Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
This article was downloaded by: [University of Western Ontario]On: 07 October 2014, At: 17:15Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK
Journal of Strategic MarketingPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjsm20
The nature and dynamicsof counter-implementationin strategic marketing: apropositional inventoryLisa C. ThomasPublished online: 10 Jan 2011.
To cite this article: Lisa C. Thomas (2002) The nature and dynamics of counter-implementation in strategic marketing: a propositional inventory, Journal of StrategicMarketing, 10:3, 189-204
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02652540210151379
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and viewsexpressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of theContent should not be relied upon and should be independently verified withprimary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of theContent.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is
expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
The nature and dynamics of counter-implementation in strategic marketing:a propositional inventory
LISA C. THOMASCardiff Business School, Aberconway Building, Column Drive, Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK
This paper highlights the idea that a broader perspective is needed in researchinto barriers to marketing implementation. It is suggested that this broaderperspective should take account of contextual and behavioural issues along withan acknowledgement of implementation as a process. The nature and dynamics ofcounter-implementation are introduced and a propositional inventory that explicatessuch behaviour as encompassing actions that may be both intentional and unintentionalin nature is developed. These actions may occur at the individual and group level as theyevolve over the implementation process and may be both constructive and destructiveto organizational performance. Particular emphasis is given to intentional counter-implementation behaviour in terms of how it initiates, manifests and develops, gainingmomentum through the transition from individual level action to collective action and,therefore, greater potential leverage for successfully sabotaging implementation efforts.The paper offers implications for management and a research agenda is proposed thathighlights content, context and process perspectives for future research in this area, aswell as potential methodologies for future research.
KEYWORDS: Counter-implementation; behavioural barriers; sabotage; power; politics
INTRODUCTION
Organizations today are faced with rapidly changing environments that call for frequentchange. Implementation is considered a key concern in the management of strategic change.Without effective implementation, the bene� ts of the strategic plan may not be realized.Inherent in any programme of change is the human dimension. Change increases anxiety amongthose tasked with its implementation as it presents the unknown and individuals must � ndnew ways of managing their own environments. Change disrupts and undermines existingforms of management and control and poses the possibility of upsetting or modifying the balanceof power among individuals and groups within an organization. Con� ict and resistance arepervasive features of organizational life (Buchanan and Badham, 1999). However, changecan provoke intentionally resistant behaviours, which may decrease the effectiveness of anyimplementation effort.
Academic interest in strategic marketing implementation has received greater attentionin recent years (Cravens, 1998; Gummesson, 1998; Noble and Mokwa, 1999), with a general
JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC MARKETING 10 189–204 (2002)
Journal of Strategic Marketing ISSN 0965–254X print/ISSN 1446–4488 online © 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltdhttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/02652540210151379
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
consensus that research must highlight a ‘broader perspective’. Previously implementation hadbeen neglected, with research emphasis placed more commonly on the actual process of strategyformulation. To this end academic and practitioner studies focused on the content of plans andthe use of techniques, structures and frameworks in the process of marketing management. Lackof knowledge and skills in the use of basic tools and techniques of marketing planning, such asproduct life cycle analysis, market segmentation and portfolio management, were found to bekey barriers to marketing planning and, therefore, implementation (McDonald, 1992). However,it has been argued more recently that, in order to manage marketing within organizations better,this broader perspective should incorporate an understanding of the organizational context andbehavioural issues as well as the more formal analytical frameworks (Piercy and Morgan, 1994;Noble, 1999; Dibb and Simkin, 2000). To this end a number of studies adopted perspectives thataddressed issues that may impede successful implementation through focusing on context (Guptaand Govindarajan, 1984; Walker and Ruekert, 1987; Skivington and Daft, 1991) and behaviour(Lyles and Lenz, 1982; Hutt et al., 1988; Frankwick et al., 1994).
The concept of ‘counter-implementation’ emerges as a recurring barrier to implementationand is viewed most often as behaviour that deliberately attempts to subvert such efforts(Guth and MacMillan, 1986; Connors and Romberg, 1991). Despite studies on the typesof employee resistance in the labour process literature (Knights and McCabe, 1998) counter-implementation in the strategic management and marketing literature is given limited treatment.However, a number of studies have acknowledged its occurrence and cited examples of a varietyof manifestations of such behaviour. These studies point to the motivations behind intentionalcounter-effort as being essentially political in nature (Buchanan and Badham, 1999) andoccurring through the exercise of power according to individuals’ self-interests (Greiner andSchein, 1988). Other studies referred to a lack of trust and commitment to organizational goalsand leaders as possible motivation for employees engaging in more destructive organizationalbehaviours (Gilbert and Li-Ping, 1998). Psychological constraints brought about throughincreased uncertainty on behalf of those tasked with implementation are also cited as amotivation for counter-implementation (Reichman and Levy, 1975). Notwithstanding thistreatment of counter-implementation, the literature is limited in terms of an in-depthexploration of its nature and dynamics within strategic marketing and particularly as regardsintentional counter-effort.
As change is now a fact of organizational life, impetus for changing strategies and structures iscreated within organizations in an attempt to realign to new environmental settings. This maycall for organization-wide changes or changes within organizational subunits. Employees fortheir part are required to adjust to new organizational con� gurations through implementationinitiatives that will enable organizations to take control of new environmental opportunities.Changes to product and market strategies call for the implementation of initiatives, which arelikely to increase anxiety as employees are faced with a new status quo. Due to uncertainty abouttheir new roles, employees are likely to engage in resistant behaviour. Although certain resistantbehaviours can be regarded as part of organizational life and may be passive and unintentionalas employees try to get to grips with new methods of working, other behaviours may bedeliberately counter to any implementation initiative. In extreme cases such subversive behaviourmay even lead to sabotage as organizational members attempt to protect their self-interests andmaintain the existing status quo.
