The Nature of the Self Recogni

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Paul Cobben

The Nature of the Self

≥



Quellen und Studien

zur Philosophie

Herausgegeben von Jens Halfwassen, Dominik Perler,

Michael Quante

Band 91

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York



The Nature of the Self

Recognition in the Formof Right and Morality

by

Paul Cobben

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York



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ISBN 978-3-11-021987-6

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Cobben, Paul. The nature of the self : recognition in the form of right and morality /

by Paul Cobben.p. cm. − (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, ISSN 0344-8142 ;

Bd. 91)Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

ISBN 978-3-11-021987-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)1. Self (Philosophy). 2. Mind and body. 3. Recognition (Philo-

sophy). 4. Ethics. I. Title.BD450.C57 2009126−dc22

2009004216

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Contents

The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right andMorality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 1 The Human Self as the Unity of Mind and Body . . . . 12Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The immediate unity of mind and body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Consciousness: looking for the independence of the outside

world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Self-consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Is the transition from the natural into the legal status possible? 28Self-consciousness and the legal status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Violence, power and the legal status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Self-consciousness and the overcoming of exclusion . . . . . . . . . 37The Lord/Bondsman relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42The historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation . . . . . . . . 44The Unhappy Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53The mind/ body unity as an historical reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Chapter 2 The Greek World: The Origin of the First Self . . . . . . 60Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60The polis as the unity of the Human and Divine Law . . . . . . 61

The abstract work of art: the representation of the pure self inthe public domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63The polis as a harmonic unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Repression of the deed: the living work of art . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69The representation of the deed: the spiritual work of art . . . . 71Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77The Roman Empire as the result of the Greek World . . . . . . . 79

Chapter 3 The Realm of Culture: The Genesis of the Second Self 81Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81



The Fall of the Roman Empire and the experience of the person 81The genesis of the moral individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83The Embodiment of the “pure Being” in the real Individual: the

self-conscious reality of the Unhappy Consciousness . . . . . . . . 87The meaning of the moral individual in the objective world . . 89The realization of the moral individual in the objective world:the process of culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90The absolute Freedom: the second self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Chapter 4 The Realm of Morality: Making the Third Self Explicit 100Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

The point of departure of the Realm of Morality: theRousseauian Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101The inner contradiction of the Napoleonic Law: the KantianReflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102The sublation of the inner contradiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104The Hegelian reflection on the Napoleonic Law: Conscience asthe origin of the third self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105The development of Conscience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106a. Conscience as the Unhappy Consciousness that repeats

Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106b. Conscience as the Unhappy Consciousness that repeats

Self-consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Conscience that becomes aware of itself as Unhappy Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110The meaning of the “absolute Spirit” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Chapter 5 Honneth’s Criticism of Hegel’s Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . 118Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118The “Phenomenology of Spirit” and the question of “TheNature of the Self ” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118The relation of mind and body as the primordial form of recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121The development of freedom from the inside perspective . . . . 121The transition from a monological into a dialogical approach . 122The absolute Spirit as the presupposition of the dialogical

relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Absolute Spirit and metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Contents VI



Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Recognition between metaphysics and empiricism . . . . . . . . . . 131Honneth’s project in relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit

and the Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Chapter 6 The program of the Philosophy of Right as elaborationof the Phenomenology’s project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136The conceptual design of the Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . . 137The abstract Right as the formal Notion of the first self . . . . . 139Morality as the formal notion of the second self . . . . . . . . . . . 141Conscience as the formal unity of right and morality . . . . . . . 142

Conscience in the ‘Philosophy of Right’ vis--vis conscience inthe ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142The formal unity of the three forms of the self following fromthe ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143The actualization of the Human Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Chapter 7 The Family: The Institutional House of the First Self . 150Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150The species life of animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150The family in the Philosophy of Right: animal life in the formof freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151The social organism of the family vis--vis the conceptualframework of the ‘Philosophy of Right’ and the‘Phenomenology of Spirit’‘ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152The education of the children in the family of the revised‘Philosophy of Right’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155a. The socialization of the child in the contingent tradition of

the family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155b. The process in which the child develops awareness of the

contingence of the family tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164Excursus: The Development of the Child to a Real Person inConfrontation with Jrgen Habermas’s Reception of the Stagesof Moral Consciousness developed by Lawrence Kohlberg . . . 166

Chapter 8 The Civil Society: Developing the Institutional House of

the Second Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Contents VII



The development of the second self’s embodiment in the‘Philosophy of Right’: civil society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176The process of Culture in Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

Culture in the socialized production System as part of theSystem of Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182Institutionalizing the second self: the community of moralsubjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187Criticism of the development of civil society in the light of thePhenomenology of Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190The revised concept of Culture in Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . 193The free market and the exclusion of individuals . . . . . . . . . . . 198The market and the moral subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Moral subjectivity and lifelong partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200The market and the good life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Chapter 9 The State: The Embodiment of the Third Self . . . . . . . 211Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211The development of the third self’s embodiment in the‘Philosophy of Right’: the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211Criticizing the state of the ‘Philosophy of Right’ in the light of the ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216The revision of the citizen and the Monarch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217The development of the third self as the presupposition of therevised state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220The Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225The political cooperation between nation states . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

Author index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238Subject index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

Contents VIII



The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and Morality

Introduction

This book is about the nature of the human self; i.e., it is not focussed onsources that contributed to a specific historical reception of the self 1, butrather, aims at a systematic, conceptual development of the self. However,

it is not self-evident that the human self has a nature, nor that this naturecan be systematically developed. Moreover, the turn of phrase “nature of the self” is ambiguous: It can concern a nature that is opposed to culture,or a nature that expresses an essence that transcends variations in time,i.e., a logical nature.

The first option, the nature of the human self that is opposed to cul-ture, is the position that is represented by the gene-theory. The gene-theory conceives of the human self as a living organism that is comparable

with other living organisms. In this context, the conception of the human

self coincides with the insight into the specific human genes. This ap-proach, like all scientific theories, does not satisfy as a philosophical con-ception of the nature of the self. The scientific framework of the gene-theory, i. e., the framework that defines the meaning of a living organism,is not, itself, subject of the gene-theory: The theory is not self-referential,it cannot explain its own existence, but is, rather, presupposed to what isaccepted as existence. Since the scientific practice cannot be excludedfrom the nature of the human self, the problem has to be solved of

how the living organism can be combined with the ability to conceptu-alize itself as a living organism. In other words, the philosophical concep-tion of the nature of the self has to solve the mind/body problem: How can the human self be understood as the unity of mind and body withoutreducing the mind to the body, or vice versa?

In Chapter 1, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 2 is introduced as a sys-tematic philosophical attempt to develop the unity between mind and

1 Therefore, this book is not meant as a replacement of Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self, (Harvard University Press, 2005) but rather, as its completion.2 Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit , translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford, 1977.



body (preserving, as well, the own nature of the mind as the body). Toconceptualize the immediate unity between mind and body, Hegelmakes use of the metaphor of the lordship/bondsman relation: The lord

represents the mind that also has a body; the bondsman represents thebody that also has a mind. In this way, the mind/body problem is refor-mulated as the problem of how to contemplate the adequate unity of lordand bondsman.

The transformation of mind/body into lordship/bondsman is not justa matter of changing terms. The transformation incorporates the Aristo-telian insight that the adequate unity between mind and body can only beconceived of at the level of society. For Aristotle, the human self, the an-imal rationale , essentially is a social self, a self that lives in the framework

of a state. This is reflected in the metaphor of the lordship/bondsman re-lation that makes it clear that the body of the mind essentially is a socialorganism. A mind that also has a body is a mind that is objectified in a social organism. Conversely, the body that also has a mind is a body thatis part of a social organism. In this respect, lordship and bondsman areHegel’s translation of the Aristotelian logos and state.

Hegel, however, transcends the Aristotelian conceptual framework when the relation between lord and bondsman is understood as a relation

of recognition.3

By this move he combines the social (communitarian)freedom of Aristotle with the subjective (libertarian) freedom of Kant. 4

If the lord is recognized by the bondsman, he not only represents theunity of the social organism (the lord represents the law of the statethat is actualized by the actions of the bondsman), but also the subjectivefreedom of the bondsman (the bondsman is free insofar as he is the “lord”of his body: He recognizes this freedom in the lord of the social organ-ism, i.e., he recognizes this lord as the objective reality of his own free-dom).

The basic idea of recognition follows from the observation that it isimpossible to conceive of the unity of mind and body at the level of the

3 Paul Ricoeur remarks in the introduction of his book, The Course of Recognition:“My investigation arose from a sense of perplexity having to do with the semanticstatus of the very term recognition on the plane of philosophical discourse. It is a fact that no theory of recognition worthy of the name exists in the way that oneor more theories of knowledge exist.” (Preface, p. ix) In fact, Hegel’s Phenomen-ology of Spirit is a systematic theory of recognition.

4 Cf. Williams (1997): “My thesis is that the concept of recognition is crucial toHegel’s project of mediating modern individualist subjective freedom (Kant)and classical ethical substance (Plato, Aristotle).” (p. 114/5).

The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and Morality 2



individual. If the mind is understood as the autonomy of the individual,this autonomy gets lost when the individual is also a corporeal individual.The individual remains dependent on his body; the death of the body

implies the death of the entire individual. The autonomy of the mindis only thinkable at a social level, i.e., as the law (logos ) of the social or-ganism. The lord represents the autonomy of an immortal individual: theindividual that is institutionalized as a social organism. In himself, the in-dividual is not autonomous, i.e., he is not the “lord” of his body. Butinsofar as the individual can recognize his individual mind/body relationin the social mind/body relation, i.e., as the lord that represents the au-tonomy of the social organism that is actualized by the actions of thebondsmen, his autonomy is no longer an illusion.

The lordship/bondsman relation is the elementary model of the freesociety. The lord represents the human autonomy, the human capability to transcend the (instinctual) laws of nature and replace them by thehuman law of the state. The bondsman represents the citizens who actu-alize the human autonomy by observing the human law as it positively appears. Therefore, the lordship/bondsman model combines two formsof recognition. The first form I will call the horizontal recognition thatconcerns the relation between the citizens. This first form of recognitionis, in principle, symmetrical: In their observation of the same law, thecitizens are free and equal. The horizontal recognition stands for the di-mension of right. The second form I will call the vertical recognitionthat concerns the relation of the citizens to the lord, i.e., to the represen-tation of their autonomy. This relation, in principle, is a-symmetrical be-cause it is the relation in which the citizens, as corporeal individuals, arerelated to their absolute essence (that will be developed as their con-science). The vertical recognition stands for the dimension of morality ,the dimension in which the citizens are absolutely unequal: In this di-

mension, they are non-exchangeable, unique individuals. Therefore, thelordship/ bondsman relation is the elementary model of the unity of right and morality , the unity of horizontal and vertical recognition.

The immediate form of the lordship/bondsman relation is not inad-equate because the relation between lord and bondsman is a-symmetrical(the vertical recognition is fundamentally a-symmetric) but rather, becauseit is still characterized by a discrepancy between the inside and outsideperspective. When it is possible, from an outside perspective, to describethe Aristotelian state in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation, this

does not imply that it is also possible from the inside perspective.From the inside perspective, the citizens cannot make a difference be-

Introduction 3



tween themselves and the lord because they immediately identify them-selves with the lord. The lord is only real as the contingent (traditional)law of the state. Therefore, the citizens are neither aware of the vertical

recognition (in their consciousness there is no room for other traditionallaws) nor of the horizontal recognition (the citizens are absorbed by theirsocial roles: These are not mediated by free choice). Only when the dis-crepancy between the inside and outside perspectives can be overcomedoes the lordship/bondsman model cease to be an external attempt to un-derstand the unity of mind and body. The external perspective from

which the model is formulated must become part of the model itself. We, i. e. , the author and the readers of this book, are also human beingsin which mind and body are united. Therefore, if we, from a meta point

of view, design a model to understand the unity between mind and body, we must recognize in the model all the meta considerations we madeabout the unity of mind and body. Only under that condition, can weaccept the model as a necessary one.

The process in which the inside and outside perspectives are broughttogether results in the development of the consciousness of the bonds-man. The consciousness of the bondsman becomes more and moreaware of the reality in which he is living. This process is discussed inthe subsequent part of Chapter 1.

Since the consciousness of the bondsman is already a moment of theentirety of the social organism he is living in, the development of thisconsciousness can be reconstructed as a necessary process. At the mo-ment, however, that the consciousness wants to know what is the contentof the social law, it is not possible to determine this content by a necessary deduction: The content of the social organism is contingent (Aristotle’smodel of the state is compatible with a multitude of traditions). Insofaras the consciousness of the bondsman is already a moment of the social

organism all the time, this social organism is a contingent organism, i.e.an organism that has historical existence.

Not all historical organisms can be identified as organisms in whichthe consciousness of the bondsman is living. The institutional differentia-tion of the organism must enable this consciousness to pass through thedevelopment in which it will become aware of the reality it is living in.Hegel identifies this social organism as the polis of the ancient Greek

world. Chapter 2 elaborates how the polis can be conceived of as the his-torical social organism in which the immediate unity of right and morali-ty , i.e., the immediate unity of horizontal and vertical recognition, is ob-

jectified.




Since the institutions of the polis allow a learning process in whichthe consciousness of the polis experiences the contingent content of thelaw, the Greek world will, sooner or later, decline. Ultimately, the con-

sciousness cannot recognize the social organism, precisely because it isa contingent organism, as the expression of its moral identity. What re-mains is a social order that is one-sidedly characterized by the horizontal recognition of right. Hegel identifies this order as the Roman Empire thatderives its unity from the property right of Roman Law. The Roman citi-zens are the formal persons who recognize one another as free and equal.

Hegel calls the formal person of the Roman Law the first self. For thefirst time, the human self has actualized itself as an autonomous self. Theactions of the person are not determined by tradition, but by the free willof the persons themselves. In the first self, the unity of mind and body forthe first time appears as an individual. The person is the free will (cf.mind) that is embodied in the social organism of the family (cf. body).The person is the “lord” of the family whose labor is oriented to the re-production of the family.

Although the first self is a necessary stage in the development of thenature of the self (the human self must transcend tradition, otherwise theindependence of his mind is not done justice) the adequate unity of mind

and body is not yet attained. The persons are atomized selves, that lack a common “lord” who represents their moral identity.5 They only practical-ly express their moral identity in the private domain, i.e., in the labor of the family. Therefore, it remains coincidental whether or not the personscan actualize their moral identity. The Roman Empire has no inner har-mony, a shared definition of good life, and will sooner or later decline.

Chapter 3 discusses the Realm of Culture that covers a period in Eu-ropean history that begins after the decline of the Roman Empire , andends with the

French Revolution, i.e., it is the period of the

Middle Ages. After the first self has been developed in the ancient Greek andRoman world, the second self is developed in the Middle Ages. In the sec-ond self, the dimension of right is reunited with the dimension of morality.In the second self, the immediate unity of right and morality of the Greek

world is transformed in the self-conscious unity of right and morality.

5 Although the Roman Emperor (the “lord and master of the world” [292/3]) is“the titanic self-consciousness that thinks of itself as being an actual living

god” (293) he is a person like the others, a formal self, that has no real powerover the content, i.e., over the substantial world of which he is supposed tobe the ruler.

Introduction 5



The idea of the second self is simple: To prevent the risk that the sociallaw is not in harmony with the moral identity of the person, the second self wants to make the social law the expression of his moral identity. This

attempt seems to be reasonable when the moral identity is “cultivated”: Itis no longer the moral identity that is immediately given and that belongsto the private domain, but it has been socialized and rationalized and haslost its particular character. The second self wants to make his cultivatedmoral identity the content of the social law.

According to Hegel, the “absolute freedom” of the citizen of theFrench Revolution is the historical reality of the second self: He does notaccept any tradition and demands that the social law is in absolutely ac-cordance with his enlightened moral self. It is, however, impossible to

meet the demand of the citizen, not only because all citizens want todo the same and cannot accept that the other citizens determine the con-tent of the social law, but also because the citizens contradict themselves:Since the moral identity transcends all positive determinedness, they haveto reject any positive shape of the law. Therefore, the subjectivism of theFrench Revolution necessarily ends in the revolutionary terror in which thecitizens try to prevent each other’s attempt to actualize the social law.

Also, although the second self cannot, evidently, be the adequate actu-alization of the unity of right and morality, it is certainly a necessary stagein the development of the nature of the self. A free, moral self cannot tol-erate a given social organism; his freedom is only real if this organism ex-presses his moral identity. The terror of the French Revolution, however,has shown what are the bloody consequences of a policy that is immedi-ately moralized. This is understood by Jean Jacques Rousseau when hedifferentiates between the social law and its transcendent moral legitima-tion. The social law is legitimate insofar as it can be considered as the ex-pression of the “volont gnrale ”, the general will. This concept remains

transcendent because it must accurately be distinguished from the “vo-lont de tous ”, the will of all, that can be positively deduced from thereal will of the citizens.

Chapter 4 discusses Hegel’s reception of this Rousseauian reflectionon the French Revolution in the Morality-Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The problem is, on the one hand, how to preserve the transcendentcharacter of the general will, and on the other hand, at the same time un-derstand the existing legal order as a manifestation of the general will.Hegel rejects Kant’s solution because of his distinction between a noume-

nal and a phenomenal world. Since the general will is situated in the nou-menal world, and the legal order in the phenomenal world, the problem




is only shifted: how to think of the relation between the noumenal andthe phenomenal world. Hegel’s own solution is elaborated as the third self ,the conscientious individual.

The third self (as reflection on the French Revolution) belongs to themodern world (Hegel’s own era) and pretends to express the adequate re-lation between right and morality. The conscientious individual is relatedto the transcendent dimension of the absolute Spirit , i. e., to the absoluteessence of his freedom. This relation reflects the citizen’s relation to thegeneral will in Rousseau. At the same time, the conscientious individualtries to actualize his moral freedom in the objective world, i.e., in the so-cial order in which he is living. Therefore, the adequate relation betweenright and morality is conceived of as the relation between objective and ab-solute Spirit.

In Chapter 5 the three forms of the self are compared to the threeforms of recognition that Axel Honneth distinguishes in “The Strugglefor Recognition”.6 The comparison is complicated because Honneth re-lates to the young Hegel whose concept of recognition, according toHonneth, is influenced by the “presuppositions of the metaphysical tra-dition” and has to be reconstructed “in the light of empirical social psy-chology”.7 It is examined which meaning Honnth’s arguments have for

the Phenomenology of Spirit. The conclusion is that the three forms of the self are not metaphysical in the sense of Honneth.

It took the social experience of the Ancient, the Mediaeval and theModern world to be able to formulate the human self adequately. Theinsight into the third self presupposes the insight into the first and second self. The individual who wants to acquire adequate insight into thehuman self has to repeat, at an individual level, the social experience of European history. In other words, this individual must participate in a so-cial organism whose institutions allow the repetition of this social expe-rience. In Chapter 6, it is argued that it is exactly this consideration thatis the basis of the project of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.8 The ethical life that is developed in this work as the unity of Family , civil Society andState , is an attempt to integrate the development of the first , second and third self in the institutional framework of one social organism. Fam-

6 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Con- flicts , Polity Press, Cambridge 1995.

7 Ibidem, p. 68.8 Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , translated by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press1967.

Introduction 7



ily , Corporation and State are presented as the adequate institutional em-bodiment of the first , second and third self.

Chapter 7, 8 and 9 consist of a detailed survey of the way in which

the development of, respectively, the first , second and third self in the Phe-nomenology of Spirit, returns in the development of, respectively, family ,civil society and state in the Philosophy of Right. My thesis is that the logicalstructure of the Philosophy of Right cannot be understood if one does notacknowledge that it has been Hegel’s intention to resume the three peri-ods of European history (Antiquity, Middle Ages and Modernity) withthe three corresponding forms of the self as the constituting logical mo-ments of ethical life. From Hegel’s viewpoint, the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right do not represent different positions. The his-

torical order is only transformed into a systematic order.Curiously enough, however, the Phenomenology of Spirit is not only a

criterion for the positive understanding of the Philosophy of Right’s com-position, but at the same time, a criterion to criticize this composition. Inthe Philosophy of Right, the concept of conscience is reduced in compar-ison with the Phenomenology of Spirit: Since the Philosophy of Right dis-cusses the objective Spirit , the dimension of the religious conscience is ex-plicitly excluded. The content of conscience is reduced to what can be ac-tualized at the (historical) level of

objective Spirit. This reduction has huge

consequences for all three domains of ethical life. The ethical life of thefamily is reduced to natural life in the form of freedom; the freedom of civil society is reduced to economic freedom; the ethical life of the state isreduced to the mono-cultural nation state.

Chapter 7, 8 and 9 not only reconstruct Hegel’s composition of thePhilosophy of Right , but also the version that would result from a positionin which conscience is not reduced. In this version, consequently, also thethree domains of ethical life are not reduced: It offers room to multi-cul-

turality, to moral and political freedom and to states that are embedded ina system of international law. In this version, the relation between absolute and objective Spirit is conceived of as the relation between human rightsand democracy. My thesis is that this alternative version of the Philosophy of Right , based on the full consequences of the Phenomenology of Spirit ,elaborates a conceptual framework that is better suitable for the under-standing of contemporary multi-cultural and globalized society thanother proposals, especially the popular theories of Jrgen Habermas9

and John Rawls.10

9 Jrgen Habermas, Faktizitt und Geltung, Frankfurt/M., 1992.




My interpretation of the Philosophy of Right is in accordance withRobert Williams when he brings to the light “the concept of recognitionas crucial to the systematic unity of the book” (p.27).11 I also agree with

R. Williams when he states that “Hegel does not fundamentally changehis position concerning recognition …” (p.2) and observes in this respecta continuity between the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right. The distinction that Williams makes between a self-subverting form of recognition (“clearly demonstrated in the case of master andslave”) and an “affirmative mutual recognition in the other that is centralto ethical life” (characterizing the “mature” Hegel), however, has to be re-futed.

Williams illustrates his distinction between two forms of recognition

in his criticism of Alexandre Kojve: “although Kojve made the strugglefor recognition central to his interpretation of Hegel, the irony is thatKojve’s work obscures and distorts Hegel’s concept of recognition. How-ever, for Hegel, recognition is a general concept of intersubjectivity, widerthan master and slave. […] In contrast to Kojve, Hegel’s master and slaveis but an important first phase of unequal recognition that must and canbe transcended.” (p.10) Williams is certainly right that Kojve’s conceptof recognition is distorted (“Kojve thinks the concept of recognition pri-marily on the basis of an ontology of negation and finitude” (p.11) andthat the recognition that is expressed in the metaphor of master and slavehas to be developed. But he is mistaken if he thinks that this developmentultimately implies the overcoming of “unequality” in the concept of rec-ognition. As mentioned before, recognition remains characterized by itstwo (“horizontal” and “vertical”) dimensions. Ultimately, the “unequali-ty” remains preserved in the a-symmetry between absolute and objective Spirit.

I share Williams’ criticism of Jrgen Habermas and Axel Honneth

when he remarks : “Unfortunately, in Honneth’s and Habermas’s interpre-tation, the early Hegel is sharply distinguished from the mature Hegel.[…] Honneth repeats Habermas’s line that in Hegel’s mature thought,the concept of recognition is displaced by a monological conception of self-reflective subjectivity” (p.15).12 He rightly supports Ludwig Siep’s

10 John Rawls, Laws of Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1999.11 Robert Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, University of California Press,

1997.12 Honneth (1995) remarks: “In this sense, the new (and, methodologically speak-ing, certainly superior), conception found in the Phenomenology of Spirit repre-

Introduction 9



reading of Hegel: “Siep believes recognition is important for Hegel’spractical philosophy because it allows Hegel to renew the classical tradi-tion of practical philosophy on a postmodern, postliberal, intersubjective-

social basis” (p.21). But, I think that his conclusion needs some specifi-cation: “This reading supports Habermas’s contention that recognition isan important counter-discours of modernity” (p.21) Hegel’s concept of recognition is superior to the concept of recognition as it is elaboratedin Habermas’s Theory of communicative Action. Habermas has never suc-ceeded in the reconciliation between the domain of recognition and thedomain of nature. His new paradigm remains characterized by a Kantiandichotomy: the dichotomy between truth and objectivity, the “object of knowledge” and the “object of experience”, intersubjectivity and nature.13

Also Williams’s criticism of Michael Theunissen needs some specifi-cation and correction. Theunissen “does attempt to show that intersub-

jectivity is derivative from a pre-social, or transcendental monologicalsubject, and that objective Geist , while supposedly the consciousness of individuals, nevertheless comes to have self-consciousness and self-rela-tion, thereby creating an asymmetry and a heteronomous relation be-tween objective Geist , ethical substance and independent individuals.This asymmetry finds expression in a pantheistic conception of the sub-

stance/accidents scheme: Self-conscious, self-relating objective Geist , isidentified with absolute Geist, the ultimate subject that is, at the sametime, ethical substance. In this scheme, individuals are reduced from in-dependent free beings to mere accidents of substance” (p.16).

Williams is right when he defends the intersubjectivity of Hegel’sproject against Theunissen (“I will show that Hegel by no means restrictsrecognition to abstract right and property, but clearly indicates that theconcept of recognition is the general structure of ethical life”, p.17).

sents, in effect, a fundamental turning-point in the course of Hegel’s thought. Asa result, the possibility of returning to the most compelling of his earlier intu-itions, the still incomplete model of the ‘struggle for recognition’, is blocked.”(p. 63) Later on he adds: “Neither in Hegel nor in Mead does one find a system-atic consideration of those forms of disrespect that, as negative equivalents for thecorresponding relations of recognition, could enable social actors to realize thatthey are being denied recognition.” (p. 93) I will show that, in the Phenomenology of Spirit , the ‘denied recognition’ appears in the form of the Unhappy Conscious-ness. The Unhappy Consciousness is not overcome by a ‘struggle for recognition’,but rather by a process of experience in which the consciousness becomes

aware of the social source of his unhappiness.13 Jrgen Habermas, “Wahrheitstheorien”, in: Vorstudien und Ergnzungen zur The-orie des kommunikativen Handelns, Frankfurt/M., 1984, pp. 127–186.




But, in my opinion, the central point is that Theunissen identifies objec-tive and absolute Spirit. Precisely because Hegel wants to solve the prob-lem of how to devise a community of independent individuals, he has to

introduce the absolute Spirit in distinction from the objective Spirit. Thea-symmetrical relation between the individuals and the absolute Spirit grounds the intersubjectivity between individuals that have a symmetricalrelation to one another at the level of the objective Spirit. The identifica-tion of objective and absolute Spirit totally ignores Hegel’s project.

The revised Philosophy of Right raises the same questions as Rawls’sPolitical Liberalism14 : how to think of a community of persons with dif-ferent moral opinions. It shows, however, that Rawls’s conception of themoral person remains unreflected. The concept of the moral person al-

ready presupposes a structure of basic institutions all the time. An atom-ized moral person is a contradiction in itself; the attempt to construct an“overlapping consensus” between atomized moral persons is totally super-fluous. The fundamental failure in Rawls’s and Habermas’s theory con-

verge: neither of them has developed an adequate conception of theunity between mind and body. They conceptualize a human self withoutidentity.

The revision of the Philosophy of Right makes it possible to give ananswer to the justified criticism of the Philosophy of Right, itself. In read-ing Hegel’s analysis of civil society , for example, Marx’s criticism of Hegeland his alleged alliance with capitalism becomes obvious. The revision,however, will clarify that Hegel, especially in his analysis of the Systemof Needs, betrays his own principles and is too much impressed by thecontingent reality he is confronted with. Also Siep’s criticism thatHegel one-sidedly remains committed to the primacy of the generaland the Christian culture is overcome in the revised version in whichthe moral individual transcends the labor system, and in which multi-cul-

turality gets the room it deserves.15

14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993: “… how is itpossible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citi-

zens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical andmoral doctrines?”. (p .4).15 Ludwig Siep, “Recognition between Individuals and Cultures”, [manuscript].

Introduction 11



Chapter 1The Human Self as the Unity of Mind and Body

Introduction

From a philosophical point of view, a scientific fact cannot entirely ex-press what makes a man into a man. Scientific facts depend on scientifictheories: It is only in the framework of scientific theory that facts are de-

fined. Theory gives facts their scientific value. Therefore, if man is scien-tifically defined as a specific organism with a specific genome, he doesnot coincide with his existence as an organism. To his existence also be-longs the scientific theory that he develops in order to represent his spe-cific organism. In this chapter, it is discussed what it means to conceive of man both as an organism and as the scientific reason for whom this or-ganism exists.

The problem to be solved is the age-old problem of the relation be-tween mind and body. This problem cannot be solved by reduction, as it

is done by David Hume and Ren Descartes. While Hume reduces mindto body when he maintains that all ideas must be reduced to impressions,Descartes reduces body to mind when he assumes that the res extensa es-sentially is a clear and distinct idea. In this reduction, either the mode of being of the mind, or the mode of being of the body disappears, so thatthe relation between two modes of being is revealed as a problem thatdoes not comply with reality. But neither can the problem be solved inKant’s way. Although Kant has understood the one-sidedness of

Hume’s empiricism and Descartes’s rationalism, and was in search of a synthesis of both approaches, his solution does not escape from repeating the problems of a scientific definition of man. Although Kant’s projectessentially is an anti-reductionist one because, in his view, mind andbody have their own domain (namely in the noumenal and the phenom-enal world), his criteria for the synthesis of mind and body remain exter-nal to these domains. Kant’s definition of man as a unity of mind andbody does not elucidate its own necessity.

For a philosopher, it is not sufficient to propose a scientific model of

the relation between mind and body. A scientific model is “subjective” inthe sense that it is not unconditional. This is not only because alternative



models are possible, but also because the criterion of its verification (ex-perimental perception) embodies a specific (conditional) view on the re-lation between (the world of the) mind and (the world of the) body. This

subjectivity can only be overcome if it has been proven that the model isnot one of the many possible models, but is exclusive. The being that ismodeled as a unity of mind and body must, at the same time, be able toaccept the model that constitutes his unity as a necessary one. The con-ception of the unity between mind and body has to be unconditional.

Of course, it is not evident that an unconditional model of the unity of mind and body is possible. All candidate models have to be tested. But

what guarantee have we that the process of testing will ever end? I think that this dilemma can be overcome by a methodological approach thatallows the systematic construction of the unconditional model. I willsummarize the central steps of this systematic construction:

1. The unity of mind and body must (hypothetically) be determined asan immediate unity. In that case, the model of the unity betweenmind and body necessarily has to be accepted by the mind that is con-stituted by the model. Because this mind is by definition immediately unified with the body, it has no room for another interpretation;

2. From an outside perspective, however, the immediate unity of mind

and body is a contradiction (between form and content). Insofar asit concerns a relation between mind and body, the terms of the rela-tion are (formally) distinguished. Insofar as it concerns an immediaterelation, however, this distinction disappears because, in regard totheir content, mind and body are immediately identical. As a matterof fact, an immediate relation is no relation;

3. The process of construction consists of the steps that mediate betweenthe inside perspective in which mind and body are immediately one,

and the outside perspective in which mind and body have domainsthat are explicitly distinguished. Each stage of the process is a revisionof the model that conceptualizes the unity of mind and body. The dis-tinction between mind and body that is implicitly presupposed in themodel of their immediate unity is, step by step, made more explicit;

4. If the stages in the process are logically interconnected, i. e., if eachstage is logically deduced from the preceding one, the process can re-sult in an unconditional model of the unity between mind and body:a model that combines the unity of mind and body with their distinc-

tion, and a model that has a necessary status for the mind that is con-ceptualized by the model itself.

Introduction 13



In this chapter, I will discuss how Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit can beinterpreted as the systematic development of the unity between mind andbody based on the aforementioned methodological assumptions.16 This

means that this development has a necessary nature, i.e., all stages of the mind/body unity can be logically deduced.17 Of course, Hegel illus-trates these stages with historical examples. But even when it has becomeclear that the body of the mind has to be understood as a social organismand, consequently, can be unambiguously related to a specific period in(European) history, history remains only an illustration. Hegel recon-structs which stages the (European) reader of the Phenomenology of Spirit has to pass through to develop an adequate insight into the unity of mindand body.18 But these stages are logical stages that have appeared in a spe-

16 Wildt (1984) rightly remarks that “the Phenemenology of Spirit has to be under-stood beforehand as a theory of the Self and of Self-Experience.” [“die Phnome-nologie des Geistes von vornherein als Theorie des Selbst und der Selbsterfahrung zu verstehen [ist].”](p. 374).

17 This logical deduction is a “dialectical deduction”. What this dialectical logic pre-cisely means, will become clear in the next section. Anyhow, the dialectical logicdoes not come down to a violation of the law of non-contradiction, as Popperseems to think. On the contrary, Hegel has developed his dialectics to overcome

contradictory relations and to safeguard the law of non-contradiction.18 This remark seems to correspond to Terry Pinkard’s opinion: “Accordingly, the

Phenomenology is supposed to take its readers, the participants in the modern Eu-ropean community’s form of life, through the past “formations of consciousness”of the European “spirit” – the ways in which that “spirit” has both taken the “es-sence” of things to be, and the ways in which it has taken agents to be cognitively related to that “essence” – and demonstrate to them that they require the kind of account which the Phenomenology as a whole provides, that the Phenomenology’s project is therefore not optional for them but intrinsic to their sense of whothey are.” (Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason, Cam-

bridge 1994, p. 17). The topic of the Phenomenology of Spirit , however, is notthe adequate understanding of European history, but rather the adequate under-standing of “substance” (what, for Hegel, equals the adequate understanding of the unity of mind and body). Although this understanding is actualized in Euro-pean history, this history remains an illustration (i. e., a contingent manifestationform) of the fundamental (logical) structures of substance. Therefore, I cannotagree to his thesis that “the three introductory sections” show that “a kind of knowledge that would be independent of social practice” is impossible. (p. 21).

Also Philip Kain (Hegel and the Other , New York, 2005) seems the be the vic-tim of the same misunderstanding when he writes: “What sense does it make to

call the absolute of one era “absolute” if it differs from the absolute of anotherera? The answer requires us to see that for Hegel reality itself is actually construct-ed by culture.” (p. 19).

Chapter 1 The Human Self as the Unity of Mind and Body 14



cific (contingent) manner in European history. Principally these stagescan also be experienced in other cultures. Actually, in the contemporary globalized world, the experiences of European culture are more or less

shared by all other cultures.

The immediate unity of mind and body

Gene theory determines the organism as a differentiated life process, thatis ultimately directed by the genes. For the time being, I will abstractfrom these differentiations and determine the organism as a kind of black box of which it is only relevant that it is something naturally

given. Unlike the gene theorist’s view, however, I consider this ‘something’not to be an object of scientific reason, but rather the object of a mindthat forms an immediate and natural unity with it, i.e., with the body that is conceived of as black box. I want to know under what conditionsthis relation between mind and body can be determined as a necessary one.19

This unity cannot be obtained by a scheme that functions as an ex-ternal link between mind and body. The connection by an external

scheme remains accidental. Mind and body must be defined in a way in which they have only existence if they are taken together. They must be conceived of in a complementary relationship, in the relative op-position between form and content.20 The mind has to be conceptualizedas the form of the body. The body has to be conceived of as something

Robert Pippin (Hegel’s Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-consciousness , Cam-bridge, 1989) elaborates an opposite interpretation. According to him, the Phe-nomenology of Spirit has to be read as a “direct variation on a crucial Kantian

theme, the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’.” (p. 6). As a consequence, He-gel’s project would be totally a priori: “As we have also seen, now in great detail,Hegel rejects the possibility of such reliance on pure intuitions, the possibility of considering the characteristics of a pure intuited manifold.” (p.133). We will see,however, that the concept of life is central in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Its cen-tral theme can be formulated as the unity of mind and body.

Good introductions in the Phenomenology of Spirit are, for example, Ludwig Siep (2000) and Stephen Houlgate (2006).

19 Insofar as the relation between mind and body is not yet understood as a neces-sary one, I will indicate this relation as a form of the natural consciousness.

20 In a relative opposition, the terms of the opposition are internally related andcannot be determined without the other. Examples are: general/particular, pa-rents/child.

The immediate unity of mind and body 15



that borrows its unity from the mind that functions as its form. The mindis the form that is only real because the body is its content. In this way,mind and body relate to one another in a non-relation: Distinct from one

another, both terms have no meaning. This relation can be illustrated by Berkeley’s esse est percipi. The body only exists insofar as it is perceived by the mind. Outside its perception, the mind has no existence. This rela-tion is an epistemological relation that is in no way distinguished fromthe object that is known. It is about a knowledge that is totally immersedin its object. Just because of its immediacy, this relation cannot be under-stood as an interpretation (for example by means of some scientificmodel). It is about a knowledge that is completely in unity with its objectand that knows its object absolutely.

If the unity of mind and body is determined in this way, the conclu-sion is justified that, from a subjective point of view, i. e., from the mind’s

view, mind and body are a necessary unity. Without one another, mindand body do not exist at all. But this mind is a very poor one. If itcould express itself, it could not even say “I” (let alone: “I am I”). Therelation between mind and body expresses a pure existence that lacksany determination. The immediacy of the mind/body relation wouldbe disturbed by any closer determination. In its unity with the body,

the mind is totally undetermined for itself.The inside and outside perspective are still distinguished. From anoutside perspective, the independence of the mind/body unity is clear.The unity is distinct from other unities. From an inside perspective, how-ever, the unity has no independence because it cannot make any distinc-tion. On the other hand, only from the inside perspective is the mind/body unity a necessary one. The subjectivity of this necessity can only be overcome if the mind/body unity is closely specified and has the op-portunity to internalize what, from the outside perspective, has become

clear: The mind/body unity must not only be determined as pure exis-tence, but also as determined existence, i.e., as an independent one.

The mind/body unity that is for itself an independent unity, can beidentified with the result of development that Hegel discusses in thefirst part of the subjective Spirit: Anthropology or the Soul. The soul is He-gel’s terminus technicus to indicate the immediate unity between mind andbody.21 At the level of the soul, however, it is not yet possible to distin-

21 Hegel defines the soul as the “allgemeine Immaterialitt der Natur, deren ein-faches ideelles Leben” [as nature’s “universal immaterialism, its simple ‘ideal’life”.] (Enz. § 389), i.e., the soul is the form in which nature has its unity.




guish mind and body. The soul is determined by the natural processes in which its body is involved. At this level, it makes no sense to describe themind/body unity as a black-box, because the soul only exists insofar as it

is naturally determined, i.e., the mind has no ability to abstract from theparticular content in which it is involved. This inability has been over-come when the soul is fully developed. At that level, the soul has eman-cipated itself from its being-submerged-in-nature. The soul is trans-formed into a mind that can abstract from particular determinationsand has an abstract unity for itself. This abstract unity is expressed inthe distinction that can be made between an inner and outer world.The soul that has freed itself from nature is for itself insofar as it can dis-tinguish itself from the outside world. The soul has been transformed

into the “subject of the judgement” “in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object, a world externalto it – but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediately re-flected into itself. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness”. (Enz.§ 412)22 Therefore, “consciousness” is the mind in an immediate unity

with its body. But in this relation, as the mind is undetermined, itsbody is, so to speak, a black-box. The mind, however, is determined inits relation to the outside world; for itself, the mind/body unity is inde-

pendent. In the second part of the subjective Spirit , the Phenomenology of Spirit (Enz.,§ 413 ff.), Hegel examines whether the outside and insideperspective of consciousness are compatible. In the next sections, howev-er, I will not refer to this second part of the subjective Spirit , but to theelaborated version of the Phenomenology of Spirit , i.e., to the book thathas the same title as this second part.

Consciousness: looking for the independence of the outside

world

In its independence, the mind/body unity is related to the outside world.It is exactly this relation that threatens the mind/body unity. Insofar as theunity only exists by excluding an outside world, it is dependent on thisoutside world and, consequently, loses its independence. In that case,the immediacy of the inside perspective can also get lost. If the mind per-

22 “in welchem es die natrliche Totalitt seiner Bestimmungen als ein Object, eineihm ußere Welt, von sich ausschließt und sich darauf bezieht, so daß es in der-selben unmittelbar in sich reflectirt ist, das Bewußtseyn.” (Enz. § 412).

Consciousness: looking for the independence of the outside world 17



ceives the determinedness of its body (because of any interaction betweenthe body and the outside world) it becomes aware of the distinction be-tween the body and itself, so that their immediate unity is broken down.

Therefore, the problem that has to be solved is: How can the mind/body unity relate to an outside world without threatening the unity of mindand body from an inside perspective?

A living organism is related to the outside world because of its needs.In its attempt to satisfy its needs and to reproduce itself, it is involved inthe outside world. In contrast to a lifeless thing, the organism is actively related to the outside world. While the lifeless thing passively undergoesthe working of external forces of nature and loses its unity by an ongoing process of erosion, the living organism actively preserves the boundariesbetween the outside world and itself. This time the outside world doesnot appear as a force of nature that is undergone by the organism, butas a stimulus to which it actively reacts. The reactions of the organismcan be interpreted in the framework of its striving for self-conservation.

The model to conceive of the organism’s relation to the outside worldcannot be maintained if the organism also has a mind at its disposal. Wedefined the mind as the form from which the organism borrows its con-scious unity, i.e., its undetermined existence as it is understood from an

inside perspective. If the organism also has a mind, the stimuli that arereceived by the organism can be interpreted as immediate determinationsof the mind, as are the simple ideas of impressions in the sense of Hume.23

The mind, however, that exists in a multitude of determinations loses its

23 Hume’s definition of “impression” is not unproblematic. (Cf. An Inquiry concern-ing Human Understanding , Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 17 ff). Hume dis-tinguishes between an impression (for example, the impression red) and the sim-ple idea of an impression (for example, the idea red). An idea is a determination

of the mind and, therefore, something that has a general way of existence. Theidea red is related to the impression red. The impression red is something “real”, i.e., something that exists in space and time and has, therefore, a partic-ular way of existence. But at the same time the impression is experienced and, inthat sense, also a determination of the mind. This time, however, the determina-tion of the mind is “immediate”: In its experience of the impression, the mind isin an immediate unity with reality. As a consequence, the experienced expressionhas a higher intensity than the simple idea. The problem is, however, how it ispossible to discern qualitative different impressions (red, blue, pain etc.). An im-mediate relation excludes qualitative differences. A relation is immediate and, by

implication, qualitatively undetermined; or a relation is qualitatively determinedand, by implication, not immediate. A relation that is immediate, and at thesame time qualitatively determined, is logically impossible.




unity and, consequently, cannot be understood as the form in which theorganism has its conscious unity. The mind as the conscious unity formof the organism has to be distinguished from the many stimuli in which

the mind has a determined content. The mind must become aware of thestimuli as coming from outside, from an outside world, in distinctionfrom the mind/body unity. The way to think of stimuli as coming from outside is elaborated by Immanuel Kant. As originating from anoutside world, the stimuli24 have a spatial form, the form of existing-be-side-one-another. As stimuli not only originating from outside but alsodetermining the mind, they have the form of time, the form of exist-ing-after-one-another.25

Stimuli situated by the mind in time and space are a multitude that

are distinguished from the immediate mind/body unity. This does notmean, however, that the mind/ body unity has developed an adequate re-lation to the outside world and has transformed its pure existence into a determined existence. The mind/body unity remains beside the multitudeof spatio-temporal stimuli. The multitude of stimuli do not constitute anindependent world. Qualitatively, the stimuli remain undetermined. It istrue that the stimuli have a spatio-temporal form, but this form belongsto any stimulus. Which stimuli are involved remains unclear.26 The stim-

24 Of course, Kant does not speak about stimuli, but rather about the “pure mani-fold” by which Intuition is affected.

25 Robert Pippin (2001), defends the thesis that Hegel “rejects the possibility of such reliance on pure intuitions, the possibility of considering the characteristicsof a purely intuited manifold.” (p. 133) For Hegel, “there are no possible differ-ences, no possible determinacy in any manifold means, unless already thought incertain non-sensible ways.” (p. 139) We will see, however, how Hegel under-stands the intuited nature as life, i.e., as a manifold that brings itself to unity.Hegel’s introduction of life is in no way “opaque”. (p. 138).

26 This is the point that is central at the level of Sense-Certainty , i.e., at the level of the first form of the mind/body relation that Hegel discusses in his Phenomenol-ogy of Spirit. Something that is sensory-given in time and space cannot be qual-itatively determined in an immediate relation: All kinds of qualities can be im-mediately given. It is true that Hegel, at the level of Sense-Certainty, does notspeak about stimuli, but rather about real things like “tree” and “house”. This,however, is not essential for what is at stake in this relation. The main point isthe conclusion that something that is immediately given for the senses cannotbe qualitatively identified.

The I, the subject of Sense-Certainty is not presented as a mind that is in an

immediate unity with its body. It is not even mentioned at all that the subjecthas a body. This is only explicated at the level of Self-consciousness. From theoutside perspective, however, it is clear that the subject of Sense-Certainty has a




uli only reflect the internal dividedness of the organism. Any of the end-less series of stimuli to which the organism is receptive can be taken intoaccount. The determination of the stimuli only exists in the endless

change of qualities, without having the possibility to concentrate on spe-cific qualities. Only when the spatio-temporal stimuli have their ownunity (distinct from the unity of the mind) can the mind/body unity ad-equately relate to them as to an objective world. Only then can the mindperceive itself as consciousness, i.e., as being related to an objective (out-side) world.

John Locke’s proposal for the solution of this problem will not do.He interprets the stimuli as properties, and thinks that these properties,thanks to the workings of the mind, can be understood as properties

of an identity, i.e., as a complex idea in which the simple ideas of theproperties are unified. In this way, however, the unity of things in theoutside world is not an objective one, but rather a unity that is subjective-ly constituted. For the same reason, the unity of things in the world can-not be grounded on a priori schemes that belong to the mind or to thelanguage in which the mind expresses itself: Also in that case, theunity remains external, i.e., subjectively constituted. The subjectivity of the unity that is ascribed to the things in the objective world can only

be overcome by considering the radical revolution in the conception of nature that is introduced by modern science.27

The world of modern science no longer consists of things with prop-erties, but rather of forces of nature. Modern science’s conception of na-ture has objectivity because it is the physical force that manifests itself innature (or rather as nature). Compared to the conception of nature con-sidered up until now, a certain reversion has been performed. Points of departure are no longer the perceived stimuli or properties, invoking the problem of their unification. For modern science, nature’s own

body: After all, it is impossible to have sense experiences without the body. Pre-cisely because the body is, at this level, for the mind only a black-box, it is notnecessary to explicitly thematize the body.

27 The problems in Locke essentially correspond to the problems Hegel discusses atthe second stage of Consciousness: Perception. It is impossible to identify an exter-nal thing by perception of properties. To succeed, the properties have to be con-ceived of as properties that, at the same time, include other properties (the num-ber of properties of a thing can endlessly be enlarged) and exclude other proper-ties (it must be possible to distinguish the properties of the one thing from the

ones of the other). Worded differently, if the outside thing can only be identifiedby means of properties, it cannot be identified at all. The unity of the thing is notitself a property that can be perceived.




unity is the point of departure: Nature consists of physical forces, i.e., of selves, unities that manifest themselves in a sensory form. What is per-ceived is already perceived as the expression of an inner unity all the

time. Observations are no longer immediate, but rather mediated: Obser- vations have developed into experimental observations that verify the law hypotheses formulated by the scientists.

The inversion of modern science can be illustrated by an examplefrom classical mechanics. The point masses introduced by classical me-chanics are not spatio-temporal stimuli that have to be unified withother stimuli. The point mass that is experienced in time and space isconsidered to be a manifestation of gravitation; it is the manifestationof a unity that is already objectively working in nature all the time. Inthe experimental observation of a point mass in time and space, it appearsthat gravitation, i.e., the unity that is hypothetically assumed by the sci-entist, is an objective unity of nature itself.

How objective, however, is the unity of the physical force itself ? What exactly is the ontological status of the physical force, or, to apply this question to the elaborated example, what is the ontological statusof gravitation?28 Science determines gravitation in its law hypothesis:Under the influence of gravitation a point mass is involved in a certain

movement, i.e., its time and space coordinates are put in a certain rela-tion to one-another. The possibility to explain the point mass’s positionin time and space as the result of the gravitational force depends on thedefinition of gravitation. Gravitation appears in its working on a pointmass: It causes the time and space coordinates of the point mass to beput in a relation that can be described in a mathematical form. Inother words, experimental observation does not result in the appearanceof an objective self, but rather in the appearance of an objective self that isprojected in nature by a subjective self, namely the scientist. This illus-trates what Kant means with the Copernican turn of modern science. 29

The unity of the object of experience is constituted by the subject of ex-perience, i.e., the scientist.30

The preceding development has shown that if the mind/body unity isunderstood as an immediate one, it is not possible that the mind, from an

28 This example is discussed by Hegel at the level of the third stage of Conscious-ness, Understanding. Cf. The Phenomenology of Spirit , p. 93.

29 Cf. I. Kant, Critics of pure Reason, B XVI.30 The Copernican turn is formulated by Hegel in terms of the “tautological move-ment” of Understanding. (PhoS, p. 95).




inside perspective, relates to an objective reality that has an independentexistence. From an inside perspective, the mind’s objective reality appearsas constituted by the mind itself, and, in this sense, as a subjective reality.

The positive result of this development is the mind that has becomereflected in itself. It has been transformed from an undetermined exis-tence into a being-in-itself, an “I”, or a “self”. This development, howev-er, was accompanied by a reduction: while, from an outside perspective,the mind was determined in immediate union with an independent or-ganism, it seems that this organism, from an inside perspective, has be-come totally invisible. It seems that the mind can only conceive of itself as a being-in-itself in relation to an independence that is its own projec-tion, i.e., in relation to an otherness that it has constituted, itself.

To cancel the discrepancy between the inside and outside perspective we have to prove under what conditions the mind can still, from an insideperspective, relate to an objective world. Since, from an outside perspec-tive, the independent reality has been determined as an independent or-ganism, the question now is: Is the vision that the mind formulates fromits inside perspective, namely that its objective world is constituted by it-self, compatible with its position from the outside perspective, namely that the objective reality has to be understood as organism, i.e., as inde-pendent life?

In the next section, I will discuss how this problem can be solved. Wehave to learn that the distinction between mind and body we made untilnow, remains too external, remains a distinction of Understanding. De-parting from a body that is also a mind, we tried to think of theirinner unity. We will see that mind and body already are a living unity all the time. The distinction between both has to be understood as theself-distinction of self-conscious life.

Self-consciousness

The attempt to conceive of the mind/body unity in relation to an inde-pendent outside world has failed. From the inside perspective, the sensory perceivable world has been destroyed. As the “self” or the “I”, the mindhas emancipated itself from nature and has become a formal self that only accepts an independency that it has constituted, itself. This self looks likeDescartes’s cogito. Like the cogito, it is a formal being-in-itself. Also the

cogito seems to presuppose that the formal structure of being-in-itself isthe only acceptable form of independence. (The formal being-in-itself




of the cogito seems to allow a multitude of cogitos , although it is unclear where the other cogitos come from).

The difference, however, between the mind that has developed itself

into a formal self and the cogito is not only that, for the mind, other for-mal selves are not yet developed, but also that, from an outside perspec-tive, the formal self of the mind is related to an independent organism,i.e., a body. The formal self of the mind also has a body (although itis ignorant of this fact). Therefore, the mind will not escape from con-frontation with other organisms.

Before it is possible to go into the mind’s confrontation with otherorganisms, another problem has to be solved. It has to be clear what itmeans to speak about an organism that is not finding its unity in the

mind. Until now we conceived of the organism as a black box existing in an immediate unity with the mind. To maintain this unity towardsthe outside world, we had to understand in what way the mind is ableto grasp the outside world as an independent world to exclude it fromitself as the immediate mind/body unity. Meanwhile, it appears that na-ture can only be excluded as the otherness if the mind can understanditself as a pure self. Only then is its unity not threatened by otherness

when the distinction with otherness is constituted by itself. Natureonly has an own self, insofar as this self is assigned to it by the mind.This is also expressed by Descartes. The existence of the mind canonly be conceived of as a pure existence, as pure self-determination.The distinction that the mind knows is constituted by itself. This conclu-sion evokes two problems. In the first place, there is the problem of dual-ism. If the mind is conceived of as a purely spiritual self, separated fromnatural reality, what meaning can it still have to speak about a relationbetween mind and body? And, in the second place, what meaning canstill be given to the concept of organism? Until now, the organism was

determined in its immediate unity with the mind. How can the organ-ism’s independence be determined when it does not take its unity fromthe mind?

Since the organism belongs to the world that is sensorially given, it issubjected to laws of nature. But this observation does not allow us to as-sign a self to the organism. This is only possible when the organism is alsounderstood as life. It is true that the working of living organisms is alsosubjected to the laws of nature, but something else is added. An organismcan be interpreted as a relatively stable system of forces, comparable, for

example, to a planetary system. The working of the forces are broughtinto line in such a way that they maintain the unity of the system they

Self-consciousness 23



are part of. It makes sense to represent the working of an organism by a teleological model: as if the working of the forces of nature in this caseare oriented on the maintenance of the organism’s unity; as if the forces

of nature strive after the survival of the organism. In that sense a practicalself can be assigned to the organism, separated from the mind. As pureself, the mind can only separate itself from nature when nature hasbeen grasped as living nature, as nature having a practical self that is sep-arated from the self of the mind.

But how do we solve the first problem mentioned above? Can thepure self relate to its body? It is true that from, an outside perspective,the pure self is related to a living organism, but this living organism is,from an inside perspective, unknown. Moreover, this living organism is

not its own body, but an organism of the outside world. But of course,from an outside perspective, the pure self still has its own body. The im-mediate unity of mind and body was the point of departure we started

with. The question is whether the pure self can ever experience itsbody without losing its purity.

Just because the pure self is in immediate unity with its body, it can-not escape from experiencing it. As an organism, its body is needy, i.e., itis dependent on the outside world when reproducing itself. As we have

seen before, this dependence manifests itself in stimuli to which the or-ganism actively reacts. At the level of consciousness, this reaction threat-ened to undermine the mind’s unity. This unity could only be saved by perceiving the stimuli as part of an outside world, i.e., by perceiving them in the form of time and space. But the pure self’s experience of the stimuli, i.e., the experience of self-consciousness, is not compatible

with this form of time and space. Because the pure self as purely being-in-itself does not allow any relation to an outside world, it can,nevertheless, when experiencing an outside world (because of its corpo-

reality) experience it only in an absolute negative form, i.e., in theform in which the pure self is totally threatened in its existence asbeing-purely-in-itself. The involvement of the pure self in the strange or-ganism can only be conceived of in the form of pure negativity 31: To res-

31 Josifovic (2008) adequately formulates: “As consciousness the new form in whichsubjectivity performs itself preserves, furthermore, the relation to the entire do-main of what sensually appears, but in such a way that the entire content of this

domain remains at the same time related to the unity of consciousness, and can,as a consequence, from the perspective of the constituting identity (as Self-con-sciousness) only represent an otherness or a difference.” [Als Bewusstsein behlt




cue its own existence, the pure self has to destroy the existence of thestrange organism.32

The pure negativity towards the strange organism can be articulated

more closely in terms of neediness. Insofar as the body of the mind/body unity is needy, it is related to an outside world that is determined as a strange organism. The experience of neediness, however, contradicts thepurely-being-in-itself of the pure self. Therefore, there is no room for a closer differentiation of neediness. Neediness as such is threatening, notsome particular form of it. Therefore, the pure self turns against needi-ness as such. Only when it can eliminate neediness as such, can it main-tain its pure existence.

Up to a certain level, the elimination of neediness in relation to a strange organism is possible. The relation of neediness between theown organism of the mind/body unity and the strange organism impliesthat the integrity of the own organism is somehow threatened by thestrange organism. If this would not be the case, then the own organismis not (practically) related to the strange organism at all. The threat of thestrange organism can have an active form (if the own organism is subject-ed to the needs of the strange organism) or a passive form (if the strangeorganism is an object of the own needs, resulting in the experience of

being dependent on the strange organism for satisfying the own needs).Both forms of the threat can be overcome when the own organismkills the strange organism and can make it its prey for satisfying itsneeds. Then the own organism has repaired its independence towardsthe outside world and is no longer related to any strange organism.

After a while, however, the needs will return, and once again a relationto strange life arises to which the new needs are directed. In this variationof needs being satisfied and arising once again, the mind/body unity ex-

periences the life process of its own organism by the strange life. There-

die neue Vollzugsweise der Subjektivitt weiterhin die Bezogenheit auf die ge-samte Sphre des sinnlich Erscheinenden bei, jedoch derart, dass smmtliche In-halte dieser Sphre zugleich auf die Einheit des Bewusstseins bezogen sind, somitaus der Perspektive der sich konstituierenden Identitt (als Selbstbewusstsein) nurein Anderssein oder einen Unterschied darstellen.] p. 75.

32 Hegel calls this negative relation to the outside organism “Desire”: “The simple‘I’ is the genus or the simple universal, for which the differences are not differ-ences only by its being the negative essence of the shaped independent moments;

and self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other thatpresents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness isDesire.” (109).




fore, it is impossible to eliminate the relation to strange life: This wouldonly be possible if the mind/body unity could totally ignore its own body.

