from this? First, it should be emphasized that changes in the

relationship between civilian and power authorities on the Kola Peninsula are not dramatic, although they have been quite significant in some sectors, notably health care. The closed towns are still closed, and the Northern Fleet is still a world quite unknown to the ordinary citizen of Murmansk Oblast. Second, international collaboration ventures can provide forums for creating new interaction patterns, also between power agencies and civilian authorities. Simply providing the parties with an arena where they can meet and talk, in circumstances different from their everyday life, may sometimes pay off. Third, the barriers to joining forces are in some cases surprisingly low. Occasionally, an international project can be merely the pretext necessary to tip the scales and change a situation that both parties view as senseless.

Alexander Salagaev Professor, Director of the Non-Governmental Organisation “Centre for Analytic Studies and Development”,

Kazan, Russia

Alexander Shashkin Senior Researcher, Sector for the Study of Social Deviance, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of

Sciences, Moscow, Russia

Alexey Konnov PhD student, Kazan State Technological University, Department of Public Administration and Sociology,

Kazan, Russia

One Hand Washes Another : Informal Ties Between Organized Criminal Groups and Law-Enforcement Agencies in Russia

Abstract

This article discusses the forms, contents and peculiarities of the existing informal ties between members of organized criminal groups and representatives of law-enforcement agencies in the Tatarstan Republic of Russia. Particular attention is paid to the origins of informal ties; ways how these relations are established, maintained, and utilized by both parts; causes of corruption in the law-enforcement agencies and the possibilities to understand it. The main conclusions are based on the results of ninety-six in-depth interviews with the law-enforcement officers, businessmen, members of organized criminal groups, and journalists conducted in main cities and towns of the Tatarstan Republic under support of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre at American University.

Introduction In February 2005 the newspaper Moscow Komsomolets published a series of articles entitled “Brigade-2”. The articles concerned a sensational criminal case of so-called “Werewolves in Epaulets” – six officers from Moscow Criminal Investigation Department and their companion General Ganeev, the Head of the Security Department at the Ministry of Extraordinary Situations. Two thousand pages of evidence detailed their large business empire which brought in almost USD 1 million per month via dozens of enterprises, casinos, restaurants registered in their relatives’ and friends’ names or by payment of protection money; about the criminal cases for which they regularly manufactured false evidence by stealthily planted drugs and arms on innocent victims; about their ‘fruitful co-operation’ with organized crime; about agents of the “Brigade” who created their own gangs, provoked them for crimes, and then gave the information to “brave policemen” who were subsequently able to show good statistical evidence of their effective work; and about the resulting scores of “broken fates”. When the “brigade” was denounced police officials did their best to show that it was the “horrible single case, which tells nothing about the system”, the “cancerous growth inside the valiant police”; former friends of the “brigade” members immediately forgot them and told that “these people should be forever disgraced”.

The clamor has gone but the questions remained: how was it possible that such brigade had successfully functioned in the most honorable Moscow City Police Department? How the border between justice and crime became blurred? Was it really a “single case” or the same

was going on in the majority of police departments all over Russia? When a similar situation recently happened in the US (two New York City police detectives were charged by federal prosecutors with taking part in eight murders on behalf of the Mafia1) the media also tried to avoid “global conclusions”. Law-enforcement system should serve as a shield that protects society from criminal trespasses, and thus the appearance of ties between policemen and criminals means the disarmament of society in the face of crime. Close ties between law-enforcement agencies and organized criminal groups are even more dangerous, as the border between the gangsters and those who were called to combat them becomes invisible. Recent facts show that the misconduct and corruption in the police forces can also help terrorists. For example, the breach of duty by policemen responsible for security-screening passengers who allowed suicide bombers to planes unchecked in return for a bribe at Moscow Domodedovo airport led to the deaths of more then ninety people2. It was proved that the explosions of apartment houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk in 1999 were possible because of terrorists’ agreement with the officer of the Trafficking Police3. At the same time such facts are rarely discussed in public, and related information appears in media only in extraordinary circumstances.

The current article will investigate the informal ties between members of organized

criminal groups and representatives of law-enforcement agencies in the Tatarstan Republic of Russia. Before starting the analysis we would like to describe the general context: give the overall picture of the sight where our research was conducted; analyze the situation with organized crime in the Tatarstan Republic and its capital city Kazan.

The Tartarstan Region and Background of Criminality The Tatarstan Republic of Russia is located about 500 miles east of Moscow along the Volga River. The total area of the Republic is 67836.2 square kilometers; with population - according to the census of 2002- of 3779.3 thousand people. Kazan is a city of approximately 1.1 million people, with massive industrial production of aircraft, chemicals, electronics, and textiles. The Republic is predominantly bi-ethnic with a majority (52.9 percent) of the population being Tartars (Muslims) and 39.5 percent Russians (Orthodox Christians) (in Kazan the proportion of Russians and Tatars is different: 48.8 and 47.5 percent respectively). It is worth noting that Kazan city boasts fifteen universities and forty research institutes.

According to our previous research, the Volga region of Russia and the Tatarstan Republic in particular were characterized by a high level of activities of juvenile delinquent gangs since the end of 1980s. During the period of existence such youth groups were transformed into well organized criminal communities; they established connections with law-enforcement agencies; they set up the networks with criminal groups acting in other Russian regions and abroad and took control of many small and medium sized businesses4. 1 See: Rashbaum, K. William, “Detectives Killed for Mob, Indictments Say”, New York Times, March 11, 2005; Feuer, Alan and Rashbaum K. William, “Blood Ties: 2 Officers' Long Path to Mob Murder Indictments”, New York Times, March 12, 2005 2 Makarov, Fedor, “Tragedia po Khalatnosti”, Report on Radio “Mayak”, September 16, 2004. Available at: http://www.radiomayak.ru/interview/04/09/16/32042.html 3 6 tonn geksogena dlia vzryvov domov vez v Volgodonsk I Moskvu sotrudnik GAI, News Reports on www.newsru.com, February 27, 2003. Available at: http://www.newsru.com/russia/27feb2003/miliciner.html 4 See: Salagaev, Alexander; Shashkin, Alexander; Sherbakova, Irina and Touriyanskiy, Elias “Contemporary Russian Gangs: History, Membership, and Crime Involvement”, in Scott Decker and Frank Weerman (eds.), European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups, Walnut Creek, Ca, Alta Mira, 2005, pp. 209-240; Salagaev, Alexander and Shashkin, Alexander “After-Effects of the Transition: Youth Criminal Careers in

Kazan city is one of the regional centers of organized criminal groups’ formation. Nowadays Kazan hosts dozens of large criminal communities (eighty-six, according to the evaluations of Tatarstan Ministry of Interior), and every group has from fifty to 300 members. According to our preliminary estimates made after twenty years studying gangs in Volga region, the total number of members of organized criminal groups in Kazan runs up to 20000 people. If we count the whole Republic, this figure should be doubled, and if the whole Privolzhskiy Federal Region is considered the final amount should be almost ten times higher.

At the same time, as our previous research has shown, gang violence in Tatarstan during the last year continues to decrease in comparison with the 1980s and the 1990s: there are fewer and fewer direct collisions or fights between the rival gangs. Nowadays the economic factors of their activities are dominant: the most influential groups have stable financial basis and sources of income; many gang members now tend to legalize their businesses and stay within the law. Moreover, active gang members and leaders try to establish informal ties with the law enforcement agencies. While such ties seem to be strong and continuous, an information vacuum does exist around the problems of organized crime and corruption, proving the necessity for independent research and rising public awareness about the symbiosis of criminal and law-enforcement structures.

The article is based on the results of ninety-six in-depth interviews with the law-enforcement officers, members of organized criminal groups, businessmen, and journalists and will discuss the following issues:

• Distinctive features of the informal ties between organized criminal groups

and law enforcement agencies in Tatarstan Republic of Russia such as Ministry of Interior (Department for the Struggle Against Organized Crime, Department for the Struggle Against Economic Crimes, Department of Criminal Investigations), Office of Public Prosecutor, courts, Department of Corrections, etc.;

• Mechanisms of establishing and maintaining ties between members of criminal groups and state officials and the process of actualization of informal ties in case of conflicts and problems;

• Patterns of using informal ties as well as financial and social advantages and privileges that every side gets as result of the interaction;

• Reasons why the informal ties between organized criminal groups and power structures appear as well as the prospects of understanding corruption in the law-enforcement agencies.

Sociological Studies of Corruption : Theoretical and Methodological Issues Corruption has always been a popular research topic for political scientists and economists. However, commonly agreed-upon theoretical approach on which to base an empirical model of corruption does not exist5. Among social and cultural factors connected with the extent of corruption researchers usually name education and income levels; openness of economical, Russia”, in Vesa Puuronen, Jarna Soilevuo-Grønnerød, Jatta Herranen (eds.), Youth – Similarities, Differences, Inequalities, Joensuu, University of Joensuu, Reports of the Carelian Institute, no 1, 2005, pp. 154-172. 5 For the detailed analysis of the political and economical approaches to corruption see e.g.: Alt E. James and Lassen Dreyer David, “The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15(3), 2003, pp. 341-365.

political, and law systems; social inequality; religiosity, and even the size of public budget in particular societies6. Another tradition is to focus on the procedures and institutions that help to reduce corruption and increase trustworthiness of government such as transparency of power institutions7, free media8, well developed non-governmental sector, etc.

In our article we will be accurate in using the term ‘corruption’ preferring to speak about the informal (or illegitimate) ties that law-enforcement officials have with organized criminal groups. “Corruption” has always been a “corrupt” concept used for politicizing the problem, both within the national political and economic system and internationally. In such a way the term “corruption” was used to blame particular societies (for example, post-communist countries) with the moral decay, democracy deficit or even totalitarianism9. As Little and Posada-Carbo have noted, “the temptation to identify corruption with alien societies, with the other, has always been irresistible” 10. When the term “corruption” will be used in our article, we will follow Treisman who defined it as “the misuse of public office” for private gains11. At the same time we realize that this definition gives us limited understanding of the meaning of various practices that are called “corrupt” for the actors who are involved in such practices and for the society and its institutions at large. Existing distinctions between administrative or bureaucratic corruption which involves the use of public office for pecuniary gain and political corruption involving the use of office both for pecuniary gain and for purposes of remaining in office12 also do not help us very much, as the ties that we have studied are deeply embedded in social networks and the creation of social capital, and thus are not limited to financial benefits or struggle for political power. In other words it is a mode of existence based on mutual trust, exchange of gifts, traditional personal relations when kinship and friendship are valued higher then professional duties13.

The sociology of corruption concentrates on social relationships that form the basis of

this phenomenon. In early sociological studies of corruption it was seen as a deviant behavior that shows the disturbance within a political system14. Similar positivistic views connect corruption with person-to-person exchange that ignores universal expectations of role-appropriate behavior15. While the logic of exchange can be regarded as a key component of 6 See e.g.: Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences, and Reform, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999; Klitgaard, Robert, Ronald Maclean-Abaroa and H. Lindsey Parris, Corrupt Cities, Washington, D.C., World Bank Institute, 2000; Treisman, D., “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Public Economy, 76:3, 2000, pp. 399–457; Husted, B., “Wealth, Culture, and Corruption”, Journal of International Business Studies 30, 1999, pp. 339-60. 7 See e.g.: Ostrom, Elinor, Governing the Commons, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Olson, Mancur, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”, American Political Science Review, 87(3), 1993, pp. 567-76. 8 See e.g.: Brunetti, A. and B. Weder, “A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption”, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum der Universität Basel Discussion Paper, No. 9809, 1998; Stapenhurst, R., The Medias Role in Curbing Corruption, World Bank Institute, 2000. 9 See e.g.: Sajo, Andras, “From Corruption to Extortion: Conceptualization of Post-Communist Corruption”, Crime, Law & Social Change, 40, 2003, pp. 171–194. 10 Little, W. and E. Posada-Carbo (eds.), Introduction in Political Corruption in Europe and Latin America, Hampshire, New York, Macmillan – St. Martin’s Press, 1996. – P. 2. 11 Treisman, D., “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Public Economy, 76:3, 2000, pp. 399–457. 12 Tanzi, Vito, “Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets”, IMF Working Paper, No. 94/99, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, New York, Academic Press, 1978. 13 See also: Klitgaard, Robert, Controlling Corruption, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998. 14 See e.g.: Friedrich, C.J., Pathologie der Politik. Die Funktion der Mißstände: Gewalt, Verrat, Korruption, Geheimhaltung, Propaganda, Frankfurt, New York, Herder & Herder, 1973. 15 Höffling, C., Korruption als soziale Beziehung, Opladen, Leske und Budrich, 2002.

corrupt ties, the presence of universal expectations seems problematic, as in some societies public official will “deviate” from role-appropriate behavior refusing to accept a bribe. Another way to conceptualize corruption is to view it as a political label16. Labeling certain activities or actors as corrupt and legalizing certain morally suspect wrongdoings are parts of the social construction of corruption17.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union it became popular to study corruption in post-

Soviet countries, especially Russia, as it was seen as paradigmatic case upon which to draw in formulating theories about corruption18. Western scholars trace the roots of corruption in Russia in the Soviet party hierarchy, excessive bureaucratic control and an absence of private property19. Post-communist states were also used as an example to justify the historical concept that sees corruption at the informal beginning of the formation of states and societies as a necessary concomitant to modernization processes. New authorities and norms are not yet been firmly established and the transition process is not yet been completed, thus the informal authorities and corruption are flourishing20.

In Russia corruption is mainly studied by lawyers, political scientists and economists.

Legal studies are focused on structural factors of corruption in a bureaucratic mechanism; its legislation and struggle against corruption on the state level21. Political scientists study corruption in the governmental structures, especially during the elections22; lobbyism in political system23; link between the state organs and organized criminal groups24; strategies of governmental structures to keep their power and extract “administrative rent” through “business capture”25. The most famous studies of administrative corruption in economic 16 See: Chambliss J. William, “Vice, Corruption, Bureaucracy and Power”, Wisconsin Law Review, 4, 1971, pp. 1150-1173. 17 See e.g.: Punch, Maurice, Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance and Control, London, New York, Tavistock Publications, 1985. 18 See: Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 1993, pp. 599-617. 19 See e.g.: Olson, Mancur, “Why the Transition from Communism is So Difficult”, Eastern Economic Journal, Fall 1995, pp. 437-461; Shleifer and Vishny, op. cit.; Shelley, Louise, “Can Russia Fight Organized Crime and Corruption?”, Tocqueville Review/ La Revue Tocqueville, Vol. XXIII, # 2, 2002, pp. 37-55. 20 Alt and Lassen, op. cit.; Kneen, Peter, “Political corruption in Russia and the Soviet Legacy”, Crime, Law & Social Change, 34, 2000, pp. 349–367. 21 See e.g.: Mishin, G.K., Korruptsiia: Ponyatie, Sushchnost’, Mery Ogranicheniia, Moscow, 1991; Kabanov, P.A. Korruptsiia I Vziatochnichestvo v Rossii, Nizhnekamsk, 1995; Vedernikova, O.N. “Osnovnie Napravleniia Bor’by s Korruptsiei”, in Korruptsiia i Bor’ba s Ney, Moscow, Rossiyskaia Kriminologicheskaia Assotsiatsiia, 2000, pp. 127-132; Selikhov, N.V., Korruptsiia v Gosudarstvennom Mekhanizme Sovremennoi Rossii (Teoreticheskie Aspekty), Avtoreferat dissertatsii kandidata iuridicheskikh nauk, Ekaterinburg, 2001. 22 See: Monitoring Zloupotreblenii Administrativnym Resursom v Khode Federalnoi Kampanii po Vyboram v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu Rossiyskoi Federatsii v Dekabre 2003 Goda. Itogovii Doklad, Centre for Anti-Corruption Studies and Initiatives ‘Transparency International – Russia’, Moscow, 2004. 23 Peregudov S., Semenenko, I., “Lobbizm v Politicheskoi Sisteme Rossii”, Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia, #9, 1996, pp. 28-42. 24 Shelley, Louise, “Post-Soviet Organized Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism”, in Williams, Phil (ed.) Russian organized crime. The new threat?, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000, pp. 122-138; Shelley, Louise, “Can Russia Fight Organized Crime and Corruption?”, Tocqueville Review/ La Revue Tocqueville, Vol. XXIII, # 2, 2002, pp. 37-55; Klebnikov, Paul, Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia, New York, Harcourt, 2000. 25 See: Raznoobrazie Stran i Raznoobrazie Korruptsii (Analiz Sravnitelnikh Issledovanii). Analiticheskii Doklad, Moscow: Regional public foundation ‘Informatics for Democracy’ (INDEM), 2001. Available at: http://www.anticorr.ru/an-study.shtm; Sattarov, G. A. (ed.), Anticorruption Policy, Moscow, INDEM Foundation, 2004.

sphere in Russia were conducted by the World Bank26. The majority of economic corruption studies are focused around the problems of privatization27 and administrative barriers to economic development28.

As has been shown in considerable number of sociological studies, corruption in

Russia has become the institutionalized social practice as it is regular, durable, and supported by the norms prevalent in Russian society29. Moreover, corruption in Russia, together with the shadow-economy, shadow-politics and shadow--law constitute an institutionalized “shadow reality” 30. Similarly to Western scholars who argue that “corrupt practices satisfy the needs of the social system, including its need for self-preservation” 31, some Russian researchers view corruption as a mean to preserve personal interests in front of the state bureaucratic apparatus and thus make a prognosis that corruption will rise with the increase of social activity and economic involvement of Russian population32.

One of the most important concepts used in the sociological studies of corruption in

Russia is a concept of ‘social networks’ that can be defined as a set of social relations and social ties between certain individual and these individuals themselves33. Certainly, corruption is a network activity, which involves various social actors. Moreover, corrupted networks are created either in vertical (along the organizational hierarchy) or horizontal dimensions (between different organizations on the same levels of management)34. The “economy of deficit” during Soviet times made everybody dependent on their ties with “useful people”. Usually such social networks were based on blood- or friend- relationships and presupposed the exchange of different services35. Such proverbs and expressions as “You to me – me to you”, “Do not have hundred rubles, have hundred friends”, “One hand washes another” show that social networks could be seen as an informal social institution. Involvement in a broad range of social networks with important people constitutes social 26 See e.g.: World Bank report “Anticorruption in transition: a contribution to the policy debate”, no. 20925, a World Free of Poverty series, 7 October, 2000, Washington. Available at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_00092205320346 27 See e.g.: Shelley, Louise, “Privatization and Crime: The Post-Soviet Experience”, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, # 4, 1995, pp. 244-56; Brovkin V.N., “Korruptsia v Rossii”, in Korruptsia: Politicheskie, Economicheskie, Ogranizatsionnie i Pravovye Problemy, Moscow, 2001. 28 See e.g.: Hellman, J. and Kaufmann, D. “Preodolenie Problemy Uzurpatsii Gosudarstva v Stranakh s Perekhodnoi Ekonomikoi”, Finansy i Razvitie, September 2001, pp. 31-35. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/fandd_statecapture_russian.pdf 29 See e.g.: Radaev, V.V., Formirovanie Novykh Rossiiskikh Rynkov: Transaktsionnie Izderzhki, Formy Kontrolia i Delovaia Etika, Moscow, Tsentr Politicheskikh Tekhnologiy, 1998; Timofeev, L. Institutsionalnaia Korruptsiia. Ocherki Teorii, Moscow, 2000; Kuznetsov, I.E. Korruptsiia v Sisteme Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia: Sociologicheskoe Issledovanie, Dissertatsiia kandidata sociologicheskikh nauk, Saint-Petersburg, SPbGU, 2000. 30 See e.g.: Kliamkin, I. and Timofeev, L., Tenevoi Obraz Zhizni: Sociologicheskii Avtoportret Postsovetskogo Obshchestva, Moscow, RGGU, 2000; Oleinik, A. “Biznes po Poniatiiam: Ob Institutsional’noi Modeli Rossiiskogo Kapitalizma”, Voprosy Ekonomiki, #5, 2001, pp. 4-25; Shanin, T. (ed.), Neformal’naia Ekonomika. Rossiia i Mir, Moscow, Logos, 1999. 31 Waterbury, J., “Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime”, World Politics, 25:4, 1973, pp. 533–55. 32 Mazaev, Y.N. Sotsialniye Otnosheniia Korruptsii: Po Materialam Sotsiologicheskikh Issledovanii, 2004. Available at http://www.publicverdict.org/ru/articles/research/sociol.html 33 Emirbayer M., Goodwin J., “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency”, American Journal of Sociology, 6, Vol.99, 1994, pp.1411-1454. 34 Sungurov, A. Yu. (ed.) Grazhdanskie Initsiativi i Predotvrashenie Korruptsii, Saint-Petersburg, 2000. 35 See e.g.: Ledeneva, Alena V., Russia’s Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

capital. According to classical definition, social capital constitutes “numerous kinds of social relations grouped according to their function in producing returns to individuals” 36.

As police and law-enforcement agencies are monopolistic institutions with a relatively high degree of discretion and low transparency they could be considered most critical in bearing on the opportunities for corruption37. At the same time police very rarely becomes the subject of the studies of corruption both on the West and in Russia. Police in almost every country appear to be a closed social institution with the tendency to protect one’s profession and organization and thus not expose deviance committed by colleagues38. Thus police corruption and police integrity are on the ‘dark side of the moon’ for most researchers who have to deal every time with problems of access, reliability and validity of information39.

Police corruption in Russia was also studied insufficiently. Among the few studies we

can mention the survey of 1,125 Russian police officers and trainees conducted by Adrian Beck and Ruth Lee40. The study above all has documented that close family and friendship ties and notions of obligation affect the extent to which police officers find corrupt activities morally acceptable and are used to justify morally dubious behavior. Research done in a specialized labor camp in Siberia for convicted law enforcement and government officials revealed high levels of corruption in their branches of the legal and administrative system41. In both studies the references to inadequate wages were mentioned by the respondents to excuse corruption. The existing studies have documented the involvement of Russian police officers in business racket42, some other different criminal or illegal activities, and ties with organized crime43.

The overwhelming majority of studies mentioned above were either pure theoretical or

quantitative; qualitative studies of corruption appear quite rarely. At the same time we would argue that ethnographies can substantially broaden our understanding of the social practices that are called “corruption” and answer how and why these practices are formed, maintained and reproduced. Our research study consisted of ninety-six semi-formalized in-depth interviews with experts and practitioners such as: law-enforcement officers (thirty-eight interviews); businessmen (twenty-four); members of the organized criminal groups (eighteen), and journalists (sixteen). The interviews were conducted in the cities, towns, and regional centers of the Tatarstan Republic of Russia (Kazan, Naberezhniye Chelny, Nizhnekamsk, Leninogorsk, Zelenodolsk, Nurlat, and Agryz). Professional interviewers of the Centre for Analytic Studies and Development (Kazan) were engaged in the study. It is important that the answers of our respondents from different categories and different 36 Coleman, J. S., Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 1990. 37 See: Klitgaard, Robert, Controlling Corruption, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998. 38 See e.g.: Crank, J., Understanding Police Culture, Cincinnati, OH, Anderson, 1998. 39 See: Sherman, L.W. (ed.), Police corruption: A sociological perspective, New York, Anchor Press, 1974; Newburn, T., “Understanding and preventing police corruption: Lessons from the literature”, Policy Series, Paper 110, London, Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, 1999. 40 Beck, Adrian and Lee, Ruth, “Attitudes to Corruption Amongst Russian Police Officers and Trainees’, Crime Law and Social Change, vol. 38, no. 4, 2002, pp.357-372. 41 See: Repetskaya, Anna, “Corruption Research Among Convicted Government and Law Enforcement Officials”, Organized Crime Watch, Vol. l, No.3, March-April, 1999. Available at: www.american.edu/traccc/pdfs/ocwatch0399.pdf 42 Gambetta, D. “Racket kak Nelegal’nii Pravookhranitel’nii Biznes”, Economicheskaia Teoriya Prestuplenii i Nakazanii, Vol. 1, Moscow, RGGU, 1999, pp. 58-63. 43 See: Romanova, A.G. Sostoianie Prestupnosti i Inikh Pravonarushenii v Organakh Vnutrennikh Del, in Kriminal’naia Situatsiia na Rubezhe Vekov v Rossii, Moscow, Kriminologicheskaia Assotsiatsiia, 2000, pp. 97-110; Varygin, A.N., Shlyapnikava, O.V. “Korruptsiia v Organakh Vnutrennikh Del”, in Korruptsiia i Bor’ba s Nei, Moscow, Rossiiskaia Kriminologicheskaia Assotsiatsiia, 2000, pp. 102-110.

jurisdictions were rather consistent, which shows the validity of the data. At the same time, the results of the study do not allow us to make generalizations about the scope of ties between organized crime and law-enforcement agencies, thus we will write about the situation in one particular Russian region.

Could You Help to Solve a Problem ? Establishing and Maintaining Illegitimate Ties in Tartarstan Corruption and ties between law-enforcement officers and members of organized criminal groups did not appear recently. Analysis of the criminal case of the gang “Tyap-Lyap” that operated in Kazan from mid 1960s till mid 1980s showed that fifty officers were fired from the police for the close ties with this gang. In our research the problem of police corruption was also named as the most troublesome by our experts44:

“Today you can buy every policeman, and people are doing that. The police system nowadays pushes out honest people as a foreign substance. Police now is a well organized system of ‘dirty money’ distribution. Every officer knows how much a person on a particular position should have. It is a cover up…” (L., businessman, record of standing 15 years, Naberezhniye Chelny).

According to our experts, abuse of public authority constantly happens in the law-

enforcement agencies. As a rule it serves the purposes of personal enrichment, but the cases of criminal behavior shift the limits of the permissibility of corruption within the professional group, and give a bad example to any newcomers to the profession. As the interview analysis has shown, almost all respondents mentioned the existence of ties between law-enforcement agencies and criminal groups emphasizing that these ties have become more common and were used more often by both sides.

In our study we have tried to define the agencies that have been more involved in the

mutually beneficial ties with organized criminal groups. According to our experts, corruption and illegitimate ties are widespread in such structures and subdivisions of the Ministry of Interior as: Department for the Struggle Against Economic Crimes (OBEP); Department for the Struggle Against Organized Crime (OBOP); Department for Criminal Investigations (OUR); State Traffic Police (GIBDD or GAI), and Department for Internal Security (USB). The main reason for this, according to our experts, is that these organs frequently face members of organized criminal groups in their work and thus develop particular schemes of co-existence and co-operation with them. Ironically, the struggle with organized crime is one of the main tasks for almost all abovementioned agencies:

“Such ties are more common for the officers from the departments that struggle with organized crimes. Gang members are their contingent, and thus they interact with each other more often. But the regional police departments are also keeping up…” (B., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 11 years, Kazan).

As our respondents have mentioned, illegitimate ties exist at almost all levels of the

hierarchy, but they are most typical for the leading officers: heads of regional and municipal police departments, heads of particular branches and their assistants. The strong hierarchy also exists also in utilization of illegitimate ties: junior officers communicate with ordinary 44 The format of the article does not allow us to cite all the quotations that justify the particular theses. Thus only the most typical and/or colorful sayings were chosen.

gang members, and leading officers deal with leaders and authorities of the criminal world. The rewards are distributed hierarchically as well:

“A District police officer goes on foot. The head of the regional office drives a Lada car. The head of the department drives more advanced model of Lada. The head of the Municipal Department of Interior usually drives a posh car. I live in a dormitory, commanders live in their big private houses. But this is not advertised. Even deputy chiefs have new cars… Everything is clear anyway…” (A., thirty-six year old, law-enforcement officer, record of standing 5 years, Nizhnekamsk).

The research has shown that informal ties with members of organized criminal groups are more common for senior officers who have been working in the law-enforcement agencies for a long time. It is so because these officers have an experience and practical skills, are competent in decision making, and thus are able to “solve problems”:

“It is mostly typical for those who work for a long time in the system and have influence there. Junior officers cannot do anything real, but those who have higher ranks have all the power, they can do what is needed. Thus they are the first called for co-operation” (B., 21 years old, gang member, Kazan).

Therefore, money and prestige appear not because of success at work, but together

with the ability to offer a wide range of “paid services” and “solve the problems” of gang members. Besides, the administrative position is actively used for the illegal protection of business structures, the organization of personal business and control over the most attractive sectors of shadow economy such as drug sales and prostitution.

Setting up relationships between the officer and gang member is a first step in

establishing mutually beneficial ties. The analysis of expert opinions has shown that the mechanisms of establishing first-time relationships can vary quite substantively. The contact can be established in a “natural manner” when police officers and gang members are relatives, or live in one neighborhood, or are friends from childhood. In the process of becoming adults, law-enforcement officers and members of organized criminal groups get higher positions in the hierarchies of their systems and thus old friends, relatives or acquaintances acquire more possibilities to solve the particular problems and continue networking:

“They do not specially meet each other because they are friends from childhood. For instance they lived in the same yard, were friends, and then one went to the organs, and another to the street. But it is not possible to strike out the friendship.” (B, 18 years old, gang member, Kazan).

Another “objective” condition of the first contact between the police officers and gang members is the activity on the same territory. The problems that might appear can usually be solved in the framework of a gang’s zone of power or on a territory under jurisdiction of a particular police department. Constant intersections of interests force both groups to contact and establish mutually beneficial relationships:

“Every organized criminal group has its territory. When the crime is committed the gang that controls this territory is contacted first of all.” (R., former law-enforcement officer, record of standing 3 years, Kazan).

After analyzing interviews with the law-enforcement officers we have singled out four

main mechanisms used by law enforcement officers to establish contacts with gang members during professional activity.

1. Officers interviewing gang members as witnesses in the past and in the course of investigation “friendship relationships” were established. This especially concerns the leaders of organized criminal groups as they usually do not commit crimes themselves but are very well informed about the situation on their territory.

2. Officers investigating gang related crimes and collecting a number of ‘hooks’ – facts that could be used to institute criminal proceedings against a particular gang member. When the offender finds this out he tries to make contact with the police officer to “neutralize the discreditable materials” using all possible means, usually ranging from intimidation to buying or stealing them.

3. Officer gets acquainted with a gang member during crime investigation activities, and then starts to “sell the resources”:

“Contacts are established during arrests, different accidents, fights... We bring the offender to the department, but after two or three days he is released. And some officers immediately get new and expensive mobile phones. Or the telephone card is paid. Who, working in the police, can speak half an hour on a mobile phone?” (M., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 10 years, Naberezhniye Chelny).

4. A contact can be established as a result of a search for a particular category of

police officers who are ‘weak and dissatisfied with their work and salary’ performed by gang members. The most vulnerable are the officers who need money as well as are unscrupulous and disposed to bribe-taking. When such an officer is found, he is supported materially, which in turn obliges him to provide support to gang members. But sometimes the contacts are established by means of intimidation:

“Contacts are established in the following way: a police officer lives in the neighborhood where a particular gang is playing the master. Usually the members of the gang help him to solve a problem, drink with him or take a vacation with him. Or they can exert psychological pressure on him, intimidate him. And after that the policeman starts to collaborate with the gang.” (Sh., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 7 years, Naberezhniye Chelny).

If the contact cannot be established directly, the parties look for the mediators. With the help of expert judgments we can name several groups of people who usually serve as mediators in establishing illegitimate ties between gang members and law-enforcement officers:

a) Former law-enforcement officers. According to our respondents from the police, none of the officers will contact unknown person and gang members in particular for reasons of personal security. In this case former police officers help gang members to establish contacts with ‘useful people’ standing as a guarantor of security for both parties.

b) Advocates. This group has rather heterogeneous structure: advocates can be former law-enforcement officers, holders of law degree, former employees of the Prosecutor’s Office, etc. Thus advocates have many possibilities to help gang members in establishing necessary ties. Moreover, according to our experts, there are advocates who get the legal education at the expense of organized criminal groups.

c) Businessmen. During the commercial activity owners of various businesses often come across both law-enforcement agencies and criminal groups and thus can help them to establish ties with each other.

d) People who came across the law-enforcement system (suspects, witnesses, defendants, etc.) but are not gang members. Gangs can specifically find such people and ask them to be mediators in establishing ties with the law-enforcement bodies.

e) Relatives and friends of gang members who work in police, Prosecutor’s office,

courts and other agencies. According to our experts, this group is the most large and reliable:

“For example, my cousin is a captain in the police, another cousin is a major, my uncle is a lieutenant colonel, my sister’s husband is a police major, and I am in the gang” (I.G., 31 year old, gang member, Naberezhnie Chelny).

At the same time experts described cases where the fact of having relatives in criminal sphere was the reasons for the discharge of a police officer. It was made to avoid actualization of such ties in favor of criminals. The discharged relatives of gang members then work in various structures controlled by these gangs or serve as advocates of gang members in courts. Our experts also described a case when a former gang member with the support of his relative of high rank became a head of the department that investigated certain crimes related to his gang and himself in the past. In that way he became a chief for the people who previously worked against him:

“It was once that a new head of the Criminal Investigation Department and old officer met each other. The officer remembered that his today’s boss was registered as a gang member. His mouth was closed. This tells us that the record was previously cleaned, or they overlooked this fact as a brother of the former was working in the central apparatus” (M., former law-enforcement officer, record of standing 8 years, Kazan).

Our experts often noticed that the contact can be established with neither a preliminary acquaintance nor or mediator between the two parties. In principle it can mean the shift to the open trade of services performed by the law-enforcement officers:

“Contacts often occur directly without any mediators. It is nothing to be afraid of! Police officer makes these contacts, shakes hands with cheaters. Chiefs can do this, it is easier for them, but two of us were discharged for nothing…” (L., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 9 years, Leninogorsk).

Besides the act of establishing illegal contacts between gang members and representatives of law-enforcement agencies, the process of maintaining the ties also has a great significance for understanding the essence of such relationships. Irrespective of the duration of contacts, law-enforcement officers and gang members make considerable efforts to maintain them. First of all the social network is maintained by periodic meetings. As the ties are illegitimate, the choice of a meeting place seems to be the indicative process. As our study has shown, the choice of a particular place depends on the level of control from the special departments dealing with the internal security. Sometimes the parties can reach privacy only inside the police department where the meeting can be masked as a standard examination procedure:

“We do not have open contacts. If we meet, we meet secretly, talk about our problems. We should be able to solve problems. It is possible to contact in the office space. Our town is small, every wall has eyes…” (Kh., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 10 years, Leninogorsk).

Other common places for secret meetings are private cottages in the countryside. Meetings in cottages usually have an informal character and are accompanied by drinking alcohol, having a bath together, calling for prostitutes, and other entertainments. Meetings “with bath and shashlik” usually happen when gang members and police officers have not only business, but also friendship relations. Participants often have a mutual personal sympathy, and are not led only by commercial interests. It is a good example of a particular way of regarding

professional duties of police officers when personal relations are put higher and gang members are considered first of all as friends but not representatives of antagonistic structure. According to some of our respondents, it is not necessary to hide the fact of contact between ‘gangster and policeman’. These statements are based on the facts that special departments for internal security work ineffectively, and it is rather hard to fix the episode of malfeasance. The rule of conspiracy, according to some of our experts, can be ignored even during the public actions where the fact of the contact can cause people’s blame:

“I know that members of organized criminal gangs come to the working place without any ceremony; they do not hide their ties. For example, gang member can pop into the Prosecutor’s Office to see his old school friend on the way to his own business. They can easily talk, pass gifts. Of course they also meet in cafes, restaurants, on picnics” (M., former law-enforcement officer, record of standing 8 years, Kazan).