The aim of this paper is to explore the nature and dynamics of counter-implementationand its occurrence in strategic marketing. Building on the existing literature a propositionalinventory that explicates the facets of counter-implementation is developed. The nature of
190 THOMAS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
counter-implementation is de� ned as encompassing actions that may be both intentional andunintentional. Employing a process perspective, intentional counter-implementation is thendiscussed in terms of how it initiates, develops and diffuses.
The practical contribution of this paper to the domain of strategic marketing lies not only inits generation of further understanding of the nature and dynamics of counter-implementation,but in providing greater awareness on behalf of senior managers of the motivations andconsequences of intentional counter-implementation. Potentially, this allows the pre-emption ofdysfunctional behaviour, thereby allowing managers to employ strategies to counter suchbehaviour before it is too late. Insights as to when and how such behaviour is likely to manifest,develop and dissipate over time are highlighted. Such an understanding should aid managementin more effective smoothing of any implementation initiatives.
The paper aims to build on existing theory relating to behavioural barriers in strategicmarketing and, therefore, extend current understanding of counter-implementation. In sodoing, deeper insights are provided regarding intentional counter-efforts throughout theimplementation process, an area that has received limited treatment in the literature. It ishoped that this paper will stimulate further interest and debate not only in strategic marketing,but also in the areas of strategic management and organizational behaviour. A researchagenda is proposed highlighting content, context and process perspectives for future research inthe area.
STRATEGIC MARKETING IMPLEMENTATION
Bias towards planning processes over implementation methods still dominates the strategicmanagement literature and limited empirical research is reported in the strategy literature thatpertains to the implementation process (Parsa, 1999). However, there are a number of descrip-tions of the implementation process. Steiner and Miner (1977) described the process as involvingthe design and management of systems in order to achieve the best integration of people,structures, processes and resources in reaching the organization’s goals and objectives. The startof the process is also important to de� ne and is generally thought to begin after a strategicdecision has been made and carried through all the intermediate steps until performanceachieves what the strategic decisions have intended (Alexander, 1985). In a synthesis of theliterature on strategic implementation, Noble (1999) stated that strategy implementation is‘a multi-faceted, complex process de� ned as the communication, interpretation, adoptionand enactment of strategic plans’ (p. 120). In order that plans are adopted it is important todiscover the barriers to implementation and, in particular, behavioural problems. Thus a ‘broaderresearch’ perspective is required that not only incorporates analytical techniques and frameworksbut also contextual issues (Piercy and Morgan, 1994; Simkin, 1996; Noble, 1999). Lack of skillsand ability in employing analytical techniques of planning thereby producing barriers toimplementation is widely cited in the literature (McDonald, 1992; Dibb and Simkin, 2001).Although a number of studies have focused on contextual issues as they affect the outcome ofimplementation initiatives few have explicitly focused on counter-implementation and how it ismanifested and initiates and evolves over the implementation process.
Contextual in� uences on implementation
Contextual issues focus on organizational climate and refer to the degree of market orientation, sup-portiveness and formalization of the planning process, con� ict mechanisms and communication
COUNTER-IMPLEMENTATION IN STRATEGIC MARKETING 191
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
processes in place, task complexity and time frames for effecting implementation (Martin, 1987;Bonoma and Crittenden, 1988; Noble, 1999).
Whilst acknowledgement is given to the importance of analytical techniques, Martin (1987)emphasized that these are entwined with the human context and must be consideredsimultaneously in any attempt to analyse such outcomes of plan use and plan performance.Bonoma and Crittenden (1988), for example, found that a � rm’s structure and the skills of itsmanagers would frequently determine strategies. In this respect the complexity of the tasks thatmarketing faces suggests whether skills should dominate over other variables. Further studiesof contextual issues have focused on structure and pertain to the con� guration of roles andprocedures, control and reward systems, functional competencies, participation and resourceallocation and how these affect implementation outcomes (Anderson, 1982; Walker andRuekert, 1987; Skivington and Daft, 1991).
Walker and Ruekert (1987) focused on the internal � ts between strategy and structure andpolicies and procedures that are best suited to implementing a given strategy, while Skivingtonand Daft (1991) proposed a framework that included both structural and systems-relatedvariables in conjunction with process variables. Such variables included interactions andsanctions in an attempt to understand the diversity of implementation mechanisms within anorganization. A number of studies have emphasized employee-centred issues in the discussion ofcontext and incorporated management style and skills, employee perceptions and attitudestowards planning and a sense of priority, commitment and political in� uences (Greenley, 1988;Connors and Romberg, 1991; Frankwick et al., 1994; Piercy and Morgan, 1994).
These studies reported that an understanding of political in� uences, con� ict and communi-cations dif� culties is critical to understanding strategy formulation and decision making. Itis suggested that a more complete process is called for that recognizes the impact of both theindividual managers’ roles in implementation and the broader organizational context onthe effective operation of the planning process. All of these contextual issues have been studiedin an attempt to effectuate implementation better and failure to consider these may lead to thenon-adoption and enactment of the strategic marketing plan (Martin, 1987).