If the relation to strange life cannot be eliminated, the identity of the

pure self seems to be based on illusion. The presupposition of the pureself is that the own body is totally satisfied.33 It is, however, typical of an organism that this total satisfaction is impossible: After satisfaction,inevitably follow new needs. The attempt to conceive of the mind in a unity with an independent organism seems to have failed, because the re-sult is a logical contradiction. If the mind has to be understood as a pureself that can only exist by totally excluding from itself the materiality of its organism, the demand cannot be made at the same time that the mindforms a necessary unity with its body. These conflicting points of depar-

ture make mind and body incompatible. The impression is aroused thatthose who conceive of man as a corporeal being that is also a spiritualbeing, inevitably have to admit to taking a Kantian position in whichmind and body have their own realms. From a noumenal point of

view, man is considered to be a spiritual being, but from a phenomenalpoint of view, however, a corporeal one. In that case, it is not possible tounify both points of view in a way that makes their unity understandableas a necessary one.

If, however, the organism is considered to be a living one, the claimthat man is separated into two different beings (mind and body) canhardly be maintained. If the organism dies, the pure self (man as spiritualbeing) seems to be automatically involved in its decay. This observation,however, in no way solves the problem of the unity between mind andbody. If the mind disappears together with the body, the mind is madea kind of epiphenomenon adhering to corporeal functioning. In effect,the mind is reduced to the body. The mind loses its independence, im-

33 Self-consciousness as Desire has, so to say, synthesized the pure manifold all thetime: in its own unity, the pure manifold is sublated. Cf. Josifovic (2008): “Inthis sense, one would … maintain that the way in which subjectivity performsitself is Desire, i.e., if it leaves its immediate identity (as abstract I or motionlesstautology), and orients itself to the manifold of the world of experience, but insuch a way that it negates the independent existence of the world of experienceand wants to maintain itself as truth towards the difference.” [Man wrde in die-sem Sinne … festhalten, dass die Art und Weise, auf die sich die Subjektivitt vollzieht, wenn sie aus ihrer unmittelbaren Identitt (als abstraktes Ich oder be- wegungslose Tautologie) heraustritt und sich auf die Mannigfaltigkeit der Erfah-

rungswelt einlsst, so jedoch, dass sie das selbststndige Bestehen der Erfahrungs-gegenstnde negiert und sich als Wahrheit gegenber dem Unterschied behaup-ten will, Begierde ist.] p. 80.




plying that there cannot be a question of a real relation between mindand body. The mind that is reduced to a property of an organism no lon-ger has an own self at its disposal that enables to relate to the body. If the

problem of the relation between mind and body can be solved, mind isnot only a property.The preceding exposition teached that the problem of the unity be-

tween mind and body cannot be solved insofar as the mind/body unity is related to an outside organism. Inside and outside perspective cannotbe brought into harmony. From the inside perspective the body is exclud-ed, but from the outside perspective the mind is in unity with the body.Therefore, the outside world confronts the mind/body unity to what it

wants to exclude, namely a natural world. If the unity of mind and

body can be solved at all, the mind/body unity must not relate to an out-side organism, but rather to an outside world that is a mind/body unity,as well.34 In the symmetrical relation between two mind/body unities, itseems to be possible that the inside and outside perspective correspond toone another. The inside perspective in which the body is excluded as aninessential reality, seems to be affirmed by the outside perspective that fo-cuses on the mind/body unity’s relation to the outside world. In theframework of the symmetrical relation just mentioned, the outside

world is a mind that excludes the body as well. The outside world isthe reality of what the mind/body unity subjectively thinks to be.

The problem is, however, that the conceptualization of the symmet-rical relation between two mind/body unities is not trivial, and evenseems to be impossible. An outside mind cannot immediately be madethe object of the mind. The being-object-of-the-mind is mediated by its body. But how can a mind that makes an embodied mind its objectdifferentiate between a embodied mind and a strange organism in gener-al? Rather, it seems to be obvious that it perceives the strange mind/body

simply as a strange organism. As a consequence, it would deal with thestrange mind/body unity as it would deal with any strange organism:It would try to destroy the strange organism in order to rescue its exis-tence as pure self. Since the relation between the two mind/body unitiesis symmetrical, both unities would try to destroy each other. The result

34 Cf. “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.”(110).




would be a struggle of life and death ending up in the death of one of thetwo unities.35

The attempt to develop the adequate relation between mind and

body as the symmetrical relation between two mind/body unities seemsto definitely fail when the struggle results in the death of one of them.Nevertheless, there is a tradition in philosophy in which the struggle of life and death between individuals or between groups is presented as a struggle for recognition. In this tradition, the struggle between individu-als can result in a situation in which the struggle is overcome because theindividuals constitute a symmetrical relation of recognition, i.e., a rela-tion in which the individuals relate to one another as self-consciousnesses.Thomas Hobbes, for example, has the opinion that the so-called “legalstatus” (in which the individuals recognize one another as persons whoparticipate in a legal order) can be conceived of as a transition fromthe “natural status” (in which the individuals relate to one another in a struggle of life and death).

Is the transition from the natural into the legal status possible?

According to Thomas Hobbes, the “natural status” can be described as a struggle of all against all. The goal of the struggle is the maintenance of the own life. While defending the own life all is permitted, even the kill-ing of the others. This is the consequence of the ius naturale , the law of nature that ultimately comes down to kill or be killed.36 The natural sta-tus, however, can be sustained when the individuals enter into a socialcontract. In that case, they submit to a ruler under the condition thathe succeeds in overcoming the mutual struggle. Therefore, in the transi-tion from the natural status into the legal status, one absolute ruler is ex-

35 In my opinion, Hegel’s formulation of the struggle is somewhat confusing: “Sim-ilarly, just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the other’s death, for it values the other no more than itself; its essential being is present to it in the formof an ‘other’, it is outside of itself and must rid itself of its self-externality.” (114)It is only from an outside perspective that the struggle can be conceived of as a struggle for recognition. From an inside perspective, the distinction between a strange organism and a strange self-consciousness cannot yet be made. Thatthe self-consciousness “values the other no more than itself” can only be said

from an external reconstruction of this relation. We will see that only the fearof death results in self-consciousness’s awareness of its body.36 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London, 1959, p. 66.




changed for another: The power of death is replaced by the power of thesocial ruler. The profit that is achieved by this transition is the socialorder. This order creates room for the labor that produces the riches dedi-

cated to life. In the social contract, the struggle for survival is continuedby other means: The social order can be a more effective means to guar-antee the survival. The means fails if the ruler cannot maintain the socialorder. Under these circumstances, the legitimacy of the ruler is under-mined and the subjects have the right to chase him away. The distinctionbetween nature and culture seems to be paper thin. The peace to bebrought about by culture can be threatened at any moment. The returnto the natural status remains always possible, and ultimately depends onthe calculation made by the individuals.

Hobbes’s construction, however, is based on a false presupposition. If the individuals in the natural status have the opportunity to calculate andask themselves whether or not a contract with a ruler means an improve-ment, they have, in fact, already left the natural status. If the natural sta-tus is characterized by the practical struggle of life and death, there is noroom for calculation or for reflecting the other’s position as a potentialcontract partner. Whoever is able to reflect, and knows the difference be-tween a relation of struggle and a relation of contract, is already part of a

cultural order all the time. Therefore, Hobbes’s conception of the transi-tion from the natural into the legal status has failed. The reflecting self-consciousness cannot be at the same time the presupposition and the re-sult of the transition.37

Maybe the natural status can be left otherwise. Maybe a legal statuscan be created that is not the result of a contract, but rather followsfrom a purely practical development. In that case, the legal order doesnot presuppose a self-consciousness that already has the ability to reflectand make free choices. The animal world seems to offer a lot of examplesof a living-together without a developed self-consciousness. Maybe theseexamples can help to construct alternative ways for overcoming the nat-ural status.

Innumerable animal species live together without having a legal order.Their peaceful cohabitation is not trivial: Animals also have the possibil-ity to struggle even when they belong to the same species. Therefore, their

37 Cf. PhR § 75 comment: “The intrusion of this contractual relation, and relation-

ships concerning private property generally, into the relation between the individ-ual and the state has been productive of the greatest confusion in both constitu-tional law and public life.”

Is the transition from the natural into the legal status possible? 29



living-together presupposes a principle that banishes the struggle and al-lows them to coordinate their conduct. The cohabitation of the membersof a flock not only implies that they can live in each others neighborhood,

but also that they have the ability to coordinate action. Only this coordi-nation gives the flock its unity as a flock.The behavior of animals that coordinate action and form a flock can

be described as the realization of a general law. For, action coordinationonly has a meaning under the assumption of a general action goal that isserved by it, for example, the survival of the flock. This general goal canbe interpreted as a general law that is realized by coordinated action.

If it concerns the animals of a flock, the origin of such a general law can be explained from innate instincts. It can be put forward that these

animals from a natural predestination are predetermined to live in a flock, although it does not have to be clear in advance which positionthey will take within the flock. In some flocks the struggle for leadershipcan break out in which the strongest succeeds. Even in that case, the ex-istence of the flock as such is not the result of the physical power of a triumphing leader. The struggle is not about the constitution of theflock, but rather about the individual that will exercise the leading rolein the flock.

If the base of the flock’s living-together is interpreted in terms of a general law, this does not make the flock a legal society. It is true thatthe legal status enables one to distinguish between actions that do ordo not correspond to the law. But this distinction gets the legal meaning only if it is known by the actors. An animal of the flock can disobey thelaw. But it can only experience its breach of the law if its behavior is prac-tically punished; for example, when it went too far from the flock and is,because of that, caught by a predator. A law can only become the law of a legal order if it is known by the actors, and the actors know what action is

legal and what is illegal, what action observes the law and what actiondoes not. Legal order presupposes reflecting self-consciousness and can-not be situated in a natural order. Once again, the conclusion runs thatthe legal status is not preceded by a natural one.38 Although the relation

38 Wildt (1984) seems to suggest that in Hegel the legal status is preceded by a nat-ural struggle: “Oppositely, one has to say that Hegel, in this expression, affirmsthe appearance again that the struggle is at all possible as a relation of pre-ethical

and, at the same time, self-conscious human subjects, i.e., as Robinsonate.”[“Umgekehrt muß man jedoch sagen, daß der Kampf als ein Verhltnis vorsitt-licher und zugleich selbstbewußter menschlicher Subjekte berhaupt mçglich ist




of the struggle can be overcome at the level of living nature in the form of instinctual laws in which the struggle is transformed in cooperation, theseinstinctual laws have no legal status. The laws of the legal status have to

be self-conscious.Until now, we assumed that the mind/body unity can only exist if it isable to exclude the strange organism. We concluded that this demandsthat the struggle of life and death with the strange organism is overcome,and suggested that this goal could be achieved in a symmetrical relationto another mind/body unity, i.e., in a “legal status”. We have argued thatthe constitution of the legal status cannot be conceived of as a temporaltransformation of the natural status. The mind/body unity can only existif it has been participating in a legal order all the time. As participant of

the legal order, the mind/body unity is no longer confronted with a strange objectivity, i. e. , the strange organism that has to be excluded. Ob-

jectivity has lost its strangeness because it has been transformed in the law that is known by the mind. Therefore, the objectivity is no longer practi-cally excluded, but recognized as an objectivity that has lost its otherness.Insofar as it can be known by the mind, objectivity and mind must insome way or another be “the same”.

The attempt to overcome the contradictions in which the mind/body

unity gets involved, has led to a fundamental change in its determination:The negative exclusion of strange objectivity has turned into a positivereception of an objectivity that is knowable. This change, however, hasnot been performed from an inside perspective. This perspective willbe elaborated in one of the next sections. Before doing this, however, I

will, in the next section, go into the essential characteristics of the legalstatus.

Self-consciousness and the legal statusThe actors’ knowledge of the general law of action is a sufficient precon-dition to identify this general law with the legal status. The law can beascribed to an original lawgiver or be conceived of as having a divine ori-gin; it can have been transformed into law-instinctual behavior that,

without legal order, would also have been performed ; it can serve the in-terest of many people or that of only one individual. To be valid as a legalorder it is sufficient that the law is known as law. Being known, the law

– also als Robinsonade.”]. p. 377. However, we will see that all stages of the development of consciousness are abstractions of the concrete totality of the polis.

Self-consciousness and the legal status 31



loses its purely practical status. If it is also understood that the law is prac-tically valid, the law counts as a legal law. Without this insight, the gen-eral law is exercised as a blind law of nature that not only models the ac-

tions, but also determines them. Only when the actor is self-consciousand understands to observe the law does he no longer coincide withhis practical actions. Only then, not only the possibility arises not to ob-serve the general law (incidentally this could have been the case before),but also the possibility to know that the own actions do not correspond tothe general law. Only then can the actor be made responsible for his ac-tions, and will it make sense to subject him to jurisdiction. The respon-sible actor who does not observe the general law commits injustice andhas to bear the consequences of his behavior. Whoever commits injustice

lets himself in for the sanctions of the jurisdiction. This overcomes in two ways the blindness of the general law that is only natural. Not only willthe violation of the general law lose its innocence, but also the sanctionsthat punish the violation. The general law that is known, is also known by the power that maintains the general law. Therefore, the sanctions on vi-olation of the law are no longer practical punishments of mindless behav-ior (the animal that ventures too far from the flock is seized by hostileclaws) but are self-conscious actions. In both cases, the offender againstthe general law brings a hostile power upon himself. But when the generallaw has become legal, the hostile power has lost its blindness. The pun-ishment for the breach of the law is no reaction of nature, but a self-con-scious action that could not have come off (for example, in case the of-fender is granted mercy). In both cases, the hostile power that has beenaroused can lead to the same results. The offender who is killed by theblind power of nature can die under legal conditions, as well (when heis punished by death). Therefore, the decisive distinction between thenatural and the legal status is not the effect of the power that realizes

the general law, but the character of the general power: Is this powerblind or self-consciousness? From the outside perspective, it cannot be

judged whether the animal of the flock observes the general law becausehis instincts do not leave him other possibilities, or because he has knowl-edge of the sanctions that illegal actions can evoke.




Violence, power and the legal status

The general law is neither a legal law on the basis of its origin, nor on the

basis of its content. Also, a general law that is enacted by a cruel dictatorto serve his own interest can become a legal law. Of course, no plea isneeded to observe that the legitimacy of this kind of legal law is highly problematic. If these laws can be called legal, then these legal laws, atthe least, are not fair. But why it is nevertheless about legal law? Mustthe law as legal law be separated from any moral notion, and is it, there-fore, a neutral means that can be used by everyone to exercise power, alsoby a cruel dictator? Still, what is the difference between the blind violenceof nature and the random will of a cruel dictator?

Indeed, insofar as the will of the dictator has the form of a random will, the difference is not essential. At the moment, however, that the dic-tator, in the exercise of his power, appeals to a general law, this power ex-ecution has lost a bit of its arbitrariness and is characterized by the very beginning of reasonableness.39 Power execution based on random will, isnot distinguished from violence. Whoever becomes the victim of thispower execution, does not know where he stands. There is no way to an-ticipate the ruler, because the victim does not know what the former

wants. Therefore, this form of power execution is not effective to enforcethe subjects to coordinate their actions. Because the power has not any general criterion at its disposal, it only gets validity in the here andnow, i.e., it can only ad hoc enforce an action by immediately threaten-ing with violence. The fear that is evoked by the exercised violence, or by the threatening of violence, is the only ground to obey the ruler.

The first step to restrain the random will of the dictator is made atthe moment that the power is exercised in the name of a general law that is generally known (i.e., not only by the dictator). At that moment,the dictator commits himself to a norm. If the dictator observes the norm

39 Vgl. J. Hollak, Recht en Macht (Wijsgerig Perspectief 11 (1970/71): “Wil ze (i.e.de macht) zich dan ook als deze vorm blijvend handhaven, dan zal ze niet alleende aan haar macht nu onderworpenen maar ook zichzelf moeten binden aan de,aan haar innerlijke tegenstelling van geboden en verboden geweld ten grondslag liggende regel alsook deze inhoudelijk moeten rechtvaardigen, daar ze anders zouterugvallen tot haar fase van puur geweld”. (p.322). [“If it (i. e., the power) wantslastingly maintain itself in this form, then it has to bind not only those who are

subjected to its power, but also itself to the rule that underlies its inner contra-diction of demanded and forbidden violence. Moreover, it has to justify the con-tent of this rule, because it will otherwise fall back in its phase of pure violence”.]

Violence, power and the legal status 33



of a general law, the subjects know where they are standing. They know how to behave for preventing the exercise of violence against them. Only in this way does it become possible to enforce action coordination. Only

in this way is the most elementary condition satisfied to enforce socialorder. This grounds the dictator’s interest to observe the general law him-self, although he, as dictator, is not obliged to. Because the law is gener-ally known, the subjects immediately know whether the ruler observes thelaw that he has enacted (or at least has approved). If it appears that theruler does not observe the law, it offers the subjects no advantage to ob-serve the law themselves. For, they do not know whether this is sufficientto ward off violence. Therefore, by not observing the law, the ruler under-mines the social order and risks that the power gets the shape of the ex-

ercise of pure violence.The publicity of the law does not make it a fair one. Publicity, for

example does not need to imply that all are equal for the law. Only the continuity of the law is guaranteed, because a public law cannot bechanged from day to day. Taken in itself, however, publicity is compatible

with all content, however unfair it may be. Public law can discriminatebetween women and men, white and black, nobility and ordinary people.The public law could even shamelessly formulate that the only importantinterest is the interest of the dictator.

It may be clear that the public law cannot have all content. If it is notmore attractive to observe the law than not to observe it, the viability of the law cannot be explained. Therefore, we can ask ourselves whetherminimal conditions can be formulated to which a viable law has to cor-respond. What minimal guarantees has the law to offer to make obedi-ence to the law more attractive than its violation?

According to Thomas Hobbes, the law applies with the minimal con-dition we are looking for when it enables one to avert death. In the mean-

time, however, we presented the arguments against Hobbes’ position. Theinstitution of the legal status necessarily implies that the ruling generallaw is known by the self-conscious individuals. Knowledge of the law characterizes the distinction between the natural society of the flock and the human society of the legal status. Therefore, a human society ex-ists of self-conscious individuals, not of individuals who are purely natu-ral. For self-conscious individuals, the purely physical survival can neverbe a sufficiently legitimate basis of the ruling power. This would result ina remarkable contradiction. How can a status that lacks room for self-

consciousness (a society in which survival is the highest criterion) offera solution to an individual who is confronted with the legitimate prob-




lems just because of his self-consciousness? Therefore, the conclusionmust follow that an individual living in a social order (i.e., a self-con-scious individual) can only affirm the legitimacy of this order if it guar-

antees his survival as self-conscious individual. What, however, is the consequence of the aforementioned condition?Is a legal order able at all to guarantee the survival of a self-conscious in-dividual? Whoever is self-conscious, is conscious of his own independ-ence. The self-consciousness distinguishes between itself and the outside

world. The outside world is a strange independence, but at the same timeit is considered continuously by the self-consciousness. In that sense theoutside world only has independence for the self-consciousness, and thereal independence is transferred to the self-consciousness. The outside

world can never be more important than the self-consciousness, becausethe distinction between the self-consciousness and the outside world isonly brought about by the self-consciousness, itself. But also, a potentialdictator belongs to the outside world. How can the self-consciousnessever conform to a dictator without doing violence to itself? Is it not typ-ical of the self-consciousness to put itself in the center of the world? How can the self-consciousness maintain itself and at the same time tolerate a dictator in the center?

This paradox can only be overcome if self-consciousness thinks thatputting a dictator in the center of the world is compatible with putting itself in the center of the world. In other words, self-consciousnessmust immediately identify itself with the dictator. But why would itdo so?

The last question starts from the wrong assumptions. It presupposesthat self-consciousness coincides with the self-conscious individual who ismore or less able to make his autonomous choices. We will see that such

an individual will only originate when the legal order has passed througha development. In the elementary definition of self-consciousness, the in-dividual, autonomous choice is not yet at stake at all. The distinction be-tween action in the framework of a flock and self-conscious action in theframework of a legal order is determined by the general law on which theaction is based: Does or does not the actor know the general law? Actionthat is determined by instinctual laws belongs to the natural status; if thegeneral law is known, the natural status has been overcome and trans-formed into the legal status. Therefore, the question is not whether

self-consciousness would conform to a dictator, but rather, it must be ob-served that there is only a question of a self-consciousness if action is per-

Violence, power and the legal status 35



formed according to a known general law. Self-consciousness has con-formed to a dictator all the time, i.e., to a known general law. 40

The observation that self-consciousness has always conformed to a

dictator can also be expressed otherwise: For self-consciousness, the law primarily has the status of natural right, i.e., the law rules immediately and has an absolute, divine status. Although the law is known, this inno way means that there is room for the consciousness not to acceptthe law. Therefore, it is true that at this stage, right is a form of powerexercise that, up to a certain level, can be called reasonable (the ruling law is known, random will is prevented) but from an outside perspective,the power exercise has been externally imposed. The factual laws of na-ture (determining instinctual action) are replaced by laws that are factual,as well, namely the laws of a holy tradition.

The elementary legal status can be illustrated by the position of Ar-istotle, who defines the human being as the animal rationale. To under-stand the human being we have to conceive of him as an animal that alsohas a mind at his disposal. The animal strives after the survival of his spe-cies. His actions are programmed according the laws of his instinct. As a rational animal the human being has a “logos”. This means that his striv-ing after survival is not programmed according instinctual laws, but rath-

er according to self-conscious laws, the laws of the state in which he isliving. Therefore, the state is conceived of as the objectification of thehuman species, as social organism in which man gives shape to his striv-ing for survival as a self-conscious being. Aristotle characterizes the stateas the second nature, as an objective reality that replaces the objective re-ality of the first nature, i.e., the nature of the body. Both forms of ob-

jectivity are expressed in the ruling of laws. In the case of the first nature,these laws are naturally given; in the case of the second nature, the laws

are established by men. Therefore, the laws of the second nature canchange, i. e., the human being is an animal that can go through a histor-ical development.

In Aristotle’s view, the contradiction between mind and body thatcould not be solved at an individual level, is overcome. The mind has

40 Houlgate (2006) is right when he remarks that not “ … all such life and deathstruggles in history issue in relations of dominance and subservience.” (69) Buthe seems to suggest that sometimes (although not always) relations of dominance

and subservience are the result of life and death struggles. Central in Hegel’s po-sition is, however, that a natural life and death struggle is incompatible with theexistence of self-consciousness.




got an own body in the organism of the state. This organism is not de-termined by nature because the body of the mind is understood as secondnature, i.e., as a nature whose laws are determined by the mind.

Self-consciousness and the overcoming of exclusion

The exposition of the elementary legal status in the two preceding sec-tions becomes totally superfluous if it remains unclear how the self-con-sciousness that has to exclude the strange organism can develop into a self-consciousness with a positive relationship to external objectivity.

We started with the immediate unity of mind and body. Only when all

stages of the development of this relation are necessary will the mind/body unity be preserved. Moreover, we know now that the transitionfrom a self-consciousness that excludes the strange organism into a self-consciousness that has a positive relation to a social organism, can neitherbe the result of a struggle nor of any other temporal development. Rather,it must be shown that the self-consciousness has to integrate conditionsthat from the outside perspective are clear, but, from the inside perspec-tive, remained hidden until now. Transitions of this kind are logical ones.

They change the conceptual determination of self-consciousness in orderto overcome the discrepancy between the inside and the outside perspec-tive.

From an outside perspective, the self-consciousness that wants to ex-clude the strange organism, is also itself an organism: It is a mind that isin immediate unity with its body. Because of this body, external forcescan work on self-consciousness and ultimately cause its death: Sometimethe mind/body unity will be confronted with an external power that itcannot overcome, i.e. , the absolute power of death. According toHegel, the absolute power of death can be experienced by the mind ina relation that he qualifies as the “fear of death”.41 The fear of deathplays a key role in the solution of the mind/body problem. To elucidatethis claim we need a closer analysis of the concept. The mind, that beforehad no awareness at all of its body, experiences in the fear of death its lifeas such, i.e., it is related to its own organism as such. Because of this, the

41 It must be clear that this “fear of death” is not the existential fear of death of a real

individual. The real individual has to be developed as the concrete unity of mindand body. But the “fear of death” will appear to be a sublated moment in the realindividual.

Self-consciousness and the overcoming of exclusion 37



mind knows the independence of its own organism: The mind knows itin its finitude and mortality. But at the same time, the mind is not ab-sorbed in this finitude and mortality. Because of its knowledge, the

mind distinguishes itself from the finitude and mortality of its organism.Neither is the mind the essence of the organism, for in that case it wouldbe conceived of as a kind of (essential) property. The fear of death is, rath-er, the experience in which the mind not only relates to the organism asan independent being, but also, at the same time becomes aware of itsown independence that is distinguished from the independence of the or-ganism. The mind has a transcendental openness to its organism and,therefore, can be receptive to the own nature of the organism, i.e., itis able to understand the organism as an independent self. At the same

time, however, the mind experiences that the self of its organism is notpure. The self of the organism is sunk in nature, i.e., it is not a self for itself, but only for the mind. And just because the mind conceivesof its organism as this impure, practical self, it can become aware of itself as the pure self, i.e., the self whose determinations are self-determina-tions.

If the fear of death can be understood in this way, it is the key for thesolution of the problem we formulated: The fear of death enables thepure self to relate to its organism in its own independence. The mind/body problem is not solved by raising the question of how mind andbody can be brought together in an inner unity, but only by the assump-tion of an organism that is already an inner unity of mind and body at alltimes. Only a mental organism is able to develop an explicit insight intothe relation between mind and body, namely by means of the fear of death it suffers. The problem is not how the pure self can relate to an in-dependent organism. There is only a question of a pure self insofar as ithas brought about a relation to its organism. In that sense, the purely-

being-for-itself of the mind’s self is the really-being-for-itself of the or-ganism that has been brought to its pure concept. Only in the fear of death can the pure self be explicitly distinguished from the independentself of its organism.

To understand Hegel’s concept of the fear of death, we have to ana-lyze his understanding of the organism. Like the force of lifeless nature,the organism has the form of a self: It is a unity manifesting itself.42 The

42 Cf. “But for us , or in itself , the object which for self-consciousness is the negativeelement has, on its side, returned into itself, just as on the other side conscious-




difference, however, is that the self of the organism is an objective self,not a self that is constituted by the scientist. Independent from scientificreason, the organism shows its unity by performing the life functions it

needs to maintain its organism. At the moment of the fear of death,Hegel describes the mind/body unity as “a conscious forced back into it-self” (117). The organism of the mind/body unity is no longer able toexpress its life functions: These are forced back into the unity of the or-ganism, making that the mind/body unity experiences the unity of its life,as such. In that sense the mind/body unity taken as an organism is, in itsfear of death, the really-being-for-itself.43 It is typical for the mind/ body unity taken as a mind that it can experience the fear of death.44 In the fearof death, the mental organism is the pure self, the pure being-for-itself that knows its organism as itself in the form of otherness. In the fearof death the mind/body unity is transformed into a self-relation: Themind perceives itself as the pure self that is related to its self in theform of otherness, i.e., to its organism that is forced back into itself.In the fear of death, the mind is related to an organism that is not strange,i.e., to its own organism that it can recognize as itself in the form of oth-erness.

An animal can experience the fear of death when it is confronted with

an absolute power, the power of death. It can try to escape from thispower and flee, or it can resist this power and fight, or it is killed becausethere is no room for fleeing or fighting. The self-conscious organism,however, processes the fear of death in its own way. Before we consideredthe fear of death, the mind was related to a strange organism that it want-ed to exclude. In that relation it had no awareness of its own organism, itsown body. Its body was, so to speak, an unknown means, unnoticed serv-

ness has done. Through this reflection into itself the object has become Life.”

(106).43 Cf. “ … for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that ex-

perience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being,and every thing solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. But thispure universal movement, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, isthe simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-itself , which consequently is implicit in this consciousness.” (117). “Inthat experience it has been quite unmanned” is the translation of “Es ist darininnerlich aufgelçst worden”. A better translation would have been: “Its differen-tiated life experiences have been transformed in an inner experience of unity”.

44 We will still see that this experience of the fear of death will get shape by repre-senting the fear of death in a lord: “This moment of pure being-for itself is alsoexplicit for the bondsman, for in the lord it exists for him as its object.” (117).




ing the mind. The mind was a lord, served by an unnoticed servant. When, however, the body is subjected to an absolute power, the mindcan no longer ignore the reality of its body, it sees through the finitude

of its organism and becomes aware of its own mortality. This knowledgeof the mortality is a relation of the pure self to its organism. The pure self has torn away from the practical relations of its organism. In that sense,the pure self is free: It has freed itself from the natural determinations.Because of this freedom, the pure self is able to have an open relationto its organism: It conceives of its organism in its own nature, i.e., asa finite organism. The mind knows that it only relates to its organism in-sofar as this relation is put forth by itself. The finite organism only ap-pears insofar as the pure self has distinguished itself from it and relates

itself as pure self to its real self, i.e., to its real being-for-itself.Insofar as it is now possible for the pure self, having experienced the

fear of death, to relate to an independent organism, i.e., its own organ-ism, the problem of the unity of mind and body is solved from an insideperspective. From an outside perspective, however, the solution has stillnot been found. The fear of death is not only temporal, i.e., linked tothe moment in which the fear of death is experienced, but also dependenton an absolute power (death) that is practiced on the organism from out-side. If the fear of death is dependent on the working of an absolutepower, neither the independence of the pure self, nor the independenceof the organism has been adequately expressed. Faced with the absolutepower of death, both lose their independence.

To understand the adequate unity of mind and body at least twoproblems have to be solved. Insofar as the fear of death plays a role, itmust not just have a temporal validity. With the temporality of thefear of death, in some sense death itself has to be overcome. For theunity of mind and body may not lose its independence on behalf of

the absolute power of death. At first sight, it seems impossible to satisfy both demands. However, we have already seen that the key for solving theproblem can be found in Aristotle. He also makes an attempt to conceiveof the unity of mind and body. Because he does not situate the problemat the level of the individual, but at the level of the human species, heoffers an entrance to overcome death: The individual dies, but the speciessurvives.

The way in which the relation between mind and body gets shape inthe fear of death can be connected with Aristotle’s conception of the an-imal rationale when the absolute power that causes the fear of death hasthe form of another self-consciousness. Under this assumption, the rela-




tion of the fear of death is transformed in Aristotle’s state organism if thefollowing conditions are fulfilled. The pure self that in its fear of death isrelated to its organism as to the self in the form of the otherness, objec-

tively contemplates in the other self-consciousness, the self that it thinksto be itself. As the source of its fear of death, the other self-consciousnesshas absolute power over the first self-consciousness. Therefore, the otherself-consciousness is also the source of the experience in which the firstself-consciousness knows itself as the “lord” of its body.45 The lord of the body, whom the pure self subjectively thinks to be, therefore, objec-tively appears in the other self-consciousness.46 The first self-conscious-ness can recognize the other self-consciousness and practically expressesthis recognition. In its actions it no longer expresses the instinctual

laws of its organism, but the legal laws that are imposed by the recognizedlord. By serving the legal law of the recognized lord, the first self-con-sciousness has become part of a state organism that corresponds to Aris-totle’s conception.47 By recognizing the other self-consciousness as thelord of the body, the pure self is recognized as the absolute power overreality. By observing the lord’s law, human autonomy is expressed. Thestate organism can be understood as a reality in which the relation of the fear of death is objectively, i.e., institutionally embodied. The rela-tion of the fear of death no longer gets lost by the death of the individualor by an external absolute power.

45 Cf. Josifovic (2008): “To prove itself as the true identity towards its appearance,the subject has to prove itself as the lord of its body.” [“Um sich als wahrhaftigeIdentitt gegenber seine Erscheinung zu erweisen, muss es sich als Herr ber sei-nen eigenen Kçrper erweisen.” p. 81].

46 Robert Pippin (2001) has no right when he states that the “significance of humanlabor … is initially merely the avoidance of death.” (162) or that “self-determi-nation, viewed as originating in the “fear of death,” is wholly undetermined by any specific telos or preset value, some absolute of greater value than life.”(162). Precisely the opposite is true: The labor in service of the lord is an attemptto realize the absolute essence: self-consciousness.

47 Although Josifovic (2008) analyzes the structure of the fear of death differently,his conclusion is the same: In the fear of death, self-consciousness learns that theunity of the species is its essence. (Cf. p. 123.).




The Lord/Bondsman relation

We have seen that the mind/body relation, mediated by the fear of death,

has been transformed in the lord/bondsman relation.48

While the mind, atthe individual level, can only exclude the body, at the social level inclu-sion of the body appears to be possible. It seems that the lord can be in-terpreted as the institutionalized mind and the bondsman as the institu-tionalized body, i.e., as the body that functions in the framework of a social organism. At the social level, mind and body seem to be distributedover two distinguished social roles: lord and bondsman. However, toavoid misunderstandings, this explanation of the lord/bondsman relationneeds some essential refinements.

To begin with, until now we have characterized the mind as the pureself. In no way is it possible to assert that the lord is the social objectifi-cation of the mind. Just because the mind is pure, it cannot be absorbedin any objectification. Rather, the lord is a specific historical representa-tion of the mind. The mind can be embodied in a social organism, butthe mind as mind, i.e., the pure self, remains separated from this organ-ism.

Secondly, lord and bondsman cannot one-sidedly be conceived of as

social roles. The Marxist tradition, for example, to interpret lord andbondsman respectively as the ruling and the oppressed class, is not com-patible with Hegel’s intentions.49 Lord and bondsman are, rather, techni-cal and metaphorical terms that are useful to express the mind/body unity as a dialectical relation. As a dialectical unity, mind and body can be rep-resented as the dialectical unity of lord and bondsman. But once again,the mind can never be identified with its realization in a dialecticalunity. As pure self, the mind remains transcendental, a free self that is

not determined by natural relations. The crux of the development of the adequate unity between mind and body is exactly localized in theproblem that the mind, on the one hand, is free, i.e., a transcendental

48 Hegel introduces the lord/bondsman relation as “two opposed shapes of conscious-ness; one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for it-self, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply tolive or to be for another. The former is the lord, the other the bondsman.” (115).

49 The bondsman is not “forced by the master to work on things” (p. 69) as Houl-

gate (2006) puts forward. The bondsman serves the lord in a relation of recogni-tion (that is only practically expressed): for the bondsman, the lord is immediate-ly his own essence. His submission to the lord is self -submission.




being, and on the other hand, is embodied in the dialectical relation be-tween mind and body.50

Thirdly, the turn of phrase in which it is said (apparently also by

Hegel51

) that the bondsman recognizes the lord as his lord can be mis-leading. In no way does the recognition at this level concern an inter-subjective relation between individuals in which the bondsman (one-sidedly)recognizes another individual as his lord. To speak about recognition atthis level makes sense only from an outside perspective. The mind hasrecognized its body as its own self in the form of otherness. This recog-nition is institutionalized in the lord/bondsman relation. From an insideperspective, this recognition is no relation at all. The recognition of the lord is practically expressed when the bondsman serves the lord,i.e., acts according the legal law. At this level, however, the relation be-tween the legal law and the bondsman is immediate. The legal lawshave the form of traditional values and norms on which the actions of the bondsman are immediately (i. e., without any critical distance)based. We will see that the lord, initially, is not a worldly ruler, but rathera god, i.e., a representation of the bondsman’s absolute essence.

Keeping in mind the aforementioned warnings, the lord/bondsman re-lation can be conceived of as Hegel’s basic model for the conception of

the unity of mind and body. From an outside perspective, the model ischaracterized by two forms of recognition, a vertical one and a horizontalone. The vertical recognition concerns the relation between the pure self and the social organism. The social organism is recognized as the histor-

50 Therefore, I totally disagree with Pippin (“What is the Question for which He-gel’s Theory of Recognition is the Answer?”), when he states: “Being spiritualbeings is an historical achievement of certain animals; not the manifestation of an immaterial or divine substance. Said much more simply: The Left-Hegelians

were right.” (p. 13) Consequently, I also reject his thesis that “There is no super-naturalism or ‘noumenalism’ in such an account and it is completely non-dual-ist.” (p.14).

51 Hegel characterizes the recognition between lord and bondsman as “a recognitionthat is one-sided and unequal.” (116). Therefore, this relation has nothing to do with inter-subjectivity. “To begin with, servitude has the lord for its essential re-ality; hence the truth for it is the independent consciousness that is for itself.”(117). That the lord is the essential reality is only practically expressed by thebondsman, namely by his labor in service of the lord. Even if the bondsmanhas developed self-consciousness (thanks to his labor activities), this does not re-

sult in a recognition of the lord: He only “sees” his own being in the lord: “It isin this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the inde-pendent being [of the object] its own independence.” (118).

The Lord/Bondsman relation 43



ical embodiment of the pure self. As pure self, the individual is absolute,an end in itself. Therefore, the vertical recognition has to do with the do-main of morality and (as we will see later on) human rights. The horizon-

tal recognition is situated within the social organism. The social organismis realized by members who observe a legal law. All members are absoluteequals insofar as they are moral individuals. Because of this absoluteequality, they will express themselves as free and equal citizens of the so-cial organism. Therefore, the horizontal recognition has to do with thedomain of right. Thus, the lord/bondsman relation, with its two dimen-sions of recognition, is an elementary model to integrate the domainsof right and morality (of human rights and democracy).

From an inside perspective, however, the domains of right and mor-

ality are still undeveloped. The individuals are totally involved in thepractice of the social organism.52 They cannot differentiate betweentheir social role and their absolute value as pure selves. Neither they can differentiate between their social role and their freedom and equality as citizens. Only when the pure self is integrated in the inside perspective,

when the contradiction between outside and inside perspective is over-come, can the social organism be conceived of as the adequate unity of right and morality, of democracy and human rights.

The historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation

Although in the lord/bondsman relation the mind/body unity has not yetfound its adequate form, it can be illustrated by historical societies. Theabsolute power with which the mind is confronted can be a naturalpower. Also a natural power can be recognized by the mind as its lord.In that case, the natural power is considered as a spiritual power, as a

god who immediately represents the pure self of the mind. Hegel givesseveral examples of natural powers that are worshipped as gods 53: godas light (the sun), god as flower or god as animal (the tribes that representtheir absolute unity in their totem animal54). The most suitable historical

52 But, of course, this does not mean that the individuals consider themselves to bethings, as Williams (1997) maintains: “Thus the slave sinks to the level of a merecommodity, not only for the master, but also for himself.” (p. 65).

53 This is discussed at the level of Natural Religion, p. 416 ff.

54 Cf. “The actual self-consciousness of this dispersed Spirit is a host of separate,antagonistic national Spirits who hate and fight each other to death and becomeconscious of specific animals as their essence;” (420).




illustration of the lord/bondsman relation, however, is elaborated at thelevel of the Egyptian world (in the religion of the artificer). In thiscase, the lord is the pharaoh, the ruler who is not only the king, but

also the god. Because the pure self this time is represented by a humanbeing, the bondsmen (i.e., the Egyptians) can go through a learning process in which they discover that they are in fact themselves the lord.

Originally, there is no room for any learning process. It is only relevant that the labor process serves the godhead. It is of no importance how the service is specified within the framework of the labor system. Laborexpresses the idea that the social order has power over nature.55 Socialorder is the power over nature as such. Therefore, the obedience of thesocial order is not subjected to any reflection: It is immediately evident

what has to be done. There is no room for alternative positions.This learning process has to do with the continuity of the social order

that results in a change of the labor process. To understand this change, a closer look at the nature of the labor process may be helpful. Labor is notan action that is immediate and natural, but mediated by the social orderand fitting in a whole of labor division. Therefore, labor presupposes theintelligibility of nature. Only when nature is, in principle, understandableis it possible to maintain a labor system in which nature is worked. Thelabor system purely practically expresses a certain insight into nature,namely the insight that nature can be worked in the form of a specificlabor organization. The purely practical status of this insight becomesclear at the moment that individuals who are working in the labor systemare not necessarily aware of this insight. They only do what is asked fromthem in the framework of the labor system.

The stability of the labor system enables its continual evolution. Theongoing working of the nature contributes to the development of a deep-er insight into the mechanism of nature. Deeper insight enables the pro-

gressing division of labor; progressing division of labor enables deeper in-sight.56 The result of this development is that the individual worker at-

55 In contrast to Jrgen Habermas (“Arbeit und Interaktion”, in: J. Habermas, Tech-nik und Wissenschaft als “Ideologie”, Frankfurt/M., 1971), who separates laborand interaction as categories that are fundamentally different, Hegel showshow these categories cannot be separated.

56 Cf. Karl Marx, who understands the development of labor division as well as a

“natural “ (naturwchsig) process. “Da diese Entwicklung [der Produktivkrfte,P.C.] naturwchsig fr sich geht, d. h. nicht einem Gesamtplan frei vereinigtenIndividuen subordiniert ist …” (Deutsche Ideologie , Berlin 1969, p. 72). (Since

The historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation 45



tributes the power over nature ultimately not to the social order, but tohimself. For him, nature has no more secrets. Within the framework of the social order he is able to subject nature to the desired actions without

being confronted with surprises.57

This shift of power from the “lord” of the social order to the worker(the “bondsman”) is expressed in the differentiation of the worker’s self-consciousness. His self-consciousness no longer projects the image of hisidentity in the “lord” of the labor system, but expresses his self in the con-cepts in which his knowledge of nature is contained. These concepts arenot schemes that are externally (theoretically) applied to nature, but de-terminations that are mediated by labor activities. For the worker’s self-consciousness, these concepts can, therefore, get validity as the essenceof nature.58 By these concepts, the freedom of the pure self, originally represented by the “lord” of the labor system, has obtained a specific his-torical content. The concepts in which nature is interpreted do not ex-press the concept of nature as such, but only the concept of nature asit is developed in the framework of a specific (historical) labor system,i.e., in the framework of a specific social organism. Therefore, the free-dom of the pure self, being the precondition of the social order’s consti-tution, is hidden behind certain historical ways of expression adopted by

the self.59

The bondsman who has recognized himself in his lord, the worker who thinks that his concepts of reality are absolute, i. e. , are the essenceof reality itself, has fallen into the illusion of having totally realized hisautonomy. He is no longer relating to a god or to any external reality.He has the illusion that the only reality is the product of his self-con-

this evolution takes place naturally, i. e. is not subordinated to a general plan of freely combined individuals …).

57 In this sense, the bondsman has developed some freedom. This is the freedom of the production system as such, not the freedom that can be located in an individual as Houlgate (2006) maintains: “Accordingly, he will understand himself to be capable of all kinds of labour and not to be dependent on, or slave to,any one of them.” (p.70).

58 Cf. “It is essential, however, in thus characterizing this shape of self-consciousnessto bear firmly in mind that it is thinking consciousness in general , that its object isan immediate unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself.” (120) Hegel calls thisthinking consciousness “stoicism”.

59 According to Hegel, stoicism is at the level of the Legal status (corresponding to

Roman Law ) historically illustrated: “The non-actual thought of it [i.e. person-ality, P.C.] which came from renouncing the actual world appeared earlier asthe Stoical self-consciousness.” (290).




scious action. The pure self seems to have totally realized itself, and thenotion that the social organism is only an historical reality seems tohave become totally out of sight. All independent reality that could

have represented the pure self has perished.60

Therefore, the real, historical existence of the social organism makes,in the long run, the discrepancy between the outside and inside perspec-tive explicit, and highlights why the social organism until now is not de-termined in a way in which both perspectives can be reconciled. From theoutside perspective, the social organism must be understood as a specifichistorical unity of right and morality. The pure self (the moral self) real-izes itself as the legal self that participates in a specific social organism. Itis only important that the moral self expresses itself in the social organ-

ism; therefore, the closer determination of this social organism is irrelevant, i. e. , is only a matter of contingency. From the inside perspective,however, the moral self coincides with the historical determination of the social organism: The real self has concretized itself in the determinedconcepts that within the framework of a specific social organism get val-idity as the concepts of nature as such. The objective reality that, from theinside perspective, appears as an absolute one, appears, from the outsideperspective, only as an historical one.

To overcome the discrepancy of the outside and inside perspective, ithas to be discussed as to how the unity of mind and body can be devel-oped in a way that, also from an inside perspective, the mind/body unity can perceive itself as the pure self that realizes itself in a contingent legalorder. This development will be elaborated in two stages. In the first stage(the stage of the Unhappy Consciousness ) the mind/ body unity will getinsight into itself as the pure self (or as the “lord”). In the second stage(the stage of “Reason”) the mind/body unity will understand the objectivereality to which it is related as a social organism in which it has to realize

itself, i.e., it gets insight into itself as the “bondsman”.61

60 Robert Pippin (2001) misunderstands stoicism. The stoic self-conscious does notstruggle “to understand the significance of his labor”. (p. 164). The stoic self-consciousness is determined because it is mediated by labor. But the stoic self-consciousness itself has no awareness of this mediation. Neither does it makesense that “this position leaves it undetermined what I am to think (exceptthat I am to think it) and so is empty, tedious.” (164). The stoic self-conscious-ness is rather characterized by the determinations of his thoughts, just because his

thoughts are mediated by labor.61 The mind/body unity will develop the insight into itself as the unity of lord andbondsman: “Its true return in itself, or its reconciliation with itself will, however,

The historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation 47



The Unhappy Consciousness

The first stage, in which the pure self is made perceptible for the inside

perspective, is performed in the movement that gives the pure self its ownembodiment and liberates it from its absorption by the social organism.The occasion for the learning process that the mind/body unity can gothrough has, again, to do with death. Like the fear of death enabledthe mind/body unity to differentiate its immediate unity and to relateas pure self to its body, so the “death” of the social organism bringsabout here that the immediate unity of the pure self with the social or-ganism (or rather, the being submerged of the pure self in the social or-ganism), is broken: The pure self can loosen itself from the social organ-

ism. We saw how the lord initially represented the pure self and how, lateron (at the level of stoicism) he seemed to have been absorbed in the allegedautonomy of the bondage. At the moment that the social organism per-ishes (dies) it also becomes clear from the inside perspective of the mind/body unity that the autonomy is only appearance. The reality of the socialorganism appears to be not dependent on the autonomous action of theindividual, but on an elusive power that transcends reality. It is this elu-sive power that disturbs the harmony of the alleged autonomy and makesthe individual unhappy. This results in the

Unhappy Consciousness , i.e.,

the consciousness that in some form becomes aware of what we already identified as the constituting moment of self-consciousness, namely the fear of death, i. e., the experience of the own finitude.62 The Unhappy Consciousness is aware of its finitude (its mortality) but at the sametime it transcends this finitude precisely because it is aware of the elusivepower that transcends this finitude. Its unhappiness exists in its inability to bring together the consciousness of its finitude and transcendence.63

display the Notion of Spirit that has become a living Spirit, and has achieved anactual existence, because it already possesses as a single undivided consciousness a dual nature.” (126).

62 Cf. “Consciousness of life, of its existence and activity, is only an agonizing overthis existence and activity, for therein it is conscious that its essence is only itsopposite, is consciousness only of its own nothingness.” (127).

63 We will see that Hegel, in the Spirit and Religion Chapters, in which he recon-structs the historical reality of the social organism in European history, implicitly and explicitly discusses several forms of the Unhappy Consciousness. He implicitly refers to the Unhappy Consciousness at the level of the Ancient Greek world, when

the individual experiences the death of the family member. Explicitly, the Unhap- py Consciousness is discussed at the level of the Roman Empire, where the “death”of the social organism, i.e., the decline of the Roman Empire , is experienced.




The transcendental power is not totally elusive for the individual. Atleast, it is clear that the power is an absolute one, i.e., a power in whichthe real world is grounded, a power over the real world. Moreover, the

power can be determined as an identity because it has turned out thatit can appear in a real social organism. Grounding the identity of the so-cial organism, the transcendent power must itself also be an identity. But,at the same time, it is obviously not necessarily linked to its appearance inthe social organism: Its identity is a transcendental, pure identity. Any closer determination, however, escapes the individual. The individualhas no possibility to represent it in an external power (as he earliermade the lord the representation of the pure self), because it is not anexternal power that caused the decline of the social organism. The decline

concerns the social organism as such, not the replacement of the one so-cial power by another. The individual can maintain the pure identity only as an inner representation without any qualification. The determinednessof the representation is only felt: The inner representation of the pureidentity is connected with the feeling of an absolute loss.64 The social or-ganism in which the individual is thought to be at home (in his allegedautonomy) has declined and appears to be absorbed by the indefinitenessof the inner representation of the absolute identity. In that sense, the rep-

Hegel interprets the self of the Roman Empire as the stoic self that, after the de-cline of the Empire, develops into the Unhappy Consciousness: “Hence it is only the Stoic independence of thought, which passes through the dialectic of theSceptical consciousness to find its truth in that shape which we have called theUnhappy Self-consciousness.” (454) Hegel describes consciousness’s experience of the decline as follows: “It is the consciousness of the loss of all essential being in this certainty of itself , and of the loss even of this knowledge about itself–theloss of substance as well as of the Self, it is the grief which expresses itself in thehard saying that ‘God is dead’ “. (455). The third form of the Unhappy Con-sciousness appears when the results of the French Revolution are reflected.

Here, Hegel develops a concept of conscience that can be considered as the highestform of the Unhappy Consciousness. The original description of the Unhappy Con-sciousness in the Self-consciousness Chapter (p. 126 ff.) discusses the elementary logical structure of Self-consciousness. These structures, however, are formulatedin metaphors that refer to the medieval history, i. e., to the historical period afterthe decline of the Roman Empire.

64 From an outside perspective, this inner representation of the pure self in the formof the feeling of an absolute loss, is the first step to internalize the lord: “Con-sequently, the duplication which formerly was divided between two individuals,the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged in one. The duplication of the con-

sciousness within itself, which is essential in the notion of Spirit, is thus here be-fore us, but not yet in its unity: the Unhappy Consciousness is the consciousness of a self as a dual natured, merely contradictory being.” (126).

The Unhappy Consciousness 49



resentation is the empty remembrance of the absolute loss, the loss of anabsolute home.

The individual can try to determine the pure identity more precisely

by giving the inner representation all kind of qualities. In that case, how-ever, it gets entangled in the dialectics that characterize Consciousness.65

An absolute identity cannot be externally determined. The only determi-nation that does justice to an absolute identity is self-determination. Atthis stage, however, the individual is not able to conceptualize the pureidentity as self-actualization. The pure identity is his internalization of a reality that has gotten lost. The determinations that the individualcan ascribe to this pure identity are factually his own ones, i.e., the de-terminations of a finite being. Therefore, the absolute identity can be de-termined as something that escapes to any nearer fixation. As an internal-ization of the individual, the pure identity is affected by determination.But as soon as these determinations are specified, they must be takenback because they are determinations of the finite individual. Hegelqualifies this undetermined determination of the pure identity as “devo-tion”, i.e., as “only a movement towards thinking”. “Its thinking as suchis no more than the chaotic jingling of bells, or a mist of warm incense, a musical thinking that does not get as far as the Notion, which would be

the sole, immanent objective mode of thought.” (131). But the pure self

65 Consciousness tried to identify something that is sensory given in time and space,i.e., it tries to link the changeable sensory world to the unchangeable mental world of identifications, and learned that all identification can only be conceivedof as self identification of the mind (Ich=Ich). This process is, as it were, inter-nalized by the Unhappy Consciousness when it tries to identify the pure self that itinternalized as the Unchangeable. For, it can perform this identification only inan attempt to link this Unchangeable with the Changeable, i. e., its consciousnessof the finite world. Hegel illustrates this attempt with the attempt of the Chris-

tian belief to identify its absolute god as Christ and as Holy Spirit. “Thus thereexist for consciousness three different ways in which individuality is linked withthe Unchangeable. Firstly, it again appears to itself as opposed to the Unchange-able, and is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle which is throughout theelement in which the whole relationship subsists. Secondly, consciousness learnsthat individuality belongs to the Unchangeable, itself, so that it assumes the formof individuality into which the entire mode of existence passes. Thirdly, it findsits own self as this particular individual in the Unchangeable. The first Un-changeable it knows only as the alien Being who passes judgement on the partic-ular individual; since, secondly, the Unchangeable is a form of individuality like

itself, consciousness becomes, thirdly, Spirit, and experiences the joy of finding itself therein, and becomes aware of the reconciliation of its individuality withthe universal.” (128).




that is only the inner representation of a real individual (i.e. , the individ-ual that survived the decline of the social organism), cannot be main-tained as an absolute one because it will disappear with the death of

the individual. Therefore, the Unhappy Consciousness has, in someform, to repeat the dialectics of Self-consciousness. It has to free its absoluteessence from the finite natural world. In contrast to Self-consciousness ,however, the Unhappy Consciousness knows itself to be a finite being that is distinguished from its absolute essence. As a consequence, the in-dividual tries to find the pure self, i.e., to find an immortal individual inthe real world.66 Such a search, however, is doomed to failure. It is in thenature of all real individuals to die.67

The failure to find the pure identity in the real world makes sure that

the individual is thrown back to himself and he tries to realize the Un-changeable by means of his labor.68 The finite existence of the living in-dividual is dependent on nature as the inexhaustible source of “gifts”. In-sofar as these gifts are mediated by labor, labor reveals the existence of anabsolute self, i.e., nature as the absolute source of life. This absolute self,however, is once again affected by the finite self, simply because it only

66 Like the activity of Desire , this search endlessly repeats itself. The Desire that kil-led the strange life in order to prove to be the essence of this life, will never have

accomplished its proof because it is, again and again, confronted with other life. Analogously, the Unhappy Consciousness that thinks to have found an absoluteself, has to repeat itself endlessly. Since a self that can be found is a living self,it will, again and again, experience that the alleged absolute self dies.

67 Hegel hints at the crusaders who search for a living god, but find an empty grave.“Consciousness, therefore, can only find as a present reality the grave of its life.But because this grave is itself an actual existence and it is contrary to the nature of what actually exists to afford a lasting possession, the presence of that grave, too,is merely the struggle of an enterprise doomed to failure.” (132).

68 In this relation, the Unhappy Consciousness can be considered as the self-conscious

repetition of the bondsman who serves his lord. This time, however, the bonds-man remains distinguished from the lord whom he actualises in his labor. Here,the lord appears as the absolute source of life, as the nature that enables life tocontinue by its gifts. These gifts, however, are mediated by the labor of thebondsman. “The fact that the unchangeable consciousness renounces and surren-ders its embodied form while, on the other hand, the particular individual con-sciousness gives thanks [for the gift], i.e., denies itself the satisfaction of being conscious of its independence, and assigns the essence of its action not to itself but to the beyond, through these two moments of reciprocal self-surrender of both parts, consciousness does, of course, gain a sense of its unity with the Un-

changeable. But this unity is, at the same time, affected with division, is againbroken within itself, and from it there emerges once more the antithesis of theuniversal and the individual. “ (134).

The Unhappy Consciousness 51



appears by mediation of his labor. Therefore, the individual tries to rescuethe absoluteness of the pure self by sacrificing its own reality. It sets asideits own individuality by serving the pure self that it has represented: it

serves its inner representation as its lord and thinks that it can realizethe lord by sacrificing its own existence.69 If the individual is, however,in its real actions, not determined by the needs of its organism, but isable to serve the pure self of the representation, the lord is not the rep-resented self, but rather the real individual, the bearer of the representa-tion. The real individual has developed insight into its own pure self andhas become able to understand itself as a moral individual, i.e., as an in-dividual that makes its pure self, its free self, the essence of its actions.

Therefore, the movement that the mind/body unity has experiencedfrom the inside perspective is a double one with two opposite directions.On the one hand, it is the purely practical movement in which the pureself, mediated by the fear of death, has objectified, and is absorbed by thesocial organism. On the other hand, the pure self returns to itself from itsobjectification in the social organism, i.e., to the mind/body unity of theindividual. This movement of objectification and sublation of objectifi-cation has resulted in a real self-consciousness. Now the individual under-stands that its absolute essence is a pure self. It understands that it is a

moral individual70 that can only do justice to its pure self if this self isnot contradicted by the contingent reality to which it is related.

From an outside perspective, it is already clear under what conditionsthe contingent reality does not contradict the real self-consciousness. Thecontingent reality must be a social organism that is realized in actions that

69 Here Hegel refers to the medieval monks who tried to be united with their godby sacrificing their nature and mental existence. “It renounces them, partly as

identified with the truth it has attained regarding its own self-consciousness in-dependence –inasmuch as what it does is foreign to it, a thinking and speaking of what is meaningless to it ; partly, as identified with external possessions –when itgives away part of what it has acquired through work; and partly, also, as iden-tified with the enjoyment it has had–when, in its fastings and mortifications, itonce more completely denies itself that enjoyment.” (137).

70 It may seem confusing to already speak at this level of a moral individual , espe-cially since it still takes a long time before Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit,reaches the Morality Chapter. As indicated in footnote 63, however, the Unhappy Consciousness is related to the individual insofar as it is not absorbed by social re-

lations: the divine law in the Greek world, the belief in the medieval world, andconscience in the modern world. We will see that these moments in Hegel’s Phi-losophy of Right are systematically developed as moments of Morality.




can be understood as self-expression of the pure self.71 Having developedthe individual into a moral individual, we can examine whether this canbecome also clear from the inside perspective, and what are the conse-

quences for the determination of the social organism.