It is worth mentioning that open contacts between police officers and gang members are sometimes promoted by the official status of the latter. A considerable number of criminal authorities have already been legalized and became representatives of business and political elites (for instance, by being elected to the State Duma of Russian Federation). Thus it is not considered shameful to meet them as they have acquired a reputation of being respectable citizens.

Undoubtedly, the main mechanism of maintaining illegitimate relationships consists of material stimulation of the officers working in the law-enforcement agencies. As it was stated by the majority of our respondents, illegitimate ties with gang members are kept because of the existing interest in personal enrichment and acquisition of material values. The ties do not always have a monetary character: the equivalent could be various gifts, possibility to buy products with discounts, free personal services, invitations to pleasure trips (sometimes together with gang members), etc.:

“Services on a personal level: free car parking, building materials for a dacha, repair works in a flat. Money is not so popular. People in gangs are good psychologists: an offer of money can insult police officers…” (A.A., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 6 years, Kazan).

As the variety of potential services to the law-enforcement officers is rather broad, the prices to buy a particular service are also different. The size of compensation usually depends on a complexity of the problem (sometimes to solve it the officer should break the law) and the “degree of friendship” with the officer or the mediator. Besides, the respondents have also mentioned two more criteria for setting up rates for particular services: firstly, the amount depends on the type of law-enforcement body: “Police costs much less then the court or other law-enforcement agencies” (P., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 6 years, Kazan); secondly, the amount depends on the position of a person offering the service:

“The Head of the Criminal Police in our Regional Police Department bought a piece of furniture for 2000 dollars. He has two wives, and each of them has a flat, but he lives already with the third or the fourth one. The higher the level of police officer, the more he costs in the police hierarchy… If you take a liter of vodka you will be fired, if you 1000 thousand dollars you will be promoted” (P.B., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 8 years, Naberezhnie Chelny).

When establishing ties with the gangs, law-enforcement officers first consider their power resources or the authority of their members in the criminal sphere. This became especially

significant when the problem could be solved only according to the criminal norms. Illegal ties with the leaders of criminal groups, as our interviews have shown, can also serve as an important mobility channel for the “guards of law and order”. Criminal authorities are able to assist in career development of ‘their’ officer using the broad power resources they have in the region, city or the whole republic. Officers of the law-enforcement bodies and gang members recognize the value of interaction with each other because such contacts are mutually beneficial. The next section of our article is devoted to the ways of utilization of such ties.

You to Me, Me to You: Models of Using Illegitimate Ties As our research has shown, social networks of gang members and law-enforcement officers are very close and usually based on friendship: the contacts are constantly established and maintained, and the flow of mutual services has a continuous character. According to our interviews, there are many ways how gang members can utilize “useful” ties in the law-enforcement agencies (police, office of public prosecutor, courts). We have singled out the following key ways they can do so: obtaining information that helps to hide crimes or avoid criminal responsibility; obtaining information that helps to commit crimes and reproduce criminal activities; practical support in criminal activity; support during economic activity; support during investigation process, court proceedings and imprisonment; and some other types of support and services. All these types will be examined below in details.

1. Obtaining information

According to our experts, the information exchange between gang members and representatives of law-enforcement agencies is widespread and continuous. As it was stated, law-enforcement bodies have no more secrets: gang members get access to the documents “for internal use”, to databases, and even to the officers’ personal information :

“Gang members surrender only those whom they don’t need. They do not surrender to their friends. But police officers surrender to their colleagues stock and barrel. Policemen are the most unreliable people. It is better not to get involved with the police, not to report anything to them. But of course everything depends on a collective and a head.” (S.M., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 7 years, Nizhnekamsk).

a) Information that helps to hide crimes or avoid criminal responsibility

Information about police operations.

We have found out during the research that anti-criminal activities of the police sometimes were ineffective as the objects of investigation knew about the planned actions due to the information drain. Gang members are often informed about the police operations such as unannounced investigations against prostitution, drugs and arms sale, thefts, and other crimes:

“Corruptibility is widespread… It is a usual case, for instance, with prostitutes. In the evening police officers develop a plan and some time is needed to approve and sign it. If you plan this beforehand you will never find any prostitutes on the street. If the raid is carried out unexpectedly - police cars are quickly organized and sent to these places – then you can see the result…” (M.N., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 5 years, Naberezhnie Chelny).

In the following quotation, a gang member talks about the mechanisms of information drain about a police operation. In his opinion, police officers give notice about the raids, as they themselves get illegal income from prostitution, drug trafficking and other criminal activities of the gangs45:

“If after the operation they do not get any money, they will prefer to warn us. The police knows everything. It is not profitable for them to prohibit everything... If you have money, nobody touches you, if your money comes to an end, you are arrested. Those who pay are living very well. The 48th is doing well, they are paying; the 36th were bankrupt or did not want to pay, and they are all in prison now; the 48th is always alarmed, when they pay, the operation is over…” (F., 26 year old, gang member, Naberezhnie Chelny).

Giving notice to the people who have committed crimes about the planned arrest.

In the same way as described above ‘friends’ in the police alarm criminals including gang members and leaders about the possibility of being arrested:

“All criminal authorities are well known. And if something is going to happen they are informed. They are told when it is better to leave the place and where it is better not to go. One of my friends always concealed himself in the village. It is better then in prison...” (S., 32 year old, gang member, Kazan).

Information about the investigation process, delivery of information and documents on the cases related to gangs.

As many of our respondents have stated, gang members are often informed about the investigations against them by the officers working in the police and Prosecutor’s Office. This information is used for the avoidance of criminal responsibility:

“It is usual that copies of documents are passed. But usually gang members are given the possibility to acquaint with the materials of criminal case. According to the law, suspected person is not allowed to see the investigation materials. If such information becomes available to the criminal the case is considered as failed” (M., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 9 years, Kazan).

By illegally familiarizing themselves with the materials of ongoing investigations, gang members can get access to the statements of their companions in crime and then develop common lines of conduct during interrogations. Information about the witnesses can be used to put pressure on them and to force them to change their statements:

“Members of our gang were put in a bull-pen for robbery in three shops. We came to the police department, read what our friends have said, what witnesses have said… All in all we easily read everything, just in case found out witnesses’ addresses…” (B., 20 year old, gang member, Zelenodolsk).

Thus gang members can have information at every stage of the investigation process (from collecting on-line data to the creation of a criminal case and delivering it to the court), and thus get wide possibilities to hide crimes and avoid responsibility.

45 Numbers in the quotation are the numbers of housing estates in Naberezhnie Chelny where gangs are active.

Checking-up on information about businesses.

If earlier the criminal code prohibited any kind of trading to gang members, nowadays commercial activity, especially illegal, constitutes one of the main sources of gangs’ income. So the information about business check-ups (by tax police, etc.) becomes very useful.

b) Information that helps to commit crimes and reproduce criminal activities

Information about natural (i.e. individual(s)) and juridical (i.e. commercial/corporate entities) persons.

As our research has shown, the information about individuals can serve different goals. According to our experts, gang members, for instance, often want to obtain information about a businessman (home address, telephone, possessed property, numbers and types of cars, etc.) and his firm to force him to pay protection money to the gang or about a witness of crime to put pressure on him/her. The access to police databases allows gang members to do that, and thus they often consume such information. Besides, the databases contain information about suspected persons; current investigations, etc.

Information about the activities of rival gangs.

The police databases also contain information about the activities of rival gangs, which is widely used by gangs in competitive activities for the spheres of influence.

Consultations with law-enforcement officers.

Among other things, gang members usually address the acquainted officers for consultations. According to the interviews, such consultations usually concern the possibilities to evade laws during illegal or commercial activity.

2. Practical support

In addition to the provision of gang members with important information, law-enforcement officers render them a variety of practical services. It is essential that almost all of such services can be qualified as crimes.

а) Support in committing crimes and reproducing criminal activity

Exerting pressure on natural persons.

The facts of direct participation of the officers in gangs’ criminal activities were mentioned rather rarely in our interviews. At the same time gang members often use the authorities of police officers for the fulfillment of their criminal designs. In particular it happens in case of threatening and exerting pressure on people:

“They can go to the crew leaders, make a deal with the officer that he gives a command to his people to come to the particular place and arrest people there,

coarsely search them to show the power, humiliate people. And policemen do this. Gang members pay directly to the officer or to his assistant. It means that they use police on duty for their own purposes” (I.P., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 5 years, Kazan).

Fights against rival gangs.

As stated by our experts, officers working in law-enforcement bodies are quite often involved in the struggle against rival gangs. It is done by regularly bringing to account members of one or another gang using the information provided by their competitors.

Co-operation in taking illegal protection money from businesses.

As it was already mentioned, police officers can be involved in the process of establishing control over businesses. Usually it happens as a result of thoroughly planned operations, when one side (gang or police) first exert pressure on the victim, and then another side offers the businessman to ‘solve the problem’ against financial reward:

“The Department for Struggle against Organized Crime (UBEP) is very active… They usually work like gang members; it means invasion and then ‘rescue’ from it. Many combinations exist. For example, the Department examines a business, exerts pressure, and then offers the services. Once it was organized in a way that UBEP exerted pressure and we offered to settle this question” (S., 32 year old, gang member, Kazan).

Help in purchasing arms and direct sale of arms to gang members.

Several experts mentioned that officers working at law-enforcement organs render assistance to gang members in purchasing arms. We can suppose that both sides of the interaction are aware that these arms can be used for criminal purposes later on.

Convoying illegal goods of gang members.

Gang members know that police officers can easier settle conflicts with their “colleagues in epaulets” (for example, traffic police inspectors). Thus they often draw the officers for such remunerative service as convoying illegal goods. The following goods are considered as the most “criminal” in Tatarstan Republic: non-ferrous metal, illegally acquired or stolen automobile spares, tires, polyethylene, counterfeit vodka, round sums of money, etc.

Removing a person from the police database.

According to our experts, if a gang member needs a clear police record (for example, when he decides to start a legal business or become a politician) it is possible to buy this service from the officer responsible. In the same way, a person can be excluded from the convictions database. Previous conviction is an aggravation during the court examination; besides, the convictions database is usually searched when a person applies for a foreign passport, tries to get a job in the law-enforcement agencies, takes part to the elections etc. Thus the exclusion from this database can be useful for gang members who want to decrease their criminal responsibility, “legalize” themselves and so forth. According to the majority of experts, such service is offered rather often:

“For instance, a person was convicted and I know it exactly… You input his name in the Information Centre at the Ministry of Interior… but the suspect has not been convicted. Thus instead of imprisonment he can get only a fine. Usually it costs about 3000 rubles (about 100 dollars) to exclude a person from the database” (Y.Y., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 16 years, Kazan).

Advanced release of detained gang members.

The facts of advanced release from detention for financial reward were mentioned very often by our experts that proves high prevalence of this service:

“For example, a person spent two days in a bull-pen and to avoid spending another eight days he pays 100 bucks” (P., former law-enforcement officer, record of standing 15 years, Zelenodolsk).

Job placement of gang members in law-enforcement bodies.

Many experts who participated in our study told us about the possibility of job placement of gang members in law-enforcement bodies. This fact tells us about the high level of interosculation of these two structures:

“We can assume that there are people who were specially send out to the police by organized crime. There is such a feeling when you look at some officers, especially young… you start thinking why they came to work in the police?” (V.N., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 12 years, Kazan).

The most scandalous are cases when gang members purposefully train future “agents” helping them to enter the key institutions of secondary and high education in Tatarstan that prepare law-enforcement officers (Elabuga Special Secondary Police School, Kazan Juridical Institute of the Ministry of Interior, etc.). According to our experts, then the graduates are placed in a job and promoted. We can suppose that such officers heartily work off the investments during the whole term of their service at the law-enforcement agencies.

b) Support during economic activity

Support in organizing and running a business.

As it was clarified during the research, law-enforcement officers as the representatives of institutionalized power structures can render important assistance to the legal and illegal businesses of a gang member. Such assistance varies from settling the problems with municipal administration to providing information about the future partners:

“Gang members use police officers, people who work in the office of the Public Prosecutor and even officers from the Department for the Struggle against Organized Crime for their business purposes. These officers can arrange places on the market after talking with a director; they can guard against all administrative delays; protect against other gangs if it is needed.” (F., former law-enforcement officer, record of standing 4.5 years, Kazan).

According to some experts, the average police executive often additionally work as a security guard in the gang members’ firms. Such involvement in economic relations makes the illegitimate ties even stronger.

Solving problems in other law-enforcement bodies.

As our research has shown, gang members actively use interdepartmental ties of law-enforcement agencies. We repeatedly came across cases, when police officers helped gang member to get back a driving license from the traffic police after an incident, to investigate traffic incidents in favor of a gang member; or when they help to speed up car registration, or strike cars off the register or even to solve problems with municipal or regional administration for criminals.

Struggle against competing business.

Illegitimate ties in law-enforcement agencies can be utilized by gang members in their struggles against business competitors. According to our experts, the methods of such struggle can vary from a simple warning to actually taking action against a competitor.

c) Support during investigation process, court proceedings and imprisonment Further we will examine the mechanisms and varieties of using illegitimate ties in the law-enforcement agencies by gang members during the different stages of criminal procedure: from investigation to the court proceedings and co-operation in the institutions of confinement.

Investigation of a case for the sake of a gang.

There is an opinion that every gang related case has an interested party, because if the members of one gang are convicted it will become weak, which is advantageous for the competing groups. However not all gang related cases are made to order.

Support of gang member during an investigation.

As the interviews have shown, members of organized criminal groups have plenty of possibilities to avoid criminal prosecution and commit various crimes with impunity using their ties in the law-enforcement agencies. If the case already came to investigation phase, gang member can be provided with the following services: various consultations, information about attestations and pressure on witnesses, assistance in reducing penalty, reclassification of crimes, etc.:

“To do everything possible to let gang members be released without further criminal prosecution or get the minimal sentences, including conditional; discover procedural infringements; influence upon witnesses of crime by means of bribery or threat. If it comes out that witness really has valuable information, they are trying to bribe him, but towards ordinary workers they usually not go beyond the threat of physical violence. Gangs can count their money and will never give it for nothing.” (S., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 4 years, Kazan).

Negligence and concealing information on a case.

According to our experts, pressure on the officers during investigation can lead to their criminal negligence. They can, for instance, conceal the on-line data on gang related criminal cases, which substantially complicates the investigation. In addition gang membership of a person on trial can be concealed to reduce the measures of punishment.

Handing over the case to another investigator.

This is another way to influence the investigation process: if the case goes to another investigator this can give a chance to ‘let it drop’.

Release from custory.

The member or members of an organized criminal group can be released from custody for a substantial financial reward; sometimes gang members are even released to be able to collect money:

“I was several times addressed at night by gang members who wanted to borrow some money to take out a person from police custory before the case would be registered. Another person was released from custody to let him find 15 thousand dollars for the bribe. It was a serious case on coinage offence” (M., 40 years old, businessman, record of standing 14 years, Kazan).

Closing criminal cases.

The possibility of ceasing or closing a criminal case was mentioned rather often by our experts. One of them described the situation when the criminal prosecution on a grave crime was stopped against a bribe in Naberezhnie Chelny:

“Two minor girls – 14 years old - were raped in Naberezhnie Chelny this summer by Gypsies, also 14-15 years olds. The case was taken to the Prosecutor’s Office and then closed. Parents of these Gypsies paid 300000 rubles (about 10000 USD); they collected this amount in four hours. Their Baron lives on my territory, and he mentioned the amount. They gave the money to the Prosecutor’s Office and to the girls’ parents. That’s all” (K.N., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 6 years, Naberezhnie Chelny).

Support during the court proceedings.

As our experts have stated, gang members have broad ties with judicial authorities. These ties are actualized when the case is transferred to the court, and the key service in this connection is to ‘win the case’, which as a rule means a decrease in punishment:

“…also falsification of criminal cases, their reclassification. For example, some documents or evidences are removed from the case and a murder is reclassified to the careless handling of weapons; group fight to the petty hooliganism, etc. Also tampering with judges: advocates say that if we find the certain sum of money, it will be such-and-such sentence” (M., 40 years old, businessman, record of standing 14 years, Kazan).

d) Co-operation during imprisonment Ties between gang members serving their sentences and officers working in the penal system were not in a specific focus of our research, but we came across the cases of such co-operation in our interviews. According to our experts, the assistance can take forms of information exchange, transfer of money or goods to imprisoned gang members, temporary release during incarceration, grant of parole, etc.

e) Other support and services The following services that can be provided to gang members by law-enforcement officers were also mentioned in our interviews: “making forged passports”, “getting access to the high levels of state power through the officers working at law-enforcement agencies”, “elections related activities: some candidates use police for ‘black agitation [i.e. secretly conducting activities of various types to undermine other candidates]’ ”, etc.

3) Utilization of Illegitimate Ties with Gang Members by Law-Enforcement Officers

The next part of the article will be devoted to the mechanisms and variants of utilization of illegitimate ties with gang members by law-enforcement officers. As the research has shown, law-enforcement officers have much less possibilities of favorable utilization of the ties with organized criminal groups. Often the interaction develops to the simple acts of selling information or services. At the same time, some officers nevertheless try to utilize the ties not only for their personal benefits, but also for raising the effectiveness of investigating work.

а) Support during criminal investigation

Information exchange.

According to our experts, officers are aware that gang members have access to the information that can be very helpful in their everyday work and in criminal investigations in particular:

“We exchange information, we can find out who has committed the crime through gang members. They can also help us to detect some drug addicts. But they only give information. We come to arrest ourselves.” (R., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 3 years, Kazan).

The following quotation shows the mechanism when the service implies the service in response. The value of co-operation for both sides is accentuated by the willingness to follow the “rules of the game”:

“Information is provided when gang members are on the hook. But such information can also be given as a gratitude for previous help. For example, when police officer helped gang member to avoid responsibility for a petty offence such as hooliganism or theft. The deals are usually made with adult gang members…” (S., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 4 years, Kazan).

As already mentioned, police officers often become instruments of the struggles between rival gangs. But the conflict among criminal groups can also be a good resource for the officer dealing with gang related crimes.

Using gangs to demonstrate work effectiveness.

As our research has shown police officers often use the ties and information from gang members to demonstrate the effectiveness of their work. First of all it concerns the execution

of plans on arresting particular categories of offenders. In one interview with gang member we came across the situation when the police officer first tried hard to support a gang and then demonstratively investigated the crimes related to this gang showing to police authorities how he can work.

Help in normalizing a criminal situation.

In a small town of the Tatarstan Republic we discovered cases of co-operation of police and gang members for the purposes of normalizing the critical criminal situation in the region.

Help in crimes clearance.

Co-operation with gang members is normalized in the discourses of law-enforcement officers because the information obtained using such ties helps in the clearance of crimes:

“For example, I know the leader of one very influential gang in Kazan. Five years ago I locked him up. He has been released and sometimes he comes to my office, we talk, I ask him questions, and he answers. I owe him nothing and he owes me nothing. Is it corruption? But what is real that up to 70 per-cent of crimes are cleared after such meetings…” (S.P., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 11 years, Kazan).

At the same time, as it was stressed in several interviews, information support and help in clearance of crimes do not guarantee immunity for gang members. It is worth mentioning that some experts told us about the agents who exist in almost every gang and regularly provide useful information. According to our respondents, this sometimes happens when a gang against which an action was brought specially gives up one of its members in order for the crime to be cleared and for other members (accessories or organizers) to avoid responsibility:

“Gang leaders sometimes give up one member who plays a secondary role in the gang, so called ‘terpila’ (can be translated as a person who suffered). He takes the responsibility for the crime he did not commit. This was made to disclose crime and make the police reduce their efforts; they do not want the police to ‘dig deeper’.” (A.F., law-enforcement officer, record of standing 6 years, Naberezhniye Chelny).

b) Support for police officer’s illegal activities When police officers themselves violate the law, it is hard for them to manage without the support of organized criminal groups. One of our respondents from a gang told us the following story:

“Once I was sitting in a bull-pen for stealing a car. There were three of us, and one was offered to do the following: cops agree to forget about the crime if we took the car to the appointed place and soldl it to one person. Then we could easily go away, nobody would touch us. My friend is a quirky guy, so he agreed. We were released…” (Sh., 25 years old, gang member, Kazan).

c) Help in solving personal problems As the analysis shows, law-enforcement officers most often ask gang members to render them private services.

Solving the problems of police officers’ children

When a child or a close relative of an officer get into a mess (for example, he or she is systematically beaten or mugged by gang members) ties with the criminal organizations can be useful. The following case was relates to us by a gang member:

“For example, the brother of a police officer is in trouble with gang members at school. He will not go there to investigate this himself; he will ask us for help. We will come and settle the problem. The brother enjoys authority… Mafia came to talk for him” (A., 22 years old, gang member, Zelenodolsk).

In addition, officers quite often use the small services provided by the firms which are under control of organized crime as a reward for supporting gang members.

Thus the key difference between the practices of utilization of illegitimate ties performed by gang members and law-enforcement officers is that members of organized criminal groups mainly use such ties for the reproduction of criminal activities (concealing of old and committing new crimes, avoiding criminal responsibility on every stage of investigation and court proceedings, etc.); in turn, officers mainly use such ties for the clearance of crimes that are not related to gangs and for the solution of personal material and financial problems.

Conclusion: Understanding Illegitimate Ties As we can see from the analysis, corruption in Russia cannot be simply reduced to bribe taking or abuse of public authority. From one side, the illegitimate ties between law-enforcement officers and members of organized criminal groups represent the specific form of a traditional social network based on friendship and family ties and characterized by mutual exchange and support in a situation of scarce resources. The social capital of every individual consists of ties with people from different spheres of social life, thus ties in the police and/or organized criminal groups can be considered as a social buttress because the actualization of such ties can be demanded at any time. The high level of job-instability among law-enforcement officers (they can be fired or downgraded) and gang members (they can be killed or put to prison) leads to the aspiration to rapidly accumulate social and economic capital. This quite often results in the erosion of any professional, ethical or legal norms, the willingness to use all possible means, including criminal, to succeed as fast as possible. Thus the representatives of both social groups studied here are trying “not to waste time while they have power”, because “nobody knows what will happen tomorrow”. Therefore the breadth of distribution and the range of utilization of illegitimate ties by both gang members and law-enforcement officers are enormous.

The trend to keep these ties “for life” and to make them more informal and even friendly, in our opinion, also comes out from the desire to create a stable platform that does not strongly depend on social and professional status. As an example we can mention a fact

that gang members often help former law-enforcement officers who previously helped them to find a job when their service is complete. In other words, the gang provides certain “social guarantees” to their partners. Such cases tell us about the systemic character of the described ties. Knowledge about the mutual advantages of co-operation between “cops and bandits” contributes to the constant reproduction of illegitimate ties as their presence is connected with the only possibility to earn one’s living and to survive in hard social and economic conditions.

From another side the research has shown the trend to formalization and commercialization of illegitimate ties, which becomes apparent in the practices of direct sale of services. This new trend results from the ‘situation in a shop’ where any person can buy goods on predetermined prices. The process of mediation changes accordingly: even an accidental person (such as witness or even people under investigation) can serve as a mediator between law-enforcement agencies and gang members. As we can see from the case of the “Moscow Brigade” mentioned at the beginning of this article and the analysis of interviews, the commercialization of illegitimate ties and the practices of free purchase and sale of services are more visible in big cities such as Moscow and Kazan. Traditional social networks based on friendship, kinship and the common place of origin are widespread in small towns.

As was discovered in the course of the analysis, the majority of causes of corruption

originate in the problems existing in the law-enforcement sphere in Russia. Macro-level causes include the qualitative changes in society after the collapse of the Soviet Union that resulted in the loss of trust in the major social institutions (such as the state, the law, and the church) and the total corruption of power institutions. According to our experts, the crisis of the last decade influenced the considerable changes in structure and relationships inside the law-enforcement agencies. This became apparent in the change of values, dissolution of morals, deformation of ethic and moral principles of the officers when professional duties were receded into the background, giving a way to the desire of earning money. Experts also mentioned such causes as a fall of prestige and authority of law-enforcement officers, low legal assistance and salary, an insufficient level of education and training, the hiring of “accidental people” into the power bodies, etc. In many expert judgments, we have found nostalgic feelings about the sense of collectivism that was typical for Soviet law-enforcement agencies. Individualization and the lack of spirit of a ‘professional corporation’ in the police were compared to friendly and even family-like relationships in the gangs. It was mentioned in some interviews that the governing body of the law-enforcement agencies in a certain sense gets an advantage from the situation when personnel commits crimes. Here the rule of mutual responsibility begins to work, and the officers start to cover up for each other if they know that everybody has unclean hands.

The second set of causes of corruption includes the institutionalization of the

mechanisms of conversion of power to financial resources when bribes, purchase and sale of services, and extortion become widespread social practices. Moreover, the clans based on common place of origin, friendship or kinship are common in Tatarstan Republic; the ties inside such clans can only be maintained by the mutual exchange of services.

“The Women in/and the Military”

Павел Петрович Щербинин / Pavel Petrovich Shcherbinin

профессор кафедры Российской истории, доктор исторических наук, руководитель, Тамбовского центра гендерных исследований, Тамбовский госуниверситет имени Г.Р. Державина / Professor, Russian History,

Tambov University

Солдатские жены в XVIII – начале XX в.: опыт реконструкции социального статуса, правового положения, социокультурного облика, поведения и настроений [ Soldiers’

wives from the XVIIIth to the XXth century : the reconstruction experience of social and legal status, sociocultural character,

behavior and sentiments]

Abstract The article examines legal and social status of Russian soldier’s wives, their mentality, sociocultural character and their everyday life in the Russian Empire (XVIII – the beginning of the XX centuries) with the help of archives, reminiscences, statistics and ethnographic sources. The author researches soldier’s wives petitions, the attitude of central and local authorities towards them, their means of social adaptation. Are displayed the peculiarities of the soldier’s wives deviant behavior (prostitution, infanticide and others). The author also examines the activity of soldier’s wives organizations (soyuzov soldatok) in 1917, the structure of soldier’s families and the peculiarities of their demographic behavior. In this article are uncovered professional favors of soldier’s wives and their participation in the women emancipation movement in Russia.

Семейная жизнь военнослужащих европейских армий вызывает в последние десятилетия широкий интерес социологов, демографов, историков, политологов и этнографов. Получают развитие специальные направления в истории семьи, гендерной истории и истории армии, в которых авторы уделяют особое внимание социокультурной характеристике, правовому статусу и повседневной жизни членов семьи военнослужащих. В тоже время исторический портрет солдатки, жены тех, кто был призван на службу в армию или мобилизован на войну, до сих пор не воссоздан. Очевидно, что повседневно-бытовых реалиях этих женщин ведущую, а подчас и определяющую роль играл «военный фактор». К нему следует отнести сами войны, а также то, что им сопутствовало, – расквартирование войск, реквизиции, военные заготовки, военно-санитарную деятельность и т.п. В статье предпринята попытка реконструкции социального статуса, правового положения, социокультурного облика, менталитета, повседневной жизни солдатских жен в Российской империи (XVIII – начало ХХ вв.). Российские солдатки не оставили мемуаров и дневников, в которых могли бы быть зафиксированы их личные свидетельства оценки влияния военного фактора на повседневно-бытовые реалии солдатских семей. Поэтому воссоздание повседневной жизни этих женщин, их настроений и социально-правового статуса неизбежно требуют внимательного изучения максимально широкого круга источников военной поры. Наиболее ценными и информационно насыщенными из них являются: первичные архивные материалы, периодическая печать, церковные источники, донесения

жандармских управлений, фольклорные и этнографические источники, материалы земских обследований и собственно прошения солдатских жен. Термин «солдатка» появился в России во второй трети XVII в., когда в русской армии были сформированы полки «нового строя», названные солдатскими. Военнослужащие этих европеизированных частей - солдаты – имели право не только жениться во время службы, но жить с семьей в местах расположения военной части. Однако в XVII в. солдатские жены являлись скорее исключением из правила, нежели обычным явлением для вооруженных сил русского государства. Таких женщин было сравнительно немного, и лишь рождение массовой регулярной армии, введение рекрутских наборов в России в начале XVIII в. способствовали появлению особого военного сословия, в которое входили не только собственно солдаты, но и члены их семей (жены, сыновья и дочери). Важно иметь в виду и то обстоятельство, что определение «солдатка» активно использовалось как в российском военном и гражданском законодательстве в XVIII – начале XX вв., так и в повседневной речевой практике россиян и россиянок, церковных и светских властей. Фольклорные и другие этнографические источники также сохранили самобытную, яркую характеристику повседневной жизни и менталитета солдатской жены.

Социальный статус солдатской жены Определить брачное поведение и семейно-бытовые условия жизни солдатских жен можно, ответив на вопросы: когда и за кого они вышли замуж, где жили после замужества и каким образом содержали себя и своих детей. Женщина могла стать солдаткой (солдатской женой, рекруткой, женой нижнего воинского чина) при следующих обстоятельствах: 1) призыве мужа-крестьянина или мещанина в рекруты или солдаты; 2) заключении брака с рекрутом или солдатом срочной службы; 3) выходе замуж за отставного или отпускного солдата. Понятно, что наиболее распространенной была первая категория, когда статус солдатки и перевод женщины в военное сословие происходили после отправки мужа в армию. Очевидно, что ни одна женщина податного сословия (крестьянка или мещанка-горожанка) не могла быть спокойна, пока ее муж находился в «призывном возрасте» и мог быть отправлен в войска. Эта перспектива неминуемого и часто неожиданного призыва создавала ситуацию постоянного беспокойства, являлась мощнейшим стрессом, сопровождавшим семейную повседневную жизнь и сословно-правовой статус населения России. Понятно, что положение русской женщины было неустойчивым и во многом зависело от частых рекрутских наборов, определяемых внешнеполитической активностью государства и ростом мобилизационных мероприятий военного министерства. С известной долей условности можно разделить все замужнее женское население России в XVIII – начала XX в. на три группы: 1) женщины, мужья которых уже служили в армии; 2) россиянки, которые с тревогой и опаской ждали часа неминуемого «изъятия» главы семьи для военных надобностей; 3) жены, мужья которых по состоянию здоровья, льготам и другим причинам не могли служить «пушечным мясом», и именно эти женщины считали себя самыми счастливыми и удачливыми. Отдача мужа в рекруты или солдаты коренным образом изменяла статус россиянок, внося в их жизнь необходимость поиска путей адаптации, выбора индивидуальных способов противодействия правовому, административному и общественному давлению, которому подвергалась любая солдатка, став представительницей военного сословия. Впрочем, в XVIII – XIX вв. солдатка, которая была крепостной до призыва

мужа в армию, становилась свободной, но принадлежащей, как военному ведомству. Важно заметить, что население России хорошо знало права военного сословия. Невыполнение помещиками обязательств освобождать солдатских жен от крепостной неволи, при призыве мужа в рекруты или в ополчение, вызывало многочисленные судебные тяжбы, а в некоторых случаях и волнения. По мнению Э.К. Виртшафтер, для семьи рекрута правовые и социально-экономические последствия призыва наступали практически немедленно: каждый рекрут оказывался потерянным как работник, налогоплательщик, отец и муж. Сложным было положение и его жены, детей и престарелых родителей, которые практически оказывались на грани нищеты. В правовом отношении и на деле рекрут и его жена, если она у него была, в момент призыва на военную службу не «освобождались», а исключались из числа членов своей общины1. Таким образом, солдатка освобождалась часто не только от крепостной зависимости, но и от всякой возможной поддержки крестьянского или мещанского общества. Необходимо иметь в виду, что, став солдатской женой, женщина могла следовать за мужем в армию и проживать там вместе с ним. Брачные узы считались священными и военные, гражданские и церковные власти не решались формально запрещать жене быть при муже. Этим правилом особенно недовольны были помещики, которые теряли не только своего бывшего крепостного, взятого в армию, но и его жену. В случаях, когда в солдаты тайно записывался крепостной крестьянин, военное начальство отказывались возвращать его из армии. Помещики бомбардировали правительство прошениями с просьбой оставлять им хотя бы жен этих «самовольных» солдат. В 1700 г. решено было, что, если солдаты станут просить «о поставке их жен, таких жен от помещиков не отбирать». Заметим, что по первым рекрутским указам можно было брать в армию только холостых рекрутов, но уже с 1707 г. допускался и призыв женатых мужчин, так как холостых оказалось для призыва явно недостаточно, а потребности армии диктовали важность скорого ее пополнения. Не случайно, уже в первых петровских указах о рекрутских наборах отмечалось, что часто новобранец отправлялся к месту службы с женой и детьми2. Однако, все определялось чаще всего возможностью. для солдата содержать жену и детей. Свидетельством значительного числа женатых рекрутов в начале XVIII в. является указ 1704 г., в котором провиантские дачи различались на две категории: для женатых и холостых воинов. Семейным выдавалось от казны по 5 четвертей (580 кг) хлеба в год, а неженатым – только 3. Однако волокита в выдаче казенного провианта ставила порой детей и жен, ушедших в поход рекрутов в крайне тяжелое положение. Власти отмечали, что в 1707 г. из-за отсутствия в государственных амбарах-магазинах хлеба «жены и дети солдат помирают голодной смертью»3. Вскоре тяготы Северной войны заставили правительство вообще отказаться от выдачи хлебного жалования солдаткам и их детям. А в 1722 г. последовало уточнение о том, что жена могла следовать за мужем только после того, как он обживется на новом месте и если на то придет «требование полков». С 1744 г. жены рекрутов должны были оставаться на прежних местах жительства. 1 Виртшафтер Э.К. Социальные структуры: разночинцы в Российской империи. Пер. с англ. Т.П. Вечериной. Под ред. А.Б. Каменского. М., 2002. С. 103. 2 Столетие Военного министерства. 1802—1902. Главный штаб. Исторический очерк. Ч. 1. Кн. 1. СПб., 1902. С. 33 – 44. 3 Быт русской армии XVIII – начала XX века / Авт.—сост. С.В. Карпущенко. М., 1999. С. 88—89.

Безусловно, к месту службы мужа-рекрута ехали лишь те женщины, которые могли решиться расстаться с привычным укладом жизни, с родными местами и родственниками. Как правило, приезжала к мужу бездетная солдатка, так как наличие детей сдерживало ее социальную мобильность. Солдатская жена, прибыв к мужу-рекруту, не обладала правом самостоятельно выбора профессионального занятия, передвижения, а попадала в зависимость от полкового командира. Такая женщина уже не имела права распоряжаться своей судьбой, как ей заблагорассудится. Она могла, конечно, подыскивать себе место проживания вне полка, но только с разрешения командира полка. В середине XVIII в. существовала специальная инструкция для полковников, чтобы они подыскивали работу для солдатских жен в пределах полка. Этим решалось несколько задач: не разбегались по сторонам солдатки со своими детьми, обязанными затем служить в армии, да и в полковом хозяйстве при помощи умелых женских рук, наводился порядок. Женщинам поручались шитье и стирка для солдат белья, вязание чулок, шитье палаток и чехлов для них и др. В XIX в. Лишь некоторые из солдатских жен находили применение своему труду в самом полку, чаще всего, ухаживая за больными солдатами, другие – устраивались на фабрики, которые располагались недалеко от места дислокации полка ее мужа, либо занимались мелкой торговлей или нанимались в услужение. Но все же большинство женщин не могли найти себе самостоятельного заработка и рассчитывали лишь на квартирное и пищевое довольствие, которое по закону полагалось семейным солдатам. Заметим, что если воинская часть располагалась на постое у городских или сельских обывателей, то еще с 30-х гг. XVIII в. для женатых солдат полагались дополнительные площади. Представляется весьма занятным, как правительство рассчитывало ценность семьи солдата по отношению к нему самому. Так, жену считали за одного солдата; трех дочерей - также за одного солдата. Заметим, что забота правительства не была связана с пониманием важности совместного проживания супругов, а лишь отражала стремление контролировать солдатское потомство. Не случайно в указах Анны Иоановны подчеркивалось, что хотя женам солдатским неприлично жить в казармах, но от разлучения их с мужьями пропадает много солдатских детей, которые потом могли бы быть обращены в службу. Таким образом, проясняются причины того, что военные власти не возражали против совместного проживания солдат и солдаток в расположении частей. В середине XVIII в. около половины военнослужащих были женатыми и проживали со своими семьями в избах или комнатах, находясь на постое или в солдатских слободах. Нанимать квартиру для проживания было дорого, и большая часть солдатских семей жила в крайней тесноте и испытывала немало неудобств. Квартирные пособия были невелики и рассчитаны на то, что у семьи солдата есть дополнительные источники финансирования (помощь большой семьи, родителей, заработки жены солдата). Казенные же квартиры, выделяемые семьям солдат, были очень неудобными. Часто это было те же солдатские казармы, перегороженные деревянными перегородками. Сложности для семейной жизни солдата и тяжелые условия для совместного проживания, отсутствие средств приводили к тому, что большинство женщин-солдаток оставалось на прежнем старом месте жительства. Наверно, не случайно, если жена не поехала за мужем сразу после призыва, то при ее вызове потом, воинское начальство предварительно рассматривало экономическое состояние семьи и могло запретить ее приезд.