Implementation as a process
The contemporary view of marketing implementation in the literature is that it be regarded as aprocess and not as an activity that follows from and is shaped by strategy formulation (Nutt,1983; Bourgeois and Brodin, 1984; Piercy and Giles, 1990; Moorman and Miner, 1998). Nutt’s(1983) claim that ‘implementation can be tied to planning through change agent, planner andparticipation managed processes’ (p. 601) highlighted the process perspective of implementation.Bourgeois and Brodin (1984) identi� ed � ve models of implementation from the literatureaccording to the different contexts on which the approaches rest. Of the � ve models, twomodels, cultural and crescive, are said to involve decision making and implementation almostsimultaneously. In fact, Moorman and Miner (1998) questioned the formal composition andexecution of marketing plans and suggested that, in some cases, composition and executionaction converge in time so that they occur simultaneously. The process perspective also suggeststhat decision making passes from an individual level to coalition decision making throughgaining prior group commitment, thereby ultimately leading to simultaneity of formulation andimplementation (Hutt et al., 1988; Priem, 1990; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989). Hutt et al. (1988)talked about the autonomous initiatives that managers often assume in nurturing innovativeactivity within a � rm. Such initiatives mean that the planning process undertaken may take a
192 THOMAS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
different route, one that is more informal and political in nature than the more formal,organizational-induced rational approach. The process is often illogical and irrational and isessentially political in nature in an attempt to gain consensus. Wooldridge and Floyd (1989)argued that variations in the strategic process help to explain when consensus is positively ornegatively related to organizational performance. Two process types were identi� ed: ‘synoptic’models and ‘incremental’ models. Synoptic models assume a rational approach to decisionmaking whilst incremental models portray strategic decision making as a non-comprehensiveprocess. This latter view is linked to the assumption that decision makers have limited capacityfor processing information, that organizations are political entities and that strategy often resultsfrom autonomous initiatives. Goals and methods are determined through an informal,unconventional process of networking, bargaining and negotiation in politicized power-basedprocesses and manipulative manoeuvrings in order to achieve consensus (Bonoma, 1988; Hutt etal., 1988). A review of the literature suggests a clear link between context provoking behaviouralproblems and, therefore, gaining a more comprehensive understanding of these problems andhow they evolve throughout the implementation process is essential for efforts at smoothingmarketing implementation.
COUNTER-IMPLEMENTATION
A de� nition of counter-implementation is proposed from a review of the literature thathighlights cases where such behaviour may be intentional or unintentional. Analysis is thenfocused on the motivations for intentional counter-effort and the consequences that suchbehaviour is likely to result in. As current studies in strategic marketing suggest implementationbe regarded as a process, counter-implementation is discussed from a process perspective,providing an understanding of how intentional counter-effort may develop over time from theindividual level to the group level in an attempt to gain momentum and how greater potentialfor success in subverting any implementation initiative may arise. Finally an analysis of when andunder what circumstances such behaviour is likely to diffuse is presented.
Counter-implementation: a de� nition
Counter-implementation encompasses a variety of different resistant behaviours that are motivatedby anxiety on behalf of those tasked with or involved in the implementation process. Such behaviourmay be motivated intentionally or unintentionally, but all may reduce the effectiveness of strategicimplementation efforts.
The above de� nition highlights the idea that counter-implementation involves resistantbehaviour on behalf of those employees tasked with implementation. This suggests that suchbehaviour may manifest at a number of different levels within the organization. Middle managersmay resist decisions made by senior managers and operations staff may resist the directivesof middle or line managers. Regardless of the level of occurrence of such behaviour, theimplementation process is rendered less successful. The de� nition also suggests that resistantbehaviour may take two forms. On the one hand, such behaviour can be regarded as passive andunplanned insofar as there is no deliberate attempt to render the process ineffective. On theother hand however, resistant behaviour maybe intentional whereby employees deliberatelyattempt to subvert the process. Both forms of resistant behaviour may occur at any stage of theimplementation process. Figure 1 illustrates the nature and dynamics of counter-implementation.
COUNTER-IMPLEMENTATION IN STRATEGIC MARKETING 193
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
FIGURE 1. The nature and dynamics of counter-implementation.
Of increasing signi� cance in attempting to understand counter-implementation are the social,psychological and political processes among the individuals engaged in a planning process.Indeed, as Reichman and Levy (1975) stated ‘perhaps the most serious obstacle to successfulplanning is the opposition of the planner to what he is doing’ (p. 38). Thus, the followingproposition arises.
P1: Counter-implementation encompasses a variety of different behaviours such as shorttermism and a failure to think beyond day-to-day activities, consensus avoidance,delaying tactics, withholding information, diversions of resources and outright con� ictand sabotage. Whilst all of these behaviours may impede implementation, they are notnecessarily conscious and planned, but may be unintentional and spontaneous.
Contradictions within management strategies mean that employees have to continuallyinterpret the tasks they are set. These interpretations may lead to acts of resistance that arenot always necessarily a challenge to management (Knights and McCabe, 1998). Reichman andLevy’s (1975) study of the psychological restraints of planning pointed to the process producingunconscious emotional con� icts that were categorized as authority con� ict, fear of uncertainty,fear of failure and indecisiveness con� ict. Con� icts raise anxieties in those involved in theplanning process and may lead to resistant behaviour.
194 THOMAS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
Resistant behaviour may involve avoidance and uncertainty of planning, short termism,consensus avoidance, delaying tactics, denial of uncertainty, politics and myopia, all of which canwork counter to successful implementation (Lyles and Lenz, 1982; Piercy, 1989; Piercy andMorgan, 1994). Such behaviour may be unintentional and passive in the form of short termismand myopia with a failure to think beyond day-to-day activities (Lyles and Lenz, 1982; Piercyand Morgan, 1994). Further examples are illustrated through poor quality administration of theplanning process, lack of necessary information for acting or lack of an understanding of thosebehaviours required due to unclear expectations and inappropriate time frames (Miller, 1997;Simkin, 1996). In this sense there is no deliberate attempt to resist implementation initiatives onbehalf of those tasked with implementation, though the results will still likely act as barriers toimplementation. What is of greater signi� cance and the particular emphasis of this paperis deliberate resistant behaviour given the potentially serious consequences of such behavioursfor organizations.