Reason

At the level of Reason, it is investigated under what conditions the moralindividual can exist, i.e., under what conditions the contingent reality to

which it is related does not contradict its pure self. At the level of observ-ing Reason it is discussed whether the moral individual can be real in a

theoretical relation to the contingent reality. The contingence of reality comes to the fore in its being sensory-given. Therefore, the question is

whether a reality that is given for the senses can be in harmony withthe pure self of the moral individual. The moral individual has to recog-nize its pure self in the outside reality; the outside reality must be con-ceived of as an expression of the pure self.

Insofar as scientists interpret lifeless nature as the expression of natu-ral laws, they consider lifeless nature to be a self, i.e., a self that is formu-

lated as a force of nature. At the level of consciousness, however, we haveseen that the self of the force of nature is not the self of an independentoutside nature, but a self that refers back to the self of the scientist (cf.Kant’s Copernican turn). It is only the living nature that has an ownself. The self of the living nature, however, is not pure, but participating in the life process of the organism or the species. Therefore, the only chance for the moral individual’s observing Reason to recognize its pureself in the outside nature, must be situated in its relation to a self-con-scious being, i.e., to the living self that also has a pure self. However,the question is whether this pure self can be perceived by observing Rea-son. Hegel’s answer is negative. The actions of the real human individualsare no expression of the pure self. The pure self, rather, manifests itself inthe actions of pure thinking. But observing Reason has no entrance to thispureness: It is dependent on its observation. In the end, Hegel ridiculesthe project of observing Reason in his reference to phrenology. The wish toobserve the pure self “is expressed by saying that the being of Spirit is a

71 There would be a reality that is, so to speak, in harmony with the Kantian Cat-egorical Imperative.

Reason 53



bone.” (208) The contradiction in which observing Reason is involved be-comes clear: What is pure cannot, by definition, be observed.

Since it has been clear that the reality of the moral individual cannot

be conceived of in a theoretical relation to reality, Hegel performs thetransition to active Reason. At this level, it is discussed whether the reality of the moral individual can possibly be conceived of in a practical relationto reality. The reason for this attempt is obvious: What fails at the level of theoretical reason, i. e. , the realization of the moral individual in relationto another moral individual, may be possible at the practical level. Atleast, individuals who live together in a social organism are no “things”for one-another. Therefore, the question that is raised at the level of active Reason runs: Can the moral individual realize itself in a social organism?

Since it concerns the realization of a moral individual that has to recog-nize its essence in the contingent reality, the question can also be formu-lated as follows: Can the moral individual understand the social organismas a reality that mediates its relation to another moral individual, so that,in the social organism, the moral individuals make the other moral indi-

viduals their subject? At the level of self-consciousness we witnessed the birth of the social

organism. In the social organism the individuals are the “bondsmen” whoserve the pure self as their “lord”. Subsequently, the moral individual wasdeveloped as the result of the decline of the social organism: as the indi-

vidual who internalized the pure self as its absolute, inner essence. There-fore, the question of whether the moral individual can realize itself in thesocial organism comes down to the question of whether the moral indi-

vidual can return to its origin. Can the individual who acquired his moralself-consciousness by leaving the social organism, return to the social or-ganism without losing its self-consciousness?

When the contingent reality of the moral individual is determined as

social organism, then it is no longer a strange independence that contra-dicts the absoluteness of the moral individual. As we saw before, the so-cial organism can be conceived of as the pure self in the form of other-ness. Therefore, the relation between the moral individual and the socialorganism can be characterized as “pleasure”: The social organism only af-firms the identity of the moral individual. This time, however, the pureself is not the self of the lord, but the pure self of the moral individual,itself.

The moral individual is, so to speak, the bondsman who knows his

own pure self as his lord. Moreover, the pure self is not only the pureself of one moral individual, but also the pure self of other moral individ-




uals. The moral individuals realize their pure self because they practically participate in a social relation to other moral individuals. They know thattheir pure self is not only their inner essence, but also the essence of the

objective world. The pure self is realized in the social organism that isproduced by the actions of the moral individuals. In this relation, how-ever, the uniqueness of the pure self, the moral identity, gets lost. Actually,the reality of the social organism only exists insofar as a shared legal law is

valid. What is realized remains restricted to what actualizes this sharedlaw. To realize itself the pure self has to determine itself. This determina-tion is performed in a social organism. This makes it precisely clear thatthe pure self has lost its uniqueness or its moral freedom: All moral in-dividuals appear in a social role that is determined by the social organism.

Here, the tension between right and morality is most elementally shown. The moral individual who wants to realize himself in a legalorder seems to have given up his absolute moral identity and to have ex-changed it for the positive social role of the legal subject. The freedom of the moral individual (implying that all determination is free self-determi-nation) seems to contradict the positive determination of the social or-ganism.72 This discrepancy between morality and right is expressed by Hegel in terms of “Pleasure and Necessity ”. (217 ff.) The pleasure of the

moral individual who again finds his home in the social organism is dis-turbed by chilly necessity. The unique individuality of the moral individ-ual gets lost in the general structures of a given social law.

At the level of “The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit ”(221 ff.) the moral individual tries to save his unique individuality by making the law of the social organism his own law, i.e., the law of theheart. This attempt, however, has to fail. Also the other moral individuals

will try to make the law of the social organism their own law. The result isa struggle between the moral individuals that cannot be won (unless the

others are eliminated as moral individuals). Therefore, Hegel speaksabout “the frenzy of self-conceit ”: The law of the social organism cannotbe determined from the one-sided subjective point of view.

The potential struggle between the moral individuals can be over-come at the level of “Virtue and the way of the world ”. (228 ff.) Themoral individual can only tolerate the social organism if he acceptsthat he has not the power to enforce the “law of the heart ”. (And even

72 Here Derrida’s “double-bind-relation” is thematized. Freedom has to realize itself to be real, but gets lost as freedom in its realization. Cf., J. Derrida, “Prjugs,devant la loi”, in: J. Derrida a.o., La facult de juger, Minuit, Paris, 1985, p. 121.

Reason 55



if he would have had the power, the enforcement of his “law of the heart ” would not result in the realization of the moral essence). The moral in-dividual has to accept that the social organism is a contingent reality (way

of the world ) that can only maintain its existence when it is actively sup-ported by the actions of the moral individuals. Although the moral individuals know that the social organism is a contingent reality, they have torecognize it as the realization of their moral essence. The moral individ-uals are virtuous insofar as they try to educate themselves in order to beable to observe the laws of the social organism. (This education of themoral individuals is the self-conscious repetition of the education of the bondsmen. In their practical labor, the bondsmen developed the dif-ferentiated self-consciousness of stoicism. In their self-conscious labor, the

moral individuals developed a differentiated self-consciousness that they know as the self-consciousness of a contingent social organism.)

If the moral individuals have developed themselves into virtuous in-dividuals they can, from an inside perspective, reconcile with the socialorganism. But the price paid for this reconciliation seems to be very high. Right and morality seem to be reconciled by sacrificing morality.It is true that is was not enforced by external power and was, rather, anact of self-sacrifice, but nevertheless, morality seems only to survive asan inner awareness. The legal subjects know that the social organismhas legitimacy only because they have recognized it in their role asmoral individuals. But this moral recognition seems to have no conse-quence for the reality of the social organism.

Until now, the social organism has not been specifically qualified. It isclear that the social organism only survives by the actions of its members:it survives as long as they observe the laws of the social organism. Untilnow, however, these laws remained undetermined. Therefore, although ithas been concluded that the moral individuals have to accept the social

organism as a contingent reality, the question must be raised whetherthe moral individuals have to accept all social organisms, irrespective of any specific determination of their laws. This question is discussed inthe section “Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself ”.(236) At this level, Hegel definitely tries to fill the gap between innerand outside perspective. If the moral individual not only understandsthat, for being real, he has to recognize the social organism, but alsoknows in what sense the social organism has to be concretely qualified,then the reality of his individuality no longer differs from his subjective

insight into this reality. Three options for qualifying the social organismare examined.




At the level of “The spiritual animal kingdom and deceit, or the ‘matter in hand’ itself ” (237), the option is considered that the social organism isimmediately given as a traditional society. Like the instinctual laws of the

animal world, the laws in this case are immediately given (cf. animal king-dom) but, in contrast to the animal world, the laws are also self-conscious.The individuals immediately know which laws they have to observe (cf.spiritual animal kingdom). Therefore, the traditional content of thelaws seems the be the ‘matter in hand’, itself. The ultimate goal of theindividual’s actions is the realization of this traditional content; the ac-tions of the individuals immediately correspond to the norms and valuesof tradition. However, insofar as the individuals are also moral individu-als, they are only interested in the realization of their moral essence, the

pure self. Therefore, if the individuals act according to the moral values of the given tradition, they do not really realize themselves. The norms and

values could have been those of another tradition. Contingent norms and values remain externally related to the moral individuals. What the moralindividuals have in common are not these traditional norms and values,but rather the moral demand that the social organism expresses their pureselves.

At the level of “Reason and lawgiver ” (p. 252 ff.), the second option todetermine the social organism is examined. Can the social organism bethe self-conscious product of all moral individuals? Is it possible to iden-tify laws that are necessary, supported by all of them? According toHegel, it is indeed possible to find these laws: This type of laws are calledby Kant “natural laws ”, i.e., laws that can be deduced from the concep-tual determinations that qualify the relations between the moral individ-uals. Hegel mentions two examples: “Everyone ought to speak the truth”(254) and “Love thy neighbor as thyself” (255). The first example con-cerns the moral essence of the individual. Only a moral individual can

speak the truth because of his pure self. As pure self, the moral individualdistinguishes himself from the real world as such. As pure self, he has theability to express propositions that qualify things in themselves, i.e., toexpress true propositions. Whether the moral individuals can factually speak the truth, however, is dependent on many contingent conditions.

The second example concerns the realization of the moral individual. Without the social organism the moral individual cannot be real. In itsturn the existence of the social organism presupposes that the moral in-dividuals recognize one another as free and equal. In this sense, they have

to love their neighbors as themselves. But the commandment cannot de-termine what real actions the neighbor’s love imply.

Reason 57



The third option to determine the laws of the social organism, dis-cussed as “Reason as testing laws ” (256) is a combination of the firsttwo options. On the one hand, the point of departure is a traditionally

given social organism, and on the other hand, the laws of this organismare tested: Are they or are they not an adequate realization of the moralindividuals? But which criterion does reason have at its disposal to per-form the test? Because the social organism is a contingent, independentreality, reason cannot impose its own norms and values. The criteria totest the social organism can only be derived from the social organism it-self. Reason can test whether the norms and values of the social organismare consistent, whether the social organism is a viable self. This kind of testing, however, can never result in an unambiguous determination of

the social organism’s laws. Consistent law systems can exist in a multi-tude. “Property, simply as such, does not contradict itself; it is an isolated determinedness, or is posited as merely self-identical. Non-property, thenon-ownership of things, or common ownership of goods, is just as littleself-contradictory.” (258).

The examination of the three options has learned that it makes nosense to look for the most adequate determination of the social laws.The moral individual is not unambiguously linked with a specified socialorganism. The concrete social organism essentially is a contingent reality.However, this does not justify the conclusion that the moral individual isindifferent to the determination of the social laws. It is obvious that a so-cial organism can offer more or less openness to moral freedom. At least itcan be investigated under what conditions the social organism gives roomto moral freedom.

The mind/ body unity as an historical reality

What is the result of the preceding development? We have observed that,from the inside perspective (via Unhappy Consciousness , Observing and Ac-tive Reason) it has become clear what, from an outside perspective, wasalready known: The existence of the individual as mind/body unity hasto be understood as a relation in which the pure self is related to an in-dependent social organism in such a way that it is aware of being the es-sence of this organism, i.e., that it knows that this organism is the objec-tification of its freedom. From the inside perspective, however, it is not

possible to determine the content of the social laws. Therefore, the con-clusion is that the real self, i. e., the mind/body unity, can only adequately




be determined by its participation in a contingent, historically given, so-cial organism: The laws of the social organism are already determined allthe time.

However, not all social organisms will do. They must correspond tothe minimal conditions that create room for moral freedom. Which theseminimal conditions are is already discussed. The institutions of the socialorganism must guarantee the development of the moral individual, i.e.,they must produce the Unhappy Consciousness. Moreover, the institutionsmust enable the moral individual to strive after his realization, i.e., themoral individual must be involved in a learning process that passesthrough the stages of observing and active reason. In other words, thesearch of the moral individual for the social organism in which it is ad-

equately realized is projected in the social organism, itself. The contin-gent, historical organism that is adequate to the moral individual cannotbe determined. What, however, can be determined is a dynamic structurethat institutionalizes the search for the adequate social organism. In thenext chapter, we will see that, according to Hegel, this contingent, histor-ical organism can be identified with the ancient Greek world.

The mind/ body unity as an historical reality 59



Chapter 2The Greek World: The Origin of the First Self

Introduction

In this Chapter the law of the social organism, in which the individual (asthe mind/body unity) is real, is nearer determined as the law of a socialorganism that is historically found, namely as the Human Law of thepolis, the city-state of Ancient Greece.73

This determination of the socialorganism by means of an historically given (contingent) content in some way joins with the attempt that was made at the level of The spiritual an-imal kingdom and deceit, or the ‘matter in hand’, itself. But the choice of the Greek city-state is not coincidental. Previously we discussed some ex-amples of the historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation, such as theexample of the Egyptian world in which the lord of the world (the phar-aoh) was worshipped as a god. The Human Law of the Greek world,however, institutionalizes a social organism that (at least initially) has

no gods.74

The Human Law stands for the type of society in which the“bondsmen” have recognized themselves in the “lord”, i. e., a society that is characterized by the relation of stoicism. The citizens of theHuman Law think to be autonomous; they think that their freedom co-incides with its expression in the Human Law.

Referring to the ancient Greek tragedies (especially those of Sopho-cles) Hegel argues that the Human Law presupposes another law, the Di-vine Law or the Law of the Family. The existence of this second law, ac-cording to Hegel, is no historical coincidence, but is implied by the ex-istence of the Human Law. In the Divine Law , the pure self of the citizensis institutionalized, i.e., the Divine Law is the embodiment of the Un-happy Consciousness. Therefore, the Divine Law can be considered asthe institutionalized reality of the moral individual.

In the Greek world the domains of right and morality are separately institutionalized in, respectively, the Human and the Divine Law. More-

73 The Ancient Greece appears as the origin of western culture, i. e. , the culture that

produced the philosophical question on which the Phenomenology of Spirit isbased.74 The original lawgiver, for example, is Solon, a human being.



over, the moral domain (the Divine Law ) initially does not concern theliving, but the dead individual. The unreality of the moral individual,however, contradicts his absoluteness. Therefore, the polis is involved

in a development in which the moral individual tries to realize himself in the social organism of the Human Law. We will see that, in this at-tempt, the moral individual passes through the same stages as themoral individual that tried to realize himself at the level of Reason.Therefore, the moral individual will experience once again that thelaws of the social organism are contingent. This time, however, the expe-rience is not a hypothetical construction, but an historical reconstruction.

The polis as the unity of the Human and Divine Law

The lordship/bondsman relation is transformed in the relationship of stoi-cism when the bondsman can identify himself with the lord. The cultiva-tion the bondsman has undergone in his service has resulted in a reality that no longer seems to have secrets for the bondsman. The distinctionsin the bondsman’s thinking seem to coincide immediately with the dis-tinctions of reality. In his thoughts, the bondsman supposes to have be-come immediately the lord of reality. It is exactly this form of stoicismthat characterizes the consciousness and the action of the citizens inthe polis: “ … the action is the transition from thought to actuality mere-ly as the movement of an insubstantial antithesis whose moments have noparticular, distinctive content and no essentiality of their own” (281). Inthis action, the pure self disappears behind its historical expression in thespecific historic law of the polis, the Human Law.

Although the actions of the citizens according the Human Law of thepolis are free (the law is a product of human freedom) this freedom is not

yet expressed as such in Human Law. The purity of the free self, the free-dom that makes it possible to realize oneself in many ways, remains hid-den behind the factual realization in the ruling Human Law. This meansthat the citizen only appears as an instrument of the state. Ultimately, thestate can ask the citizen to sacrifice his life for the salvation of the state.This does not do justice to the inward freedom of the citizen, to his pureself that makes him a member of an absolute, supra-temporal moral order

which is distinct from the worldly order of the state. This is a blessing forthe state because it does not need to fear the subversion of its authority by

the pure self. The family is the social organism in which the moral individual is embodied.

The polis as the unity of the Human and Divine Law 61



If the pure self is not expressed at all in the polis, it would be no morethan a void illusion. Maintaining that the Human Law is an expression of human freedom would cease to have any meaning. As a result, the law

would only exist, and could have a natural as well as a divine origin.The human origin of the Human Law can only be understood if this free-dom belongs to the reality of the polis. According to Hegel, in the Greek

world it is not the state but the family that does justice to the pure self.The family is not dealing with citizens but with real individuals which

it keeps alive and educates to become citizens. Also, these activities seemto have nothing to do with the individual’s participation in the pure self.This changes, however, with the death of the individual. For the state, thedeath of the individual is a relative loss, the loss of one of its many citi-

zens. Conversely, for the family, the death of the individual is an absoluteloss. Because the family has to educate its members to their ethical role, itprincipally does justice to them as free individuals, i.e., as individuals

who participate in the pure self. The submission to the ethical role is es-sentially self-submission.

The absolute loss of the family leads to a process of experience whichis structured like the Unhappy Consciousness. The absolute essence of thedeceased individual can only be held in the memory of the family and isthus separated from the objective world. This separation denies the abso-luteness of its essence. Therefore, the family searches for the dead one inthe real world. However, it can only find the body of the lost individual.In its “work,” i.e., in the burying of the body, the family tries to reunitethe dead body, by sacrificing its corporeality (the body is given back to“the bosom of the earth”) (271) with its absolute essence. This re-union, however, is the result of the family’s actions. In its entombing of the dead family member, the family does justice to the pure self of the deceased. This justice, however, gets no place in the real world.

The deceased, who is honored by the family, has taken a place in the un-derworld. Individual and community, the right of the pure self and theright of the citizens of the state, do not need to be opposed if they areseparated and allocated to different worlds. Hegel formulates the decea-sed’s right of entombing as the family’s duty, i.e., as the Divine Law that is valid alongside the Human Law. The stability of the HumanLaw is saved because the moral dimension is banished to the underworld.

Chapter 2 The Greek World: The Origin of the First Self 62



The abstract work of art: the representation of the pure self inthe public domain

The definite banishment of the pure self to the underworld will fail. Thepure and real self are internally united. This internal bond will inevitably lead to the penetration by the pure self into the public consciousness and,consequently, to the undermining of the state’s stability. This is expressedin the development of the polis that can be characterized as the return of the repressed. The freedom of the pure self is the implicit presuppositionof the polis. The pure self will invade the public domain of the polis stepby step. Ultimately, the pure self can claim its place as the formal person.If this occurs, however, the polis is destroyed.

The development of the polis immediately reflects itself in the religion in the form of art , in which the self-consciousness of the polis is rep-resented. Without the threat of this decline, the polis would be in perfectharmony and the motive to represent this harmony would be absent. Thischanges when the harmony is in danger. “Since the ethical nation lives inimmediate unity with its substance and lacks the principle of the pure in-dividuality of self-consciousness, the complete form of its religion firstappears as divorced from its existential shape”75 (425).

Apparently, the religious representation has a double meaning. Onthe one hand, the representation already expresses the decline of thepolis, for the religious consciousness is a manifestation of the principleof pure singularity. Without the emergence of self-consciousness, there

would be no need for religion. On the other hand, the decline of thepolis can be delayed when its absolute essence is represented by the reli-gious consciousness. The religious representation contradicts the actualdecline. For the religious consciousness, the polis still has an absolute es-

sence, even though the facts show otherwise. Here, religion functions asan ideological consciousness, which is dedicated to the status quo.From a certain point of view, the polis is itself the perfect work of art.

It is not only a work that embodies human freedom, but also it is the only existence of this freedom. Freedom has no other mode of being. To be

75 “Indem das sittliche Volk in der unmittelbaren Einheit mit seiner Substanz lebtund das Prinzip der reinen Einzelheit des Selbstbewußtseins nicht an ihm hat, sotritt seine Religion in ihrer Vollendung erst im Scheiden von seinem Bestehen auf”

(490/1). The English translation is obviously wrong. The point is not that thereligion is divorced from the ethical substance, but that the religion only gets ex-istence when the polis threatens to become ruined.

The abstract work of art: the representation of the pure self in the public domain 63



free means to be a citizen of the polis. To be a citizen of the polis meansto be free. There is no way to be free outside the polis. The citizen has noconscience or subjective identity to differentiate between his public and

subjective role. In this sense, freedom only exists insofar as it is practically performed. Any reflection on this freedom, any subjective notion of thecitizen about the fact that he is free, would destroy the specific sense of freedom that is meant here. The polis would no longer be substantial,for its substantiality would be denied by subjective thinking. Thismeans, in other words, that the polis, as a work of art, is the exclusivemedium for this type of freedom to appear in. The polis is, in thissense, the ultimate society of artists.

The harmony of the polis, however, is disturbed at the moment that

the repressed pure self threatens to return and to invade the public con-sciousness. Then, the harmonious consciousness of the citizen will be un-dermined and the Human Law will decline. The decline can be wardedoff if the Human Law is represented as an absolute entity. Because thepolis itself is a work of art the ideal medium to represent the polis is an-other work of art. The work of art we are looking for is identified by Hegel as the statue of the god and the temple, the house of the god.The statue of the god is an idealized human being and represents, in He-gel’s interpretation, the citizen. The ethical substance, in which the citizenhas realized himself, is represented by the temple.76 The temple is the

world of the god, like the ethical substance is the world of the citizen.It is essential that the god and the temple are works of art that representthe divine world, i.e., a world that has a stable, absolute existence. The

works express a specific logical relationship, namely, the relationship of stoicism. For the stoic consciousness, there is only one form, one kocor, which is both the law of nature and the law of the self. Therefore,there is no real distinction between nature and self. Correspondingly,

the statue and the temple are both forms of one and the same absolutesubstance. Thus, there is also no actual distinction between them. They represent, to recall a quotation I mentioned before, “the movement of

76 “The first mode in which the artistic spirit keeps its shape and its active con-sciousness farthest apart in the immediate mode, viz. the shape is there or is im-mediately present simply as a thing. In this mode, the shape is broken up into the

distinction of individuality, which bears within it the shape of the self, and of universality, which represents the inorganic essence in reference to the shape,its environment and habitation” (427).




an insubstantial antithesis whose moments have no particular, distinctivecontent and no essentiality of their own” (281).

However, in the long run, the moments of the pure self, the coming

to self-consciousness at the level of family in a process of experience that was structured in the form of Unhappy Consciousness , cannot remain hid-den from the public consciousness. The result will be that the undermin-ing force of pure self can no longer be repressed by representing the polisas an absolute entity and, consequently, that the polis declines. The de-cline of the polis, however, can, for the time being, be postponed

when the moments of the pure self are not expressed in the form of self-consciousness but in the form of representation, i.e., as the abstract works of art. If the moments are represented as absolute works of art

that have their own existence beside the statue and the temple that orig-inally represent the harmonic unity of the polis, the undermining force of the pure self is, so to speak, fixated. It is true that the pure self that existsfor the family beside the objective world (as the subjective memory of thedeceased) returns in the public consciousness, but because this return hasthe form of the abstract works of art it is compatible with the independentreality of the Human Law. Human Law is also represented by abstract

works of art that exist alongside the other works and represent theirown absolute reality.

The penetration by the pure self in the public consciousness is done justice by Hegel when he says that the sculptor does not recognize the ac-tivity of his actions in the statue.77 The sculptor objectifies his pathos inthe statue, like the citizen objectifies his pathos in the Human Law.78 Thepathos of the artist, however, is not identical with its expression in the

work of art but also encompasses the moment of freedom.79 The self

77 “Since his work comes back to him simply as joyfulness, he does not find therein

the painful labour of making himself into an artist, and of creation, nor the strainand effort of his work” (429).

78 The term pathos shows up for the f irst time at the level of the ethical world, whenHegel discusses the objective reality of the polis. “The substance does appear, it istrue, in the individuality as his ‘pathos’…” (284). Apparently, pathos is the ab-solute ethical content insofar as it is experienced by the citizen.

79 It is at the level of religion in the form of art that Hegel uses the term ‘pathos’ forthe second time. Here, the term has a negative meaning. As the pure form of theself, the individuality has lost all content. This loss, however, is no emancipation,is not yet liberation from substantial ties. The loss of the absolute content is ex-

perienced as an absolute emptiness. Or, rather, the absolute being is experiencedin the mode of its total absence. This time, the negative, formless, but absolutecontent is called pathos. It is the pathos of the pure self in which all form has




of the artist has dissociated itself from its being immediately determinedby the substance. The work of art is the result of the struggle between thepure activity of the artist and his pathos. Insofar as the sculptor does not

recognize his activity in the work, the work as well as the polis it repre-sents loses its absolute status.The substance of the polis can regain an absolute representation if the

activity of the artist is also represented in the work. According to Hegel,this happens in the hymn, the second form of the abstract work of art hediscusses. At this level, the god is represented in the medium of the ex-pressed language. In this medium, the work of art remains, in its objec-tification, bound to the self. Therefore, the separation between the self and the substance has been avoided. The hymn is not a thing like a statue

or a temple which, once produced, keeps the activity of the self outsideitself. The hymn only exists in and by the performance of the people.Here, the religious self-consciousness is “ pure thought , or the devotion

whose inwardness in the hymn has at the same time an outer existence”(430).

The reverse side of this alliance between the existence of the work of art and the activity of the self is that the existence of the work of art isfleeting. The hymn is, in Hegel’s terminology “a vanishing existence”

(432). The work’s objectivity is too much confined in the self and, there-fore, “falls short of attaining a lasting shape and is, like Time, no longerimmediately present in the very moment of its being present” (432).

Now it becomes clear what Hegel implicitly already indicated by using the term Devotion. In the hymn, the theoretical moment of the Un-happy Consciousness is objectified. In the hymn, the god is represented asan unchanging but impalpable being. The unhappiness of the Unhappy Consciousness is due to the contradiction in which it is involved. Becauseits ‘god’ remains impalpable, i. e. , it does not appear in the real world, this

been concentrated. The pure self relates itself to the formless essence, as “the pureactivity.” “This pure activity, conscious of its inalienable strength, wrestles withthe shapeless essence. Becoming its master, it has made the ‘pathos’ into its ma-terial and given itself its content, and this unity emerges as a work, universal Spi-rit individualized and set before us” (427). This makes clear in what sense the work of art is an individualisation of the general spirit. Individuality has beenthe pure form of the absolute substance itself. Individuality and substance, how-ever, disintegrate and are transformed into the relationship between the pure self and its pathos. The specific form of this relationship is objectified in the specific

form of a work of art. Since the work of art gives a renewed and positive reality tothe absolute content, as well, the work of art can be characterized, indeed, as theindividualisation and representation of the general spirit.




‘god’ is (negatively) determined by the real world and, therefore, is notabsolute. To rescue the absoluteness of this ‘god’, the Unhappy Conscious-ness looks for its reality. As we saw in the previous chapter, Hegel illus-

trates this search with the example of the medieval crusades that triedto find the reality of god in the holy land. The crusaders, however,only found a grave (no real self has an eternal life). Consequently, the Un-happy Consciousness makes other attempts to reconcile the absolute self

with the real world. By sacrificing its real self, it tries to become unified with the pure self. If, however, the Unhappy Consciousness succeeds inovercoming its real self, the Consciousness itself appears to be the absoluteessence of the real self.

The development of the abstract work of art is structured in accord-ance with the Unhappy Consciousness: The pure self that is representedin the hymn must be reconciled with the real world. In the abstract Cult , the third form of the abstract work work of art , the real self is raised“into being the pure divine element” (433) by ritual actions: “a soul thatcleanses its exterior by washing it, and puts on white robes, while its in-

ward being traverses the imaginatively conceived path of works, punish-ments, and rewards, the path of spiritual training in general, i.e., of rid-ding itself of its particularity, as a result of which it reaches the dwellings

and the community of the blest” (433).Like the search for the real self that is divine, the attempts of the ab-

stract Cult will fail. The ritual actions cannot really change the real self into a divine self. Therefore, a second attempt has to be made in the ac-tual Cult , the fourth form of the abstract work. The actual Cult is the ac-tion that can be understood as a spiritual movement, “because it is thistwofold process, on the one hand, of superseding the abstraction of thedivine Being (which is how devotion determines its object) and making

it actual, and, on the other hand, of superseding the actual (which ishow the doer determines the object and himself) and raising it into universality” (433/4). The central action of the actual Cult is an act of sac-rifice. On the one hand, the divine Being is sacrificed: “The animal sac-rificed is the symbol of a god; the fruits consumed are the living Ceres andBacchus themselves” (434). On the other hand, the actual is sacrificed todivine Being: “with the pure surrender of a possession which the owner,apparently without any profit whatever to himself, pours away or lets riseup in smoke” (434). The result of these sacrifices is the transformation of

the divine Being “into self-conscious existence, and the self has conscious-ness of its unity with the divine Being” (435).




In the unity of self and divine Being, the devotion is “robbed of itsouter existence”. The Cult replaces this defect and “produces a dwelling and adornments for the glory of god” (435). Once again, it appears

that the labor in which the self sacrifices itself for the god ultimately shows that the real self is the essence of god: “The dwellings and hallsof the god are for the use of man, the treasures preserved therein arehis own in case of need; the honor and glory enjoyed by the god inhis adornment are the honor and the glory of the nation, great in souland in artistic achievement” (435).

The polis as a harmonic unity

In the first section, we saw that the loss of family members resulted in a dialectic movement structured according to the Unhappy Consciousness. Asa result of this movement, the family appeared as the essence of the pureself. The pathos of the family is expressed in the Divine Law. The duty of the Divine Law guarantees that the pure self of the deceased member re-mains preserved in the memory of the family. In this sense, the Divine Law is, so to say, the institutional house of the pure self that is distin-guished from the domain of the state.

The separation between Human and Divine Law seemed to protectthe state from the undermining force of the pure self. The pure self, how-ever, is the presupposition of the freedom of the state’s citizen. Therefore,the penetration by the pure self into the public consciousness cannot beprevented; this penetration can only be postponed by representing the re-lation between citizen and polis in works of art, i.e., as the fixed relationbetween statue and temple. As a product of the artist, however, the work of art also presupposes the pure self and is, itself, undermined in its ab-

soluteness. To repair the absoluteness of the work, the pure self is repre-sented in its turn as an abstract work of art, structured according the mo-ments of the Unhappy Consciousness. This time, the result of the dialecticmovement shows the state as the appearance of the pure self. The pathosof the state (expressed in the Human Law ) is no longer separated from thepathos of the family, but is explicitly understood as the realization of thepure self.

Now, also the individuals themselves can conceptualize the polis as a harmonic unity in which all the moments of Reason are objectified.80 The

80 From the outside perspective, this was already clear. In Chapter 2, it has been ela-




pure self that is institutionalized in the family relates to the objective world of the state in which it can recognize its own essence. If the relationis theoretically considered, it appears as the reality of the observing reason:

“What observation knew as a given object in which the self had no part, ishere a given custom, but a reality which is, at the same time, the deed andthe work of the subject finding it” (276). From a practical perspective, itis the reality of the active reason: “The individual who seeks the pleasureof enjoying his individuality , finds it in the Family, and the necessity in

which that pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizenof his nation. Or, again, it is in knowing that the law of his own heart isthe law of all hearts, in knowing the consciousness of the self as the ac-knowledged universal order; it is virtue, which enjoys the fruits of sacri-fice, that brings about what it sets out to do, viz., to bring forth the es-sence into the light of day, and its enjoyment is this universal life.” (276/7).

From a totalizing perspective, it is the reality of the matter in hand:“Finally, consciousness of the ‘matter in hand’, itself, finds satisfaction inthe real substance which contains and preserves in a positive manner theabstract moments of that empty category. That substance has, in the eth-ical powers, a genuine content that takes the place of the insubstantial

commandments which sound Reason wanted to give and to know; andthus it gets an intrinsically determinate standard for testing, not thelaws, but what is done.” (277).

Repression of the deed: the living work of art

The harmonic unity of the polis is only guaranteed when the citizenscommit no deeds in the pregnant sense, i.e., deeds that are uncondition-ally free: Their actions have to be in accordance with the prevailing Human Law. This guarantee fails, however, at the moment that theHuman Law is understood as an expression of the pure self. The pure

borated that the individuals as mind/body unity can only exist under the condi-tion that the moral individual can recognize himself in the objective world.Under what condition, in its turn, this recognition is possible is developed atthe level of Reason. Therefore, the conception of the polis as the reality of thehuman individual presupposes that the polis is the concrete reality of all the mo-

ments that were passed through to conceive the unity of mind and body. “All previous stages of consciousness are abstract forms of it [i.e. , the substantial reality of the polis, P.C.].” (264).

Repression of the deed: the living work of art 69



self is basically a free self that is able to commit any action or, at least,actions that are not in accordance with the prevailing Human Law.Therefore, the harmony of the polis is dependent upon restrictive condi-

tions that must be imposed on possible actions. These conditions can bespecified for the different relations that the free individual can take uponhimself towards the polis, i.e., they can be specified for the different mo-ments of the objectified Reason that compose the polis. We will see thatthese conditions are represented in the living and the spiritual works of art.

In the living work of art, the first moment of the objectified Reason,i.e., the observing Reason, is represented as an absolute, everlasting rela-tionship. At this level, the statue is unified with its precondition, thepure self, and has developed into a “living statue” expressed by living in-

dividuals. The two forms of living art represent, respectively, the Divine and the Human Law as separated entities. In this separation, the external,theoretical relationship between the Laws is reflected, which characterizesthe form of the observing Reason.

We have seen that the Divine Law is the “house” of the pure self. By means of the Divine Law , the pure self is given an institutional body. Thepure self and its incorporation, mind and body, are represented in “themystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus” (438). Ceres standsfor the feminine principle of the body: the “simple essence as the move-ment, partly out of its dark night of concealment up into consciousness,there to be its silently nourishing substance; but no less, however, themovement of again losing itself in the nether darkness, and lingering above only with a silent maternal yearning” (437). Bacchus stands forthe masculine principle of the mind. As the “moving impulse” he is:“nothing but the many-named divine Light of the risen Sun and its un-disciplined tumultuous life which, similarly let go from its [merely] ab-stract Being, at first enters into the objective existence of the fruit, and

then, surrendering itself to self-consciousness, in it attains to genuine re-ality–and now roams about as a crowd of frenzied females, the untamedrevelry of Nature in self-conscious form.” (437/8).

The Human Law is the mediated “house” of the pure self, in which itsmediated existence as citizen has been given a second nature in the objec-tive institutional body of the state. This mediated unity of mind andbody is represented in the athlete of the Olympic Games, the “inspiredand living work of art that matches strength with its beauty; and onhim is bestowed, as a reward for his strength, the decoration with

which the statue was honored, and the honor of being, in place of thegod in stone, the highest bodily representation among his people of




their essence” (438.) In the representation of the athlete, it becomes clearhow the religious consciousness regulates the actions of the free citizen(and postpones the decay of the polis). The freedom of the citizen re-

mains encased in natural boundaries: Mind and body appear as strengthand beauty, i.e., as cultivated nature.

The representation of the deed: the spiritual work of art

At the level of the active reason, however, the citizen cannot accept boun-daries that are set by an external, natural world. The active reason wants torelate itself to an external world that it can recognize as the result of is

own action. Therefore, this world can only be a social world. This is il-lustrated by the moments of the active reason as they appear in the har-monic unity of the polis.

The first moment of the active reason, Pleasure and Necessity , consid-ered within the harmonic unity of the polis, is described by Hegel as fol-lows: “The individual who seeks the pleasure of enjoying his individuality ,finds it in the Family, and the necessity in which that pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizen of his nation” (276). If, however,

the individual becomes aware of his pure freedom, he will no longer ac-cept the self-consciousness of the Human Law and will resist it as a strange necessity. Once again, the stability of the polis is threatened. To

ward off this threat, the moment of Pleasure and Necessity is representedas an absolute relation in the first form of the spiritual work of art , name-ly, the Epic.

In the spiritual work of art, the representation of the pure self is nolonger separated from the representation of its objective expression likein the living work of art.81 In the spiritual work, the self is represented

as the self expressing itself. Therefore, speech is its medium: “The perfectelement in which inwardness is just as external as externality is inward isonce again speech… “ (439). At the level of the Epic , however, the self that expresses the speech, the minstrel, is still distinguished from theself that is expressed in the speech. What is expressed is “Mnemosyne,recollection and a gradually developed inwardness, the remembrance of essence that formerly was directly present” (441). Here, Hegel is making reference to Homer’s Iliad. In this work, the expression of the self is still

81 “In the Bacchic enthusiasm it is the self that is beside itself, but in corporeal beau-ty it is spiritual essence” (439).

The representation of the deed: the spiritual work of art 71



the result of the synthetic representation of the minstrel: “It is no longerthe actual practice of the Cult, but a practice that is raised, not yet indeedinto the Notion, but at first into picture-thinking , into the synthetic link-

ing-together of self-consciousness and external existence.” (440).In the Epic, Pleasure is represented by human action, i.e., the actionsof the heroes. The actions of the heroes, however, are managed by thegods: “The universal powers have the form of individuality and hencethe principle of action in them; what they effect appears, therefore, toproceed entirely from them and to be as free an action as that of men.Consequently, both gods and men have done one and the same thing.The earnestness of those divine powers is a ridiculous superfluity, sincethey are, in fact, the powers or strength of the individuality performing the action; while the exertions and labor of the latter is an equally uselesseffort, since it is rather the gods who manage everything.” (441/2).

However, over the many gods hovers the universal self , the might of Necessity. “They are the universal, and the positive, over against the in-dividual self of mortals which cannot hold out against their might; butthe universal self , for that reason, hovers over them and over this whole

world of picture-thinking to which the entire content belongs, as the irra-tional void of Necessity . . .” (443).

As long as the universal self of Necessity remains undetermined, itremains unclear how the unity of society can be concretized. Therefore,the empty self of Necessity has to be transformed into the determinedlaw of society. We have already seen how the polis can exist as the har-monic unity of two laws, the Human and the Divine Law. This harmony is guaranteed insofar as the Divine Law restricts itself to the underworldso that its action does not interfere with the action of the Human Law ,i.e., when “no deed has been committed.” In this case, all can accept

the Human Law so that there is no need for “the law of the heart ” tobe revealed as “the frenzy of self-conceit.” The law of the heart can be un-derstood as a constituting moment of the harmonic totality of the polis:“Or, again, it is in knowing that the law of his own heart is the law of allhearts, in knowing the consciousness of the self as the acknowledged uni-

versal order” (276).Principally, however, the deed is unavoidable because the pure self of

the family and the real self of the polis do not immediately coincide.(Their reciprocal relation has to be developed). This is exemplarily illus-

trated by Creon’s ban to entomb Polynices, who sacrificed the interest of the state for his own interest. The clash between the two laws is post-




poned because in the Tragedy, their ultimate harmony is represented as anabsolute one.

This appeal to the tragedy seems to be strange because Hegel also de-

scribes the “deed” and the decline of the harmonic unity of the polis interms of the Tragedy , in particular, Sophocles’ Antigone. In the tragedy,however, the clash between the two laws is accompanied by a processthat Hegel calls the “depopulation of Heaven” (449). It is this processthat, for the time being, can retain the appearance of harmony.

First, the “Chorus of the Elders” representing the people praises a multitude of gods: “Lacking the power of the negative, it is unable tohold together and so subdue the riches and varied abundance of the di-

vine life, but lets it all go its own separate ways, and in its reverential

hymns it extols each individual moment as an independent god, firstone and then another” (444). The clash between the two laws, however,is reflected in the religious representation: “If, then, the ethical substance,in virtue of its Notion, splits itself as regards its content into powers which were defined as Divine and Human Law , or law of the nether and of theupper world–the one of the Family, the other the State power, the firstbeing the feminine and the second the masculine character–similarly,now, the previously multiform circle of gods with its fluctuating charac-

teristics confines itself to these powers which are thereby brought closerto genuine individuality.” (445).Both characters–the actor of the Human Law and the actor of the Di-

vine Law –are one-sided: They only know the content of their own law.Therefore, their consciousness is intrinsically connected with the side of not-knowing: “Therefore, the two sides of consciousness which have,in actuality, no separate individuality peculiar to each, receive, when pic-torially represented , each its own particular shape: the one, that of the rev-elatory god, the other, that of the Furies who keep themselves concealed.

In part, both enjoy equal honor, but again, the shape assumed by the sub-stance , Zeus, is the necessity of the relation of the two to each other.”(447/8).

In the “deed,” the one-sidedness of the ethical powers becomes man-ifest, resulting in the decay of these powers: “The action, in being carriedout, demonstrates their unity in the natural82 downfall of both powersand both self-conscious characters. The reconciliation of the opposition

with itself is the Lethe of the underworld in death; or the Lethe of the

82 “Natural” is the translation of “gegenseitig”. A better translation would have been‘reciprocal’.

The representation of the deed: the spiritual work of art 73



upper world as absolution, not from guilt (for consciousness cannot deny its guilt, because it committed the act83) but from the crime; and also thepeace of mind following atonement for the crime.” (448).

The downfall of the ethical powers is reflected in the completion of the depopulation of Heaven: “The self-consciousness that is representedin the Tragedy knows and acknowledges, therefore, only one supremepower, and this Zeus only as the power of the state or of the heart,and in the antithesis belonging to knowing [of knower and known],only as the father of the particular that is taking shape in the knowing;and also as the Zeus of the oath and the Furies, the Zeus of the universal ,of the inner being dwelling in concealment.” (449).

Self-consciousness, which has kept Zeus as its only god, has lost itsspecific content. Zeus has become the representation of the pure formof self-consciousness. Therefore, self-consciousness is no longer able torescue the ethical substance by sacrificing its self-conscious action. Thepure self is explicitly separated from the contingent reality. The third mo-ment of the active reason, Virtue and the way of the world , ceases being a constituting moment of the reality of the polis.84 Self-consciousness, “thesimple certainty of self, is, in fact, the negative power, the unity of Zeus,of substantial being and of abstract Necessity; it is the spiritual unity into

which everything returns” (449/50). This negative power of self-con-sciousness is represented in the Comedy: “The self-consciousness of thehero must step forth from his mask and present itself as knowing itself to be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the absolute powersthemselves, and as being no longer separated from the chorus, from theuniversal consciousness” (450).

In contrast to the self of the gods, the self of self-consciousness is notimagined. Moreover, the self of self-consciousness is not dependent on a substantial being: It is only involved in a substantial power insofar as itacts its part by putting on its mask. But the self “quickly breaks outagain from this illusory character and stands forth in its own nakednessand ordinariness, which it shows to be not distinct from the genuineself, the actor, or from the spectator” (450). This play between the self of the mask and the genuine self is the exhibition of “the ludicrous con-

83 A better translation would have been ‘deed’.84 We have already seen how Hegel characterized Virtue and the way of the world as

a constituting moment of the polis: “It is virtue, which enjoys the fruits of sac-rifice, that brings about what it sets out to do, viz., to bring forth the essence intothe light of day, and its enjoyment is this universal life” (276).




trast between [the self’s] own opinion of itself and its immediate exis-tence, between its necessity and contingency, its universality and its com-monness” (451).

The self that has emancipated itself from the ethical substance is thefree self with the capacity for reasonable thinking.85 Its gods are no longercoincidental individualities that reflect the divers powers in the ethical

world. Reasonable thinking develops their individualities into the simpleIdeas of the Beautiful and the Good in which return, at the highest levelof abstraction, the Divine and Human Laws. (In the Beautiful the individ-ual gets a universal meaning and in the Good the community encompass-es the interests of the individuals). Insofar as the gods have a natural side,“they are clouds,86 an evanescent mist, like those imaginative representa-

tions” (451/2).Because of their abstractness, the thoughts of the Beautiful and the

Good are empty so that any individual has the opportunity to givethem his or her own meaning and make them the result of his or her co-incidental, contingent individuality: “Therefore, the Fate which up tothis point has lacked consciousness and consists in an empty reposeand oblivion, and is separated from self-consciousness, this Fate is now united with self-consciousness. The individual self is the negative power

through which and in which the gods, as also their moments, viz. existentNature and thoughts of their specific character, vanish. At the same time,the individual self is not the emptiness of this disappearance but, on thecontrary, preserves itself in this very nothingness, abides with itself and isthe sole actuality.” (452).

Conclusion

The religion of the work of art is the religion of freedom in its immediateform. It is the religion of the ancient Greek people that has objectified thefree self in the polis: The polis is the concrete totality of all moments of the free self. In the immediate form of the polis, however, freedom assuch (i.e., the free self in its pure form) is not objectified. The pure

85 J. Heinrichs, Die Logik der ‘Phnomenologie des Geistes’ , Bonn, 1974. He thinksthat the transition of the Greek religion into reasonable thinking correspondsto the transition from Unhappy Consciousness to Reason, see p. 441. However,

we have seen that Reason is already represented by the living and the spiritual work of art.86 Here, of course, Hegel is referring to Aristophanes’ Comedy, The Clouds.

Conclusion 75



self is the hidden presupposition of the polis. The reality of the polis isonly a specific historical form of the polis that exists beside a multitude of other poleis. In the struggle between the poleis, each polis can become

ruined. Their decay appears as an external power, as the empty self of Fate. In fact, the decay of the polis is caused by an internal power,i.e., by the penetration of the ethical life of the polis by the pure self.

The development of the polis is the process in which the empty self of Fate is recognized as the pure self of the real individual. The pure self willbe understood as the Fate of ethical life. In the end, the only reality is thereality of the contingent self that knows that in its part as persona, it is themaster of this reality.

The development of the polis is an ongoing learning process that is

performed by means of religious representations: All the constituting mo-ments of the ethical life, the moments of the free self, are successively rep-resented by a work of art.87 This representation mediates a raising of theconscious, which results in the explication of the pure self as the presup-position of the polis.88 At this point, the decay of the polis is over.

The religion of the work art first appears at the moment the pure self of the individual threatens to penetrate the public domain of the polis.The decay of the polis is warded off by representing the relation between

individual and community as an absolute and harmonious relation: inthe representation of the statue of the god and the temple. The statueand the temple, however, cannot repress the pure self because they only represent the objective appearance of individual and community, notthe free activity that is presupposed by them. Therefore, the pure self is represented as an absolute being in the abstract work of art. The devel-opment of the abstract work of art results in the living work of art in whichthe representation of the pure self is immediately united with its reality:

87 W. Jaeschke, Vernunft in der Religion, Stuttgard 1986. He interprets the abstract ,living and spiritual works of arts as historical stages of the religion of the work of art (see p.208). Although within the development of the spiritual work of art there seems to be some chronological succession, the religious forms representthe moment of the polis which are real at the same time. Therefore, it is not nec-essary that the logical development totally coincides with a chronological one.

88 R. Bubner, “Die “Kunstreligion” als politisches Projekt der Moderne” in A. Arndta.o. (Ed.) Hegel Jahrbuch 2003, Glauben und Wissen. Erster Teil , p. 310: “DieGeneralformel einer Entwicklung der Substanz zum Subjekt erzeugt in der spe-zifischen Anwendung auf das Religionskapitel, das wir diskutierten, die Eigen-

tmlichkeit, daß in der griechischen Lebensform das Substantielle eingebter, weitergereichter und durch Tradition besttigter Sittlichkeit bereits durch sthe-tische Transformation vom Ansichsein zum Frsichsein emporgehoben ist.”




In the athlete of the Olympic Games, the statue of god has become a liv-ing god.

In the athlete, however, the pure self remains embedded in natural

relations. It is only at the level of the spiritual work of art that the self can be expressed as a spiritual one, i.e., as a self that transcends the nat-ural relations. In the Epic, Tragedy and Comedy, the pure self is successive-ly represented as the abstract self of Fate, the self-conscious self of Zeus,

who is the only one supreme power, and the pure self of the real individ-ual that understands itself as the Fate of the world.

Retrospection

We have seen that the polis can be reconstructed as a free state, i. e. , as a social organism borne by free citizens who think that they, by observing the law, can objectify their pure freedom. This alleged autonomy, howev-er, can only be maintained when the pure self of the citizen can be keptoutside the public consciousness: For this pure self, the real social organ-ism must appear as a contingent order. The pure self is not only embod-ied in a social organism that is distinguished from the state, namely the

family, but is also placed in another world, i.e., the underworld. The objectification of the pure self is separated from the objectification of thereal self. Both objectifications are distributed over family and state,over the Divine and Human Law.

The stability of the polis is continuously threatened by the freedom of the pure self. This threat is warded off when the public consciousness rep-resents the social organism as an absolute reality: In two works of art, inthe temple and the statue of god, citizen and polis are represented as anabsolute relation.

The representation of the polis in the works of art, however, cannotdefinitely repress the pure self. The works of art themselves are also a product of the pure self: They are products of free artists. In its pureness,the pure self is a being that remains elusive and, therefore, it can only be-come a subject of self-consciousness in the form of the Unhappy Con-sciousness. By representing the forms in which the Unhappy Consciousness tries to realize itself in its turn as an absolute work of art, the potentialundermining working of the pure self can be warded off. In this case,

the forms of the Unhappy Consciousness are represented alongside the ab-solute representation of the polis. Ultimately, it appears that not the ab-

Retrospection 77



solute work of art, but the real individual is the appearance of the pureself: The real self is a moral individual.

As long as the moral individual is in harmony with the state, it is con-

vinced that it realizes its freedom in the state, i. e. , it is related to the stateas the realized observing and active Reas on. Because of the contingentcharacter of the state organism, however, the harmony cannot standfirm. The individual has the freedom to perform actions that are notin harmony with the Human Law 89 and undermine its order. To regainthe stability of the polis, the inharmonious relation between individualand polis is again represented in a work of art and fixated as an absoluterelation. Insofar as the individual relates to the polis in the form of theobserving Reason, this relation is represented in the living work of art; in-

sofar as the individual is related to the polis in the forms of active Reason,these relations are represented in the spiritual works of art.

At the level of the comedy, however, it is the representation of the work of art itself that reveals that the work of art represents a contingentreality as if it were a divine one. Then the individual can become aware of the contingence of the social organism in which he is living. Consequent-ly, the Human Law loses its legitimacy as the alleged expression of the in-dividual’s freedom. This works out in the decline of the Greek world. Theattempt to synthesize the moral and legal dimension has failed; Divine and Human Law exclude one another.

This conclusion corresponds with the conclusion that was drawn atthe level of the Animal Kingdom. The moral individual cannot adequately realize itself in a social organism that is contingently given. This time,however, the conclusion is not drawn on the basis of a hypothetical recon-struction of a social organism, but on the basis of the reconstruction of anhistorical social order. Therefore, the decline of the polis does not lead tothe lawgiving Reason, like the reaction was to the failure of the Animal

Kingdom, but to the reconstruction of a new historical social order: a so-cial order in which the deficiency of the Greek society is overcome and in

which a new attempt is made to the adequate realization of the moral in-dividual. Hegel identifies the Roman Empire as this new social order.

89 Hegel’s example of this individual is Antigone.




The Roman Empire as the result of the Greek World

According to Hegel’s reconstruction, the social organism of the Roman

Empire is characterized by the property right of Roman Law. TheRoman citizen is a formal legal person, who owns property. Insofar asthe formal person is free, he is a moral individual that tries to realizeits pure self. By the decline of the Greek World, the moral individualhas learnt that the social organism is a contingent reality and has no ab-solute ground. Insofar as he played a social role, he was not realizing anabsolute essence, but only wearing a mask. The characters of the tragedy,recognizable by their masks, appeared to be dependent on real individu-als. Therefore, if the moral individual can realize himself, he has to turnto the real individual, not to the social roles of the state organism. Sincethe real individual has existence in the social organism of the family, itappears that it is not a contingent social organism (the state) but a self constituted social organism (the family).

The person of the Roman Law is, from the inside perspective, themoral individual that realizes his pure self in the social organism of thefamily. On the one hand, the person is free, i.e., he has a pure self; onthe other hand, the person owns property, i.e., he has the right to impose

his will on the properties he owns. The consumption of the properties isnot dedicated to the survival of the person’s physical organism, his body,but rather to the survival of the social organism of the family, i.e., of thesocial organism in which the person expresses his free will. The person is,so to speak, the lord who serves himself as bondsman in the consumptionof his properties. Because of this reason, Hegel also calls the person the first self. Until now, the moment of the lord (the moral dimension)and the moment of the bondsman (the legal dimension) were distributed

over distinguished institutions. In the person, however, the moments arefor the first time united in a single individual. Therefore, the person is a self, an individual unity of mind and body.

As the unity of the lord-moment and the bondsman-moment the per-son is, like the citizen of the polis, a manifestation of the relation thatHegel indicates as stoicism. In their actions, the citizens of the polis per-form “the transition from thought to actuality merely as the movement of an insubstantial antithesis” (281). The actions in which the persons con-sume their properties can be described likewise. This time, however,

thought and actuality have not the generality of the Human Law andthe state organism, but the subjectivity of the person’s thought and the

The Roman Empire as the result of the Greek World 79



family organism. The general stoicism of the polis is, so to speak, concen-trated in the individuality of the person.

From an outside perspective, the persons are a multitude of contin-

gent family organisms. The contents that are realized in the distinguishedfamilies are in no way organically tied with one another. The persons areonly formally related as the legal persons of the property right who rec-ognize one another as free and equal persons. Insofar as the persons coex-ist as real families, their external relation is represented by the RomanEmperor. Like the other individuals, the Roman Emperor is a person;but he is a self “beside itself” (293), i.e., his content only representsthe externally-being-together of the contingent multitude of families.This external coherence is also expressed in the religion of the Roman Em-

pire. The Roman gods exist as a pantheon in which they are assimilated inan external unity.90

The Greek world was structured as the double relation of recognition,as the being-together of right and morality. Morality was institutionalizedas the Divine Law ; alongside morality, right was institutionalized as theHuman Law. In the Roman World right and morality, Human and Divine Law , are integrated in the reality of the person. On the one hand, the per-sons recognize one another as the free and equal persons of the RomanLaw; on the other hand, the moral dimension is internalized by the per-son and practically expressed in the particularity of the family life. Thisinternalization and practical expression, however, result in the declineof the pureness of the moral content. In Chapter 4, we will discuss thereturn of the pure self in the Realm of Culture. The development of this world will lead to the genesis of the second self.

90 Cf. “In this, the reality of the ethical Spirit is lost, and having lost all content, theSpirits of national individuals are gathered into a single pantheon, not into a pan-theon of picture-thought whose powerless form lets each Spirit go its own way,

but into the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which disembod-ies them and imparts to the spiritless Self, to the individual person, a being that isin and for itself.” (454).




Chapter 3The Realm of Culture: The Genesis of the Second Self

Introduction

As is the case in the polis, also in the Roman Empire the absolute freedomof the pure self remains an implicit presupposition. The pure self remainssubmerged in the practical execution of freedom, i.e., in the way in

which the person expresses his freedom in his property. Therefore, thediscrepancy between inside and outside perspective also at this time con-tinues to exist. From the outside perspective, the property order is a con-tingent order: an historical form of a social organism. From the insideperspective, the self only exists insofar as it participates in a property order. Just like in the polis, also in the Roman Empire the concealed pre-suppositions come to light: not by the death of the individual, but by the“death” of the social organism, i.e., the decline of the Roman Empire. Be-cause of its contingent unity, the decline of the empire is as necessary as

the natural death of the individual. Sooner or later, the Empire has to fallbecause of opposed internal power positions.

For the person, the Fall of the Roman Empire means the loss of hisreality as person, i.e., the property order declines. Just as the family of the polis preserves the pure memory of the deceased family member,tries to find, again, his reality and arrives at the self-consciousness of the Divine Law by means of the dialectics of the Unhappy Consciousness ,so the person preserves the meaning of the declined Empire as a “pure

Being”, tries to find, again, its reality and develops by means of the dia-lectics of the Unhappy Consciousness the consciousness of the “pure Be-lief”. We have to dwell on this development of the “pure Belief” andto elaborate how exactly the person survives the Fall of the Roman Empire.

The Fall of the Roman Empire and the experience of the person

The decline of the property order does not necessarily mean the decline

of the persons who were the bearers of the property order. The individualcan survive the implosion of the legal order. But what are the consequen-



ces for his freedom? Does the decline of the property order in which thefreedom is realized, also imply the annihilation of freedom? To answerthis question, we first have to discuss the consequences of the decline

of the property order for the self-consciousness of freedom.The individual who, as person, participates in the property order canthink to be autonomous. After all, he can have his property at his dispos-al. By the decline of the property order, however, the individual experi-ences the boundaries of his autonomy. The decline only happens tohim, and surely is no result of his autonomous action. Therefore, the re-ality of his autonomy appears to be dependent on a power that transcendshis autonomy. This does raise the question of what exactly is the nature of this power and how it is related to the alleged freedom of the individual.

The external power to which the individual is related and that has be-come fatal for the property order (the power that, for example manifesteditself in the power of the Ostrogoths who undermined the property orderof the Roman Empire ) cannot be understood as the overwhelming powerof nature that immediately threatens the free self-consciousness. As a per-son, the individual has experienced that nature, in principle, is no obsta-cle to his freedom. Obviously, nature cannot only manifest itself as a me-dium in which he can realize his freedom, but also as a medium that re-sists his freedom. Because nature is factually appearing as a violent power,the second sight of nature, i.e., nature that is in harmony with freedom,can only be maintained as a inner representation of the individual. Hissecond sight seems to be only a recollection of something that has everexisted.

