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THE MOZAL PROJECT Sagnik Chakraborty (A015) Ashutosh Chaturvedi (A016) Sonal Choudhary (A017) Harsh Dingwani (A018) Vishal Garg (A019) Rahul Goel (A020) Varun Goel (A021)

The Mozal Project

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Page 1: The Mozal Project

THE MOZAL PROJECT

Sagnik Chakraborty (A015)Ashutosh Chaturvedi (A016)Sonal Choudhary (A017)Harsh Dingwani (A018)Vishal Garg (A019)Rahul Goel (A020)Varun Goel (A021)

Page 2: The Mozal Project

Aluminum Industry

• Aluminum– Light, resistant to corrosion, good heat and electrical

conductivity– Wide variety of metal forming and fabricating techniques

• Extraction process– Bauxite -> Alumina Refining -> Aluminum Smelting

Page 3: The Mozal Project

Why Mozambique ?

• Starting new enterprise : could take 5 years• Lower per-capita income• High country risk• High indebtness• Applied for HIPC debt initiative

• Attractive power tariffs• Cheap labor• Investment incentives

Page 4: The Mozal Project

Mozal Project

• $1.4 bn project• Interests of Eskom, Alusaf and Mozambican government• Major inputs :

– Alumina : imported from Billiton 25yr supply agreement– Electricity : Eskom will supply 25yr agreement– Labor : Skilled -> South Africa, Unskilled -> Mozambique– Other raw materials : same suppliers as that for Hillside smelter– Plant for industrial free zone -> no taxes except for 1% sales tax

• Combination of Equity, Sub-ordinated debt, Senior debt• Banks - need of IFC

Page 5: The Mozal Project

Should Alusaf/Gencor invest in the Mozal project ?

Page 6: The Mozal Project

Strategic Benefits

• Market Opportunity– To rebuild Mozambique’s damaged infrastructure

• Strong footing in South Africa– Hill Side Smelter

• $360 million under budget• Four months ahead of schedule• Mozal will access the same resources

• Support from Government of Mozambique– Industrial Free Zone

• Exemption from custom duties and income tax• Sales Tax of only 1% is levied

Page 7: The Mozal Project

• Currency Exposure– All the inputs and the outputs are denominated in U.S. dollars

• Competitive and Reliable Electric Supply– Power drawn from Eskom’s South Africa Grid– Long term and attractive electricity prices– Availability of hydroelectric power

• Key elements in Aluminum Production– Alumina import on a long term deal– Labor costs– Hill side suppliers

• Low Production Costs– Based on the operating plan, the production cost of Mozal in the

lowest 5% of industry capacity

Page 8: The Mozal Project

• Current Ratio– The current ratio for all the projected years is comfortably above

1.33

• Debt Service Coverage Ratio– DSCR of the company for the following years is falling within

comfortable limits

Financial Benefits

Yr ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12

CR 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 4.0 3.2 7.1 12.8

16.1

Yr ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12

DSCR

4.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.4 2.2 1.8 3.4 5.2

Page 9: The Mozal Project

What are the greatest risks ? Have they been adequately discussed ?

Page 10: The Mozal Project

Risks

• Risks can be divided into 4 categories:-– Pre-completion risks: Technological risk and Completion risk– Post-completion risks: Operational Risk– Sovereign risks– Financial risks

Page 11: The Mozal Project

Pre-completion Risks

• Technological Risk– Reliability of the technology– Ability of the sponsors to handle such risks to prevent cost

overruns or construction delays• Risk Mitigation

– Mozal would use proven, state-of-the art smelting technology ,Pechiney technology from France, that was used in the Hillside smelter

– Alusaf was the subsidiary of the South African Gencor group, which was the world’s fourth largest aluminum producer

– Gencor had successfully completed the Hillside smelter-which was, at that time, the world’s largest greenfield aluminum smelter

Page 12: The Mozal Project

Pre-completion Risks

• Completion Risk– Complex bureaucratic processes in Mozambique may delay

getting the necessary permits to proceed with the construction– Conditions of insufficiency of basic infrastructure may slow

down the construction efforts• Risk Mitigation

– Establishment of a special liaison committee by government– Infrastructure development for electricity supply by Eskom and