Motivations for intentional counter-implementation
The literature on counter-implementation suggests that there are certain behaviours that aim atsabotaging implementation efforts and that these behaviours are deliberate and subversive innature (Guth and MacMillan, 1986; Connors and Romberg, 1991; Harris, 1996). Resistance inthis case takes the form of managers putting little effort into implementation if they believe theyhave a low probability of performing successfully and performance has a low probability ofachieving the desired outcome or the desired outcome does not satisfy individual goals and,hence, self-interests (Guth and MacMillan, 1986). Guth and MacMillan’s (1986) studycategorized counter-effort as either taking a position on alternatives being proposed duringdecision making or resisting decisions after a decision has been made. The suggestion is thatmiddle managers with low or negative commitment to strategies formulated by senior manage-ment create signi� cant obstacles to effective implementation. A number of tactics for obstructingimplementation may be deployed, for example withholding information from line staff,dominating meetings with personal agendas, refusing to consider worker contributions and, insome cases, cancelling meetings that are designed for imparting information to co-workers,attempts to divert resources, goal de� ection techniques, outright con� ict and sabotage (Connorsand Romberg, 1991; Harris, 1996; Agocs, 1997). In a synthesis of the literature of counter-productive behaviour, Harris and Ogbonna (2002) noted a number of terms and phrases that areused for referring to such behaviour. An underlying suggestion of irrationality is found to beprevalent in phrases such as ‘deviant behaviour’ and ‘dysfunctional behaviour’. In Harris andOgbonna’s (2002) study of service sabotage, the term sabotage was used for denoting organiz-ational members’ behaviours that are intentionally designed to affect particular outcomesnegatively.
In an attempt to explicate the motivations of intentional counter-implementation usefully, itis possible to categorize group motivations as belonging to one of four types: politics, power,psychological constraints and trust. Each of the four types is discussed below.
Organizational politics play an important role in motivating counter-implementation in thesense that individuals and groups manoeuvre in order to protect their power bases and authorityand, ultimately, their positions within an organization (see Hutt et al., 1988). The bene� ts andcosts of project sponsorship are weighed up in terms of personal and subunit goals in light of theorganizations’ reward and measurement systems. Management self-interest determines the degreeof commitment to implementation and acts as a motivator of counter-implementation (see Guth
COUNTER-IMPLEMENTATION IN STRATEGIC MARKETING 195
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
and MacMillan, 1986). Thus, power and politics act as important in� uences on counter-implementation. Political behaviour is conjoined to the level or degree of change beingattempted or, for example, the strategic marketing initiative being implemented. Kumar andThibodeaux (1990) regarded organizational change as a continuum of relationships comprisingthree levels or degrees of change and the higher the level of change the larger its scope andthe greater the impact of the outcomes associated with it. First-level change according to thisconceptualization consists of those interventions that target limited aspects of a single subsystem,unit or department without any major change in the status quo. Second-level change involvesmajor reorganizations within subsystems and, � nally, third-level change involves organization-wide interventions. Kumar and Thibodeaux (1990) postulated that the higher the level ofchange being implemented, the greater the extent of political involvement required on the partof the change agent. It is assumed in this work that the change agent is working in pursuit oforganizational goals, yet if political involvement occurs in this sense by managers it is arguedthat, similarly, managers may exert political behaviour in an attempt to subvert change at any ofthe three levels. Clearly those who seek to block or subvert change can be expected to resorton occasion to political tactics, thereby potentially triggering a parallel response from thosepromoting change (Buchanan and Badham, 1999).
An analysis of the concept of power also helps explain motivations of intentional counter-implementation. Pfeffer’s (1992) discussion of power concentrated on types of decisions and thedegree to which power is involved. Decisions found to be highly involved with power werethose related to interdepartmental coordination, promotion, transfer decisions and decisionsabout facilities and equipment allocation. Decisions relating to hiring, appraising, personnelpolicies and grievances were found to be less involved with power. Pfeffer’s (1992) research alsofound that there is a more political climate involving the more frequent use of power at higherorganizational levels. This suggests that power is more important in major decisions such as thosemade at higher organizational levels. Again, Pfeffer’s (1992) study took the perspective of powerbeing employed in pursuit of organizational objectives, yet if the de� nition of power is taken as‘the capacity to in� uence another person or group to accept one’s ideas or plans’ (Greiner andSchein, 1988, p. 13) again it is argued that the use of power may also be employed in an attemptto subvert implementation initiatives. Indeed, Greiner and Schein (1988) categorized individualemployees’ intents as either work related or self-oriented, adding that it is self-oriented intentsthat promote covert, deceptive behaviour and such behaviour depends on the priorities of theindividual exercising power.
Whilst both politics and power may be powerful motivators in their own right, they may alsobe interdependent. For example, if politics is de� ned as ‘¼the practical domain of power inaction, worked out through the use of techniques of in� uence and other (more or less) extremetactics’ (Buchanan andBadham, 1999, p. 2), then an interplay is seen between the two categories.
Further to power and politics as motivators of intentional counter-implementation,psychological constraints raise anxieties in those involved in the planning process, a process thatis essentially logical but prompts illogical, irrational and emotional responses or dysfunctionalbehaviours that actually inhibit the process. Psychological constraints refer to individuals wishingto disassociate themselves from error and, thus, from planning, which obliges the planner to takerisks, rebellion against having directed or ordered situations imposed and anxiety provoked byincreased uncertainty in a change to the status quo (see Lyles and Lenz, 1982; Reichman et al.,1975).