The recollection, however, is certainly not just an inessential fiction.Nature as the power that transcends society cannot only be a blind des-tiny. There has been a time in which it tolerated a free society (in the ageof the polis and the Roman Empire ). Therefore, it is not as much an ab-

solute power that, per se, resists freedom, but an absolute power that hasat its disposal the chance of the free individual to realize his freedom. Inthis sense, the absolute power of nature is the essence of freedom. 91 In thiscase, the external violence that ruins the property order shows not somuch the unreality of the individual’s freedom, but rather that the reality of the conditions under which he can practically realize his freedom tran-scends his autonomy. Therefore, the individual can rescue his freedom by representing the absolute power as an inner being that has the absolutepower to permit (or forbid) the actualization of his freedom. By this rep-

91 In fact, here the pure self appears again.

Chapter 3 The Realm of Culture: The Genesis of the Second Self 82



resentation, the individual has the awareness that the reality in which hecannot realize his freedom is not the only possible one. At the same time,the represented absolute power transcends the alleged autonomy of the

individual. After all, the individual has experienced that he is not ableto guarantee for himself that he can realize his freedom in the real world. In this sense, the inner representation stands for an absolutepower on which the individual knows himself to be dependent. It isthis power that has the real conditions at its disposal under which hehas the possibility to realize his freedom; this power is the ground of the property order in which he can realize his freedom.

The genesis of the moral individual

The individual who has made the absolute being his inner representationseems to have emancipated himself from the legal order. His freedom hasreceived its own place that does not coincide with the freedom he has as a person in the framework of the legal order. The individual has become a moral individual who is free because he relates to a pure inner being thathe considers the be the ground of his own freedom. This freedom seems

to be due to any individual, independent of the fact as to whether or nothe participates in a legal order. Accordingly, Jrgen Habermas sharply dis-tinguishes between the moral individual and the legal subject. As legalsubject the individual belongs to a real legal community, but as moral in-dividual he belongs to mankind. As moral individuals, all natural individ-uals are equal, as legal subjects only those individuals are equal who arealso persons and belong to a legal community; the moral point of view is universal, the legal point of view is restricted to a specific legal com-munity.92

However, Jrgen Habermas’ way to distinguish moral individuals andlegal subjects is not tenable. The moral individual not only, in a geneticsense, presupposes the legal community, but also systematically. Rightand morality are not related in an external “relation of completion” 93,like Habermas thinks, but are internally linked.

Rightly, Habermas puts forth that the moral point of view is a universal one. Whoever speaks about human individuals has to involve mor-ality in his considerations. But why is this the case? Because the moral

92 J. Habermas, Faktizitt und Geltung, p. 139 ff.93 J. Habermas, Faktizitt und Geltung, p. 137, “Ergnzungsverhltnis”.

The genesis of the moral individual 83



individual is not measured to a specific legal community, but to himself:any moral individual inwardly relates to an absolute being (that later on

will be developed as the conscience). But, why is it necessary to attribute

such an inner being to all individuals? The opinion that all individualsare moral individuals may have a universal validity, but on this basis itis not necessarily a universal point of view.

Habermas is right when he maintains that each human individual is a moral one. But to ground this position, the universality of the moral in-dividual cannot, just like that, be opposed to the particularity of the legalsubject. As legal subject, i.e., as the person of the property order, the in-dividual is thought to be autonomous. As autonomous subject, the indi-

vidual can, in a certain sense, claim an absolute status: Reality seems to

coincide with the reality he realizes in his autonomous action. Nopower seems to limit his actions. At the moment, however, that the prop-erty order gets ruined, this power, after all, appears to exist. It is thispower that the moral individual makes the content of his inner represen-tation. This inner being is absolute because it transcends the alleged ab-solute power of the autonomous person. Therefore, the independence of the moral individual, expressing itself in his inner relation to an absolutebeing, is linked with the presupposition of the property order. Withouthaving experienced the alleged autonomy of the property order, themoral individual cannot be related to an inner being to which he attrib-utes an absolute meaning.

The real legal community is a particular community and, therefore,cannot be understood as the presupposition of a universal moral individ-ual. The moral individual, however, is universal because any individual

with a human self-consciousness is also a moral individual.94 Thehuman self-consciousness is only real in a legal community and canonly develop into a real moral individual when the legal community

has developed into a property order in which the individual, as a legalperson, thinks to be autonomous. Therefore, the reality of the moral in-dividual in some sense presupposes the reality of the property order.

That the moral individual who has been developed up to now is in-ternally involved in the property order can also be shown by considering the moral individual, himself. The inner being to which the individual isrelated can be considered as the representation of the absolute essencethat the person, in his alleged autonomy, thought to be himself. If thisrepresented essence is absolute, it is, in the same sense, absolute as the

94 This has been developed in the chapter on Self-consciousness.




person thought himself to be absolute. The person could imagine to beautonomous as long as he had the opinion that the property order wasnothing other than the realization of his freedom. In the decline of the

property order, however, the opposite has appeared to be the case. Theproperty order certainly appeared to be dependent on an “outside”.This “outside” already was, in the form of the determinedness of the per-son, a moment of the property order all the time. What exactly the par-ticular determinedness of the person is and to what extent the consump-tion of the property is able to express it, remains, under the conditions of the property order, a private affair that is, consequently, from the view of the legal order an accidental one. The accidental existence of the property order is made explicit when the property order becomes ruined. The per-

son can survive this decline if he conceives of the accidental content as thecontingent reality of an absolute being. By the representation of an abso-lute being the legal subject is transformed into a moral individual. Theproperty order gives nature, only in general, the form of freedom by mak-ing nature its property. The specific content of nature, however, remainsundetermined. The property law is a purely formal law that makes thecontent of the legal act a private affair. This, however, makes it principally possible that the content is not compatible with the formal law order and,as the “outside”, turns against law.

The represented inner being is absolute insofar as it is the essence of all reality to which it is related. It does not stand a reality that has its ownindependence. This demand, however, contradicts the determinationthat, until now, is given to the inner being: As a being that is only inner, it is related to an independent outer reality, so that it cannot bereally absolute. This is the starting point for a development processthat the moral individual has to go through in his attempt still to rescuethe absoluteness of his inner being.

It must become clear in what way the outer reality does not contradictthe inner being, i.e., in what way the outer reality can be conceived of asappearance of the absolute inner being. At first sight, this demand seemsto be impossible because the absolute being is introduced as the innerbeing of the free individual to escape a reality that was not compatible

with the freedom of the individual. How could this reality still be inter-preted as the appearance of a inner being? The conditions to fulfill thisdemand, however, can be clear if one considers how the decline of theproperty order has given rise to the representation of an inner absolute

being. The inner absolute being is the “outside” of the freedom that ini-tially conceived of itself as the absolute being. If the free individual could

The genesis of the moral individual 85



get hold of the “outside” as an “inside” he would kill two birds with onestone: He would not only be able to conceive of the inner being of hisfreedom as his own freedom, but would also still have the opportunity

to realize its inner being. The realization should be performed in a legal order in which freedom not only formally gets shape (as in the prop-erty order) but also really: The legal order should guarantee that the nat-ural content also is an expression of freedom by ending the banishing of this content to the private domain. The law that expresses freedomshould immediately validate the particularity of the individual (that is un-derstood as the content of freedom) as the content of the law.

The aforementioned conditions will be fulfilled by the citizens of theFrench Revolution. They not only have put their subjective freedom in the

place of the inner absolute being, but also they want to express their subjective freedom as the content of the law of society. This means that theformal realization of freedom in the property order has been replaced by the substantial realization of freedom in a political order in which the citi-zens immediately want to realize their subjective freedom. The formal re-alization of freedom by the first self (the person) has been replaced by thesubstantial realization of freedom by the second self , i.e., the subject that

wants to realize his subjective freedom.How the transition from an inner absolute being to which the indi-

vidual is related (a relation that historically can be situated after the Fallof the Roman Empire ) into an absolute being that is understood as a sub-

jective microcosm that wants to realize itself in the political order (a re-lation that historically can be situated as the aspiration of the citizens of the French Revolution) can be really performed, in no way is clear. Hegeltries to interpret this development as the rise and inner dynamics of Me-dieval Christianity. He discusses this development as structured according the stages of the Unhappy Consciousness.95

95 In his first introduction of the Unhappy Consciousness at the level of Self-conscious-

ness , Hegel illustrates this consciousness already with the examples of MedievalChristianity. However, it is only at the level of the Realm of Culture that this his-torical reality is explicitly interpreted.




The Embodiment of the “pure Being” in the real Individual: theself-conscious reality of the Unhappy Consciousness

In the elementary, logical expression of the Unhappy Consciousness inChapter 2, we witnessed how the Unhappy Consciousness was the resultof the decline of the social organism. The Unhappy Consciousness survivesthe social organism because it represents the hidden pure essence of thesocial organism (the pure self that previously was recognized as thelord) as an inner absolute being (the “unshakable being”). The declineof the social organism is historically exemplified with the Fall of theRoman Empire. Therefore, also the representation of the inner absolutebeing can be historically exemplified. The inner absolute being is repre-sented by the absolute self, the god, of the Judeo-Christian religion. In-sofar as the god remains a purely subjective, inward representation along-side the objective reality, his absoluteness is, according to Hegel, only a belief. But the subjectivity of the belief is overcome in the historical de-

velopment of Christianity. Just as we have seen before, this time the elu-sive absolute being of the Unhappy Consciousness also gets its embodimentin the real self. The logical stages of the development of the Unhappy Consciousness can be exemplified as historical stages in the development

of Medieval Christianity.The individual that represents his absolute being as the pure self of a

god gets involved in the dialectics of consciousness.96 To rescue the abso-luteness of his pure god, the representation must overcome its abstract-ness, i.e., it must be possible to determine the absolute self of the god.If, however, the individual represents his god as a real self (as the Sonof God, Christ), it remains unclear how the pure and real self of thegod can be brought together: The represented god is absolute as finite,as well. The individual can try to solve the problem by representing hisgod as the “Holy Spirit”. In that case, it is not the real individual thatmakes his god finite, but it is the god himself who only exists in commu-nion with the real self. In the representation of the holy spirit, however,the individual is thrown back to himself: He, himself is the real self with-out which the pure self of the god has no existence.

96 As we have seen in Chapter 2, Hegel’s original introduction of the Unhappy Con-sciousness is illustrated with examples from the medieval world. These medieval

forms are not repeated in the Realm of Culture. In contrast to Hegel, I givethese medieval examples of the Unhappy Consciousness a place in the Realm of Culture. These forms can be understood as the previous history of the Belief.

The Embodiment of the “pure Being” in the real Individual 87



Having arrived at this self-consciousness, the Unhappy Consciousness gets involved in the dialectics of Self-consciousness.97 It leaves the theoret-ical relation to an inner self and turns to a practical relation to the objec-

tive world. In this world it seeks a real self that can be understood as thereal existence of an absolute self. This search is expressed in the Crusadesto the Holy Land to find Christ, the living God. The crusades, however,are doomed to fail. It is in the nature of the real self the be mortal. Con-sequently, the crusaders can only find an empty grave.98

In the next step to realize the pure self, the individual repeats the lord/bondsman relation. He now tries to realize the pure self of his god by sac-rificing his real self. This is possible because the individual is a member of the community of the (Roman Catholic) church. This community exists

insofar as the individuals serve (as “bondsmen”, i.e., as monks) their god(the “lord”). In their service, the pure self of the god gets real existence.The individuals, however, strive after the existence of their god as a pureself, and think to reach this goal by totally sacrificing their real self. They try to negate the existence of their body by fasting, and to negate the ex-istence of their mind by the endless repetition of ritual prayers. If the in-dividuals, however, succeed in their intention, they themselves are thepure self, not their god. The power to totally discipline their mind andbody presupposes that the individuals are free, i.e., have a pure self.

Just like the pure recollection of the deceased family member got itsembodiment in the living family (by mediation of the dialectics of theUnhappy Consciousness ) so the pure recollection of the declined social or-ganism gets its embodiment in the living individual (as well mediated by the dialectic of the Unhappy Consciousness ). Initially, the living family members of the polis were harmoniously related to the objective reality of the Human Law. They recognized this objectivity as the realizationof their inner being (they recognized the moments of observing and ac-

tive Reason). In contrast to the family of the polis, the real individual of the Realm of Culture is not related to a social organism, and certainly not

97 The dialectics of Self-Consciousness is performed in the form of the Unhappy Con-sciousness.

98 The experience of the crusades repeats the relation of Desire in the form of Un-

happy Consciousness. Self-consciousness tries to find again and again its pure es-sence (the pure self of the God) as a living self. But all living selves appear tobe mortal.




to a social organism to which he is harmoniously related.99 The social or-ganism has decayed and the objective reality appears as a contingent one.

The meaning of the moral individual in the objective world

The moral individual who has understood that the absolute inner being ishis subjective essence is related to a contingent objective world (the reality that is left after the decline of the Roman Empire ). If his subjective es-sence, the Lutheran God in which he is inwardly involved, really is anabsolute essence, it cannot remain purely subjective. To affirm the abso-luteness of the subjective essence, it has to be realized in the objective

world. But insofar as the objective world is a contingent reality, it remainsaccidental whether or not this realization is possible. Just because the con-tingent world is an independent existence, there is no guarantee that themoral individual can realize himself in this world. This guarantee is only given under the condition of the first stage of the Revealed Religion, thereligion of the Realm of Culture.

Like the Belief of the moral individual, also the Revealed Religion re-fers to the Christian religion. At the level of the Revealed Religion the

Christian god, however, is not thematized from the viewpoint of themoral individual, but as the god of the objective world. 100 In the firststage of the Revealed Religion, god is represented as the Father, the creatorof the objective world.101 This god has created the world in its contingent

99 To a certain extent, the family in the polis can be compared to the religious com-munity in the Realm of Culture. Like the reality of the Divine Law has been developed in the family, so the reality of the Belief is developed in the institutionsof the Church. As a subject of Belief, the individual will have a judgment on the

institutions of the realm of Culture. But this independent position, with respectto the social institutions, is not dependent on institutional actions within theframework of the church. The subject of Belief has internalised the relation tothe absolute Being: In the transition from Catholicism into Protestantism, thesubject of Belief no longer needs the mediation of the priests.

100 Cf. “The content itself which we have to consider has partly been met with al-ready as the idea of the ‘unhappy’ and the ‘believing’ consciousness; … The con-sciousness of the community, on the other hand, possesses the content for its sub-stance , just as the content is the certainty of the community’s own Spirit.” (464).

101 This first moment of the Revealed Religion corresponds to the Unhappy Con-

sciousness in the form of Consciousness. The inner representations of the Father,the Son and the Holy Spirit return. (“There are thus three distinct moments: es-sence, being-for-self which is the otherness of essence and for which essence is,

The meaning of the moral individual in the objective world 89



existence. Therefore, the objective world is reconciled with the pure self of God the Father. As creation of God the Father, the objective worldprincipally is understood as the creation of a pure self. As a consequence,

the moral individual, in principle, has the possibility to realize his subjec-tive essence in the objective world.The function of the first stage of the Revealed Religion is comparable

to the first stage of the Religion of Art in the polis. Just like the momentsof the Unhappy Consciousness (namely those moments that resulted in theembodiment of the recollection of the deceased family member in the liv-ing family) were introduced in the public domain by their representationin the abstract works of art, so the representation of God the Father in-troduces the moments of the Unhappy Consciousness (namely those mo-ments that resulted in the embodiment of the recollection of the declinedsocial organism), in the public domain of the Realm of Culture.

The realization of the moral individual in the objective world:the process of culture

The absoluteness of the subjective essence can only be confirmed when it

is realized in the objective world. The moral individual must be able toonce again find his subjective essence in an objectivity that is structuredlike the stages of observing and active Reason. This realization of the moralindividual is mediated by the second and third stages of the Revealed Re-ligion.

In the second stage of the Revealed Religion, the Realm of the Son(Christ) in the objective world is not only represented as a creation of God, but also as a world in which God himself appears, namely in the

form of his Son, Jesus Christ. Because this Son is a human being, atthis stage the religious representation makes clear that the objectivity of the human world, in itself, expresses the pure self of the divine

and being-for-self, or the knowledge of itself in the ‘other’.” (464)) And, the ab-solute self appears again as “devotion”, as a being that escapes enduring existence:“the being-for-self that shut itself out from essence is essence’s knowledge of its ownself. It is the word which, when uttered, leaves behind, externalized and emptied,him who uttered it, but which is as immediately heard, and only this hearing of

his own self is the existence of the Word.” (465). This time, however, the abso-lute self is the God of the community, not just the inner representation of theindividual.




being.102 From this religious conviction, the moral individual derives thecertitude that he can find again his subjective essence in the objective

world, namely in the objective human world, the social organism.103

After the Fall of the Roman Empire , the institutions of the social or-ganism have to be rebuilt. But the process of rebuilding cannot one-sidedly be understood as a more or less coincidental, practical processin which the real individuals constitute a new social organism by serving a lord in their role as bondsmen. Because the individuals are also moralindividuals, they do not accept whatever tradition of the social organism.For the moral individuals, the social organism has legitimacy only insofaras they can recognize it as the objectification of their subjective essence.The moral individuals judge the social organism. They consider it to begood if it corresponds to subjective pure self, and they consider it to bebad if does not.104 This judgment gives rise to the dialectics of culture be-tween the individuals and the social organism. As well, the individual asthe social organism is cultivated in a process that can only end when themoral individual can recognize the social organism as an adequate objec-tification of his pure self.

The first stage of the process of cultivation has the structure of observ-ing Reason. The moral individual tries to recognize his subjective essence

in a (social) world that is objectively given. As we have seen before, thedialectics of observing Reason repeats (in its own, mediated form) the di-alectics of Consciousness and Self-consciousness.

Firstly, the moral individual tries to recognize his essence in the socialorganism as an immediately given identity (cf. the Sense-Certainty ). Inthis immediate relation, however, the social organism remains undeter-mined (all real social organisms can be immediately given). In the secondattempt, the social organism is determined in relation to the individual.

102 Cf. “Spirit is thus posited in the third element, in universal self-consciousness ; it isits community. The movement of the community as self-consciousness that hasdistinguished itself from its picture-thought is to make explicit what has been im-plicitly established. The dead divine Man or human God is in himself the univer-sal consciousness ; this he has to become explicitly for this self-consciousness.”(473).

103 The Realm of the Son has the same function in the Realm of Culture , as the living work of art has in the polis: It represents the integration between the moral in-dividual and the objective world.

104 Cf. “Now, self-consciousness holds that object to be good, and to possess intrinsicbeing, in which it finds itself; and that to be bad in which it finds the opposite of itself.” (302/3).

The realization of the moral individual in the objective world: the process of culture 91



Also in this relation, however, the social organism cannot be identified.On the one hand, the individual is a corporeal individual who tries to sat-isfy his needs in relation to the social organism (the social organism ap-

pears as Wealth, 305).105

On the other hand, the individual is a spiritualindividual who sacrifices his corporeal existence and realizes (as the “lord”that is served by his body as the “bondsman”) the social organism, itself (that in this relation appears as State Power , 305).106 Like the Perception

was not able to identify the Thing by bringing together the two pointsof view concerning the Thing (the Thing is One and Also), so themoral individual is not able to identify the social organism by bringing together the two viewpoints (the social organism is State Power andWealth). Therefore, it appears, thirdly, that the unity of the social organ-

ism must not be attributed to the social organism itself, but to the judg-ing individual (cf. Understanding ).

In his attempt to understand the social organism’s unity as the resultof the judging individual, the moral individual repeats the dialectics of Self-consciousness (in the form of observing Reason). In the first stage,the stage of the language of f lattery , the moral individual identifies the un-limited monarch (Louis XIV)107 as the one who represents the unity of the social organism. He has this position because he is surrounded by in-

dividuals (the noblemen) who are saying to him all the time, in their language of the flattery , that he is the unlimited monarch.108

The identity that is dependent on the language of the flattery , however,gets ruined by the ambiguity of the noblemen. The noblemen do not co-incide with their service (as “bondsmen”) to their “lord”, the monarch.Insofar as they recognize the unlimited monarch, they are moral individ-

105 Hegel has in mind the feudal nobility that is rewarded for its service to the feudalsovereign.

106 Hegel means the feudal sovereign.107 Cf. “The result is that the Spirit of this power is now an unlimited Monarch: un-

limited , because the language of flattery raises power into its purified universality ;this moment being the product of language, of an existence which has been pu-rified into Spirit, is a purified self-identity; a monarch, for such language likewiseraises individuality to its extreme point; what the noble consciousness divests it-self of as regards this aspect of the simple spiritual unity is the pure intrinsic being of its thinking , its very ‘I’.” (310/1).

108 In the relation of Desire, the pure self has to prove again and again the he is theessence of nature by negating nature. Here, the noblemen have to proof again

and again that the unlimited monarch is the essence of the social organism by negating themselves and by expressing the judgment that the monarch is the es-sence. In this sense, Desire is repeated in the form of observing Reason.




uals who are sacrificing themselves for the social organism. But they arealso corporeal individuals who want to satisfy their needs. Therefore, itremains unsure whether their service concerns the State Power (so that

the language of flattery is completely honest) or the Wealth, i.e., the reward they receive for their service. At any moment, what is meant asState Power can turn into its opposite, Wealth, the good can changeinto the bad, the being-in-itself into the being-for-self. This ongoing pos-sibility of change is expressed in the language of disruption.109

The language of disruption seems to make clear that nothing in reality is what is seems to be. Reality, the social organism seems to lose its sub-stantiality. This becomes absolutely clear when the individual experiencesthat it is related to a contingent world. Whether the individual is reward-

ed for his serving the social organism, he has not under control himself. Whether he can profit from the Wealth that is produced by the social or-ganism is not dependent on his own decision, but on a strange being, onthe will of the monarch who can or cannot endow him Wealth. Therefore,the individual experiences the highest possible alienation. The reality thathe should be able to recognize as the reality in which his freedom is real-ized appears as a reality in which wealth is an external thing and, in

which, consequently, it is totally accidental whether he can realize his es-sence.

The experience of the highest possible alienation makes the moral in-dividual give up the relation form of observing Reason.110 He has experi-enced having no opportunity to find again his essence in the objectively given social organism and returns as the pure Insight (321 ff.) to himself.

As the pure Insight (that repeats the relation form of stoicism), themoral individual takes on a rationalistic position. He is related to a con-tingent world, but considers his pure concept as the essence of this reality.Therefore, in some sense the pure essence of the moral individual has re-

alized itself, for it is nearer determined. This nearer determination, how-ever, is a conceptual determination that remains alongside the contingent,sensual reality. [The position of the pure Insight is represented by RenDescartes for whom the mathesis universalis is the essence of all reality.]

109 Cf. “language of this disrupted consciousness” (316), the translation of “Spracheder Zerrissenheit”.

110 Cf. “But this expendable, selfless being, or the self that has become a Thing, israther the return of that being into itself; it is being-for-self that is explicitly foritself, the concrete existence of Spirit.” (316).




As long as the pure Insight is related to a contingent reality his claimto be the essence of all reality is contradicted. After all, the contingentreality has its own independence. As the Enlightenment , the pure Insight

turns against the contingent reality and tries to transform it into a reality that only expresses its own pure insight. In this attempt, it repeats the re-lation form of active Reason. This repetition only makes sense when themoral individual presupposes the validity of the third stage of the re-

vealed religion, the stage of the Holy Spirit in which the internal unity between god and mankind is represented. Mankind is not only the Sonof God, but also realizes, in and through his actions, God’s own es-sence.111 Under the condition of this religion, the moral individual canassume that he is able to realize his absolute inner essence.

Firstly, the moral individual repeats the relation of Pleasure and Ne-cessity when it turns as Enlightenment against Superstition. He understandsthe contingent reality as a traditional order that is based on accidentalopinions that are only legitimized by Superstition. Enlightenment thinksto be able to subject this kind of world without much resistance. Itneeds only to confront Superstition with its arguments to make it sureof its right. It thinks that its enlightened activity can only result in the pleasure of its triumphing argumentation that experiences no resistance

at all.112

From the outside perspective, reality is not only contingent, but alsois a social organism that can survive because it is grounded in the secondstage of revealed religion. In this religion, human reality is represented asthe son of god, i.e., the social organism is interpreted as a contingent re-ality in which the pure self has given shape to itself. Since Enlightenment results from the moral individual’s attempt to realize himself, it is by re-vealed religion not confronted with Superstition, but with its own presup-

position. After all, also the moral individual has made the pure self his ab-solute essence (albeit that this essence until now was an inner essence). In

111 Cf. “Spirit is thus posited in the third element, in universal self-consciousness ; it isits community. The movement of the community as self-consciousness that hasdistinguished itself from its picture-thought is to make explicit what has been im-plicitly established. The dead divine Man or human God is, in himself, the universal consciousness; this he has to become explicitly for this self-consciousness.”(473).

112 Cf. “But this silent, ceaseless weaving of the Spirit in the simple inwardness of itssubstance, Spirit concealing its action from itself, is only one side of the realiza-tion of the pure insight.” (332).




its confrontation with the (alleged) Superstition it also becomes clear forEnlightenment, itself, that it is confronted with its presupposition.

Enlightenment and Superstition relate to one another as the “satisfied”

and the “unsatisfied” Enlightenment.113

The pure Insight that turns againstthe contingent reality develops into the satisfied Enlightenment. It tries toexpress the essence of the contingent reality in general laws that, in theirturn, express the pure matter, and thus seems to finalize its Enlightenmentproject. The alleged superstition, however, remains confined in the reality of a contingent social organism whose essence, as the “beyond” ( jenseits )of the divine pure self, remains elusive. Basically, however, both positionsare each others opposite and in this sense they pass into one another. The“beyond” of the alleged Superstition (faith) is, as pure thinking, pure iden-tity, pure matter. The other way around, the pure matter of the satisfied Enlightenment is, as Thing-in-itself, a “beyond”.

The passing of both positions into one another is performed in theRealm of Utility, in which all in the world is only a being-in-itself insofaras it is for an other.114 The satisfied Enlightenment is related to a contin-gent reality, and experiences in its relation to the unsatisfied Enlightenment that the contingent reality only exists distinct from the pure self. The un-satisfied Enlightenment is related to the pure self, and experiences in its

relation to the satisfied Enlightenment that its pure self only exists distinctfrom the contingent reality.

Actually, the hidden unity of the Realm of Utility is the real individ-ual, i.e., the individual that unites the moral and the legal individual.The satisfied Enlightenment , by making the unsatisfied Enlightenment itsobject, is related to the legal individual, i.e., the member of the socialorganism that knows that this organism is legitimated by the pure self of God. Obviously, the unsatisfied Enlightenment is related to the moral

individual by making the satisfied Enlightenment its object. Therefore,in the confrontation between satisfied and unsatisfied Enlightenment , thereal individual can develop the awareness to be, as well, the essence asthe appearance of the world. By expressing himself in the social organism,the real individual is the being-in-itself. This being-in-itself only exists in-

113 Cf. “ … but there is this difference, the latter is satisfied Enlightenment, but faithis unsatisfied Enlightenment.” (349).

114 Cf. “What is useful, is something with an enduring being in itself, or a Thing;

this being-in-itself is at the same time only a pure moment; hence it is absolutely for an other , but equally is for an ‘other’ merely what it is in itself; these opposedmoments have returned into the indivisible unity of being-for-self.” (354).




sofar as it is for another, i.e., the pure self of the god. The pure self of thegod, however, is the inner pure self of the real individual. Therefore, thereal individual appears as the autonomous individual, i.e., the individual

that exists by realizing his inner essence.

The absolute Freedom: the second self

Hegel discusses the autonomous individual as the absolute freedom(355 ff.) that characterizes the citizens of the French Revolution. The au-tonomous individual is the moral individual who has the certitude that hecan realize his absolute essence as legal individual, i.e., in the social or-

ganism in which he has realized himself. For the autonomous individual,the world is nothing else than the self-realization of his inner essence. Heis the autonomous author of the law that is realized in the social organ-ism. The world where the autonomous individual is living is a world

without alienation, a world in which he can feel totally at home. Thetranscendental world of the pure self is united with the real world of the social organism. “The two worlds are reconciled and heaven is trans-planted to earth below.” (355)

At the level of the absolute freedom, the moral and the legal dimensionare, for the second time, united in the individual. Therefore, the absolute freedom can be called the second self 115, or the moral subject. In contrast tothe first self , the formal person of the Roman Law , the content of the sec-ond self is not contingent, but posited as the expression of subjective free-dom. The law of the social organism is the autonomous law of the second self. Therefore, the absolute freedom can be interpreted as the historical re-alization of the lawgiving Reason.

The lawgiving Reason was discussed as a hypothetical attempt to de-

termine the law of the social organism from the perspective of the partic-ular consciousness. This attempt failed because only laws at a very highabstraction level could be formulated. The absolute freedom, however,does not content itself with such abstract laws because it intends to bethe lawgiver of a real social organism. As a result, the French Revolutionends in terror: If all citizens want to impose their specific law, being the expression of their subjective freedom, they exclude one anotherand can only fight a struggle of life and death. This makes explicit that

115 “The second self is the world of culture which has attained its truth, or it is Spiritthat has recovered itself from its dividedness–absolute freedom.” (384).




the that the absolute freedom repeats the second stage of active Reason, The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit. The revolutionary citizens

who want to realize their “law of the heart ” are seized by the subjectivism

of “self-conceit ” and are confronted with a strange necessity. The realiza-tion of the social organism’s law presupposes that all serve the same“lord”. This is not possible when the distinction between the moraland political domain is not respected. The immediate moralization of politics inevitably leads to terror.116

Retrospection

In the Realm of Culture , the structures of the Greek world are repeatedand brought to self-consciousness. The many poleis with their contingentethical content return as the families that have their self-consciousness inthe formal legal person of the Roman Law. Like the Human Law of thepolis, the Roman Law is structured to conform to the relation of stoicism,

which implies that the freedom’s pure self remains immersed in the prac-tical performance of freedom. In contrast to the polis, however, in whichthe citizen is not aware of the particularity of the ethical content, this

awareness is developed by the person, who knows that the freedomthat he realizes in his family organism has a particular content that is dis-tinguished from the content of other family organisms. At the level of theRealm of Culture , it is thematized how the person develops insight intothe contingent content of his freedom (like the Greek citizen developedinsight into the contingency of the polis’s ethical life) and how he tries toovercome this contingency in a doubled process of culture (in which, as

well, the person, as his world, is cultivated). As in the polis, the return of the repressed pure self in the Realm of

Culture also is mediated by death. This time however, not by the death of the family member, but by the “death” of the social organism. The re-membrance is retained as the inner representation of the absolute “pureThing”. Just as, at the level of the polis, the remembrance of the deceasedfamily member is embodied in the Divine Law of the family, so the re-membrance of the declined social organism is embodied in the faith of

116 In this sense, the Sharia is a form of terror and in some sense, also an insult togod: after all, as an absolute being, he may not be distinguished from the finitereality.

Retrospection 97



the individual. In both cases, the embodiment is mediated by the dialec-tics of the Unhappy Consciousness.

The development of the Realm of Culture is characterized by the

movement in which the faithful individual is integrated with the objective world. In the first step of this process, mediated by the first stage of theRevealed Religion, the faithful individual becomes part of the public do-main. In the second step, the faithful individual really integrates withthe objective world by means of a process of culture. This process is struc-tured according to the dialectics of observing and active Reason and medi-ated by, respectively, the second and third stage of the Revealed Religion(the realm of the Christ and the realm of the Holy Spirit ).

The development of the Realm of Culture is the self-conscious repe-

tition of the movement performed in the polis in which the Divine Law is integrated with the objective world of the Human Law. In thefirst step of this process, mediated by the first stage of the Religion of Art (the abstract work of art) the Divine Law becomes part of the publicdomain. In the second step, Divine and Human Law are synthesized in a process that was also structured according the dialectics observing and ac-tive Reason and, this time, respectively mediated by the second and thirdstage of the Religion of Art (the living work of art and the spiritual work of art ).

In the Greek world, the moral dimension had its place in the underworld and the legal dimension in the real world of the Human Law. Thefirst (immediate) attempt to integrate both dimensions in one individualresulted in the first self of the Roman Law. In the first self , however, themoral dimension remains implicit: It is only practically expressed inthe freedom of the person to subject his property to his free will. Inthe Realm of Culture, the moral dimension has its place in the faithful in-dividual who, initially, is externally related to the institutions of the legal

order. The second (self-conscious) attempt to integrate the moral andlegal dimension resulted in the second self , the absolute Freedom of theFrench Revolution. The self-conscious unity of right and morality, howev-er, fails and leads to the revolutionary terror.

The failure of the second self can be explained in terms of the discrep-ancy between the outside and inside perspectives. From the inside per-spective, the second self tries to realize his subjective freedom in the law of the social organism and he thinks this law to be nothing else thanthe expression of his absolute essence. From the outside perspective, how-

ever, the second self immediately identifies the absolute moral dimension with the contingent dimension of the social organism. That this imme-




diate identification is false appears in the terror of the French Revolution. All citizens want to realize their subjective freedom in the social law; thismakes explicit that they only realize a contingent content that is not com-

patible with the content of the others.The failure of the second self shows that the historical experiment stillhas not succeeded in finding the adequate unity between mind and body.In the next chapter, the third attempt is discussed that will result in thethird self , the self of the conscience.

Retrospection 99



Chapter 4The Realm of Morality: Making the Third Self Explicit

Introduction

The culture of the French Revolution is, according to Hegel, “the grand-est and the last” (362) culture. As the absolute freedom, the moral individ-

ual is no longer related to an external, traditional world. The moral individual thinks that it can produce the entire world out of his subjectivefreedom. This leads to a position in which the dimension of right is to-tally swallowed up by the dimension of morality. For this reason, the sec-ond self of the absolute freedom can be interpreted as the reversal of thefirst self of the Roman Empire: The Roman Law represents a world in which the moral dimension is totally swallowed up by the dimensionof right.

In the Realm of Morality , the realm in which the third self will be iden-

tified as conscience , it is developed as to how the dimensions of right andmorality can be conceived of in an adequate unity. Therefore, in the third self , the first and second self are brought together in an harmonic synthesis.

In contrast to the polis and the Roman Empire , the Realm of Morality is not a third historical episode in the European history. (Because theFrench Revolution took place during Hegel’s lifetime, such a third histor-ical stage could not be formulated by Hegel without having the preten-sion to be a fortune-teller.) After the “grandest and last” culture of the

absolute freedom, all historical experiences are finished with that are nec-essary to conceptualize the philosophical insight into the adequate rela-tion between the dimensions of right and morality. Therefore, theRealm of Morality is characterized by philosophical reflection. By means of the philosophy of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, himself, in theRealm of Morality, are discussed as to what conclusions can be drawnfrom the experiences of the French Revolution.



The point of departure of the Realm of Morality: theRousseauian Reflection

After the terror of the French Revolution, society is not lastingly disrupt-ed: soon Napoleon appears on the stage to restore social order. Therefore,the question is raised of how the citizens of the Revolution, whose abso-lute freedom resisted tradition, as such, were able to comply with Napo-leon’s government. The principle argument to conceive this transition isdiscussed in Chapter 2 at the level of active Reason, when the Law of the heart or the frenzy of self-conceit (221) is developed into the next stage:Virtue and the way of the world. (228) When the citizens experiencethat it is impossible to impose their subjective law on the social organism

because this is an independent, contingent reality, they conclude that they can only realize their subjective freedom (and, consequently, let survivethe social organism) by freely chosen, virtuous submission to an existing objective reality, the way of the world. The “grandest culture” of the citi-zens, however, has made clear that the way of the world is no anonymousdestiny, but rather the absolute freedom of the other citizens. In the end,it was the freedom of the others that manifested itself as the absolutepower of death, the guillotine of the French Revolution.117 Therefore, if

the virtuous citizens accept the contingent law of the way of the world (represented by the contingent seize of power by Napoleon) they know that this law is the contingent expression of an underlying absolute es-sence, namely the absolute freedom of the citizens. In other words, thecitizens have understood what, from the outside perspective, was already clear at the level of the lordship/bondsman relation. The absolute essenceof the social organism is the pure self, that is represented by the lord. Therepresentation of the lord appears as the contingent social law that is re-alized by the service of the bondsmen.

The insight of the citizens is formulated in the philosophy of Jean- Jacques Rousseau, who conceives the pure self, the absolute essence of the social organism, as the volont gnrale. According to Rousseau, the

117 Cf. “The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too which has no inner significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point

of the absolute free self. It is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with nomore significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water.” (360).

The point of departure of the Realm of Morality: the Rousseauian Reflection 101



legal order is only legitimate insofar as it expresses the universal will; only under that condition does it do justice to the autonomy of all.118

Like the Human Law and the Roman Law , the Napoleonic Law , inso-

far as it is understood as the expression of the general will, is the thirdshape in which the relation of stoicism appears in European history.119

In the Human Law of the polis, stoicism appears in its immediate formas the autonomous action by which the citizens realize a common tradi-tional content. In the Roman Law, stoicism appears in its self-consciousform as the autonomous persons who practically realize their subjectivefreedom in their property. The stoicism that appears in the Napoleonic Law synthesizes the two preceding forms. The autonomous citizens real-ize a common traditional content, but they know this content as the ex-

pression of the pure self, i.e., they have insight in the historical contin-gency of this content.

The inner contradiction of the Napoleonic Law: the KantianReflection

In contrast to the polis and the Roman Empire , at the level of the Napo-

leonic Law the pure self is no hidden presupposition because it is explic-itly expressed by the volont gnrale. Yet, the pure self also, in this case,causes a problem. The absoluteness of the pure self (the volont gnrale )contradicts the finitude of the social organism. It is true that the socialorganism is conceived of as the finite expression of the pure self, butthis relation, as such, is not expressed in the social organism. From theoutside perspective, there is no difference between a social organism

whose citizens do or do not conceive it as the expression of the pure

118 The self has overcome the absolute freedom ; it no longer demands that its actionsimmediately coincide with the universal will : “For consciousness, the immediateunity of itself with the universal will, its demand to know itself as this specificpoint in the universal will, is changed round into the absolute opposite experi-ence. What vanishes for it in that experience is abstract being or the immediacy of that insubstantial point, and this vanished immediacy is the universal will itself which it now knows itself to be in so far as it is a pure knowing or pure will.”(362/3).

119 In this sense, the Realm of Morality can be considered as a new historical episodeafter the French Revolution, but not as a Realm that passes through a real devel-opment.

Chapter 4 The Realm of Morality: Making the Third Self Explicit102



self. Hegel discusses this contradiction as Dissemblance or duplicity (374)in which section he refers to Kant’s practical philosophy.120

At this stage, it is made explicit that Hegel designed the metaphor of

the lordship/ bondsman relation with reference to Kant’s categorical im-perative. The citizens of the Napoleonic Law not only interpret their world in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation (the volont gnrale is the lord who is served by the citizens who realize the social organismof the Napoleonic Law ) but also want to observe the categorical impera-tive. After all, the Napoleonic Law can only be interpreted as expression of the pure self if the actions of the citizens can be considered to be freeones. Since the citizens are real individuals, i.e., unity of mind andbody, the assumption that their actions are free and, consequently corre-

spond to the categorical imperative, presupposes that these actions do notcontradict the citizen’s self-realization as corporeal beings. Therefore,Kant’s first postulate of the practical Reason must be formulated, i.e.,“the harmony between morality and nature”. Free action must be com-patible with the satisfaction of needs.121

To guarantee the reality of the Napoleonic Law , however, it is not suf-ficient to postulate the principle harmony between morality and nature.The citizens must be able to realize this harmony in their actions, i.e.,

they must be able to will this harmony. Since the citizens are a unity of mind and body, their will is as well determined by reason as by nature.Therefore, the possibility to realize the harmony between morality andnature is dependent on the fulfillment of Kant’s second postulate of the practical reason: “the harmony of morality and the sensually deter-mined will”.122

But, also under the condition of the second postulate there is noguarantee that the Napoleonic Law can be realized. The determinationof the will results in conceptual contents that are realized in actions.

These actions must result in the reality of the social organism. The deter-minations of the social organism must correspond to the conceptual de-

120 The relation Dissemblance or duplicity is a form of scepticism: It makes it clear thatthe citizens are not autonomous with regard to the content of their actions.

121 Cf. “The harmony of morality and Nature–or, since Nature comes into accountonly in so far as consciousness experiences its unity with it–the harmony of mor-ality and happiness, is thought of as something that necessarily is , i.e. it is postu-lated.” (367).

122 Cf. “The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective Nature, thefinal purpose of the world ; the other, the harmony of morality and the sensuous will, the final purpose of self-consciousness as such.” (369).

The inner contradiction of the Napoleonic Law: the Kantian Reflection 103



terminations of the will. Therefore, the third postulate concerns “the har-mony between thinking and being”.123

In the end, however, the postulates do not succeed in their attempt to

clarify the reality of the Napoleonic Law because they cannot sublate thecontradiction that also characterizes this version of stoicism. On the onehand, the pure self is determined as an absolute being that absolutely transcends the domain of nature. At the same time, however, the pureself is realized in the finite reality of the social organism; i.e., withoutnature the pure self does not appear at all and can not be determined.

The sublation of the inner contradiction

The two preceding forms of stoicism, the Human and Roman Law , de-clined because they were confronted with a contradiction. The positivecontent of the laws contradicted the underlying freedom that transcendsany determination. The contradiction became manifest by the return of the repressed pure self that was mediated by death (respectively thedeath of the family member and the death of the social organism). Atthe level of the Napoleonic Law, all repression has been overcome: the

“grandest and the last” culture has eliminated all external reality. There-fore, it is not necessary that the pure self returns by making undone itsrepression. The pure self is already part of the Napoleonic Law ’s con-sciousness all the time, namely in the form of the volont gnrale. (Asa matter of fact, also this time the occurrence of the pure self in the Na- poleonic Law ’s consciousness was mediated by death: the death of the liv-ing self as the result of the French Revolution’s terror).124 The doublemovement of the Unhappy Consciousness in which the pure self respective-ly became embodied and got involved in the objective world (the move-ment we witnessed, as well, at the level of the Human Law as the level of Roman Law ) does not come off this time. This does not alter the fact that

123 Cf. “While, however, the first postulate expresses the harmony of morality andNature, as a harmony that simply is , because in it Nature is this negative aspectof self-consciousness, is the moment of being , this implicit harmony, on the otherhand, is now essentially posited as consciousness. […] This [consciousness, P.C.]is then henceforth a master and ruler of the world, who brings about the harmo-

ny of morality and happiness, and at the same time sanctifies duties in their mul-tiplicity.” (370).124 Cf. “ … the terror of death is the vision of this negative nature of itself.” (361)




the pure self once again practices an undermining force that leads to a version of the Unhappy Consciousness.

We have seen that the undermining force of the pure self, at the level

of the Napoleonic Law, results from the reflection of the Dissemblance or duplicity. As the absolute essence of the world, the pure self is not com-patible with its appearance in a finite social organism. This contradictioncan be overcome at the level of Conscience. We will see that this level isstructured according to the stages of the Unhappy Consciousness.

The Hegelian reflection on the Napoleonic Law: Conscience asthe origin of the third self

The social organism that is understood as the expression of the volont gnrale is, for the citizen, nothing else than the objectification of hisown individuality as unity of mind and body. Volont gnrale and socialorganism are the objective expression of his mind and body. Therefore,

when the reflection of Dissemblance or duplicity shows that the pureself and the social organism contradict one another, the citizen cannot ac-cept this contradiction because this would mean that his own being con-

tradicts itself. Consequently, the citizen concludes that the contradictionis not essential. It only appears as the result of an external reflection onthe objectified relation between mind and body. From his inside perspec-tive, the contradiction does not exist at all. Inwardly he persists in theunity of mind and body.

The citizen who inwardly persists in the unity of mind and body haspassed to the relation of Conscience. As Conscience , the citizen has the cer-titude that the social organism, i.e., the reality to which he is related, isnothing else than the objectification of his absolute essence.125 Con-

science is, so to speak, for itself the lord (the pure self) who realizes him-self as bondman in the social organism. From the outside perspective,

125 Cf. “But as moral pure self-consciousness, it flees from this disparity between the way it thinks [of these moments] and its own essential nature, flees from this un-truth which asserts that to be true which it holds to be untrue, flees from this with abhorrence back into itself. It is a pure conscience which rejects with

scorn such a moral idea of the world; it is in its own self the simple Spiritthat, certain of itself, acts conscientiously regardless of such ideas, and in this im-mediacy possesses its truth.” (383).

Conscience as the origin of the third self 105



however, Conscience is a subjective being that, as Unhappy Consciousness, isrelated to the contingent reality of the social organism.

The development of Conscience will consist of the step-by-step reali-

zation of the Unhappy Consciousness leading to the result that Conscience (as absolute Spirit ) is not only subjectively, but also objectively, i.e., fromthe outside perspective, the essence of reality. This will accomplish theproject of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The human being can absolutely be understood as the unity of mind and body.

The development of Conscience

From the inside perspective, the conscientious citizen thinks to have com-plete moral autonomy at his disposal. Nothing can disturb the absoluteconviction of Conscience. From the outside perspective, however, the pic-ture looks different. The conscientious citizen appears as the individual

who has internalized the lord and who matters not much to the social or-ganism’s reality. The individual is immediately convinced that the abso-lute content of his self-consciousness, i.e., the content of his Conscience ,immediately coincides with the content of objective reality in general.This conviction, however, remains, for the time being, an inner oneand does not matter at all to the social organism’s reality.

The question is whether the inner conviction of the conscientious in-dividual can resist the social organism’s reality that he excludes. There-fore, the development of the conscientious individual discussed by Hegel under the title “Conscience. The ‘beautiful soul’, evil and its forgive-ness ” (383) can, as a matter of fact, be considered as the systematical re-search to the question of whether the individual in this form is thinkableat all. We will see that the development of the conscientious individual is

structured according the stages of the Unhappy Consciousness and repeats,like the Unhappy Consciousness , the moments of Consciousness and Self-consciousness.

a. Conscience as the Unhappy Consciousness that repeats Consciousness

The conscientious individual who repeats the development of Conscious-ness wants to find the content of his Conscience in the reality to which he

is immediately related. In this context, this immediate reality is not anobject (like in the elementary form of Sense-Certainty ) but an action




that is immediately given in the framework of the existing social organ-ism. Therefore, the individual thinks that this immediately given actionexpresses the reality of his Conscience.126 The action that is immediately

given, however, is only an example of many actions that are immediately given. This necessitates a nearer identification of the action that expressesthe content of the Conscience. This is done by the individual by claiming that especially that action expresses the content of Conscience that does soaccording to his subjective conviction.127 The subjectivism into which theconscience’s content relapses can be overcome when this conviction is rec-ognized by others.128

b. Conscience as the Unhappy Consciousness that repeatsSelf-consciousness

The individual whose conviction is recognized by the others has an inter-subjective way of existence that is separated from the given reality of thesocial organism. Since this individual considers his self-consciousness (theconviction of his conscience) essential and the given reality inessential, herepeats, respectively, the three stages of the development of self-con-

sciousness: Desire, Lordship and Bondage and Stoicism.The individual repeats Desire because he can only retain the convic-tion of his conscience as the absolute essence (and consequently, can per-sist in his autonomy) when he demonstrates that the objective reality to

which he is related is inessential. Therefore, the individual understandsthe action in which he expresses his inner nature, his drive or desire as

126 Cf. “Action qua actualization is thus the pure form of will–the simple conversionof a reality that merely is into a reality that results from action, the conversion of

the bare mode of objective knowing [i.e. knowing an object] into one of knowing reality as something produced by consciousness.” (385).

127 Cf. “This immediate concrete self-certainty is the essence [of the action]; looking at this certainty from the point of view of the antithesis of consciousness, thecontent of the moral action is the doer’s own immediate individuality ; and the

form of that content is just this self as a pure movement, viz. as [the individual’s]knowing or his own conviction.” (387).

128 Cf. “This being-for-another is, therefore, the substance which remains in itself orunexplicated, which is distinct from the self. Conscience has not given up pureduty or the abstract in-itself ; duty is the essential moment of relating itself, qua

universality , to another. Conscience is the common element of the two self-con-sciousnesses, and this element is the substance in which the deed has an enduring reality , the moment of being recognized and acknowledged by others.” (388).

The development of Conscience 107



an action that constitutes the social organism. Under that condition hisaction contributes to the realization of the absolute content of conscience.Consequently, the action realizes the individual’s duty.129

The needy nature of the individual, however, appears in a multitudeof actions. Therefore, towards the others who dispute that his actions aredutiful, the individual again and again has to bring up points of view thatshow that his actions serve the general good the best. (Analogously, theelementary Desire had to prove again and again that his pure self is theessence of the (living) natural objects.) Precisely because of this, becauseof the possibility to find again and again a new point of view to illustratethat his action expresses his duty, the individual can preserve the illusionof his autonomy.130

Because the individual, on the one hand, thinks himself to be totally free to determine what is the content of his duty but, on the other hand,has to manifest himself in a particular action, a discrepancy can ariseabout the individual’s own opinion with regard to his duty and the opin-ion of the others. After all, the others judge the individual on the basis of the actions he performs. If this discrepancy is acknowledged by the indi-

vidual, he arrives at the repetition of the lordship/bondsman relation, butthis time in a version in which he takes on, as well, the role of the lord as

the role of the bondsman. The individual realises that he, being depend-ent on his actions, remains tied to the external reality and, therefore, playsthe role of the bondsman. At the same time, the individual, as conscience,performs the role of the lord. He remains autonomous insofar as his sub-

jective conviction remains dependent on that action that he decides to bethe expression of his conscience.131

The moral content of the individual that has internalized the lordship/ bondsman relation, however, remains elusive for the others. If they consid-

er the action that is really performed by the individual to be the expres-

129 Cf. “But action is called for, something must be determined by the individual, andthe self-certain Spirit in which the in-itself has attained the significance of theself-conscious ‘I’, knows that it has this determination and content in the imme-diate certainty of itself. This, as a determination and content, is the natural con-sciousness, i.e. impulses and inclinations.” (390).

130 Cf. “In the strength of its own self-assurance it possesses the majesty of absoluteautarky, to bind and to loose. This self-determination is therefore without moreado absolutely in conformity with duty.” (393)

131 Cf. “What ought to be there , is here an essentiality solely by its being known to beself-expression of an individuality; and it is this being known that is acknowl-edged by others, and which as such ought to have an existence.” (395).




sion of his conscience, the individual always has the possibility to main-tain that the moral content is not expressed in this action, but is deter-mined by his expressed conviction that the moral content appears in a

specific action. Moreover, the individuals are not distinguished fromone another, so that it must be assumed that the other individuals alsohave internalized the lordship/bondsman relation. They could get involvedin a mutual struggle if one of them identifies the moral content with a particular action: Regularly the other would identify the moral content

with another action. This mutual struggle, however, would be senselessbecause it is not the objectivity of the action that makes it a moralone, but rather the judgment that the individuals pass on the action.This makes it possible that the individuals can reconcile. They can recog-

nize themselves in the others with respect to the opinion that it is the in-dividual’s moral judgment that makes or does not make the action of theexpression of conscience. This reconciliation implies the individuals’emancipation from their roles as bondsmen. The objectivity to whichthey are related no longer has the quality of an external action, but existsof the intersubjectively shared judgment on the moral content of the ac-tion.

The overcoming of their role as bondsmen induces the individuals torepeat stoicism.132 Once again they can cherish the illusion to be com-pletely autonomous. From the inside perspective, the natural reality hasbeen totally sidetracked. The content of the duty is no longer realizedin the medium of nature, but in the medium of speech. The individualshave the opinion that the realization of their duty is nothing else than ex-pressing their conviction concerning the content of their duty towardsothers. The objectivity of the duty is derived from the individuals’ mutualrecognition that they are convinced that the expressed conviction on thecontent of the duty is true. Hegel indicates them as the self-satisfied in-

dividuals who are absolutely convinced of their own excellence and whocan persevere in this conviction because they confirm one another in theirbeing excellent.133

132 Cf. “The declaration of this assurance in itself rids the form of its particularity. Itthereby acknowledges the necessary universality of the self.” (397).

133 “The spirit and substance of their association are thus the mutual assurance of

their conscientiousness, good intentions, the rejoicing over this mutual purity,and the refreshing of themselves in the glory of knowing and uttering, of cher-ishing and fostering, such an excellent state of affairs.” (398).

The development of Conscience 109



Conscience that becomes aware of itself as Unhappy Consciousness

From an outside perspective, the individuals lose themselves in their puresubjectivism (or, as Hegel expresses it, in their “solitary divine worship”(397)). They can only retain the illusion of their autonomy as long asthey suppress the natural reality, and this repression only holds as long as the individuals conserve their collective delusion. In reality, however,they repeat the relation of scepticism, for, although the reality of their ac-tion transcends their autonomy, they have the illusion to be able to deter-mine autonomously whether or not they perform their duty.

Sooner or later, the individuals experience the contradiction in whichthey have ended up. Once the speech will fall silent and the spell is bro-ken that maintained their illusion, this results in a position in which theindividuals repeat the Unhappy Consciousness. When the sounds of the as-suring speech have faded away, the individuals must observe that they have lost their conscience’s content.134 Their pride has gone before thefall, and leaves the individuals in a situation in which they have to enduretheir deepest deceptions. They suffered the greatest possible loss. Whilethey just celebrated their boundless autonomy, they now are left behind

with nothing. For them, there remains nothing else than the sorrow of anabsolute loss. Although the individual tries to ward off this sorrow by es-caping reality and to lose himself as “beautiful soul ” (400) in the purenessthat he retains against the evil world, in the end he learns, from an insideperspective, what he, as conscientious individual, from the outside per-spective, already was all the time: an individual who is related to a strangeoutside world and can only realize the absolute content of his conscienceif he succeeds in eliminating the strangeness of the outside world.

If the individual has been persuaded of the impossibility to retain hisabsolute essence as an inner unreal being, he has to identify himself as anindividual who is mind and body, as well. On the one hand, he under-stands himself as essentially autonomous; on the other hand, he under-stands that he is also corporeal. At the same time, he acknowledgesthat his autonomy and his corporeality are not compatible. He canonly maintain his autonomy if he is able to realize his absolute essence.

134 Cf. “The absolute certainty of itself thus finds itself, qua consciousness, changed

immediately into a sound that dies away, into an objectification of its being-for-self; but this created world is its speech, which likewise it has immediately heardand only the echo of which returns to it.” (399).




This realization, however, can only be performed by means of the linguis-tic action that belongs to the individual insofar as he is corporeal. Becauseevery real action necessarily is a finite one, the realization of the absolute

essence necessarily implies the decline of its absoluteness. This dilemma can also be expressed in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation. As wesaw before, the awareness of the individual is no longer that he plays therole of the lord (because he transcends all action) as well as the role of thebondsman (because he is tied to the real action). Now the individual un-derstands, on the one hand, that he has to be as the lord as well as thebondsman because the lord cannot be real without the bondsman; but,on the other hand, he has experienced that both positions exclude oneanother.

The necessary conclusion seems to be that, even though Hegel devel-ops the individual as the unity of mind and body, the individual can notbe conceived of without contradiction, This conclusion, however, is rash.The development is accomplished by the research of the conditions under

which the individual can be understood, after all, as unity of mind andbody.

The question of whether the ‘lord’ moment can be compatible withthe ‘bondsman’ moment can be discussed as an inner dialogue in which it

is investigated how both moments relate. The problem is, however, thatin this exercise it remains unclear what is the objective value of such aninner dialogue. Because all individuals comprise both moments, the dia-logue can also be constructed as a dialogue between two individuals whoeach take on one of the moments. For convenience’s sake, I will indicatethese individuals respectively as the ‘lord’ and the ‘bondsman’.135

The lord thinks that whoever performs the good cannot dirty hishands by real action. All real action serves a particular interest and haslost the pureness of the good. The bondsman takes on the opposite po-sition. He thinks that action is necessary because otherwise the good re-mains unreal. Therefore, the lord judges that the bondsman performs thebad and that he is hypocritical because he claims to perform the good.The bondsman reacts by maintaining that his position is not distinguish-ed from that of the lord at all. Also the lord performs a real action when

135 As “lord”, consciousness transcends all specific content; as “bondsman”, however,it is linked with a specific content: “Conscience, which in the first instance is

only negatively directed against duty as this given specific duty, knows itself tobe free from it; but since it fills the empty duty with a specific content from itself ,it is positively aware that it, as this particular self, makes the content.” (400).

Conscience that becomes aware of itself as Unhappy Consciousness 111



he expresses his judgment on the bondsman. Moreover, also the lord ishypocritical because he pretends, while really acting, to do the good.136

The lord, however, cannot accept this recognition of the bondsman137 be-

cause this would imply the concession that the good is contaminated by real action. The explicit refusal of the lord to accept the recognition of the bondsman, however, makes that the lord is not only bad and hypo-critical from the bondsman’s subjective point of view, but also from anobjective point of view. He is bad because he tolerates other criteria forhimself than for the bondsman. While demanding for himself that hisposition transcends his real action, this does not apply to the bondsman.Moreover, he is hypocritical because, having a position that is not distin-guished from the one of the bondsman at all, he pretends to take another

position. Therefore, it is the lord who hinders the bondsman to manifesthimself objectively as an individual that transcends his real action.