Конечно, солдат мог завести семью и в период своей службы в армии. Однако, уже в 1764 г. нижним чинам было запрещено вступать в браки без согласия полковых командиров. Кроме того, от солдата требовалось соблюдение следующих условий: наличие свидетельство о согласии невесты солдата и родителей на брак; достижение невестой 16 летнего возраста; согласие податного общества об отдаче невесты замуж за солдата4. И все же, главным фактором, влиявшим на семейный статус солдата, было его материальное положение. Не случайно, большинство солдат принимали решение и получали дозволение начальства на брак, лишь при обретении более высокой должности, а так же при приискании себе богатой невесты. Понятно, что в полках значительную часть женатых составляли: фельдфебели, фельдшеры, мастеровые, которые обрели семьи именно после получения этих званий и должностей. Заметим, что офицеры признавали благотворное влияние семейной жизни на нравственность, поведение солдата и его отношение к службе. Поэтому они при наличии благоприятных обстоятельствах старались не препятствовать устройству солдатом своей семейной жизни. Командиры полков отмечали, что семейные солдаты становились степеннее и рассудительнее, имели определенные цели и прочные привязанности. Некоторые выпивавшие ранее солдаты бросали под воздействием жен свою пагубную привычку, улучшалось и здоровье солдат, так как они не заражались больше сифилисом и другими венерическими заболеваниями. Браки солдат, отличались большой разницей в возрасте жениха и невесты, составляя порой несколько десятилетий. Специальное изучение состава семей отставных солдат в XVIII и XIX вв. подтверждает эту тенденцию. Нами была сформирована на основе первичных архивных источников электронная база данных «Семьи отставных солдат XVIII в.», обработка которой показала, что 29 процентов солдатских семей имели разницу в возрасте мужа и жены от 15 до 25 лет, еще 14 процентов – от 10 до 15 лет, почти 40 процентов мужей были старше своих жен на 5 - 10 лет, а лишь четыре процента – были ровесниками5. Такая большая разница в возрасте солдата и его жены объяснялась тем, что многие солдаты женились уже после службы в достаточно зрелом возрасте не на своих ровесницах, которые либо уже устроили свою судьбу, либо не могли уже составить конкуренции молодым девушкам на выданье. Весьма примечателен и средний возраст членов солдатских семей: муж – 59 лет, жена – 47, сын 19, дочь – 10 лет. Сыновей в солдатских семьях было почти в три раза больше, чем дочерей. Но можно предположить, что при проведении переписи отставных солдат, власти не всегда учитывали «солдатских девок», предпочитая четко регистрировать будущих рекрут – сыновей солдат. Заметим, что ревизские семьи отставных солдат к середине XIX в. явно росли (1850 г. средний размер - 5.5 человек, 1858 г. - 9.0 человек), что можно связать с сокращением срока рекрутской службы и довольно частым разрешением им встречаться с женами в период службы или отпуска домой. Фактически же, некоторые солдаты, хотя и считались женатыми, но жен своих не видели с момента рекрутства – они обзавелись супругами еще «в крестьянстве», успели даже завести детей, и жены, понимая, что ничего хорошего от солдатского житья не ожидается, остались на прежних местах, давая, впрочем, своим мужьям основание долгие годы считаться семейными. Некоторые солдаты более десяти лет не видели своих жен, хотя некоторым удавалось бывать дома во время кратковременных отпусков. Впрочем, и некоторые солдатки, годы, а порой и десятилетия проживая без 4 Михайлов М.М. Военные законы. СПб., 1861. С. 125. 5 См. Государственный архив Тамбовской области (далее – ГАТО). Ф. 12. Оп. 1. Д. 163. Л. 19—94.

мужа, стремились как—то устраивать свою личную жизнь, находили постороннего «утешителя и заступника». И если вдруг солдат добивался у полкового начальства разрешения выписать свою жену к себе в часть для совместного проживания, то ему приходилось вступать в многолетнюю переписку с земской полицией, чтобы выяснить, жива ли его жена и где она находится. Таким образом, очевидно, что большинство солдаток все же не решались поехать к мужу, а оставались в местах прежнего проживания. Весь комплекс изученных нами источников позволяет выявить примерное процентное соотношение проживания солдатки и ее мобильности. Итак, с мужем в армии проживали около 5 процентов солдаток, еще 15 процентов женщина пытались жить самостоятельно в городах, других селах, находя собственные источники пропитания и крова над головой. Но большая часть, около 80 процентов солдатских жен, оставались жить там, где их застал призыв мужа в рекруты: в его большой семье, доме его или своих родителей, других родственников, односельчан. Солдатские жены имели право получать паспорт, который позволял им менять место жительства в поисках работы, однако часто мужья-солдаты отказывались давать согласие на проживание жены отдельно не только в городе, но и часто и в родном селе. Без этого разрешения власти, в свою очередь, не имели права выдавать женщине паспорт, с правом самостоятельного выбора места жительства. Судьба таких женщин была незавидной. Архивные источники сохранили многочисленные прошения солдаток с просьбами выдачи им паспорта «для прокормления своею работою». В абсолютном большинстве случаев мужья-солдаты отказывали женам и власти отклоняли их прошения о получении паспорта. Требование обязательного согласия мужа-солдата на самостоятельное проживание жены действовало и после замены рекрутской повинности всеобщей воинской обязанностью. Так, в 1888 г. солдатка села Тулиновки Тамбовского уезда Анна Абоносимова в своем прошении в Главный штаб военного министерства умоляла разрешить выдать ей отдельный паспорт, так как муж «помощи мне не дает никакой», отказывая в то же время «в выдаче удостоверения, по которому я могла бы наняться к кому либо». Через губернатора Анна Абоносимова, как и сотни ее подруг по судьбе, получила сообщение об отказе в удовлетворении ее прошения, так как без согласия мужа ей не мог быть выдан просимый паспорт6. Таким образом, патриархальные стереотипы и запреты ограничивали мобильность солдаток, препятствовали им в налаживании собственной жизни и поиске средств пропитания. Конечно, солдатка после ухода мужа в армию могла остаться и в семье свекра или деверя, если она жила там долго или уйти из семьи мужа к отцу, или братьям, либо жить с детьми отдельной семьей. Немало солдаток оседало в городах или торгово-промышленных селах, где они могли найти какое-то пропитание и доход. Главными занятиями солдаток в городах являлись работа в услужении, на фабрике, занятия мелкой торговлей или проституцией. В городских условиях, когда надо было самой оплачивать и свой кров, и свое пропитание, обеспечивать потребности детей, женщины брались за любую работу и промысел. Понятно, что их заработки и доходы оставались весьма ограниченными. Статистические данные по городским эпидемиям показывают, что у городских маргиналов, в том числе и у солдаток, смертность была в два раза выше, чем у крестьян, проживавших в городе. Это объясняется тем, что у крестьян 6 См.: ГАТО. Ф. 4. Оп. 1. Д. 3993. Л. 2.

была либо защита хозяина, либо он мог вернуться в свой дом в деревню. А у солдаток этого не было, и они могли рассчитывать только на свои силы и возможности. Лишь некоторые солдатки своей активностью и трудолюбием, а порой удачливостью, обретали экономическую независимость и благополучие, становясь владелицами ремесленных мастерских и доходных заведений. Однако, это было скорее исключение, чем правило в повседневной жизни российской солдатки. Большинство солдаток в силу обстоятельств, общественного мнения и традиций российского общества обречены были на мучительный поиск стратегии выживания себя и своей семьи. По сути, солдатка теряла свои социальные корни, после призыва мужа на службу и вынуждена была вести активный поиск нового положения в обществе7. Заметим, что с 1866 г. браки солдат в период службы уже не разрешались. В 1892 г. и 1904 г. в военное законодательство были внесены изменения, что исключения из этого правила и разрешение солдату жениться могло допускаться только в крайних, особо уважительных случаях, и не иначе, как с Высочайшего на то соизволения. Таким образом, отношение властей к бракам солдат за почти два столетия в корне изменилось. Если в XVIII в. браки солдат одобрялись, то в XIX в. происходило неуклонное сокращение возможностей для солдата завести семью и проживать с ней при воинской части.

Рождаемость и положение детей в рекрутских семьях Изучение рождаемости, социально-правовой адаптации рекрутских семей, повседневной жизни законных и незаконных детей в семьях солдаток представляет несомненный интерес. Первичные архивные источники сохранили многочисленные свидетельства жизненных коллизий солдатских жен и их незаконнорожденных детей, на основании которых и попытаемся реконструировать эту сторону семейно-брачных отношений солдаток и их материнского поведения. Отметим, что если в целом в императорской России положение и будущее ребенка зависело от социального положения его отца, то в солдатских семьях к военному сословию относились и еще не рожденные дети, а также все потомство не только от солдатских жен, но и от солдатских дочерей, от солдатских внучек, даже если они были прижиты незаконно. Очевидно, что для государства главным и определяющим являлись не законность или незаконность рождения ребенка в семье солдата, а его безусловная принадлежность к военному сословию и последующая служба в армии. На рождаемость в солдатских семьях влияло несколько факторов. Во-первых, длительная разлука, порой на десятилетия, очень редкие встречи лишь при возможном кратковременном отпуске мужа-солдата домой или поездке жены-солдатки к мужу на место дислокации воинской части формировали особый тип сексуальных отношений, брачного поведения солдатки и статуса ее детей. Во-вторых, необходимо учитывать особенности социокультурных процессов, информированность российского общества в период рекрутчины. Очевидно, что после призыва мужа на службу часто солдатка ничего не знала о его судьбе. Да и сами мужья-солдаты могли только догадываться, как живут их семьи и что происходит на родине. 7 David L. Ransel. Mother of Misery: Child Abandonment in Russia. Princeton, 1988. P. 155.; Wirtschafter E.K. The common soldier in eighteenth—century Russians Drama // Reflection on Russia in the Eighteenth Century. Koeln, 2001. P. 370—371.

Переписка в солдатских семьях была редкой или вообще отсутствовала. Таким образом, часто мужья и жены после рекрутского набора и расставания, годами, а иногда десятилетиями ничего не знали друг о друге. Отсюда становится вполне понятным наречение солдатки в общественном мнении «полувдовой», одинокой и беззащитной женщиной. Вероятно, не случайно многие рекрутки считали, что после призыва мужа на службу в армию их судьба поломана и у них нет больше перспективы нормальной семейной жизни и женского счастья. Военная машина перемалывала судьбы солдатских жен, лишая их не только самого мужа-«кормильца», но и даже сведений о его службе и жизни в армии. Да и сами солдаты после призыва на службу находились, по наблюдениям современников, на положении бесправных, лишенных семьи и собственности. Один из солдат, восстанавливая картину прошлого, констатировал, что, рекрут редко возвращался после службы домой, а если и возвращался, то его не узнавали: «…товарищи его уже умерли, молодые готовили своих сыновей в солдаты, старые связи безвозвратно исчезли: жена, которую он оставил еще молодой, встречала его старухой, окруженная чужими для него детьми, да и сам он был уже не тот…»8. Рекрутчина фактически способствовала краху многих солдатских семей, лишала детей отцов, а жену – мужа. Лишь тяжелое ранение, болезнь, инвалидность мужа-солдата давали ему шанс увольнения из армии, возвращения домой и встречи со своей семьей, но вместо опоры и поддержки он нередко становился уже обузой для своей семьи. В-третьих, репутация солдатки была уже по определению негативной. Стереотипы и образы ее сексуального и брачного поведения были однозначными: если женщина-солдатка, значит, она – гулящая, распутная, неприкаянная, а все ее дети – незаконнорожденные. Даже если солдатка рожала вполне законного ребенка, это вызывало подозрение и удивление. Для женщины-солдатки очень трудно было преодолеть негативное восприятие своего образа в сознании современников и современниц, что в свою очередь накладывало отпечаток на поведение солдатских жен и их настроение. Россияне и россиянки по-разному относились к незаконным рождениям в семьях солдаток, пытаясь иногда объяснить особенности сексуальной жизни солдатских жен. Представляются интересными наблюдения Б. Энгель об отношении крестьян в районах с развитым отходничеством к «одинокой» жизни россиянок. Неверность жен крестьян-отходников односельчане часто объясняли расхожими представлениями о сексуальности женщин. Не одобряя женской распущенности, они часто относились к ней снисходительно, благодаря своим представлениям о непокорности женской природы и необходимости мужского надзора. Например, крестьяне терпимо относились к солдатским женам, которые, пока мужей не было, сходились с другими9. Информаторы Этнографического бюро князя В.Н. Тенишева фиксировали достаточно единодушные оценки брачного поведения солдаток, отмечая, что повсеместно жена изменяла солдату-мужу и имела незаконных детей10. В период многолетней разлуки нередко и сам муж-рекрут, и его жена искали партнеров на стороне, но если для мужчины это в худшем случае заканчивалось венерическим 8 В.П. Из записок рядового первого призыва // Вестник Европы. 1875. № 9. С. 291. 9 Барбара А. Энгель Бабья сторона // Менталитет и аграрное развитие России (19-20 вв.). Мат-лы междунар. конф. М., 1996. С. 86. 10 Тенишев В. Административное положение русского крестьянина. СПб., 1908. С. 104.

заболеванием и поркой в казарме, то женщине приходилось расплачиваться за свою случайную связь кризисом семейной жизни, а также осуждением ее окружением и обществом в целом. Отношение мужей-солдат, вернувшихся со службы и обнаруживших незаконных детей у своих жен, в большинстве случаев было резко негативным. Разъяренные мужья по обычному праву могли поступать с такими женами, как им заблагорассудится: истязать и избивать их, унижать и постоянно напоминать о «грехе». Социальное окружение солдатки, как правило, оставалось равнодушным к судьбе несчастной женщины, а расправы солдат с неверными женами нередко заканчивались убийством. Анализ судебных дел свидетельствует об изуверских способах наказания солдатами своих неверных жен: один из них, оказавшись дома на побывке, в качестве наказания подвесил жену за руки и за ноги к перекладине полатей и стал поджаривать ее на огне. Пытка закончилась смертью женщины. Другой солдат, недовольный поведением своей жены, бросил ее в колодец, где она утонула11. Заметим, даже если муж и прощал свою жену за ее «грех» и продолжал хорошо к ней относиться, то для общественного мнения он должен был все равно ее избивать и унижать12. Причем и вся дальнейшая жизнь «согрешившей солдатки» должна была напоминать ей о ее «непотребстве и бесстыдстве»: женщине запрещалось нарядно одеваться, посещать сельские посиделки, свадьбы и т.п. Женщине-солдатке приходилось впрочем нередко скрывать рождение не только незаконных, но и вполне законных детей. Прежде всего, жены солдат стремились скрыть рождение мальчиков, которым была уготована участь отцов – неизбежный призыв на военную службу. Примечательно, что, даже будучи беременной, в период призыва мужа в рекруты, женщина лишалась естественного права на своего ребенка, так как если он рождался мужского пола, то автоматически считался принадлежащим военному ведомству. К солдатскому сословию российское законодательство причисляло и всех незаконнорожденных детей, произведенных на свет рекрутскими женами, солдатками, солдатскими вдовами и их дочерьми и даже внучками13. Военное «закабаление» солдатских детей вполне отражало доминирующую тенденцию крепостнической России: все податные сословия должны были принадлежать либо государству, либо помещикам, либо армии. В данном случае «военное закрепощение» распространялось на всех членов солдатских семей, практически лишая их возможности как-то изменить свой статус или выбрать иную стратегию выживания и социального поведения. Если солдатская дочь, выходя замуж, уходила из родительского дома, то мальчик – кантонист обрекался на пожизненную «женитьбу» с военной службой, оставляя родителей без опеки и поддержки. Можно предположить, что матери-солдатки завидовали своим соседкам, вышедшим замуж за обычных крестьян и мещан, хотя и те были не застрахованы от ситуации, когда и они после рекрутского набора тоже стали бы солдатками. Несмотря на жестокие кары и преследования за укрывательство рождений кантонистов, россиянки, как правило, боролись за судьбу своих чад. Нередкими были случаи, когда солдатки, стремясь спасти своих детей от неизбежного в будущем призыва в армию, скрывали беременность, заявляли о рождении мертвого ребенка или выкидыше. При первой возможности женщины уходили в соседнее село или в город, оставляли своих малюток знакомым или родственникам, которые объявляли о «неизвестных 11 Соловьев Е.Т. Преступления и наказания по понятиям крестьян Поволжья // Сборник народных юридических обычаев. СПб., 1900. С. 293. 12 АРЭМ. Ф. 7. Оп. 1. Д. 1027. Л. 5. 13 Свод постановлений о солдатских детях и по другим предметам. СПб., 1848. С. 4.

подкидышах», а позже брали их на воспитание. Солдатки также отдавали детей в дома для подкидышей и иногда ухитрялись воссоединиться со своими детьми. Некоторые солдатки, оставляя своих детей в приютах, надеялись на изменения законов о военной службе, которые однажды разрешат им вернуть детей. Действительно, после ликвидации в 1856 г. института кантонистов, многие солдатки появились в приютах и просили вернуть им мальчиков, от которых они отказались ранее14. Казалось бы, рождение девочки в семье солдата, законное или незаконное, ничем ей самой не грозило. Но материнская обреченность «наследовалась» и дочерью. Сын, рожденный уже солдатской дочерью в браке или незаконно, снова объявлялся собственностью военного министерства и обязан был служить в армии. Солдатские дочери – девки солдатские – тоже начинали укрывать своих детей и пытались, как и их матери, противостоять закону и своей несчастной судьбе. Так российское государство и военное министерство обрекали на противодействие и попытки спасения от армии всех женщин в солдатских семьях, добиваясь от всех мужчин из этих семей неизбежной военной службы. Фактически семейная неустроенность наследовалась в солдатских семьях, а государство не считалось с тем, что ломались судьбы целых поколений представителей и представительниц военного сословия. Заметим, что за будущее солдатских детей боролись не только матери-солдатки, но и помещики. Это противостояние за право обладания ребенком из семьи солдата определялось, прежде всего, экономическими обстоятельствами, ибо помещики стремились сохранить у себя будущую рабочую силу, а правительство интересовалось стабильным пополнением запасов «пушечного мяса». Таким образом, и матери-солдатки, и солдатские дети занимали ненадежное социальное положение в обществе и нередко оказывались беззащитными перед произволом помещиков и чиновников. Попытаемся реконструировать данное противостояние солдаток и помещиков путем анализа судебных дел и прошений солдаток, стремившихся отстоять права своих детей. Судебные разбирательства солдаток о возвращении им незаконно отобранных детей нередко продолжались годами, но вполне могли заканчиваться благополучным для них исходом. Так, в 1811 г. вдова-солдатка Кирсановского округа Аграфена Матвеева написала прошение на имя императора с просьбой вернуть ей незаконно прижитого сына Василия, которого «содержала на собственном своем пропитании», так как местный помещик А.Л. Болотников решил перевести его в свои крепостные. Разбирательство длилось 8 лет и закончилось в итоге в пользу солдатки15. Документы провинциальных судов сохранили большое количество подобных разбирательств дел о незаконных детях солдаток и претензиях на них помещиков. Заметим при этом, что солдатки, как принадлежавшие к военному сословию, могли подавать прошения в любые инстанции без гербового сбора, на обычной бумаге, и на эти прошения обязательно давался ответ. Так, одно их архивных дел свидетельствует о том, что солдатка Спасского уезда Тамбовской губернии Мария Петрова подала в 1850 г. прошение окружному начальнику. В нем она сообщала, что ее муж-крестьянин поступил в 1812 г. рекрутом, в отпуске не был, писем не присылал, а через некоторое время умер. После смерти его она вступила во второй брак с государственным крестьянином Степаном Саблиным и прижила с ним трех сыновей, которые были внесены в списки военных кантонистов. Причем первый уже поступил на службу, а 14 David L. Ransel. Mother of Misery: Child Abandonment in Russia. P. 157. 15 ГАТО. Ф. 2. Оп. 33. Д. 78. Л. 1-8.

второй также должен быть отправлен служить. Солдатка-крестьянка просила оставить ей для помощи в старости и для пропитания хотя бы третьего сына и записать его по ревизии к ее новому семейству16. Заметим, что солдатка даже не просила вернуть ей всех сыновей, которые не являлись солдатскими детьми и не обязаны были служить вовсе, так как принадлежали к крестьянскому сословию. Неожиданно для солдатки ее второй брак был признан духовным судом законным, а все трое сыновей отнесены были к гражданскому ведомству и освобождены от службы. Такая счастливая развязка этого дела наступила только после пятилетнего разбирательства, но она свидетельствовала о возможности солдатки оспаривать юридически свои права и права своих детей. Таким образом, солдаткам приходилось проявлять упорство в защите прав своих законных и незаконных детей, добиваясь нередко успеха в своих исках. Вероятно, материнские чувства и стремление защитить свою семью оказывались у солдаток сильнее сословных предрассудков и социальных ограничений. Солдатские жены одними из первых в России оценили возможности апелляции к законодательству и возможности защиты своих прав как представительниц военного сословия, которые нарушали помещики или местные власти. Очевидно, что резкое ухудшение положения женщины-солдатки после призыва мужа в армию или на войну вызывало у нее потребность в защите прав своих детей и собственного правового положения перед властями и социальным окружением. Возможно, именно эта инициативность и активность в поиске справедливости превращали солдатку в одну из самых «продвинутых» среди современников «правозащитниц», ибо солдатские жены чаще представительниц других сословий подавали прошения властям, обращались с изложением своих претензий непосредственно к императору, участвовали в обширной бюрократической переписке и многочисленных судебных тяжбах. Понятно, что в большинстве случаев солдатки не писали прошения самостоятельно, обращаясь к помощи писаря или грамотного соседа, но все же они сами обретали непосредственный правовой и жизненный опыт, учились требовать соблюдения норм российского законодательства. Кроме того, достаточно частая успешность обращений солдаток к центральным и региональным властям и знание ими правил составления прошений формировало уважительное отношение к «опытности» солдатских жен у родственников и социального окружения. Создание большой регулярной армии в XVIII в., когда мужчина на долгие годы, если не навсегда, отрывался от родного дома, резко увеличило и количество незаконнорожденных детей, прежде всего в семьях солдаток. Многие женщины, стремясь скрыть позор от нечаянного зачатия незаконного ребенка, стремились избавиться от «свидетельства греха». Современники признавали, что наиболее часто практикуется «изгнание плода» вдовами и солдатками. Опытные соседки или старухи-ворожейки делились с ними советами, как сделать это наиболее надежно. Женщины пили спорынью, настой фосфорных спичек, поднимали тяжелые вещи. Один из сельских священников сообщал, что «…одна девица была беременна и извела плод тем, что била себя лапотной колодкой по животу. Народ не обращает на это особого внимания»17. До нас дошли описания самых изуверских средств, к которым прибегали женщины, чтобы избавиться от нежелательного ребенка: пили отвар пороха, селитры, мелко истолченные стекло и песок, керосин, глотали серу, сулему и даже ртуть. Прыгали с высокой лестницы, с изгороди, с сеновала. Нередко такие опыты избавления 16 ГАТО. Ф. 4. Оп. 1. Д. 1398. Л. 2. 17 АРЭМ. Ф. 7. Оп. 1. Д. 947. Л. 7.

от «греха» приводили к «смертельным исходам с кровотечениями и в мучениях»18. Если не помогали все эти способы, то женщины старались сделать нелегальный аборт и спасти свою репутацию. Некоторые солдатки шли даже на убийство младенцев, чтобы скрыть незаконное рождение. По подсчетам С. Максимова, в XIX в. убийство детей было вообще самым распространенным женским преступлением в России. Среди важнейших причин детоубийств назывались те, которые были вызваны военным фактором: зимние стоянки солдат на постое, а также наличие фактически брошенных женщин-солдаток19. Да и среди осужденных за детоубийство большинство женщин относились именно к военному сословию. Все это лишь указывает в очередной раз на остроту проблемы незаконнорожденных детей в солдатских семьях. Можно выделить несколько важных обстоятельств, влиявших на устойчивую тенденцию рождения солдатками незаконных детей. Во-первых, неопределенность условий и сроков призыва в армию, многолетняя разлука с мужем ломали привычный уклад жизни и повседневности солдаток, вынося ее на обочину традиционной семейной жизни. Во-вторых, сам «военный фактор», то есть постой войск, социальные ограничения (экономические, правовые и сословные) вынуждали солдатку менять свое сексуальное поведение, изменять «далекому и недоступному» мужу. В-третьих, окружение солдатки было «уверено» в ее потенциальной неверности, постоянно напоминая несчастной «соломенной вдове», что она неизбежно придет к подобию «падшей» женщины, и это ее рок и ее судьба. Наконец, заметим, что сложившаяся в России система призрения подкидышей и незаконнорожденных детей мало способствовала ограничению детоубийств, и не случайно, составлявшие около трех процентов в составе российского населения солдатки давали более половины осужденных за это преступление. Рассмотрим еще один аспект, связанный с нелицеприятной характеристикой в общественном мнении российской солдатки. Речь пойдет о проституировании солдатских жен. С солдаткой в общественном мнении россиян в XVIII – начале ХХ в. часто ассоциировались отрицательные характеристики, критическое отношение, обвинение в разврате и сексуальной невоздержанности. Часть солдаток действительно вынуждена была заниматься проституцией, как организованной, зарегистрированной, так и «нелегальной», тайной. Только из зарегистрированных официально проституток каждая пятая являлась солдаткой20. Отмечались случаи, когда этим же ремеслом промышляли и солдатские дочери. Подобные династии, по понятны причинам, не могли пользоваться авторитетом и уважением современников. Впрочем, на наш взгляд, само развитие проституции в России было напрямую связано, с процессами милитаризации, воздействием военного фaктора на повседневную жизнь российского общества в XVIII – начале ХХ в. Ведь именно военные были одними из самых «активных» клиентов как официальной, так и «тайной», нелегальной проституции. Рост венерических заболеваний среди военнослужащих служил мощным стимулом для легализации проституции, желания властей поставить под санитарно-медицинский, полицейский контроль представителей «древнейшей профессии». 18 Федоров В.А. Мать и дитя в русской деревне (конец XIX – начало ХХ в.) // Вестн. Моск. ун-та. Сер. 8. История. 1994. № 4. С. 18. 19 Максимов С. Сибирь и каторга. Ч. 2. Виноватые и обвиненные. СПб., 1871. С. 65. 20 Статистика российской империи. XIII. Проституция по обследованию 1 Августа 1889 г. Под редакцией А. Дубровского. СПб. 1890. С. 2.

Дореволюционные этнографы подтверждали, что нарушения супружеской верности бывали чаще со стороны жены, объясняя влиянием военной службы на народ: «…Не говоря о солдатках, - которые везде гуляют, сколько хотят. Они, к сожалению, у нас не работают, а добывают себе пищу больше лёгким образом. Не лучше их семейная жизнь в тесном смысле этого слова. Ужаснейший обычай в крестьянстве женить своих детей до поступления на службу, - обычай, происходящий от необходимости иметь лишнюю работницу, - является источником больших несчастий. Солдатки в громадном большинстве случаев, ведут жизнь страшно распутную…»21. Конечно, не оставались в долгу и мужья, возвращавшиеся со службы. Они наряду с крестьянами - отходниками являлись в деревне главными разносчиками венерических заболеваний. Серьезную угрозу для здоровья гражданского населения оказывали и расквартированные на постой воинские части. Как отмечали современники, жены, оставленные мужьями дома, нередко заражались сифилисом от квартирующих в деревне солдат. С другой стороны, сами солдаты во время походов и лагерных сборов при расквартировании по деревням или при отпуске на работы часто заражались. Многие из них, уходя в запас, заразившись на службе, легко заражали жену и односельчан. Во многих местностях, где раньше сифилиса не существовало, он развивался именно с того времени, как солдаты становились там на зимние квартиры. Подобное развитие интимных отношений военнослужащих с женщинами являлось составной частью казарменного быта, невольного безбрачия массы здоровых и молодых мужчин, которые всегда, несмотря на строгий надзор начальство, находили возможности для «несанкционированных» встреч с женщинами на стороне. Не случайно проституция всегда была верной спутницей регулярных армий во всех странах, а венерические заболевания оставались одной из серьезных проблем для военных врачей. Таким образом, рассуждая о женском непостоянстве и венерических заболеваниях, которые захлестывали порой целые населенные пункты, надо иметь ввиду воздействие солдатской массы на окружающее население и влияние «военного фактора» в целом на гражданское население императорской России. Одним из таким мощных воздействий была и постойная повинность. Самоуправство постояльцев, бесчинства были чрезвычайно распространенным явлением. По отзывам современников, «…русский солдат является бичем для своего хозяина: он распутствует с его женой, бесчестит его дочь… ест его цеплят, его скотину, отнимает у него деньги и бьет беспрестанно…»22. Да и статистика осужденных за изнасилование в XIX в. свидетельствует, что наибольший процент осужденных за это преступление давало именно военное сословие23. Несомненно, воздействие военных и милитаризма на гражданское население в России в XVIII – начале ХХ в. было весьма значительным. Во многих случаях, войны и военные не только влияли на развитие страны в целом, но и на судьбы и повседневную жизнь «обычного» человека. Судьба солдатки и ее поиск стратегий выживания, собственная линия поведения формировались под воздействием правовых и повседневных реалий, отражая стремление солдатских жен самостоятельно искать выход в критической ситуации, в которой она оказывалась после призыва мужа в армию или на войну. Именно армия и милитаризм обрекали многие тысячи россиянок на одиночество, 21 Записки земского начальника Александра Новикова. СПб., 1899. С. 188. 22 Цит. По.: Лапин В. Семеновская история. Л., 1991. С. 39. 23 Столетие военного министерства. 1802—1902. Военно—тюремные учреждения Т. XII. Ч. III. СПб., 1911. С. 223.

подталкивая их фактически к занятиям «продажной» любовью. Вероятно, что одним из побудительных мотивов для занятий проституцией у солдаток была неопределенность их фактического семейного статуса.

К вопросам изучения истории российской солдатки Новые возможности реконструкции социально-экономического облика, менталитета, особенностей повседневной жизни российской солдатки, появились и при использовании информационных технологий. Речь идет о создании электронных баз данных (далее – БД) и введении в научный оборот значительных массивов первичного архивного материала (прежде всего региональных архивов, которые сохранили не только обобщенные сводки, но подлинные рекрутские переписные листы, справки об освидетельствовании, материалы земских обследований и др.). К настоящему времени в ходе изучения влияния военного фактора на повседневную жизнь населения Тамбовской губ. нами сформированы семь БД в электронной форме с материалами о социально-экономическом, семейном статусе, настроениях солдатских жен в рассматриваемый период. Для изучения повседневных реалий рекруток и жен отставных солдат весьма полезны сведения из БД: «Отпускники» и «Рекруты». БД «Отпускники» создана на основе поуездных списков отпускных нижних чинов Тамбовской губернии ХIX в. Ее информационными полями являются данные о месте жительства, возрасте, сословии, семейном положении, воинском звании, роде войск, занятиях отпускника, перемещениях его в пределах губернии, дате увольнения и постановки на учет. Материалы БД «Отпускники» позволяют проанализировать то, как вчерашние рекруты находили свою «нишу», приспосабливались к гражданской жизни, выбирали занятия и решали семейные проблемы. Обработка материалов БД показывает демографический состав солдатских семей (возраст мужа и жены, количество и возраст детей, имущественное положение семей). Сравнение поуездных списков состава семей отпускников и их социально-экономического положения позволит проследить динамику изменений происходивших в солдатских семьях, после возвращения мужа со службы, выявить особенности демографического поведения, социальной стратификации, уклад жизни солдатских семей в XIX в. БД «Рекруты» представляет собой официальную форму, копирующую ту, что заполнялась в рекрутском присутствии и содержала обязательные для сведения о рекрутах: фамилия, имя, отчество рекрута, его возраст, рост, приметы (цвет волос, глаз, состояние зубов), сведения о месте жительства (городе, уезде, селе, деревне, слободе), социальном статусе (из мещан, помещичьих, удельных, государственных крестьян), семейном положении (холост, вдов, женат), данные о жене, детях (их пол и возраст), отметка о беременности жены. Приведем пример сведений об одном из рекрутов 96 набора (март 1831 г.): «Митрофан Романов Рожнов, из однодворцев, села Малые Пупки, Козловского уезда, 26 лет, роста – 2 аршина 35/8 вершка, лицом бел, волосом рус, глаза серые, нет четырех зубов. Жена – Домна Ефремова, сыновья: Терентий – 9, Филипп – 4 лет, дочь Агафья - 2 лет. Жена беременна24». Таким образом, исследователь получает возможность глубокого изучения военного сословия, некоторых аспектов его повседневной жизни. Изучение массовых источников провинциальных рекрутских присутствий позволяет выйти при их обсчете на неожиданные результаты. Так, 24 ГАТО. Ф. 4. Оп. 1. Д. 3567. Л. 45.