Lack of trust in both organizational goals and leaders has also been cited as a possible reasonfor employees engaging in more destructive organizational behaviours (Gilbert and Li-Ping,
196 THOMAS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
1998). Trust relates to a feeling of support and con� dence in the employer and refers toemployee faith in corporate goal attainment and organizational leaders and to the belief that,ultimately, organizational action will prove bene� cial to employees. However, if employeesfeel betrayed by management they may engage in such destructive behaviours as neglect or,in extreme cases, sabotage (Gilbert and Li-Ping, 1998). Thus, intentional counter-implementation may be motivated for a variety of reasons in an attempt to deliberately subvertthe implementation process, which leads to the following propositions.
P2: Faced with changes to the organizational status quo, individuals and groups engage inpolitical manoeuvres as power is exercised in order to protect self-interests. The exerciseof power is likely to be more frequent at higher organizational levels involving majordecisions.
P3: Implementation initiatives create uncertainty that raise anxieties in those involved in theplanning process and prompt dysfunctional behaviours that inhibit the implementationprocess.
P4: Feelings of betrayal by organizational leaders reduces trust on behalf of employees, whichprompts them to engage in destructive behaviours.
Consequences of counter-implementation
The studies described earlier suggested that implementation might be highly political, but thatthis political manoeuvring may aid successful implementation (Hutt et al., 1988; Kumar andThibodeaux, 1990; Priem, 1990; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992). Indeed, Kumar and Thibodeaux(1990) talked of politics as a useful tool for aiding managers in achieving organizational goalsand focused on the use of politics by managers in achieving change. In this sense politicalinvolvement may be regarded as naturally emerging out of negotiation in which managers, aschange agents, attempt to challenge and modify the existing status quo of the various subsystemsof the organization. On the other hand, those who feel threatened and adversely affected seekto maintain them. In this way the use of politics may be regarded as useful and necessary inan attempt to achieve implementation and is deliberately employed in helping achieveorganizational goals. However, there will also be organizational members who will continue toresist such attempts of the change agent. This creates a situation of constant negotiationinvolving political behaviours between managers where counter-implementation may beregarded as healthy and rational and may be expected as part of organizational life. In a sense,change is forced through, albeit incrementally, due to constant negotiation and compromise onbehalf of the change agent and those tasked with implementation of the change.
Hutt et al. (1988) talked of autonomous strategic behaviours, which managers often assume innurturing innovative activity within an organization. Autonomous behaviour refers to the factthat the planning process undertaken may take quite a different route, one that is much moreinformal and political in nature than the more formal, often organization-induced rationalapproach. Throughout the process of strategy formulation the authors’ pointed out that‘champions’ emerge to lead speci� c courses of action or component groups within theorganization may establish internal momentum around partial decisions. Whichever champion isnurtured is said to shape the direction of strategy. In attempting to synthesize the literature onautonomous strategic behaviours, Vyas (2001) categorized three dimensions of such behaviour asproactive, resistant and subversive. Whilst the proactive dimension suggests that organizationalgoals may be successfully achieved through informal politicking and the resistant dimension
COUNTER-IMPLEMENTATION IN STRATEGIC MARKETING 197
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
suggests that certain behaviours may be passive and unintentional, the subversive dimensionis de� ned as behaviour that deliberately attempts to impede a strategy and its implementation.In fact, Egan (1994) classi� ed two kinds of organizational politics: the politics of self-interestand positive institution-enhancing politics. Whilst the latter can add great value, the formermay be quite costly. This paper highlights the idea that counter-implementation may bepolitical and irrational, thereby resulting in negative outcomes that will impede the success ofany implementation initiative. This leads to the following propositions.
P5: Differing perspectives of counter-implementation may be viewed as incorporatingbehaviours that are both constructive and destructive to the implementation process.
P6: Constructive behaviours involve informal, irrational, political manoeuvrings as employeesattempt to achieve organizational objectives.
P7: Destructive behaviours provoke negative outcomes that are costly to the organization andmay lead to the failure of any implementation initiative.
P8: Taken together, both constructive and destructive behaviour can be regarded as useful toorganizations since the existence of opposing views promotes debate, thereby resulting inchange taking place incrementally through constant negotiation and compromise.
Counter-implementation as a process
Counter-implementation, whatever perspective is held, may be viewed as a process. Dawson’s(1994) processual framework of change demonstrated that the context, content and processof change are central to explanations of organizational transition. The framework advocatedthree time frames for processual analysis: the conception of a need to change, the process oforganizational transition and the operation of new work practices and procedures. Thisframework is reproduced in Fig. 2. Dawson (1994) suggested that, during each of these timeframes, certain individuals may act as inhibitors of change and prove instrumental to the failureof programmes that seek to establish new organizational arrangements. A parallel argument isthat intentional counter-implementation may also take place during any of these time framesand also initiate at any stage of the implementation process.
Intentional counter-implementation may take place at any point during the implementationprocess, particularly if organizations face rapidly changing environments and where unexpectedstimuli provoke the need for change. Intentional counter-implementation may initiate duringdecision making prior to strategy formulation and implementation, what Dawson (1994)identi� ed as the ‘conception of a need for change’, with managers taking a decision on altern-atives being proposed. Such behaviour may also occur after decision making, that is during theimplementation process (Lyles and Lenz, 1982). This is linked to both the transition stage andoperation stage of Dawson’s (1994) framework. There may even be cases when the compositionand execution of an action in planning and implementation may converge in time so that theyoccur simultaneously (Moorman and Miner, 1998). Such convergence is termed improvisation,where the narrower the time gap between composing and performing or planning and imple-mentation, the more the act is improvisational. In this sense, intentional counter-implementationmay be concomitant. Thus, the following proposition arises.