After having objectified his badness and hypocrisy by his attitude of rejection towards the bondsman, the lord, however, is able to understand

what position he takes, after all. Once he has said that he, himself, is notto be judged, but the bondsman has to be judged on his real action, thelord admits that his position is unbearable. He then accepts, after all, thebondsman’s hand that is held out. Lord and bondsman reconcile, objec-tively expressing by this that all individuals comprise the moment of thelord, as well as that of the bondsman.138 Both moments cannot be sepa-rated. Whoever wants to keep clean hands, yet soils his hands for the rea-son that he sides against the one who thinks that without action the goodremains empty, and who thinks to realize the good by real action, mustunderstand that the good never coincides with real action.

It is true that the reconciliation between lord and bondsman hasshown that both moments presuppose one another (the one moment nec-

136 Cf. “The conscience that judges in this way is itself base, because it divides up theaction, producing and holding fast to the disparity of the action with itself. Fur-ther, it is hypocrisy, because it passes off such judging, not as another manner of being wicked, but as the correct consciousness of the action, setting itself up inthis unreality and conceit of knowing well and better above the deeds it discred-its, and wanting its words without deeds to be taken for a superior kind of real-ity.” (405)

137 “But the confession of the one who is wicked, ‘I am so’, is not followed by a re-ciprocal similar confession.” (400).

138 Cf. Wildt (1984) “Hegel grounds the possibility of confession and reconciliation

in the experience of equality of the subjects.” [“Hegel begrndet die Mçglichkeit von Bekenntnis und Verzeihung in der Erfahrung der Gleichheit der Subjekte.”](p. 369).




essarily implies the other), but this observation is neutral with regard tothe question of the individual’s real existence. It is only obvious that, if the conscientious individual exists, this conscientious individual can real-

ize the good only by finite action. Precisely because he is tied to real ac-tion, the actual realization of the good transcends his autonomy. The au-tonomous individual is not the lord who produces the bondsman out of himself, thus being the creator of his own corporeality. His corporeality (and, consequently, his being situated), is already predisposed to his au-tonomy all the time and, therefore, confines his autonomy. The realiza-tion of the absolute good can only be performed by the absolute gooditself that can use the conscientious individual as a means for this end.The conscientious individual can do no more than try to realize the

good, insofar as his powers permit him to do so. Whether or not he suc-ceeds, transcends his autonomy and can only be understood as the mercy granted by the absolute good, itself: In that sense, the absolute good hasto be understood as an actor, i.e., as the absolute Spirit.139

The meaning of the “absolute Spirit”

The conclusion that the mind/body unity has to be concretized as the re-lation between the absolute Spirit and the social organism may be felt as a disillusionment. Is not the meaning of this conclusion that human free-dom, the unity of mind and body, can ultimately only be based on reli-gion? Is human freedom dependent on the belief that the pure self is a god who can or can not be merciful to us? If we reflect on the preceding development, this conclusion appears to be wrong. The absolute Spirit isnot invented by the conscientious individual, but was the presuppositionof the historical world all the time. We have seen that the social organismof the Human Law could only exist thanks to its foundation in the reli-

gion of the work of art. Also the development from the Roman Law to theNapoleonic Law presupposed a form of religion, this time the revealed re-ligion. We have examined the nature of religion and identified both reli-gions as representations of the pure self. Therefore, religion can be under-stood as an historical example of the lord, i.e., the pure self that is rec-

139 Cf. “The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent Spirit, which beholds

the pure knowledge of itself qua universal essence, in its opposite, in the pureknowledge of itself qua absolutely self-contained and exclusive individuality –a re-ciprocal recognition which is absolute Spirit.” (p. 408).

The meaning of the “absolute Spirit” 113



ognized as the essence of the social organism. If the conscientious individual understands the social organism where he is living as an objectivereality in which the absolute Spirit has realized itself (in a finite form), he

only has become aware of the relation that principally is already expressedin the lordship/bondsman relation all the time. The free individual serves asbondsman, the pure self that is represented as a lord. If the conscientiousindividual conceives of the absolute Spirit as the ground of this world, hehas understood what religion represented: the pure self. The absolute Spi-rit is the pure self that appears in history.

At this level, the metaphor of lord and bondsman can cause misun-derstandings. The free individual is no bondsman of the absolute Spirit inthe sense that he is one-sidedly used as a means that realizes the end of the

absolute Spirit. Precisely because the individual has understood that theabsolute Spirit is the essence of religion, he has understood that the godis his own pure self. In his relation to the absolute Spirit, the individualhas understood his finiteness. On the one hand, he has conceived of the pure self as his absolute essence, and on the other hand, he knowsthat he can only realize this absolute essence in the form of an historicalsocial organism, i.e., in a finite manner.

We have witnessed that the individual’s insight in his finitude is

mediated by an historical process. This insight itself, however, transcendsthe historical process. Only when this insight has been developed, can itbecome clear that the religious representation of the pure self also reflectsthe social organism whose pure self it represents. (We have observed thatthe social organism and the religious representation are interconnected.)In other words, only then can it become clear that religion represents the(absolute) pure self in a finite form. This comes to the fore in the system-atical place of religion in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Although it is ob-

vious that Europe’s historical development cannot be understood without

religion, and although it is obvious, as well, that the religion of the work of art is an integral part of the Greek world, like the revealed religion is anintegral part of the Realm of Culture , Hegel discusses the religion formsonly after the Realm of Morality, i.e., after having developed the individ-ual’s relation to the absolute Spirit. Hegel’s considerations seem to be plau-sible.140 Only when religion can be understood as expression of the abso-lute Spirit, and only when it is understood that this expression is finite,does the contingence of the religious representation become acceptable:

140 Later on, I will raise the question of the religion’s systematical place again. SeeChapter 7, Retrospection.




Religion can be conceived of as the representation of the lord that neces-sarily has a contingent form. This contingent form will be sublated at thelevel of the philosophical notion, the absolute Knowledge, that Hegel dis-

cusses in the last chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit , following on thechapter on Religion. It is true that Hegel also has the opinion that, at thelevel of the conscientious individual, the relation to the absolute Spirit isalready reached (so, before the systematical discussion of Religion). But atthis stage, the absolute Spirit can only be formally determined. Only whenit has been shown, at the level of Religion, that the absolute Spirit really manifests itself in history (i.e., in historical religion forms), can the con-tent of the absolute Spirit be developed: the absolute Notion that all ap-pearing reality presupposes.

Retrospection

At the level of the second self , the absolute freedom, the moral individualhad in mind the immediate realization of his freedom in the social organ-ism. From an outside perspective, however, this attempt resulted in an in-adequate realization of freedom. The absolute freedom is performed by the contingent individual who tries to makes his subjective freedom the

measure for all. In this relation the moral and legal order are not compat-ible: the legal order is sacrificed to the moral one.

At the level of the third self , conscience, the realization of the consci-entious individual’s freedom is mediated by the absolute Spirit. Therefore,right and morality appear as the relation between social organism and ab-solute Spirit. At this level, the relation between right and morality, seenfrom the inside perspective, is no longer contradicted by the outside per-spective. This time, neither right is absorbed by morality, nor is morality absorbed by right. It is true that the moral dimension (the absolute Spirit )is objectified in the social organism, but this means in no way that theseparation between right and morality disappears. The difference betweenabsolute Spirit and social organism is maintained (as a kind of “ontolog-ical difference”): The absolute Spirit transcends the social organism. Thistranscendence is objectively expressed in the process of world history.

World history makes explicit that all social organisms are only contingent,i.e., they decline and are followed by other social organisms.141

141 The Phenomenology of Spirit discusses world history at the level of religion.

Retrospection 115



The social organisms in history appear as a multitude of contingententities, like the Human, the Roman and the Napoleonic Laws. Althoughthese organisms are not related to one another in a teleological process,

they can, retrospectively, be hierarchically ordered. We have seen how the Human, the Roman and the Napoleonic Laws respectively producedthe first , the second and the third self. In the first self , the pure self remainsimplicit and is only practically expressed; in the second self, the pure self has become self-conscious; in the third self , the pure self is understood asthe absolute Subject of reality, the absolute Spirit. Moreover, the world of the second self cannot be developed without the experiences of the first self ,and the world of the third self cannot be developed without the experien-ces of the first and second self.

Since the adequate relation between right and morality is only acces-sible for the third self and the third self can only be developed when theexperiences of the first and second self are passed through, the conditionscan be formulated to which a social organism must respond to allow itscitizens the adequate realization of their freedom: The institutions of thissocial organism must enable its citizens to reproduce the experiences of as

well the first , and the second and the third self. This conclusion results incriteria to test contingent (historical) social organisms. The completion of the Phenomenology of Spirit has produced the criteria that can be appliedby the “Reason as testing laws ”. We will see in the next chapters that theproject of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right can be considered as the elaborationof the “Reason as testing laws ” applied to Hegel’s own time. The Philosophy of Right tests to which extent the institutions of Northwestern Europe canbe considered as institutions that correspond to the criteria developed inthe Phenomenology of Spirit. To what extent should these institutionsallow their citizens to reproduce the experiences of the first , the second and the third self? 142

Before going into the project of the Philosophy of Right , however, I will discuss Axel Honneth’s criticism of Hegel’s concept of recognition. According to Honneth, this concept is too metaphysical and needs sup-port from empirical sciences. It is true that this critcism is not oriented to

142 Cf. Smith (1989): “As we shall see later, there is an inner teleology to moralgrowth whereby the life-cycle of the individual moral agent, in some sense, reca-

pitulates the experience or history of the entire species. Nothing is ever lost orforgotten, but is incorporated into a richer conception of the self. For Hegel,as for Freud later on, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”. p. 129.




the Phenomenology of Spirit , but I will show that this work provides in theadequate elements for a reconstruction of Hegel’s answer to Honneth.

Retrospection 117



Chapter 5Honneth’s Criticism of Hegel’s Metaphysics

Introduction

In his book, “The Struggle for Recognition”, Axel Honneth reverts to theconcept of recognition that has been developed by the young Hegel. Atthe same time, however, he claims that we cannot appeal to this concept

just like that, because it remains connected to the “presuppositions of themetaphysical tradition”. Hegel’s “speculative thesis that the formation of the practical self presupposes mutual recognition between subjects” has tobe reconstructed “in the light of empirical social psychology”. (68) Thethesis that there exist “various forms of reciprocal recognition”, needs“an empirically supported phenomenology”, “one that allows Hegel’s the-oretical proposal to be tested and, if necessary, corrected.” (69) At theend, it has to be examined whether “the third thesis, according to

which the sequence of forms of recognition follows the logic of a forma-

tive process that is mediated by the stages of moral struggle” (69) “can withstand empirical doubts” (70).

Although Honneth does not expressly relate himself to the Phenom-enology of Spirit (“in which the topic of a ‘struggle for recognition’ wasrestricted to the issue of the conditions for the emergence of ‘self-con-sciousness’” [145]), I will investigate in this chapter whether I have totake to heart the objections that Honneth expresses against the young Hegel if I relate myself to the concept of recognition in the Phenomenol-

ogy of Spirit, and want to make it productive for our era. Is this concept a metaphysical one, and does this mean that we can only sensibly relate tothis concept if it can stand an empirical test?

The “Phenomenology of Spirit” and the question of “TheNature of the Self”

In the introductory chapter, the question of the “nature of the self” is not

immediately related to the Phenomenology of Spirit, and developed fromthe central question of this work. Rather, it was observed that contempo-



rary thinkers like Jrgen Habermas and John Rawls seem to determinethe human individual, in the footsteps of Kant, in an ambiguous manner.On the one hand, the human being is a reasonable or moral individual

and borrows his uniqueness from this qualification (he is a discourse part-ner who is not exchangeable or has a unique plan of life ); on the otherhand, he is a corporeal individual who is distinguished from the othersby his corporeal identity. However, it remains unclear how his moralor reasonable identity has to be conceived of in a unity with his corporealidentity. As a corporeal individual, the human being seems to be the bear-er of mental powers. But how the human being can be understood as theunity of mind and body is not thematized. It is only clear that the cor-poreal identity does not determine the mental one, and that the mentalidentity does not determine the corporeal one.

In the preceding chapters it is examined whether the unity betweenmind and body can be understood by conceptualizing their mutual rela-tion as a “relative contradiction”, i.e. as a form/content distinction: Themind is understood as the form in which the body gets its unity. It wasinvestigated under which conditions the inner unity between mind andbody that was formulated from an outside perspective, could also be un-derstood from an inside perspective. If this investigation is successful,

then the mind/body unity can be understood as a unity in itself, i.e.,as a unity that independently exists. Therefore, this investigation canalso be formulated as the question of whether the unity of mind andbody can be conceived of as a substance.

Such a project is as well distinguished from the project of Descartes, who separated mind and body by assigning them to different substances,as from the one of Spinoza who transformed mind and body by means of the attributes of thinking and extension into moments of the unique di-

vine substance. As the Cartesian project, this project does justice to theunique individual, but this time it does not result in the dualism betweenmind and body. The project is closely related to Hegel’s project in thePhenomenology of Spirit , but initially has another objective. After allHegel does not raise the question of whether the unity of mind andbody can be conceived of as substance, but rather the question of whetherit has a meaning at all to speak about the existence of a substance. Ulti-mately, his answer is positive. It makes sense, if we understand substanceas subject, as the absolute Spirit. This seems to bring Hegel’s project into

the neighborhood of Spinoza: Substance is eminently the divine sub-stance.

The “Phenomenology of Spirit” and the question of “The Nature of the Self” 119



Hegel begins his project with the consciousness of the Sense-Certainty ,i.e., the consciousness that tests whether an object that is immediately given as a sensory one can be understood as substance. The result of

this test is negative, because what is sensorially given exists of a multitudethat can only be brought to an unity in a external way. The unity thatconsciousness tries to find refers back to the unity of consciousness itself,i.e., to a pure self. Therefore, the determination of consciousness canonly be understood as self-determination.

However, this conclusion does not imply, according to Hegel, that thepure self has to be understood as the Cartesian cogito. After all, it wasonly possible to draw this conclusion because consciousness is relatedto nature. This relation to nature presupposes that consciousness is al-

ready a corporeal consciousness all the time. Therefore, Hegel explicitly thematizes in the chapter on Self-consciousness the question of whetherthe pure self can be conceived of in unity with a living organism. Thismeans that the question of whether it makes sense at all to speak about the existence of substance, has been evolved to the question of

whether the unity of mind and body can be conceived of as a unity.That the project of the preceding chapters, unlike the Phenomenology

of Spirit , immediately begins with the question of whether the unity of mind and body can be conceived of as substance, makes clear that the ob-

jective of this project is in no way a divine substance, an absolute spiritthat cannot accommodate an independent human subject. It is truethat this objective has the consequence that the setting of the Phenomen-ology of Spirit is not copied, but this deviation only concerns the presen-tation. With regards to the content, it has no meaning at all.

While Hegel, in the Consciousness -Chapter, raises the question of whether the natural multitude can be understood as a unity by itself , Iraise the question of whether the relation to the natural multitude does

not affect the mind/body unity. Also this affection can only be preventedif the natural multitude can, by itself, be understood as a unity that is dis-tinguished from the mind/body unity. While in the Phenomenology of Spi-rit, the corporeality of consciousness is only thematized at the level of self-consciousness, I brought this corporeality into question from the begin-ning. In this way, I hope that I have clarified from the outset that Hegel’sproject is, in principle, not metaphysical in the sense of Habermas andHonneth: as an absolute Spirit in which the independence of the realhuman individual gets lost. We will still see, however, that it is necessary

to differentiate between a formal and a substantial concept of the absolute Spirit.

Chapter 5 Honneth’s Criticism of Hegel’s Metaphysics120



The relation of mind and body as the primordial form of recognition

We have seen that the central step that is performed in the Phenomenology of Spirit to conceive the unity of mind and body is thematized under thetitle, fear of death. In the fear of death, the pure self recognizes itself in theorganism that makes it a real individual. The organism is the real self thatin the fear of death is recognized by the pure self as the self of which itself is the essence. In the fear of death, the relation between mind and body that is conceptualized as a relative contradiction becomes self-conscious.The pure self recognizes itself in its body as a self in the form of other-ness. The fear of death is the elementary experience in which the mind isat itself in the other as other.

The inner experience of the fear of death is objectified in the lordship/ bondsman relation that, therefore, can also be understood as the institu-tionally objectified fear of death. In the lord, the pure self is objectifiedas an institutional self that is the essence of a social organism. In thebondsman, the organism is objectified as a social organism. The fear of death is objectified in the labor that the bondsman performs in serviceof the lord.

Considered from an outside perspective, the mind/body unity that isobjectified in the lord who is recognized by the bondsman, is a free unity.Unlike the natural organism, the social organism is not determined by ex-ternally given natural laws, but by man-made laws that are symbolized inthe lord. From an inside perspective, these laws appear as not free, as thetraditional laws that are already given all the time. The entire further de-

velopment of the Phenomenology of Spirit exists in examining under which conditions the laws can, also from an inside perspective, become

valid as self-made.

The development of freedom from the inside perspective

In order to assure, also from an inside perspective, the insight into thefreedom of the social organism, the law that commands this organismhas to be explicated as a free law. In terms of the lordship/bondsman met-aphor: Freedom must not only practically be expressed by replacing the

natural action of an organism with action in service of the lord, but also itmust become clear that the lord is a pure self, a self that is freely related to

The development of freedom from the inside perspective 121



the social organism. It has to be clear that the social organism is a con-tingent reality in which the free self has expressed itself in a specific

way. In other words, the free self must not be absorbed in the specific

way in which it has objectified itself.In the Phenomenology of Spirit , the first step to develop freedom fromthe inside perspective is performed at the level of the Unhappy Conscious-ness , the position in which, so to speak, the bondsman has internalized thepure essence of the social organism (the pure self of the lord). The secondstep is performed at the level of Reason, where the Unhappy Consciousness

wants to find again the (social) reality as expression of his internalizedpure self. From the outside perspective, it is clear at once that this secondstep has to fail. As a contingent reality, the social organism cannot at the

same time be understood as the expression of many free selves. Therefore,the result of the development of Reason is that the single self gets the in-sight that the social organism remains an external contingent reality. Thelaw of the social organism cannot be determined from the perspective of the single self.

The transition from a monological into a dialogical approach

Referring to Jrgen Habermas’s terminology, the failure of Reason to de-termine the law of the social organism can also be formulated as the fail-ure of a monological approach. The single self (the bondsman who hasinternalized the pure self ), is monologically related to the objective reality that it tries to determine as the expression of its particular freedom. Thismonological approach contrasts with the dialogical approach that was al-ready addressed in the case of the constitution of the lordships/bondsmanrelation. After all, the social organism can only exist if the lord for all

symbolizes the social organism, and if the actualization of the law imme-diately coincides with the actualization of their own essence. This dialog-ical approach, however, gets lost if, at the level of Unhappy Consciousness and Reason, it is thematized as to how the single self can become aware of the actualization of his freedom.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit , the Spirit-Chapter takes up again thedialogical approach of the lordship/bondsman relation. Point of departureis the contingent organism that all participants immediately understandas the actualization of their free essence. Hegel identifies this organism

as the Human Law of the Greek polis that is realized in the actions of the free citizens. This transition to an historical dimension implies that




the question of whether the unity of mind and body can be conceived of as a substance has become, in a certain way, empirically testable. The re-sponse to this question appears to be dependent upon the answer to an-

other question: Can the Human Law of the polis sensibly be understoodas a social organism in which the lordship/bondsman relation has got realshape? And, subsequently, can the Human Law be understood as sub-stance?

The relation between the lordship/bondsman relation and the HumanLaw that is established here, can raise the question of why Hegel, after hisdiscussion of the lordship/bondsman relation, does not immediately switchover to the Spirit-Chapter, leaving out the passages regarding the Unhap- py Consciousness and Reason. This, however, can effectively be explained.The Human Law can only be understood as substance if it can be clari-fied that the pure freedom of the Greek citizens does not submerge in theHuman Law ’s practical actualization of freedom. The Greek citizen has toacquire insight into the contingency of the Human Law. In other words,he has to endure the experiences of the Unhappy Consciousness and Reason.This means that not only the lordship/ bondsman relation, but also the Un-happy Consciousness and Reason must be found again in the historical re-ality of the polis. We have seen that this, according to Hegel, is indeed the

case: In the polis, the Unhappy Consciousness can be found again in therelations of the Divine Law , the law of the family, and Reason can befound again in the relation between Human and Divine Law.

The absolute Spirit as the presupposition of the dialogicalrelation

In the Spirit-Chapter, the question is thematized under which conditionsthe social organism that is understood as a dialogical relation can be un-derstood as a substance. This comes down to the question of whether thesocial organism can be conceived of in a unity with the pure self. How-ever, the social organism is now identified as the Human Law of the polis,i.e., as an historical organism.

We have seen how Hegel describes the development of the polis as theprocess in which the pure self of the Divine Law penetrates the HumanLaw. Again, the result of this development is that the law of society is un-

derstood as a contingent law, leading to the decline of the polis. The in-sight into the contingency of the Human Law does not mean that the so-

The absolute Spirit as the presupposition of the dialogical relation 123



cial organism cannot be understood as a substance at all: Hegel presentsthe Roman Empire as a social order in which the contradiction of theGreek world has been solved.

The Roman Empire ’s solution of the contradiction between the tradi-tion of the Human Law and the pure self is the formal Roman property law. Thanks to this law, the citizens of the social organism are free andequal persons who are not bound to any tradition. Each person has theright to determine his own tradition at the level of the family. The personis, so to speak, the lord of his family. The many families are united by a formal law that gives all citizens the right to express their particular free-dom in the private domain.

Hegel shows that, in the long term, the Roman Empire has to decline

because the many traditions that it contains do not display an internalcoherence. Therefore, the survival of the Empire is dependent on the bal-ance of power between the families. If this power balance is disturbedand, consequently, the decline of the Roman Empire is brought about,the persons experience that the reality of their freedom does not coincide

with the existence of the Roman Empire. It appears that the essence of thesocial organism is a pure self that also cannot manifest itself. The person

who has internalized the pure self is the Unhappy Consciousness that thistime does not exist beside the Human Law , but wants to actualize itsinner essence as the Human Law.

We have seen how Hegel thematizes the self-actualization of this formof the Unhappy Consciousness at the level of the Realm of Education. Here,the Unhappy Consciousness is the moral person who wants to immediately actualize himself as the Human Law. Once again the question has to beraised as to whether the unity of mind and body can be understood in thisrelation as a substantial unity. It appeared that this was again not the case.

After all, this development ended in the absolute freedom and the terror

of the French Revolution: if all want to sublate the contingency of theHuman Law by making it the immediate expression of their moral self,the result will be that the Human Law will be ruined.

The contradiction of the Realm of Education (the general social or-ganism that has to be the expression of the particular freedom), is sublat-ed at the level of Morality: By understanding the essence of the social or-ganism, in accordance with Rousseau, as the volont gnrale , the socialorganism can still be understood as the moral self-expression of all, butnow at the level of a pure being.

The attempt to conceptualize this pure being (in accordance withKant), in unity with the real social organism, however, fails. This results




in the conclusion that the pure self and the social organism can only beunderstood as a substantial unity if they are already comprehended as aninner unity all the time. This position demarcates the inner certainty of

Conscience , the third form of the Unhappy Consciousness that is discussedin the Spirit-Chapter. We have examined how conscience , in the development in which it ac-

tualizes its subjective certainty, repeats in a self-conscious manner the di-alectical movement of Consciousness and Self-consciousness, and acquiresthe explicit insight into itself as Unhappy Consciousness. Then, Conscience becomes aware that it has to understand its pure essence (its “lord”), asthe absolute Spirit that realizes itself in and by the social organism.

What this self-realization of the lord (the absolute Spirit ), exactly meanscan easily evoke misunderstandings.

The introduction of the absolute Spirit does not mean that the realhuman being (as unity of mind and body), is reduced to a marionette,to be tools in the hands of an absolute power. After all the point of de-parture of the Spirit-Chapter was human freedom: the human who is notone-sidedly understood as a natural being, but also as a spiritual being

who is autonomous and has, therefore, objectified himself in theHuman Law. This Human Law has been understood as an historical, dia-

logical relation, i. e., as a relation that for the particular individual appearsas a contingent reality. Therefore, the question has to be answered of how this contingent reality (the Human Law ’s collective actualization of free-dom), can be reconciled with the particular freedom of the individual.

The response to this question resulted in the three forms of the self that can be considered as closer determinations of the institutional struc-ture of the Human Law: Only under the condition of these closer deter-minations can the Human Law be reconciled with the particular freedom.

The institutional structure of the first self (the person) has to guaranteethat each individual has room for the particular determination of his free-dom (for a particular tradition). The institutional structure of the secondself (the “absolute freedom”), has to guarantee that the Human Law is nocontingent reality, but is explicitly posed as the reality that has beenbrought about in and by the actions of socialized individuals, and that,consequently, becomes valid as a dialogical reality. The institutional struc-ture of the third self has to guarantee that the dialogical reality is effective-ly brought about. It must guarantee that all comprehend the dialogical

reality as expression of their pure freedom. This means that they haveto understand this reality as self-expression of the absolute Spirit.

The absolute Spirit as the presupposition of the dialogical relation 125



The insight into the three forms of the self can hardly be called a met-aphysical insight. They determine the conditions under which the socialorganism can be reconciled with the particular freedom. Because Hegel

makes certain historical conditions the presupposition to acquire these in-sights, they have, in some sense, an empirical basis. Neither can it bemaintained that the development of these historical conditions imply a metaphysical conception of history: as if history is ruled by a necessary teleology. It is only implied that if the unity of mind and body is ade-quately understood as substance (i.e. as well from the inside as fromthe outside perspective), the involved historical stages must have beengone through. Like Habermas, Hegel could distinguish between develop-ment logic and development dynamic: The logical reconstruction of the

historical process may well be distinguished from its actual dynamic.

Absolute Spirit and metaphysics

Nevertheless, Hegel seems to make a step that justifies the criticism of Habermas and Honneth. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Spirit-Chap-ter is followed by the chapter about Religion. In this chapter, the formalconcept of the absolute Spirit that is introduced at the end of the Spirit-Chapter, is transformed in the substantial concept of the absolute Spirit that is elaborated in the final chapter, absolute Knowing. While the abso-lute Spirit first was the formal condition that had to be fulfilled to com-prehend the unity of the particular freedom and the Human Law, it now seems to be transformed into a real self, a god who is the true actor of thehistorical process. Is this step acceptable? Does it not come down thatHegel establishes that, departing from the particular freedom, it is notpossible to comprehend it adequately in unity with the Human Law,

and that, therefore, an appeal to a supra-human power is unavoidable?Does not the transition to religion mark the point that only the absolute Spirit can be understood as a substance? Does this concept of the absolute Spirit as the absolute subject substance not definitely make clear that thehuman individual, the unity of mind and body cannot be understood assubstance? Is not the human being reduced here to a tool of the absolute Spirit?

To understand which step Hegel is making here, it is good to returnonce again to the lordship/bondsman relation. At this stage, the thesis was

elaborated that the unity of mind and body can only be comprehended asa substantial unity in the domain of society. In this domain, the relation




between mind and body is objectified as a social organism that is under-stood as the expression of an institutional self, i. e. , the lord. The lord rep-resents the pure self that is actualized in the social organism in a partic-

ular, historical manner. The actualization of the social organism is per-formed by the labor of the bondsman who works in the service of thelord. Considered from the outside perspective, the lord has two functions.On the one hand, he represents the unity of the social system: He is, so tospeak, the king who symbolizes the norms and values that determine thetradition of the ruling social system. On the other hand, he represents thelegitimacy of the ruling power: He is, so to speak, the god, the transcen-dent being that is the basis of the ruling power. This transcendent being isa pure self. Because this transcendent being is actually the essence of the

bondsman, the power of the king is legitimate. From the inside perspec-tive, initially both roles totally coincide. The pure freedom of the bonds-man totally remains absorbed in the practical action by which he actual-izes the social organism.

Nevertheless, the bondsman does not totally coincide with his socialaction. If this would be the case, he would not distinguish himself froman animal that lives in a social connection. The bondsman is also a self-conscious being. This is expressed by Hegel when he says that the bonds-man recognizes the lord as his essence. This recognition means, firstly,that the lord may not be one-sidedly interpreted as an external powerof nature that physically forces the bondsman to do what he wants. Sec-ondly, this recognition means, positively, that for the bondsman, the lordrepresents his own absolute essence: In this sense, the lord is the represen-tation of a goddess. Therefore, the recognition of the lord by the bonds-man has nothing to do with the recognition of the one human individualby the other. It is not necessary at all that the lord represents a humanindividual. He, rather, represents an absolute power with which the

human individual is confronted (which power, just by recognizing it asa lord, is no external power). Therefore, it is no option at all, that therelation between lord and bondsman (to do justice to democratic free-dom), actually should be a symmetrical one. In his recognition of thelord, the bondsman recognizes that the values that regulate his practicalaction are absolute ones.

The lordship/bondsman relation teaches that, for the bondsmen whoactualize in their actions the Human Law , this law never is a contingentreality. This is expressed by them when they represent the lord for whom

they “work” as an absolute power. For that reason, the exercise that wasexecuted in the Spirit-Chapter with regard to historical forms of the

Absolute Spirit and metaphysics 127



Human Law (Antiquity, Middle Ages, Modernity), still is an abstraction. After all, we saw that the Spirit-Chapter was preceded by an attempt (by means of the development at the level of Unhappy Consciousness and Rea-

son), to comprehend the pure freedom of the singular self in unity withthe Human Law. This attempt failed because, for the pure freedom of thesingular self, the Human Law is a contingent reality, with which it is, con-sequently, not internally linked. At that stage, the transition to the Spirit-Chapter was made. Point of departure of this chapter was a contingent,historically observed Human Law , i.e., the law of the polis, of the Greek society. The choice for the Greek society was made because it could bereconstructed as a society in which the relation forms of the Unhappy Consciousness and Reason could be found again. In this way, the search

for the unity of the singular self’s pure freedom and the Human Law was continued otherwise : as the search that was actually performed ina contingent, historical process.

The historical setting of the Spirit-Chapter remains abstract becauseit initially remains implicit what is already clear at the level of the lord-ship/bondsman relation all the time. It is true that, in relation to thepure freedom of the singular self, the specific tradition of the HumanLaw appears as a contingent tradition, but at the same time, the pure free-dom of the singular self cannot have existence when it does not partici-pate in the social organism. The what of the tradition may be contingent,but this contingency does not concern the that of the tradition. In a realhistorical society, the singular self expresses this necessary relation be-tween itself and society by representing the social organism as an absoluteself, i.e., by its religious representation. In the Spirit-Chapter, this reli-gious dimension is not yet explicitly thematized.

The abstraction of the Spirit-Chapter becomes explicit when Con-science , at the end of the chapter, performs the transition from a formal

concept of the absolute Spirit. Here it becomes clear, from an inside per-spective, what, from an outside perspective, was already clear at the levelof the lordship/bondsman relation: The singular self can only actualize itsfreedom in the historical reality of the Human Law in which it already participates all the time. It is true that the Human Law as an historicalreality is a contingent one, but formally, as an expression of freedom, itis not. In the formal concept of the absolute Spirit, the Human Law is un-derstood as a specific historical expression of pure freedom. At that stage,it is not only understood that the essence of the divine being is the pure

human freedom, but also that the Human Law has to be understood by the bondsman as self-expression of this essence. It is true that the human




being actualizes the Human Law in and by his action, and that this actionactualizes at the same time his particular freedom, but that he is able at allto express his actions in a Human Law in which all express their freedom,

transcends his particular freedom. He positively expresses this notion of his own finitude when he understands the Human Law as the self-expres-sion of an absolute subject whose essence is the human freedom. The Phe-nomenology of Spirit discusses this absolute subject in the chapters aboutReligion and absolute Knowledge.

Religion

We have seen that, at the level of religion, the social organism is repre-sented as an absolute being. Therefore, the essence of the goddess canonly be understood as the general human freedom if, in the social organ-ism, justice has been done to the free self. We have seen that this is only the case after the French Revolution. Since in the Spirit-Chapter severalforms of the social organism are gone through, this could be the basisfor a reconstruction of the religious representations that correspond tothese forms. Only together with these religious representations can thehistoric reality of these forms of the Human Law be understood, sothat the abstraction of the Spirit-Chapter is overcome. Unlike Hegel, Ihave discussed the society forms of the Spirit-Chapter in connection

with the corresponding religion forms. I will explain the reason for thislater on in this chapter.

In his reconstruction of the religion forms, however, Hegel goes a stepfurther. At the level of the Religion of Nature , he reconstructs the religionforms that precede the Greek society, i.e., that precede the society in

which human freedom has at least objectified itself in a Human Law.

These religion forms correspond with relations that were discussed be-fore, at the level of Consciousness and Self-consciousness. At this level,human freedom still is absorbed in relations of nature. This can alsobe formulated in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation (which, for a matter of fact, is not done by Hegel, himself): The action of the bonds-man is still linked with the natural organism (it has not yet obtained a institutional form in a social organism), and the lord is, at this level,the power of nature that is represented as a divine power. This resultsin the forms of the so-called religion of nature.

In the first form of the religion of nature (god as light), the naturalreality of Sense-Certainty (the many sensory given objects), is represented

Religion 129



as a divine being. In the second form (god as flower or god as animal), theobject of Perception (the thing with many properties), and Understanding (the force), are respectively represented by a flower and an animal as a

divine being. Finally, in the third form (the religion of the artificer),the world of the lordship/bondsman relation is represented as a divine re-lation, namely the relation between pharaoh and pyramid. (From thesereligions of nature, by the way, an extra argument can be borrowed formy alternative presentation of the Consciousness Chapter: The attemptsto comprehend the outside world as a unity are repeated here by the rep-resentation of the outside world as a goddess. Since the goddess is the ab-solute essence of the representing self, here it becomes explicit that it isabout comprehending the representing self as substance.)

At first it may seem strange that, in the Religion-Chapter, Hegel reverts to religion forms that precede the Greek world. Why discuss theseforms, when the Spirit-Chapter historically only begins at the Greek

world? At second glance, there are, at least from Hegel’s perspective,good reasons for this move. Due to the introduction of the religion of nature, not only do the forms of the Unhappy Consciousness and Reasonhave their religious representation (we have seen how this happened atthe level of the religion of art and the revealed religion), but also the

forms of Consciousness and Self-consciousness. Consequently, all forms of consciousness that are gone through in the development that was orientedto the comprehension of the mind/body unity, have their religious repre-sentation. Moreover, these representations are thus reconstructed, thatthey are placed in a dialectical coherence. Together, they form a develop-ment in which it is more and more adequately explicated under whichconditions the unity of mind and body can be comprehended as a sub-stantial unity. This development is completed in the formal concept of

the absolute Spirit in which it is comprehended that the human being can express the substantial unity of mind and body when he actualizeshimself in a Human Law that he can, at the same time, understand asself-expression of a pure self. This formal concept of the absolute Spirit is transformed into a substantial one when the dialectical coherence of re-ligion forms (and the societies that correspond to these forms), can be un-derstood as moments of the self-expression of the pure self. Then, sub-stance is understood as ‘subject’. However, this subject is not thehuman subject, the substantial unity of mind and body, but rather is

the divine subject that in his self-realization produces the entire reality. With this last step, an absolute subject is introduced that is linked with




the metaphysical position that is rightly rejected by Habermas and Hon-neth.

Hegel, however, does something else. Although Hegel also completes

his project with a substantial concept of the absolute Spirit and, conse-quently, comprehends substance as subject, this subject is distinguishedfrom the metaphysical subject against which Habermas and Honnethturn themselves. In Habermas’s and Honneth’s interpretation, the absolute Spirit is factually historicized: Objective and absolute Spirit coincide. Inthis case, it becomes impossible indeed to distinguish a developmentlogic and dynamic: The self-actualization of the absolute Spirit is identified with a contingent historical process. However, as remarked before, Hegelcould also have made the distinction between development logic and dy-namic. Not just the religion forms, but the religion forms that arebrought to concept, their conceptual structures, are part of Hegel’s sub-stantial concept of absolute Spirit. The substantial concept of absolute Spi-rit does not coincide with the historical process, but rather enables con-ceptualization of the contingent historical process as such. The insight hasbeen acquired that the substantial unity of mind and body can only beconceived of as an historical process in which the pure freedom moreor less realizes itself in the social organism. The insight into this process,

as such, is not historical, even though it is recognized that there are his-torical conditions that enable us to have access to this insight.

Recognition between metaphysics and empiricism

The rejection of the historical interpretation of the absolute subject hasno implications for the fundamental (necessary) status of the threeforms of the self. We have seen how these three forms followed fromthe project in which it was tried to comprehend the unity of mind andbody as a substantial one. Point of departure of this project is a funda-mental form of recognition, a form of recognition that precedes theone that expresses itself in the three forms of the self: the recognitionof the body by the mind. We have seen how this project, in the Spirit-Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit , resulted in the question of how the unity of the pure self and an empirical Human Law (the socialorganism) can be conceptualized. In the response to this question, the

three forms of recognition were developed that Hegel expresses as thethree forms of the self.

Recognition between metaphysics and empiricism 131



Although these three forms are developed in a reflection on the con-tingent European history (Antiquity, Middle Ages, Modernity), and, con-sequently, represent insights that could only be developed on the basis of

an historical process of experience, they express necessary relations. They express the necessary forms to which the institutional structure of theHuman Law has to correspond to be valid as the actualization of thepure self. It is true that this means that the appearance of these threeforms of the self in a real society can only be mapped if they are linkedto empirical data that are borrowed from that society (this is elaborated inthe next chapters), but the relevance of these three forms as such is notbased on empirical testing.

Although Axel Honneth, in his “The Struggle for Recognition”, re-

lates to works that Hegel has written earlier than the Phenomenology of Spirit , the three forms of recognition he distinguishes (Love, Respectand Solidarity), strongly recall the three forms of the self that Hegelhas developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This is especially true be-cause, for Honneth, the three forms of recognition have their institutionalreality in family , civil society and state. In the next chapters, it will be madeclear that this is also the case for the three forms of the self. If Honneth’sthree forms of recognition can indeed be related to the three forms of the

self in the Phenomenology of Spirit , and if Honneth implicitly presupposesthe unity of mind and body, this would mean that his project, as formu-lated at the beginning of this chapter, has to be reformulated. The testing,“in the light of empirical social psychology” for which Honneth is look-ing, must concern the concrete historical appearance of the three forms of the self, not the “metaphysical” framework in which these forms are de-

veloped. I think that this reformulation is only supported if it is moreclosely viewed what the empirical testing to which he is appealing actually implies. Then, it appears that this testing already presupposes the norma-

tive framework of the three forms of recognition all the time. The way in which Honneth formulates his program is already an indication for this:

“But before I can outline at least a few of the essential features of the socialtheory I have in mind, two presuppositions must first be systematically clari-fied, presuppositions that are inherent but not developed in Hegel’s andMead’s theories of recognition. First, the three-part division that both au-thors appear to make among forms of recognition needs a justificationthat goes beyond what has been said thus far. The extent to which such a distinction actually fits anything in the structure of social relations is some-

thing that must be demonstrated–independently of the texts discussed untilnow–by showing that this way of distinguishing phenomena can be broughtinto approximate agreement with the results of empirical research. In what




follows, this demonstration is to take the form of a phenomenologically-ori-ented typology that aims to describe the three patterns of recognition in sucha way that they can be checked empirically against the data from individualsciences. Central here will be evidence for the claim that the various forms of

reciprocal recognition can, in fact, be mapped onto different levels of thepractical relations-to-self in the way suggested, in vague outline, in Mead’ssocial psychology. On the basis of this typology, one can approach the secondtask that Hegel and Mead bequeathed to us in failing to clarify a crucial im-plication of their theoretical ideas. Both thinkers were in fact equally unableto identify accurately the social experiences that would generate the pressureunder which struggles for recognition would emerge within the historicalprocess” (p.93)

In this program, the metaphysical presuppositions on which Hegel bases

his three forms of recognition remain intact. Consequently, the programis presented as a completion to Hegel: It is about an elaboration of pre-suppositions that are “inherent in Hegel’s theory of recognition”. If thethree forms of recognition are once made the point of departure, it canempirically be examined if and how they can be found again in empiricalsocieties, and to which development processes they belong. In the mean-time, we have seen that the completions that are demanded here are, insome form, present in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and we will see thatthis is also the case for the Philosophy of Right.

Only in the last chapter of “The struggle for Recognition”, does Hon-neth go into the entirety of his social theory and give formulations thatconcern the entirety of the three forms of recognition: “The concept of ‘ethical life’ is now meant to include the entirety of inter-subjective con-ditions that can be shown to serve as necessary preconditions for individ-ual self-realization.” (173) These formulations are striking because they seem to come very close to what I presented here as the result of the Phe-nomenology of Spirit. Also the three forms of the self could be described as

“the entirety of inter-subjective conditions that can be shown to serve asnecessary preconditions for individual self-realization”. But it remains a riddle as to why Honneth, after his criticism of Hegel’s metaphysicalroots, thinks to be entitled to speak about “necessary conditions”, andall the more, because he stated in a previous page: “Our approach departsfrom the Kantian tradition in that it is concerned not solely with themoral autonomy of human beings, but also with the conditions fortheir self-realization in general. Hence, morality, understood as thepoint of view of universal respect, becomes one of several protective

measures that serve the general purpose of enabling a good life. But incontrast to those movements that distance themselves from Kant, this

Recognition between metaphysics and empiricism 133



concept of the good should not be conceived of as the expression of sub-stantive values that constitute the ethos of a concrete tradition-based com-munity. Rather, it has to do with the structural elements of ethical life

which, from the general point of view of the communicative enabling of self-realization, can be normatively extracted from the plurality of allparticular forms of life.” (172) It remains unclear how such an extractioncan result in necessary preconditions.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel showed how these necessary conditions can be deduced from the question of how the unity of mind and body can be comprehended as a substantial unity. Honnethseems to presuppose this unity. He does not understand that the necessary preconditions of individual self-realization precisely follow from Hegel’sdeduction. In his theory of the three forms of recognition, therein failsthe fundamental form of recognition that is able to base the innerunity of these three forms: the recognition of the body by the mind.

Honneth’s project in relation to the Phenomenology of Spiritand the Philosophy of Right

We witnessed the kinship between Hegel’s project in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the project of Honneth. The three forms of the self that Hegeldevelops in this work can be understood as: “the entirety of inter-subjec-tive conditions that can be shown to serve as necessary preconditions forindividual self-realization”. The big difference is that Hegel establishes thenecessity of the preconditions, and Honneth does not. In the preceding chapter, we also saw that the Phenomenology of Spirit solves a deficitthat Honneth observes in the young Hegel, when he discusses his third

thesis (“the sequence of forms of recognition follows the logic of a forma-tive process that is mediated by the stages of moral struggle”). In the Spi-rit-Chapter, the three forms of the self are developed in relation to theEuropean history, so that it responds to Honneth’s demand that “stagesof moral struggle” “can withstand empirical doubts”. A reconciliation be-tween the positions of Hegel and Honneth, however, would not be pos-sible if the transition that is made in the Phenomenology of Spirit from theformal concept of the absolute Spirit to the substantial one, should beone-sidedly interpreted historically. In that case, this transition would

mark a form of “metaphysics” that is rightly criticized by Honneth. After all, the consequence of this transition would be that the ethos of




“concrete tradition-based communities” would be one-sidedly interpretedas the self-expression of an absolute subject and, consequently, would beruined as contingent ethos. The historical interpretation of the substantial

concept of the absolute Spirit , however, is false. Nevertheless, this histor-ical interpretation of the substantial concept of the absolute Spirit may beadequate for the Philosophy of Right. Just because the religious self-con-scious fails in this work, there seems to be no room for the learning proc-ess that results in the insight into the contingency of the ethos of “con-crete tradition-based communities”.

In the next chapters, I will elaborate how the Philosophy of Right builds on the Phenomenology of Spirit , how the Philosophy of Right placesthe three forms of the self in a systematic coherence, and how the actu-

alization of this systematic coherence can be conceived of in our era. It will appear that the historical interpretation of the substantial conceptof the absolute Spirit plays a role in the Philosophy of Right. As a conse-quence, the ethos that Hegel elaborates for his era threatens to bemade absolute.143 Ethical life is not explicitly developed as a contingenthistorical appearance of the three forms of the self. Especially this contin-gent status asks for a contribution of the empirical sciences (empiricalpsychology, social psychology), to develop the concrete content of ethicalsubstance.

In the next chapters it will also be discussed as to how a contemporary version of the Philosophy of Right will look when, in line with Honneth, we abstain from the substantial concept of the absolute Spirit that is one-sidedly interpreted as an historical one. In this elaboration, there is roomfor contingency and positive sciences. Moreover, it will appear that, incontrast to Hegel, the appeal to religion forms that correspond to the de-

velopment in the Spirit-Chapter (religion of art and revealed religion), is inone way or another necessary. It is precisely these religion forms that play

a role in putting the social objectivity in perspective. Anticipating this dis-cussion, I already have combined, in the preceding interpretation of thePhenomenology of Spirit , unlike Hegel, the polis and the Realm of Educa-tion with their corresponding religion forms, i.e., religion of art and re-vealed religion.

143 Erzsbet Rzsa (2005) shows that, in this respect, there is a discrepancy betweenthe preface and the main text of the Philosophy of Right.

Honneth’s project in relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit 135



Chapter 6The program of the Philosophy of Right as elaborationof the Phenomenology’s project

Introduction

In this chapter, I will show that the program that Hegel elaborates in hisPhilosophy of Right can be completely understood as the elaboration of a

project that is inspired by the Phenomenology of Spirit. The relation be-tween both works not only implies that the Phenomenology of Spirit can elucidate what is at stake in the Philosophy of Right , but also canserve as a critical touchstone. Does Hegel remain true to his own project?I will put forward the thesis that it has been Hegel’s intention to remaintotally true to the position he has developed in the Phenomenology of Spi-rit. But I also want to make clear that the relation between both works iscomplex: Starting from the Phenomenology of Spirit, it is possible to writea Philosophy of Right that responds much better to the demands of ourera. In the Philosophy of Right , Hegel is sometimes so much led by thereality of his time, that it is at the cost of the critical potency that has al-ready been developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Partly, the fact that Hegel has been led by his own time is unavoid-able. In the introduction of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel, himself, al-ready indicates that a philosopher cannot surpass his era.144 This is notonly about a form of modesty, but also about a boundary that Hegelhas methodologically justified. The institutions of the rule of law cannot,

once and for all, be developed by a philosopher who takes in the stand-point of eternity, but essentially have an historical form. They are the re-sult from the Reason as testing laws , i.e., from the reason that, on the baseof universal criteria, tests in what sense existing institutions can be inter-preted as expressions of freedom.

My criticism on Hegel does not concern the historical determinednessof the institutions in the Philosophy of Right , but rather, the universal cri-

144 “It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump overRhodes.” PhR , p.11.



teria that underlie his testing. Although Hegel derives his central argu-ments from the Phenomenology of Spirit , I will show that there is sometension between both works. Ultimately, in his reception of these criteria

in the Philosophy of Right , Hegel has been influenced too much by thereality of his time. Consequently, the realization of human freedom hasbeen conceived of too much from the primacy of labor, i.e., from theeconomic domain. At the same time, it cannot be put just like that,that this making labor absolute (what comes down to conceiving the spi-ritual existence of man too much from his corporeal existence) is inno-cent of the Phenomenology of Spirit. In principle, this making labor abso-lute is innocent of the project of the Phenomenology of Spirit : After all it isagain and again argued that the pure self cannot be absorbed by the social

organism. But the methodological organization of the work, in which thereligion forms corresponding to the historical forms of the social organ-ism are discussed afterwards , promotes making labor absolute in the Phi-losophy of Right. In the Philosophy of Right, the methodological distinctionbetween objective and absolute Spirit is made a real one. The relation tothe absolute Spirit is only discussed at the level of world history, not atthe level at which the real social institutions are developed. After all,these institutions are not real because they are developed from the objec-tive Spirit’s point of view. Their reality is only in sight when the relationto the absolute Spirit is developed.

The conceptual design of the Philosophy of Right

Hegel formulates the program of the Philosophy of Right in § 1: “The subject-matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right, i. e. ,the concept of right, together with the actualization of that concept.” The

concept of right is more closely elaborated in the first two parts: Abstract Right and Morality. The actualization of the concept of right is moreclosely elaborated in the third part: Ethical Life. I will show how, inthe first part (abstract Right ) the formal concept of the first self fromthe Phenomenology of Spirit returns and how, in the second part ( Morali-ty ), the formal concept of the second and third self from the Phenomenol-ogy of Spirit return.145 Therefore, the concept of right appears as the for-

145 Rightly Erzsbet Rzsa (2007) states: “The second self, i.e., the individual as es-sential moment of the substance, as well as the sublation of the first self arethought determinations of Hegelian philosophy that can also be recognized in

The conceptual design of the Philosophy of Right 137



mal unity of the three forms of the self, as the formal unity of Right and Morality.

In Chapters 7, 8 and 9, I will discuss how Hegel’s concept of right

applies to the institutions that he finds in the modern world of histime: To what extent can they be conceived of as expression of free-dom?146 Insofar as the contingent institutions from his era can indeedbe conceived of as expression of freedom, he includes them in his Philos-ophy of Right as institutions of Ethical Life. I will show how Hegel, in thethree sections of Ethical Life (Family , Civil Society and State )147 reverts to

the Philosophy of Right.” [Das zweite Selbst, d.h. das Individuum als wesentlichesMoment der Substanz, wie auch die Aufhebung des ersten Selbst sind Gedanken-

bestimmungen der hegelschen Philosophie, die auch in der Rechtsphilosophie zuerkennen sind.] (p. 78).146 In contrast to Alan Patton (1999), I do not think that Hegel makes “a priori

claims about the social and institutional conditions under which human person-ality and subjectivity can be developed and sustained.” (p. 204).

147 Honneth (2003) remarks: “ … how much the idea of a social differentiation of three spheres of recognition owes to a kind of social-theoretical transformation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Just as Hegel spoke with regard to the “ethical” (sit-tlich) order of modern society of three institutional complexes (the family, civilsociety, and the state), whose internal constitution as spheres of recognition al-lows the subject to attain the highest degree of individual freedom through active

participation, the same basis idea is to be found in my own reflections in theform of a differentiation of three differently constituted spheres of reciprocal rec-ognition.” p. 143/4. However, Honneth distinguishes two differences with He-gel’s approaches. In the first place, the struggles for recognition at the three levels“essentially function only to motivate the transition to the next level of ethically constituted institutions.” (p. 144).

Secondly, Honneth reproaches Hegel a “concretism” that makes that “the bor-ders between the institutional complexes on the one side, and the spheres of rec-ognition on the other, break down altogether.” (p. 146). I do not think that thisconclusion can be maintained. The three forms of the self represent three forms

of recognition that are relatively independent. Moreover, it is rather Honneth’s“concretist” reading of Hegel than Hegel himself, who identifies the threeforms of the self with the contingent institutions.

Honneth (2000) interprets Right and Morality in the Philosophy of Right as“two definitions of individual freedom, which independently of each otherhad already exerted, in his view, considerable influence upon the practical self-conception of society”. (p. 34) I have tried to clarify that Right and Morality are internally linked in Hegel’s concept of recognition. In this sense, recognitionreconciles the complementary perspectives of Nancy Fraser and can become clear what according to Honneth remains unclear: “it remains completely unclear why

the capitalist social order is now to be investigated specifically from the two per-spectives of “economy” and “culture,” when it would seem equally possible to an-alyze the object filed from other perspectives, such as “morality” or “law”. [“law”

Chapter 6 The program of the Philosophy of Right138



the Phenomenology of Spirit. On the one hand, they are designed as actu-alization of the three forms of the self (as Family , Corporation and State )and revert to Antiquity, Middle Ages and Modernity (respectively Ethical

World , World of Culture and Morality ); on the other hand, these actualforms of the self, as in the Phenomenology of Spirit , can be understoodas ways in which the spiritual animal kingdom, the Reason as lawgiver and the Reason as testing laws get shaped.

The abstract Right as the formal Notion of the first self

The first self , the formal person of the Roman Law, is a free individual

who expresses his freedom in the free use of his property. The law guar-antees that the individual is recognized as owner of his property. The per-sons recognize one another as equal: All have the equal right to dispose of their property. The formal property law guarantees the horizontal recog-nition of the law by which all individuals are valid as equal.148

From the view of Roman Law , the content that is given by the individual to his freedom is accidental: The persons are contingent individ-uals and the property they have at their disposal is a contingent fact. At

the level of abstract Right , Hegel tries to determine the first self in a way that refrains from all historical contingencies. The person is no longer a real individual to which the Roman property law is attributed, but a for-malized relation: a free will that is only real insofar as it expresses itself inproperty.149 This relation is the first moment of abstract Right: Property.(§ 41 ff.). To what individual the free will is attributed does not matter,for each (human) individual has a free will. Moreover, in what property the free will expresses itself is of no importance, either. It will do to sim-ply determine the property as thing, i.e., as “something” that can sensu-

ally appear.The formal notion of the first self is only then adequately expressed

when inside and outside perspective do not contradict one another.Therefore, if the person, for himself, expresses his freedom in thething, this must be also true from the outside perspective. This is guar-

is here the translation of the German Recht and can, therefore, also be translatedas right , P.C.] p.156.

148 Cf. R. Williams (1997): “My thesis is that for Hegel, right is grounded in mutual

recognition.” (p. 138).149 Since the free will wants to find itself in the objective reality (cf. the property),abstract Right repeats the relation forms of observing Reason.

The abstract Right as the formal Notion of the first self 139



anteed when the person’s relation to the thing is principally mediated by exchange. If all property is the result of exchange between persons, theperson has a free relation to his property.150 (This is the second moment

of abstract Right: Contract (§ 72 ff.)) The property that expresses his free-dom can basically be exchanged to another property, so the person is nottied to any specific property.

If the person’s reality is dependent on property exchange, his existenceis only guaranteed if the property exchange is possible. Therefore, in con-trast to the person of the Roman Law , the existence of the person is notdependent on the existence of an historical property order, but rather onthe nearer qualification of the thing. Until now, the quality of the thing isundetermined. The exchange between two undetermined things, howev-

er, cannot express the person’s subjective freedom with regard to thething. The existence of the person remains dependent on a accidental,undetermined thing.151 Only when the exchange process shows that itis the person who decides to relate to a particular thing because its par-ticular quality attributes to the actualization of his subjective freedom,is the freedom of the person with regard to the thing objectified. Atthe level of abstract Right , however, there is no room for this particularrelation to the thing. On the one hand, the persons are free and equal,i.e., totally exchangeable; on the other hand, even if the persons couldhave particular preferences with regard to the thing, it would be acciden-tal as to whether or not the thing would be qualified to play a role in thesubjective actualization of freedom. In the third moment of abstract Right,the Wrong (§ 82 ff.) it is made explicit for the person that the subjectiveactualization of his freedom remains accidental. This accidental actualiza-tion can only be overcome when the transition is made to the second self of Morality.

150 Therefore, A. Patton (1999) is right when he understands property “as a mediatorof recognition” (p. 159). The weakness that he observes in Hegel’s approach a

priorism) (p. 123) makes no sense: We have seen that Hegel’s development of rec-ognition and his actualization of recognition has, on the one hand, a logical di-mension (unity of inside and outside perspective) and, on the other hand, an em-

pirical dimension: the examination of how recognition is actualised in a specificera.151 Cf. the conclusion of the observing Reason: “The being of Spirit is a bone.” (208).




Morality as the formal notion of the second self

Morality in the Philosophy of Right can be conceived of as the pure form of

the second self of the Phenomenology of Spirit , the absolute freedom. Wehave characterized the absolute freedom as the morality that has absorbedthe domain of right : As absolute freedom the, moral individual wants im-mediately to make himself the lawgiver of the social organism. In the Phi-losophy of Right, Hegel develops the pure form of the second self by ab-stracting from the contingent relations. He develops the relations to real-ity that the moral self (the “subject” ) has to take on to understand reality as one in which he can express his freedom.

The first moment of Morality (in the Philosophy of Right ) Hegel char-

acterizes as Purpose and Responsibility (§ 115 ff.). In this relation it is ex-pressed that reality, first of all, has to be understood as the result of self-conscious action. The intended content of action (purpose) has to be ac-tualized in the action’s result, so that the moral individual can take re-sponsibility for his action.152

Hegel indicates the second moment of Morality (in the Philosophy of Right ) as Intention and Welfare (§ 119 ff.). This moment makes it clearthat the action for which the “subject ” takes responsibility has to be closerdetermined as an action that serves the welfare of the “

subject ”. This pre-

supposes the subject’s insight in his welfare: Only then can he purpose-fully make welfare the dedication of his action.153

In the third moment of Morality , Good and Conscience (§ 129 ff.), it isdiscussed that the subjective welfare can only be actualized when it is inharmony with the welfare of the others. (§ 134) Therefore, the “subject ”has the duty (cf. Conscience ) to fill in the actualization of his welfare in a

way that he also actualizes the welfare of the others, i. e. , he has to realizethe good.154

152 This moment refers to the first moment of active Reason in the Phenomenology of Spirit: Pleasure and Necessity. This time, however, pleasure (as purpose) is, so tospeak, developed as a positive moment of the moral individual in his entirety, theconscientious individual.