традиционно считалось, что в XIX в. в рекруты предпочитали брать холостых мужчин. Однако, материалы БД «Рекрут» свидетельствуют, что в первой половине XIX в. в Тамбовской губ. женатые рекруты составляли две трети (63,3 процента), холостые только – 35, 5 процентов, и были даже вдовые рекруты – 1,2 процента. Интересно и другое наблюдение, связанное с анализом БД «Рекрут»: десятки семейных мужчин нанимались охотниками добровольно, то есть шли выполнять рекрутскую повинность за очередного рекрута, родители которого выплачивали охотнику за это значительную по тем временам сумму – до 400 рублей. Вероятно, для этих наемных рекрутов подобное вознаграждение являлось достаточным для содержания своей семьи, а сами «охотники» составляли наемную часть русской армии. Очевидно, что наполнение БД и их обработка позволят выяснить системную информацию по семейно-повседневной жизни солдаток и их семей. Среди реформ Александра II одной из самых важных по своему воздействию на социальные отношения, правовой статус, повседневные реалии российского общества была военная реформа 1874 г.25. Однако, закон о всеобщей воинской повинности не предоставлял льгот женатым призывникам. И количество семейных солдат, по сравнению с рекрутскими временами, даже увеличилось. Если в 1860-е гг. женатые, имевшие детей солдаты, составляли более 38 процентов, то после 1874 г. две трети поступавших в войска новобранцев имели семьи. Заметим, что нередко жена и дети призванного новобранца оставались совершенно без средств к существованию и обрекались на нищету и унижения. Не случайно, как и во время рекрутчины, горько плакали женщины, понимая, сколько страданий и горя им придется хлебнуть после призыва мужа на службу в армию. Жены призывников назывались теперь женами нижних чинов, призванных на службу. Однако чаще всего и в законодательстве, и в повседневной речевой практике военного и гражданского начальства и социального окружения их по прежнему именовали солдатками. Понятно, что этот термин теперь не отражал сословных и социальных изменений в жизни россиянок, как это было при рекрутских наборах, но вполне указывал на преемственность в повседневных реалиях солдатских жен. Женщины, как и их мужья, призванные на службу, оставались в том же сословном состоянии и были приписаны к своему прежнему обществу. Военная реформа 1874 г. внесла в статус и повседневность солдатских жен и негативные моменты. И срок службы супруга сокращался, и разлука становилась меньше, но солдатки не имели уже права, в отличие от рекруток, следовать за своими мужьями в армию и жить с ними при воинской части. Военное начальство считало, что шестилетний срок службы не способен разрушить семью, и половое воздержание супругов не скажется пагубно на их брачных отношениях. Но случайные связи, поиск партнеров на стороне, рост венерических заболеваний продолжали оставаться неотъемлемой составляющей воздействия армии на гражданское население и в пореформенный период. Примечательно, что жена солдата и ее дети не получали поддержки ни от общины, ни от помещика, рассчитывая в лучшем случае лишь на помощь большой семьи или других родственников. Понятно, что и такая поддержка была случайной, носила 25 Dietrich Beyrau, Militaеr und Gesellschaft im Vorrevolutionaren Russland. Cologne, 1984; Benecke W. Militaer und Geselschaft im Russischen Reich. Die Geschichte der Allgemeinen Wehrplicht 1874-1914. Habilitationsschrift. Goettingen, 2003 и др.

эпизодический характер или вовсе отсутствовала. Как оказалось, воздействие военной реформы на жизнь россиянок, ставших, как и в рекрутские времена, солдатками, было таким же негативным. Военные чиновники и правительство не задумывались о судьбах и жизненных интересах женщин, которые должны были после призыва мужа в армию сами заботиться о содержании себя и своих детей, не пытались прогнозировать последствия шестилетней разлуки для семейно-брачных отношений, не учитывали того негативного воздействия, которое оказывало изъятие для военных надобностей кормильца семьи. Конечно, реформы 60-70-х гг. XIX в., в том числе и военная реформа 1874 г., которые проводил Александр II и его окружение, были «великими», но они также несли большие страдания и горе «обычному» человеку, так как личностные аспекты, индивидуальность и уникальность «отдельной» личности были малоинтересны реформаторам. При проведении реформ и радикальных перемен в обществе самодержавие и его институты менее всего учитывали «женский фактор» и последствия реформаторской деятельности для «простых» россиянок. Женщинам-солдаткам приходилось самостоятельно решать возникающие проблемы, улаживать правовые и социальные противоречия, выживать в условиях традиционно негативного и подозрительного отношения к статусу солдатской жены. Надо заметить, что лишь к началу ХХ в. жена, состоящего на действительной службе нижнего чина, могла получать отдельный вид на жительство без согласия своего супруга26. Данное разъяснение Сената позволяло многим россиянкам самостоятельно принимать решение о своем месте жительства, поиске работы и значительно повышало мобильность солдатских жен. Специальный анализ системы призрения семей призванных из запаса нижних чинов в периоды русско-турецкой 1877-1878 гг., русско-японской 1904-1905 гг. и Первой мировой 1914-1918 гг. войн позволил определить наиболее существенные изменения в повседневной жизни русских женщин, а также взаимоотношения власти и общества в кризисные периоды отечественной истории. Так, лишь первая, относительно массовая мобилизация запасных и отпускных солдат в период русско-турецкой войны 1877-1878 гг., заставила правительство юридически оформить ответственность органов местного самоуправления за призрение солдатских семей, часто лишавшихся единственного кормильца и нуждавшихся в срочной помощи. 25 июня 1877 г. были утверждены «Временные правила о призрении семейств запасных, призванных на военную службу». Сопоставляя результаты социальной поддержки семей призванных на войну солдат, можно определенно констатировать, что выплаты пособий от местных самоуправлений были неполными, назначались лишь при признании нуждаемости в получении пособия, что в условиях провинциальной России создавало почву для злоупотреблений и коррупции. Кроме того, пособия выплачивались нерегулярно и не могли существенным образом компенсировать ущерб, нанесенный уходом главы семьи на войну. Таким образом, социальная защита семей призванных на войну солдат оказалась несовершенной, и экономическое положение большинства таких семей резко ухудшалось, что отражалось на структуре потребления, способствовало социальной напряженности и дефициту семейного бюджета. Чаще всего солдатке отказывалось в пособии на тех основаниях, что она жила среди родственников, которые могли ее содержать; либо жила отдельно, но имела средства к 26 Систематический сборник законов о мещанских управлениях с позднейшими разъяснениями Правительствующего Сената, Министерств и других учреждений. Состав. Я.М. Вилейшис. Херсон, 1914. С.364.

содержанию своей семьи, либо находилась в услужении, имела другую работу, на которую и могла бы рассчитывать; либо имела свой дом или взрослых сыновей. Очевидно желание властей свести к минимуму число тех, кому надо было обязательно помогать. Положение солдатской жены в пореформенной России, таким образом, мало отличалось от повседневных реалий и практики призрения рекрутки. Стратегии выживания и борьба за поиск средств для существования своих семей оставались главной заботой россиянок, у которых государство «изъяло» мужей для военных надобностей. Русско-турецкая война 1877-1878 гг. не была тотальной, а ее влияние на повседневные реалии русских женщин, как правило, касались лишь тех солдатских жен, чьи мужья были в армии и на войне. Русско-японская война 1904-1905 гг. оказала глубокое воздействие на традиционный уклад жизни общества, повседневно-бытовую культуру, общественные настроения населения России, выплеснув наружу проявления структурного кризиса империи, конфликта личности и власти в модернизирующейся России. Война привела к дестабилизации отдельных сторон повседневной жизни русских женщин, подтвердив несовершенство механизмов социальной поддержки семей нижних чинов, призванных на театр военных действий. Закрепление за земствами обязанности по выплате пособий семьям солдаток не могло быть реализовано в полном объеме. Данные выплаты назначались не всем нуждающимся в пособии солдатским семьям, а лишь тем, кто мог подтвердить «нуждаемость». Устранение государства от помощи солдатским семьям негативно воздействовало на настроение солдат на фронте и их близких в тылу, явилось одной из важнейших предпосылок роста оппозиционных, в том числе и антивоенных, настроений среди населения России. Военная повседневность вызвала резкое ухудшение жизненного уровня солдатских семей, которые часто оказывались без основного источника доходов, так и не смогли восполнить нарушенный баланс. В таких семьях ухудшилась структура потребления, стали возникать проблемы по уплате налогов и сборов. Военная пора повлияла на эмоциональный мир русских женщин, способствовала формированию особых навыков «общения» с властями, убедила россиянок в необходимости самим решать свои житейские проблемы. Самосознание русских женщин в период русско-японской войны 1904-1905 гг. развивалось, сочетая в себе как традиционные для военных лет настроения (рост молитвенных настроений, упадок духа, переживания за судьбу своих близких, оказавшихся на фронте), так и рост самостоятельности и самореализации (поиск самостоятельного заработка, планирование семейного бюджета, активное участие в переписке и подаче прошений для получения пособия). Примечательно, что военная повседневность выявила и важнейшие проблемы эмансипации россиянок начала ХХ в. Представления о том, что только мужчина может и должен быть главой семьи и ее опорой, главным добытчиком и кормильцем показали, что в условиях войны и тыловых реалий эти подходы устарели и не соответствовали ситуации в стране. Русско-японская война 1904-1905 гг. существенно повлияла на жизнь большинства солдаток и их семей, заставив многих россиянок эмансипироваться от традиционной несамостоятельности. Именно эти годы стали периодом скорейшего развития женского социального самосознания, в том числе заинтересованности в получении образования и женском бунтарстве. Первая тенденция отразилась в стремлении родителей давать возможность своим дочерям получать образование, которое позволяло бы им находить работу и средства к жизни, а вторая свидетельствовала об активизации женских общественных настроений и неудовлетворенности правительственной политикой изменений в социально-

экономической и политической сфере. Радикализация мировоззрения русских женщин воплощалась в погромных акциях, которые выявляли степень накала общественных страстей в России в период войн и революций начала ХХ в. Однако тотальные изменения в женскую повседневность внесла Первая мировая война 1914-1918 гг. Важнейшей чертой женской повседневности в военные годы было обретение солдатками экономической, а в ряде случаев и общественной самостоятельности и самодеятельности. Имеется в виду то, что многие солдатские жены, видя безвыходность положения и не надеясь на земскую или общественную помощь, брали хозяйство в свои руки. Кроме того, война способствовала активному включению женщин в промышленное производство, освоению новых профессий в сфере обслуживания и управления. Война привела к «феминизации» и активному вовлечению женщин в прежде запретные для них отрасли и профессии. Таким образом, война сыграла в женской судьбе и конструировании будущего русских женщин важную роль, являясь трагедией в семейной, личной жизни, она смогла уничтожить те препятствия и барьеры, которые в мирное время всегда стояли на пути женщин в ликвидации неравенства, достижении равноправия в профессионально-общественном статусе и повседневной жизни. Свидетельством изменения статуса женской самоорганизации в годы войны явилась деятельность женских общественных организаций (дамских комитетов, союзов солдаток и др.). В военные годы женщины не только активно опирались на общественное мнение, но нередко сами его формировали. Вовлечение женщин в общественные организации, укрепление роли личности, стремление к индивидуальной свободе отражало важнейший процесс европеизации русского общества. Фактически женское общественное движение являлось новой социальной конструкцией, которое в критические военные годы демонстрировало приверженность идеям гражданского общества и гуманизма. Важной стороной женской общественной самодеятельности, в том числе и солдатских жен, было появление нового женского типа в обществе, по сути, бросавшего вызов прежним патриархальным семейным и общественным устоям. Первая мировая война 1914-1918 гг. явочным порядком расширила официальную сферу деятельности женщин, в том числе и общественную составляющую, позволив объединять усилия по наиболее востребованным направлениям общественной инициативы. Завершающим этапом женской общественной самодеятельности стали союзы солдатских жен 1917 г., благодаря которым женщины-солдатки впервые в истории отечественной государственности смогли направлять своих представительниц в органы местного самоуправления – Советы и исполкомы. Если вначале революции большинство женских организаций заявляло о поддержке Временного правительства и его курса на продолжение войны, то к осени 1917 г. многие союзы солдаток, недовольные отсутствием улучшения положения своих семей, стали выдвигать более радикальные требования. Все чаще в постановлениях собраний солдаток звучали требования повышения пайка, а также выдачи его и семьям тех солдат, которые дезертировали с фронта или добровольно сдались в плен, «так как эти семьи не должны отвечать за поступки своих глав и не могут быть обрекаемы на голодную смерть»27. Нередко комитеты и союзы солдаток занимались устройством солдаток на работу, защищали их при возникновении конфликтов с предпринимателями, контролировали выдачу пайков солдатским семьям, проводили «кружечные» сборы, лотереи и т. д. За счет собранных средств они оказывали помощь солдаткам продуктами, топливом, 27 Тамбовский земский вестник. 1917. 20 сентября.

детской одеждой и обувью. Солдатки все чаще выступали с призывами к прекращению войны, об этом же они писали своим родным на фронт. Заметим, что революционная действительность и анархические проявления нередко ограничивали реализацию планов союзов солдаток, которые к началу 1918 г. теряли авторитет и почти повсеместно прекратили свое существование. В отношении общества и государства к солдатке перманентно складывалась ситуация противостояния административного и человеческого измерения, нужд и потребностей военного министерства и судеб отдельных конкретных людей и семей. В повседневной реальности солдатские семьи (жены и дети) пересекали часто социальные границы и изменяли свое формальное положение, используя всевозможные легальные и полулегальные возможности для выживания. Дело все было в том, что абсолютное большинство солдатских семей могли рассчитывать только на свои силы, редко на помощь общины и городского общества, но почти никогда на государственную поддержку. В семейном, социальном, экономическом плане солдатка и ее дети оказывались обреченными на страдания и низкий уровень потребления, выброшенными из привычного окружения и не нашедшими новой ниши в обществе имперского периода Российской истории. Вне сомнения, военные, армия, милитаризм оказывали значительное влияние на «рядовых» россиянок, оставляя наиболее глубокий след в судьбе женщины-солдатки.

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Christine Eifler Professor, University of Bremen, Germany

Das unterschätzte Potenzial: Soldatinnen in den russischen Streitkräften [The Underestimate Potential: Female Soldiers in the

Russian Military]

Abstract Since the military plays a vital role in Russian society, it is also of central importance in the process of social transformation in Russia and thus in the re-construction of gender that is going on in Russian society. So what does mean that the number of female soldiers has increased enormously since 1992? It will be argued that while on the one hand this could be read as a head-start of women in a male-dominated organization, on the other this is not to be mistaken as a one way advancement. The official military discourse and the perspectives of female soldiers are very different. While in the hegemonial military discourse women are a temporal phenomenon, female soldiers themselves take great efforts to gain a sustained and accepted position in the military. Further questions pursued in this paper are: Why do Russian women want to serve in the military? What are male-female relations in the army? And: What are the professional experiences of female soldiers in Russia?

Die Frage nach der Reformfähigkeit des russischen Militärs hat in den letzten Jahren in der internationalen wissenschaftlichen Debatte erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit erlangt. Sie gilt als eine wichtige Frage der Entwicklung der russischen Gesellschaft und deren Demokratisierung überhaupt. Vor allem mit dem Amtsantritt Wladimir Putins im Jahre 2000 verbanden sich Hoffnungen auf eine Reform der Streitkräfte und nach grundsätzlichen Veränderungen im Verhältnis von Militär und Gesellschaft. Über die Ergebnisse und die Wirksamkeit des begonnenen Prozesses der Veränderung der Streitkräfte existieren widersprüchliche Einschätzungen. Es gibt differierende Sichten auf die bisherigen gelösten und ungelösten Probleme1. Übereinstimmung existiert jedoch weitgehend in der Bewertung, dass die Wirkungen des eingeleiteten Reformprozess in vielen Fragen noch nicht absehbar sind. Neben Fragen der ökonomischen, materiellen und sozialen Situation des russischen Militärs beginnt sich in den letzten Jahren die Aufmerksamkeit um weitere Problemfelder zu erweitern. Zu den neueren Themen zählen der Stand der zivil-militärischen Beziehungen und die Art der sozialen Verhältnisse in den Streitkräften2. Damit stehen Themen zur Debatte, die einerseits auf Ereignissen und Vorkommnissen in den Streitkräften beruhen; andererseits einen neuen Grad von Öffentlichkeit durch zivile Akteursgruppen erlangt haben. Herausragendes Beispiel sind die Organisationen und Aktivitäten der Soldatenmütter im Zusammenhang mit den Gewaltpraktiken in den Streitkräften gegen junge 1 Vgl. D. R. Herspring, "Deprofessionalising the Russian Armed Forces", in The Challenges of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe. Building Professional armed Forces, A. Foster, T. Edmunds, A. Cottey Eds., Basingstoke, 2002. D. R. Herspring, "Putin and the Armed Forces", in Putin’s Russia. Past, Imperfect, Future Uncertain, D. R. Herspring Ed., Lanham, 2003, pp. 155-174. H. Adomeit, Putins Militärpolitik, Berlin: SWP April 2003. P. Rutland, "Military Reform Makes Time", in Russia in 2002: Waiting and Wondering, P. Rutland, Transitions Online, http://www.fol.ts. J. Schmidt-Skipiol, "Die Militärreform in Rußland, Teil II: Aktueller Stand und Zukunft", Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien: Berichte, Nr. 54, 1998. 2 Vgl. S. L. Webber Ed., Military and society in post-Soviet Russia, Manchester, 2005. J. E. Fedorov, B. Nygren Eds., Russian military reform and Russia's new security environment, Stockholm, 2003. M. P. Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries. The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces, University of Michigan, 2000.

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Wehrdienstleistende und dem Krieg in Tschetschenien3. Diese Auseinandersetzungen haben sowohl die politische als auch die wissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit für die soziale Situation in den Streitkräften geschärft. An dieser Stelle stehen die russischen Soldatinnen im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtungen. Dieses Thema ist bisher wenig beachtet und von anderen Themen der Krise des Militärs überlagert worden4. Dabei bietet die berufliche Situation der Soldatinnen einen interessanten und aufschlussreichen Einblick in den Transformationsprozess der Streitkräfte. Diskutiert wird dies im ersten Punkt, der sich mit dem Integrationsprozess der Frauen in die Streitkräfte beschäftigt. Dabei wird deutlich, dass der Frauenanteil erheblich angewachsen ist, sich aber hauptsächlich auf die unteren militärischen Ränge beschränkt. Im zweiten Punkt wird die Verankerung der Rechte und Pflichten der Soldatinnen auf juristischer Ebene dargestellt. Damit ist die Situation von Frauen in den Streitkräften auch zu einem öffentlichen und parlamentarischen Thema geworden. Die Integrationspolitik der militärischen Führung ist Gegenstand des dritten Punktes. Im abschließenden vierten Punkt werden die beruflichen Erfahrungen einer Soldatin vor dem Hintergrund der krisenhaften Prozesse in den Streitkräften diskutiert.

Zum Stand der Einbeziehung von Frauen in die Streitkräfte Die Öffnung der Streitkräfte für Frauen seit Beginn der 90er Jahre vollzog sich vor dem Hintergrund anhaltender krisenhafter Prozesse sowohl in der russischen Gesellschaft als auch in den Streitkräften selbst. Besonders unter dem Eindruck der gewaltigen Rekrutierungsprobleme unter Männern, die aufgrund des gesunkenen materiellen und sozialen Prestiges des Militärs entstanden sind, wurden die Streitkräfte für Frauen geöffnet. Trotz der krisenhafter Begleiterscheinungen sind Soldatinnen zu einem wichtigen Faktor in der militärischen Organisation geworden. Es wird zu sehen sein, dass der begonnene Integrationsprozess von Frauen Einfluss auf die innermilitärische soziale Dynamik hat. Die Öffnung der Streitkräfte für Frauen steht im engen Zusammenhang mit der 1992 einsetzenden Erhöhung des Anteils von Zeitsoldaten (kontraktniki). Mit der Vergabe von zweijährigen oder dreijährigen Kontrakten erhoffte sich die militärische Führung, aktuelle Rekrutierungsprobleme beheben zu können. Darüber hinaus sollte mit kurzzeitigen Verträgen, die für die durch die Militärreform erforderliche, aber nicht überschaubare Personalentwicklung flexibel gehalten werden. Mit dem Status eines Zeitsoldaten war darüber hinaus eine geringfügigere Bezahlung im Vergleich zu den Berufssoldaten verbunden. Diese Umstände haben Frauen in bedeutendem Umfang Zugang zu den Streitkräften verschafft. Von den 2005 ca. 144.000 Zeitsoldaten sind fast 40% Frauen5. 3 Vgl. A. B. Caiazza, Mothers and soldiers: gender, citizenship, and civil society in contemporary Russia, Routledge, 2002. E. M. Hinterhuber, Die Soldatenmütter Sankt Petersburg: zwischen Neotraditionalismus und neuer Widerständigkeit, Hamburg, 1999. K. L. Bannikov, Antropologiia ekstremal’nikh grupp. Dominantnye otnosheniia sredi voennosluzhashchikh srochnoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Armii, Moskva, 2000. J. Schmidt-Skipiol, "Die Militärreform in Rußland. Teil I: Problemlage und Vorgeschichte", Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien: Berichte, Nr. 53, 1998. 4 Vgl. A.I. Smirnov, "Women in the Russian Army", Sociological Research, Vol. 41, # 1, January-February 2002, S. 78-88. E. Sieca-Kozlowski, "Russie: l’armée en mutation - Les femmes. Une intégration a reculons", Le courrier des pays de l’Est: politique, économie et société, # 1022, 2002. S. Salmenniemi, "Civic Activity – Feminine Activity? Gender, Civil Society and Citizenship in Post-Soviet Russia”, Sociology, Vol. 39, # 4, S. 735-753. S. L. Rykov, Problemy professional’noi diskriminacii zhenshchin v vooruzhenych silach, in Demokraticheskii kontrol nad voennoi sferoi v Rossii i stranach SNG, A.I. Nikitin Hrsg., Moskva, 2005. 5 D.R. Herspring, "Putin auf dem Weg zur Militärreform", Russlandanalysen, Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, 09.09.2005, S. 2-6 (S. 2).

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Die Öffnung der Streitkräfte für Frauen ist von den schwierigen materiellen und sozioökonomischen Bedingungen geprägt, die die Eingliederung der Frauen in die militärische Gemeinschaft erschweren. Dennoch haben Frauen trotz der schwierigen Verhältnisse ihren Platz gefunden. Bereits seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre sprechen Militärs von den Frauen in den Streitkräften als einem bedeutsamen Faktor, der es verlange, ”in jeder Hinsicht Ernst genommen zu werden”6. Viele Militärs betonen, dass ohne die Tätigkeit der Frauen einige Streitkräfte nicht funktionsfähig wären. In einigen Bereichen besetzen Frauen die Hälfte der Positionen, so bei Radaroperationen, der Nachrichtenübertragung aber auch in der Luftabwehr. Im Jahre 2001 leisteten 120.000 Frauen ihren Dienst in den Streitkräften7. Von ihnen sind 3.500 Offiziere, 24 haben den Rang eines Oberst, 167 den eines Oberstleutnants, 542 sind Majore, über 1.200 haben den Rang eines Hauptmanns, 1.300 sind Oberleutnant, 500 Leutnant, 120 Unterleutnant und 2.500 sind Fähnriche. Seit 1991 wurden von 200 Verwendungen 170 für Frauen geöffnet. Somit umfassen die Tätigkeiten von Frauen vielfältige Bereiche. Von den 120.000 Frauen führen 40% Tätigkeiten mit Ingenieur- und technischem Profil (außer bei der Luftwaffe und der Flotte) aus. Im medizinischen Bereich sind 7% und im erzieherisch-pädagogischen Bereich 1,5 % der Frauen tätig. Die Mehrzahl der Frauen ist bei den Bodentruppen tätig, ca. 1.000 Frauen bei den Eliteluftlandetruppen. In kampforientierten Einheiten sind Frauen ebenfalls zu finden. Hauptmann Svetlana Protasova ist die einzige Frau Russlands, die einen Jagdflieger vom Typ Mig-29 fliegt. Die zweite Frau, die den Umgang mit Kampfflugzeugen beherrscht, Oberstleuntnant Galina Koshkina fliegt einen Kampfhubschrauber. In der Tulaer Landungstruppendivision führt Obersergeant Marina Kovaleva das Kommando über eine Mannschaft. Frauen sind hier als Fahrzeugführer, Richtschützen und MG-Schützen tätig. Mindestens 50% der Soldatinnen arbeiten in der Stabsebene der Kommandos oder dienen in Wehrämtern und Finanzorganen. Am 1.4.2001 wurde Ljubov` Kudelina als Zivilistin zur stellvertretenden Verteidigungsministerin ernannt und ist in dieser Funktion zuständig für die Finanzen der Streitkräfte. Seit 1992 sind Frauen bei der UNO in humanitären Missionen eingesetzt. Im Jahre 2001 wurden 1.700 Frauen aufgrund der Erfüllung ihrer Dienstaufgaben und weitere 200 Soldatinnen wegen der Teilnahme an Kampfhandlungen in Tschetschenien mit hohen staatlichen Auszeichnungen geehrt. Mit diesen Entwicklungen hat sich Russland in kürzester Zeit an eine mit den USA vergleichbare Stelle bezüglich des Anteils von Frauen in den Streitkräften geschoben. Sie machten bereits Mitte der 1990er Jahre 14,4% der Stärke der Streitkräfte insgesamt aus8. Damit haben Frauen in Russland vor dem Hintergrund umfassender gesellschaftlicher Wandlungsprozesse Einzug in eine Institution erhalten, die ihnen bisher weitgehend verschlossen war und die eine besondere symbolische Rolle für gesellschaftliche Machtverhältnisse spielt. In vielen NATO-Ländern sind Frauen dort seit mehreren Jahren vertreten. Länder, in denen – wie in Deutschland und Italien – noch gesetzliche Beschränkungen des Zugangs von Frauen zum Militär bestanden, haben diese aufgehoben. Die Spanne ihres jeweiligen Anteils reicht zur Zeit von weniger als 1% in Polen oder Österreich bis zu fast 15 % in Russland und in den USA. Als Freiwillige dienen Frauen sowohl in Wehrpflichtarmeen als auch in Freiwilligen- und Berufsarmeen. Sie erreichten die Öffnung verschiedener Dienstzweige, Verwendungsbereiche und Truppengattungen. Sie sind 6 M. Zakharchuk, "Schast’ia vam, dorogie podrugi, Armeiskii Sbornik", # 1, 1995, S. 16-17 (S. 16). 7 Z. Vashurina, "Zhenshchina v armii", Vlast, # 4, 26 April .2001, S.1-8 (S. 1). 8 D.R. Herspring, "Women in the Russian Military: A reluctant marriage", Miverva, Vol. 15, # 2, Spring 1997, S. 42-59, (p. 44).

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in Kampfunterstützungseinheiten und zum Teil auch in den männlich-maskulin konnotierten Kampfeinheiten tätig9. In militärischen Hierarchien sind Frauen noch deutlich unterrepräsentiert, haben zum Teil jedoch bereits relative hohe Ränge inne. In allen Ländern hat sich der Prozess der Einbeziehung von Frauen als äußerst widersprüchlich und gegen Widerstände vollzogen, im Ergebnis dennoch dazu geführt, dass Soldatinnen heute zum öffentlich anerkannten Teil des Militärs geworden sind. Für einen nicht unerheblichen Teil von nationalen Militärs erfolgte die Öffnung unter dem Etikett der militärischer Tätigkeit von Frauen als Berufsausübung10 und im Rahmen beruflicher Gleichstellung11. In diesem Zusammenhang erscheint der Beruf des Soldaten als ein „Job wie jeder andere“ und der Zugang von Frauen zum Militär als Aufhebung eines spezifischen Arbeitsverbotes. Die Frage, ob es sich beim Soldatenberuf um einen Beruf wie jeden anderen handele, wird in der militärsoziologischen Debatte seit Beginn der 80er Jahre diskutiert. Sie kann nicht als geklärt betrachtet werden. In einem von Charles C. Moskos und Frank Wood 1988 herausgegebenen Sammelband mit dem programmatischen Titel „The Military – More than Just a Job?“12 wird die Institution-Organisations-These behandelt. Diese beinhaltet die Überlegung, dass sich der Soldatenberuf von einer Tätigkeit sui generis zu einem „Job wie jeder andere“ entwickle. Demnach wandle sich das Militär von einer Organisation, die überwiegend institutional ist zu einer Organisation, die überwiegend occupational13 ist. Patricia M Shields stellt in diesem Band die These auf, dass die Streitkräfte mit der Aufgabe der Wehrpflicht in den USA im Jahr 1973 eine Job-Perspektive annahmen und als Arbeitgeber auftraten, der um Personal konkurrierte. Allerdings teilten ihrer Ansicht nach Soldatinnen diese Perspektive nur begrenzt. Sie seien vielmehr institutionell orientiert; ökonomische Faktoren einer Tätigkeit im Militär hätten sicher Bedeutung, Rituale, Disziplin und institutionelle Werte wären aber ebenso wichtig für sie14. Auch aus Erhebungen zum militärischen Berufsbild des Offiziers im europäischen Vergleich lässt sich eine breite Heterogenität in Hinblick auf die Berufsauffassungen erkennen. Es existieren nicht nur große Unterschiede in der Betonung der spezifischen militärischen Kompetenz und Verantwortung gegenüber der Gemeinschaft innerhalb einer Offiziersgruppe, sondern auch erhebliche 9 Zu den Staaten mit den größten Einsatzerfahrungen von Frauen zählen die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Großbritannien, Kanada und Frankreich. In ihren Streitkräften existieren Restriktionen im Zugang zu Kampfeinheiten. Norwegen, Spanien, Belgien, Österreich, Schweden und Ungarn haben die Öffnung vollständig vollzogen, Frauen können in allen Waffengattungen dienen. Nur Luxemburg schließt Frauen vollständig vom Militär aus. In der BRD wurde mit dem Jahre 2001 die Öffnung aller Verwendungen für Frauen erklärt. Auch in der Schweiz leisten Frauen als Freiwillige Dienst in den Streitkräften, ebenso in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas. In Algerien dienen Frauen als Offiziere und Unteroffiziere auf freiwilliger Basis; in Israel sind sie über die Wehrpflicht oder im freiwilligen Militärdienst tätig. Vgl. Military Balance 1999 – 2000, hg. vom International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford 1999. Nato, Nationale Botschaften, vgl. auch Constanze Stelzenmüller, Bürgerin in Uniform, in: ZEITPunkte, Wohin marschiert die Bundeswehr? Fakten Meinungen und Dokumente zur wichtigsten politischen Debatte des Jahres 2000, Heft 4/2000, 34-37, hier 35. 10 So das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofes vom 11. Januar 2000 zur Praxis der Einbeziehung von Frauen in die Bundeswehr, die als ein Verstoß gegen die aus dem Jahr 1976 stammenden gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Gleichstellungsrichtlinien der EU bewertet wurden. Demzufolge hat der Grundsatz der Gleichbehandlung im Berufsleben auch als Richtlinie für die Ausgestaltung der Beschäftigungsverhältnisse in den Streitkräften zu gelten. Frauen nur zum Sanitätsdienst zuzulassen, verstoße gegen den Grundsatz der Gleichbehandlung im Zugang zur Beschäftigung, zur Berufsbildung, zum beruflichen Aufstieg und in Bezug auf die Arbeitsbedingungen innerhalb der Streitkräfte. 11 Das betrifft zum Beispiel die USA, Kanada, Großbritannien, die BRD und Russland. 12 Charles C. Moskos u. Frank R. Wood Hg., The Military – More than Just a Job?, Washington 1988. 13 Mit occupational ist hier ein Job gemeint, der zeitlich begrenzt ausgeübt wird; im Gegensatz zur Profession, die mit Berufung verbunden wird. 14 Vgl. Patricia M. Shields, Sex Roles in the Military, in: Moskos/Wood, Military, wie Anm. 7, 99-113.

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nationale Divergenzen15. Zwar ist eine Verrechtlichung und Angleichung des Militärs an andere Berufe zu konstatieren, aber ebenso das Weiterbestehen von Merkmalen, die dafür sprechen, die militärische Tätigkeit doch als eine besondere einzustufen. Vor allem wird das mit dem Soldatenberuf verbundene Verhältnis zum Töten und Getötetwerden als wesentlicher Punkt angesehen, der den Unterschied zu anderen, zivilen Tätigkeiten ausmacht. Diese weiterhin andauernden militärsoziologischen Diskussionen können auch als eine spezifische Reflexion des von Morris Janowitz beschriebenen Prozesses der „Zivilisierung“ des Militärs gedeutet werden. Demnach erreichen relevante soziale Veränderungen nach und nach alle gesellschaftlichen Organisationen und Institutionen – so auch die Organisation Militär – und beeinflussen die Orientierungen ihrer Mitglieder16. Auf der individuellen Ebene spiegeln sich diese in heterogenen Motiven von Frauen und Männern, in Streitkräften tätig zu sein, wider, so in der Attraktivität eines über den Militärdienst möglichen Zugangs zu qualifizierten Ausbildungs- und Berufsmöglichkeiten. Auf der institutionellen Ebene zeigen sich die Veränderungen im Wandel des rechtlichen und sozialen Status des Militärs. Es wird in der Gesellschaft weniger als Kriegsmaschinerie wahrgenommen, sondern in steigendem Maße auch als öffentlicher Arbeitgeber, der die jeweiligen nationalen, sozialen und zunehmend auch arbeitsrechtlichen Gesetze und Bestimmungen beachten muss. Nach der Gesetzeslage ist in den meisten europäischen Staaten eine Unterscheidung nach Geschlechtern bezüglich der dienstrechtlichen Stellung und der Karrierechancen im Status Berufssoldat nicht zulässig. Als Teil der Exekutive und als soziale Institution ist das Militär immer mehr jenen Zugangsprinzipien unterworfen, die auch für andere staatliche Bereiche gelten: der Durchsetzung von Chancengleichheit, lediglich eingeschränkt durch überprüfbare und gesellschaftlich akzeptierte Kriterien wie Eignung und Leistungsfähigkeit und ohne Ansehen des Geschlechts. Damit verbunden sind die Förderung von Frauen sowie der Schutz vor sexueller Belästigung und Mobbing, was vom Arbeitgeber organisiert und durchgesetzt werden. Den nationalen Militärs ist es zum überwiegenden Teil auferlegt, die jeweiligen gesetzlichen Bestimmungen des Arbeitsschutzes für schwangere Frauen und des Mutterschutzes einzuhalten17.