P9: Intentional counter-implementation takes place at any point in the implementation processand may initiate during organizational decision making prior to formulation and imple-mentation and at any point during the implementation process or concomitantly.
198 THOMAS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
FIGURE 2. Organizational change: a processual framework (adapted from Dawson, 1994).
Furthermore, previous studies have also suggested that individual and coalition interventionbehaviour is the natural and spontaneous result of competing demands as individuals and groupsexperience pressures and anxiety and manifest these through political behaviour (Guth andMacMillan, 1986). This paper argues that individual to coalition intervention behaviour developsover the implementation process in an attempt to gain greater leverage in any effort to subvertthe process. For example, Guth and MacMillan (1986) highlighted the idea that such behaviourmay gain momentum through joining a coalition in order to achieve greater leverage andultimate success. In this sense intervention is manifested through individuals seeking otherorganizational members in order to form coalitions who will agree to stand in opposition to theproposed strategy. It is suggested that forming a coalition is an attractive alternative option togoing it alone and groups of middle mangers opposed to a strategy are more likely to subvert itsuccessfully than any individual intervention. Kelly’s (1998) work on ‘mobilization theory’ in the� eld of industrial sociology and the labour process suggested that workers develop collectiveinterests through a process of transition in an attempt to mobilize and take collective actionin the workplace, thereby increasing their power resources. Such ‘collectivism’ may producecon� ictual and collaborative relationships. Collective action arises when employer actionscon� ict with shared beliefs. Kelly (1998) argued that dissatisfaction may be necessary for motivat-ing collective action, but it is not suf� cient. A further requirement is a sense of injustice, whichcan arise when employers’ actions con� ict with shared beliefs. The process of transition fromindividual level to collective level passes through three processes of attribution, social identi� -cation and leadership. Attributions refer to explanations for an event or action in terms ofreasons or causes or both. Social identi� cation relates to employees developing a sense ofthemselves as a group in opposition to another group. Leadership relates to the ability of anindividual to frame issues informally so as to promote a sense of injustice about an event. Thus,
COUNTER-IMPLEMENTATION IN STRATEGIC MARKETING 199
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
the importance of promoting group identity and reinforcing the sense of injustice, therebyencouraging workers to think collectively, attribute blame to management, encourage collectiveaction and defend collective interests against counter-mobilization, is important. Kelly (1998)suggested that, once an individual belongs to a group, then mobilization depends on de� nitionsof interest, the degree of organization and the costs and bene� ts of taking action. AlthoughKelly’s (1998) work related to the mobilization of workers at lower levels within the organiz-ation, it is argued that the same process of individual to collective action may take place betweenmembers at higher levels of the organizational hierarchy. Thus, the following proposition arises.
P10: Intentional counter-effort initiates at an individual level and gains momentumthrough coalition formation and, therefore, greater likelihood of success in sabotagingimplementation efforts arises.
Of further interest to the study of intentional counter-implementation is knowledge of whenand under what circumstances such behaviour is likely to diffuse throughout the implementationprocess. Using Dawson’s (1994) processual framework, it is argued that intentional counter-implementation may stop during any of the three time frames proposed for a number of reasons.For example, compromise may have been reached on behalf of the change agent and thosetasked with implementation through constant negotiation and politicking during the implemen-tation process. In addition, certain dysfunctional behaviours may diffuse naturally as newpriorities emerge and supersede the original motivations for such behaviour. Alternatively,actions by senior managers in an attempt to thwart or diffuse dysfunctional behaviour may bedeployed to ‘counter’ counter-implementation behaviour. Some senior managers may be able tobring issues at the heart of such behaviour into the open through inquisitiveness and decisiveaction and challenge that behaviour seen to add cost to the organization (Egan, 1994). Effectivemanagers as change agents may have found tactful strategies for helping those in opposition tochange move beyond their defensiveness. Such managers may also be able to � nd probes that getat dysfunctional norms during decision making prior to implementation taking place (Egan,1994). Measures to counter the collective challenge of organizational members intentionallyresisting implementation initiatives may include, in extreme cases, getting rid of the offendingparties (Kelly, 1994). Kelly (1994) further suggested that alternative means for thwarting suchcollective action may come about through repressing actual leaders or potential leaders ofcoalitions so as to impair the capacity of the group for organizing and acting collectively. Again,such action may take place both prior to and during implementation. Thus, the followingpropositions arise.
P11: Intentional counter-implementation may diffuse either naturally or through managementintervention at any stage of the implementation process.
P12: Intervention to diffuse intentional counter-implementation relies on managers beingattuned to the occurrence of such action and their subsequent deployment of strategies tochallenge deliberately resistant behaviours.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This paper has highlighted the idea that a broader perspective is needed in research into barriersto marketing implementation. In order to effectuate implementation better it is suggested thatthis broader perspective needs to take account of both contextual and behavioural issuesalongside the acknowledgement of implementation as a process. The literature reveals a clear
200 THOMAS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
link between context producing behavioural problems, which can impede the effective outcomeof implementation initiatives. Counter-implementation is introduced as involving behavioursthat are both intentional and unintentional in nature, the consequences of which may be bothconstructive and destructive to organizational performance. Such behaviour may occur at boththe individual and group level as it evolves in an attempt to increase the likelihood of achievingsuccess. It is argued that an understanding of the nature and dynamics of counter-implementation is necessary in attempts at managing strategic marketing better.