153 This moment refers to the second moment of active Reason in the Phenomenology of Spirit: the law of the heart and the frenzy of self- deceit. This time, however, thelaw of the heart (as intention) is, so to speak, developed as a positive moment of

the moral individual in his entirety, the conscientious individual.154 This moment refers to the third moment of active Reason in the Phenomenology of Spirit : Virtue and the way of the world. This time, however, virtue (as conscience)

Morality as the formal notion of the second self 141



Conscience as the formal unity of right and morality

The conscience that Hegel introduces in the Philosophy of Right can be

understood as the unity of abstract Right and Morality , i.e., as theunity of the formal notion of the first and second self. After all, wehave not only seen that morality in its most concrete determination(the third moment) has been transferred to conscience, but in his deter-mination as conscience, at the same time, is returned to abstract Right.For, conscience demands the actualization of the good155, i.e., consciencedemands to actualize moral freedom in the form of right.

In the next chapters, we will see how Hegel, in the development of the third part of the Philosophy of Right , understands ethical Life as theactualization of conscience.156 Conscience, as the unity of the formal no-tion of the first and second self , is confronted with the institutions thatHegel finds in his era in an attempt to actualize Reason as testing laws. In-sofar as Hegel thinks to be able to understand them as actualization of conscience, he includes them in the Philosophy of Right as institutionsof ethical Life. We will see how the state, as the dialectical unity of family and civil society, can be understood as the actualization of conscience,unifying in itself the actualization of the first and second self.

Conscience in the ‘Philosophy of Right’ vis--vis conscience inthe ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’

Until now, I carefully avoided linking conscience in the Philosophy of Right, with the third self of the Phenomenology of Spirit that Hegel alsocharacterizes as conscience. The conscientious individual of the Phenom-

enology of Spirit is related to the absolute Spirit. He understands the socialorganism as the contingent self-expression of the absolute spirit, andknows that he can only indirectly take care of the realization of the

is, so to speak, developed as a positive moment of the moral individual in hisentirety, the conscientious individual.

155 Cf. “The good is the Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the partic-ular will. In this unity, abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing and thecontingency of external fact, have their independent self-subsistence superseded,though at the same time they are still contained and retained within in it in their

essence.” (§ 129).156 Ethical life is “the good become alive” (§ 142), the concrete identity of the good with the subjective will (§ 141).




good: by serving the institutions of the social organism in which he lives.Essentially, this conscience is distinguished from the one of the Philosophy of Right that is determined as a conscience that actualizes itself in the so-

cial organism. Obviously, Hegel did not want to discuss in the Philosophy of Right the relation to the absolute Spirit. This relation is only touchedon at the end of the Philosophy of Right , namely at the level of world his-tory, when the transition to the absolute Spirit is performed.157 The cur-tailment that Hegel displays concerning the concept of conscience in thePhilosophy of Right 158 has dramatic consequences for the entirety of thefurther development.159 The adequate notion of the relation betweenright and morality, the Reason as testing laws adequately applied to the in-stitutions of our era, has to revert to the concept of conscience in the Phe-

nomenology of Spirit.

The formal unity of the three forms of the self following fromthe ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’

If we depart from the Phenomenology of Spirit, the formal unity of thethree forms of the self look different. Once again conscience, as the

third form of the self, can be understood as the unity of the first and sec-ond self. We have seen that the individual who is conceived of as the unity of mind and body, at the level of conscience, could be understood for thefirst time in a way in which inside and outside perspective coincide. Asconscience, the individual is related to the absolute Spirit that he under-stands as the pure self manifesting itself in the social organism. He has thecertitude that he indirectly actualizes his freedom by observing the laws of

157 “The element in which the universal mind exists in art is intuition and imagery,

in religion feeling and representative thinking, in philosophy pure freedom of thought. In world history this element is the actuality of mind in its whole com-pass of internality and externality alike.” PhR § 341.

158 “The religious conscience, however, does not belong to this sphere at all.” (§ 137 A).

159 Fred. Neuhouser maintains: “Indeed, one of the persistent aims of this book hasbeen to show that the normative standards that inform Hegel’s social theory canbe made plausible and compelling in detachment from his secular theodicy sim-ply by articulating how they have their source in the idea of practical freedom …”(p. 270). I will invert Neuhouser’s critcism. The problem of the Philosophy of

Right is that it is too much detached from Hegel’s secular theodicy. Hegel’s “com-prehensive metaphysical vision” (p. 270) precisely consists of the adequate artic-ulation of the ideal of practical freedom.

The formal unity of the three forms of the self 143



the social organism in which he is living. Also from the outside perspec-tive, the perspective of world history, the actualization of freedom is un-derstood in this way. Since outside and inside perspective coincide, this

concept of conscience can be immediately valid as the formal, absoluteconcept of conscience. There is no need to abstract from historical con-ditions.

The first and the second self belong to the previous history of con-science. They determine the fundamental structures of the society forms that the individual must have passed through to have the ability to develop insight into conscience. At the level of conscience, the individ-ual knows that he can actualize his freedom only in a finite way, namely by participating in the social organism of which he is part. The first and

the second self impose a nearer determination of the social organism in which conscience can actualize his freedom. The social organism has tobe thus structured so that it enables the conscientious individual topass through the relation forms of the first and second self; or better,that it has already passed through them all the time, so that his insightin the social organism as one in which he can actualize his freedom is con-ditioned by this social organism itself.

The conscientious individual can only pass through the relation formof the first self when the social organism corresponds to the demand thatit is already given all the time as an objective reality. Since this demandmeans that conscience has to find his freedom immediately in the reality that is objectively given, it comes down to understanding the social or-ganism as objectification of observing Reason. Since the social organismthat is immediately given is real as property, the relation in which thefirst self appears can, like in the Philosophy of Right , be understood asthe relation between person and property, i.e. , as the free self whotakes the given thing as the expression of his freedom. In contrast to

the Philosophy of Right , the relation between person and property isthis time already understood all the time as a moment of the surpassing conscience. As conscience, the individual knows that his free essence, inthe form of immediacy, is realized in the relation between person andproperty.

The freedom of the person is only practically expressed in the prop-erty. His pure self, the self that transcends any actualization, is absorbedin the practical process. It is true that the person in the use of the prop-erty can show that he is the lord of the thing, but this lordship is only

expressed because the person is, so to speak, his own “bondsman”. Inthe “labor” of the use of the property, the person practically expresses




his subjective freedom, i.e., the thing appears as use value that is con-sumed by the person. This consumption, however, does not satisfy imme-diately given “natural” needs, but rather the needs that are defined by the

norms and values of the immediately given social organism. The pure self of the person is not expressed in the “labor” of the use of the property.This would only be the case if, at the same time, the factual use of theproperty expresses that the person has the freedom to use the property otherwise.

The person’s independence from the particular use of the property (his freedom vis--vis the thing) can appear when the property only func-tions as a token of the person’s freedom. The property, in its function astoken, abstracts from the physical qualities of the thing without which the

thing could not have any use value. It is only important insofar as it refersto the undetermined freedom of the person: it only represents the that of his freedom. The problem is, however, how the thing can appear as tokenin the objectifying relation that characterizes the first self , i.e., the self of the abstract Right.160 Can the token be found in the given objectivity of the world? As in Hegel’s version of the abstract Right, the transition of the relation of Contract can also be made in this revised version. If thepossession of property is principally mediated by exchange on the base

of an exchange contract, this cannot only make explicit that the personsrecognize one another as proprietors, but also that the quality of theproperty is inessential. Principally, everything can be exchanged to every-thing else. The property is only a token for recognition, i.e., the repre-sentation of the person’s freedom.

While the second moment of the abstract Right in the revised Philos-ophy of Right is once again the Contract , the third moment of abstract Right differs from the original version and can not be identified as theWrong. For, the problem that has to be solved at the level of the second

moment is not that the exchange between persons remains accidental. It istrue that the content of the commodities that are exchanged between thepersons is not determined. Consequently, it remains accidental whetheror not the exchanged commodities are qualified to satisfy the needsthat are defined by the norms and values of the social organism in

which the person practically expresses his freedom. But this state of affairsdoes not result in the Wrong, i.e., the possible contradiction between theformal (general) will of the free and equal persons and their particular

160 In the abstract Right , the relations of observing Reason appear in their true form:Objective reality is developed as expression of the free self, i.e., the person.




will. The problem of the revised abstract Right is rather that it does notallow bringing together the general freedom of the formal persons andthe content of their particular will. At the level of abstract Right both di-

mensions exclude one another. Either the will of the person is determinedas a particular will that is expressed in the thing as a particular use value,or the will of the person is determined as a free will that is expressed inthe thing as a general exchange value. But the thing that appears as use

value does not appear as exchange value, and vice versa. This problemcan only be overcome by the second self that is discussed at the level of Morality.

The conscientious individual can only pass through the relation formof the second self when the social organism corresponds to the demand

that it is produced by the individual himself: He must be the lawgiverof the social organism. As in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , the first momentof Morality can be characterized as Purpose and Responsibility (§§ 115–118). If the social organism is the product of the free individual, it isovercome that the content of the social law is accidental; at the sametime, the content can be freely determined.

As in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , also the second moment of Morality can be determined as Intention and Welfare (§§ 119–128). At this level isformulated as to what criteria the free content of the social law is subject-ed: In the social law, the welfare of the individual has to be actualized.The approval of this demand, however, is not unproblematic. When itis assumed that each subject can have knowledge of his subjective free-dom and, based on this knowledge, can try to actualize his welfare in a social organism (for example a family organism), then the question re-mains as to whether the realization of the welfare of the one subject iscompatible with the one of the other. Therefore, in his Philosophy of Right , Hegel adds the demand that also the welfare of the others has to

be actualized, and elaborates this demand as the third moment of Mor-ality , as Conscience that has the duty to actualize the general good(§§ 129–140). This move, however, is highly problematic. In a certainsense, the subjective identity that tries to express his subjective freedomis given. The subject cannot assume at random any identity, but has todiscover by life experience what his very identity is. This contingenceof subjective identity makes the possible harmony between the actualiza-tion of subjective welfare by many subjects a rather accidental affair. Theaccidentalness of this harmony can only be overcome when the many

subjective identities can be conceived of as moments of a shared socialorganism. But this is only possible when their contingence, in one way




or another, is abolished. The problem of abstract Right returns in a spe-cific form at the level of Morality. The particular and the general actual-ization of freedom can, on the one hand, not be brought together, but on

the other hand, do presuppose one another. The particular realization of freedom is not possible when it is not in harmony with the actualizationof freedom of all. But if it is in harmony with the general actualization of freedom, it seems to decline as particular freedom realization. Therefore,at the level of the second moment of Morality , only the demand can beformulated that the particular as well as the general freedom, that the par-ticular welfare as well as the general welfare, has to be actualized. Bothdemands, however, cannot be unified in the conscience that is deter-mined as the duty to actualize the general good, as is done in the Philos-ophy of Right.

We have seen that conscience in the revised Philosophy of Right hasbeen differently determined. The conscientious individual knows thatthe social organism in which he is living is a contingent self-expressionof the absolute Spirit, and he knows that he can only indirectly contributeto the actualization of the absolute good by serving the institutions of thesocial organism in which he is living. By now we have seen to which near-er determinations this social organism has to respond: to the structures of

abstract Right and Morality. We have also seen what are the consequencesof these determinations: The demand has to be made upon the social or-ganism that it actualizes right and morality in an adequate unity; roommust be made for both subjective and general actualization of freedom.Moreover, it is clear that the subjective actualization of freedom may not be reduced to a moment of the general good; neither may the abso-lute good161 be reduced to the general good.

Only when the conscientious individual actualizes himself in a social

organism that is structured according the revised abstract Right and therevised Morality , can he also realize in this organism the self-insight of being a conscientious individual. Precisely because the social organism in-stitutionally distinguishes between the particular and the general actuali-zation of freedom can it meet the demands raised by the conscientiousindividual: The social organism has to be a contingent realization formof the absolute Spirit (it actualizes the absolute good in the form of the

161 Hegel maintains: “The good is thus freedom realized, the absolute end and aimof the world.” (§ 129) This absolute good may not be confused with the generalgood that is realized in the particular state.




general good). But the self-actualization of the absolute Spirit has to gotogether with the realization of subjective freedom.

The actualization of the Human Self

We have elaborated what it means to understand the human self as theunity of mind and body. This unity can only be conceived of in theframework of a social organism that can be described by means of themetaphorical lordship/bondsman relation. This metaphor elucidates thatthe unity between mind and body gets shape in the form of two kindsof recognition: a vertical recognition (the recognition of the lord) that

makes the individual a moral individual; and a horizontal recognition(the mutual recognition of the bondsmen as free and equal). To think of the adequate unity of mind and body comes down to thinking of the adequate unity of Right and Morality, which relation Hegel concep-tualizes as the relation between objective and absolute Spirit.

The adequate conceptualization of the relation between right andmorality has succeeded if the inside perspective of this relation coincides

with the outside perspective. According to Hegel, this adequate relation

expresses the absolute Notion of man as unity of mind and body, i.e.,this Notion transcends all historical actualization forms. Since themoral individual is an absolute self, human beings, as moral individuals,are absolutely equal. This equality is principally expressed in a social or-ganism in which all individuals are free and equal persons, i.e., the socialorganism is principally a democratic one. Therefore, in the adequateunity of right and morality, at the same time the elementary unity of human rights162 and democracy has been expressed.

The adequate unity of right and morality, of democracy and human

rights, is an absolute criterion to test contingent social organisms: To what extent do they adequately express human rights and democracy,morality and right? In the second part of this book we will test the socialorganism of the modern, globalized world. To exercise this test we canappeal to two examples163: on the one hand, the example of European

162 We will see how the institutions of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat ) are developed asthe unity of Right and Morality. Insofar as they express the moral dimension, I

will claim that they are related to human rights.163 Although Honneth (1995) seems to accept the structures of recognition that cor-respond to the three selves, he states that Hegel’s line of thought “is tainted by




history that Hegel has elaborated in the Phenomenology of Spirit , and onthe other hand, the example of the Philosophy of Right , in which Hegelhas synthesized the experiences of European history to conceptualize

the adequate institutions for his era. We have to repeat Hegel’s attemptfor our time. But we have to avoid the curtailment as it is representedby the Philosophy of Right, in comparison to the Phenomenology of Spirit.

metaphysical premises that can no longer be easily reconciled with contemporary thought.” (p. 67). He concludes: “ … an empirically supported phenomenology is thus needed, one that allows Hegel’s theoretical proposal to be tested and, if necessary, corrected.” (p. 69) We have seen, however, that the three forms of the self result from the making more explicit of the conditions that allow usto conceive of the unity of mind and body. Since the problem of the unity of mind and body is not even raised by George Herbert Mead, his “translation of Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity into a postmetaphysical language” (p. 70) is

redundant. But, of course, the historical appearance of the three forms of theself has to be tested. This test is performed by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spi-rit, as well as in the Philosophy of Right.

The actualization of the Human Self 149



Chapter 7The Family: The Institutional House of the First Self

Introduction

In this chapter, I will elaborate the institutional actualization of the first self for our era, i.e., I will confront the conceptual determinations of the first self with institutions of our globalized world and examine which in-stitutions can be considered as an adequate realization of the first self. Toprepare for this attempt, however, I will first go into Hegel’s attempt inthe Philosophy of Right to elaborate the institutionalization of the first self for the nineteenth century. I will criticize the result of Hegel’s attempt,i.e., the family. This criticism does not concern the features of the family that typically seems to belong to the Nineteenth Century, but is more el-ementary. I will show that Hegel, by giving the family a natural content,confuses natural and ethical immediacy. As a consequence, his concept of family does not meet the criteria for the first self that Hegel himself has

developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This criticism will appear help-ful for the positive construction of the first self’s institutional embodi-ment.

The species life of animals

In contrast to human beings, the species life of animals is not institution-alized. It is only practically performed in the process in which the species

reproduces itself. At least in the case of mammals, this reproduction proc-ess can be described in a kind of “dialectical” structure. Insofar as the fe-male individual produces offspring, it is, from an outside perspective (assuch, in itself), a being that belongs to a species. The relation to the spe-cies becomes “for” the female individual in its relation to the male indi-

vidual. In the sexual intercourse, the membership of the species is ex-pressed by the actions of the individuals, themselves. Moreover, the rela-tion between the male and the female individual can be interpreted as a relation in which the species in its generality is related to the individual

exemplar of the species. The relation between the sexes is a general rela-tion of the species. But the consequences of this relation, pregnancy, is



objectified in a particular female individual. The male individual repre-sents the moment of generality; the female individual, on the otherhand, represents the moment of particularity. Finally, the offspring ex-

presses the species life as it is in and for itself. From the outside perspec-tive, the offspring has been produced by his parents; from the inside per-spective, the offspring “recognizes” its parents and acts in accordance withthem.

The family in the Philosophy of Right: animal life in the formof freedom

Hegel’s construction of the family in the Philosophy of Right can be con-ceived of as a social organism in which the animal reproduction can getshape in the form of freedom. The individuals who constitute the socialorganism of the family are not natural individuals, but free and equal per-sons who can make a free decision for marriage. This decision is, first of all, the formal decision to constitute “one person”. (§ 162) Moreover, thecontent that is actualized in the social organism of the family is not a nat-ural one (the decision to marry is not motivated by sexual interests), but

an ethical one. The formal decision to marry implies, at the same time,the substantial decision to share one identity that is expressed in thelove between the marriage partners. (§ 163) Therefore, the social organ-ism of the family is the concrete person: the person who is free and equalin his relation to other persons and real in the shared love between themarriage partners.

The love between the partners is objectified in their children. (§ 163)The labor that is done in the family organism exists of raising the children

to adulthood. The product of the family is the children that have beenraised into free and equal persons. Therefore, in the family, the naturalreproduction of the species has been transformed in the ethical reproduc-tion of the free and equal persons.

But also, Hegel’s interpretation of the natural individuals in logicalterms (the male individual standing for the moment of universality andthe female individual standing for the moment of particularity), returnsin the social organism of the family and gets its free, ethical meaning in the gender roles of the marriage partners. (§ 166) These gender

roles are structured according the lordship/bondsman relation. The woman recognizes in her husband her free essence, i. e. , her “lord”:

The family in the Philosophy of Right: animal life in the form of freedom 151



The man is the free person who represents the family in the social domain(the civil society as the multitude of families). (§ 178) The woman is the“bondsman” of her husband insofar as she actualizes in her labor the free-

dom of the “lord”: In the “labor” of the family, the free and equal personsare reproduced.164

The social organism of the family vis--vis the conceptualframework of the ‘Philosophy of Right’ and the

‘Phenomenology of Spirit’‘

I will not interfere with the discussion as to how Hegel’s concept of the

family is related to the historical family institutions in the Europe of theNineteenth Century. I limit myself to the question of whether his con-cept of the family corresponds to the criteria that he himself has formu-lated in the Philosophy of Right.165 Since ethical life in general is deter-mined as the unity of abstract Right and Morality , the family, as the im-mediate form of ethical life, has to be structured as the unity of first mo-ment of abstract Right and the first moment of Morality , i. e., as the unity of Person/Property and Purpose/Responsibility. We have observed that thesocial organism of the family can be considered as the concrete Person.Moreover, it is evident that this concrete person, according to Hegel,has his own (family) property. (§ 170) Therefore, it is in no way problem-atic to interpret Hegel’s concept of the family as the actualization of thefirst moment of abstract Right. But we must check, later on, whetherproperty functions as use value or only as exchange value.

It is, however, problematic to interpret Hegel’s concept of the family as the actualization of the Purpose/Responsibility relation. Although this re-lation seems only to demand that the social organism of the family is the

result of free action (of course, the marriage is constituted by the free de-cision of the partners), the actions that are performed by the partners can-not be considered free in this sense. The role patterns that Hegel ascribes

164 Cf. “From the physical point of view, the presupposition–persons immediately existent (as parents) –here becomes a result, a process which runs away intothe infinite series of generations, each producing the next and presupposing the one before.” (§ 173).

165 Steinberger (1988) states that “ … Hegel […] has shown […] that something like

marriage is necessary to the unfolding of Objective Spirit, but has failed to provethat only marriage can do the job.” (p. 187) Of course, it is not Hegel’s claim toidentify historical institutions with the Objective Spirit.

Chapter 7 The Family: The Institutional House of the First Self 152



to the man and the woman, i.e., a pattern that is based on a biologicalqualification, makes that their action is inspired by their “pathos”(their character as man or woman), rather than that it is a free action.

It is true that, compared to the polis, the relation between man and woman has changed. Although also in the polis the man is linked withthe moment of generality (the Human Law), and the woman to the mo-ment of particularity (the Divine Law ), their actions are fundamentally different from those of the marriage partners in the Philosophy of Right.The actions of man and woman in the polis are one-sided because they only observe one of the two laws. In the marriage of the Philosophy of Right, this one-sidedness seems to have been overcome. The Humanand Divine Law are, so to speak, unified in the love of the marriage part-

ners. In their love the partners share their identity. Therefore, the actionsof man and woman can no longer be one-sided. If the woman acts, sheacts at the same time in the name of her husband, and vice versa. Manand woman both represent in their actions the entirety of their sharedidentity.

However, if we compare the way in which the division betweenHuman and Divine Law is overcome in the family of the Philosophy of Right, to the way in which it is overcome in the Phenomenology of Spirit ,it is immediately clear that the actions of the marriage partners cannot beconsidered to be free ones. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the overcoming of the division between the two laws is performed in the transition fromthe polis into the Roman world. This transition results in the formal per-son of the Roman Law that Hegel characterized as the first self. The first self as it appears in the Roman Law seems to coincide with the first self asit is embodied in the marriage of the Philosophy of Right. On the onehand, in both cases the first self is real as the family organism that appearsin the property of the family; on the other hand, the family organisms

relate to one another as the free and equal persons. Nevertheless, this sim-ilarity is deceitful.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit , the transition from the polis to theRoman Law implies what Hegel calls a “ruin of ethical substance”.(289) The person of the Roman Law has emancipated himself from thetradition of the polis (or better, since the different poleis have differenttraditions from the traditions of the polis). As person the individualhas internalized the pure self that was remembered by the Divine Law.This internalization, however, is only immediately performed: It is not

known by the individual, but only practically expressed in the family life. As a consequence, the content of family life is purely contingent;

The social organism of the family 153



it is no longer embedded in a shared tradition. This exactly is indicatedby the formula “loss of ethical life”.

In the Philosophy of Right , however, this “disappearance of ethical life”

has not been performed within the family.166

After all, the man and the woman have their traditional gender role.167 The “loss of ethical life” isonly discussed at the level of the Dissolution of the family , i.e., at the mo-ment that the children have left the family and relate as free and equalpersons in the civil society. (§ 177) These persons do not share a commontradition and are no longer determined by the tradition of their originalfamily. This does not mean, however, that the persons in the civil society are able to understand the traditional content of the family as a contin-gent one. On the one hand, it appears that the persons that create new

marriages observe the same traditional gender roles as in their originalfamily. On the other hand, as we will see in the next chapter, Hegel con-siders the commodities that belong to the family property not as use-val-ues to satisfy the needs of the contingent norms and values of the family,but as use-values that satisfy natural needs. These natural needs are only socialized by the culture of the market.

From the perspective of the Phenomenology of Spirit, one would ex-pect the construction of a Philosophy of Right in which each family hasits own contingent tradition (like the contingent traditions of the differ-ent poleis). Within these families, the education of the children would bea twofold process: In the first stage, the children would be socialized inthe contingent tradition of the family; in the second stage, the children

would be involved in a learning process in which they develop insightin the contingency of the family tradition as such (cf. the citizens of the polis who, mediated by the religion of the work of art , developed in-sight in the contingency of the polis’s ethical life).

166 It is only in the transition into the civil society that Hegel speaks about “the dis-appearance of ethical life”. (§ 181).

167 Therefore, I agree with Steinberger (1988): “But, more strongly, I would suggest

that the two–the theory of gender and the theory of marriage–are, in fact, flatly contradictory.” (p. 188). For a criticism of Hegel’s conception of the gender val-ues see also Hardimon (1994), p. 185).




The education of the children in the family of the revised‘Philosophy of Right’

a. The socialization of the child in the contingent tradition of the family

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, it has been developed that the individual,as unity of mind and body, can only be conceived of as the member of a social organism that corresponds to structures that can be represented by means of the metaphor lordship/bondsman. Therefore, the child who is so-cialized in the social organism of the family must have passed through allstages of the natural consciousness that Hegel developed from Sense-Cer-tainty up to and including the lordship/bondsman relation. Whether a psy-chological development in this sense is realistic can only be established by scientific research.168 Since it is not within my competence to practice thisresearch, I restrict myself to the attempt to repeat this development of thenatural consciousness in terms of the psychological development of a child. Evidently, this reconstruction has only the status of a research hy-pothesis.

I depart from the newborn child and assume that he already has anelementary consciousness of the “I” all the time. I assume that the new-

born baby already has a notion of his own being-in-himself, so that hecan distinguish between himself and the outside world. Moreover, I pre-suppose that this elementary consciousness of the “I” also embraces anelementary form of an (inner) freedom, i.e., it can retain itself as an el-ementary consciousness of the “I” and is not determined by the outside

world. The “I” can hold the boundary between the world and itself. Theoutside world appears in the form of variable impressions; through these

variable impressions the “I” remains at itself. Subsequently, I assume that

the baby finds himself already in a family situation. For example, he has a father and a mother taking care of him and, together with, for example,some brothers or sisters, he is part of a common household.

Initially, the newborn child is absorbed by the above-mentioned con-sciousness of the “I”. He has no knowledge of his own body and no more

168 Thomas Kesselring tries to explain that the Piaget’s development psychology isstructured like the stages of Consciousness and Self-consciousness. Cf. ThomasKesselring, Entwicklung und Widerspruch. Ein Vergleich zwischen Piagets geneti -

scher Erkenntnistheorie und Hegels Dialektik, Frankfurt/M., 1981; ThomasKesselring, Die Produktivitt der Antinomie. Hegels Dialektik im Lichte der genet-ischen Erkenntnistheorie und der formalen Logik, Frankfurt/M., 1984.

The education of the children in the family 155



self-knowledge than that he is an “I”, distinguished from the outside world. The only “substantial” knowledge he has, are the various impres-sions of the outside world.

Considered from the outside perspective, it is clear that the baby canonly relate to the outside world because he has a body , rather than becauseof his ability to identify objects in the outside world by means of sensualperception. The newborn baby has not yet reached the stage of this “the-oretical” knowledge. Rather, his relation to the outside world is practical.

As corporeal being, the baby is needy: He is hungry, thirsty and needsprotection against the cold. The perception of the outside world is atfirst the practical experience of this neediness: a feeling of hunger, thirstand coldness. In its experience of the neediness, the I-Consciousness of

the baby is determined by the outside world. A baby who is hungry co-incides with his feeling of hunger. He cannot distinguish between himself and this feeling. The feeling of hunger appears to be an overpowering ob-session. Therefore, the experience of neediness is the experience of a lack of freedom. In this relation, the distinction between the “I” and the out-side world cannot be retained.

The experience of neediness is overcome at the moment that the needis satisfied. A child who is given the breast has overcome the hostile out-side world. From the feeling of being dominated by the outside world hehas returned to a positive self-awareness. Therefore, the breast of themother (the “mamma”) can become the symbol of the consciousness of the “I” that was previously totally undetermined. However, if the con-sciousness of the “I” can be symbolized, the relation to the outside

world has been submitted to a change. The satisfaction, i. e. , the presenceof the mother’s breast, is only temporary. After the satisfaction, the feel-ing of neediness returns, until the new need is also satisfied. Therefore,the self-awareness is mediated by a feeling of negativity , by the feeling

of being dependent on a outside world. Because of this, the consciousnessof the “I” is actualized as a process, i.e., as a being determined by theneeds and the return to the own identity by the overcoming of thisbeing-determined. This makes that the own identity is experienced asthe identity of an organism. An organism is free insofar as the mainte-nance of its identity is due to itself; insofar as it satisfies its needs.This freedom is lacking, however, insofar as this self-maintenance is de-pendent on given means of satisfaction. This makes the consciousnessof the “I” somewhat ambivalent. The consciousness of the “I” is free,

but this freedom can only be maintained if the external reality has a qual-ity that is able to satisfy the needs of the I. Since the “I” has not the ability




to determine the quality of the external world, it lacks, in this sense, free-dom.

The experience of the lack of freedom is based on the naturally given

neediness; in this relation freedom is impossible. In his neediness thechild is confronted with a power that it cannot overcome. As a naturalorganism he can never break the power of the outside world. In his need-iness, he remains dependent on the outside world and, in the long run, he

will even decline by its power. Ultimately the child dies (although we may hope that this will only happen at an older age). Not the free will has theultimate control over the body, but death. Therefore, freedom seems tobe incompatible with corporeality.

The child, however, is not a mere natural organism that is related to a

natural environment. He is cared for by his parents and lives in the con-text of his family. The life environment of the child is, so to speak, anartificial organism: a life community that is created by the actions of the parents. The goal of the life community is, amongst others, to guar-antee that the needs of the community’s family members are satisfied.Good parents will do their utmost best to make sure that their childrenlack nothing. If they succeed, the child is not related to an outside worldmanifesting itself as a strange power that leaves it accidental whether hisneeds are or are not satisfied, but rather to an outside world in which herecognizes his own essence. His parents have taken care that his world isan extension of himself in which all his needs are satisfied. Therefore,nothing seems to hinder the child’s awareness of the “I”. The only reasonfor the existence of the world seems to be to serve the child.

The world to which the child is related is the social organism of thefamily in which his parents have expressed their subjective freedom.(Later on, I will discuss how this has to be understood.) Consequently,the child’s needs that are satisfied cannot be considered as immediate nat-

ural needs (the needs of a biological organism), but rather as the culturalneeds in which the free subjective identity of the parents expresses itself.In this sense, the natural organism of the child is already socialized all thetime: The needs that he can satisfy and that are developed in the courseof his growing up are already the cultural needs of the social organism of the family all the time. Therefore, the child cannot distinguish betweenthe actualization of his “I” and the actualization of the free subjectivity of his parents, i.e., he can immediately recognize his parents as his“lord”, as representation of his own essence.169

169 Here, it has no meaning at all to maintain that the child’s recognition of the pa-




Partly, the freedom of the child is only appearance. The child thinksto be free because he identifies himself with his guardians. Actually, how-ever, the relation between the child and his parents is totally a-symmet-

rical. The child conforms to the family life that is constituted by his pa-rents. But at the same time, it cannot be maintained that this relationlacks any freedom. The child is not subjected to the parental authority because he has been driven by instinctual actions. Neither is he subjectedbecause he has been forced by his parents. The child obeys because heidentifies himself with his guardians. His submission, like the submissionof the bondsman to the lord, is self-submission. This is exactly the germof his freedom.

The child who grows up in the context of the family becomes more

and more familiar with its norms and values. He learns to speak the lan-guage in which he can make all the distinctions that are necessary for thefamily life. He approaches, more and more, the role that is expected of him. The child internalizes the demands of his parent, so that the lifein the family becomes something totally obvious. Because of that, the au-thority of the parents vis--vis the child loses its externality. The child nolonger identifies with the guardians, but experiences family life as the ac-tualization of his own freedom. He thinks that he is doing nothing other

than practicing the norms and values that follow from his own convic-tion. He is convinced that his life is totally in harmony with himself.Therefore, the disciplining in the family to which the child is subjectedappears as self-discipline and self-expression.

b. The process in which the child develops awareness of the contingenceof the family tradition

The freedom of the child that has socialized himself in the social organ-ism of the family is freedom only in appearance. The social content hehas appropriated is constituted by his parents. Although the process of socialization presupposes that the child is free (he is able to observe cul-tural norms and values), his pure self is absorbed by the norms and valuesthat he practically performs in the family. Like the citizen of the polis, the

rents has to be preceded by a struggle of life and death. The reality of the child isnot first a natural organism that is afterwards socialized. He already realizes him-

self in the form of freedom all the time. Yet, it makes sense to put forth that thefear of death is institutionalised in the social organism of the family: Without thefamily the child would die.




child can only become aware of his pure freedom when he develops in-sight into the contingency of the family norms and values. I will show that the stages of this process of development can be reconstructed ac-

cording to the format of the religion of the work of art. As in the polis,the pure self will appear as the undermining force of the family tradi-tion.170

We have experienced that, at the level of the polis, the pure self got itsembodiment in the family, i.e., in its Divine Law. Later on, I will elab-orate that, also in the revised Philosophy of Right , the pure self (in its im-mediate form) gets its embodiment in the family. This time, however, thepure self that is embodied is not the pure self of the deceased family member, but the pure self of the parents. The persons that constitutethe family organism can express their subjective freedom in the normsand values of the family they create. Therefore, the norms and valuesof the family have a totally different status for the parents than for thechild.

That the norms and values of the family express the subjective free-dom of the parents, is indirectly experienced by the child who is growing up. Since the parents express their subjective freedom in the family organ-ism, all families have different, contingent norms and values. The differ-

ence between the norms and values is experienced by the child when he isconfronted with other families. The experience of the contingence of thefamily norms and values threatens to undermine the child’s confidence inhis own family. For the first time, he has the suspicion that there is somedifference between his identity and the one of his parents.

The child, however, had identified himself with his parents and hadbeen convinced that his destiny lies in the unconditional care of his pa-rents. Therefore, the experience of contingence does not immediately re-

sult in the child’s loss of basic trust, or in an identity crisis. The child,rather, tries to ward off the undermining forces, and repairs the convic-tion that his own family expresses his own absolute identity. His confron-tation with other families does not make his own family an exchangeableone. The child’s consciousness of the absolute meaning of his own family is represented by the image of his family. The child makes his parents andhis parental house the representation of his absolute identity (like the citi-zens of the polis represented their absolute identity in the statue of thegod and the temple).

170 Once again, this reconstruction of the child’s development is purely hypothetical.




By representing the family, the child can develop a self-conscious in-sight into the family relation. To maintain his image of the family as theexpression of his subjective identity, the child is obliged to assimilate

more and more determinations in his image until the moment whenhe must admit that the family organism is a contingent entity that failsto give shape to his subjective identity. We will see that the stages of the representations can indeed be structured like the stages of the religionof the work of art.

The child was urged on the representation of the family because he was confronted with other families having other values and norms.This diversity practically expresses the pure self of the persons: They all have the subjective freedom to constitute a family organism in

which their subjective norms and values are embodied. If, however, thechild represents the family organism in which he is living by means of the image of his parents and his house, he represents the subjective par-ticularity of the family organism. But this particularity is not representedas the product of the pure self of his parents. Therefore, to retain theimage of the family as the representation of his absolute identity, thechild must integrate the pure self of his parents in his image of the family.Since his parents express their pure self in the language in which they

utter their subjectivity, the child must make this language the image of the family, as well. Insofar as this language functions as an image of the family, the pure self has become part of the child’s consciousness of it.171 We will see that this penetration of the pure self, in the end, con-tributes to the revelation of the contingency of the family organism.

The pure self that is embodied in the speaking voice of the parentshas “a vanishing existence” that “falls short of attaining a lasting shapeand is, like Time, no longer immediately present in the very moment

of its being present”.

172

Therefore, the child passes through the Unhappy Consciousness: The representation of his absolute essence slips away. Therepresentation can only be brought back when the free self of the parentsis synthesized with the social organism of the family. The representationof this synthesis finds the child in the “ritual” actions of the parents, i.e.,

171 Cf. the hymn at the level of the religion of the work of art: The hymn representsthe pure self of the artist who produced the work of art (the statue of the god). With the hymn, the pure self penetrates in the public consciousness of the polis

(likewise here, in the family, in the form of the human voice).172 Here, I repeat the qualifications that Hegel gives to the hymn at the level of thereligion of the work of art.




in the actions in which the parents symbolize the reproduction of thefamily’s social organism. These actions are performed in the festivitiesand ceremonies in which the family life is central: birthdays, funerals, sea-

son’s celebrations, baptismal ceremonies, Mother’s and Father’s days,etc.173 Insofar as these actions concern the institutional reality of the fam-ily, they are involved in an objective existence, i.e., in an existence thatsurvives the vanishing existence of the speaking voice. Insofar as these ac-tions are symbolic, they concern the family organism as such and are, inthis sense, free.

In the “ritual” actions, however, the synthesis between the subjectivefreedom of the parents and the family organism remains external. Becausethese actions are only “ritual”, they exist over and above their real actions

and cannot guarantee the absolute existence of the family organism. Thisexistence seems to be guaranteed only if the externality of the relation be-tween the free action and the family organism is overcome. The free ac-tion must necessarily be oriented to the actualization of the family organ-ism. This demand seems to be impossible: The freedom of the actioncontradicts the demanded necessity.

The aforementioned contradiction can be overcome when the free ac-tion that has to actualize the family organism is not attributed to the pa-

rents, but to the child himself. Because the child accepts the norms and values of the family as his absolute essence, he can have the convictionthat he realizes his freedom when he observes the norms and values inhis actions. Therefore, the child turns to a new stage in his development:He tries to actualize the norms and values of his family. He takes up therole of the “bondsman” who tries to observe the norms and values of his“lord”. By sacrificing himself to this lord, i.e., to these norms and values,he tries to actualize his free essence.174

By totally observing the norms and values of the family, the model

child learns that he is the “lord” of these norms and values: Their realexistence is dependent on his freedom. At this stage, the child becomesaware of his free identity, of his independence from his parents. But atthe same time he still identifies himself with the norms and values of his original family: He has appropriated these norms and values as hisown ones. Consequently, the objective reality of the family organismhas become a reality in which the child recognizes his own inner essence.This relation to the objectivity of the family determines how the child

173 Cf. the abstract Cult in the Greek world.174 Cf. the actual Cult of the Greek world.




relates to the broader objectivity of the social world. The child expects toget back his free essence in the social reality: He identifies himself withsport heroes, pop stars and movie stars.175

Sooner or later, the child will experience the limitations of the iden-tification with his youth heroes. They become stiffened icons in which hecannot recognize the freedom of his identity. Therefore, the child tries tounderstand the broader objective world as the world in which he can rec-ognize his free essence, because this world is mediated by his action. Sincethe actions of the broader social world are outside the scope of the child(who only acts in the domain of the family), this understanding of thebroader social world can only be achieved be means of representations.Like the Ancient Greek citizens who represented their social world in

the spiritual works of art (Epic , Tragedy and Comedy ), so the modernchild portrays his world in distinct spiritual works of art. In both cases,the representations must ward off the outside world that threatens thenorms and values of the original family.

In the multicultural society, collectively shared stories such as theIliad , and the tragedies and comedies of the Ancient Greek world, fail.Nevertheless, in the public domain of the multicultural society, storiescirculate (in the form of books, movies, theatre pieces, television pro-

grams, songs, musicals), that can have the same educative function asthe spirituals works of art , namely making the children aware of the con-tingency of the norms and values of their original families. These storiescan teach (as in the Epic ), that if all individuals persist in their originalnorms and values while acting in the public domain, they make theblind destiny master of the world. Or they can make it clear (as in thetragedies ), that, although the subjectivity that is expressed in the family organism excludes the inter-subjectivity that is expressed in the public do-main, at the same time they presuppose one another. Or, ultimately, they

show (as in the comedies ), that the stories are only constructions in whichthe protagonists play their roles. Under the masks of their roles, however,they remain the ordinary individuals who all have their own family normsand values. Probably this explains the popularity of (real-life) soaps andprograms like Idols , i.e., programs in which the actors are unskilled, “or-dinary” people.

The stories teach the children that all attempts to attribute to thenorms and values of their own family a status that surpasses contingency,

175 Cf. the living work of art in the Greek world, in which the observing Reason wasrepresented.




are in vain. The norms and values express the subjectivity of their parentsto which the children are related as to a contingent fact. The awareness of this contingency ends in the “ethical” dissolution of the family: At the

moment that the child himself realizes that the norms and values of hisoriginal family are contingent, his relation to these norms and values be-comes external. As a consequence, he is no longer a member of the socialorganism of the family. Although the child may factually still live with hisoriginal family, it loses for him the meaning of an ethical institution in

which he shares the norms and values with his family members.In Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the ethical dissolution of the family has

another meaning: “The ethical dissolution of the family consists in this,that once the children have been educated to freedom of personality, andhave come of age, they become recognized as persons in the eyes of thelaw and as capable of holding free property of their own and founding families of their own, the sons as heads of new families, the daughtersas wives. They now have their substantive destiny in the new family;the old family, on the other hand, falls into the background as merely their ultimate basis and origin, while, a fortiori , the clan is an abstraction,devoid of rights.” (§ 177)

Also according to Hegel, the ethical dissolution of the family has to

do with the growing up of the children and the external relation they develop towards the original family. In Hegel’s view, this externality is prac-tically expressed in the new families that are constituted by the children.The externality does not concern the awareness that the norms and valuesof the original family are contingent. On the contrary, it appears that thenew families essentially have exactly the same norms and values as theoriginal family. Hegel not only indicates that the man and woman inthe new families have the same gender roles as in the original family

(“the sons as heads of new families, the daughters as wives”), but healso seems to assume that the grownup sons and daughters are immedi-ately prepared to constitute a new family. The notion fails that the chil-dren can only constitute their own family when they have developed theirown subjective norms and values. Once again it appears that Hegel con-fuses ethical immediacy with natural immediacy. Ethical immediacy ex-presses non-exchangeable subjectivity and appears in a multitude of forms. In the Philosophy of Right , the ethical immediacy is not only con-fused with natural immediacy because it has apparently only one form of

appearance, but also because this single form is, as we have seen before,deduced from natural (biological) relations.




In our view, the adequate constitution of new families is only possible when the grownup children have passed through a learning process in which they develop insight into their own subjectivity. In this case,

they can overcome the contingency of the norms and values of the orig-inal family and constitute a family organism in which norms and valuesare observed that express their own subjectivity, not the one of their pa-rents (although the children can, of course, discover that their own normsand values do not differ from the ones of their parents). Since this learn-ing process takes place at the level of civil society, it can only be discussedin the next chapter, in which the civil society is systematically developed.

Although the systematic exposition of the institutional embodiment of the three selves has to get shape after one another, it is clear that the ex-

position is a logical one, so that the distinct parts already presuppose oneanother all the time. After the development of civil society , we have, so tospeak, to return to this chapter (that concerns the first self ): Only the per-sons who are educated at the level of civil society are prepared for the ad-equate constitution of new families.176

Retrospection

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel understands the family as the social or-ganism in which the animal reproduction gets shape in the form of free-dom. As a consequence, the ethical content of the family is not developedas the ethical life in the form of immediacy, i.e., as the domain in whichthe contingent subjectivity of the free individuals is expressed. The ethicalimmediacy is confused with the natural immediacy: Natural relations aretransformed into ethical relations that are still determined by nature.177

This determination of the family not only contradicts subjective freedom

because it confines the tradition of family life to the one that is deter-mined by nature, but also because this confined tradition offers no

176 Also in the Philosophy of Right, the persons develop their subjectivity only at thelevel of civil society. This subjectivity, however, is not brought down to the family relations. In this respect, Hegel seems to be influenced by the Phenomenology of Spirit , in which the three forms of the self belong to distinct historical periodsand are not developed as moments in the framework of a concrete entirety.

177 In fact, Hegel returns to his position of the Jena Lectures of Philosophy. Cf. Hon-

neth (1995): “Hegel now makes use of ‘recognition’: In love relationships, he writes in a marginal remark, it is the ‘uncultivated natural self ’ that is ‘recog-nized’.” (p. 37).




room for the actualization of subjective freedom at all. According to He-gel’s Philosophy of Right, there is only a place for subjectivity outside thefamily: at the level of civil society.

Departing from the Phenomenology of Spirit, the embodiment of the first self in the social organism of the family must be understood otherwise. The family members themselves must be able to understand the eth-ical life of the family as a contingent tradition in which the life partnersexpress their subjective freedom. In this revised conception of the family,the education of the children becomes more complicated. Education isnot only the process in which the children are socialized in the traditionof the family, but also the process in which they develop insight into thecontingent status of this tradition. Moreover, the education process has to

be continued at the level of civil society, where the children must developinsight into their own subjective identity. Only when this condition is ful-filled, are they in the position to constitute their own marriage.

Although the revision of the concept of family is inspired by the Phe-nomenology of Spirit , this work is at the same time responsible for the con-fusion in the Philosophy of Right. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegeldiscusses the religion forms that belong to the historical worlds only after-

wards, when the transition to the absolute Spirit has been performed. Theseparation between religion and the objective world returns in the Philos-ophy of Right , because this work is meant as the systematic developmentof the objective Spirit. However, it is precisely this separation that preventsthe adequate development of the first self ’s embodiment.

In Chapter 8, I will examine the embodiment of the second self in civil society. At this level, I can discuss the continuing education process in

which subjective identity is developed. Before the elaboration of this pro-gram, however, I will first make an attempt to make my reconstruction of the child’s moral development more plausible. In an Excursus, I will com-

pare this reconstruction with Habermas’s reconstruction of Kohlberg’sstages of moral consciousness.

Retrospection 165



Excursus: The Development of the Child to a Real Person inConfrontation with Jrgen Habermas’s Reception of the Stages

of Moral Consciousness developed by Lawrence Kohlberg

Introduction

In his discourse ethics, Jrgen Habermas develops an alternative for Kant’scategorical imperative, his so-called Principle of Universalization, abbrevi-ated by him as “U”: Every valid norm has to fulfill the condition that “ All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general ob-servance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s inter-ests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternativepossibilities for regulation).”178 Together with the “Principle of discourse ethics ” “D”, that implies that: “Only those norms can claim to be validthat meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capaci-ty as participants in a practical discourse ”179, “U” is the core of Habermas’sethical theory.

“D” indicates that the highest moral law, like the categorical imper-ative, aims at testing certain norms on their moral content. As in Kant,it is about the universalizability of norms. This time, however, universal-

izability does not mean an absolute freedom that transcends all content,but rather, a generality that is understood as rational consensus. There-fore, dependent on this consensus, the test can result in norms thathave a defined content. In “U”, the demands that the content of themoral norms has to satisfy are specified more precisely: Action that is pre-scribed by a moral norm must have a result that does justice to the sub-

jective interest of all.From the fundamental determinations of the moral subject as they

are developed up until now, Habermas’s discourse ethical findings arehardly surprising. Also, the determination of the concrete person (themoral subject) ended in the conclusion that real freedom is only possibleif there has been justice done to the subjective interests of all (cf. “U”).Moreover, at the level of the formal determination of the free person,it became clear that that free persons relate completely symmetrically to one another, so that no person can do anything without the consent

178 Cf. Jrgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical

Justification”, p. 65. In: Jrgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communica-tive Action, Polity Press 1992.179 Ibidem, p. 66.




of all. (cf. “D”). Nevertheless, both approaches diverge at an essentialpoint. While it came to the fore in our exposition that it is possibly prob-lematic whether the symmetry between the formally determined persons

is compatible with the demand that justice has been done to the subjec-tive interest of every person, it seems that for Habermas there is no prob-lem at all. Habermas’s secret is the discourse theory of truth and rightness,based on his conception of discourse. A norm is just when all involvedhave reached rational consensus about it. Rational consensus is distin-guished from consensus that is only factual and can only be accomplishedif certain conditions are satisfied. It can only be accomplished as the resultof a reasonable argumentation process between all involved. The reason-ability of the argumentation is guaranteed if the argumentation partners

relate freely and equally (symmetrically) to one another. Moreover, they must be prepared at all times to exchange the paradigmatic presupposi-tions of their argumentation to other paradigmatic presuppositions.

It is not difficult to recognize that precisely the discourse theory of rightness hides the problems observed by us. As soon as the discussionpartners relate themselves to concrete contents, they do no longer relatesymmetrically to one another. They have a determined relation to thecontent that is, especially in its determinedness, distinct from the relation

other partners take to the content. From this it follows that the discoursetheory of rightness is untenable, and that the problems observed by usreturn also to Habermas. He should have asked himself whether “U”and “D” are compatible.

Until now, the distinction between our approach to the moral subjectand the one of Habermas has in no way been articulated sufficiently sharply. To make this clear, I still have to make some remarks about

what is at stake in Habermas’s thought enterprise. As it has already been mentioned before, “U” can be understood as the discourse ethical

translation of Kant’s categorical imperative. Accordingly, so also can“D” be understood as the discourse theoretical transformation of theKantian concept of autonomy. It can even be defended that the wholeTheory of communicative Action can be interpreted as a discourse theoret-ical transformation of Kantian Reason.180 But Habermas does not only want to develop another philosophy, but also undermine the status of tra-ditional philosophy as such. Philosophy has lost its autonomy. Therefore,“U” and “D” do not have the status of philosophical insight, but rather

180 Cf. Paul Cobben, “Communicatief handelen als theoretisch grondbegrip”, ANTW, 81.4, 1989, pp. 241 – 263.

Excursus: The Development of the Child to a Real Person 167



have for Habermas the status of what he calls “hypothetical reconstruc-tion”. (116) Habermas tries to reconstruct which concept of moral law and which concept of autonomy are active in our cultural tradition. Ra-

tional reconstructions remain to have a hypothetical status, and can only retain their attractiveness if they are indirectly supported by scientific,i.e., empirically testable theories. (116/7) Our attempts to get to grips

with the essential determinations of the moral subject by conceptual anal-ysis will be a thorn in Habermas’s side. After all, this kind of project triesto maintain philosophy’s autonomy.

Yet, Habermas’ appeal to scientific (and, consequently, testable) the-ories, offers an exquisite chance to deepen the confrontation with our ap-proach. In his article “Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln”

(“Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action”181), Habermas con-fronts himself with the development stages of the moral consciousness asthey are conceived of by Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg has the opinionthat the development of the moral consciousness (at least insofar as itis characteristic for our culture), necessarily goes through six stages. Itis about a developmental psychological theory that pretends that it canbe empirically tested. In the article just mentioned, Habermas tries to in-terpret development stages in terms of the discourse ethics. If this is pos-sible, discourse ethics can profit from the empirical testing by whichKohlberg’s theory is supported.

Also in our approach, the moral consciousness can only be generatedif it goes through some number of development stages. In this case, how-ever, the development stages do not have the status of a scientific hypoth-esis, but are developed in the framework of an attempt to understand how a free person can be conceived of as a corporal individual at all. There-fore, philosophical insights are pretended. But also, philosophical insightsare not apart from the empirical reality. Therefore, it is worth the effort to

examine whether the development stages that are distinguished by Kohl-berg can also be explained in terms of philosophical development stages.

In the following exposition, the discourse ethical interpretation iscompared to the philosophical one. This makes it possible to articulatemore precisely the import and scope of both approaches.

181 Jrgen Habermas, “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action”, in: Jr-gen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Polity Press 1992.




The interpretation of the development stages of Kohlberg

Habermas tries to interpret the moral stages distinguished by Kohlberg in

the framework of his Theory of communicative Action. In the consecutivestages, the communicative action is more and more explicated, until fi-nally the sixth and highest stage of communicative action is completely crystallized as the “action oriented toward reaching understanding”182

of the discourse. Like Kohlberg, Habermas divides the stages into threephases, each of which in turn is comprised of two stages: the pre-conven-tional, the conventional and the post-conventional phase. I will start withthe discussion of the pre-conventional phase and will, subsequently, ex-amine how this phase can be interpreted by our philosophical approach.

The pre-conventional phase is characterized by the lack of thematiz-ing social reality. The moral subject (the child) is, in his actions, imme-diately related towards (the actions of) his direct family members. Therelation to others is not at stake. Moreover, at this level, action has a pure-ly egocentric perspective: Empathy in the other’s position is still impos-sible. In the first stage of this phase, the child does what his guardian tellshim to do, acting from a feeling of loyalty towards this guardian. Thechild is obedient because he cannot imagine not to be. In the second

phase, the child only does something if he gets something in returnthat is in his interest.

In our approach, the consecutive stages of the moral consciousnesscan be interpreted as well as a process of explication. This time, however,it is not about the explication of communicative action, but rather aboutan explication of the reality of freedom. But also, in this case, the firstphase of the development process can be called pre-conventional. Inthis phase, the I-consciousness is not yet that far developed that it is

aware of a social reality. The world to which it is related is a naturalone, not a social one. In the first stage of this phase, the child is only re-lated to the immediately given, natural reality and it is one-sidedly orient-ed to the actualization of its I-awareness. It can only maintain this aware-ness, as long as it has overcome its needy relation to nature. Therefore,the “mamma” (the breast of the mother) can become a symbol of theI-awareness. In this stage, the action of the child is oriented to being not related to natural reality; he does not want to know about his needi-ness, because this threatens his I-identity.

182 Ibid, p. 160.




In the second stage of the pre-conventional phase, the moral con-sciousness has experienced that it cannot overcome its relation to nature.It experiences what it means to be a living organism. It is constantly con-

fronted with its own neediness and its action is oriented to the satisfactionof its needs. Now, nature appears as an independent power that has thestructure of an organism; nature appears as the process in which the childsometimes can satisfy his needs and sometimes not.

The second phase that Habermas (with Kohlberg) distinguishes is theconventional phase. In this phase, the social reality no longer remains keptout of range. The moral subject knows that his action takes place in thesocial context and is, therefore, linked with conventions. His motive toact is no longer inspired by the power of the guardian or by the advantage

a certain action brings, but by the duty to respect the prevailing tradition.In the first stage of the conventional phase (i.e., in the third stage of themoral consciousness), the moral consciousness identifies itself with thespecific role it has in society. It thinks to have the duty to fulfill therole society has in mind. In the second stage of the conventional stage(i.e., in the fourth stage of the moral consciousness), it no longer actsone-sidedly from the specific role that has been assigned to it, but relatesitself to the social system in its entirety. It understands that that society can only survive if it has certain underlying norms. It considers it to beits duty to observe these norms because they are legitimized by the uni-

versal will. Also, the conventional phase can be distinguished in our approach.

The moral subject that cannot realize its freedom as a natural organismtries to reach its goal in the framework of the family community. Inthis relation, the objective reality is no longer a given natural being-at-it-self, but the traditional reality of the family. In the first stage of this con-

ventional phase, the child identifies himself with the head of the family.

He obeys the head of the family as an undisputed authority, and by this,takes on his role as a member of the family. He experiences the fulfill-ment of this role as his immediate duty because, without this role, he

would be deprived of his identity.Precisely because the child conforms himself to the tradition of the

family, he passes step by step through a development by which he reachesthe second stage of the conventional stage. Step by step, he gets involvedin the life of the family. He develops a language with which he can makeall distinctions that are relevant in this world. For him, the world loses all

its strangeness. Therefore, a change can take place in his conception of the family’s essence. The reality of family life is no longer conceived of




as dependent on the family head’s authority, but gets its ground in theinsight that the child has developed in family life. The child completely knows his reality: he has appropriated this reality and feels as at home in

it as a fish does in the water. Reality has removed all its strangeness and is,for the child, nothing other than the real appearance of his own insight.The child no longer acts on the basis of the authority of the family head,but on the basis of his own insight, i. e., his insight into the nature of re-ality. The child knows that he lives in a specific family community. Heacts in correspondence to his insight into how a member of the family should behave.

In the post-conventional phase, the moral subject is able to discusssociety as such. He is explicitly able to distinguish between the subjective,

inter-subjective and objective world. Therefore, he not only knows thatsocial conventions are changeable, but also he can distinguish betweenthe norms that are factually valid in the social world and those thatshould be valid according to his subjective insight. In the first stage of the post-conventional insight (i.e., the fifth stage of the moral conscious-ness), the moral subject wants to discover the highest principles of justiceand wants to test (in a scientific discourse), to what extent the norms thatare actually valid correspond to these highest principles of justice. The“Theory of Justice”, as it has been developed by John Rawls, can be con-sidered a model of this stage.

In the second stage of the post-conventional phase (i.e. the sixth andhighest stage of moral consciousness), the moral consciousness no longerthinks that the highest principles of justice can be identified by a theoret-ical construction. It is only certain that the highest principles of justice arethe result of a procedure as described by Habermas in his concept of thepractical discourse. Therefore, the moral subject strives for the creation of the conditions under which the practical discourse can be performed.

Also in our approach, a post-conventional phase can be distinguished.In this phase, the child is confronted with other families and discovers thecontingence of the tradition of his own family life. For the first time, thechild is forced to conceive of his subjective identity independently fromhis family life. He opposes family life as a changeable traditional reality.Because of this, he seems to have lost all moral certainty. Yet this does notimply that the child relapses into moral skepticism. He has felt complete-ly at home in the family. He has experienced the family affection resulting in his opinion to be really free. Family has made him what he is, includ-

ing the one who is now opposing the family. Now the child knows that hecan never again be absorbed by family life and that he has an independent




identity. At the same time, he knows that he never would have become who he is without the family. Therefore, he once again turns to the family and examines which principles underlie the tradition of the family, and

hopes after all to find in these principles the actualization of his freedom.The stage in which the moral consciousness identifies these principles with the family rituals that raise up the life of the family members aboveactual life and link it with the continuity of changing generations, corre-sponds to the first stage of Kohlsberg’s post-conventional consciousness.Now moral consciousness understands family life as appearance of uni-

versal principles. The transition into the sixth and highest stage of moral consciousness, however, has not been made. If the moral con-sciousness of the child concludes that the family rituals are after all

only valid in the contingent family community, then he does not con-clude that the principles that underlie family have to be understood asthe result of a practical discourse, but he turns away from the family and no longer tries to actualize his freedom in it. The child leaves the pa-rental house and tries to keep the universality of his freedom by actual-izing his freedom outside the family, namely in his role as the person

who actualizes himself in the symmetrical exchange of properties. We will still see how the grownup child later founds his own family andno longer has to consider the real family life as an external, contingentreality, because he can make it the expression of his subjective freedom.In the next chapter, I will elaborate under what conditions this subjectivefreedom can be developed. At least the grownup children will have to par-ticipate in the public discussion of civil society.