EdM– Employment of the same project management team ,as Hillside

smelter, under similar agreements

Page 13: The Mozal Project

Post-completion Risks

• Operational Risk• Fluctuations in prices of alumina, which accounted for

33% of total production costs• Fluctuations in prices of electricity, which accounted for

25% of total production costs• Availability of other raw materials such as coke,

petroleum etc.• Labor Issues• Demand Uncertainty• Currency Exposure

Page 14: The Mozal Project

Post-completion Risks

• Risk Mitigation– Input prices are function of LME aluminum prices, when output

prices are high input prices would be high and vice-versa– 25 year supply contract with Eskom and EdM for electricity

supply– Long term purchase contract with sponsors– Initial skilled labor and management expertise from South Africa– Majority of unskilled low cost labor would come from

Mozambique– Other inputs would be supplied from the same contractors who

supplied the Hillside smelter under similar long-term contracts– Major inputs and all outputs would be denominated in U.S.

dollars

Page 15: The Mozal Project

Sovereign Risk

• Risk of Expropriation – Sovereign risk was the most important reason that

Gencor/Alusaf chose to finance the project via project financing, as opposed to corporate financing, in order to minimize their risk exposure and be able to raise capital

– Creeping Expropriation:- Gov’t may remove the privileges that the smelter would be exempt from customs duties and income taxes

– It is likely that the Government may change the 1% sales tax, which is more critical than the income tax

Page 16: The Mozal Project

Sovereign Risk

• Risk Mitigation– Project was structured in a way to ensure that an expropriation

would have international consequences– International suppliers:- power from Eskom of South Africa,

alumina from Billiton’s Australian operations, raw materials such as coke, petroleum etc would also be imported.

– Any expropriation will jeopardize its relationship with all these countries

– Involvement of IFC, a member of the world bank group reduces the risk of expropriation

– Expropriation will have impact on future flows from development fund

Page 17: The Mozal Project

Impact on the Economy

• Increase exports by $430 million• Increase GDP by $157 million(by 9%)• Increase net foreign exchange by $161million per year• 5000 construction jobs and 873 permanent jobs• Develop human capital through managerial, health and other skills

training• Improve infrastructure and spur investment along Maputo corridor• AIDS awareness program• Additional housing• Commercial ties with local businesses to bolster Mozambican economy• Due to the a large number of benefits to the economy , the government

would not act against the interest of the project

Page 18: The Mozal Project

• Political Instability• Risk of war: not completely eliminated • Bureaucratic hurdles• Underdeveloped infrastructure

• According to the World Economic Forum, out of the 20 African countries surveyed, Mozambique ranked last in terms of road infrastructure, legal effectiveness and second to last in terms of openness to trade and time and expense needed to obtain permits and licenses

Page 19: The Mozal Project

Financial Risk

• It was uncertain from where the 50% of equity would come and who would buy 50% of the output

• None of the lenders had committed any funds even though the sponsors had held preliminary discussions with a series of banks and development agencies

• Lot of dependence on the involvement of IFC

• Risk Mitigation• A French ECA supporting the use of the French technology was expected to

provide 85% insurance for loans from French banks, and IDC was in advance discussions with the South African ECA for insurance for $400 M senior debt

• The French ECA may be more willing to bear the political risk than banks do because it attaches a higher value to the project in order to be able to export the technology

• The South African ECA may be more willing to bear the political risk than banks do because it attaches a higher value to the project in order to be able to promote the south African exports

• The appraisal from IFC concluded that the project was viable and had financial and economic rate of return

Page 20: The Mozal Project

Will the sponsors be able to finance the deal ?