Veränderungen des rechtlichen Status des russischen Militärs In Russland wird die Öffnung der Streitkräfte auf der exekutiven und legislativen Ebene von der Neugestaltung des rechtlichen Rahmens für den militärischen Dienst von Frauen begleitet. Für die Ausgestaltung der Geschlechterverhältnisse in allen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen einschließlich dem Militär gilt die in Artikel 19 der Verfassung der Russischen Förderation niedergelegte Verpflichtung des Staates, "Männer und Frauen haben die gleichen Rechte und Freiheiten und gleiche Möglichkeiten zu ihrer Verwirklichung"18. Um diese Rechtsnorm durchzusetzen, wurden 1993 durch den Präsidenten verschiedene Erlasse und Verordnungen veröffentlicht19. Auch auf der legislativen Ebene wurden Maßnahmen getroffen, um dem 15 Vgl. Guiseppe Caforio u. Marina Nuciari, Military Profession in the View of European Officers, in: Jürgen Kuhlmann Hg., The Present and Future of the Military Profession: View of European Officers (= Forum International 18), Strausberg 1996, 131-181. 16 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait, New York 1991, besonders 46 ff. 17 An diesem Punkt zeigt sich eine wichtige Veränderung, die einer in vielen nationalen Militärs üblichen Praxis, Frauen in der Schwangerschaft, als Alleinerziehende oder Mütter – oft „unehrenhaft“ – auszuschließen, ein Ende setzte. Als unverheiratete Frauen waren ihnen zum Teil sexuelle Beziehungen während ihres militärischen Dienstes überhaupt untersagt. 18 Konstituciia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (1993), Stat’ia 19. 19 Es handelt sich dabei um die Erlasse "Über die vordringlichsten Aufgaben der staatlichen Politik gegenüber Frauen" vom 4. März 1993 und "Über die Verstärkung der Rolle der Frauen in den föderalen Organen der Staatsmacht" vom 30. Juni 1996 sowie der Verordnung "Über die Bestätigung des nationalen Aktionsplanes zur

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Verfassungsprinzip Geltung zu verschaffen: sowohl durch die Ratifizierung international geltender Normen20 für die Durchsetzung gleicher Rechte von Frauen als auch durch die Schaffung von staatlichen und parlamentarischen Einrichtungen21 zu ihrer Durchsetzung. Mit der Fixierung des rechtlichen Rahmens wurde die Verantwortung des Staates für die sozialen Beziehungen im Militär zu einem öffentlichen Gegenstand. So stand erstmals in einer parlamentarischen Anhörung im April 1999 die soziale und rechtliche Stellung der Frauen in den Streitkräften auf der Agenda22. Sie kam zu dem Ergebnis, dass in der Realisierung der in der Verfassung gesicherten Rechte für Frauen noch gewaltige Defizite bestehen. Entsprechende Gesetzesvorschriften zur Sicherung der freien Arbeits- und Berufswahl und des Mutterschutzes sind nicht in vollem Maße garantiert. Dies zeigt sich u.a. in dem nicht ausreichenden sozialen Schutz der Frauen in den Streitkräften. Frauen werden auch nicht die gleichen Rechte wie Männern in der Frage des Rechts auf Erholung, auf medizinische Versorgung und der Wahrnehmung von Rentenansprüchen zugestanden. Für alleinstehende Mütter ist der im Vergleich zum zivilen Bereich höhere Verdienst ein Motiv für den Militärdienst. Andere dienstleistende Frauen kommen entweder aus Familien von Militärangehörigen oder leben in unmittelbarer Nachbarschaft einer Militärgarnison und nutzen somit die wenigen Möglichkeiten, um überhaupt erwerbstätig sein zu können. Darüber hinaus gibt es noch immer Privilegien für Militärangehörige – Freifahrten, Urlaubsschecks, Wartelisten für Wohnungen –, die für Frauen aufgrund der schlechten materiellen Lage auf dem zivilen Arbeitsmarkt attraktiv sind23. Das Resultat von 17.000 staatlichen Überprüfungen der rechtlichen Situation und des sozialen Schutzes von Frauen in den Streitkräften ist, dass erhebliche Divergenzen zwischen gesetzgebenden Verordnungen und der Praxis ihrer Einhaltung zu beobachten sind. "Rechtsverletzungen sind ein Massenphänomen. Praktisch überall wird nicht beachtet, dass armeedienstleistende Frauen in vollem Maße die Garantien, Vergünstigungen und Kompensationen, die durch die föderalen Gesetze und andere normative Rechtsakte zum Schutz der Familie, der Mutterschaft und der Kinder festgelegt sind, erhalten."24 Am weitesten verbreitet sind Rechtsverletzungen bezüglich der Arbeitszeiten von Frauen. Oft wird die vorgeschriebene Arbeitszeit von 36 Stunden pro Woche überschritten. "Diskriminierungspraktiken" zeigen sich auch beim Zugang zu Privilegien für Militärangehörige, so bei der Wohnraumvergabe, den Zuschüssen für Lebensmittel und der Zahlung des Kindergeldes. Frauen werden des weiteren durch ungerechtfertigte Ablehnung Verbesserung der Lage der Frauen und zur Verstärkung ihrer Rolle in der Gesellschaft bis zum Jahre 2000" vom 18. Juni 1996. 20 Ratifiziert wurde im Oktober 1997 die Konvention Nr. 156 der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) "Über die gleiche Behandlung und die gleichen Möglichkeiten für werktätige Männer und Frauen: Werktätige mit familiären Verpflichtungen". Ebenfalls erstellt wurde eine "Konzeption für die Gesetzgebungstätigkeit zur Gewährleistung gleicher Rechte und gleicher Möglichkeiten der Männer und Frauen". 21 So wurden mehrere Organe geschaffen: Kommission für Frauen, Familie und Demographie beim Präsidenten der Russischen Förderation, Kommission für Fragen zur Verbesserung der Lage der Frauen bei der Regierung der Russischen Förderation, Abteilung für Probleme der Familie, Frauen und Kinder im Ministerium für Arbeit und soziale Entwicklung sowie das Komitee für Frauen, Familie und Jugend in der Staatsduma der Russischen Förderation. Vgl. auch B. Godel, Auf dem Weg zur Zivilgesellschaft: Frauenbewegung und Wertewandel in Russland, Frankfurt, 2002, S. 58. 22 A.V. Aparina, "Zhenshchiny i vooruzhennye sily rossiiskoi federacii", Anhörung in der russischen Staatsduma, April 1999, hektographiertes Material, S. 1-68. 23 In Russland waren 2001 62, 7% aller registrierten Arbeitslosen Frauen. Vgl. S.L. Rykov, "Professional’naia diskriminaciia zhenshchin v vooruzhenych silach", http://www.ifpc.ru/general/rus/n4/html. Downloaded am 13.12.2001. 24 A.G. Samodelkin, Oberst der Justiz, Anhörung, s. Fußnote 15, S. 19.

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im Zugang zum Militärdienst und bei Vertragsabschlüssen benachteiligt. Frauen werden zum Teil ohne einen Vertrag beschäftigt. Des weiteren sind in Verträgen mit Frauen rechtswidrige Klauseln enthalten, die die Rechte der Frauen beschneiden, eine Tatsache, die "Gesetzlosigkeit und Willkür fördert"25. So werden Frauen zu Tätigkeiten herangezogen, für die sie keine ausreichenden Voraussetzungen körperlicher oder qualifikatorischer Art mitbringen. Zum Teil sind sie in Verwendungen tätig, die nur für Männer vorgesehen sind. Ein Umstand, der als "gefährlich für Leben und Gesundheit der Frauen"26 eingeschätzt wird. Zu dieser unsicheren sozialen Stellung kommen nach Einschätzung der Behörden "besonders ernsthafte Verletzungen durch Eingriffe in die persönliche Unversehrtheit und Würde" der Frauen27. Sexuelle Nötigung und Übergriffe stellen massive Probleme in den Streitkräften dar. Anonyme Befragungen in den Streitkräften haben eine große Anzahl von "Grobheiten, Unverschämtheiten und sexuellen Belästigungen seitens der Kommandeure und anderer Dienstgrade"28 ergeben, die deren Umfang deutlich machen. Die benachteiligte Position von Frauen in den Streitkräften widerspiegelt nach Meinung der Vorsitzenden des Komitees der Staatsduma für Frauen, Familie und Jugend, A.V. Alevtina, die Stellung der Frau in der russischen Gesellschaft29. Im Militär zeigt sich die in spezifischer Weise die benachteiligte Position, die Frauen im Zugang zu sozialen und kulturellen Ressourcen haben. Kritisiert wird die in den Streitkräften existierende geschlechtsspezifische Arbeitsteilung und die Tatsache, dass die prestigeträchtigen Posten und Tätigkeiten in den Streitkräften für Männer reserviert sind30. Für diese Situation werden nicht unerheblich die ungleichen Zugangschancen für Frauen zur militärischen Ausbildung verantwortlich gemacht. 1999 lernten 1162 Frauen an Armeelehranstalten, die Juristen, Dolmetscher, Ökonomen und für das Nachrichtenwesen ausbilden; davon waren 350 Frauen im Rang eines Unterleutnants und 300 Offiziersschülerinnen. An der höchsten militärischen Einrichtung, der Militärakademie, schlossen zwei Frauen ihr Studium ab, an staatlichen Hochschulen studierten 1341 Soldatinnen, und an weiteren mittleren Armeelehranstalten 3 Frauen. Bis 1998 hatten Frauen das Recht, Armeelehranstalten zu besuchen. Im Rahmen eines Versuchs wurden Frauen an Hochschulen der Raketenstreitkräfte zugelassen. 1997 erließ der Verteidigungsminister den Befehl, der die Aufnahme von Frauen an Armeelehranstalten beendete. Dieser Befehl wurde nicht veröffentlicht. Frauen werden demzufolge nur für bestimmte Tätigkeiten unter Vertrag gestellt oder können sich nur noch an staatlichen Hochschulen und den dort angebotenen Zusatzausbildungen ausbilden lassen. Militärische Ausbildung und Qualifikation an den höheren Militärakademien wird ihnen verwehrt. Das bedeutet die Verletzung ihrer Rechte. Dies geschieht, "da Männer Angst haben, dass die Frauen voran kommen werden"31. Nach Meinung A. V. Aparina werden damit Frauen, trotz ihres hohen quantitativen Anteils, von prestigeträchtigen Karrierewegen ferngehalten. Frauen machen in bestimmten Einheiten bis zu 80% der Berufssoldaten und der zivil Tätigen aus. Dies stellt ein gewaltiges Potenzial dar. Dem steht eine militärische Genderpolitik gegenüber, 25 Ebd., S. 20. 26 Ebd., S. 22. 27 Ebd., S. 21. 28 Ebd., S. 21. 29 In dieser öffentlichen Anhörung wurde die Situation von Frauen in den Streitkräften und der Stand der Einhaltung der Rechte der Soldatinnen erörtert. 30 Damit setzte sich im Militär jene Tendenz fest, so Aparina, die sich auch in der Gesellschaft zeige: In krisenhaften Branchen der Volkswirtschaft – wie Banken, Handel und Versicherungswesen – mit niedrigem sozialen und finanziellem Prestige sind Frauen überproportional vertreten. Vgl. Aparina, Anhörung, s. Fußnote 15, S. 18. 31 Aparina, Anhörung, s. Fußnote 15, S. 5.

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die zu einer "Deformierung der Strukturen des weiblichen Kontingentes in den Streitkräften führt"32. Dieses "Paradox"33 ist kennzeichnend für die Situation der Soldatinnen. Sie stellen allein schon quantitativ ein wichtiges Potential dar. Das Spektrum ihrer Tätigkeiten und Verwendungen hat sich kontinuierlich erweitert. So ist der Anteil der Frauen in taktischen Einheiten gestiegen, vor allem bei den Einheiten der Kampfunterstützung bei Raketenstreitkräften, der Luftabwehr und der Aufklärung. Frauen nehmen in zunehmenden Maße an Kampfunterstützungshandlungen teil34. Doch trotz des beruflichen Engagements stehen ihnen vielfältige Widerstände entgegen35.

Zur militärischen Integrationspolitik Die Einbeziehung von Frauen in die Streitkräfte ist eingebettet in den widersprüchlichen Prozess der Modernisierung und Reformierung der russischen Armee, der wesentlichen Ausdruck in der Schaffung einer Berufsarmee finden soll. Mit ihr verbindet sich die Vorstellung von einer technisch gut ausgestatteten Armee, sozial abgesichertem Personal und gesellschaftlich akzeptiertem militärischem Auftrag. Eine wichtige Ebene ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Durchsetzung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie im Militär – eine große Herausforderung angesichts autoritärer Unterstellungsverhältnisse und Disziplinierungsmuster. Die Demokratisierung der Streitkräfte ist ein mehrdimensionales Problem, dessen Bewältigung nicht unerheblichen Einfluss auf die Einbeziehung von Frauen hat. Sie beeinflusst alle Bereiche des militärischen Lebens, die Rekrutierung, die Ausbildung und das Training, die Aufstiegswege und Karrierechancen sowie die sozialen Absicherungen und die soziale Zusammensetzung des Offizierkorps36. Für die militärische Führung stellen weibliche Soldaten ein wichtiges Reservoir für die Bewältigung der krisenhaften Prozesse im Militär dar. Die Integrationspolitik der Streitkräfte ist darauf ausgerichtet, das allenthalben beschriebene "große Potenzial" der Frauen auszunutzen. Worin besteht dieses Potenzial? Erstens: Für den überwiegenden Teil der Soldatinnen ist die Tätigkeit in den Streitkräften ein langfristiges Vorhaben. Bis zum Erreichen der Altersgrenze wollen laut Befragungen 50% im Militär tätig sein, bis zum Rentenanspruch 40%37. Setzt man dies ins Verhältnis zum Alter der Berufssoldatinnen – 30-40 Jahre sind 60%, 40-50 Jahre 30%, 20-30 Jahre 10% – zeigt sich einerseits, dass den Streitkräften eine stabile Gruppe an Interessentinnen für eine langfristige militärische Tätigkeit zur Verfügung steht. Das große Interesse nach einer weiteren Verlängerung ihres Dienstes macht andererseits deutlich, dass Frauen zu einer ernsthaften 32 Ebd., S. 4. 33 E. Sieca-Kozlowski, s. Fußnote 5, S. 31. 34 Das Interesse der Soldatinnen, den männlichen Soldaten gleichgestellt im Zugang zu militärischen Tätigkeiten zu sein, zeigt sich ausdrücklich an einem weiteren Punkt. Versuche der Parlamentarierinnen, in der Staatsduma ein Gesetz einzubringen, das Frauen die Teilnahme am bewaffneten Konflikt in Tschetschenien verbietet, wurde von den Frauen in den Streitkräften abgelehnt. 35 Von den Frauen, die an Kampfhandlungen in Afghanistan 1999 beteiligt waren, erhielten 1390 dafür staatliche Auszeichnungen. Im ersten Tschetschenienkrieg betrug die Zahl der Ausgezeichneten 231. 1998 sind 641 Armeedienstleistende bei der "Erfüllung der Pflichten des Kriegsdienstes" umgekommen oder gestorben. Darunter sind 52 Frauen. (Vgl. Aparina, Anhörung, S. 4.) Eine Vertreterin des Komitees der weiblichen Invaliden und Teilnehmer am Afghanistankrieg berichtete, dass Frauen, die im Afghanistankrieg eingesetzt waren, die Vergünstigungen vollständig gestrichen wurden. (Vgl. Aparina, Anhörung, s. Fußnote 15.) 36 M. P. Ulrich, "Democracy and Russian Military Professionalism. Why Full NATO Partnership Is Still A Long Way Off", Airpower Journal, Special Edition, 1996, pp. 79-84. 37 A. I. Smirnov, Zhenshchiny na voennoi sluzhbe: novye vozmozhnosti i sotsial’nye prava. Moskva, 2000, p. 12 ff.

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Konkurrenz in der Besetzung der Stellen werden können. Dies betrifft vor allem Tätigkeiten mit niedrigen Dienstgraden. Zweitens: Frauen in den Streitkräften verfügen über höhere Bildungsabschlüsse als männliche Soldaten. Von den weiblichen Soldaten haben 26,7% einen Studienabschluss oder ein nicht abgeschlossenes Studium; 65,9%verfügen über einen mittleren spezialisierten Abschluss, davon 36,7% mit einer technischen Orientierung und 7,5% haben einen allgemeinen mittleren Abschluss. Ein allgemeiner oder spezialisierter allgemeiner Abschluss gilt als Zugangsberechtigung für den beruflichen Status als Soldat und als Sergeant. In der Gruppe der weiblichen Soldaten verfügen 53,4%, in der Gruppe der Sergeanten 58,8% über einen höheren Abschluss haben also weiterführende Einrichtungen besucht38. Das höhere Bildungsniveau widerspiegelt sich nicht adäquat in den militärischen Tätigkeiten der Frauen. Vielmehr sind sie oft unterhalb ihrer Ausbildungsabschlüsse eingesetzt39. Für die Integration von Frauen ist es ein großes Hemmnis, dass nur die Hälfte von ihnen entsprechend ihrer erworbenen Qualifikationen eingesetzt ist. Der andere Teil benötigt Umschulungen, die jedoch nicht in erforderlichem Umfang und Qualität durch die Streitkräfte zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Höhere militärische Einrichtungen sind ihnen weitestgehend verschlossen. Im Militär sind Frauen durch ihr Geschlecht professionell benachteiligt. Die berufliche Realität der meisten Soldatinnen steht im Gegensatz zu deren professionellen Bedürfnissen und der Bereitschaft, sich beruflich zu engagieren. Das Ergebnis einer Befragung von Berufssoldatinnen zeigt, dass 80% der befragten Frauen nach Verbesserung ihres beruflichen Könnens streben40. Offiziell sind Frauen nicht in Kampfeinheiten eingesetzt. Jedoch gaben 70% von ihnen ihre Bereitschaft an, falls erforderlich an "realen Gefechtsaufgaben teilzunehmen." Frauen sind demzufolge bereit, sich an Kampfhandlungen zur Abwehr eines "Aggressors" und an friedenschaffenden Operationen zu beteiligen. Einer von den Frauen gewünschten und geforderten Ausweitung der Tätigkeits- und Aufgabenbereiche in den Streitkräften stehen entschiedene Widerstände und Vorbehalte der männlichen Soldaten gegenüber. Nach einer Befragung männlicher Offiziere wird den weiblichen Berufssoldaten bescheinigt, dass sie für den dienstlichen Alltag über wichtige Eigenschaften und Fähigkeiten verfügen41. Dazu zählen Sorgfalt, Fleiß und Disziplin. Frauen begehen deutlich weniger Verstöße gegen die militärische Disziplin. Sie sind interessiert und leistungsorientiert. Die Anwesenheit von Frauen habe einen positiven Einfluss auf die Atmosphäre im Militärkollektiv. Ihnen werden ausgeglichene Beziehungen zu den Vorgesetzten bescheinigt. Frauen im Dienst seien selbstlos und setzten sich mit großem Engagement für dienstliche Belange ein. Große Vorbehalte existieren bei männlichen Offizieren gegen Frauen auf der Führungsebene42. Für die "Erziehung weiblicher Militärangehöriger" sollen nach wie vor Männer zuständig bleiben. Große Ablehnung erfährt der Einsatz von Frauen bei hervorgehobenen Kampfaufgaben und bei Kampfunterstützungsmaßnahmen. Als Besatzungsmitglieder von Flugzeugen und Hubschraubern können sie sich nur 1% vorstellen. 38 Ebd., . 28 ff. 39 In der Gruppe der weiblichen Fähnriche stellt sich der Zusammenhang von Bildungsniveau und militärischer Tätigkeit wie folgt dar: 33,6% von 65,1% der befragten weiblichen Fähnriche sind entsprechend ihrem Bildungsniveau in den Streitkräften tätig. In der Gruppe der einfachen weiblichen Soldaten und bei den weiblichen Sergeanten ist bei 56,2% das Bildungsniveau höher als es für die Tätigkeit erforderlich ist. Ebd. 40 Vgl. Rykov, s. Fußnote 14. 41 Ebd., S. 26. 42 Smirnov, s. Fußnote 28, S. 46 ff.

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Den Einsatz von Frauen bei Kampftätigkeiten zur Abwehr eines Aggressors und in friedensschaffenden Operationen befürworten nur 5% der befragten Offiziere. 10% lehnen Frauen in entsprechenden militärischen Verwendungen grundsätzlich ab. Sehr hoch ist der Anteil der befragten Offiziere (67%), die die Professionalität von weiblichen Berufssoldaten in den Streitkräften "als Abweichung von den traditionellen geschlechtlichen Rollenverständnis" verstehen. Demzufolge sei eine Soldatin, die beruflich erfolgreich ist, keine "richtige" Frau. Um das große Potential der Soldatinnen für eine Transformation der Streitkräfte zu nutzen, bedarf es vor allem der Anstrengungen der militärischen Führung. Ein großes Problem ist die völlig unzureichende Führungsqualität leitender Offiziere, die die Integration von Frauen nicht im erforderlichen Maße vorantreiben. Gefordert wird eine "Optimierung der psychologischen Aspekte der Führungstätigkeit gegenüber weiblichen Armeeangehörigen" und eine "Erhöhung der Genderkultur der leitenden Offiziere"43. Die Mehrheit der Offiziere ist gegenwärtig jedoch noch nicht bereit, Frauen als gleichberechtigte Tätige zu akzeptieren. Mit der Einbeziehung von Frauen sind neue Probleme für die militärische Führung entstanden. Eine verbreitete Integrationsstrategie der Streitkräfte besteht in der Zulassung von Frauen deren Ehemänner auch im Militär tätig sind. Mit der Absicherung eines weiteren Einkommens in der Familie wird das geringe Familienbudget aufgebessert44. Zu den neuen Umständen, auf die die Militärführung damit reagieren muss, zählt der familiäre Status des militärischen Personals. Die familiäre Situation hat im Verständnis der militärischen Führung bedeutenden Einfluss auf das berufliche Engagement und das professionelle Selbstverständnis. Das russische Militär versucht, auf die neue Tatsache zu reagieren, dass neben der bisherigen Form der Familie, in der lediglich der Mann Berufssoldat war, nun Familien existieren, in denen beide Partner oder nur die Frau in der Armee dienen45. Die Veränderungen im familiären Status werfen jedoch weitergehende Probleme auf. Bisherige Dienstzeiten und militärische Belastungen waren konzipiert und praktiziert für die familiären Umstände eines männlichen Berufssoldaten. Die Dauer des alltäglichen Dienstes war nicht vertraglich festgelegt und dauerte nicht selten 14 Stunden. Da Familientätigkeiten weitgehend den Frauen überlassen sind, muss die Durchführung des Dienstalltages dieser Tatsache Rechnung tragen. Die Dienstzeiten werden für Berufssoldatinnen vertraglich festgelegt. Damit entsteht das Dilemma, dass der besondere Schutz der Familienverpflichtungen der Frauen im Vordergrund steht. Diese Orientierung begrenzt jedoch eine gleichwertige Beschäftigung von Frauen, da sie den Status der weiblichen Berufssoldaten einschränkt. 43 Martinovich, "Zhenshchiny i Armiia", Orientir, # 11, 2000, S. 24-27 (p. 24). 44 So sind 57,4% der Berufssoldatinnen mit einem Armeeangehörigen verheiratet. Dabei ist der Anteil der Frauen am höchsten, der mit Offizieren verheiratet ist. Er beträgt 38,1%. Mit Fähnrichen sind 13,4% verheiratet. Am geringsten ist der Anteil von 5,9% in der Gruppe der Sergeanten oder Soldaten, die auf Vertragsbasis dienen. 3,6% der befragten Frauen haben arbeitlose Männer. Diese Quote liegt deutlich unter dem Durchschnitt der Gesamtbevölkerung. Ebd., S. 44. 45 Das Ausmaß der neuen Problemstellungen zeigt sich an folgenden sozialen Daten: Von den von Smirnov befragten Frauen sind 68,5% verheiratet. Die Quote der verheirateten weiblichen Offiziere ist ähnlich hoch, nämlich 65,25%. 11,1% der Frauen lebte zum Zeitpunkt der Befragung in Scheidung. 2,6% sind verwitwet. Lediglich 17,8% der befragten Frauen sind nicht verheiratet. Meist handelt es sich um Frauen im Alter von bis zu 25 Jahren. Die größte Gruppe der nicht verheirateten Frauen sind die mit einem niedrigen Offiziersrang (27,6%). Die Hälfte und damit der größte Teil der Berufssoldatinnen hat 1-2 Kinder. 2-3 Kinder haben 30%, 3-4 Kinder 5%, kinderlos sind 15%. Ebd., S. 38.

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Zum beruflichen Selbstverständnis der Soldatinnen Die in allen Ländern zu beobachtenden Widerstände männlicher Soldaten gegen die Einbeziehung von Frauen hat vielfältige Ursachen. Zum einen stellen nun auch Frauen im Militär eine berufliche Konkurrenz dar; zum anderen geraten tradierte symbolische Anordnungen in den Geschlechterhierarchien und die damit verbundenen gesellschaftlichen Subjektpositionen unter Druck. Mit der Einbeziehung von Frauen werden bisherige institutionelle Praktiken und kulturellen Rituale erschüttert. Dies zeigt sich an den Schwierigkeiten der militärischen Organisation, die zuvor ausgeschlossene Gruppe der Frauen gleichberechtigt zu integrieren. Wenn aktuell in nationalen Streitkräften sogenannte Integrationsprobleme in diesem Zusammenhang auftreten, so geht es dabei einerseits um materielle Ressourcen, also Karrieren und Positionen im Militär, und andererseits um die Zuweisung von sozialen Rängen und Machtpositionen in Gesellschaft und Politik. Mit dem weiblichen Soldaten stellt sich gesamtgesellschaftlich die Frage, in welchen Positionen Frauen Macht und Einfluss haben und an welchen Entscheidungsprozessen sie teilhaben sollen. Zur Zeit werden diese Auseinandersetzungen in Organisationen der UNO und bei NGOs geführt, die verlangen, dass Frauen verstärkt im peacekeeping eingesetzt werden und im Rahmen des gender mainstreaming zu gleichen Teilen an militärischen und militärpolitischen Entscheidungen partizipieren sollen46. Vor dem Hintergrund der geschilderten Situation in den russischen Streitkräften soll nun die Frage nach dem beruflichen Selbstverständnis der Soldatinnen am Beispiel der Erfahrungen von Ol’ga dargestellt werden. Sie gehört zu einer Gruppe von Soldatinnen, die 2003 befragt wurden47. Von Interesse waren dabei die Erfahrungen im beruflichen Umfeld. Bei der qualitativen Befragung wurde davon ausgegangen, dass die besondere Konstruktion des Soldatenberufes und seine nachhaltige Männlichkeitsbindung die Soldatinnen mit besonderen Bedingungen in der Entwicklung ihres beruflichen Selbstverständnisses konfrontiert. Frauen erfüllen im militärischen Bereich in allen Armeen in quantitativer Hinsicht und nach qualitativen Bestimmungsmerkmalen den Tatbestand des Tokenism48. Eine Ursache dafür ist die zahlenmäßige Unterrepräsentanz der Frauen in einer Institution. Die Folge ist, Frauen sind innerhalb des Militärs in einer randständigen Position, sie haben keinen gleichberechtigten Status und können nicht als integriert angesehen werden. Die herrschende Gruppe kontrolliert den Gesamtkontext und die Organisationskultur. Die Mitglieder der unterrepräsentierten Gruppe entwickeln unter diesen Bedingungen unterschiedliche Strategien der Anpassung, mit denen der individuelle Konflikt zwischen den Anforderungen der militärischen Organisation und der eigenen Geschlechterrolle ausgetragen werden muss. 46 Vgl. Judith Stiehm, Peacekeeping and Peace-Research: Men’s and Women’s Work, in: Women and Politics, 1 (1997), 28-36; dies., Männer, Frauen und Peacekeeping. Eine Forschungsnotiz, in Eifler/Seifert, Konstruktionen, wie Anm. 16, S. 283-286. 47 Die Gruppe der befragten Frauen umfasste 5 Offiziere, 12 Unteroffiziere und 3 Frauen haben einen Mannschaftsdienstgrad. Die Offiziere sind als stellvertretende Leiterinnen oder Leiterinnen von Abteilungen tätig. Diese Frauen haben einen Hochschulabschluss. Die Unteroffizierinnen und Frauen mit Mannschaftsgraden arbeiten in den Streitkräften als Buchhalterin, Telegrafistin, Technikerin, Filmvorführerin, Schriftführerin, Klubhausleiterin oder als Ausbilderin im Sanitätswesen. Sie haben fast alle Ausbildungen mit Fachhochschulabschluss oder als Facharbeiterinnen, arbeiten aber nun oft in völlig anderen Berufen. 48 Vgl. R. Moos-Kanther, "Some Effects of Proportions of Group Life: Response to Token Women", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, # 5, 1977, pp. 960-972. C. Cnossen, "Frauen in Kampftruppen: Ein Beispiel für "Tokenisierung"", in Soziale Konstruktionen – Militär und Geschlechterverhältnis, C. Eifler, R. Seifert Hrsg., Münster, 1999, pp. 232-247.

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Darüber hinaus sind Frauen in keiner anderen Organisation in ähnlicher Weise mit professionsspezifischen Geschlechterdiskursen konfrontiert. Die Frage nach dem Handling der Betroffenen und ihren Genderkonstrukten im Organisationskontext war daher von besonderem Interesse49. Ol’ga war zum Zeitpunkt des Interviews 36 Jahre alt. Sie ist seit 1993 in den Streitkräften und im militärischen Rang eines Majors in einer Oberstleutnantverwendung tätig. Sie hat einen Hochschulabschluss als Ingenieurin für Elektrotechnik und ist Leiterin einer Nachrichtenzentrale, in der ihr 440 Menschen unterstellt sind. Ol’ga ist verheiratet. Ihr Ehepartner geht einem zivilen Beruf nach. Sie haben eine 14 jährige Tochter. Die Familie lebt gemeinsam in einem Zimmer im Wohnheim50. Ol’ga gehört zu der kleinen Gruppe von Frauen mit höherem militärischem Rang. Ihre beruflichen Erfahrungen sind an dieser Stelle deshalb von Interesse, weil sie zeigen, welche Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten sich für Frauen bieten und unter welchen Bedingungen diese ihre Professionalität in den Streitkräften entwickeln können51. Ol’ga hat sowohl Förderung als auch Behinderungen in ihrem beruflichen Aufstieg erfahren. Für ihre militärische Karriere waren mehrere Faktoren förderlich. Sie beschreibt es als wichtig, dass sie vor allem in den ersten Jahren bei männlichen Vorgesetzten nicht auf Vorurteile gestoßen ist, sondern tatkräftig unterstützt wurde. Neben ihrer hohen beruflichen Qualifikation war eine militärische Zusatzausbildung, die sie an einer zivilen Hochschule absolvierte, von Nutzen. Schnell wurde sie Kommandeur eines Zuges und später einer Kompanie und konnte zu einem frühen Zeitpunkt ihrer Karriere wichtige berufliche Erfahrungen machen. Während dieser Zeit begann sie sich für ein Studium an der Militärakademie zu interessieren und setzte durch, dass sie dort gegen den Widerstand des Verteidigungsministeriums aufgenommen wurde52. Nach einem zweijährigen Studium an der Militärakademie wurde ihr entgegen der üblichen Praxis nicht die Verwendung eines Kommandeurs eines Bataillons angeboten, sondern lediglich die einer Kompanie. Um dennoch diesen Posten zu erhalten, bat sie, in die Kommandeursfakultät aufgenommen zu werden. "Man sagte mir, da kommt keine Frau hin, aber ich dürfte zur Ingenieursfakultät. Gut, ging ich eben da hin. Nachdem ich diese abgeschlossen hatte, bekam ich eine Kommandeursverwendung." Ol’ga verfolgt ihre beruflichen Interessen konsequent und setzt sich gegen Widerstände zur Wehr. Sie ist stark identifiziert mit ihrer Tätigkeit und äußert große Zufriedenheit über ihre berufliche Situation. Ihr berufliches Selbstverständnis ist davon geprägt, dass sie sich in der Lage sieht, mit den als äußerst kompliziert geschilderten Umständen in den Streitkräften 49 Der Leitfaden wurde im Rahmen eines DFG-Forschungsprojektes über Frauen in den Streitkräften der USA, der BRD und Russlands entwickelt. Die Interviews wurden von Nataša Fedorova mit Unterstützung von Jan Sieczkarek durchgeführt. Ihnen sei an dieser Stelle für ihre Unterstützung und ihren Einsatz ausdrücklich gedankt. Weitere Ergebnisse dieses Projektes vgl C. Eifler, "Bewaffnet und geschminkt: Zur sozialen und kulturellen Konstruktion der Soldatin in Russland und in den USA", L’Homme, Zeitschrift für Feministische Geschichtswissenschaft, # 2, 2001, S. 73-97. 50 Viele der Familien leben beengt in Wohnheimen. Nur 33% der Frauen haben eine eigene Wohnung, 16,7% wohnen in einer Dienstwohnung und 29,4% wohnen in Wohnheimen. Eine eigene Wohnung zu besitzen, bedeutet trotz der damit verbundenen Mehrkosten sozialen Fortschritt in den Lebensverhältnissen. Am besten versorgt sind Familien, in denen der Mann einen hohen Offiziersrang hat oder Fähnrich ist und bereits viele Dienstjahre absolviert hat. Die größten Wohnprobleme haben jene Ehepaare, bei denen beide niedrige militärische Ränge inne haben. Vgl. Smirnov, s. Fußnote 28, S. 56 ff. 51 Zu weiteren Ergebnissen der Befragung vgl. Eifler, „ Weil man nun mit ihnen rechnen muss..."Frauen in den Streitkräften Russlands, in Gender und Militär. Internationale Erfahrungen mit Frauen und Männern in Streitkräften, C. Eifler, R. Seifert Hrsg., Königstein 2003, pp. 101 – 137. “Soldatinnen in Russland”, in Frauen im Militär: empirische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Integration von Frauen in die Streitkräfte, J. R. Ahrens, M. Appelt, C. Bender Hrsg., Wiesbaden, 2005, pp. 213-229. 52 Bis dahin hatten Frauen nur in Kriegszeiten zu Militärakademien Zugang.