Concluding considerations

Habermas claims that his Theory of communicative Action, and the relateddiscourse ethics, acquires indirect scientific support with the help of thestages of moral consciousness that Kohlberg distinguishes. On the onehand, these stages of the moral consciousness can be interpreted interms of the Theory of communicative Action, and, on the other hand,they can be experimentally tested. However, if it is right that the stagesof moral consciousness developed by Kohlberg can be equally well inter-preted in our approach, there seems to be a problem. Which approach isaffirmed by Kohlberg’s scientific experiments? Are the stages formulated

thus abstractly that they are compatible with at least two and possibly more approaches? Then it has little meaning to claim that a theory is in-




directly supported by scientific experiments. At best, it can be maintainedthat the experiments do not contradict the theory.

Yet, the preceding argumentation does not imply that Kohlberg’s sci-

entific and empirically testable theory is, in the same way, related to thetheory of Habermas as to our approach. In the last case, the stages of moral consciousness are deduced in an immanently philosophical reason-ing: They resulted from the attempt to reconcile freedom and corporeal-ity. If a developmental psychologist comes to similar formulations of thestages and can connect them with the moral development of real children

with the help of experiments, this can certainly be interpreted as an affir-mation of the philosophically developed stages of the moral conscious-ness. However, I think that the relation between the Theory of communi-cative Action and Kohlberg’s development psychology remains that ob-scure, that the affirmation of Habermas’s theory by Kohlberg’s psychol-ogy, does not succeed.

Habermas makes two important remarks about the relation betweenhis theory and the one of Kohlberg:

“A nonfoundationalist self-understanding of this kind does more, however,than simply relieve philosophy of tasks that have overburdened it. It notonly takes something away from philosophy; it also provides it with the op-

portunity for a certain navet and a new self-confidence in its cooperativerelationship with the reconstructive sciences. A relationship of mutual de-pendence becomes established. Thus, to return to the matter at hand, notonly does moral philosophy depend on direct conformation from a develop-mental psychology of moral consciousness ; the latter in turn is built on phil-osophical assumptions. I will investigate this interdependence by using Kohl-berg as an example.”183

Later on in the article, Habermas maintains:

“What follows has the limited purpose of making a plausible case for theforegoing hypotheses about the ontogenesis of speaker and world perspec-tives, on the basis of existing empirical studies. At best, a hypothetical recon-struction of this kind can serve as a guide to further research. Admittedly, my hypotheses do require distinctions not easy to operationalize, distinctions be-tween (a) communicative roles and speaker perspectives, (b) implementa-tions of these speaker perspectives in different types of interactions, and(c) the perspective structure of an understanding of the world that permitsa choice between basic attitudes to the objective, social and subjective worlds.I am aware of the difficulty that results from the fact that I have to bring

183 Ibid., p. 119.




these distinctions from the outside to bear on material derived from previousresearch.”184

Here, Habermas speaks about a certain navet of non-foundationalist

philosophy towards the reconstructive sciences. If he wants to stress with this the methodological independence of science, then, of course,there is nothing against it. I simply do not understand what it has todo with the self-understanding of philosophy that is or is not “founda-tionalist”. Also, a philosophy that acknowledges philosophically based in-sights leaves room to the specificity of scientific research. Whoever thinksthat the development stages of the moral consciousness in a specific cul-ture can be deduced from a philosophical ground position, does not re-

alize, himself, that the philosophical conceptualization of reality leavesplenty of room for an historical concretizing that can only be made acces-sible by scientific research.

However, the way in which Habermas makes a problem of the rela-tion between philosophy and science is highly dubious. On the one hand,he speaks about a “mutual dependency” between science and philosophy,and, on the other hand, he acknowledges that the analytic points of view of his philosophy are externally related to science. This means that therelation between science and philosophy cannot be determined at all.

Firstly, the “mutual dependency” leads to a circularity in which nothing can be determined with certainty, even though Habermas makes the im-pressive revelation that he has “reservations about the circular character”of the mutual testing of philosophy and science that he “considers to beunfounded”. (p. 117) Secondly, one can ask oneself what this circularity means when the relation between philosophy and science is understood inthis external way. Why, considering this externality, should the philosoph-ical presuppositions of the scientific hypotheses (in this case: the develop-

ment stages of moral consciousness), have anything to do with the theory of communicative action? Why, considering this externality, should thetheory of communicative action be precisely related to Kohlberg ’s scientif-ic theory? Who can conclude that there are no better candidates?

Habermas’s misconception of the relation between philosophy andscience is expressed when he discusses the universal status of the stagesof moral development. According to Habermas, Kohlberg opposes allkinds of relativistic approaches, and persists in universalistic stages by “(a) reducing the empirical diversity of existing moral views to variation

184 Ibid., p. 141.




in the contents , in contrast to the universal forms , of moral judgment, and(b) explaining the remaining structural differences between moralities asdifferences in this stage of development of the capacity for moral judg-

ment.” (p. 117). Of this exists the “consonance between psychologicaltheory and normative theory” (p. 117), i.e., between what I indicatedas philosophy and science.

The finding of universal forms, however, is not a matter of science. With the help of scientific testing it can never be proven that a form isuniversal. Universal forms follow from philosophical standpoints. An ex-ample would be our philosophical position from which we have deduceduniversal development stages of the moral consciousness. If Kohlberg in-troduces universal forms, this means that he is, at that moment, active as

a philosopher, not as a scientist. Kohlberg’s philosophical position can orcannot coincide with the one of Habermas. But in both cases there is nomatter of an indirect affirmation of Habermas’s theory.

The development stages that can be philosophically deduced alwayshave a logical , not psychological status. For example, they show the logicalsteps that have to be passed through by a free individual who is still ab-sorbed by natural relations and who wants to develop into an explicitly free individual, or they show the logical steps that have to be passedthrough by the individual who has the potency to make himself under-standable towards others and who wants to actualize this potency.These logical steps can be the criteria for the formulation of psychologicaldevelopment stages that are passed through by a concrete individual.This, however, asks for a certain cultural realization. Only in this transi-tion does science come into sight. One could maintain that philosophy that is based on the results of fruitful scientific research is indirectly af-firmed. But also, in this case, there is no matter of “mutual dependency”between philosophy and science.




Chapter 8The Civil Society: Developing the Institutional Houseof the Second Self

Introduction

In this chapter, I will elaborate the institutional actualization of the second self for our era, i.e., I will confront the conceptual determinations of the

second self with institutions of our globalized world and examine whichinstitutions can be considered as an adequate realization of the second self. To prepare this attempt, however, I will first go into Hegel’s attemptin the Philosophy of Right, to elaborate the institutionalization of the sec-ond self for the Nineteenth Century. I will critique the result of Hegel’sattempt, the Corporation (or, what Hegel calls, the second family ). Thiscriticism does not concern the features of the Corporation that typically seem to belong to the Nineteenth Century, but is more elementary. I

will show what are the consequences of Hegel’s confusion at the level

of the family (where he confused natural and ethical immediacy). Atthe level of civil society , there is no room for subjective freedom in itspregnant meaning: It is reduced to a subjectivity that is totally socialized.

As a consequence, Hegel’s concept of Corporation does not meet the cri-teria for the second self that Hegel himself has developed in the Phenom-enology of Spirit. This criticism will appear helpful for the positive con-struction of the second self ’s institutional embodiment.

The development of the second self’s embodiment in the‘Philosophy of Right’: civil society

Systematically, the second self has to be conceived of as the mediated (self-conscious) unity of right and morality. Therefore, one would expect thatthe civil society is constructed as the unity of the second moment of ab-stract Right, i.e., Contract , and the second moment of Morality , i.e., In-tention and Welfare.

Insofar as the civil society is understood as the domain of the multi-tude of families, it is not difficult to recognize the relation of the Con-



tract. The families are the “concrete persons” who recognize one anotheras free and equal. Their mutual recognition becomes real in the Contract,i.e., at the moment that the families exchange their properties.

The civil society , as the multitude of families, seems to correspond tothe Roman Law in which the legal persons recognize one another as freeand equal. Also the persons of the Roman Law are family heads, and inthis sense, “concrete persons”: They reproduce themselves by the free con-sumption of the family’s property and they express their mutual recogni-tion by the exchange of properties.

The comparison between the civil society and the Roman Law allows a further elaboration insofar as Hegel characterizes the relations betweenthe persons in both cases as a “disappearance of ethical life”. The

Roman Law has been constituted after the decline of the ethical lifethat was actualized in the Greek world. The Roman families no longershare their norms and values, and are only related insofar as they ex-change properties. At the level of civil society , the free and equal personshave left family life: The family is only represented as the commoditiesthat are produced by the family and that can be exchanged with the com-modities of other families.

The “disappearance of ethical life” leads to the decline of the Roman

Empire because it is not guaranteed that the persons can harmoniously live together. In Chapter 4, it is discussed which developments this de-cline induced: The pure self that was absorbed by the practical freedomof family life returned in the form of an inner representation, and wasembodied in the Belief. The judgment that the Belief passed on the (ob-

jective) institutional world, induced, in its turn, a process of culture in which the persons were completely socialized. This resulted in the abso-lute freedom of the French Revolution, i.e., in the revolutionary citizens

who want to immediately actualize their alleged autonomy. At the level of civil society , however, the “disappearance of ethical life”cannot lead to the decline of civil society. Civil society is already a momentof the entirety of the ethical life in which the conscientious individual hasactualized his freedom all the time. The person is the conscientious indi-

vidual who is aware that he actualizes his freedom in the civil society: Heknows that his actualization of freedom, at the level of civil society , has a mediated form, i.e., the mediated unity of right and morality. Therefore,the person of the civil society is also an autonomous moral subject who

wants to actualize his subjective freedom. The person of the Contract is, at the same time, the subject of Intention and Welfare.

The development of the second self’s embodiment 177



The problem is, however, that it is not evident that the persons of thecivil society can be the subjects of Intention and Welfare, as well. Whereasthe formal (free and equal) persons do not exclude one another, this may

be different for the subjects of Intention and Welfare. The actualization of the welfare of the one can exclude the welfare of the other. Therefore, thepersons of the civil society , like the persons of the Realm of Culture , mustpass through a process of culture that guarantees that they can strive aftertheir subjective welfare without excluding one another. We will see thatthis process results in the Corporations. The Corporations make possible

what failed, at the level of absolute freedom, in the Realm of Culture:the harmony between the moral individuals that actualize their subjectivefreedom. In the next section, I will discuss the process of education in the

civil society, and show that it is structured like the process of culture in theRealm of Culture.

The process of Culture in Civil Society

We have seen that the moral individual of the Realm of Culture was relat-ed to an objective institutional world. In his process of culture, the moral

individual repeated the stages of observing and active Reason. Also the per-son of civil society is related to an independent, objective world, namely the commodities that he finds at the free market. His process of cultureconcerns his relation to these commodities, and repeats once again thestages of observing and active Reason.185

Since the observing Reason repeats, in its turn, the stages of Conscious-ness and Self-consciousness , the person’s process of culture begins with a re-lation that is structured as the Sense-Certainty (in the form of observing Reason): The commodities that he finds at the market are immediately

given, contingent entities. Therefore, it is completely accidental whetherthese commodities can or cannot satisfy the person’s welfare. This can be-come clear only when the person’s specific relation to the commodity isconsidered. The commodity must have use-value for the person, i.e., itmust have specific qualities that are able to satisfy his welfare. As a con-sequence, however, the objectivity of the commodity is broken down. Itsexistence disintegrates into two distinct points of view: on the one hand,

185 Of course, this ‘repetition’ does not concern the status of dialectics: The absoluteposition that has to be developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit , is already devel-oped in the Philosophy of Right all the time.

Chapter 8 The Civil Society 178



the subjective point of view of the person for whom the commodity, asuse-value , exists of a multitude of qualities; on the other hand, the objec-tive point of view of the market. In this objective view, the commodity

has exchange-value, i.e., a general value that is equal for all persons of the market. Like the Perception (the second moment of Consciousness ) was not able to bring together his two points of view (the One and the Also), or, like the moral individual (of the Realm of Culture ) was notable to reconcile State Power and Wealth, so the person fails to bring to-gether the points of view that divide the commodity in use-value and ex-change-value. This is only possible from a point of view in which Under-standing is repeated.

The person can restore the unity of the commodity when he realizes

that the use-value, as well as the exchange-value, must be reduced to him-self. The exchange-value of the commodity is no objectivistic quality be-side the use-value, but is intrinsically twined with the use-value: Ex-change-value has to be understood as use-value as such. (§ 63) Ex-change-value and use-value are related as being essence and appearance.The commodity has a general value on the market (exchange-value);but it can only have this exchange-value when this exchange-value is ex-pressed in some (specific) use-value. Without use-value, the commodity has no exchange-value. Therefore, at this level the person is related tothe commodity like Understanding (the third moment of Consciousness )is related to nature: Objectivity is conceived of as a supra-sensual force(cf. exchange-value) that is expressed in the sensual manifestations of the force (cf. use-value). Since, however, the value of the commodity (both exchange-value and use-value), depends on the evaluating person,the commodity has its unity in the evaluating person (as in the Realmof Culture , State Power and Wealth appeared to have their unity in the

judging individual).

After having repeated the stages of Consciousness (in the form of ob-serving Reason), the person repeats the stages of Self-consciousness (in theform of observing Reason). If the unity of the commodity is dependenton the person’s evaluation, its objectivity is only guaranteed as long asthe process of evaluation is continued. This means that the exchange of commodities must be overcome as an accidental action. In that case,the families are not households that are, in principle, self-supporting,only exchanging the commodities that they do not need for their ownconsumption, but households whose consumption is structurally mediat-

ed by the exchange on the market. They maintain the objective worldthat corresponds to their evaluating activity by repeating again and

The process of Culture in Civil Society 179



again the exchange of commodities. (Cf. the Desire that maintains its cer-titude to be the essence of all reality by repeating again and again the neg-ation of nature, or the (Realm of Culture’s ) moral individual who main-

tains the objectivity of the unlimited Monarch by repeating again andagain his language of flattery.)Even if the person’s consumption is structurally mediated by the mar-

ket, it remains possible that the person has needs that are not satisfied by the exchange process. This means that his welfare is not adequately actual-ized. The adequate integration of Contract, and Intention and Welfare, de-mands further steps. Only when the person is totally socialized and thefamilies have become moments of a production system that is essentially mediated by market exchange, can the actualization of the person’s wel-

fare be guaranteed. This total socialization, that Hegel considers the prop-er Culture of civil society , is performed in a relation in which the lordship/ bondsman relation is repeated (in the form of observing Reason).

The total socialization of the person presupposes that the family is nolonger the institution in which the labor activities are localized. Labormust have the shape of a social production system, i.e., a labor systemin which labor essentially is mediated by exchange. In Marxist terminol-ogy, one would say: Labor must have become a commodity at the market.

The person who sells his labor as a commodity on the market gets involved in a relation that can be described in terms of a lordship/bondsmanrelation. By selling his labor force, he places himself (as “bondsman”), inthe service of an employer (as “lord”), who organizes the labor process.The goal of the labor process is not the immediate satisfaction of theneeds of a family, but rather the production of commodities that canbe sold at the market (and indirectly satisfy the needs of the families).186

The mechanism of the market is determined by the two relationforms that constitute it: Contract, and Intention and Welfare. As the per-sons of the Contract, the individuals are exchangeable, i.e., their actionsare formal and general; as subjects of Intention and Welfare, the individ-uals are particular, i.e., they strive after their particular welfare. There-fore, Hegel can maintain that the moment of generality and the momentof particularity are the constituting coordinates of the market. (§ 186)These moments, however, are externally related, so that the process of

186 Later on we will see that this relation can, in some respect, be compared to the

Marxist relation between wage labor and capital. In principle, however, this com-parison cannot be made because Hegel does not sustain the doctrine of labor value.




their integration has the form of a continuous turn. The moment of gen-erality turns into the moment of particularity, and the moment of partic-ularity turns into the moment of generality. This continuous movement

appears in the supply and demand of the market. On the one hand, thepersons of the market offer a particular supply, i.e., a use-value. On themarket, this particular supply turns into a general exchange-value. On theother hand, the persons of the market sell the commodities that corre-spond to their demand. In this case, the general exchange-value of thecommodities turns into the particular use-value. This turn from use-

value into exchange-value, and vice versa, matches with the language of disruption in the Realm of Culture.

The competition at the market evokes innovations: not only concern-

ing the development of new products, but also in the field of technolog-ical improvements. This innovation is at the center of the process of cul-ture that Hegel discerns in civil society. When Hegel introduces, in § 190of the Philosophy of Right, the concept of human need, he distinguishes itfrom animal need. The animal need is naturally given and, therefore,fixed: “An animal’s needs and its ways and means of satisfying themare both alike restricted in scope.” As a spiritual being, man transcendsthe animal’s natural fixation: “Though man is subject to this restriction

too, yet at the same time he evinces his transcendence of it and his universality, first by the multiplication of needs and means of satisfying them, and secondly by the differentiation and division of concrete needinto single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs, par-ticularized and so more abstract.”

What is remarkable here is that Hegel interprets human needs as a prolongation of animal needs.187 Human needs can be understood as a multiplication and differentiation of “natural needs”. (§ 195) Such anopinion one would sooner expect in Marx (who understands the needy man in his relation to nature), than in Hegel. For, Hegel emphasizesthat the reality of man as a spiritual being is only conceivable within a culture community (of which the lord/bondsman relation is the basicmodel). According to that view, human need has not to be conceptual-ized, as in the case of animals, in relation to the first nature, but in rela-tion to the “second nature” (§ 151): the norms and values of the family

187 This conclusion is in line with Houlgate (2006): “Instead of simply having a nat-

ural need for food, therefore, they may want a particular kind of food prepared ina particular way, for example. In this way, Hegel explains, the needs and wants of human beings become more and more specialized and refined.”

The process of Culture in Civil Society 181



community that determine which needs are valid in it. Once again, how-ever, it becomes clear that Hegel identifies the contingence of the family community (for the children, the norms and values of the family appear

as traditional facts), i.e., its finitude, with its naturalness in the form of freedom: Traditional facts are equated with natural immediacy that istaken up in the form of freedom. We already saw what the consequencesare : The contingence of the family community is not discussed, so thatthe norms and values of the family community seem to be given once andfor all and, moreover, the same for all families, i.e., there is no room formulti-culturality.

Culture in the socialized production System as part of theSystem of Needs

The competition on the market has consequences for the productionprocess: It is subjected to the ongoing division of labor and technologicalimprovements. This changes not only the nature of the objective side of the labor process (the technology of the machines), but also its subjectiveside, the worker. He passes through a process of culture that is differen-

tiated in theoretical and practical education. The theoretical educationthat Hegel equates with Understanding and language is not only under-stood by him as the “multiplicity of ideas and facts” developing itself in line with the ongoing division of labor, but also as “a flexibility andrapidity of mind, ability to pass from one idea to another, to grasp com-plex and general relations, and so on.” (§ 197) Therefore, the theoreticaldevelopment of education consists of the development of an increasingly differentiated scientific insight into reality, and of the power to integrate

this insight more and more self-evidently in an immediate view on the world. According to Hegel, labor’s practical education “consists first inthe automatically recurrent need for something to do, and the habit of simply being busy; next, in the strict adaptation of one’s activity accord-ing not only to the nature of the material worked on, but also, and espe-cially, to the pleasure of other workers; and finally, in a habit, producedby this discipline, of objective activity and universally recognized apti-tudes .” (§ 197) Therefore, practical education results in a socializing of action that has become a second nature, and that makes it possible

to function trouble-free in a labor system that is based on scientificand technological insights.




The ongoing scientification of the labor system not only results in a growth of social wealth (because specialized labor is more productive),but also in the exclusion of some to participate in this wealth: “despite

an excess of wealth, civil society [is] not rich enough” (§ 245) This lastobservation relies on a series of presuppositions. The first presuppositionis that the division of labor makes it less and less complicated, so that lessand less education is needed (compare Marx who makes labor of the as-sembly line the standard of labor belonging to the modern productionsystem).188 For that reason, the potential supply of labor grows biggerand bigger. On the other hand, the technological development of thelabor system leads to a higher and higher productivity, lowering the de-mand for labor. Both factors together bring about that the supply of labor surpasses the demand. The consequence is a surplus of laborers

who can in no way be integrated in the System of Needs. On the onehand, the potential supply of labor cannot be integrated by creating extra jobs (this would only further disturb the market relations, becauseit would generate a supply of goods for which there is no demand).189 Onthe other hand, the demand on the market cannot be enlarged by putting an unearned income to the unemployed person’s disposal, because thismakes the unemployed one-sidedly dependent and deprives them of

their self-esteem as human beings, i.e., of the freedom that manifests it-self in the System of Needs as the freedom to acquire income through one’sown labor.190

188 Karl Marx (1969): “Es ist ein Produkt der manufakturmßigen Teilung der Ar-beit, ihnen die geistige Potenzen des materiellen Produktionsprozesses als fremdesEigentum und sie beherrschende Macht gegenberzustellen.” (p. 382). (It is a re-sult of the division of labour in manufactures, that the labourer is brought face toface with the intellectual potencies of the material process of production, as the

property of another, and as ruling power.).189 “As an alternative, they might be given subsistence indirectly through being given

work, i. e. , the opportunity to work. In this event, the volume of production would be increased, but the evil consists precisely in an excess of productionand the lack of an proportionate number of consumers who are themselvesalso producers …” (§ 245).

190 “… the burden of maintaining them at their ordinary standard of living might bedirectly laid on the wealthier classes, or they might receive the means of liveli-hood directly from other public sources of wealth (e.g. from the endowmentsof rich hospitals, monasteries and other foundations). In either case, however,

the needy would receive subsistence directly, not by means of their work, andthis would violate the principle of civil society and the feeling of individual in-dependence and self-respect in its individual members.” (§ 245).

Culture in the socialized production System as part of the System of Needs 183



The consequences implicated in the culture of the System of Needs cannot be true. An institutional order departing from the realization of freedom for all, cannot end in the conclusion that some are superfluous

without contradiction. This can only mean that somewhere Hegel as-sumes presuppositions that are not correct, or with regard to which, atleast it has to be observed that it concerns presuppositions based on his-torically contingent data. But what data are involved?

That the civil society is not rich enough for all cannot mean that it isprincipally impossible to produce enough for all. The modern productionsystem raises productivity and, therefore, is better equipped than ever toprovide society with at least a minimum existence. The not-being-rich-enough has to be related to the mechanism of the market: it must beproved that the play of supply and demand is functioning in a way that some necessarily become superfluous. Hegel has exactly this inmind when he assumes that some players on the market can offer nomore than unskilled labor. If the ongoing scientification of the labor sys-tem, interrelated with the ongoing division of labor, makes that unskilledlabor (the mechanical labor) can be replaced by machines, it will lose thecompetition with the machine at the moment that the quantity of the un-skilled labor that can be replaced by the machine191 is higher than the

quantity required for the production of the machine. Here it comes tothe fore that Hegel’s appeal to Adam Smith192 has left its traces: The peo-ple’s being superfluous, the being-not-rich-enough of civil society, only has a meaning if his doctrine of the labor value can be appealed to.193

However, this appeal has, in turn, only meaning if mechanical labor,i.e., labor that principally can be replaced by machines, can be madethe standard for human labor in general. Such a one-sided view of labor has a certain validity in a society in which unskilled labor factually

191 “Further, the abstraction of one man’s production from another’s makes work more and more mechanical, until finally man is able to step aside and install ma-chines in his place.” (§ 198).

192 Hegel refers to Smith, Say and Ricardo, see § 189.193 If the labor force of the worker can principally be replaced by machines, the

worker is reduced to a “thing”, i. e. , he is only a commodity. This is the centralobservation on which Marx’s criticism of capitalism is based. After all, Marx’s cri-terion for criticism is Kant’s categorical imperative: capitalism reduces man to a mere means. In Hegel’s system, the “not-being-rich enough” refers to the end of

observing Reason: “Der Geist ist ein Knochen”, i.e, the reduction of the worker’sfreedom to a “thing”. For this reason the systematical transition to active Reasonhas to be made.




has some dominance, but cannot sustain the argument that civil society isnot rich enough in principle.

Distinct from Marx and Smith, Hegel is not one-sidedly connected to

the doctrine of labor value. He emphatically maintains that the value of a service in which someone’s personality or spiritual powers are called uponcannot just be compared to the value of things.194 Hegel’s argumentationthat some are superfluous because they cannot get a job in the System of Needs, appears not to be principal. Factually, the supply of unskilled labormay surpass the demand, but precisely because they are spiritual beings,people are able to educate themselves, and thus offer an alternative supply that matches the demand of the market.

The reification that is performed in the labor process is a self-reifica-

tion. The workers are self-conscious to participate in a dynamic process in which the self-reification can be performed again and again differently and more differentiated. The reification in the labor process is mediatedby a contract between persons and, therefore, is based on a relation of law. The culture of the labor process contributes to the reality of formallaw.195 It results in a socialization of the person’s nature, leading to the factthat the person not only formally, but also really can participate in a socialorder structured according to general rules of law.

Insofar as the persons are totally socialized, they have replaced theirnatural needs and drives196 by actions that completely correspond tothe System of Needs: The formal persons of the Contract have completely socialized the actions in which they actualize their welfare. This meansthat they are also in their real actions free and equal: Their real actionsare exchangeable because they have been transformed in inter-subjectiveactions that function as a moment in the rationalized System of Needs.

194 “Counsel’s acceptance of a brief is akin to this, and so are other contracts whosefulfilment depends on character, good faith, or superior gifts, and where an in-commensurability arises between the services rendered and value in terms of cash.(In such cases the cash payment is called not ‘wages’ but ‘honorarium’.)” (§ 80).

195 “As the private particularity of knowing and willing, the principle of this systemof needs contains absolute universality, the universality of freedom, only abstract-ly and therefore as the right of property. At this point, however, this right is no

longer merely implicit but has attained is recognized actuality as the protection of property through the administration of justice.” (§ 208).196 See: Introduction Philosophy of Right , § 19.

Culture in the socialized production System as part of the System of Needs 185



Under this condition, the social presuppositions are fulfilled for the func-tioning of what Hegel calls the Administration of Justice.197

The Administration of Justice institutionalizes what we call today pri-

vate Law. It not only formulates the generalized action patterns as positiverules of laws, but also takes care for the maintenance of these rules of law.On the one hand, this Administration of Justice has been made possiblebecause the persons have cultivated their nature; on the other hand, itis the Administration of Justice that contributes to the process of cultureand makes it possible. The integration of Contract, and Intention and welfare has its institutional shape in the Administration of Justice. And, likethe System of Needs that it contains, the Administration of Justice is alsoa dynamic system that develops itself in time, for example, under the in-

fluence of technological improvements.The Administration of Justice (§ 209 ff.) can be characterized as the

domain in which the person practically actualizes the general good. It in-stitutionalizes the System of Needs that produces all commodities for the“good life”, i.e., the ethical community in which all families are united.Therefore, the existence of the Administration of Justice is dependent on“the particular will that wills the general as such”, i.e., on the “lord” of the ethical community. In the next chapter, we will see that this lord isinstitutionalized as the third self who manifests itself in the state power.

The System of Needs that is institutionalized in the framework of the Administration of Justice can be considered as the immediate, positive ac-tualization of the freedom of the persons. By participating in the System of Needs, they practically satisfy their needs in the form of freedom. Thisimmediate form of the actualization of freedom is once again structuredas the relation of stoicism (in the form of observing Reason), i.e., the free-dom of the pure self is absorbed in its practical manifestation: The pureself as such is not expressed. However, insofar as the persons are also

moral subjects, they are also conscientious individuals, i.e., they know themselves as the pure selves who cannot content themselves with the ac-tualization of the immediate good in the System of Needs , but who have toactualize the absolute good in which they can recognize themselves aspure selves. To reach this goal, the person passes through the stages of ac-tive Reason.

197 This moment matches with the pure Insight of the Realm of Culture: it repeats therelation of stocism (in the form of observing Reason).




Institutionalizing the second self: the community of moralsubjects

Insofar as the individuals know themselves as pure selves, i.e., as persons who also have a conscience, they know that they are not exchangeable.They have an absolute value that cannot be objectified in whatever his-torical System of Needs. As free individuals they transcend the positivelaws of any real social organism. They are not dependent on the historicalorganism, but rather, the other way around; the social organism is a spe-cific form in which they actualize their pure selves. To this absolute valueof the individuals justice is done at the level of the institution that Hegelcalls Police. (§ 231 ff.)

The Police, in the Philosophy of Right, is an institution with a muchbroader mission than that which we nowadays call police. Its main task is to guarantee that none of the absolute individuals is excluded fromthe System of Needs that is institutionalized in the framework of the Ad-ministration of Justice. The police have to organize the institutional facili-ties that offer each person the chance for real participation in the socialsystem. The police not only take care of the daily functioning of the Sys-tem of Needs (maintenance of the public order, organization of the infra-

structure, prevention of monopoly positions, inspection of labor condi-tions, quality examination of commodities, etc.), but also organize the fa-cilities that enable the persons to enter the System of Needs. According toHegel, the individuals have become more and more “sons of the civil so-ciety”. (§ 238) Therefore, it belongs to the tasks of the police to bring about the institutions of education in which the young persons cangain the certificates that are necessary to participate in the System of Needs. (§ 239)

However, even if the Police is a perfectly functioning institution, it

cannot guarantee that all persons have entrance to the market. Just be-cause the market is free, it has its own necessity, the law of supply anddemand. Those persons who are not able to generate a supply that cor-responds to a demand of the market (who have not, for example, the de-manded professional qualifications), will be excluded. Therefore, the Po-lice institutionalizes a relation form that we encountered before as the firststage of active Reason, i.e., Pleasure and Necessity. The absolute value of the persons who are also moral subjects is not compatible with a socialorganism in which they are only moments. The Pleasure of the persons

Institutionalizing the second self: the community of moral subjects 187



to actualize their moral freedom in the System of Needs is confronted withthe Necessity of the free market.198

The actualization of freedom that is dependent on the law of the mar-

ket remains accidental and is, therefore, inadequate. According to Hegel,this problem can be solved at the level of Corporations (§ 250 ff.), insti-tutions that have features of mediaeval guilds, modern companies,trade unions and professional organizations. The basic idea is that persons

who belong to the System of Needs can be divided as participants of differ-ent branches. Each branch forms a corporation in which the participantsrelate to one another as in a “second family”. (§ 252). As in the first (nor-mal) family, the welfare of the participants of the corporation coincides.The Corporation is a social organism in which the participants share thenorms and values of the branch they belong to. The work of the secondfamily is not (as is the work of the first family), the reproduction of thefree person, but rather the reproduction of the free society. In the multi-tude of Corporations, the production system is organized as an organic en-tirety in which each Corporation is an organ. The production system assuch produces all commodities that are needed for the good life, i.e.,the ethical life that is explicitly institutionalized at the level of the State (cf. next chapter).

As in the first family, the participants of the Corporation do not relateto one another as persons. They share the love for their profession (pro-fessional ethics), and know that it is their collective goal to perform theproduction of their branch. Once the individual is a member of the Cor- poration he remains a life long member. The Corporation will take care of his income and family when external disasters prevent him doing thishimself. (§ 252) Therefore, the market relations (including the additionaldependence on its chance), are overcome between the participants of a

Corporation. The Corporation guarantees the social security.In distinction from the first family, however, the access to the secondfamily is mediated by freedom.199 On the one hand, the individuals arenot members of the Corporation on the basis of their birth (for example,because they have to practice the profession of their parents), but by free

198 Therefore, the Police repeats the Epic that discussed the difficulty to subsume themany gods in one community, or it repeats the Struggle of Enlightenment withSuperstition at the level of the Realm of Culture: the difficulty to subsume the

many subjects of the Belief in one worldly community.199 Therefore, Houlgate (2006) has no right when he remarks that the corporationsare “essentially the same as guilds.” (p. 204).




decision. The individual must decide that he is willing to become a mem-ber of a Corporation, and the Corporations must decide that they acceptthe individual as a member. On the other hand, both decisions must

be rooted in rational arguments. The individual must make his choicefor a profession because he understands that he has the subjective capaci-ties for it. And the Corporation must accept an individual as its memberon objective grounds. The Corporation must need new members for theeconomically considered production of its commodities, and the individ-ual must be objectively qualified (by the demanded certificates), for thebranch of the Corporation.

At the level of the Corporation, the second stage of active Reason, The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit, is repeated.200 The law of the

market is replaced by a self-made and self-conscious law, the law thatdominates the social organism of the Corporation. For the individual,the law of the Corporation can be identified as the law of the heart.The individual has cultivated his immediate nature on the market andby means of education. By transforming his immediate nature, he has ap-propriated it as his free, subjective nature. It is this subjective nature thathe can actualize in the framework of the Corporation as his law of the heart. At the state level, the actualization of subjective freedom of the

one (his law of the heart ) would exclude the actualization of the subjectivefreedom of the others (the other laws of the heart ). All individuals wouldmake the law of the state their subjective law, and would experience thattheir intentions are not compatible. They would become aware of the“ frenzy of self-conceit ”, the hubris of the one-sided subjective autonomy that, at the level of the Realm of Culture, led to the absolute freedom, tothe terror of the French Revolution. At the level of the Corporation, how-ever, the confrontation between incompatible subjectivities can be avoid-ed. Because there are many Corporations , the individuals can choose the

one that corresponds to their subjective freedom. Moreover, the Corpora-tions do not exclude one another, but are rather moments of the produc-tion system in its entirety.

Although not all individuals can become a member of a Corporation,at least the ones who participate in them seem to have the possibility toactualize their subjective freedom. However, since we have seen that the Administration of Justice , as the Police and the Corporation, presuppose, as

200 The Corporation repeats, as well, the Tragedy that thematizes two “laws of theheart” that are still determined by natural qualifications: the Human and the Di-vine Law.

Institutionalizing the second self: the community of moral subjects 189



well, the existence of a state in which the particular will, that wills thegeneral as such, is institutionalized, the adequate actualization of freedomdemands the development of the institutions of the state. This will be the

subject of the next chapter. Before we can turn to this chapter, however, we must examine what criticism Hegel’s conception of civil society evokes,and discuss the possible alternatives.

Criticism of the development of civil society in the light of thePhenomenology of Spirit

Although the development of the civil society, as it is performed in the

Philosophy of Right, can be elucidated from the background of the Phe-nomenology of Spirit , it is precisely the last work that can also help to criti-cize this development. The program that follows from the Phenomenology of Spirit is not consequently elaborated in the Philosophy of Right.

The main point of criticism we have already encountered at the levelof the family, where Hegel reduced ethical immediacy (in which the sub-

jectivity is expressed that is not exchangeable, and that has many forms of appearance), to natural immediacy in the form of freedom (in which only

the pathos of man and woman are expressed, without giving room to a multitude of forms). This reduction returns in a certain form at thelevel of civil society, when the persons at the market are presented as per-sons who initially have natural needs. It is these natural needs that are cul-tivated until they are totally socialized and integrated in the social pro-duction system.

The consequence of this reduction is the disappearance of moral subjectivity at the level of civil society. There is only room for exchangeable,socialized persons, not for unique subjects. This comes explicitly to thefore when Hegel maintains that some form of (mechanical) labor canbe replaced by machines. This not only means that some people are fac-tually reduced to things, but also, since Hegel speaks about the civil soci-ety that is not “rich enough” (§ 245)201, that for some this reduction isunavoidable.202 Of course, one could object that there may be principal

201 The problem of poverty is clearly discussed by Hardimon (1994), p. 236 ff.202 I disagree with Fred. Neuhouser (2000) when he remarks: “Finally, there is no

reason that Hegel’s theory need make outlaws, or even social outcasts, of the mi-nority of individuals who lead more idiosyncratic lives at the margins of bour-geois respectability.” (p. 268).




limits to the supply of unskilled labor that the market can absorb. Butthat argumentation also cannot be proved. Firstly, the modern produc-tion system is characterized by a dynamics in which the demand of prod-

ucts and services can be infinitely differentiated, so that the demand forlabor is not principally clamped down.203 And secondly, it is always pos-sible to adjust the labor supply by education.

Hegel’s thesis that the civil society is not rich enough for all appears toarise from making the distinction between theoretical and practical edu-cation absolute. Influenced by the reality of his era, Hegel has been se-duced to separate both forms of education, and so creates room for a Marxist analysis avant la lettre. In that analysis, the distinction betweentheoretical and practical education is transformed into the separation be-

tween spiritual and manual labor (a separation that Marx characterizes asthe highest form of labor division).204 Then, the ultimate consequence of practical education is the ability to make oneself part of the mechanicallabor process. This makes man an appendage of the machine, and reduceslabor to purely physical effort.205 Only under that condition does the doc-trine of labor value have a certain validity. To Hegel, however, it has to beobjected to that this form of manual labor is incompatible with his theory of the realization of freedom. In human labor, theoretical and practical

education have to remain connected.It is true that Hegel seems to resume the moral subjectivity at the levelof Police , and Corporation, but this resumption remains insufficient.These institutions do not only not change the fact that some are excluded(because the market mechanism principally excludes them), but also re-strict the subjective freedom to economic freedom: In the Corporation,the individuals are recognized as professionals, not as unique subjects.

203 According to Houlgate (2006), Hegel also assumes this infinite differentiation:

“… it is evident that there is no limit to what people might want or need inthe future.” (p. 199) However, for Hegel, the production system operates inthe framework of the good life.

204 Karl Marx, Deutsche Ideologie , “Die Teilung der Arbeit wird erst wirklich Teilung von dem Augenblicke an, wo eine Teilung der materiellen und geistigen Arbeiteintritt.” (p. 31). (Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears.).

205 Karl Marx, Das Kapital, “Alle Arbeit ist einerseits Verausgabung menschlicher Ar-beit im physiologischen Sinn, und in dieser Eigenschaft gleicher menschlicheroder abstrakt menschlicher Arbeit bildet sie den Warenwert.” (p. 61). (On the

one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human labourpower, and in its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates andforms the value of commodities.).

Criticism of the development of civil society 191



They have the freedom to choose and develop their professions, but notthe freedom to actualize their subjective freedom as such; they are appre-ciated colleagues, not ends in themselves.

Although Hegel rightly maintains that good workmanship is to beframed in an ethical community (i.e., a community with shared viewson the good life), at least two fundamental objections can be madeagainst his attempt to understand this community as a “Corporation”.First, in his opinion, the corporations have a mediating function in thedevelopment of the highest form of the ethical community, the goodlife as it is shaped at state level. The corporations can have this functionbecause Hegel thinks that they together form an organic unity: the pro-duction system in its entirety that is in the service of the good life at state

level. This assumption is based on a presupposition that was criticized be-fore, namely the assumption that the commodities and services producedby the production system can be understood as the ongoing differentia-tion of the natural individual’s needs, which have their unity in his nat-ural organism. The differentiation of the production system flows fromthe immoderate differentiation of the scientific and technological knowl-edge in reaction to the immoderate differentiation of the demand on themarket. This demand has no organic limits on itself, neither of the indi-

vidual (whose needs are not natural, but cultural), nor of the state (pro-duction is oriented to the world market, not to the state organism).

The internal immoderation of the production system’s rationality,i.e., the rationality of Understanding 206, leads to a second fundamentalobjection against the Corporation: Any attempt to understand the laborcommunity immediately as a moral community, in accordance with con-temporary business ethics207, neither does justice to morality, nor to therationality of the production system. A company selects people becauseof their professional qualities, and enters into a contract with themthat is principally redeemable. In that sense, the employee is not a moral individual. In the other way around, the moral individual doesnot derive the norms and values in which he expresses his subjectivity from the particularity of a production branch.

At the end, Hegel’s reduction (making the economic domain absoluteat the cost of ethical immediacy), is caused by a methodological demar-

206 The rationality of Understanding exists of the endless repetition of analysis and

synthesis without inner unity.207 P. Ulrich, Ch. Sasarin, Facing Public Interests. The Ethical Challenge to Business Policy and Corporate Communications.




cation. In the Philosophy of Right, he only discusses the objective Spirit ,not the absolute Spirit. Only at the end of the Philosophy of Right is theabsolute Spirit in sight because, at the level of world history , it is when

the transition from objective to absolute Spirit is performed. Therefore,in the Philosophy of Right , the concept of conscience is not determinedas a relation to the absolute Spirit (as is the case in the Phenomenology of Spirit ).208 In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel explicitly distinguishesthe conscience that he develops at the level of Morality from the religious conscience. The demand of the moral conscience is to actualize the generalgood, a duty that can be accomplished by participation in the institutionsof ethical life. The duty of the religious conscience is to actualize the ab-solute good. This duty transcends objective Spirit and is not thematized inthe Philosophy of Right.

It is precisely this limited concept of conscience that prevents the ad-equate examination of subjective freedom. The welfare and the good thatare under discussion at the level of civil society are only the welfare and thegood that can be objectified in the socialized production system. Welfareis not thematized as the appearance of the subjective norms and values in

which subjective freedom expresses itself ; the good is not thematized asthe historical appearance of the absolute good. In the next sections, we

will see that this is only possible when the Philosophy of Right is rewritten,departing from the concept of conscience that is developed in the Phe-nomenology of Spirit, i.e., from a position in which the religious con-science is not excluded.

The revised concept of Culture in Civil Society

The revised process of culture at the level of civil society , starts from realindividuals, i.e., conscientious individuals, who want to realize their sec-ond self. Once again, the individuals relate to one another in the institu-tional form of the Contract: They recognize one another as free and equalpersons, and they actualize this recognition by the exchange of commod-ities. Once again, the individuals are also moral subjects who want to ac-tualize their welfare. But in this revised version of the process of culture,this welfare is not discussed in terms of natural needs that have to be so-

208 Maybe we have to make an exception for the conscience of the Monarch, seeChapter 9.

The revised concept of Culture in Civil Society 193



cialized. The initial determination of the welfare has to do with the im-mediate ethical life of the family.

Later on, it shall become clear that the ethical life of the family can be

understood as the objectification of the shared subjective norms and val-ues of the marriage partners who have constituted the family. The processof culture, however, does not start from the position of these marriagepartners, but from the position of their grown up children. As we have

witnessed in Chapter 7, these children have experienced that thesenorms and values are contingent, i.e., different from the norms and val-ues of other families. For the time being, however, this does not meanthat the grown up children dissociate themselves from these norms and

values. Although they know that they are contingent, they have, for the

moment, no reason to adopt other norms and values than those of their original family. Therefore, they consider these norms and valuesas their own ones, and if they have the intention to actualize their sub-

jective welfare, they want to recognize these norms and values in the objective world.

As in the Philosophy of Right, the revised process of culture begins with the repetition of the stages of observing Reason and, more particular-ly, with the relation forms of Consciousness and Self-consciousness in theform of observing Reason. Therefore, the initial situation of the processof culture can be characterized as the grown up children who want to ac-tualize their subjective welfare immediately: They want to recognize thenorms and values of their original family in the commodities they find atthe market, i.e., they expect that these commodities immediately corre-spond to their family life. The commodities must be able to satisfy theneeds that belong to the immediate ethical life of their families (cf.Sense-Certainty ).

The commodities on the market, however, have general exchange

value, i. e. , they can satisfy the needs of some families, but not necessarily the needs of all of them. Therefore, for the grownup children, the objec-tivity of the commodities on the market falls apart in use-values and ex-change-values, i. e. , in commodities that can–and those that cannot–satis-fy their subjective welfare (cf. Perception). It depends, from the family’spoint of view, on whether or not the objective world actualizes its subjec-tive welfare.

The grownup children can restore the unity of the commodity whenthey succeed in bringing together the two points of view. The exchange

value of the commodity is no objectivistic quality beside the use-value,but is intrinsically intertwined with the use-value: exchange-value has




to be understood as use-value as such. Exchange-value and use-value arerelated as essence and appearance. The commodity has a general value onthe market (exchange-value); but it can only have this exchange-value

when this exchange-value is expressed in some (specific) use-value.209

Without use-value, the commodity has no exchange-value. Therefore,at this level, the grownup child (as moral subject), is related to the com-modity, like Understanding is related to nature: Objectivity is conceivedof as a supra-sensual force (cf. exchange-value) that is expressed in thesensual manifestations of the force (cf. use-value). Since, however, the

value of the commodity (both exchange-value and use-value) dependson the evaluating person, the commodity has its unity in the evaluating person. It is the grownup children themselves who, as family members,

decide whether the commodities have value at all. According to them,the commodities in themselves, i.e., as objective entities, have no intrin-sic value.

After having repeated the stages of Consciousness (in the form of ob-serving Reason), the grown up child (as moral subject) repeats the stages of Self-consciousness (in the form of observing Reason). Insofar as the com-modities are properties that are exchanged on the market by free andequal persons, they belong to a world that is inessential for the grownup

children. In the public domain of the market, the commodities have ex-change-value. This exchange-value, however, is factually determined atthe market, i.e., it is uncoupled from the validating activity of the grown-up child. Therefore, from an outside (objective) perspective, reality fallsapart in two domains: the private domain of the family and the publicdomain of the market. From the inside perspective of the grownupchild, however, the public domain of the market is inessential. For thegrownup child, the commodities have only value as a result of his own

validating activities. Since the commodities on the market have an ex-

change-value that is independent from his validating activity, they are in-different to them; in fact, they are non-existent. Therefore, the grownupchild can imagine himself to be an autonomous self-consciousness whoproduces a world by his autonomous validating activities (cf. the pure self ).

The alleged autonomy, however, is disrupted at the moment that thefamily requires the commodities of the market to satisfy its needs. Then,it is confronted with a strange objectivity that it cannot neglect. The fam-

209 Of course the relation between use-value and exchange-value is not determined ina Marxist way.




ily can overcome this strange objectivity when it is able to buy (or acquireby exchange), the commodities that can satisfy its needs (because they have, inside the framework of the family use-value). But in this case,

the strange objectivity will sooner or later return when the family needs other commodities from the market. It seems that this returncan be prevented when the satisfaction of needs is structurally mediatedby the market, i.e., under the conditions of a fully developed free market:capitalism.

In a fully developed free market, the production process is no longercentered in the family, but in organizational units (factories) whose work-ers are gathered by mediation of the market. Therefore, the family can nolonger exchange its surplus products, i.e., the products it does not need

for its own consumption. The only products of the family are the family members themselves. The only commodity it can exchange is the laborforce of the family members. So, the family sells the labor force of thefamily members and buys the commodities that can satisfy the needsof the family. The labor force is bought by the factories that producecommodities for the market, i.e., commodities that have to be sold tothe families. Under these conditions, the commodities on the markethave become a moment in the consumption process of the families.

They have lost their strange objectivity because they are produced tobe sold at the market, i.e., in the end they are produced for the consump-tion of the families.210

Even under the conditions of a fully developed market, however, theautonomy of the family members cannot be completely restored. One theone hand, the immediate ethical life of the family can generate needs thatdo not correspond to commodities that are supplied by the market; onthe other hand, it can be the case that the family cannot afford to buy the commodities of the market. The question is how the demand in

the private domain of the family can be geared to the supply in the publicdomain of the market.

Insofar as the family members sell their labor force to the factories,they enter a labor process in which they repeat the lordship/bondsman re-lation in the form of observing Reason. They serve their “lord”, i.e., theorganizer of the labor process, by performing the tasks that are demandedby the labor process. Once again, this labor process is involved in the dy-namics of the free market. These dynamics result in a development of the

210 The endless repetition of the exchange process in order to restore autonomy matches with the relation form of Desire (in the form of observing Reason).




labor process (new products, ongoing division of labor, new technolo-gies), and a cultivation of the workers. The process of cultivation, how-ever, differs fundamentally from the process of culture as it is elaborated

in the Philosophy of Right.The central difference is that the process of culture can never lead tothe complete socialization of the worker. Although his mind and body can be better and better trained to accomplish the job, although the

job may become more and more specialized, under all circumstancesthe worker remains a moral individual. The cultivation results in betterpractical skills and better insight into the objective nature of the laborprocess, but the worker will never coincide with his labor activities.The cultivation, rather, creates the possibility to make a distinction be-

tween the subjective norms and values of the family and the objective world of labor. While the subjective norms and values of the family are originally completely immersed in the labor process within the family,the differentiation between the family and the labor process,211 also ena-bles the worker to differentiate between his subjective norms and valuesand the normative demands of labor itself. The more the labor process isobjectified in machines and labor division, the more insight the workercan develop into the pure identity of his subjective norms and values.

Once again the process of culture prepares the individuals to liveunder the conditions of the Administration of Justice. They learn whatit means to act according to rules that have an inter-subjective validity.

After all, the culture in the labor process finishes the education of thegrown up children. Thanks to the process of culture, they have the ability to act as real persons, i.e., to actualize their freedom and equality becausethey observe the rule of law that is equal for everybody. In contrast to thePhilosophy of Right , however, the process of culture does not solve theproblem of how to harmonize the demand of the families and the supply

of the market. The socialization of the worker in the labor process doesnot imply at all that that the needs of the families are also socialized. By becoming aware of the subjectivity of the family norms and values, theindividuals understand that the needs of the family are subjective. Al-though these subjective needs can only be satisfied by mediation of themarket, this does not mean that the market can satisfy all subjectiveneeds. The problem is not so much that the market would not be ableto respond to the diversity of the family needs because the supply onthe market is qualitatively and quantitatively limited. New demand gen-

211 Vs. Habermas, no separation between labor and interaction, cf. footnote 55.




erates new supply. The problem is, rather, whether the families haveenough money to effectuate their demand on the market. In other

words, can the families satisfy their needs with the money that they re-

ceive in exchange for their labor force? Has the production system theability to actualize the good life, i.e., can it satisfy the needs of all individuals?

The free market and the exclusion of individuals

As long as it remains accidental whether the individual can or cannot sellhis labor force on the market, it is clear that the actualization of the good

life cannot be guaranteed. For the individuals who fail in finding a job,the objective world remains a hostile world in which they cannot recog-nize themselves.212 The market reduces them to a commodity without value. Therefore, also in the revised version of the civil society, the tran-sition to the relation forms of active Reason has to be made, to begin with, to the first moment, Pleasure and Necessity.

As in the Philosophy of Right, this moment gets shape in the institu-tion of the Police , that must safeguard that all individuals will at least havethe chance to participate in the market. It is up to the individuals them-

selves to take their chances, i.e., the “pleasure” to actualize their welfare.But this time, the failure of the Police has nothing to do with the mech-anization of labor, as is the argument in the Philosophy of Right. Theproblem is not that some individuals can only supply unskilled labor

while it is cheaper to replace unskilled labor by machines. Labor that ispurely mechanical cannot be accepted in a free society, because it reducesindividuals to things. The point is not that all forms of simple labor mustbe banned, but rather that in those cases in which unskilled labor is per-formed, the workers may not be reduced to things. They are not only per-sons on the market, but also in the labor process: By doing their unskilled

job they remain colleagues who have to be respected as persons. This hasconsequences for the value of their labor force. This value cannot beequated with the costs of replacing machines. All workers, included theunskilled workers, are persons and moral subjects. Therefore, they must earn enough to actualize their welfare. If it is cheaper to leave theunskilled labor to the machines, unskilled labor is simply no option for

212 Cf. Der Geist ist ein Knochen, “the being of Spirit is a bone.” (208).




persons. To find a job, the unskilled persons must be schooled in otherprofessions.

But, even if the unskilled labor is eliminated by machines and the Po-

lice offer adequate opportunities for training and retraining, the free mar-ket cannot guarantee an acceptable job for all, because the criteria for what is “acceptable” are contradictory. On the one hand, an acceptable job must guarantee an income that permits the actualization of the per-son’s welfare, and on the other hand, the market determines the incomesaccording the law of supply and demand. The criteria of the market arenormally not compatible with moral criteria for welfare: the moral crite-ria are not deduced from the market, but from the norms and values of the family. From the incompatibility of criteria it does not follow that

civil society is not “rich enough” for all; not only because, even if someare excluded, the criteria remain incompatible, but also because the par-ticipation of all is the basic principle of a society in which all are free andequal persons. An acceptable job for all is, so to speak, the basic demandthat the market has to satisfy. The conclusion concerning the contradict-ing criteria can only be that the mechanism of the market is not sufficientto solve the problem, i.e., how to conceive of a civil society in which a multitude of moral subjects can actualize their welfare.

The market and the moral subject

The moral subject that wants to actualize his welfare on the market seemsto be in an underdog position. He has learnt that the norms and valuesfrom his original family are contingent and subjective. So, which weaponshas he to defend them against the objective power that is exercised by thelaw of the market? Only if the subjectivity of these norms and values can

be overcome does it seem to be possible to resist the pressure of the mar-ket. The anxiety concerning the survival of the norms and values, how-ever, is premature. After all we have seen that the embodiment of the sec-ond self starts from the conscientious self that knows that it objectifies itself in the form of the second self. Therefore, the subjective norms and valueshave an absolute ground in the conscience of the individual. But untilnow, the grownup children are not aware of this absolute ground. There-fore, we have to elaborate the institutional learning process in which thegrownup children can discover this absolute ground.

The public domain of the free market is not only the domain of eco-nomic exchange, but also the domain in which the individuals are in-

The market and the moral subject 199



volved with one another as moral subjects. More particularly, there canbe, for example, public discussions about subjective norms and values,or the individuals can inform themselves about the norms and values

of the others by mass-media, movies, books, etc. This confrontationcan have effects of several kinds. The individuals can conclude that themultitude of norms and values puts them all in perspective, so that, infact, it is irrelevant in which norms and values the individuals expresstheir subjectivity. This kind of relativism, however, would not only con-tradict freedom itself (we have seen that the moral dimension is a neces-sary moment of freedom), but also cannot explain the social reality of theindividuals: If they live in a world that is characterized by a multitude of subjective norms and values, it must be clear how this multitude can be

reproduced. Therefore, in the end, only two other possible reactions aremeaningful. On the one hand, the individual can experience that thenorms and values of his original family are indeed also his own. Onthe other hand, he can discover that the norms and values that expresshis subjectivity are different, and identify them as the norms and valueshe is confronted with in civil society. In both cases, the norms and valueslose, from the perspective of the individual, their contingent status. If theindividual is convinced that the norms and values express his own subjec-tivity, he understand them as the appearance of his absolute essence, i.e.,he understands them as the manifestation of his conscience.

To get its social meaning, the new conviction of the individual has tobe institutionally objectified. The individual must express his subjectivenorms and values in the family organism, i.e., the grownup child mustmarry and create his own family. The marriage, however, cannot be themarriage as it is conceived of in the Philosophy of Right. We have seenthat the gender roles in this conception do not leave room for subjectivenorms and values. In these gender roles, a specific tradition is made ab-

solute. If, however, the complementary gender roles are given up andboth partners are themselves already “complete” moral subjects, the prob-lem has to be solved as to how it is still possible to think of a lifelong re-lationship between partners.

Moral subjectivity and lifelong partnership

If the complementary role division between man and woman is given up

and if one tries to think of a relationship between complete individuals, a new problem immediately arises. Why should individuals, who are com-




plete in themselves, share a subjective identity? Would there be any rea-son for the individual to constitute a household together with another in-dividual? Could the general conditions be met for the maintenance of an

institution which has, amongst other things, the task to raise and educatechildren? At first glance, a relationship between partners who are not comple-

mentary seems to be contradictory. If a relationship between partners im-plies a shared subjective identity, it must be possible to conceptualise thisidentity as an harmonious unity. How is this harmony thinkable if theparticipating partners are not complementary? There is only one alterna-tive. The love of the partner must not concern the other in his specificgender role, but the other individual as such. In that case, the partners ex-

perience a full openness for one another. Their relationship is not dialec-tical in the sense that the identity of the partner has a meaning that isonly relative to his own identity. The identity of the other partner be-comes meaningful in itself. The shared identity with the partner is con-stituted, so to say, by suspending his own identity. The one partner makesthe identity of the other partner his own. The asymmetry of this kind of relationship can be avoided if both partners perform the same movement,i.e., if both partners make the other partner’s identity their own.