Page 21: The Mozal Project

Structure of the deal

Page 22: The Mozal Project

Equity structure

Mozal was a joint venture between Alusaf and IDC of South Africa

Alusaf $125 million• The aluminum subsidiary of the Gencor group, a South African natural

resource company• Built world’s largest greenfield aluminum smelter, Hillside smelter in

South Africa

IDC(Industrial Development Corporation) $125 million• $3.6bn government owned development bank of South Africa• Longstanding business relationship with Alusaf

Prospective Participant – Mitsubishi Corporation ------• $78bn Japanese industrial conglomerate with large metals group

Page 23: The Mozal Project

Subordinated Debt

IFC $65 million• World bank group promoting private sector development in

developing countries• Finance projects which have private ownership, are commercially

viable, environmentally sound and provide significant development benefits to the local economy

• 10% of all project finance deals occurred in countries with rating less than 25

• Also acts as a development lender by appraising prospective projects, structuring the legal and financial documents, providing long-term capital, and deterring sovereign interference

Other development Institutions $85 million

Page 24: The Mozal Project

Senior debt

Export Credit $540 million• IDC and Coface arranged ECA (Export Credit Agency) covered finance• IDC in discussion with CGIC, South African ECA to provide insurance

for $400mn of senior debt• $140 million Coface insured finance

Loans $140 million• IFC to provide $55 million• Other Development institutions to provide $85 million• Coface to provide 85% cover for loans made by French banks

Page 25: The Mozal Project

Favourable factors

• Sponsors assembled a group of international lenders comprised of– major financial institutions, – development banks, – export credit agencies, and – multi-lateral agencies [e.g. the IFC and the World Bank—the

“lender of last resort” for developing countries] as a deterrent against expropriation

• Thus, the structural and institutional approach to risk management by the sponsors discourages sovereign interference. This would encourage lenders to be a part of the deal. Thus, the structure of the deal seems to be viable and favourable for the success of the project. And thus, sponsors will be able to finance the project

Page 26: The Mozal Project

How does IFC involvement affect the deal ?

Page 27: The Mozal Project

About IFC

• A member of World bank group founded in the year 1956 and owned by more than 172 member countries.

• World’s largest multilateral source of debt and equity financing for private sectors project.

• Promoted Pvt. Sector investment in developing countries • Unlike other multilateral development institutions, IFC’s loans

were not backed by sovereign guarantees and the capital was paid-in rather than callable on demand.

Page 28: The Mozal Project

The Affect

• IFC brings credibility to the project and provides reassurance to potential lender– Project Appraisal– Environment and Social Impact Assessment– Due diligence – high risk projects

• ‘Honest Broker’ – IFC had a reputation for being fair to all parties in the deal by reducing the incentive for short term opportunistic behaviour

• Help in other aspects of the deal like the integration of the diverse legal system followed in Mozambique and other countries

• Completion guarantees: They could also help to structure the contractual terms to define financial and technical performance

Page 29: The Mozal Project

• From the financing angle:– IFC provided loans with longer maturities matching the

long project lives.– It was willing to lend on subordinated basis.– IFC gave greater emphasis to development benefits

• IFC played a big role in preventing adverse sovereign action and its involvement reduces political risk

Page 30: The Mozal Project

Will the IFC and the sponsors share similar objectives ?

Page 31: The Mozal Project

Mitsubishi

Equity provider and will share the output (large metal

group)

IDC Sustainable

development of SA by promoting

private enterprises

IFC Promotion of private sector investments in developing countries as a way to reduce

poverty and improve people’s lives

Alusaf Returns from

the project, proximity to Hillside smelter, inputs at attractive rates

Govt of Moz was actively trying to improve climate for private sector

investment

Eskom Wanted to expand its operations

outside SA and utilize its excess

capacity

French Export Credit Agency

Supporting the use of Pechiney technology

Page 32: The Mozal Project

Objectives of IFC

• Mission statement – promoting private sector investments in developing countries as a way to reduce poverty and improve people’s life.

• High risk projects – invest in those projects which nobody else wants to finance.

• Developing human capital among Mozambicans through managerial , health and other skills training.

• Providing critical infrastructure and spur investments along the Maputo corridor.

• Generate future investments in other private sector ventures.

Page 33: The Mozal Project

• New Smelter – at competitively priced power• Profit motive – cheap availability of inputs like alumina, raw

materials, electricity and labor• Risks mitigation – risks had been identified and had been

dealt with appropriately• Establishing commercial ties with local businesses

Objectives of Alusaf

Page 34: The Mozal Project