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umzugehen. Ol’ga beschreibt sich als anpassungsfähig und als durchsetzungsfähig. Spezifische Probleme einer militärischen Tätigkeit (Standortwechsel, zusätzliche Arbeitsbelastungen, ständige Verfügbarkeit und Einsatzbereitschaft) werden von ihr nicht als grundsätzliche Einschränkungen angesehen. Die Entwicklung von Leistungsbereitschaft und Leistungsfähigkeit empfindet sie als interessante Herausforderung. Sie schätzt Eigeninitiative, Eigenverantwortlichkeit und die Verschiedenartigkeit der Aufgaben. "Mir gefällt es, mit Menschen zu arbeiten. Es gefällt mir, Aufgaben zu erfüllen. In der Armee ist es sehr interessant, eine lebendige Arbeit. Alles ändert sich ständig, jede Stunde. Das ermüdet ein wenig, reizt einen natürlich etwas, weil du die Dinge eigentlich systematisch lösen willst, irgendwelche Entschlüsse fasst und dann ändert sich alles. Manchmal gefällt einem das, manchmal nicht. Aber im Prinzip ist es interessant." Aus der Anerkennung der beruflichen Regeln erwarb Ol’ga persönliche Sicherheit. Wichtig sind ihr vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit und die Unterordnung des Einzelnen unter ein gemeinsames Ziel. In den Streitkräften tätig zu sein, sieht sie als eine Möglichkeit, um in einem Sinnzusammenhang, der kollektiv und gesellschaftlich anerkannt ist, tätig zu sein. Trotz ihrer hohen beruflichen Qualifikation und Erfahrungen in der Leitung von Kollektiven. ist sie unsicher über die Möglichkeiten eines weiteren beruflichen Aufstiegs. Daraus resultiert für sie ein großer Leistungsdruck: "Chancen gibt es, aber es kommen so viele Umstände zusammen. Der Wunsch allein ist zu wenig. Deshalb muss man hier täglich beweisen, dass du es kannst, dass du nicht so schlecht bist wie andere. Das heißt, du stehst immer im Rampenlicht, wirst ständig verglichen, musst beharrlich arbeiten." Für die Konkretisierung ihrer Vorstellungen von einer weiteren militärischen Karriere fehlen Ol’ga weibliche Vorbilder. Sie kritisiert die Benachteiligungen von Frauen in der Ausbildung und im militärischen Alltag. Besonders die Undurchlässigkeit kampforientierter Karriereaufstiege für Frauen sieht sie als Hindernis im Zugang zu höheren militärischen Rängen. Welche Erfahrungen in der Leitung von Kollektiven hat Ol’ga? Für ihr Verständnis als Vorgesetzte ist es wichtig, dass sie Vorbild sein will. Ohne diese Vorbildfunktion könne sie eine Leitungsfunktion nicht glaubwürdig ausüben. Sie beschreibt die Schwierigkeit, als Frau Verantwortung in männlichen Kollektiven zu übernehmen. "Und damit nicht genug, dass man in ein neues Kollektiv kommt – das Kollektiv ist auch noch männlich! Ein Fähnrich, wenn er 45 Jahre alt ist, verstehen Sie, und du bist 24, und er schaut dich an – eine junge Frau. Deshalb, damit sie den Vorgesetzten in dir sehen, nicht einfach einen Vorgesetzten von der Straße, sondern wirklich einen mit Kenntnissen, der bereit ist zu helfen, sie zu retten, sie nicht vor anderen Vorgesetzten zu verraten, muss man selbst alles machen, mit den eigenen Händen, mit eigenem Beispiel vorausgehen, alles mit ihnen gemeinsam machen. Ins Fahrzeug klettern, Kabel schleppen, Telefone einrichten. Das heißt, an einem Platz sitzen und warten, bis dir alles berichtet wird, hat keinen Sinn. Man muss unbedingt losgehen, sich nach dem Bericht alles ansehen, Details einholen, Aufgaben stellen, sich einarbeiten. Das heißt, wenn ein Vorgesetzter alles weiß und versteht, dann kann man ihn auch nicht täuschen." Eine wichtige Debatte in den russischen Streitkräften dreht sich um die Frage, ob männliche und weibliche Soldaten gleich behandelt werden sollen53. Auch für Ol’ga ist das ein zentraler Punkt ihres professionellen Handelns. Im militärischen Alltag wird Ungleichbehandlung in verschiedenen Bereichen praktiziert, so bei zusätzlichen Dienstverpflichtungen, militärischen Ausbildungen und im täglichen Umgang. Normative für körperliche Belastungen und 53 Ausführlicher Eifler, Fußnote 51

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gesundheitliche Anforderungen für Frauen wurden so verändert, dass sie im Dienstalltag weniger als Männer belastet werden und so nur Aufgaben mit einem geringeren Schwierigkeitsgrad erhalten. Ol’ga kritisiert die unterschiedlichen Anforderungen als Ausdruck der nicht gleichwertigen Position von Frauen in den Streitkräften. Die physischen Anforderungen seien für Frauen deshalb wesentlich geringer, da sie für viele Hilfsfunktionen eingesetzt werden sollen und nicht für eine heraus gehobenen Positionen vorgesehen sind. Gleiche Leistungskontrollen und Leistungsanforderungen gegenüber Frauen und Männern sind ihrer Meinung nach jedoch Voraussetzung für gleiche professionelle Bedingungen und Anerkennung. Ol`ga ist sich ihres bisherigen äußerst erfolgreichen beruflichen Aufstiegs als singuläre Erscheinung bewusst. Ihre berufliche Identität ist in hohem Maße von dem Bewusstsein bestimmt, dass sie als Frau die männlichen Normen und Leistungsanforderungen als ihre eigenen angenommen hat. Sie identifiziert sich über deren Beherrschung. So soll sich der Dienst von Frauen "von der Idee her in Nichts unterscheiden. Alle sind gleich, unabhängig von Hautfarbe oder Geschlecht, alle erfüllen eine Aufgabe, alle untergeben sich dem konkreten Vorgesetzten, alle bekommen das gleiche Gehalt, deshalb, warum soll es Unterschiede geben? Frauen gegenüber sollte man nicht loyaler sein. Ich z.B. gewähre meinen Offizieren – auch Frauen sind bei mir Offiziere und Fähnriche – ich gewähre ihnen keine Zugeständnisse, weil sie Frauen sind. Nichts dergleichen." Als militärische Vorgesetzte nutzt Ol’ga bewusst den institutionellen Rahmen der militärischen Organisation. Die militärische Befehlsstruktur und die militärische Hierarchie wird von ihr als eine Art Schutz und Unterstützung bei der Durchsetzung dienstlicher Belange verstanden. Über die Einhaltung der militärischen Disziplin identifiziert sie sich mit den Zielen der militärischen Institution. In ihrer beruflichen Karriere hat sie "Konsequenz und Strenge" als geeignete persönliche Strategien entwickelt, die eine Integration in die "Männerwelt des Militärs" überhaupt erst möglich gemacht haben. Sie beharrt auf der Einhaltung der vorgeschriebenen Regeln. Ol’ga lässt keinen Zweifel daran, dass sie auf die Durchsetzung ihrer Forderungen gegenüber untergebenen Soldaten und die konsequente Durchsetzung von Dienstverpflichtungen achtet: "Zu Stellvertretern bin ich sehr schroff, weil sie meine Helfer sind, und ich quäle sie immer. Zu Soldaten bin ich auch schroff, aber nicht zu allen, das heißt, wenn ich sehe, dass der Soldat mit etwas nicht fertig wird, dann helfe ich ihm und lasse auch den Vorgesetzten ihm helfen. Für einen Soldaten ist das Erlernen auch schwer. Aber wenn er unverschämt, grob ist, dann arbeiten wir brutal mit ihm. Aber sonst herrschen normale, gleiche Dienstverhältnisse. Alles hängt vom Menschen ab, von seinen Eigenschaften und den zu erfüllenden Aufgaben, das heißt, hier ist alles darauf ausgerichtet, die gestellten Aufgaben zu erfüllen: wenn du sie erfüllst – wirst du von uns gelobt, wenn du sie nicht erfüllst – musst du Rechenschaft ablegen. Wenn du es nicht kannst – bringen wir es bei, wenn du nicht willst – zwingen wir dich." Der Umgang mit sozialen Diskriminierungen und Sexismus kann als wichtiges Kriterium für die soziale Akzeptanz der Frauen in der militärischen Organisation gelten. An den Diskursen darüber spiegelt sich in spezifischer Weise wider, inwieweit soziale Benachteiligungen von Frauen und sexuelle Belästigungen gesellschaftlich verurteilt und geahndet werden. Darüber hinaus wird an der Art der Rede deutlich, welche Positionen Soldatinnen in den Streitkräften erlangt haben. Eine zentrale Frage in diesem Zusammenhang ist, was als diskriminierend empfunden wird. Ol´ga spricht von "verborgener Diskriminierung und Konkurrenz", die für die Frauen zu einem enormen Leitungsdruck führt: "Um zeigen zu können, wozu du fähig bist, dass du

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taugst, dass du nicht schlechter bist als dein Konkurrent, dafür muss eine Frau sehr viel mehr investieren. Aber nicht durch Charme dem Vorgesetzten gegenüber, sondern durch dienstliche Belange und Arbeitsfähigkeit. Und dafür muss man beweisen, dass man es kann. Wie du mit Menschen arbeitest, mit Untergebenen, wie du die Aufgaben erfüllst." Bezug nehmend auf die Ablehnung ihres Wunsches, die Militärakademie zu besuchen, grenzt sie sich von der gängigen Praxis ab, Frauen auszuschließen. "Und es darf so etwas nicht geben, dass z.B. eine Frau kein Recht hat, in der Akademie zu studieren, also höhere Armeebildung zu erlangen. Auf welcher Grundlage? Warum darf ich es nicht? Warum kann eine Frau keine Kommandoverwendung innehaben? Deswegen, weil sie eine Frau ist? Sie soll nur eine Ingenieursverwendung einnehmen, aber warum?!" Ein weiteres Problem bei der Integration von Frauen sind die vielfältigen Formen sexueller Diskriminierung. Für den Umgang damit dürfte nicht unerheblich sein, dass die öffentliche Rede über Geschlecht von einer Vielzahl von Sexismen durchzogen ist. Mutterflüche, im Russischen "Mat" vom Wort Mutter (mat`) entlehnt, sind selbstverständlicher Teil der gewöhnlichen Alltagssprache in öffentlichen Ämtern, in den Medien und den persönlichen Beziehungen sowie im Militär. Für Männer gilt der Gebrauch von sexistischem Slang und von Mutterwitzen als Ausbruch von Emotionen. Dabei handelt es sich keinesfalls um ein Phänomen, das nur Männersache ist. So begründete die Sportmoderatorin Darja Chervonenko ihre öffentliche Verwendung von Flüchen und Grobheiten mit der Aussage "Was soll ich machen, wenn die Kerle kein normales Russisch verstehen?"54 Um diese Entwicklungen akzeptierter sprachlicher Entgleisungen einzudämmen, verbot das Russische Parlament im Jahre 2003 mit einem Gesetz das Fluchen und den Gebrauch von Fremdwörtern im öffentlichen Leben. Der Themenbereich "Fluchen" ist den Soldatinnen in den alltäglichen Praxen vertraut und verlangt individuelle Strategien. Ol´ga versucht, weibliche Abwertung zu ignorieren: "Man kann erzählen, was man will! Das, was ich nicht hören will, höre ich nicht! Ich selektiere. Das geht alles an mir vorbei. Das Wichtigste ist, den Kern zu verstehen, was der Vorgesetzte oder sonst wer will, ob er nun flucht oder nicht. Ich schenke dem keine Beachtung, das heißt, mir ist das egal. Das ist nicht beleidigend, das ist sozusagen einfach Slang. Darin liegt nichts Schlimmes, das ist nicht gegen jemanden persönlich gerichtet, z.B. auf mich. Das ist einfach die Art der Kommunikation. Darin liegt nichts Schlimmes. Es schockiert mich nicht! Überhaupt nicht!" Neben den geschilderten sprachlichen Diskriminierungen sind sexuelle Übergriffe und Belästigungen in den Streitkräften Erscheinungen, die die Einbeziehung von Frauen in die Streitkräfte begleiten. Sexuelle Belästigung wird in der Frauenforschung als Mittel der Hierarchiebildung und Herrschaftsausübung in Organisationen betrachtet55. Die Diskurse über sexuelle Übergriffe geben in spezifischer Weise Auskunft über die Stellung von Frauen in den Streitkräften in Bezug auf die herrschenden Machtverhältnisse. Wie bereits dargestellt existiert bei den Soldatinnen ein Bewusstsein über unakzeptable Situationen in den Verhältnissen zwischen Männern und Frauen im Arbeitsumfeld. Sexuelle Übergriffe und Belästigungen in der russischen Armee werden jedoch kaum ausgesprochen. Ol`ga sieht dies im Zusammenhang mit den hierarchischen Unterstellungsverhältnissen: "Wenn das jemandem auch passiert ist, dann sagt er es niemals offen. Mir ist es zum Beispiel nicht passiert, weil ich schon als Offizier kam. Und zu Offizieren hat man ein ganz anderes 54 Daria Chervonenko, Pravda, 17 July 2003 55 D. Rastetter, Sexualität und Herrschaft in Organisationen: eine geschlechtervergleichende Analyse, Opladen, 1994.

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Verhältnis." Sexuelle Belästigungen, werden als "unangemessener Umgang" oder als Bildungsproblem umschrieben. "Unverschämtes Verhalten habe, so Ol’ga, seine Ursache im Bildungsstand und in der Erziehung56. Ol’ga ist optimistisch, dass die Diskriminierungen gegenüber Frauen im Zuge der Schaffung einer Berufsarmee überwunden werden. Mit dieser verbindet sich die Vorstellung, dass sie gut ausgerüstet, sozial abgesichert und gesellschaftlich anerkannt ist: "Ein Armeedienstleistender muss unabhängig von der Verwendung oder vom Rang materiell versorgt sein. Er muss mit Wohnraum versorgt sein, damit er sich keinen Kopf um die Familie machen muss. Wenn das gewährleistet ist, kann er sich ganz seiner Aufgabe widmen. Und dann ist im Dienst alles in Ordnung und zu Hause ist auch alles in Ordnung. Dann werden die Leute zur Armee gehen und sie werden nicht mehr aus der Armee flüchten." Ol’ga ist gut informiert über die Integrationsprobleme von Frauen in westlichen Armeen. Sie weiß, dass Frauen dort in langjährigen Auseinandersetzungen ihren Platz in den Streitkräften gefunden haben. Inwieweit sich die Frauen in den russischen Streitkräften als gleichwertige und anerkannte Soldatinnen etablieren können, ist aus der Sicht Ol’gas von der weiteren Entwicklung des Landes und der Streitkräfte abhängig. Allerdings bezweifelt sie, dass Frauen, wie einige Militärs hoffen, in den Streitkräften nur Lückenbüßerinnen bleiben. Soldatinnen haben bisher einen wichtigen Beitrag bei der Überwindung der Krise der Streitkräfte geleistet, obwohl ihr Potenzial noch keineswegs ausreichend genutzt wurde. 56 In der Bewertung sexueller Belästigungen gibt es Übereinstimmungen mit dem offiziellen militärischen Diskurs. In ihm wird sexuelle Gewalt und Nötigung als "moralisch-ethische Frage" umschrieben und nicht als ernsthafte Integrationshindernisse. Eine typische Argumentation der militärischen Führung lautet in diesem Zusammenhang: "Viele weibliche Armeeangehörige werden, und das gar nicht so selten, mit Grobheiten, Mangel an Bildung und Unverschämtheiten einzelner Offiziere und Unteroffiziere konfrontiert. Leider kommt es auch zu Versuchen einiger Vorgesetzter, Soldatinnen zu ihrer Geliebten zu machen. Übrigens sind wir hier nicht weit vom Westen entfernt. So sind amerikanische weibliche Armeeangehörige nach wie vor sexueller Belästigung ausgesetzt." N. Kartashov, O. Beresneva, "Pust’ legkim okashetsia put", Armiia, # 16, 1994, S. 4-8 (p. 6).

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Aigi Resetnikova Researcher, Institute of Law, University of Tartu, Estonia

Women in Policing in a Transforming Organization : The Case of The Estonian Police

Abstract

In spite of women joining the police in ever-increasing numbers in Estonia, these numbers, in fact, do not really reflect the actual situation plaguing gender issues in Estonian society. The issue of women in policing in Estonian Police has never been the subject of close academic scrutiny. In order to counterbalance the monosexual tradition of thought, the author seeks to introduce the reader to information on policewomen in Estonia and look at their issues from a female perspective. In addition, the survey of Estonian policewomen and their status enlarges the picture of women in policing to include those in Estonia.

Despite women police officers’ range of experiences, most international research on their careers has focused on problems they have faced gaining acceptance in a historically masculine field. Thus, although there is a considerable body of research on women’s tribulations as tokens, on their marginalization by male peers and supervisors, and on the persistence of sexual harassment in police departments on policewomen in various police organizations in Europe and around the world, only few studies have focused on Estonian policewomen. The current article attempts to fill that void1.

Like many organizations in a state and society in transition, Estonian Police too are going through a rapid change. Police officers are expected to be more knowledgeable, to be capable of a wider range of skills and to keep abreast of new developments in their profession as well as major changes in wider community. This is particularly apt in the light of an emphasis on “customer focus” as exemplified by the shift from police force to police service.

WOMEN’S PERFORMANCE IN POLICING There is a controversy today over whether women’s policing style is similar or different from men’s style and whether this might be harmful or beneficial to policing. Many women in the police service itself are reluctant to discuss differences in styles because they believe this may push them back into specialist positions, which sometimes have considerable prestige but often limit an incumbent’s upward mobility. On the other hand, many feminist groups, particularly the U.S.-based National Center for Women & Policing, a project sponsored by the Feminist Majority, an activist feminist group in the U.S., believe that women’s difference is an advantage2. Thus, they believe that, in many of the areas of police activity, women are especially adaptable and can even perform better than men. According to this view, policewomen are especially suitable for working for special police prostitution groups, dealing with migrants in prostitution and trafficking in women within the larger cities. They are gaining more and more experience concerning working with police groups dealing with 1 See M. Eichler and J. Lapointe, On the Treatment of Sexes in Research, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1985; they noted that studies involving only one sex are legitimate and justifiable. In particular, studies involving women compensate for the many gaps in knowledge, errors and omissions which characterize the social science and humanities. 2 E. Smeal, J. Sreenivasan and J. Jackman Eds., Women Redesign Policing, The Feminist Majority Report, Vol. 8, #2, 1996. URL: http://www.feminist.org/

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domestic violence and juvenile affairs. Policewomen are generally more acceptable to women and children who have been the victims of the misdeeds of men. Girls and young children have more confidence in women. At the same time, the field of crime prevention is becoming more important to police agencies and here policewomen play their greatest role. They are usually assigned to the department’s juvenile bureau and their effectiveness lies in a couple of areas. Policewomen are very adept at evaluating parents and poor home situations which do not always meet the eye. They are also gifted in gaining the confidence of small children and in determining whether behaviour is normal or antisocial. The employment of policewomen offers the best method of finding out the real problem, ascertaining what the runaway girl experienced while away from home, and then determining the best course of action to pursue.

Research conducted internationally clearly demonstrates that women officers rely on style of policing that uses less physical force, are better at defusing and de-escalating potentially violent confrontations with citizens, and are less likely to become involved in problems with use of excessive force. Additionally, women officers often possess better communication skills than their male counterparts and are better able to facilitate the cooperation and trust required to implement a community policing model. Female police officers often respond more effectively to incidents of violence against women3 and will ultimately improve response to domestic violence. The service-oriented style of policing reveals women as less likely to misconduct themselves, or become cynical toward citizens4. They are considered at least equal to male officers in most areas of police work5. Also, research demonstrates that female officers are equally capable as their male counterparts when it comes to job performance6, and have demonstrated no consistent differences in the quality of their performance in street policing7. The argument premised on women’s lack of physical strength can be rejected by the earlier research. Bell8 found that no research has proven that physical strength is related to the ability to successfully manage dangerous situations. As an additional benefit, the very presence of women in the field will often bring about change in policies and procedures that benefit both male and female officers9.

STATUS OF WOMEN IN ESTONIA The role of women in law enforcement mirrors the social attitudes and prevailing customs towards women in the society at large. It is important to look at the history and developments of status of women in the Estonian society to understand the roles female police officers play today: women’s social and economic status in society historically and the challenges they still face in achieving equality of rights and opportunities to set their goals and reach their human potential, and their professional roles. 3 K. Lonsway, M. Moore, P. Harrington, E. Smeal and K. Spillar, Hiring & Retaining More Women: The Advantages to Law Enforcement Agencies, 2003. URL: http://www.womenandpolicing.org/pdf/NewAdvantagesReport.pdf 4 National Center for Women & Policing, Recruiting and Retaining Women: A Self-assessment Guide for Law Enforcement, 2001. URL: http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/185235.pdf 5 E. Poole and M. Pogrebin, Factors Affecting the Decision to Remain in Policing: A Study of Women Officers. Journal of Police Science and Administration, Vol. 16, #1, 1988, pp. 49-55. 6 S. E. Martin, Female Officers on the Move: An Update on Women in Policing, in Critical Issues in Policing, 3rd ed., R. G. Dunham and G. P. Alpert Eds., Waveland Press, Prospect Hights, IL, 1997, pp. 363-384; M. Morash, Understanding the Contribution of Women to Police Work, in The Police and the Community, 4th ed., L. A. Radalet Ed., Macmillan, New York, 1986. 7 A. Worden, The Attitudes of Women and Men in Policing: Testing Conventional and Contemporary Wisdom, Criminology, Vol. 31, #2, 1993, pp. 203-237 8 D. J. Bell, “Policewomen: Myths and Realities”, Journal of Police Science and Administration, Vol. 10, 1982, pp. 112-120 9 K. Lonsway, et al.,Op.cit.

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According to the legislation, women and men were equal in the Soviet Union but this equality was limited to political slogans and very little was done in practice to evaluate and improve gender equality. Absolute equality between women and men was officially declared but the meaning ascribed to the term was somewhat lopsided and did not reflect the real situation. Living a half century under a totalitarian regime has caused a serious gap in Estonians’ knowledge of the character of human rights and their protective mechanisms10. With the help of violent repression of individuals and personalities and through involuntary emancipation, women were declared to have all rights, including the right to work in any chosen field of life. However, real life sharpened the understanding that rebellion against male domination in the leading position of society was considered outrageous and rude. The equality practiced during this period hid the real discrimination against women and their low status in society and in the workplace11.

Public awareness of human rights issues started to gradually develop after Estonia

regained independence in 1991. Soon it became clear that the social and professional status of women in Western and Eastern European countries, resembled a great deal. According to Narusk12 the main similarities were:

• pyramid structure (there is a lack of women at public and professional

positions of upper management bodies; majority of women are working at lower posts);

• professions divided into “women’s and men’s jobs”; • compared with men women usually get paid less despite of exercising the

common tasks; • compared with men, women have heavier workload.

Today, many Estonian women still do not question the justice of “men’s work” and “women’s work” based on biological and psychological stereotypes, which has left a double burden of domestic and wage labour on women’s shoulders. Masculine and feminine traits are stereotypically construed as differentiating between women and men. See Epstein (1988); according to her view the theory of socialization into sex roles focuses on the process by which the sexes assume different personality characteristics, skills, and preferences. This perspective suggests that cultural views of the proper attitudes and behaviour for each sex are communicated to boys and girls through the message of their parents, the images provided by media, and the communications of teachers and friends; these messages are then internalised, with consequences for adult life. Socialization contributes to sex segregation by creating in males and females specific orientation, preferences, and competencies for occupations that have been defined as sex-appropriate, while leaving men and women disinclined toward or ignorant of opportunities to pursue other occupations13.These views stem from historical background of Estonian society where women used to have a significant influence in managing the household and raising kids, compared with men they performed heavier workload, however, had only a modest influence at the decision-making level.

The developments in gender equality in contemporary Estonia have been made possible due to the major economic and political changes – gaining independence in 1991 and 10 V. Kolga, EU National Reports: Estonia National Report on Law and Policy Addressing Men’s Practices, July 2001, URL: http://www.cromenet.org/ 11 U. Oksa, Women Policing and the Transition to Independence. Paper presented at the Third Australasian Women and Policing Conference: Women and Policing Globally, Canberra, October 2002. URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/policewomen3/oksa.pdf 12 A. Narusk, Eesti naised ja ratsionaalsed valikud, Ariadne Lõng, Vol. 1, #2, 2000, pp. 50-59 13 Ibid.

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starting the transition to a market economy. Both sexes have to be represented in all spheres of society and all levels of decision making so that men and women could influence equally the societal development14. Although contemporary Estonian women have been successful in industry as well as in science, gender stereotyping in any field has still persisted with the support of public policy and public opinion. One of the most obvious examples of inequality is the difference in salary rates. Although women and men must have equal opportunities for establishing economically independent life, women’s wages are still significantly lower than men’s wages, even though this wage gap has been slowly decreasing15. Men and women are not paid equally in any European country, whereby this gap is wider in Estonia where women’s salaries have been about one four times lower than men’s throughout the years following independence16.

In Estonia, the question of women’s human rights and sex discrimination started to

gain more attention after Beijing Women’s World Conference in 1995. Estonia has joined several legally binding international conventions on the equality between women and men, among them the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. In addition, Estonian Gender Equality Act was passed in 2004. In a democratic and open society the question of whether women should or should not be part of the police needs no discussion. According to the document compiled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs for progressing the Estonian Police “The Priorities in Development for the Police Structures until 2006” female and male police officers must have equal possibilities when it comes to payment and career. It is important that during the recruitment process skills, knowledge and characteristics of the candidate must be assessed regardless of her/his sex. How this may affect the Estonian female police officers remains to be seen.

THE ESTONIAN POLICEWOMEN Although there is a great deal of information available on the history of policewomen in the United States, and some on Britain and western European countries, there aren’t any other resources available than one study on the history of Estonian women in policing conducted by the historian Mai Krikk.

Krikk17 found that since 1929, when the first woman was accepted to the police school under special permit issued by the Minister of the Interior, and was later appointed to the criminal police, altogether there worked two female police officers at the criminal police until the II World War. These women had studied law at the University of Tartu, therefore had higher education in addition to the police school training, not common characteristic among the male staff of criminal police. In addition, two other female police officers were employed by the Political Police before the Soviet occupation in 1940.

After the entry of the first woman to the police school, in 1929, there appeared 20

other female police school applicants wishing to join the police. However, Estonian society was not yet ready to accept women to the police school.

14 K. Mänd Ed., Erinevad, aga võrdsed, ÜRO Rahvastikufond ja Sotsiaalministeerium, Tallinn, 2003. 15 See for more information Purju (2004). 16 Mänd, Op. Cit.; S. Maanso Ed., Eesti statistika aastaraamat 2005. Statistikaamet, Tallinn, 2005. 17 M. Krikk, Eesti politsei loomine ja areng 1918-1940, Olion, Tallinn, 2001.

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Women accomplished integrated into the police organization since the very foundation of the new Estonian Police in August, 1991. Although Estonian women have been involved in policing since 1929, their presence went unnoticed until the beginning of 2000 when they became majority among the applicants to the Police School at Paikuse in Pärnu county. Consequently, the focus of effective diversity management became important, and, for a time it became somewhat essential to prevent women to enter the police service and become organized. Regardless the level of representation of women in the police has grown radically from 1992 to present (see Table 1 below).

Due to continuous reforms the number of sworn police staff in the Estonian Police has

been falling. Despite of the personnel cuts, the share of female police officers has been increasing. In 2001 there were 1,305 police officers working for the Tallinn Police Prefecture, whereas 38 percent of them were women. Women occupied 22 percent of the patrol police positions and 33 percent of the constable positions18. In June 2003, the total number of police officers was 3,565, of which 1,028 were women. The overall percentage of women, approximately 29 percent of the total number of police officers at that time. According to February 2006 data, the total number of police officers is 3,373, of which 1,129 are women. The overall percentage of women, 33.5% of the total number of police officers, is the highest in Europe and in the world.

Currently, as of 2003, the highest ranking female police officer is Heete Simm who

holds the title of Police Director at the Police Board. Recently, Ester Kallakas, another female Police Director who held the position of Police Prefect for years, retired. There is one female Deputy Police Director working for the Police Board and a small number of Chief Superintendents. However, the majority of the Police Superintendents of the Police Board are women. From the civilians there are currently five female higher officials out of 12 higher civilians’ posts at the Police Board. Out of 209 Estonian Police higher-ranking police posts 26 are filled with women, which make approximately 12 percent of women out of the total number of higher-ranking police positions.

In the Criminal Police Department of the Tallinn Police Prefecture, which is the

largest Prefecture in Estonia and serves the capital city of Tallinn, two out of six higher-ranking police officers are women. Among other units such as Homicide, Auto Tracking, and Drugs Crime, they are in charge of the Co-ordination Unit and the Surveillance Unit. In the City Police Precinct of the Tallinn Police Prefecture there is one female out of three higher-ranking police posts. She is in charge of the Law Enforcement Unit. There are no other higher-ranking female police officials on higher-ranking positions at any other Precincts or Departments of the Tallinn Police Prefecture. Women form approximately 45 percent of the workforce of the Criminal Police Department as well as approximately 57 percent of the total number of police posts of the City Police Precinct. As a comparison there are approximately 55 percent of women working at Northern Police Precinct, whereas the percentage is the same in the Traffic Department.

Estonian policewomen enjoy all the benefits guaranteed by state legislation. There is

no information about differences in male and female police officers’ salaries as there is no official data regarding the subject, and salaries are commonly not discussed among officers. Until recently women have been dominated applications for study at the Police School. According to the Estonian Police 2003 data available from the World Wide Web in December, 2002 out of 155 applicants, the total number of females was 110. Despite the fact 18 Tallinna Politseiprefektuur, 2002.

81

that the number of applicants has increased throughout the recent years, the number of male applicants has been rather modest. However, during the recent admission 232 applications were received and only 50 percent were from females.

In spite of the large percentage of women in the Estonia Police, there is a lack of information about them. Somewhat surprisingly, no research about women in policing has been conducted. Veronika Viru, a higher-ranking female police activist of the Police Board, has proposed to include research concerning women in policing in the 2004 Police Board activity plan. So far the police are lacking valuable data about women in policing although females form considerably large percent of the Estonian police force with its 29 percent of female representatives (2003 data). In November, 2002 the formation of Estonian policewomen’s association was discussed by an interest group and is expected to be initiated within the year 2004. These are the first signs of interest in the women at a national level and of development of a consciousness of their positions within the police by the women themselves. How this may affect the women or the Estonia Police remains to be seen.

Table 1. Demographic breakdown of the numbers of police personnel

Year Police officers Female police officers

N N % 1991 5393 - - 1992 5545 687 12.4 1993 5821 815 14.0 1994 5192 913 17.6 1995 4911 972 19.8 1996 4738 1032 21.8 1997 4400 1013 23.0 1998 4089 916 22.4 1999 3584 908 25.3 2000 3633 943 26.0 2001 3550 978 27.5 2002 3504 1007 28.7 2003 3591 1074 29.9 2004 3522 1076 30.6 2005 3496 1095 31.3 2006 3373 1129 33.3

Source: The Police Board 2006 To obtain a higher position and rank police officers, no matter what their sex is, have to have served a certain number of years in the police service and have to meet the evaluated requirements for police officers. Today, men still assume the more respected positions of authority and power in the Estonian Police, positions quite consonant with societal views about men’s “natural” roles. Women within the police agencies find themselves most often in the lowest, supporting ranks and positions. Furthermore, male police officers tend to get promoted to senior management and top positions more frequently than female police officers. Constituting a little more than 33% of the nation’s police officers, women have found it especially difficult to rise through the ranks and achieve higher posts. In 2006, out of 302 higher-ranking police officers women shared only 15.6% of those positions. They are unique groundbreakers who have managed to breach the glass ceiling. However, majority of

82

the female higher-ranking police officers (82.2% in 2004) are employed as commissaries – the lowest rank among higher-ranking positions.

During the spring 2002, a poll called “Personnel Barometer”19 was carried out within the Estonian Police in cooperation with the Finnish Police where about 1,000 female police officers and employees expressed their opinion. The main factors causing dissatisfaction among women were: salaries – 49.6 percent; career progression – 38.9 percent; job valuation by the public – 34 percent, and guaranteed job – 27 percent. Evaluating organizational culture, the women emphasized the fact that there is a need to stick to the work plans – 68.8 percent. The possibility to talk often to the superior about the problems related to work was rendered important – 62.6 percent, also a regular monitoring of achieving the objectives was essential – 60 percent. As a result of the research it came out that the Estonian female police officers and employees are far more exposed to counseling than their male colleagues. The main reasons for getting advice are job and family related problems. A recent study revealed that career possibilities attract little more than half (52.9%) of female police officers working for the Estonian Police. According to a survey conducted in 2004, 76.5% of women consider their male colleagues to have better career opportunities.

So far, no arrangements or projects have been carried out in order to raise the number

of women in higher rank or in senior management positions. Since 1996, Estonian policewomen have participated in discussions and events with their European colleagues through the European Network of Policewomen, though Estonian Police became a member of the organization not until the beginning of 2000. The initial aim of the network is to optimize the position of women within the European police and law enforcement organizations. In 2001, the female representatives of the Estonian Police were among the founders of the Nordic-Baltic Network of Policewomen along with colleagues of other Nordic and Baltic countries that are actively participating in the work of this network. The main objectives of the network are sharing information and experience as well as empowerment of female police officers.

Although the interest towards women networking became an object of interest relatively recently, the first attempt to form Estonian women police network arised already in 1998. However, the lack of interest from policewomen as well as the lack of support by the top management level police officials has put a damper on this initiative for a few years. Management was quite skeptical and sometimes even standoffish about taking part in the activities of police women networking. Lack of information and misunderstanding of women’s movement as “the club of feminists“ could be the main reasons for their initial attitude. However, eventually changes in their mind triggered the discussions regarding the formation of Estonian female police officers’ association and it appeared into the agenda again in 2002. Therefore, unlike many police organizations, with the support of upper echelon of the Estonian Police, which consists mainly of male police officers, an Estonian Police Women Association (Eesti Politsei Naisühendus) was founded in November 2003.

The Association unites both female sworn and non sworn staff, and its founding members formed about 5% of the overall number of female police officers. However, their number has been consistently increasing. The association remained with moderate membership levels during its first year of operation, its members making up approximately 9% of the total number of female personnel. 19 U.Oksa, Op.cit., pp.3-4

83

Although one of the main and most important objectives of the association is to empower women police, to promote their self-consciousness and encourage them to pursuit managerial positions, it is too early to predict how the Estonian Police Women Association activities will promote the position and overall situation of female police officers in the future. There exist underlying issues affecting women’s full integration into policing, which cross professional boundaries and spill out into the society at large. Although variety of social issues concerning women have exacerbated, gender issues among them, up to today, gender difference in Estonia has not been under close scrutiny, nor are personal and public issues analyzed from gender aspect. The police too are lacking valuable data about women in policing although they form considerably large percent of the Estonian police force with its 33.5% of female representatives. The current overview of Estonian women in policing has supplied initial information of the modern policewomen and of the pioneering women police from the history in Estonian policing.

In Estonian Police there are, of course, still far fewer women than there are men, but their number continue to increase. The current presence of women, so far from changing the near monopoly of men, comprising about 88% of the Estonian police personnel in 1992, merely shows today that the police are themselves beginning to replicate the demographic structure of society with allowing equal opportunities to everyone.

84

Annex to “The Women in/and the Military”

85

Women in the Military and Power Structures in Russia, the Soviet-Union and Post-Soviet Societies : A Selected Bibliography

Electronic resources • http://www.minervacenter.com/ In English. An academic website specialised in

the study of women in the military or in a war context. A few articles on

women in post-Soviet militaries.

• http://wmw.iatp.by/ In Russian. Website of a project on Belarus women in

World War II, conducted by the Gender Studies Department of the European

Humanities University of Minsk.

• http://www.vvsu.ru/grc/ In Russian. An important bibliography on women and

the army in the USSR and in post-soviet societies as well as some online

resources on this website of the Centre for gender studies of the State Economic

University of Vladivostok

• http://www.pipss.org/sommaire448.html A special issue devoted to women and

the military in post-soviet societies.

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коллективному действию, под ред. В.М. Костюшева. М., CПб.: СПб

филиал Института социологии РАН, 1999. С. 51-64.

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• Daucé F., « Les mouvements de mères de soldats à la recherche d’une place

dans la société russe », Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, # 2 (juin),

1997, pp. 121-122.

• Elkner J., "Dedovshchina and the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers under

Gorbachev", The Journal of Power Institutions In Post-Soviet Societies, Issue 1,

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2004, Dedovshchina : From Military to Society

http://www.pipss.org/document243.html

• Glasser J., United People’s Party of Soldiers’ Mothers : An Ananlysis of a

Grassroots movement, Zhe, Stanford’s Student Journal of Russian, East

European, and Eurasian Studies, vol.1, spring 2005,

http://zhe.stanford.edu/spring05/soldiers%20mothers2.pdf

• Lebedev, A., “The test of reality : Understanding families' tolerance regarding

mistreatment of conscripts in the Russian army”, in Daucé, F., Sieca-

Kozlowski, E. (Eds), Dedovshchina in the Post-Soviet Military. Hazing of

Russian Army Conscripts in a Comparative Perspective, Ibidem-Verlag,

Hannover, 2006, 308 p.

• Melnikova V., Lebedev A., Les petits soldats : le combat des mères russes,

Bayard, Paris, 2001

• Oushakine, S., «The Politics of Pity: Domesticating Loss in a Russian

Province», American Anthropologist, 2006, vol. 108 (2), pp. 297-311,

http://www.princeton.edu/oushakine/download/english/2006.The%20Politcs%2

0of%20Pity.pdf

• Sperling V., “Opposition to the war in Chechnya : antimilitarist organizing in

Russia”, PONARS Policy memo, # 224, January 2002,

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0224.pdf

• Sperling V., “The last refuge of a scoundrel: patriotism, militarism and the

Russian national idea”, Nations and Nationalism, # 9 (2), 2003, pp. 235-253.

• Sperling V., Organzing Women in Contemporary Russia. Engendering

Transition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 303 pages

• Wallance B., “Russia's Mothers:Voices Of Change. Committee of Soldiers'

Mothers of Russia”, Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military,

Fall-Winter, 2000,

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EXI/is_2000_Fall-

Winter/ai_73063468

• Zawilski, V., “Saving Russia’s sons: The soldiers’ mothers and the Russian-

Chechen wars” in Webber, S., Mathers, J., Military and society in post-soviet

Russia, Manchester University Press, 2006, pp. 228-240.

• Zdravomyslova E., “Civic Initiatives: Soldiers' Mothers Movement in Russia”,

in Patomaki H.(ed.), Politics of Civil Society: A Global Perspective on

Democratisation, Helsinki: NIDG Working Paper, 2000, # 2. pp. 29-42.