The implications for management are signi� cant given that such behaviour may potentiallyhave such an extreme impact. Managers may need to pre-empt the formation of intentionalcounter-implementation and diffuse its development during the implementation process. Thispaper has highlighted several means that managers may use in countering intentional counter-implementation. However, these rely on managers being attuned to the prevalence of suchbehaviour, which may sometimes be subversive and covert. Whilst some managers may be adeptat identifying and surfacing this sometimes covert and deliberately subversive behaviour, thereare likely to be cases where managers are unaware of both the motivations and manifestations ofintentional counter-implementation. Even in cases where managers do recognize suchbehaviours, recognition may be too late to alter the outcome of the implementation initiative.Thus, there is a need for training in order to recognize such behaviour and for managersdeveloping strategies to counter that behaviour where it exists. Furthermore, employees willneed to be encouraged to voice their concerns and to be able to communicate situations thatneed to be addressed properly so that any feelings of uncertainty brought about by changes inthe status quo may be successfully dealt with or some form of compromise reached.
RESEARCH AGENDA
Further exploratory research is necessary in order to test the propositions presented in this paper.A variety of different perspectives and contexts can be taken that may provide useful insightsinto the � elds of strategic management, organizational behaviour and marketing.
This paper illustrates that counter-implementation may be analysed at a number of differentlevels within organizations. Several studies (Guth and MacMillan, 1986; Connors and Romberg,1991) have focused on counter-implementation at the middle management level, whilst othershave emphasized counter-implementation within the top management team (Lyles and Lenz,1982). Further studies have focused on resistant behaviour at the employee (shop-� oor) level(Kelly, 1998). Future studies in strategic marketing will need to integrate both middle andsenior management perspectives since, whilst marketing managers are middle managers, if theorganization is taken as a whole, they are senior managers at a functional level.
Linked to these different perspectives is the choice of a particular implementation initiative orthe type of change as the focus of future studies. Perhaps the most useful initiatives for any futurestudy will involve major decisions concerning changes in subsystems or organization-widechanges (Kumar and Thibodeaux, 1990). Decisions of this type are more likely to be carried outat higher organizational levels (Pfeffer, 1992). The contents of such decisions in the domain ofstrategic marketing may include those that relate to changes in product and market strategies orthe adoption of customer relationship management programmes for example.
Furthermore, as implementation can be regarded as a key issue in organizational change sinceit represents an alteration in activities or tasks, future research will need to take a processapproach that addresses change within a historical and organizational context. Such an approachwill refer to sequences of individual and collective events, actions and activities unfolding over
COUNTER-IMPLEMENTATION IN STRATEGIC MARKETING 201
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
time in context. The advantages of this approach include increased explanatory and greaterpredictive power (Mackenzie, 2000). Rather than generalizing from snapshots of change orfocusing on a particular activity such as the problems and practice of implementing change,a series of longitudinal, in-depth case studies that support processual analysis may be morebene� cial (Dawson, 1994). Such processual analysis will take account of the change processmoving backwards and forwards between various tasks and may be involved in a number ofdifferent activities simultaneously so as to uncover the dynamic and complex process of change.Theories of organizational decision making, power and con� ict require a processual form and,with this in mind, longitudinal qualitative methodologies are deemed most appropriate in thestudy of change (Pettigrew et al., 2001). Participant observation, interviewing and contentanalysis of documents may be used to this end. In attempting to understand counter-implementation from a process perspective, retrospective data analysis will need to be employeddue to the historical dimension to the unfolding of any change programme. A number of studiesin the domain of strategic management and organization theory have used retrospective accountsor self-report methodologies for studying strategic change and planning processes (Lyles andLenz, 1982; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Guth and MacMillan, 1986). Despite a variety ofarguments for and against the use of retrospective data, there has been limited investigation intothe integrity of such data in strategic management (Golden, 1992). A number of strategies forreducing errors are, however, suggested. These include the content of retrospective data accountsrelying on past facts rather that beliefs and intentions, the need for researchers to acknowledgepossible emotional attachments to ‘pet projects’ and, in using multiple respondents in anorganization, eliminating the in� uence employees’ roles may have on responses (Golden, 1992).In an attempt to smooth inherent weaknesses of any qualitative methodologies further, alterna-tive approaches may, however, be employed. In order to bridge the gap between qualitative casestudies and quantitative survey methodologies, Larsson (1993) advocated the use of case surveysso as to combine the respective bene� ts of generalizable, cross-sectional analysis and in-depthprocessual analysis. The case survey method involves analysis of sets of cases in order to uncoverparticular patterns across a number of case studies. This allows the study of a number of issuesin-depth across many cases.
Finally, further elaborations to research into the nature and dynamics of counter-implementation in strategic marketing may usefully be applied to a variety of organizationalcontexts, such as the service sector or the not-for pro� t sector.
REFERENCES
Agocs, C. (1997) Institutionalized resistance to organizational change: denial, inaction and repression. Journalof Business Ethics 16, 917–31.
Alexander, L.D. (1985) Successfully Implementing Strategic Decisions. Long Range Planning 18(3), 91–8.Anderson, P.F. (1982) Marketing, strategic planning and the theory of the � rm. Journal of Marketing 46, 15–26.Bonoma, T. (1988) Marketing subversives. Harvard Business Review 64(6), 113–19.Bonoma, T. and Crittenden, V. (1988) Managing marketing implementation. Sloan Management Review 7,
7–13.Bourgeois, L.J. and Brodin, D.R. (1984) Strategic implementation: � ve approaches to an ellusive phenom-
enon. Strategic Management Journal 5, 241–64.Buchanan, D. and Badham, R. (1999) Politics and organizational change: the lived experience. Human
Relations 52(5), 609–29.Connors, J. and Romberg, T. (1991) Middle management and quality control: strategies for obstructionism.
Human Organization 50, 61–5.
202 THOMAS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
Cravens, D.W. (1998) Implementation strategies in the market driven strategy era. Academy of MarketingScience 26(3), 237–41.