• Zdravomyslova, E, “Peaceful Initiatives: the Soldiers’Mothers Movement in

Russia”, in Breines I., Gierycs D., Reardon B. (eds.), Towards a Women's

Agenda for a Culture of Peace, UNESCO Publishing, 1999. pp. 165-180.

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Book Reviews "Women in/and the Military" (2 titles)

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Svetlana Alexievitch, La guerre n’a pas un visage de femme [Svetlana Aleksievich, U voiny ne zhenskoe litso, Moskva : Pal’mira 2004] [The face of war is not feminin], Paris : Presses de la Renaissance, 2004, 399 pages.

In this book Svetlana Alexievitch gives another view point about the Second World War in

the USSR : she shows the different ways that women have waged this war. As she says, she aims to write not another book about war but “a book about mankind in war” (p.15), about his feelings... Her objective is to give women the opportunity to tell the reader their story, a story that is, for many, unknown and, as we learn, hidden. By letting these women express themselves openly, she simply listened and tried to “note down the testimonies of women who had different military jobs” (p.102). She often had “no more strength to listen. But they still needed to talk” (p.312) about “their” war.

The reader follows the different steps of the way women went into war. They left their towns, their parents, some of them their children and husbands, their friends... with enthusiasm and patriotism. These feelings made it easier for women to wear the uniform and to play roles usually reserved for men. As such we can say that this “total” war did have a woman’s face. But it doesn’t mean the roles of women were always seen as legitimate: at the beginning, they often met many difficulties to be taken seriously as soldiers: because, for them, “everything in the Army was complicated” (p.116), it was an unknown environment. Men accepted the women but some explain it was not an easy experience: “we did more than men, because we had to show that we were just like them” (p.250), something which is still true today in armies where women are employed. They learnt new jobs and how to fight; all of which brought them into contact with a world of fear, horror and death.

They were deeply upset by this experience. More than 50 years after, they all explain that their life completely changed because of what they had experienced there, even those who had had more “traditional” jobs like laundresses in the armies. Some explain they don’t cry anymore; others tell the author they left a part of themselves on the battlefield. For all of them the war was also a very difficult experience physically which influenced their behaviour over a short or long period of time. But, paradoxically, even if war induced many transformations in the way they thought about themselves, they “tried to remain the same” (232) as they used to be. They tried to break the uniformity what was a condition of their acceptance within the armies, for example their hair was cut very short just like the men’s. Thus, many were afraid to loose their feminity and looked for attitudes or situations that made it possible for them to be “like other women”, as far as possible (to dance during a party but incognito, to keep a skirt, a ring, to love...) and not to live only collective experiences, but individual ones too, for example love.

The homecoming was a second and deep rupture, not only for those whose families died during the war. Most of them hoped life would be back to normal again but they met a lack of understanding of what they really did during the war. They expected some recognition and often received contempt, insults especially from women who stayed at the home front and who accused them of having sexual relations with men, their men. Thus, as one says, they waged another war, “a terrible one too” (p.392). It was the end of the arms’ fraternity: “men walked out on us. They didn’t protect us” (p.392). Most of the women decided to tell nobody they wore the uniform and kept in touch with other women by letters (p.148). The recognition comes later than for men who “were the winners, the heroes, some potential fiancés, it was their war. [...] Our victory had been confiscated from us. It had been discreetly exchanged for an ordinary feminine happiness” (p.148). As we may say, the sexual division of labor must go on. That could explain why this part of these war memories has remained hidden: these feminine soldiers felt guilty. Such a feeling had been reinforced by the attitudes of civilians; it made it difficult for women to remember what they experienced during and after the war, and nobody really wanted to listen to what they’d like to say. Only a few veteran’s organizations try to keep the memory alive; they helped the author to meet these women in uniform.

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Svetlana Alexievitch’s point of view is very empathic. She wanted to remain faithful to what the women she interviewed told her and she managed to do so but the reader doesn’t know a lot of thing about the author’s method, about how she selected the testimonies, ... The testimonies are given to the reader without commentaries except for some observations about the difficulties the author had (for example the book begins with a few pages bout what the censure suppressed – her own censure and the regime’s one both deal partly with the relationships between men and women). We have a lot of details about the women’s work, their relationships with other soldiers, their feelings... All these elements put light on a subject often discussed: did women really wage war, did they wear arms? Alexievitch’s work answers positively, but from a particular example and from a special context. The questions brought to the surface by this experience could be further investigated in other contexts, especially about recent participations of women in military operations around, in other forms of war... That could put light on the sexual division of labor, and on war too.

Vincent Porteret

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne – CNRS

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Людмила Альперн, Сон и явь женской тюрьмы, Санкт-Петербург: Алетейя, Серия «Гендерные исследования» [Liudmila Al’pern, Dream and reality in women’s prisons], 2004, 446 с.

The dream of any author – especially of a book with the word “dream” in the title –

consists in having his or her text reviewed by somebody who at least understands the theoretical approach structuring the book’s content. How often writings based on qualitative methods are destroyed by reviewers who “deconstruct” them in perspective of quantitative methods and vice versa!

The identification of the theoretical perspective adapted by the author of Dreams and the reality of prison for women does not represent a puzzle for the reader. As the title of the series – “Gender studies” – suggests, the book should be interpreted and judged according to the criteria set by feminist researchers and writers. Some concerns about the way in which the author presents and discusses the statistical data (see, for instance the table on p. 36: it is difficult to understand its organization and whether the numbers correspond to percentages or to something else) appear irrelevant from this point of view. Even the lack of clearly stated research questions and hypothesis and loosely connected parts of the text (in fact, the book contains a number of previously published essays) do not potentially decrease its value for a true connoisseur. Feminist research has another order of priorities: focus on mechanisms of masculine domination, predominantly qualitative and ethnological methods, the author’s involvement into the movement for improving women’s conditions and, consequently, a subjective and partisan character of arguments. The message sent by the author is embodied not in “neutral” arguments and “robust” causal relationships – the first and foremost it is embedded in the personality of the author herself. Judged according to these criteria, the book does send a message: the author succeeds in persuading the reader of her commitment to the feminist cause and, in particular, to the task of improving the conditions of motherhood in prison. (The fact that sometimes the personality of the author overshadows her personages is excusable: after all, it is extremely difficult to write a text that would be simultaneously “an intimate confession and an impartial report”1).

However, the opinion of a reviewer who does not share feminist values may also be instructive. First, not all potential readers of the book are partisans of feminism, especially taking into consideration the number of its copies – one thousand – and the fact that several essays included in the book have been previously published in the Russian edition of Index on Censorship that has a large and diversified readership. Second, the “outsider” views and interprets the text otherwise than the “insider” does and his or her opinions may help discover new dimensions in the text that even the author has been unaware of. Here are several observations that could have been made by a “sympathetic outsider”.

The reader who gets used to the language of hypothesis, causal relationships and logical demonstrations will find the book full of paradoxes. On the one hand, Ludmila Al’pern fights against all forms of gender discrimination in prison, this ‘male’ institution because of its mere constitutive idea of institutionalized violence and the spread of the public sphere, this “kingdom of men”. She convincingly points out the cases of gender discrimination during transfers from one penitentiary to another (it is worth noting that problems related to the organization of transfers are often neglected in writings on Russian prison), in questions of personal hygiene, health and motherhood, work and so forth (pp. 43-72). On the other hand, the solution proposed by the author sounds surprising: she seems to argue in favor of the return of women to the sphere of privacy where they feel more comfortable while playing traditional female roles. “It is worth thinking about making the conditions of women’s detention more corresponding to their female role, their vocation for motherhood, their role of mothers, real and not fictitious, and helping

1 Geertz, Clifford (1996), Ici et là-bas: l’anthropologue comme acteur, Paris : Ed. Métailié, p. 18

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them find elements of the privacy in the everyday life in prison” (p. 29). In other words, the author proposes to reduce gender discrimination by acknowledging and even strengthening gender asymmetries.

The logical contradiction – it should be kept in mind that we are speaking about an outsider’s attempt to deconstruct the text – suggests nevertheless that there is a more substantial and real problem behind it. Does a violent and unsuccessful attempt to reduce – one can put ‘erase’ instead – gender asymmetries, in prison as in Soviet society as a whole, mean that no other alternatives than the return to the point of departure – a traditional and pre-modern situation – are available and/or feasible? The author intuitively acknowledges the existence of a strange similarity between the social organization of Russian prisons for women and the constitution of a society that some Western feminists dream about. In both cases women go beyond the narrow boundaries of their traditional home, the sphere of privacy, and assume more active public roles. “New forms of woman’s self-perception rudely produced by Russian prison with its system of collective detention transform her into a kind of personality promoted by the feminist education among Western female intellectuals. There is a convergence between the two cases: despite the apparent dissimilarity of ways [towards emancipation], they lead to the same results” (p. 22). Soviet society in general and prison in particular derived from a particular – and mostly unsuccessful – attempt of modernization (gender a/symmetry is just one of the sides of this process). Does this failure call for abandoning attempts to find alternative and less violent strategies of modernization, including strategies for reducing gender gaps? Does the assumption that “Russians would prefer to live, like all other European peoples, properly and wealthy, yet they cannot because of referring to a completely different set of values” (p. 200) gives us a really satisfactory excuse for not taking seriously any feasible alternative?

The solution proposed by L. Al’pern lies not ahead, but behind. And it is hardly satisfactory not only from the point of view of those who argue in favor of alternative strategies of modernization. The problem is that modernization in its Soviet version did not leave the past untouched, be it traditional values or the archetype of woman opposed to violence and machismo. For instance, let us have a closer look at sexual relationships among women in prison. Al’pern’s book is one of the rare sources about prison in which this question is not bypassed. The author argues that women are much more sensitive and attentive to their homosexual partners than men are in heterosexual contacts. “At the purely physical level a women is a more interesting partner for another women: she knows well her own erogenous zones and is able to find them quickly on the girlfriend’s body” (p. 148). The results of some other studies2, including my own, conduced in two prisons for women located in the region of Moscow and the region of Perm’, allow drawing a more nuanced picture. While they assume men’s gender roles in prison it is not rare to see women reproducing patterns of macho behavior: they resort to violence, impose double standards, start fighting to assert their “maleness” and use the coarse language, mat. The rich raw data included in the book, especially transcripts of in-depth interviews, suggest very similar ideas. For example, the term “macho-women” (baby-muzhiki) used by one of the young interlocutors (p. 46) seems appropriate for describing the reproduction of machismo in a society populated exclusively by women. The interview No. 1 (pp. 304-323) was probably conducted with one of these “macho-women”: the interlocutor does not feel any reciprocal obligations with regard to her much younger partner and feels free even to physically impose the will (p. 320) on the latter.

Such a less partisan look leads us to believe that probably no actor, including women, in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia escaped from harmful effects of the failed attempt of violent modernization. All of them tend to reproduce the same model of power relationships (that the author accepts to see only when it is embodied in the state and its representatives). The idea of S. Lukes that subordinates and dominants can be equally considered as “functions” of a dominant model of power relationships, regardless whether they reproduce it consciously or

2 Волкова, Татьяна (1998), Женщина в зеркале криминала, Москва, с. 143-148

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unconsciously, looks especially promising in this context3. To put it differently, men and women are equally involved in the process of the continuous reproduction of the dominant model of power relationships in their everyday life, in prison and outside its walls. If true, this statement contains bad news and good news at the same time. It is the bad news because it prevents us from seeing the situation in black-and-white and reduces the number of leverages available for changing it. On the other side, the good news resides in finding additional arguments for changes and in the understanding that there is no way back, only ahead, to escape from the impasse.

Anton Oleynik

Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada

3 Lukes, Steven (2005), Power: A Radical View, Houndmills, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2nd edition

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Book Reviews - General (7 titles)

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David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Bruce W. Menning, eds., Reforming the Tsar's Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004.

David Schimmelpenninck and Bruce Menning have produced an excellent volume

collecting contributions of a number of both well-established and junior scholars on the history and development of the tsarist military, grouped together around the general theme of reform. In some ways, it is comparable to Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe's complementary The Military and Society in Russia, 1450-1917 (Leiden, 2002). Schimmelpenninck and Menning's contributors, however, focus more on political and institutional history; Lohr and Poe's on social and cultural history. They are best read together.

The quality of the fifteen individual contributions is quite high. The editors have assembled them around the themes of population and resources, intelligence and knowledge, response to wars, and personalities, followed by three concluding commentaries on the essays as a whole. The commentaries ably point out themes and commonalities of their own; I will take a slightly different tack.

Most of the essays on the post-Crimean War period fall neatly into the glass-half-full / glass-half-empty debates on the nature of late imperial Russia. Was imperial Russia fitfully and steadily moving towards a stable and developed society, or were its profound problems and contradictions destined to bring revolution? While the question is to a large degree teleological--it reads backwards from the Russian Revolution--the question itself is so important that it deserves to be raised. After all, the February Revolution was in many ways a military mutiny. The failure to incorporate the Russian military in the historiography of revolution (Allan Wildman's The End of the Russian Imperial Army (Princeton, 1980) is a notable exception) suggests the nature of the imperial army deserves a closer look.

On the optimistic side, Robert Baumann finds that the universal service reform of Dmitrii Miliutin was remarkably effective in mobilizing Russia's massive population, broadening participation in the army, and improving the general educational level of the army and thereby of society as a whole. David Jones suggests that the creation and expansion of youth movements, particularly scouting, show that Russian civil society was not nearly so backward as commonly held, and that Russia was moving slowly towards some model of Western normality. Willis Brooks' look at the military press finds it to be a haven for free discussion and the advocacy of reform, and an important counterweight to official conservatism. David Schimmelpenninck's study of the evolution of military intelligence and Gudrun Persson's examination of Russian attaches in the 1860s both describe the rational and systematic use of foreign intelligence to improve Russian military functioning and to prepare for future wars.

On the pessimistic side, Mark von Hagen sees the steady integration of increasing numbers of non-Russians into the Russian military as a vital part of the politicization of ethnicity that would help to bring down the Russian empire. Jacob Kipp's study of Russian railroad construction brings out the sharp contradiction between military necessities and the imperatives of domestic development. David Rich's look at military geography and statistics finds perennial difficulties in dealing with the complexity of modern war, establishing effective high command, avoiding political interference, and creating a real general staff to coordinate military work. Oleg Airapetov's examination of Miliutin's opposition to a true general staff underlines the same conclusion. Bruce Menning's analysis of military doctrine before World War I, while finding serious efforts to understand the nature of future war, nonetheless sees a familiar failure to coordinate theoretical insights with effective practical

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implementation. John Steinberg sees the failure to reform the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff before World War I as the sacrifice of military need to theoretical polemics and political games.

As my summary makes clear, this volume will not settle the debate over the direction of pre-revolutionary Russia. Nonetheless, it makes our picture of the late imperial army much clearer, and leaves no excuse for failing to integrate imperial military history into broader story of the Russian Revolution.

Not all the essays fit so neatly into a debate over the road to revolution. Paul Bushkovitch, echoing his findings in Peter the Great: The Struggle for Power (Cambridge, 2001), shows that Peter the Great did not radically break with old Muscovite elites in favor of a meritocracy. Instead, he blended new and foreign elements with existing elites in a careful balancing act. Frederick Kagan argues that while the Napoleonic era witnessed a steady and systematic improvement in Russian military administration, but not as a result of defeat. The Russian government instead actively chose to learn from its own and others' experiences, with the spur of defeat only one part of the process. Bruce Menning and Dmitrii Oleinikov in separate articles both find that unconventional war on Russia's southern frontier, whether steppe warfare against the Turks or mountain warfare in the Caucasus, pushed military officers to innovate, accept the need for mobility, and show more initiative. This was even true for people and periods generally seen as hostile to reform: G. A. Potemkin, A. I. Chernyshev, and the reign of Nicholas I. As with all volumes of collected essays, the next question after the quality of the individual contributions is how the essays cohere, how they come together to produce a greater whole. In this case, the concluding essays by David McDonald, Dennis Showalter, and William Odom do an excellent job pointing out the themes and questions that emerge from the essays. Given their insightful work, I will be more questioning.

The first question is whether reform is a useful paradigm for examining tsarist military history. That is, does it focus inquiry in some helpful way? The editors of this volume certainly believe that, but the scope of essays makes one wonder what does not fall into the category of reform. Their introduction discusses the triggers to periods of reform, whether military defeat or foreign threat, and identifies them in 1700, 1855, the 1860s, the early 1870s, 1878, 1904-5, 1908, and 1910. On top of that, the introduction points to two centuries of Russian contact with neighbors' unconventional warfare as producing reform. If that is the case, and I do not doubt that it is, when was the late imperial military _not_ reforming? Even the most hide-bound and reactionary tsar, Nicholas I, has now been revealed through Frederick Kagan's The Military Reforms of Nicholas I (Basingstoke, 1999) to have presided over far-reaching military reforms.

As Dennis Showalter's conclusion rightly remarks, one of the clear lessons of this volume is that the Russian military, contrary to its press, was competent. It recognized problems and attempted to deal with them in a rational and systematic way. Given that, evolutionary reform is necessarily constant, as it is in any military. The issue of reform in the tsar's army thus becomes simply the history of the tsar's army, a title that would have worked equally well for this volume.

The second question is what the institutional evolution described in the book is leading towards. The historians contributing to the volume are all to a large degree willing to look at the past for its own sake. William Odom, as a political scientist, changes the terms of the debate in his commentary to ask what relevance this has to contemporary Russia. He identifies particular continuities in the imperial and post-Soviet experience, but there is a broader question here. The center of gravity of the essays is firmly in the post-Great Reforms period. Of the 15 research essays, one covers Petrine Russia, two go forward into the Napoleonic era, two are broadly concerned with the 19th century, and the remaining ten

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mostly or entirely cover the post-Great Reforms period. That crescendo builds to a climax in 1914, but after that . . . silence.

The editors can certainly be forgiven for limiting the scope of their volume; no book can cover everything. The problem is that the imperial experiences discussed here have enormous implications for World War I and the Soviet period, implications which the reader is left alone to draw. Many scholars--Peter Gatrell, Peter Holquist, and Joshua Sanborn, to name only a few-- have shown clear continuities from imperial Russia through the experience of total war into the Soviet period. Odom himself draws out some of these connections in his conclusion. Whether conscription, or ethnic policy, or railroad building, or military education, or mass organizations, there is enormous scope for exploring the resonance between imperial ancestors and Soviet descendants.

One concrete example: a number of the essays deal with aspects of staff work in the Russian army: particularly Schimmelpenninck, Rich, Kagan, Menning, Steinberg, and Airapetov. Each essay is clear and succinct snapshot of the development of a staff in the Russian army at a particular point in time, whether General Staff, Main Staff, or Main Directorate of General Staff. This first of all shows the desperate need for a good and comprehensive history of Russian staffs to put the complex and confusing development of the institution into some kind of political and intellectual context: those individual snapshots, while sharply focused, do not make for smoothly-flowing animation. More importantly, however, the twistings and turnings of Russian staffs suggest some kind of structural problem with the place of a staff, one that goes well beyond the Russian Empire. After all, the Soviets faced similar debates about the relative power and importance of the Staff and the Defense Ministry: see Philip A. Bayer, The Evolution of the Soviet General Staff, 1917-1941 (Garland, 1987) and this author's "Tukhachevsky in Leningrad," Europe-Asia Studies, # 48.8 (December 1996), pp. 1365-1386. Even contemporary Russia has not produced a stable structure to determine the relationship between ministry and staff.

These questions do not undermine the book's value as an assembly of some of the best work being done today on tsarist military history. Anyone interested in the tangled web of post-Soviet military developments should welcome these insights from the past.

David Stone

Kansas State University

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Catherine Merridale, Ivan's War, the Red Army 1939-1945, London: Faber and Faber, 2005, 396 pages.

Catherine Merridale's first well reviewed and much appraised book “Night of

Stone, Death and Memory in Russia” (Granta, 2000) examined the culture of suffering in Russia during the Soviet period. One key chapter in this previous book detailed the ordeals undergone by the Russian Armed Forces and the people at large, during the Great Patriotic War. Five years later, the British historian brings her expertise to this topic in Ivan's War.

At first glance, the topic of suffering and endurance of the Russian narod might appear to be well-covered territory. Yet Merridale's achievement is the way in which she brings the necessary empathy to the subject, whilst at the same time managing to keep the objective distance needed for an reliable historical analysis.

The main accomplishment of Ivan's War is to compare the soldiers as they really acted on the battlefield during WWII with the idealised version of the Russian soldier propagated by the Soviet state. Such idealizations were powerful concepts which retain some of their force even today. Merridale's anthropological research showed that the Russian soldiers honoured somewhat selective and biased accounts of their war-time behaviour (and still do so). A number of ugly and unacceptable elements of the actual behaviour of the soldiers has tended to be omitted (consciously or unconsciously) from the record of the war and the collective and public memories.

Her confrontation of the soldier's reality with the soldier's myth is largely in the period when World War II raged most heavily on the Eastern front. The book covers operation Barbarossa and the debacle of the Soviet troops in Belarus, Ukraine, Western Russia and south-western Russia; the battle of Stalingrad is seen by Merridale as the first turning point of the war; the battle of Kursk, which gave a definite blow to the image of invincibility of the German troops; operation Bagration (the second turning point of the war) which turned the Soviet military endeavour from a war of liberation into a war of revenge; and finally, the end game, the battle of Berlin. Yet she chooses not to focus simply on the purely military - strategic and tactical aspects of these events but also to concentrate on the experiences of the Russian soldier in the frontline, the so-called frontovniki. Hence she arrives at a social-cultural history of the Russian soldier.

To explain the behaviour of the Russian soldiers in the first chaotic months of the war, Merridale refers to the political and sociological context of the 1930’s: the massive collectivization of agricultural life in the Soviet Union, the Great Purges, the State-organized famine in Ukraine, and the Finnish war. In other words, the author shows the effects of the politics of Stalinism on the military fabric of the Soviet State at the end of the 1930’s. The massive number of cases of desertion, self-mutilation, collaboration, theft and random violence during the first year of the war are explained by the fact that many soldiers were discouraged, even enraged by the criminal behaviour of the Soviet State. Time and again, ‘disloyal’ behaviour of the soldier was exhibited as soon as State control degenerated into chaos. As a result, the soldiers’ loyalty could only be called conditional and uncertain. This anti-Soviet conduct exhibited by the soldiers (and the rural Ukrainian and Belarusian population at large) could only be countered by even more cruel and harsh counter measures by the State. One of these harsh counter measures to install loyalty and order on the front was the famous order Nr 270, signed by Stalin in August 1941, which

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gave every Commanding Officer, Political Officer or NKVD Officer the right to execute on the spot any Officer who showed disloyal or cowardly behaviour. Families of deserters could be arrested by this order as well. The Soviet State had to keep the pressure high on its own soldiers (and population) in order to motivate them to fight and to avoid the total collapse of the Soviet State. The Soviet soldiers' conduct was thus arguably induced by the inhumane measures taken by the State. In this sense, the Soviet soldier did not suffer only from the atrocities committed by the German enemy, but also from the terror organized by its own State. Hence, Merrdiale shows the impact of a totalitarian regime on the conduct of the soldier and how a vicious circle (a constant build up) of violence and counter-violence was created. One example may illustrate this observation: Merridale postulates that the function of the Soviet Partisan movement was not only to fight behind the lines in occupied territory and to destabilize the lines of communication of the German army, but also to control the Soviet population under German occupation. Any kind of ‘disloyal’ behaviour of the Ukraine or Belarusian population was punished by the Partisans. This not only explains the sometimes cruel behaviour of the Partisans against their own people, but also shows that the major concern of the Stalinist regime was to keep control over its population.

What is particularly interesting in Merridale’s book is her focus on a largely forgotten story, namely of what happened to many soldiers after May 1945, after the official ending of the Second World War. The euphoria of the victory over the Fascist regime was, indeed, for many soldiers very short. Many of the Soviet legion were sent to the Asian front just a few weeks after the violent battle of Berlin, to fight against Japan in Manchuria. Others, rather than being demobilised were assigned to various tasks aimed at rebuilding the Soviet State into a super power, if they indeed escaped being sent to the Gulag. Once again, the soldier-citizen of the Soviet State, notwithstanding his enormous contribution to the survival of the Soviet State, could not count on any compassion from the Soviet authorities: 27 million people lost their life during the Great Patriotic War; 25 million people became homeless; 8,6 million soldiers died; and 90% of the men that were born in the year 1921 were erased. However, the Soviet authorities, more in particular Stalin and his entourage, decided that this was not enough. The Soviet people, we would say, suffered beyond the point of death.

Another fine aspect of the book is that Merridale is never satisfied with a one-dimensional and therefore simplified explanation of the Soviet soldiers’ behaviour. She often shows how extremes of human behaviour are usually caused by a complex cluster of factors. For example: when she touches upon the merciless behaviour of the Soviet soldiers against the German population in East Prussia. The deplorable behaviour of the Soviet soldier on German territory included widespread rape and looting. The rape warfare, in which even children and elderly people were not safe, was especially atrocious. Many thousands of female victims ended up severely internally wounded by broken bottles when the Red wave swept over their doomed homeland. Some authors explain such brutality by the one-dimensional motivation of the sexual frustration of the soldiers. Others attribute it the battle stress of the soldiers. Merridale gives a combination of factors to account for this explosion of brutality. Rape and looting were thus tolerated and even encouraged by the Soviet authorities. There was, for instance, propaganda encouraging the men to give free rein to revenge and cruelty (the Political Officer and writer Ehrenburg played an important role in this campaign). Stalin's Speech of 1 May,

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1944 encouraged the Soviet Soldiers to conquer Germany with the outcry: ‘To berlog’ (To the Beast). Besides State propaganda, there was group pressure. Soldiers who refused to take part to these rape orgies were treated at best with suspicion, and at worst could be shot by their drunken comrades. There was, needless to say, also the influence of alcohol, that was abundantly available in East Germany. Also there was naturally the sexual frustration of the frontovnik which added to the excitement as the Soviet soldier saw for the first time in their life the way that Western women dressed. There was also psychological stress caused by the bloody battles and atrocities and that changed the ugly face of thanatos into an even more heartless face of eros. There was also fear of the capitalist state, a fear that turned very quickly into anger and fury after they saw the richness of the capitalist farmers and city dwellers. Many soldiers were also frustrated by the massive occurrence of the so-called postal divorces, as Soviet women could not handle the loneliness and the harshness of their life when their husbands were so long away from home. The resulting frustration of the soldiers produced a fury against any woman they might meet. As a result, many Soviet soldiers negatively released this pressure against many thousands of German women in East Prussia, a fact that has been censored by the official accounts and subjected to selective amnesia with the soldiers themselves. What is valuable here is Merridale's analysis of how war crimes of this order may result, when the State fails to manage the inevitable negative psychological and sociological stress of soldiers in wartime. Not to mention what might happen when such stresses are politically abused, as in the propaganda campaign mentioned above.

Merridale's book is also full of interesting data, although she candidly admits that precise figures were difficult to locate amid the unimaginable chaos and state-protected myths. Some of this data is already well known fact which is still used by the Russian authorities today. We are, for instance, regularly reminded during Vladimir Putin's official speeches of the impossibility of conceiving the reality of the 27 million deaths during the Great Patriotic War. It is as if he wants to continue the state of victim hood and to promote suffering as an ideology, as was done during the Soviet period. What the President of the Russian Federation does not mention, however, is the responsibility of the Soviet authorities (the NKVD especially) for killing many of their own people, as well as the responsibility of the military authorities for heedlessly wasting human life during military campaigns. Minefields, for instance, were ‘attacked’ by waves of infantry soldiers in order to clear them. The Battle of Berlin cost 360,000 soldiers their lives. The Bagration operation cost was 300,000 lives in twelve days of battle. Of the 403,000 tank crew men who participated in the battle of Kursk, 310,000 would die, to name but a few.

Merridale also includes some other data on aspects of the frontline life of the soldiers which is not that well known by the public at large. She notes, for instance, the psychological suffering by the soldiers and the non-existence of any help in this field. Only 100,000 Soviet soldiers of the 20 million active soldiers who participated in the war would be counted as permanently mentally scarred. She also shed some light on the participation of women in the Soviet Armed Forces during the Second World War. Contrary to what we would think, women who participated in combat were actually very poorly regarded as opposed to the nurses and typists who had a very good image. Just after the war, for instance, women who received decorations were seen as ‘whores’, as if they had earned these decorations by compromising themselves sexually with the officers. The author also sheds some light on social groups such as orphans, Shtrafniki,

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zapadniki, Vlasovites, etc. Cultural aspects such as the influence of songs, literature, poems and rhymes on the life of the soldiers also receive the attention of Merridale. In sum, Merridale has provided a richly informative and empathetic book that anyone interested in Soviet and Russian warfare, past or present, should read.

Joris Van Bladel

Slavist, Pipss.org Editorial Board

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David Wolff et Gaël Moullec, Le KGB et les pays baltes, 1959-1991 [The KGB and the Baltic states], Belin, Collection Histoire et Société Temps Présents, 2005, 240 pages.

Le contenu de cet ouvrage déborde largement son titre. Si les auteurs, en effet, évoquent

l’activité de la police politique (NKVD, MGB puis KGB) dans les pays baltes surtout entre 1939 et 1959 , ils ne limitent pas leur étude à ce cadre étroit. En prenant appui sur de nombreux documents d’archives inédits, ils étudient la politique du Kremlin dans ces pays, ses fluctuations, les problèmes auxquels elle s’est heurtée , les antagonismes qu’elle a provoqués.

Ils choisissent de privilégier certains moments : la brève période qui va de l’annexion des pays baltes à l’Union soviétique au cours de l’été 1940 à l’invasion de l’Union soviétique par la Wehrmacht le 22 juin 1941 ; ils étudient les déportations d’éléments nationalistes, de gradés de l’armée, de hauts fonctionnaires et de paysans étiquetés« koulaks » au lendemain de cette annexion. Ils examinent aussi en détail la seconde vague des déportations en 1949 ; les pays baltes, surtout la Lituanie, ont opposé une résistance acharnée à la réintégration dans l’union soviétique. Cette résistance, menée par les « frères des bois », n’a pas été le seul fait des nombreuses forces qui avaient collaboré avec les nazis pendant trois ans. David Wolff et Gaël Moullec montrent que cette seconde vague de déportations vise plus la population locale qui soutient les groupes armés antisoviétiques que ces groupes mêmes tapis dans les forêts. Elle dresse donc la population contre le régime.

Ces réalités étaient jusqu’alors plus ou moins bien connues. La partie la plus neuve du livre est sans aucun doute celle qui couvre les années 1953-1959. Au lendemain de la mort de Staline Beria insiste pour que dans les républiques où les aspirations nationales sont les plus puissantes (l’Ukraine et les trois pays baltes) on promeuve systématiquement des cadres nationaux à la place des Russes et russophones un peu partout placés aux postes de commande . La chute de Beria à la fin de juin 1953 n’inverse pas d’abord cette politique. David Wolff et Gaël Moullec portent une attention particulière aux développements que cette véritable dé-russification de certains secteurs dirigeants connaît en particulier en Lettonie sous la direction de Berklavs, membre du Bureau politique du PC letton et qui bénéficie d’une large appui dans cette instance, d’où il ne sera chassé qu’en 1959 .Les auteurs reproduisent le procès-verbal d’une réunion du Bureau politique du parti communiste letton du 4 mars 1958. Une note du Comité central du Parti communiste de l’Union soviétique a qualifié la politique systématique de promotion de cadres lettons dans la république de « manifestation de nationalisme bourgeois ».L’un des principaux dirigeants de ce parti Latsis rétorque que la note est « unilatérale : Il n’est question que du nationalisme bourgeois et il n’y a rien sur le chauvinisme impérial » (russe) . Quant à Berklavs, il déclare :« nous devons porter à la connaissance de la direction du Comité central du PCUS notre désaccord avec le ton politique général sur lequel est écrite cette note ».(pp. 140-141)

Certes ce n’est pas la Hongrie de 1956 (dont les auteurs soulignent par ailleurs les échos qu’elle a rencontrés en Lituanie et en Lettonie), mais c’est une opposition nette à Moscou , qui ne sera liquidée qu’un an plus tard. David Wolff et Gaël Moullec montrent comment ces dissensions ont affaibli et en partie paralysé le KGB au moment- même où, après l’amnistie décrétée par Moscou en 1954 et 1956, les exilés reviennent par milliers dans ces républiques en même temps que les déportés de 1941 et de 1949.

Ce que David Wolff et Gaël Moullec qualifient d’ « éphémères printemps » (qui ont néanmoins duré six ans) a marqué durablement ces trois républiques. Moscou a resserré les boulons à partir de 1959. Mais le calme obtenu était trompeur et provisoire. La suite sur laquelle l’ouvrage passe beaucoup plus vite, l’a montré.

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Les auteurs ; dans leur conclusion, insistent sur un héritage inattendu des méthodes du KGB en soulignant les difficultés de l’apprentissage de la démocratie Ils rappellent ainsi que « les hommes politiques qui (dans ces pays) se prononçaient contre l’adhésion (à l’Union européenne ) étaient dénoncés, traînés dans la boue et accusés d’être des hommes de paille du KGB » (p. 228). La substitution de l’excommunication à la discussion, prolongement surprenant de la longue présence du KGB dans ces pays, est l’un des nombreux thèmes de réflexion que propose cet ouvrage.

Nadine Marie-Schwartzenberg

CNRS, Paris

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Stephen L. Webber and Jennifer G. Mathers eds., Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006, 277 pages.

In the run up to the July 2006, G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, public opinion leaders

in the developed European countries and the United States warned that Russia was backsliding on democratic reform, increasing defense spending rapidly, and using energy blackmail to rebuild power and influence. President George Bush expressed some of the West’s concerns to Putin in public and in private meetings. Putin stood his ground and reminded his guests, royally housed in the Petrine imperial setting, that Russia, a sovereign state with a deep and rich history, would rebuild its post-Soviet institutions in keeping with Russian needs and traditions. President Putin added that Russia hoped to avoid the type of democracy the US was building in Iraq.

What might be called the Putin thesis argues that the chaos of the 1990’s did enormous damage to Russian state viability, including the armed services. Democratic and progressive reform require state strengthening, the revival of effective institutions of government; and, in the Russian case, a central government capable of making and implement authoritative decisions. Thus, he argues, the very state strengthening that concerns Western observers is a necessary stage in Russia’s reconstruction into a law-governed, civil society. His popularity ratings suggests that some 60-70% of Russians agree with him.

Thus, as social scientists who study power institutions, we have an interesting challenge. On the one hand, our studies of Russian political culture argue that authoritarian values permeate Russian society. On the other hand, we know that the very gatekeepers of this authoritarian society rejected the corrupt, socialist dictatorship in 1990-1991 and set progressive, European goals for Russia’s future development. Thus, the Soviet system generated its own capacity for self-criticism and change and did indeed change. Consequently, in order to understand the current situation and its prospects for progressive development, we have to do more than identify authoritarian continuity. We need to focus on the relationship between pattern maintenance and adaptation to new conditions.

As social scientists who study power institutions we should have clear, well-substantiated answers to fundamental questions about the direction of Russian military reform, the main problems to be addressed, and the amount of progress made thus far. We should also be able to make predictions and to provide pragmatic advice based upon our theories. Since our work explains how power institutions function under liberal and authoritarian systems, it could be used to develop either type. We use our scholarly journals primarily to advance the liberal arts and sciences and to contribute to the development of knowledge. They also have a secondary function related to policy advocacy although most scholarly journals avoid stating this openly. My reading and evaluation of The Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia will be guided by the traditional scholarly agenda, by an open society agenda, and by my scholarly interest in understanding how progressive reformers emerge and what happens to them.

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Stephen L. Webber’s Introduction

Webber argues that our studies of civil-military relations were too narrow and we should broaden our analytical frameworks into what he calls a society-military interface model. I agree with his general point about the specialized studies of civil-military relations but fear that the SMI model he proposes is impractical because it casts too broad a net. Webber explains, “In other words, ‘society-military relations’ refers to all aspects of the interface between civilian society and the military sphere, in the political, economic, social, symbolic and cultural realms. (page 3)”. To complete this vast research agenda, he would need to produce a multi-volume encyclopedia of society-military relations in Russia. Who would assemble these trees into an understandable model of the forest? Arguably, Webber should simplify his model and explain more clearly how it will be used for longitudinal studies. This might be accomplished by identifying stages of society-military relations development, a revision that needs a general theory of the direction in which European society-military relations are moving.

Webber is heading in that direction when he explains that the SMI model focuses on militarism, militarization and the society-military relationship (pages 12-15). He places the Russian case within the larger study of the demilitarization of European society, a theme he returns to in Chapter 7., where he and Alina Zilberman address Martin Shaw’s Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century.

The book’s Introduction also contains a good discussion of our field’s evolution over the past several decades. However, the SMI model it advocates is still a work in progress; and, as the editors explain, the book’s chapters were not required to address it. Thus, we need to evaluate the chapters individually, on their own merits, rather than as specific parts of a larger SMI project.

Can Russian Society be Demilitarized?

Lev Gudkov argues that the Soviet Union was a highly militarized society because military-like values permeated civilian and military institutional life.1 His insights are consistent with the classical literature on totalitarian mobilization regimes: “The imperatives of universal mobilization became the principles for the organization of daily life… (page 47).” The Soviet experience produced an authoritarian political culture and social science predicts that societies infused with authoritarian institutions and values cannot be quickly transformed into liberal democratic, civil societies. Gudkov’s research confirms the existence of major residues of support for non-liberal values in Russian society at large and in the power institutions in particular. Since Gudkov spent decades building Russia’s ability to study public opinion objectively, his findings merit careful attention.

Gudkov argues that as a result of the Chechen wars, “Russia’s generals have gained unprecedented political influence (page 50).” The movement of military and FSB officers into public leadership roles, according to Gudkov, is natural given Russia’s authoritarian political culture and the public’s deep insecurity Russia’s economic and political viability. Thus, public trust in the power institutions is high, far higher than in 1 Lev Gudkov, Chapter 1, “The army as an institutional model;” pages 39-63.

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civilian political leaders and institutions such as the Duma (page 51). Further, the old Soviet defensive consciousness survives and reproduces itself as suspicion of NATO and the West (page 52).

Gudkov’s conclusions and predictions are conservative. Societal and institutional inertia prevent the Russian armed forces from being transformed into modern, professional armed forces of the Western European type. More attention should be given to the explanation of why solid members of the Soviet Communist Party rejected their own corrupt “militarized” system and repudiated it. Otherwise, we and Russia remain trapped in a permanent authoritarian syndrome. Is that indeed the case?

The Russian Media and Military Reform

Bettina Renz argues that societal and institutional inertia--Russia’s authoritarian legacy actively resists independent media efforts to perform the watchdog functions needed in an open society. The power institutions want the media to educate the public in ways reminiscent of the Soviet era. Renz makes the classical arguments for a free press as an indispensable part of the institutional architecture of open society, one of the “mechanisms for holding state officials to account for their exercise of power (page 62).” Renz studied diverse responses to dedovshchina to make her point that the power institutions resent negative investigative reporting. She explains that conservative authorities make the classical arguments against alleged reporting excesses which undermine society’s trust in the armed forces and make military reform all the more difficult.

Renz points out that the flowering of press freedoms enjoyed during the first half of the 1990’s was partly the result of general institutional disorientation. Thus, it was perhaps the chaos rather than Boris Yeltsin’s commitment to liberal values that created the space for a very diverse, free press. But, when the power institutions began to recover, they imposed the expected institutional discipline on their own publications, Krasnaya zvezda, for example and became more fastidious about controlling information flows. Renz shows that Vladimir Putin has expressed support for the free press but has also given very clear signals that his preference is for constructive, patriotic criticism, a media that helps educate and shape public opinion in support of national leadership. I agree with her conclusion that access to security and military information is once again tightly controlled but that the Russian media made substantial progress since the 1980’s. Russian society now has access to independent analysis, including “watchdog” analysis of military affairs.

Yet, even open societies have problems with their respective power institutions. Further, Western civil-military relations theory argues that military officers should stay out of politics and policy debates. Active duty officers, as a matter of professional discipline, do not communicate openly with reporters. There is no easy solution to this problem. Military discipline tends to trump glasnost’ and civilian primacy tends to stifle military participation in policy debates. Even open societies have closed sectors.

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Post-Soviet Russian War Films

David Gillespie’s chapter on war films reminds us that the arts play an important role in giving voice to ideas and to shaping public opinion about the armed forces, military history, and specific wars.2. It is refreshing to read Gillespie because his style is rooted in the discourse of the humanities and quite free from the deadening social science jargon that turns the general public away from much of our scholarly work. He covers an astonishing array of films and demonstrates convincingly that there is tremendous artistic diversity in post-Soviet Russia, diversity that reflects the country’s enormously complex and often contradictory reactions to war in general and the battle for the North Caucasus in particular.

Western public opinion has from the outset sympathized with the Chechen separatists and favored independent film makers who take that point of view. But the situation is Russia is far different; and, from my perspective, better attuned to the tragedy unfolding there. Gillespie reminds us that extreme Russian patriotic nationalists have their favorite war films. However, there is far more to the Russian movie front that neo-fascism. Postmodern philosophical travelers have their own versions of the conflict. In addition, there are well-made historical movies about the battles of the nineteenth century. Gillespie ends his brief chapter with a discussion of Andrei Konchalovskii’s film, The House of Fools, a surrealistic masterpiece which reveals the lunacy of it all. Its message: “War is madness, and only the lunatics seem to know any semblance of order, routine and normality (page 91).

Political Uses of National Insecurity

Mikhail Alexseev’s chapter shows how Yeltsin and Putin exploited national insecurity to win public support for premeditated constitutional changes that enhanced the power and authority of the presidency.3. Vladimir Putin argues that without political recentralization and state strengthening, democracy will fail. First create a strong viable state and then democratize it--this is his main political thesis. Alekseev shows how Yeltsin and Putin used windows of opportunity created by the Chechen wars and various terrorist incidents to advance this program.

The trends which Alexseev discusses became even more pronounced in 2005 when Vladimir Putin used the public’s reaction to terrorist incidents to win Duma approval for an enormously important change in the way Russians elect the governors of the federal regions. The Duma replaced the direct popular election of governors with a system of indirect elections in which the president nominates candidates to the regional legislatures. Additionally, he created special counter terrorism units with the power to find and liquidate terrorists in the southern federal district. Thus, although these changes took place after the chapter was written they are predicted by the chapter’s main thesis. Alexseev argues that Putin and others have exploited the sense of insecurity created by terrorist attacks and the warfare in the North Caucasus to enhance their powers and to insulate the power ministries from troublesome democratic oversight and to avoid 2 David Gillespie, Chapter 3, “Confronting imperialism: the ambivalence of war in post-Soviet film.” 3 Mikhail A. Alexseev, Chapter 4, “Back to hell: civilian-military ‘audience costs’ and Russia’s wars in Chechnya.

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fundamental military reform (page 111). I think Putin would argue that the Chechen wars actually forced the civilian leadership to address the collapse of the Soviet military and to take action to produce more effective military forces. Both views are correct. Some reforms were delayed but others were pushed forward.

Rebuilding Reliable Control

Pavel Baev’s chapter examines the reform problem in greater depth.4. In my book I argued that Boris Yeltsin’s 1993 constitution made the military and the other power ministries presidential armed forces because it gives the president the power to appoint and dismiss all top commanders without parliamentary review.5. Thus, one would expect the military would cater to the presidency which controls the rewards system. This system gives the president too much authority and prevents the Duma from functioning as an effective check and balance.

However, in reality, presidential power has not been able to achieve the reformist goals Russia’s presidents have set for the armed forces. Russian presidents have been embarrased and frustrated by military institutional behavior. One embarrassing piece of information after another hit the headlines, everything from gross corruption and conscripts who died from neglect to the sinking of the nuclear submarine, the Kursk. Real world performance did not fit the idea; in reality, the commander in chief could not effect basic reforms. People could be fired but firings did not correct the chronic problems.

Baev’s chapters offers some insights into real world Russian institutional inertia. The armed forces are presidential but the presidents have delivered what it takes. The military simply does not trust the presidents to provide the support required to maintain basic systems let alone to modernize them. Boris Yeltsin’s failure to provide enough funding to pay for basic salaries and operating costs forced the Russian military to develop coping habits that undermined centralized command-and-control. Powerful regional governors began to make up the difference and to develop special relationships with regional commanders. Baev explains, “The combination of starvation, identity crisis and professional cultural conflict strongly pushed the military towards the regions, where dynamic economic process went hand in hand with political sovereignisation and identity building (page 119).”

(Krasnaya zvezda regularly praised civilian patrons who sent supplies and funds to Russian bases. Led by the intrepid mayor, Yury Luzhkov, the city of Moscow adopted the Russian Black Sea fleet, for example. All across the country, military base by military base, deals were worked out between commanding officers and local political and business leaders to help the military make ends meet. In exchange, the military sometimes provided labor and other services. Oddly enough, collaboration between local commanders and regional leaders was standard practice under Communist Party dictatorship and this Soviet habit helped the military to survive the post-Soviet economic crisis. Further, the military ran its own network of collective farms and was used to breaking formal rules to solve operational problems. Few Western studies of Soviet civil-

4 Pavel Baev, Chapter 5., “Military reform and regional politics.” 5 See Chapter 17, “The Theory and Practice of Democratic Constitutional Control,” in Robert V. Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics: Duty, Dictatorship, and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin; Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick and London, 1998.

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military relations have understood these complexities. However, these practices did not threaten centralized control until the 1990’s.)

This dangerous trend could not be reversed until the federal government and the president had the funds to support the armed forces properly. During Putin’s first term, as Baev explains, the country’s financial situation changed and the president began the process of rebuilding the military chain of command and federal administrative authority over the regions. Arguably, this supports Putin’s thesis that the state must first be rebuilt and then democratized. The data Baev provides demonstrate that central control and internal discipline were breaking down during the 1990’s.

Military Reform, and the Challenge of Broadening Access to Policy Making

Julian Cooper ‘s chapter addresses at least two key issues, economic dimensions of military reform and executive domination of policy making. Cooper reminds us that Mikhail Gorbachev began cutting defense spending and calling for military reform well before the chaotic changes of the 1990’s.6 The huge cuts that hit all across the Russian defense establishment were catastrophic and deeply wrenching to millions of military personnel, defense workers, and their families. Cooper provides some excellent data. For example, defense industry employment dropped by two-thirds from 1990 to 2001. The younger more talented employees fled for better jobs and the mean age of employees jumped from 39 to 58 (page 133).

Arguably, the social contract between the civilian political leadership and the defense establishment was stretched to the breaking point because the former could not meet its financial obligations towards the armed forces and the defense contractors. Instead of reform, Russian defense had to cope with near disaster. Once the fiscal crisis passed, Russian leaders could begin to address military reform and military accountability to elected officials more calmly. Cooper does an excellent job explaining the accountability issues, especially the Duma’s efforts to exert influence over budget and policy formation. He also touches on problems the executive branch has with defense spending oversight and accountability. He notes the emergence of independent, non-governmental, civilian expertise in defense affairs and other signs that the society-military interface is slowly moving closer towards a middle ground between the closed Soviet system and the European open society ideal. This is the story of a long “uphill struggle” against well-entrenched national habits. Cooper concludes that more prodding from the international community is required to promote greater transparency.

I wish Cooper had also addressed how the huge economic gap between Russia’s military professionals and the business tycoons affects military morale and trust between military and business elites. The Russian military has remained the most poorly paid, housed, and supported of all the major European armed forces. Similarly, much of Russian society is extremely poor by general European standards. By contrast, the Russian business community boasts several dozen billionaires and hundreds if not thousands of millionaires. In many ways, the Russian civilian business elites have caught up to and even surpassed their Western counterparts in personal riches and lavish life styles. Under these conditions, the Russian military can neither recruit nor retain the high quality personnel required to bring the Russian armed forces up to the Western European 6 Julian Cooper, “Society-military relations in Russia: the economic dimension.”

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standard. If this situation tends to alienate the military officers from the civilian elites, it is fundamentally unhealthy for democratic stability.

Societal Pressure Changed Russian Draft Policy

Stephen Webber and Alina Zilberman begin by raising a number of interesting theoretical questions about the demilitarization of European societies and the Russian case.7 They also sort through some contradictory data. On the one hand, as Gudkov reported, Russian society has a high level of trust in power institutions, especially the presidency and the military. On the other hand, some 90% of all Russian youth avoid military service and there was a widespread rebellion against the draft. By disaggregating the public opinion data, the authors show that the older generation carried the most positive views of the military while the younger generation had rather different ideas.

What is most interesting is the manner in which the Russian state responded to societal criticism. Vladimir Putin presided over major changes in the military draft. He adopted a plan to cut the period of service from two years to just one year. He implemented new educational and other incentives. He supported the shift towards military professionalization and a complex set of contracts for service. The chapter was written as these reforms were beginning to gain traction. Thus, pressure from society on the state brought changes, reforms that moved Russia a bit closer to the European mainstream. This is neither democratic governance nor true civilian control but it is a sign that the Russian state is more responsive to societal opinion than in the past, a positive development. The institutionalization of democratic societal control would require changes in the Yeltsin constitution.

Women in Uniform

Chapter by chapter, the evidence builds that traditional Russo-Soviet authoritarian values are evident in all dimensions of society-military relations but that some progressive reforms have taken place. Jennifer Mathers reviews the evidence on the gender front and finds that Russian society is decades behind Western Europe.8 Although about 10% of the Russian army’s uniformed personnel are women, they are assigned to a narrow set of positions which Russian society identifies as appropriate for women. The type of gender differentiation that was normal in Western armed services some thirty to fifty years ago is the current Russian practice and there is no influential movement to alter it. Further, the higher military leadership positions are still almost exclusively the male domain. Further, it appears that Russian men and women still hold very traditional views of gender roles. Mathers does a fine job summarizing and evaluating the available data.

One is forced to conclude that the seventy years of Soviet “revolutionary” government actually retarded Russia’s modernization by preserving sexist authoritarian patterns of behavior and values more typical of late nineteenth European society.

7 Stephen L. Webber and Alina Zilberman, Chapter 7, “The citizenship dimension of the society-military interface.” 8 Jennifer G. Mathers, Chapter 8, “Women, society and the military: Women soldiers in post-Soviet Russia.”

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Although Russia is a traditional society, it is plagued by some very modern, complex problems. Our models have trouble capturing the bizarre Russian toleration for mixing pre modern and postmodern values. Perhaps this is because we tend to ignore such contradictions in Western society.

Traditional Maternal Activism

Valerie Zawilski’s chapter analyzes and explains the origin, development, and impact the committees of soldiers mothers (CSMs) had on military reform.9 The CSM data force Western Europeans and North Americans to examine their simplistic views of Russian society and to make room for traditional maternal political activism by mothers who challenged and defied the Russian military, especially the draft boards, in order to force the system to address serious deficiencies. Bit by bit the authorities officially adopted the main reforms the CSMs demanded: a new system of draft deferrals, an end to sending raw recruits into dangerous combat, more attention to the dedovshchina problem, better diets for draftees, etc. Thus, Russian women--mothers and others, accomplished important reforms in a male dominated society’s most stereotypically male institution, the armed forces. Democratic initiative influenced policy development in the Russian military. This fact should make us question our simplistic models of the Russian military as closed to society.

Zawilski demonstrates that CSM activism is not to be confused with modern European feminism. Although some elements in the CSM community had “leftist” ideological views that could be seen as anti-military, others were quite willing to cooperate with military authorities to bolster military reform. Thus, women were able to influence Russian policy development within a traditional Russian sexist framework. Zawilski argues that such a sexist Russian framework actually gave the women some political space and compelled their critics to hold their punches. Mature Russian mothers, even grandmothers, have a special status in Russian society.

During the tumultuous 1990’s, the power institutions were more unstable and more permeable than during the 1980’s. Advocates of democratic initiative are starting to look back on the 1990’s with nostalgia. Russia’s post-Soviet Time of Troubles was highly creative. Some argue that windows of opportunity are now closing as the power institutions recover and rebuild. However, the fact that much of the CSM reform program became official government policy is cause for optimism.

The Cossack Revival

Elizabeth Sieca-Kozlowski’s chapter examines the latest state in the long history of Russia’s Cossack communities, especially those in the North Caucasus between the Black and Caspian Seas.10 Her analysis supports the larger thesis concerning the special qualities of the 1990’s, a period characterized by unusually high levels of public initiative and confusion about the lines of authority within and among power institutions and

9 Valerie Zawilski, Chapter 9, “saving Russia’s sons: the Soldiers’ Mothers and the Russian-Chechen wars.” 10 Elizabeth Sieca-Kozlowski, Chapter 10, “The integration of the Cossacks within the Russian Army: political and military implications.”

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between power institutions and society at large. Further, her work on the Cossacks also touches on much larger questions about post-Soviet Russia’s basic identity and new national symbolism.

Boris Yeltsin adopted Russian imperial symbolism and replaced the hammer and sickle with the imperial double-headed eagle. All post-Soviet power institutions now serve under the double-headed eagle.11 Does this mean that the modern Russian state is prepared to revive the imperial Russian Cossack tradition? If so, Russia would be building power institutions that defy modern ideas about military professionalism. This would be a major deviation from the strategic reform direction the Russian state adopted when it declared that its goal was to create modern, professional armed forces.

The author provides excellent insights into the Russian state’s efforts to institutionalize--coopt and control the Cossack revival. After all, no modern state can permit armed militias to develop and operate outside governmental control. The monopoly on coercive power is one of the primary measures of state viability. During the 1990’s Russia was losing control over armed force, a process that had to be reversed. However, once the crisis period passed, it was time to impose discipline and to bring all organized armed force under central control, including the Cossacks. The author’s evidence indicates that this process is incomplete.

In addition to command and control concerns, the Kremlin has ideological and ethno-national concerns about Cossack revival. Sieca-Kozlowski emphasizes that traditional Cossack, Russian Orthodox nationalism has been rejected as Russian state ideology. Russia is officially a multinational and multiconfessional state; therefore, Russia’s power institutions cannot openly embrace traditional Cossack ideology. The politically correct, post-Soviet Cossack is supposed to defend the Russian Federation’s multinational state and multiconfessional ideals. The traditional view of the Cossacks as imperial Russian policeman is politically counterproductive. The Russian state channels Cossack community activism into positive channels, activities ranging from caring for orphans to encouraging youth to prepare for military service and to serving as auxiliary armed forces. Nevertheless, the author correctly argues that historically powerful symbols of Russian statehood and culture such as the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s Cossacks have currency. On state occasions Russia’s presidents proudly display various cavalry units, including Cossacks. (To date, I have not heard of any Muslim Tatar elite troops on parade in Moscow although that may well come next as political correctness works its way from Kazan to the Kremlin.) Although the post-Soviet, Russian state and its power institutions proclaim that Russia is a multinational and multiconfessional state, traditional great Russian patriotism is the prevailing “unofficial” ideology and its symbols are widely displayed.

Conclusion and Reflections

I find myself in general agreement with the book’s Conclusion, written by Jennifer G. Mathers. She states that the chapters provide a wealth of information but neither apply nor test and criticize the SMI model. She therefore provides summaries of each chapter and some general comments about broad changes in the society-military equation. She concludes, “there are unmistakable signs of a shift in its balance.” 11 See Chapter 18, “Serving Under the Imperial Eagle” in R. V. Barylski , Op. cit.

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Although the shift is towards the modern European open society relations, Russian society is still far from that goal. I would argue that we need clearer benchmarks and standards for measuring progress towards that goal. We also need to address the Putin thesis that state strengthening is an integral part of progressive reform and that without it Russia could not develop into a modern democratic state.

During the 1990’s when I wrote The Soldier in Russian Politics, I was especially interested in progressive officers who wanted to bring their country and the Russian military into the European mainstream. I was also fascinated by some prominent, responsible conservative officers whose insights into the challenges the country faced had turned out to be quite perceptive. Russia had and still has progressive military professionals. There was and still is intelligent progressive life inside the military’s “authoritarian” institutions. The same must be said about the KGB; and Putin is a good example of this. Thus, I was pleased to see Webber and Zilberman discussing Lopatin, Rokhlin, and others (pp. 194-195) and beginning to develop the discourse about how reformers inside and outside the power institutions interact. Julian Cooper’s chapter also provides interesting information about this issue. We need to continue to build our understanding of how and why support for progressive change develops within authoritarian society and its most authoritarian institutions.

Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia is a solid contribution to the field. It provides rich interdisciplinary insights into society-military relations during a period when Russian power institutions were struggling to recover their corporate viability and emerging from the travails of the 1990’s.

Robert V. Barylski

University of South Florida

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David J. Betz, Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe, RoutledgeCurzon Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series 2, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. ix + 203 pages.

This meticulously-researched and well-written book provides a wealth of

detailed information and analysis about the development of civil-military relations during the 1990s in four post-Communist countries: Poland, Hungary, Russia and Ukraine. David Betz is interested primarily at the civilian side of the civil-military relationship, and throughout the book he poses questions (and suggests answers) about the nature and extent of civilian control of the armed forces and the reasons why civil-military relations in each of the four countries under scrutiny depart from democratic norms to a greater or lesser extent. In his research for the book, Betz has made extensive use of interviews with elite politicians, military officers, defence analysts and journalists in the countries concerned in order to “penetrate beneath the rhetoric to explore the reality of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe at a time of great change” (p. viii).

The book is divided into four chapters. The first (“Approaches to civil-military relations”) sets out the major theoretical positions on civil-military relations and discusses their implications for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during this period of transition. The author argues that the concept of civilian control of the armed forces essentially involves three inter-related themes, namely: civilian responsibility for directing military policy; an active role for civilians in defence policy-making and monitoring; and civilian oversight of the military through agencies such as parliamentary committees and national security councils. Each of the remaining three chapters is then used to explore one of these themes in considerable detail.

Chapter two (“Security policy-making and defence reform”) outlines the tasks of security policy-making and defence reform in the new environment facing these four countries after the end of the Cold War and indicates how well each managed this task in the face of reduced defence budgets. Very useful historical background is provided about the major components and functioning of a Soviet-type defence establishment as well as about the military forces of each country which sets the stage for the analysis of developments in the 1990s. The chapter goes into detail about the problems encountered and mistakes made in reform attempts.

Chapter three (“Civilian integration in the ministry of defence”) begins with an overview of a Soviet-type ministry of defence, with essentially no civilian involvement, and discusses the bumpy (and as yet incomplete) processes of integrating civilians undertaken in each of the four countries. Betz draws attention to the complexities inherent in civilianising a defence ministry, which amounts to far more than simply appointing a civilian defence minister. Instead, civilians need to be capable of exercising real influence on defence ministries, which in turn requires civilian expertise in military and security issues – expertise which was almost wholly absent in these countries during the period of Soviet control and has been very slow to develop subsequently. At the same time, the mistake was often made on both sides of the civil-military relationship of assuming that civilian control of the military equates to civilian command of a country’s armed forces.

Chapter four (“Agencies of civilian oversight”) focuses on those agencies of civilian oversight which exist outside the ministry of defence, such as parliamentary defence committees, military personnel commissions, security councils and military

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inspectorates. This chapter is particularly good at demonstrating the link between the functioning of institutions relevant to civil-military relations and the wider context of political developments in these countries, such as the relative constitutional and political strengths of the presidency and the parliament. For example, parliamentary scrutiny of the armed forces in Russia is seriously undermined by the fact that “neither the ministry of defence, nor any other ‘power ministries’ are required to report to parliament on their activities; the minister of defence is subordinate to the president and reports to him, not the legislature” (p. 137, emphasis in original). Another strength of this chapter lies in the use of material obtained through the author’s interviews with key insiders to illuminate the important gaps between the theory and practice of civil military relations. To take one example: “Neither the Ukrainian nor the Russian parliament exercised substantive and detailed oversight of security policy and defence spending in the period under review. While there is a constitutional provision for parliamentary oversight of the budget in both countries, in reality this mechanism does not work” (p. 138).

The book ends with a concluding chapter which discusses the impact of the prospect of NATO membership (or not) on the development of civil-military relations and institutions and also points towards some new directions in the theory of civil-military relations.

This book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of civil-military relations in post-Communist countries and also has insights to offer for the broader study of the relationship between militaries and societies. It is a work which will be useful for students and scholars alike who are seeking to get to grips with the details of developments in these four countries during a crucial stage in their transition towards fully-democratic rule.

Jennifer G. Mathers

University of Wales, Aberystwyth

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John Norris, Collision Course: NATO, Russian and Kosovo (foreword by Strobe Talbott). Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2005. 333 pages.

Recension requires thoroughness in reading and examining a book, including its cover.

In this connection, the cover of John Norris' book bodes ill for its content. A physical map with mountains, waterways, a few localities - most of which are half hidden by the title. However, enough of them can be made out (Argun, Aksay, Khasavyurt, Gudermes...) to understand that this is no map of Kosovo but that of Chechnya! Could anyone fail to suspect an unfortunate mistake, a slip of the pen confirming Russian geostrategists' worst nightmare : Chechnya after Kosovo, Russia after Yugoslavia? Luckily, John Norris' account and analysis of American diplomatic action during the Kosovo crisis - more exactly during the 78 days of NATO bombing over Yugoslavia - are a far cry from such clichés.

First and foremost, this is an eye-witness account. John Norris was part of a team led by Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, for the Americans in tripartite negotiations with Viktor Chernomyrdin for Russia and Mahti Ahtisaari, the Finnish president acting as third party, in an attempt to resolve the crisis.

Far from reconstructing the story of these events in a smooth and linear fashion, John Norris leads the reader into the ups and downs of diplomacy in extraordinary times. This is a rich testimony. Scripts of telephone conversations, anecdotes and portraits, especially those of Russian diplomats and officers (Aleksandr Avdeyev, Viktor Chernomyrdin, Georgy Mamedov, Boris Mayorski, Igor Ivanov, Yevgeny Barmyantsev, Leonid Ivashov, Viktor Zavarzin) are included not only to complete the account : they also help to present diplomacy in a human light.

Firstly, John Norris offers an inside view on American motivations and preoccupations during the crisis ; on the work carried out by American diplomacy to maintain fragile cohesion between the allies and NATO and, especially, to include Russia in the settlement of the conflict. This last aspect seems to have been the major concern for American diplomacy throughout the Kosovo crisis and, notably, in the case of the tripartite negotiations. In addition, this allows for an easier understanding of the book's NATO, Russia and Kosovo cross-title. In retrospect, this will to preserve Russia (at any price) or, more precisely, to preserve Russian power as personified by president Yeltsin, seems symptomatic of president Clinton's team's attitude with regard to Russia. This is most acutely borne out by the scripts of the tragicomic telephone conversations between the two presidents : "Clinton stressed that the situation was at a critical juncture and that Russia and the United States stood on the verge of a great achievement. Clinton immediately noticed that Yeltsin sounded either sick or drunk, or both, and the Russian president - not known for his mastery of English - answered some of questions even before they were translated..." (p. 216). More seriously, John Norris' description reveals all the ambivalence in relations between Russia and America during the 1990s. The situation was still charged with cold war memories, if only because the people in question were still partly the same or, at least, brought up during these bygone times ("Under his carefully appointed, almost effete, appearance, lay an un-reconstructed Soviet worldview." (p. 33) - as his description of the Deputy Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Avdeyev, reads), in a context where the imbalance was ever wider : on the one hand, American diplomacy in a position of strength, imposing its vision and not hesitating to stand against Russia without the approval of the Security Council ; on the other, Russian diplomacy in crisis, without any arguments to put forward in a situation too far removed from its direct interests. And yet, despite this imbalance, both parties seemed attached to maintaining an illusion of parity fooling no one any longer. "In short, we should keep in constant and close communication

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with Moscow, but not let them become deeply involved in a serious negotiation - for the sake of the US-Russian relationship." (Richard Holbrooke quoted p. 55).

The contrast between his description of the way American diplomacy functions and his outlook on the functioning of Russian diplomacy is equally gripping even if, of course, his viewpoint carries different weight in the two cases.

The picture he paints of the American decision-making process during the Cuban missile crisis bears some resemblance to Graham Allison's analyses during the said crisis. Indeed, we find different ingredients of 'Allisonian' analysis, whether it be elements of a rational approach, of the importance of political bargaining or of the role of organisational processes. With its exchanges and confrontation of ideas and difficult arbitration between solutions, all presenting defects, American diplomacy appeared as diplomacy in quest of its own identity, where taking a position of principle stands alongside gradual and practical adjustments. Power and influence struggles between personalities (between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and William Holbrooke or between Wesley Clark, commander-in-chief of NATO troops and Secretary of Defense William Cohen...) or between departments and agencies also played a part. In the end, however, the game was under control and the 'dysfunctioning' (with regard to a linear and vertical vision of rational decisions), allowing above all for the game to be kept open and leading to a practical optimum not disowned by John Norris.

In the Russian case, dysfunctioning took on a whole other dimension. Its real origins were to be found in the institutional and political chaos which seemed capable of overflowing, at any moment, as much domestically as internationally. The occupation of Slatina airport, by a small contingent of Russian troops coming from Bosnia, was a clear illustration of the political chaos in Russia : neither the Defense Minister, nor the Foreign Minister, nor even the Russian President's Special envoy seemed to have been included in the secret surrounding this initiative, as well as its possible consequences.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that this institutional and political chaos in Russia, pointed out by John Norris, was also, paradoxically, the Russian President's major trump card, as much on the diplomatic front as on that of politics at home. The political weakness of the Russian president was, first of all, a major argument in negotiations with the United States and Boris Yeltsin played it to the hilt: Yeltsin to Clinton: "You know that I am hearing concerns by our military who are talking about getting military servicemen to go and help Milosevic [...]. Yeltsin continued to stress the difficulty of the situation and how he was doing his best to cooperate." (p. 67). The President's weakness, both physical and political, resulted in real vagueness concerning the powers and attributions of the various Russian negotiators : the President's Special envoy, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister..., a highly destabilising situation both for the Russian political participants themselves and for their American counterparts : "Gore pleaded to have Yeltsin call Ivanov and give him clear instructions. While Chernomyrdin was sympathetic, he mentioned sheepishly that he was not able to directly contact President Yeltsin." (p. 217). But was it not this vagueness which, in a certain manner, allowed Boris Yeltsin to maintain his influence and control over domestic politics, by giving him the possibility of disavowing (and discrediting) or, on the contrary, taking credit for his subordinates' initiatives? In this fashion Boris Yeltsin, after several days' silence, was able to revindicate instigating the “Trojan Horse” operation aimed at occupying Slatina airport. And Boris Yeltsin came paradoxically strengthened out of an internal political crisis, which was seemingly to signal his political doom, and an international political crisis seen as a real slap in the face for Russian diplomacy in the 1990s. Some months later, after organising the question of his succession, he left power head held high.

Finally, John Norris' work offers a useful extra layer of information for those who followed these events closely. For those who followed them a little less closely, it is a

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fascinating look behind the scenes of American diplomacy and American-Russian relations. For everybody, it brings a fresh, stimulating view of events which are sufficiently recent to be part of our history and of participants who are not all retired yet, …or only just.

Guillaume Colin

Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris

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Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (Eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe – Process and Progress, DCAF – Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces/ LIT, 2004.

The book is divided in two parts: the introduction and conclusion (by Marina Caparini

and Otwin Marenin) and several case studies of individual police organizations in Central and Eastern Europe. In the introduction, Caparini and Marenin emphasise the importance of the police in a democratic society. The main function of the police – the provision of security – is one of the basic demands laid against the state by its society. Democratic policing is described in the first part of the introduction, analyzing in details the notions of legitimacy, professionalism and accountability, as the main parts of democratic policing. Caparini and Marenin emphasize that even a professional and accountable police force will not become legitimized if it fails in its major functions of maintaining order, neutral enforcement of laws, provision of security and protection of people and property without discrimination or bias.

The main question in this book is how to implement democratic policing or what is the situation with democratic policing in the transitional countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where policing served (and still serves) the needs of the state and the ruling group, and was heavily politicised and militarized in orientation, structure and equipment.

The country chapters examine how reforms have been implemented over the last 14 years since the dissolution of the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The question is “what has really changed in these systems of policing ?”. The basic goal of the contributions is to assess (to a certain extent) the police reforms in the studied countries, - what has been done and what remains to be achieved in order to make policing system more democratic and effective. Each of the scholars from Central and Eastern Europe tries to describe the situation in his country. They focus on several topics. The first is the description of reforms and changes in police organization since 1989 in five areas (goals, legal status and powers of police, organizational structures and policies, operational policies and work patterns, and supervision and accountability mechanisms). Secondly, the contributors were asked to assess and evaluate the implementation and success of reforms in the areas of democratization, legitimization, and to determine what problems and obstacles still exist to further reforms. In this part, the question raised is also the integration of reforms in state – society relations. The last general question is “what insights for theory and policy do the descriptions and evaluations of police reforms suggest ?”

The book seems to be comprehensive and fits also into bridging the gap of contemporary knowledge on policing, especially in this area of Europe, where we are facing largely a one-way street from West to East. The approach could lead to modifications of existing views on what works in reforming the police, converting a one-way street into a circle of mutual learning, a reciprocal flow of information, a feedback loop in which all those who study and practice policing participate and share information and advice.

The main part of the book consists of the case studies of 14 Central and Eastern European countries, grouped in four chapters: Central Europe (The Czech Republic, former GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), South-eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania), Western Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia), and Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine). The majority of the contributors are prominent scholars from the country they write about, except for Eastern Europe, where authors have significant experience with policing in Russia and Ukraine.

Upon the analysis, presented for each included country, Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin in the last chapter conclude that the reforms of police organizations in Central and

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Eastern Europe have not produced the expected results; much remains to be done and what remains is probably the most difficult aspect of reforms. The conclusion is that reforms at the surface matter but they are only the beginning of a progress. The authors emphasize that only changes in structural conditions which surround and determine the nature and work of the police as well as changes in the habits of the police during their interactions with the public will constitute a progress towards a democratic form.

There is a general consensus among the authors that police reforms in Central and Eastern Europe include learning the language of democracy. It requires more time to start implementing goals, facilitate values, implement good practices and use the appropriate models into sustainable police progress.

In the conclusion, Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin, state that one of the real gaps in these chapters is the minor absence of the voice of street level police officers – (what they think about reform matters), for they will have to implement reforms, convert the rhetoric into practice. Police officers’ views would add a significant piece of information which goes beyond a rhetoric of democratic policing.

Although more research is needed on policing in this rapidly changing area of Europe, we can say that the book Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe – Process and Progress provides a valuable overview of the status of police reforms throughout Central and Eastern Europe and is adding significant information to the general knowledge about policing in a part of the world that used to be tabula rasa for scholars and police practitioners in the last decades, especially for those who belong to a prevailing English-speaking criminological community.

Gorazd Meško & Branko Lobnikar

Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor, Slovenia