Dawson, P. (1994) Organizational Change: A Processual Approach. London: Paul Chapman Publishing Limited.Dibb, S. and Simkin, L. (2001) Market Segmentation: Diagnosing and Treating the Barriers. Industrial
Marketing Management 30(8), 609–25.Egan, G. (1994) Working The Shadow Side. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.Floyd, S. and Wooldridge, B. (1989) Research notes and communications strategic process effects on
consensus. Strategic Management Journal 10, 295–302.Frankwick, G., Ward, J., Hutt, M. and Reingen, P. (1994) Evolving patterns of organizational beliefs in the
formation of strategy. Journal of Marketing 58(2), 96–114.Gilbert, J. and Li-Ping, T. (1998) An examination of organizational trust antecedents. Public Personnel
Management 27(3), 321–38.Golden, B.R. (1992) The past is the past – or is it? The use of retrospective accounts as indicators of past
strategy. Academy of Management Journal 35(4), 848–60.Greenley, G. (1988) Managerial perceptions of marketing planning (10). Journal of Management Studies 25,
575–601.Greiner, L.E. and Schein, V.E. (1988) Power and Organizational Development: Mobilizing Power to Implement
Change. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.Gummesson, E. (1998) Implementation requires a relationship paradigm. Academy of Marketing Science 26(3),
242–9.Gupta, A. and Govindarajan, V. (1984) Business unit strategy, managerial characteristics, and business unit
effectiveness at strategy implementation. Academy of Management Journal 27(1), 25–41.Guth, W. and MacMillan, I. (1986) Strategy implementation versus middle management self-interest. Strategic
Management Journal 7, 313–27.Harris, L.C. (1996) The impediments to initiating planning. Journal of Strategic Marketing 4, 129–42.Harris, L.C. and Ogbonna, E. (2002) Exploring service sabotage: the antecedents, types and consequences of
frontline, deviant, antiservice behaviours. Journal of Service Research 4(3), 163–83.Hutt, M., Reingen, P. and Ronchetto, J. (1988) Tracing emergent processes in marketing strategy formation.
Journal of Marketing 52, 4–19.Kelly, J. (1998) Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long Waves. London: Routledge.Knights, D. and McCabe, D. (1998) What happens when the phone goes wild?: staff, stress and spaces for
escape in a BPR telephone banking work regime. Journal of Management Studies 35(2), 163–94.Kumar, K. and Thibodeaux, M. (1990) Organizational politics and planned organization change: a pragmatic
approach. Group and Organization Studies 15(4), 357–65.Larsson, R. (1993) Case survey methodology: quantitative analysis of patterns across cases. Academy of
Management Journal 36(6), 1515–33.Lyles, M. and Lenz, R. (1982) Managing the planning process: a � eld study of the human side of planning.
Strategic Management Journal 3, 105–18.McDonald, M.H.B. (1992) Ten barriers to marketing planning. The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing
7, 4–22.Mackenzie, K.D. (2000) Processes and their frameworks. Management Science 46(1), 110–25.Martin, J. (1987) Marketing planning systems and the human element. Irish Marketing Review 2, 34–42.Miller, S. (1997) Implementing strategic decisions: four key success factors. Organization Studies 18(4),
577–602.Moorman, C. and Miner, A. (1998) The convergence of planning and execution: improvisation in new
product development. Journal of Marketing 62(3), 1–20.Noble, C. (1999) The eclectic roots of strategy implementation research. Journal of Business Research 45,
119–34.Noble, C. and Mokwa, M. (1999) Implementing marketing strategies: developing and testing managerial
theory. Journal of Marketing 63(4), 57–73.Nutt, P. (1983) Tactics of implementation. Academy of Management Journal 29(2), 230–61.
COUNTER-IMPLEMENTATION IN STRATEGIC MARKETING 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
Parsa, H.G. (1999) Interaction of strategy implementation and power perceptions in franchise systems:an empirical investigation. Journal of Business Research 45,173–85.
Pettigrew, A., Woodman, R. and Cameron, K. (2001) Studying organizational change and development:challenges for future research. Academy of Management Journal 44(4), 697–714.
Pfeffer, J. (1992) Managing With Power. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.Piercy, N. (1989) Diagnosing and solving implementation problems in strategic planning. Journal of General
Management 15, 19–38.Piercy, N. and Giles, W. (1990) The logic of being illogical in strategic marketing planning. The Journal of
Services Marketing 4, 27–37.Piercy, N. and Morgan, N. (1994) The marketing planning process: behavioural problems compared to
analytical techniques in exploring marketing plan credibility. Journal of Business Research 29, 167–78.Priem, R.L. (1990) Top management team group factors, consensus and � rm performance. Strategic
Management Journal 11, 469–78.Reichman, W. and Levy, M. (1975) Psychological restraints on effective planning. Management Review 64(10),
37–42.Simkin, L. (1996) Addressing organizational prerequisites in marketing planning programmes. Marketing
Intelligence and Planning 14(5), 39–46.Skivington, J. and Daft, R. (1991) A study of organizational framework and process modalities for the
implementation of business-level strategic decisions. Journal of Management Studies 28, 45–68.Steiner, G.A. and Miner, J.B. (1977) Management Policy and Strategy: Text, Readings and Cases. London:
MacMillan.Vyas, A. (2001) Autonomous Strategic Behaviours During Strategy Implementation: Measurement, Antecedents and
Consequences. Conference Paper, Academy of Marketing, Cardiff University.Walker, O.C. and Ruekert, R.W. (1987) Marketing’s role in the implementation of business strategies:
a critical review and conceptual framework. Journal of Marketing 51, 15–33.
204 THOMAS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f W
este
rn O
ntar
io]
at 1
7:15
07
Oct
ober
201
4