This alternative of totally sacrificing one’s own identity may seemrather unrealistic. But I think that the alternative gives an adequate de-scription of two individuals who have fallen in love. If I am in love,the loved one, in the first place, is not a woman or man, but an irreplace-able, unique individual. I will be obsessed by the loved one and not beable to keep her out of my mind. Moreover, I will be prepared to pleaseher in all possible ways. For me, the loved one would be the centre of the

world.The question is however, whether love has any objectivity.213 Is it not

the saying that love makes one blind? What can be the meaning of appro-

213 This problem cannot be solved by institutionalizing the partner relationship inmarriage, as R.Winfield seems to think: “By itself, however, lovers’ concernand sharing remains purely contingent upon personal feeling, whose own dura-bility is itself accidental. Marriage, on the other hand, upholds the rights and du-ties of spouses even when their passion has lapsed.” (R. Winfield, The just Family ,New York, 1998, p. 84) The question is that, even if the “passion has lapsed”, thepartners must still want to “join immediately together in their unique individu-

ality”. (p. 82) If “passion has lapsed”, the way Winfield characterizes the positivefreedom of marriage no longer holds: “Accordingly, marriage can be said to con-tribute a positive freedom in which the immediacy of romantic love becomes

Moral subjectivity and lifelong partnership 201



priating the partner’s identity if there is no adequate knowledge of it? Is itpossible at all to have complete knowledge of a unique identity? Does itever make sense to assume that one knows his own identity, let alone the

identity of another person? Although all pretended absolute insight in anindividual identity must be refuted, the lover necessarily has a notion of the beloved’s identity. This notion, however, must not be understood asan intellectual insight, but rather as the experience of beauty. For thelover, the beauty of the partner is the representation of the partner’s ab-solute identity. In the experience of beauty he feels the totality of the per-sonality which he wants to make his own.

To speak about beauty as the representation of an absolute identity corresponds to Hegel’s concept of beauty. According to Hegel, in beauty

the absolute appears in the form of the sensible.214 The experience of beauty can be interpreted as the intuition of the absolute. At the sametime, however, beauty is only a representation of the absolute, and isin no way the concrete realisation of it. The experience of beauty, for ex-ample, has a subjective dimension: Both partners have their own repre-sentation. Although this subjective dimension may be considered as a shortcoming, it is the only way to do justice to the absoluteness of theindividual identity. Simply because beauty is a subjective image of an ab-

solute identity, it can tolerate the existence of an alternative image of theabsolute identity, namely the image the partner has.Besides the advantage just mentioned, the subjectivity of the repre-

sentation of the absolute identity also has a disadvantage. This comesto the fore when the beauty of the partner withers and it loses itsmagic power. This explicates that the alleged absolute identity of the part-ner is dependent on the identity of the lover. The partner’s absolute iden-tity is only real when (in the form of her beauty), it is experienced by theother partner. This may seem to be the end of the absoluteness of the

identity. But in fact, the absoluteness of the identity now turns to theother partner. The awareness that the absolute love for the partner wasa subjective interpretation does not undermine the absoluteness of thefeeling of being in love. If, however, the beloved partner no longer is iden-tified as the source of love, the lover himself remains left as the only al-ternative source. Therefore, the former lover understands that only an in-

mediated by an objective bond, formally recognized by spouses and outsidersalike to empower spouses with juridical entitlements that are not simply expres-

sions of the passions of individuals.” (p.85) Romantic love that has lapsed cannotbe “mediated by an objective bond”.214 G.W.F. Hegel, sthetik , p. 179 (Stuttgart).




dividual who has an absolute identity can fall in love. Only an individual who already owns an absolute identity can absolutely make his partner’sidentity his own. In accordance with Hegel, I will refer to this absolute

identity as “conscience”. (Phenomenology of Spirit , p. 382) Let us considerthe new situation in which the magic power of love has collapsed, and thepartners are pushed back into the intimacy of their conscience. The at-tempt to comprehend the shared identity in terms of the receptivenessfor the beauty of the partner has failed. Once again, the partners appearin complete isolation, delivered to the mystery of their private conscience.

Yet the introversion of the private conscience cannot be accepted. If con-science stands for the absoluteness of one’s identity, it must overcome itsone-sided subjective status. An identity which has no real existence, can-

not be maintained as an absolute one.215

From the inside perspective, the real existence of the absolute identity seems not to be problematic. The individual who claims to know his ab-solute identity evidently will act in accordance with his insight. There-fore, he will claim that the actions in which his existence is real, expresseshis conscience. From the outside perspective, however, things are differ-ent, because the immediate unity between conscience and the expressionof conscience in actions has no validity. The external observer is confront-

ed with a multitude of actions, and must ask himself which actions areexpressing the other’s conscience. Is, for instance, the other expressing his identity by walking? Therefore, the subjective conviction to expresshis own identity by subjective action only makes objective sense if theconviction is acknowledged by others. In this way, the first step can bemade to restore the identity, which is shared by both partners. In the mu-tual acknowledgement by both partners that the conviction is right thatthe subjective actions express the absolute subjective identity, they enableone another to give their claim for an absolute identity some objectivity,namely as the claim which is inter-subjectively shared. (Cf. the transitionfrom Consciousness in to Self-consciousness )

Even in case of a shared claim, however, it remains unclear where thecontent of this claim comes from, and on what grounds the reached con-sensus is based. If, for instance, identity is physically determined becausethe individual decides to express the most intimate subjective feelings, du-

215 In the following paragraphs, I interpret the dialectics of ‘Morality’ (Phenomenol-

ogy of Spirit ) in the light of the partner relationship of man and woman. As isdiscussed in Chapter 6, this dialectics repeats Consciousness , Self-Consciousness and Unhappy Consciousness.

Moral subjectivity and lifelong partnership 203



rable consensus is impossible. The one partner has to indicate which feel-ings express his identity. But each time the other partner thinks he knowsthe relevant feelings, it can be too late, because the feelings have already

changed. It is impossible to deduce an absolute identity from a multitudeof feelings. All synthesis of feelings into a unity can only be provisional.Therefore, the partners can only maintain their absolute identity if they assume that it has a spiritual origin. (Cf. Desire )

As a consequence, subjective identity should be understood as freeself-determination, which surpasses its subjective status because it is ac-knowledged as free self-expression. But even then the absolute subjectiveidentity is not safeguarded. Once again, subjective identity appears as de-pendent on (mutual) recognition, i. e., consensus. The progress which has

been made consists of the demand that not only the that of conscience’sconviction, but also the what of its spiritual content must be recognizedby the partner. But as long as recognition only has an inter-subjective sta-tus, it still remains unclear what is the objective ground of the consensusbetween the partners and, in connection to this omission, whether theconsensus is more than a temporary one. The subjective identity has ex-istence as long as, and as far as, the mutual recognition actually is ex-pressed. In that sense, the subjective identity is dependent on time-spatialactivities, i.e., on speech-acts. (Cf. Stoicism) This dependency excludes itsabsoluteness.

The conclusion seems to be justified that the idea of an absolute subjective identity must be dropped. The acts which mediate its existence, atthe same time deprive it of its absoluteness. Only one escape is possible.The partners must realise that their subjective identity, i.e., the identity

which makes them soul mates for one another, has already been givenall the time. (Cf. the transition to the Unhappy Consciousness )

Real action is not oriented to the constitution of an absolute identity,

but on the striving for knowing the absolute identity. This learning proc-ess is embedded in a practical relationship in which the partners, as mu-tual lovers, are already involved all the time. The choice of the partners toform one shared subjective identity does not create the soulmateship, butcan, at best, formalize the soulmateship which already existed all the time.The choice for one shared subjective identity is divided in itself. By theirchoice, the partners do not become one individual, but they are express-ing that the process of developing insight into their subjective identity cannot be performed without the partner. The appropriation of one’s

subjective identity is the ongoing striving for clarifying one’s life history.On the one hand, this clarification presupposes that the own life has been




already been lived all the time (including the participation in civil soci-ety), and, on the other hand, it presupposes that the recognition by thepartner is looked for. Of course, the acknowledgement of an interpreta-

tion by the partner is not the criterion of its truth. Yet, it can be main-tained that without this acknowledgement the interpretation cannot betrue. The objectivity of the own subjective identity can only be known,insofar as it is continuously expressing itself in the relationship withthe partner. Mortal men are not able to have absolute knowledge of their absolute subjective identity. But the continuity of the relationship

with the life partner, and the associated acknowledgement of the attemptof interpreting the own life history, can be a hint for the truth of this in-terpretation.

The market and the good life

If the existence of the many families, having their own subjective normsand values, is guaranteed, the problem has to be solved as to how the fam-ilies can live together in one society. Insofar as the welfare of all familiescan be actualized, the society objectifies the good life. Since the actuali-zation of the good life is mediated by the market, the definition of the

good life can be considered as a normative standard for the functioning of the market. The market must not only produce all commoditiesthat are needed to satisfy the needs of all families, but also take carethat all families have an income that allows them to buy what is neededfor the satisfaction of their welfare. We have already observed that thenormative standard for the market cannot be deduced from the law of the market itself. The norms and values of the families are independentfrom the market. It is neither the market that constitutes the unity of the

many families, nor is the market the “material base” for the unity of thegood life. Therefore, the transition to the good life cannot be made at thelevel of the System of Needs as it is laid down in the Philosophy of Right. Inthis work, the norms and values of the family are replaced by the normsand values of the second family (the Corporation), i. e., replaced by normsand values that are deduced from the production system. This under-mines the independence of the domain of the family. Moreover, the de-

velopment of the Philosophy of Right assumes that the Corporations arepart of the organic unity of the production system, i.e., it assumes

that the unity of the good life (that is explicitly discussed at the levelof the state ), is preceded (at the level of civil society ), by the “material”

The market and the good life 205



unity of the production system (the “Verstandesstaat”216). The produc-tion system of modern society, however, produces for the world market.This means that the production system, out of itself, has no unity that

precedes the good life as it is defined at state level. Nor are the branchesin the production system organically linked to one another. If somewherein the world new demand is created, then, in principal, new branches canbe developed without limitations prescribed by the market system.

The normative standards for the production system must in some way or another be deduced from the norms and values of the families.This, however, is only possible when a number of mediations can be per-formed. On the one hand, it must become clear how the multitude of norms and values of the distinct families can brought together in an en-

compassing system of norms and values. On the other hand, it must beunderstood how the norms and values are related to the production sys-tem.

It is evident that the norms and values of the distinct families are re-stricted by the modern production system: Only those norms and valuesare permissible that respect the separation between the private domain of the family and the public domain of the System of Needs.217 But the at-tempt to bring the various norms and values of the families together,can initially be performed apart from the

System of Needs. Although, in

principle, each family can have its own norms and values, in reality many families will share its norms and values with other families. There-fore, it is possible to divide civil society into groups of families that sharenorms and values.218 Insofar as these groups are institutionalized in ideo-logical associations like denominations, cultural organizations, journals,ideological clubs (humanists, socialists, liberals) etc., the first step hasbeen made to transform the various norms and values in an encompassing system: The many families are structured in a limited number of ideolog-

ical associations.219

216 Cf. § 183 “the state as the Understanding envisages it.”217 In an allusion to Rawls one could say: not all values and norms belong to “rea-

sonable comprehensive doctrines”.218 Which groups exactly exist and how they emerge in a “struggle for recognition”

has to be observed by empirical sociology.219 These “ideological associations” can, for example, be interpreted as cultural mi-

norities. In this sense, the freedom and equality of the French Revolution has

prepared the contemporary multi-cultural society. Of course, these cultural mi-norities differ from the national minorities Kymlicka (1995) has in mind when he writes: “On the contrary, national minorities often claim an ‘inherent’




The ideological associations can be compared with the Corporations inthe Philosophy of Right, insofar as they have the function to create a “local” generality, i.e., a generality that still is distinct from the encom-

passing system. At the same time, the ideological associations are funda-mentally different from the Corporations because they are disconnectedfrom the production system. This disconnection is necessary since, onthe one hand, it prevents the family from losing its independence andbeing absorbed by production relations, and on the other hand, thatthe production is moralized and its rationality is undermined. Moreover,the ideological associations, unlike the Corporations , are not organically involved in a coherent system. As a consequence, not only is the numberof ideological associations open, but also the number of participants each

of them can accept: No individuals are excluded, as was in the case of theCorporations. In the ideological associations the multi-culturality of mod-ern society is explicitly objectified.

Although the ideological associations exist beside the production sys-tem, they cannot just leave the production system to itself. From the per-spective of the ideological association, the concept of the good life can bedetermined, namely as the life in which the norms and values of the as-sociation can be actualized. Therefore, the ideological association can for-mulate normative standards for the production system. These standards,however, remain as a moral “ought”, externally related to the productionsystem. The ideological association can only formulate a political pro-gram that elaborates which measures have to be taken to subject the pro-duction system to its normative standards.

The moral freedom of the associations can only be actualized if theirpolitical program is realized. Since the distinct ideological associationsalso have distinct political programs, their programs cannot immediately be made the program of the state power that unites the ideological asso-

ciations. In some way or another, the distinct political programs must bemediated to the unity of an encompassing political program. In contem-porary society, this process of mediation gets its shape in the institutionalframework of political parties.220 A political party can represent the polit-

right to self-government, which they see as pre-dating their incorporation intothe larger state, and as enduring into the infinite future.” (p. 142) He mentionsthe example of “residents of Indian reservations”.

220 Cf. Fred. Neuhouser: “Thus, liberal critics are clearly right in arguing that He-

gel’s theory, without going so far as legally to prohibit radical social critique, failsto recognize it as having a value in the modern world that would warrant itsbeing specially protected or encouraged, or even thought worthwhile.” (p.

The market and the good life 207



ical program of an ideological association. All political parties togethermust, in some way or another, determine the encompassing political pro-gram of the state. In the next chapter we will see how this task is institu-

tionalized in the parliament.If the moral dimension of labor is determined at state level by medi-ation of political parties, the production organizations (the companies)are guarded against an immediate moralization of the production. Thisprevents the development of factories and companies that are, for exam-ple, Catholic, Islamic or Humanist. The companies would be restrictedby ideological demands. As a consequence, the rationality of the free mar-ket would be undermined. Yet, the moralized production that is implicat-ed by the Corporations of the Philosophy of Right does justice to an aspectthat cannot be neglected: In the Corporations, the moral dimension of labor is sustained by the workers themselves. They know that they realizetheir own welfare in the Corporations. This evokes the question of

whether a moral dimension of production that is externally imposed by politics can be effective at all. Can this kind of morality motivate the

workers? Do politics not lack the knowledge that is demanded for the im-plementation of normative standards in the production process?

The aforementioned problem can be solved when, as in the Philoso-

phy of Right , the branches of the production process participate in theelaboration of the normative standards insofar as these concern theirown branch. This, however, is only possible when two conditions are ful-filled. On the one hand, the elaboration of the normative standards mustbe mediated by the general normal standards as they are fixed at politicallevel. On the other hand, the elaboration may not be done by a party of the market, i.e., individual companies or factories that belong to thebranch. Rather, it must be the responsibility of the branch organizationas such that does not itself operate at the market, and represents all indi-

vidual companies or factories that belong to that branch. Therefore, theCorporations of the Philosophy of Right can keep their function in the re-

vised civil society if they are interpreted as branch organizations that con-trol and develop the normative standards of their members.

In the Philosophy of Right, it belongs to the task of the Corporations totake care of the professional education of its members. In contemporary society, however, the institutions of education are normally (at least inEurope), organized by the state (state universities and schools), or by

265). By means of the political parties, it is possible to recognize “radical socialcritique”.




ideological associations (for example, Christian universities and schools,financially supported by the state). It is precisely because these universi-ties and schools are not “common” players on the market (their “prod-

uct”, the output of certified students, is controlled by the state, i.e., by education authorities), that they are extremely suitable for integrating normative standards in their education program, i. e., the normativestandards that are formulated at state level. Insofar as the education pro-grams are specialized in specific professional abilities, the normative di-mension of the program can be developed in cooperation with the con-cerned branch organization, i.e., the revised Corporation.

In contrast to the assumption in the Philosophy of Right , employees dono longer work their whole life in the same enterprise. They may not

even work lifelong in the same branch. If the individuals change theirlabor situation, especially with the switch over to a new branch of produc-tion, they may need complementary education. Insofar as the comple-mentary education has a normative dimension, it is important that it isorganized again by the universities and schools in cooperation with thebranch organizations.

Retrospection

We have discussed how Hegel develops the Corporation as the institution-al embodiment of the second self. This embodiment presupposes that thecontradiction between the freedom and equality of the persons and theuniqueness of the moral subjects is overcome by a process of culture inthe modern production system. The culture of the production system so-cializes the moral individuals and makes them suitable to participate inthe legal order of a social organism. This social organism is subdivided

in Corporations in which the individuals can actualize their moral partic-ularity. We observe that Hegel’s conception of the embodiment of the second

self does not adequately do justice to the moral subject. Ultimately, he issacrificed to the labor system. As an alternative to Hegel’s concept, I de-

veloped the ideological association. These associations are not mediatedby the culture of the production process, but rather by a learning processin the public domain of civil society. By mediation of public discussion,the individuals develop insight into their subjective norms and values.

Mediated by political parties, the ideological associations formulate thenormative framework of the production system, i.e., the shared norms

Retrospection 209



and values of the good life. In the next chapter, it will be discussed how the good life is institutionalized in the state, and how the state can be con-sidered as the embodiment of the third self.




Chapter 9The State: The Embodiment of the Third Self

Introduction

In this chapter, I will elaborate the institutional actualization of the third self for our era, i.e., I will confront the conceptual determinations of thethird self (as elaborated at the level of Morality in the Phenomenology of

Spirit ), with institutions of our globalized world, and examine which in-stitutions can be considered as adequate realizations of the third self. Toprepare this attempt, however, I will first go into Hegel’s attempt in thePhilosophy of Right to elaborate the institutionalization of the third self forthe Nineteenth Century. I will criticize the results of Hegel’s attempt, theNation State (or, what one could call in a variation on Hegel, the third

family ). This criticism does not concern the features of the State that typ-ically seem to belong to the Nineteenth Century, but is again more ele-mentary. I will show what are the consequences of Hegel’s confusion at

the level of the family (where he confused natural and ethical immedia-cy), and at the level of civil society (in which subjective freedom is re-duced to a subjectivity that is totally socialized). As a consequence, He-gel’s concept of State does not meet the criteria for the third self thatHegel himself has developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. For the citi-zens, the third self seems to coincide with the objective reality of the Mon-arch. Therefore, their conscience is restricted to its objective appearanceand is not conceived of in its relation to the absolute Spirit. This criticism

will appear helpful for the positive construction of the third self ’s institu-tional embodiment.

The development of the third self’s embodiment in the‘Philosophy of Right’: the State

Systematically, the third self has to be conceived of as the adequate unity of right and morality. Therefore, one would expect that the State is con-

structed as the unity of the third moment of abstract Right (Injustice ), andthe third moment of morality (Good and Conscience ). To make Injustice a



moment of the State , however, seems a bit strange. But this becomes un-derstandable if we call to mind what Hegel meant by Injustice. At thelevel of abstract Right , it remained undetermined whether the particular

and the general will were in harmony. Therefore, Injustice could not beexcluded: particular and general will could contradict one another.That was precisely the reason that the transition to Morality had to bemade: The particular will could not remain undetermined. At the levelof the State , however, the adequate unity of Right and Morality hasbeen developed. Therefore, the harmony between the particular and gen-eral will can be guaranteed. As the moment of the State , Injustice is sub-lated, i. e. , the particular and the general will are in harmony. The State isthe particular will who wills the general will as such. The State is an in-

stitutionalized self : the Monarch. The Monarch is the individual who, inhis institutional role as Monarch, wills the general will as such. (§ 279).

For the citizens of the State , the Monarch represents the objectifica-tion of their freedom. The State is the reality of the good life , the actual-ization of the (general) Good. The conviction that the State is the actual-ization of the Good is subjectively expressed in the patriotism of the citi-zens. This patriotism functions as the Conscience of the citizens who areconvinced that this Conscience is actualized in the ethical life of theState. (§ 268) In the relation between the Monarch and the citizen, thelordship/bondsman relation has got its definitive shape. The citizen actsin service of the Monarch. But he knows that he, by this service, actual-izes his own freedom. After all, the Monarch represents the good life: inhis recognition of the Monarch, the citizen recognizes his own freedom.

As representation of the citizen’s freedom, the Monarch is an individ-ual who plays, as does the “lord”, an institutional role. In this institution-al role, the Monarch is, so to speak, an immortal individual : not only be-cause the institutional role survives when the Monarch dies, but also be-

cause the monarchy is hereditary, i. e. , the reproduction of the monarchalfamily guarantees that the monarch is succeeded. (§ 280) But, in contrastto the “lord” of the initial lordship/bondsman relation, the Monarch is notonly the (institutionalized) symbol of the citizen’s freedom, but also thedeveloped reality of this freedom. He is the adequate reality of thethird self and, therefore, the adequate unity of the first and second self.

We have seen that the embodiment of the first self , the family, couldbe interpreted as the immediate actualization of freedom. In the family,the moments of the free person, i.e., generality, particularity and singu-

larity, are actualized in the immediate unity of the family organism: thegender role of man (moment of generality), and woman (moment of par-

Chapter 9 The State: The Embodiment of the Third Self 212



ticularity), are unified in the mutual love (moment of singularity). In theembodiment of the second self , the Corporation, the actualization of free-dom has become self-conscious. The moment of generality has become

self-conscious as the free and equal person of the free market; the mo-ment of particularity, as the welfare that is expressed in the commoditiesof the market. And, the moment of singularity has become self-consciousin the unity of both preceding moments: In the Corporation, the free per-sons have decided to actualize their welfare in cooperation with the othermembers of the Corporation. This cooperation is self-conscious in themutual respect that the corporation members express to one another asskilled professionals.

In the Philosophy of Right , the many Corporations are understood as

the “organs” of a coherent production system. (“Verstandesstaat ”) Thisproduction system is in the service of the good life that, at the level of civil society , is only a practical unity. It is only at the level of the State that the unity of the good life is as such intended: the Monarch is theparticular will who wants the good life as such. Therefore, the embodi-ment of the third self , the Monarch, has to be understood as an institu-tional whole that is presupposed to the institutions of civil society andthat explicates the unity that remains implicit at the level of civil society.The institutions of the state (the Constitution, § 259) are differentiated inthree powers (§273) in which the moments of the Person have their“true” existence, i.e., they are not only self-conscious (like the institutionsof civil society ), but also explicitly realized as moments of the good life’sunity.

In the Legislature (§ 198 ff.) the moment of generality has its “true”existence. It explicitly formulates the laws of the good life as the lawsof the state. The Legislature is the institution that is presupposed to the

Administration of Justice , i. e. , to the institution that guarantees the reality

of the free and equal persons. Thanks to the Legislature , the state has a coherent system of laws that allows the citizens to understand themselvesas the free and equal citizens of the state organism.

In the Executive (§ 287 ff.) the moment of particularity has its “true”existence. Thanks to the Executive , all actions of ethical life (resulting inparticular existence), are manifestations of the good life. The Executive isthe institution that is presupposed to the system of production (including Police and Corporations ). It not only guarantees, in general, that the pro-duction of welfare is in harmony with the actualization of freedom, i.e.,

it is a moment of the good life, but also it is particularly responsible forthe well-functioning and coordination of Police and Corporations. More-

The development of the third self’s embodiment 213



over, the Executive is, in some sense, responsible for the Administration of Justice because it not only contains what we call nowadays the Govern-ment , but also Jurisdiction, i.e., juridical actions that try to correct “nor-

mal” actions.Finally, Legislature and Executive are united in the Crown (§ 275 ff.),the “true” existence of the moment of singularity. This not only meansthat both these powers are intertwined (the Executive is based on thelaws of the Legislature , as is the existence of the Legislature as institutionbased on actions of the Executive ), but also that they are the moment of an encompassing power: The Monarch, i.e., the representative of theCrown, is, as well, President , Leader of the Government and Chief Justice.

Although the good life, as it is objectified in the state, is mediated by

the subjective freedom of the free market, it remains an historical man-ifestation of freedom. In the language of the Philosophy of Right , thegood life objectifies the Spirit of a People. Therefore, the State doesnot seem to be considered as the adequate realization of the third self.In the Phenomenology of Spirit , the third self is developed as the consci-entious individual who is related to the absolute Spirit. The conscientiousindividual knows that the actualization of his freedom has a contingent,historical form. In that sense, the ethical life cannot be the “absolute endand aim of the world” (§ 129) as it is stated in the Philosophy of Right.

In the Philosophy of Right , this problem is solved by the differentia-tion between the conscience of the citizens and the conscience of the

Monarch. As conscientious individuals, the citizens are the patriots whoare convinced that it is their duty the observe the laws of the state.The obedience of this duty coincides with the actualization of their free-dom. At state level, the moral “ought”, i.e., the duty to realize the good,has been completely fulfilled. The Monarch, however, is the conscientiousindividual who is aware of the finitude of ethical life. The Monarch can,

so to speak, distinguish between the general good that is actualized in thestate, and the absolute good that principally transcends any historical re-alization. The Monarch is the conscientious individual who is related tothe absolute Spirit and, therefore, knows that the objective world of the state is only a finite manifestation of the absolute Spirit.

In the Philosophy of Right , the conscience of the Monarch is men-tioned in § 285: “The third moment in the power of the crown concernsthe absolute universality which subsists subjectively in the conscience of the monarch and objectively in the whole of the constitution and the

laws.” Although this formulation makes it dubious whether the Monarchreally transcends the objective world of the state, this transcendence seems




to be presupposed in the “right to pardon criminals”: “The right to par-don criminals arises from the sovereignty of the Monarch, since it is thisalone which is empowered to actualize mind’s221power of making undone

what has been done and wiping out a crime by forgiving and forgetting it.” (§ 282) Moreover, also the “majesty” of the Monarch seems to indi-cate his transcendence: “The personal majesty of the monarch, on theother hand, as the final subjectivity of decision, is above all answerability for acts of government.” (§ 284)

The transcendence of the state and the relation to the absolute Spirit isexplicitly discussed at the level of International Law (§330 ff.) and World History (§ 341 ff.): In the relations between the states, the transition fromobjective into absolute Spirit has been made. Therefore, it is at this level

that the conscience of the Monarch can be compared with the conscienceas it is developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The relations betweenstates are essentially conceived of as relations between the Monarchs of the states: “The state’s tendency to look abroad lies in the fact that it isan individual subject. Its relation to other states, therefore, falls to thepower of the crown.” (§ 329) This means that the relations between statesdepend “on different wills each of which is sovereign.” (§ 330) Precisely because of the sovereignty of these wills, they are free to recognize oneanother or to refuse this. If they do recognize one another, their relationis structured like the “beautiful soul”, one of the moments of consciencein the “Phenomenology of Spirit ”. As long as the Monarchs recognize oneanother, they can persevere in the illusion of their absolute autonomy.This autonomy, however, is only real insofar as the Monarchs continueto express their mutual recognition. When, however, this process is bro-ken off, the contradiction in which they are involved becomes clear. The

Monarch is autonomous insofar as he has realized himself in the good lifeof the state. Also, the other Monarch is autonomous insofar as he has re-

alized himself in the state: But this time it is about another state. There-fore, the conclusion must be that, insofar as the Monarch has realizedhimself in the good life of the state, his autonomy cannot be recognizedby the other Monarch. As expression of the Monarch’s conscience, thestates exclude one another: They cannot both be an absolute reality.

The mutual exclusion of states is discussed at the level of world his-tory. Since there exists no international legal order, the states are relatedas in a “state of nature” (§ 333) i.e., when the states do not succeed inarranging agreements, the ultimate consequence is war. The struggle of

221 In German: “Macht des Geistes”.

The development of the third self’s embodiment 215



world history , however, has not only a destructive result. Although allstates strive after their own survival, world history can be conceived of as a process in which freedom is actualized more and more adequately.

This is the “cunning of Reason” that is active in history, behind theback of the world leaders. In the “cunning of Reason”, it is expressedthat it is ultimately the absolute Spirit that manifests itself in world history ,not blind destiny.

In the Philosophy of Right , world history is classified in four Realms:the Oriental Realm, the Greek Realm, the Roman Realm and the Germanic Realm. These four realms correspond to the four stages of world history as they are discussed in the Religion Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spi-rit 222. Once again, world history is interpreted as a process in which theabsolute Spirit comes to itself in a progressive development of religionforms. And, once again, these religion forms are attributed to distinctstates in distinct historical periods, i. e., states which are essentially mono-cultural. In contrast to the Phenomenology of Spirit, however, thetransition to the absolute Spirit is not performed by the conscience of the individual. Even the Monarchs do not understand that their actionscan be interpreted as manifestations of the absolute Spirit.

Criticizing the state of the ‘Philosophy of Right’ in the light of the ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’

I will abstain from a closer discussion of how the institutions of the stateare elaborated in the Philosophy of Right. It will be sufficient to criticizethe aforementioned main features of the development of the state, in-spired by the Phenomenology of Spirit. In the next section, this criticism

will be the starting point of an alternative construction of the state. Inthe elaboration of the institutions of this revised state, it will be possibleto return to some aspects of the state institutions as they are developed inthe Philosophy of Right.

The central criticism of the concept of state in the Philosophy of Right ,concerns the relation between the citizen and the Monarch. On the onehand, the citizen has a conscience that, in comparison with the conscience

222 The Religion Chapter distinguishes between the natural religion (that comprises

the Oriental religions), the Greek religion of art developing in the Roman pan-theon of gods, and the Christian revealed religion that ends in (German) Luther-anism.




of the Phenomenology of Spirit , is reduced: The citizen is a patriot, i.e., hehas the duty to actualize the good life of his state. On the other hand, theMonarch only represents the actualized good life. It is true that, in some

aspects, the conscience of the Monarch transcends the actualized goodlife, but even in this case, conscience is reduced in comparison withthe Phenomenology of Spirit: The conscience of the Monarch is not relatedto the absolute good, to the absolute Spirit. The relation to the absoluteSpirit is only practically developed in the process of world history. Asthe “cunning of Reason”, the absolute Spirit manifests itself in world his-tory.

The reduction of conscience implies that the good life of the state ab-sorbs, so to speak, the pure self. There is no room for subjective freedomthat transcends the historical actualization of good life.223 Subjective free-dom remains reduced to the social System of Needs: subjective freedom inthe field of consumption and labor.

At the level of world history , it becomes clear why religion is excludedfrom the institutional framework of ethical life. It is obvious that Hegelpresupposes states that are, generally speaking, mono-cultural, i.e., statesin which the citizens share their religion. Therefore, religion becomesonly relevant when the state is transcended at the level of world history.

The revision of the citizen and the Monarch

As in the Philosophy of Right , the embodiment of the third self can be un-derstood as the relation between citizen and Monarch if “citizen” and“Monarch” are terms that are respectively related to the “bondsman”and the “lord” of the bondsman/lord relation. The citizen/monarch rela-tion has to be understood as the adequate form of the bondsman/lord re-lation, i.e., as the adequate unity of right and morality, the adequateunity of horizontal and vertical recognition. Since we have already seen(in Chapter 6) that the adequate unity of right and morality coincides

with the adequate unity between objective and absolute Spirit , this lastunity must also characterize the citizen/monarch relation. As in the Phi-

223 I think that Fred. Neuhouser (2000) assigns more self-reflexivity to the socialmembers than Hegel intends to do: “That is, Hegel’s ideal requires that social

members have a general grasp of the purpose of each of the social spheres to which they belong, and of how the three principal institutions constitute a com-plete and coherent whole.” (p. 253).

The revision of the citizen and the Monarch 217



losophy of Right , this is possible when the citizen recognizes the “monarch”as a person who represents the social organism in which his freedom isactualized. Once again, the citizen is understood as the third self , the con-

scientious individual. This time, however, the conscience of the citizencannot be identified with his patriotism. As in the Phenomenology of Spi-rit , the citizen is, as a conscientious individual, related to the absolute Spi-rit.

For the revised citizen, the social organism of the state that is repre-sented by the “monarch” does not coincide with the adequate actualiza-tion of his conscience. The revised citizen knows that he can actualizehis freedom only in the form of objective Spirit , i.e., as the good lifethat is only an historical realization form of the absolute good. The

good life remains distinguished from the absolute Spirit. Therefore, the“monarch” is not absolute insofar as he represents the unity of thegood life in which the citizen actualizes his freedom, but rather insofaras he represents the absolute ground of the state’s unity, the absolute Spi-rit.

The “monarch” who represents the absolute Spirit can be interpretedas the president of the constitutional state. Insofar as the state organism isan historical entity, its law is subjected to changes that are especially re-lated to developments in the domain of civil society. However, insofaras this law is also legitimized as the embodiment of the third self, it isalso founded in the absolute Spirit , i.e., it has a supra-historical essence.In our era, we know this supra-historical essence as the so called “humanrights”, as the absolute moral rights that are attributed to human beings assuch. These are the rights whose conceptions are developed at the level of the revised abstract Right and the revised Morality. (cf. Chapter 6).

The human rights can get a specific formulation in the Constitution of the state. This is the first step to actualize the human rights in the objec-

tive world. In the Constitution, the human rights are related to an histor-ical state organism. The Constitution gives the human rights not only a positive formulation as the fundamental rights of the Constitution, butalso reconciles them to the normative framework of the positive law that is valid in an historical state organism.

The president who represents the Constitution plays an institutionalrole that is distinguished from his natural existence. Since this institution-al role expresses that the existence of the state is legitimized by the abso-lute Spirit , it has the majesty that the Philosophy of Right attributes to the

monarch. The majesty, however, cannot be an argument to make thefunction of the president an hereditary one. It is only important that




the Constitution guarantees that the function of the president is, under allcircumstances, fulfilled. This could be done by determining the presiden-cy as a constitutional monarchy. An argument for this solution would be

that it at least becomes clear that it is irrelevant what are the personalqualities of the president. But it is an illusion to think that an hereditary president can claim a status that is more “absolute” than, for example, anelected president. In both cases, it is the Constitution that determines how an individual is selected for the presidency. Nature can not only not guar-antee that a president has offspring (so that constitutional rules are need-ed to determine who in this case will be the successor), but even whenoffspring are available, it is, for example, not a law of nature that the eld-est son will be the successor224: The constitution determines which family

relations are relevant. As the representative of the absolute Spirit , i.e., as the representative

of the Constitution, the president cannot be the leader of the government. As a finite reality, the good life and its government are distinguished fromthe absolute Spirit: they have an independent, contingent existence. Nev-ertheless, however, the good life is not totally separated from the absolute Spirit: in its absoluteness the absolute Spirit has to manifest itself in thegood life. As manifestation of the absolute Spirit , the laws that constitute

good life can be considered as contingent appearances of human rights.Therefore, the Constitution determines that the president has to takecare for the powers that constitute good life. The president is not himself the leader of these powers, but he has to install them as relative independ-ent powers. As the absolute ground of the powers of good life, the pres-ident represents, in the eyes of the citizens, not only the human rights,but also democracy: By installing the powers of good life that is in ac-cordance to the human rights, the president guarantees the existence of a democratic legal order.

In contrast to the Philosophy of Right , the powers of the good life can-not be identified as, respectively, Legislature, Executive and Crown, butrather as the trias politica of Montesquieu. Although the state nowadaysalso has a legislative power, this power cannot be a moment of the Crownor the Presidency. As the power that constitutes the framework of the so-cial organism of the state, it has a relative independency: On the onehand, the legislative power formulates his laws in correspondence with

224 This was precisely the conflict between Eteokles and Polyneikes: for the Divine Law they were both son of the king (even twins), who could claim to be his suc-cessor. For the Human Law , however, only the eldest son has this right.

The revision of the citizen and the Monarch 219



the Constitution; on the other hand, the laws integrate the developmentsat the level of civil society. The second power of the present day state, theGovernment , has the same task as the Executive , insofar as the Govern-

ment is responsible for the existence of the institutional framework in which the laws of the legislative power are actualized. Jurisdiction, how-ever, does not belong to the task of the Government, but is, rather, thethird power of the social organism of the state. The power of Jurisdictionguarantees the unity of the state organism as such: It judges whether thelaws of the legislative power are in harmony with the Constitution, and whether the actions of the Government and the citizens are in harmony with the laws. Once again, the three powers of the state can be consideredas the institutional objectification of the three moments of the person(generality, particularity and singularity). But this time, these powers can-not (like the Monarch) be considered as the “absolute end and aim of the

world” that is only practically legitimized at the level of world history. Thethree powers are embedded in, and legitimized by, the Constitution that isrepresented by the President.

In the next section, I will discuss how the conscience of the citizencan be developed in accordance with the conscience as it is developedin the Phenomenology of Spirit. After all, the third self of the Phenomenol-

ogy of Spirit is the presupposition of the revised concept of the state.

The development of the third self as the presupposition of therevised state

In Chapter 8, we have seen that the cultivated persons can organize them-selves in ideological associations in which they share subjective norms and

values. If these ideological associations elaborate what these values andnorms imply with respect to the conception of good life, they can bethe base of political parties. Only when all political parties are representedin the legislative power that determines the legal framework of good life,does society do justice to subjective freedom. In contemporary states, thisrepresentation is institutionalized in several variations of parliamentary democracy.

I abstract from the different forms in which democracy gets shape,and observe that the central point is that all, or at least the most impor-

tant, ideological associations are represented by political parties in theparliament. The political parties have to rationally discuss the legal frame-




work of good life. Insofar as they do not succeed in reaching a rationalconsensus, they have to come to a compromise. To guarantee thatthese compromises are reached, the parliament commits itself to institu-

tional rules (for example, voting procedures in which the majority deter-mines the ultimate decision). In this context, however, I am especially in-terested in the parliament as an institution of education. It plays a centralrole in the education of the citizens. Without the parliament, they cannotdevelop the conscience as it is discussed in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

The relation between the political parties in the parliament is struc-tured like the relations between the monarchs , as I discussed in one of the previous sections. As long as the political parties do not disagree,they can have the illusion to be totally autonomous. They are the “beau-

tiful souls” who affirm to one another this alleged autonomy and losethemselves in the expression of each other’s excellence. At the moment,however, that this mutual recognition fades away, they have to face thereality in which they are situated. They all have their political programin which their subjective norms and values are actualized. Insofar asthe parties consider their norms and values as the good, they are absoluteand they have to be realized. But insofar as the good is identified as theactualization of specific (subjectivist) norms and values, it is disputed by other parties on the basis of other (subjectivist) norms and values, and de-clines as the (absolute) good.

The contrast between the parties can only be overcome in a learning process that makes clear that all political programs are historical manifes-tations of an absolute concept of freedom (as developed in Chapter 6).This insight makes it possible to be tolerant towards other political pro-grams. Moreover, the learning process has to elucidate that the politicalparties, as members of the parliament, are already functioning all thetime within a legal framework that transcends the specific political con-

ceptions of good life. Therefore, the political process appears, like theprocess of world history in the Philosophy of Right , as the manifestationof the absolute Spirit. In contrast to the Philosophy of Right , however,

where the monarchs were not aware of their relation to the absolute Spirit ,the political parties have explicit insight into the legislative power as a power that gives a specific historical interpretation of the absolute con-cept of freedom, i.e., the political parties embody the third self. Sincethe learning process of the political parties in the parliament is reflectedin the discussions of the mass media in the public domain, all citizens can

reproduce this learning process and understand themselves as citizens of a state in which the third self is embodied.

The development of the third self as the presupposition of the revised state 221



Once the citizens have developed insight into the conscience at statelevel, they understand the entirety of their conscience. At the level of thefamily, the conscientious individuals actualize their conscience in the

form of immediacy. As in the Phenomenology of Spirit , the conscientiousmarriage partners actualize their conscience by repeating the stages of Consciousness and Self-consciousness (cf. pp. 106–109). At the levelof the System of Needs , the conscientious individuals actualize their con-science in the form of mediation. As in the Phenomenology of Spirit , theconscientious persons on the market actualize their conscience by repeat-ing the stages of observing Reason (cf. 194–196). It is true that we havepresented this stage of the actualization of conscience as a learning processin which the grownup children acquired insight in the norms and valuesof their original family in distinction from the reality of the productionsystem. But this learning process remains important for the persons whohave founded their own family. In their participation in the System of Needs , they actualize the norms and values of their family by their specificsupply and demand on the market, and by their specific contribution tothe discussions in civil society. Moreover, they can develop these normsand values under influence of the confrontation with newly developedproducts and services or new ideological positions and opinions. At the

level of the revised Police and Corporation (the ideological Association),the transition is made to the ultimate form of conscience (as it getsshape at the level of the state). As in the Phenomenology of Spirit , themoral subjects actualize their conscience by repeating active Reason. Atthe end, they learn at the level of Jurisdiction, that their conscience is re-lated to the absolute Spirit.

The three domains of ethical life, family , civil society and state , insti-tutionalize together the complete learning process of conscience in ac-cordance with the learning process as it is developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. As a consequence, in the revised Philosophy of Right , the moral“ought” is conserved at the level of ethical life. In the original Philosophy of Right, the moral “ought” is overcome because the three moments of themoral subject (Purpose and Responsibility , Intention and Welfare , Good and Conscience ), are realized at the level of ethical life: In the social organismof the family , the purpose of the partners is realized so that they are re-sponsible for their actions; in the social organism of the Corporation,the intention is realized so that the actions of the Corporation’s members

serve their welfare ; in the social organism of the state, conscience (patrio-




tism) is realized so that the state coincides with good life.225 In the revisedPhilosophy of Right , however, Purpose is not absorbed by the social organ-ism of the family, but remains distinguished from this organism because

it is expressed by the partners insofar as they actualize conscience in theform of immediacy. Likewise, Intention is not absorbed by the social or-ganism of the Corporation. Intention appears as the actualization of con-science in the form of mediation, i.e., as the subjective norms and valuesthat are explicated in distinction from the production system. Conscience ,finally, is not absorbed by the social organism of the state because it is notnarrowed to patriotism. By the discussions in the parliament and the cor-responding discussions in the public domain, the citizens learn that therealized good life is an historical manifestation of the absolute good,

i.e., the tension between conscience and good life is conserved.

The Government

Like the Executive in the Philosophy of Right , the Government is the mo-ment of state power in which the moment of particularity is objectively institutionalized, i.e., the Government guarantees that the real actions

of the citizens are performed within the framework of the general lawsas they are determined by the legislative power. The Government , howev-er, is not only an instrument of the legislative power , i. e., a bureaucracy of civil servants who only execute what is told by the legislative power , butalso is a relative independent power. Although the Government is depend-ent on the legislative power , this last power is, in the other way around,also dependent on the Government. The political parties in the parlia-ment can try to formulate their conception of good life, based on theirsubjective norms and values, and translate this conception in a systematic

system of laws. This system of laws, however, cannot coincide with thesystem of law that underlies the State’s reality of good life. Not only be-cause the system of law is a compromise between many political parties(the dominance of one party would contradict subjective freedom), but

225 Nevertheless, I do not think that Peter Steinberger’s (1988) conclusion can bemaintained: “In this regard, I believe that Hegel’s intention to view political so-ciety as an ethical community is emblematic of the degree to which his politicalthought is so very different from the superficially similar views of more orthodox

liberals, including Kant himself.” (p. 244) The realization of good life in worldhistory is distinguished from the absolute good. My criticism of Hegel is thatonly the philosopher seems to know this distinction, not the citizen himself.

The Government 223



also because of the dynamics of modern society. The dynamics of civil society results in an ongoing process of differentiation, with respect tothe ideological associations, as well as with respect to the production sys-

tem. Neither these ideological associations, nor the companies of the pro-duction system form an inner organic unity which the lawgiver could an-ticipate (as the Corporations in the Philosophy of Right are considered as“organs” of a production system). They are part of a global market of opinions and commodities that can endlessly expand their differentiation.Therefore, the process of lawgiving needs the continuous input from thedevelopments in the practical world, i.e., it needs some input from theGovernment.

Insofar as good life is realized, it is based on the institutional structure

that has been actualized by the Government according to the existing law system. The real good life, however, is a dynamic system in which, on theone hand, the application of the existing legal rules is not a mechanicalprocess, but rather a process that asks for interpretation and putting pri-orities. On the other hand, the new development of good life (originating in civil society ) continuously transcends the framework that is foreseen by the lawgiver, so that the Government can only function when there issome discretional power. Because of these two reasons, the Government

is a political body that has to formulate an action program that is sus-tained and controlled by the parliament. Since it is, in the first place,the Government that is confronted with developments that transcendthe framework of the law, it is obvious that the Government can takethe initiative for the formulation of law proposals, and submit them tothe parliament.

Jurisdiction

In the revised Philosophy of Right , the moment of singularity is not objec-tified in the power of the President. We have seen that the President rep-resents the absolute ground of the state, not state power itself. Neverthe-less, also the revised Philosophy of Right needs a power in which the mo-ment of singularity is objectively objectified. Since the legislative power inthe Government are relatively independent, their mutual harmony is notguaranteed, and cannot be guaranteed by one of these two powers: Inthat case, they would lose their relative independence. Therefore, the har-

mony can only be safeguarded by a third power, namely Jurisdiction. Ju-risdiction judges whether the actions in the State are in accordance with




the law. It judges not only the actions of the Government , but also the ac-tions of the legislative power itself (are the laws in accordance with theConstitution? ), the citizens, the family members and the persons of the

market. The Administration of Law that was already discussed at thelevel of civil society , is part of the power of Jurisdiction (in contrast tothe Police that is part of the Government ).

International Law

Since the citizens are conscientious individuals who are related to the ab-solute Spirit , i.e., who know that the state they are living in is only an

historical form of good life, the modern state is not only practically relat-ed to other states. The citizens know that it is their absolute duty to actu-alize human rights in the good life of a democratic state. Because thismoral demand concerns all human beings, the citizens are not only relat-ed to their fellow citizens, but to all. At the same time, however, the citi-zens know that the moral demand can only be actualized in an historicalstate that is distinguished from other states. The awareness of the histor-ical finiteness of the own state implies an internal relation to other states:Domestic and international law are intertwined.

Insofar as all states are legitimized by human rights, international law exists and can made explicit by international treaties in which the humanrights are recognized. By this recognition, the states, at the same time,recognize one another as equal, i.e., as historical forms of good life.This mutual recognition of states excludes illegitimate states, i.e., statesin which the human rights are internally violated, or states that do notrecognize all legitimate states as equal.

The possible existence of illegitimate states seems to imply that only

under the condition of a world Government can the actualization of free-dom be guaranteed. A world Government , however, cannot be defendedon principle grounds. It is true that if a world Government exists, the con-clusion must be that the world citizens obviously recognize this world Government as a legitimate state, but this does not mean that the world Government is the most adequate form to actualize freedom. The exis-tence of a world Government only factually expresses that there are no il-legitimate states that can threaten the realization of freedom. But it can-not principally prevent this threatening. Since the actualized good life is

an historical existence (be it in the form of a world state or in the form of many states), good life principally exists as a multitude of good lives. In

International Law 225



that sense, a world government will always be an historical accident thatcan be overcome. The point is that the adequate realization of freedom(“eternal peace”) is only guaranteed if all citizens can participate in a

state that they can recognize as the actualization of good life. Normally this implies a multitude of states.If the adequate realization of freedom gets shape in a multitude of

states, institutional mechanisms are presupposed that prevent or over-come the existence of illegitimate states. In the contemporary worldthere were examples of military interventions (called humanitarian inter-ventions), against regimes that violated human rights. Even if these inter-ventions are based on mandates of the United Nations, they remain very problematic. Since no world Government exists, these kinds of actions are

only possible thanks to opportunistic coalitions that evoke the suspicionthat they are, rather, the result of power politics. Moreover, even themightiest nation does not have the power to enforce human rights. Inter-vention makes sense only when it sustains internal, oppositional powersthat can be helped by an internal regime change. Military interventionto overthrow a dictatorship has to be motivated by the request of a ma-

jority, representing internal opposition to that dictatorship.226

The most important mechanism for the creation of eternal peace has

nothing to do with exceptional situations that ask for military interven-tion, but rather with the regular international relations that are the resultof the world market. Since, at the national level, the markets function inthe normative framework that is politically defined, the nation states areinclined to demand that the import products are produced under compa-rable normative conditions (for example concerning health, labor times,minimum wages, prohibition of child labor, responsibility for the envi-ronment, etc.). This may result in a convergence of the normative frame-

works of all states that participate in the world market. Moreover, the world market can contribute to a convergence of normative frameworksin a different manner. The world market has created multicultural soci-eties. Therefore, the process of lawgiving is mediated by more andmore ideological associations and, consequently, different cultural influ-ences. In this sense, the practical process of world history, the confronta-tion between mono-cultural states as discussed in the Philosophy of Right ,

226 The invasion of Iraq has shown that, even if the protection of human rights had

been the main argument for intervention, an external imposition of a democraticorder makes no sense. A government that is not able to guarantee the lives of itscitizens is not in the position to defend the values of human rights.




is internalized in the national state and has become a self-conscious proc-ess.

But the integrating mechanisms of the world market will not be suf-

ficient for the creation of eternal peace. Precisely, the relative independ-ence of the world market leaves room for developments that escape thenormative political frameworks. Multi-nationals can operate world wideand try to play the national states off against one another. The immod-erate expansion of the production process can generate struggles for thescarce raw materials and energy sources. The burdening of the environ-ment can undermine the very conditions of existence for all civilizedcommunities. In their attempt to ward off these problems, the nationalstates can, as well, identify themselves with some multi-nationals

(which ultimately will lead to war), or politically cooperate. The politicalcooperation between the states transcends the mechanisms of the worldmarket. In the next section, I will discuss the structures of political coop-eration.

The political cooperation between nation states

The intertwinement between domestic and international law has conse-

quences for the foreign policy of the nation state. Even if an internationalpower to enforce international law does not exist, the nation state cannotavoid observing some rules of international law without contradicting it-self.227 The presupposition of the modern nation state that all human be-ings have human rights, has a positive and a negative implication for na-tional policy in its relation to international law. The negative implicationis that national policy may not destroy foreign legal communities, insofaras they can be considered a specific historical form in which the freedomof moral persons has been realized. The positive implication is that na-tional policy must promote the development of free legal communities

when there are human individuals who do not participate in a freelegal community.

The free legal community not only makes those who are outside, to a certain extent, insiders (because they are recognized as bearers of humanrights), but also makes those who are inside, to a certain extent, outsiders.

227 “International law has recognized powers and constraints, and rights and duties,

which transcend the claims of nation-states and which, while they may not bebacked by institutions with coercive powers of enforcement, nonetheless havefar-reaching consequences.” (Held, 1996, p.101).

The political cooperation between nation states 227



Just because the participants in the legal system are also conscientious in-dividuals, they do not coincide with their role as legal persons. As consci-entious individuals, they are also outsiders, critically relating themselves

to the operating conception of the good life. It is because of this outsideposition that the free legal community is an open and dynamic society which must again and again integrate newly developed views: not only new technological inventions, but also new cultural costumes, originating from one of its cultural subgroups.

Modern society has to integrate colliding opinions about, for exam-ple, sexuality, abortion, euthanasia, the relation between state and reli-gion, the meaning of the public domain, the relation between men and

women. Because of its openness to cultural diversity, the modern nation

state has made the international dimension part of its internal function-ing. The self-reflexivity of the modern state not only concerns the aware-ness of being a specific historical state among other states, but also (andespecially), the insight of being involved in an ongoing process of change,provoking the ongoing necessity for critical discussions about how tohandle these changes. For that reason, national law is not locked in itself,but is rather open for international dimensions.228

This openness is given shape in international law.229 On the one

hand, nation states may enter into treaties, which give internationalcourts the competence to review national legislation and jurisprudence(for example the European Court); on the other hand, they can, withthe help of the UN, intervene in foreign legal communities. The problemis, however, that the legitimacy of international law remains dependenton national law.230 Nations can withdraw from international treaties, if they do not want to accept decisions of international courts concerning their legislation and jurisprudence.231 And the legitimacy of interventions

228 On the one hand, this international dimension is recognized by Francis Fukuya-ma (Francis Fukuyama, State Building. Governance and World Order in the Twen-ty-First Century , Profile Books, 2005, p.154). But he confronts this position withthe idea that the will of the people is the highest authority (ibidem, p.155).

229 This opinion, however, is disqualified by Francis Fukuyama as a European illu-sion: “The problem with the European position is that while such a higher realmof liberal democratic values might theoretically exist, it is very imperfectly em-bodied in any given international institution.” (Fukuyama, 2005, p.156).

230 “The “international community” is a fiction insofar as any enforcement capabil-ity depends entirely on the action of individual nation-states.” (Fukuyama, 2005,

p.157).231 Fukuyama gives a couple of examples concerning the United States: “Much of this centered on European charges of American unilateralism on issues like the




in a state which has terminated its UN membership seems to be very du-bious. Once again, international law seems to have no legitimacy withoutthe existence of a world state. Nevertheless, I think this conclusion is pre-

mature. We have not only seen that the world state is not a necessary pre-condition for international law, but also that it is not even its most ade-quate institutional form.

Essentially the existence of international law is not dependent on theexistence of a world state. As soon as reason is the legitimisation of thelegal order, domestic law can potentially be developed into internationallaw: the universality of reason can be translated into the universality of law, i.e., into law without boundaries. If national law is understood asthe expression of universal values (human rights and democracy)232, itis a small step to recognize other legal systems, which understand them-selves as the expression of these universal values, as well.233 Internationallaw is created from the moment that the shared universal norms are for-mulated in a treaty text (like the UN declaration for human rights), andsubscribed to by a number of countries. In that case, international law isnot dependent on the existence of a central world power, but rather onthe explicit self-submission of nation states to the shared universal values.Under these circumstances international law is not an external power, im-

posed upon the nation states, but rather an objectification of what was

treatment of al-Qaida prisoners in Guantnamo Bay, the American abrogation of the antiballistic missile treaty, Washington’s failure to join the InternationalCriminal Court, and, earlier, the Bush administration’s announcement that it was withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. The most seriousrift, however, emerged over Washington’s intention to attack Iraq in order to ef-fect “regime change” and eliminate its WMD.” (Fukuyama, 2005, p.142).

232 Habermas’s discourse theory of law is an example of this position. “Erst nach die-ser Weichenstellung kann ich das System der Rechte mit Hilfe des Diskursprin-

zips so begrnden, daß klar wird, warum sich private und çffentliche Autonomie,Menschenrechte und Volkssouvernitt wechselseitig voraussetzen .” (Habermas,1992, p. 111/2). (“Only after this preliminary spadework can I ground the sys-tem of rights with the help of the discourse principle, so that it becomes clear why private and public autonomy, human rights and popular sovereignty, mutu-ally presuppose one another.”, Habermas (1996), p. 84).

233 Of course, this view opposes John Rawls’s “Fact of Reasonable Pluralism” (JohnRawls, The Law of Peoples , Harvard University Press 2000, p.124). However, if Rawls remarks that “They cannot argue that being in a relation of equality with other peoples is a western ideal.” (p.122), it appears to be possible to

speak about ‘equality’ independent of the cultural context. In my Das Gesetz der multikulturellen Gesellschaft (Paul Cobben, 2002, Wrzburg), I develop free-dom and equality as absolute values, which precede all cultural differences.




already implied in domestic law all the time. The question can be raised whether this way of institutionalizing international law is the best alter-native. Can it be argued that the world state is a better solution?

International law, that is not enforced by the power of a world state,seems to be powerless. If it is not powerless, it seems to be dependent on a coincidental coalition of states. In that case, particular states would, underthe guise of international law, only strive after their own interests. I think,however, that the powerlessness of international law does not necessarily need to be a disadvantage. The powerlessness of international law has a reverse side. Because international treaties seems to be without enforcea-ble obligations, they are less affected by the constraints of domestic law,i.e., they offer more room to the universal, moral point of view.234

Norms for protection of the environment or minorities can correspondto higher, i.e., more universal standards than would be possible in thedomain of domestic law. In international treaties, nation states canshow their moral superiority without having to be afraid of its practicalconsequences. In the end, there is no power to enforce international trea-ties, even if there are international courts. But, and this is the point I wantto make here, in a mediated way international treaties do have a practicalmeaning. They can be an important factor in domestic public discussions,and ultimately result in an adjustment of domestic law. In this mediated

way, international law can be enforced by particular nation states. Thehigh moral standard of international law can influence the developmentof domestic law. The other way around, the development of domestic law can influence the development of international law. Because nation statesare becoming more and more globalized and multicultural, internationalrelations are becoming, as it were, more and more internalized in domes-tic law. Domestic law has to deal with many cultural groups that havetheir own values and norms, and with economic processes which are es-

sentially part of a globalized market. Therefore, the gap between domesticand international law becomes narrower, so that, as in the EU, domesticlaw can become part of a continental law system.

234 For Francis Fukuyama, the lack of enforceable obligations is only a disadvantage:“A great deal of both international and national law coming out of Europe con-sists of what amounts to social policy wish lists that are completely unenforcea-

ble. Europeans justify these kinds of laws by saying they are expressions of socialobjectives; Americans reply, correctly in my view, that such unenforceable aspi-rations undermine the rule of law itself.” (Fukuyama, 2005, p.157).




Domestic and international law are not only interdependent, but canalso strengthen one another. Domestic law can be influenced by the lessrestricted moral orientation of international law; international law can

profit from the internalized international law structures of domesticlaw. Because of these dialectics between domestic and international law,the existence of a multitude of nation states in no way contradicts the ex-istence of international law. Therefore, the world state can be redefined asthe process in which international law is developed in its dialectic relationto a multitude of domestic law systems.235

235 Instead of this dialectics between domestic and international law, Thomas Poggeproposes an intermediary position: “What I am proposing instead is not the idea of a centralized world state, which is really a variant of the pre-eminent-state idea.Rather, the proposal is that governmental authority – or sovereignty – be widely dispersed in the vertical dimension. […] Thus, persons should be citizens of, andgovern themselves through, a number of political units of various sizes, withoutany one political unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of

the state.” (Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Cambridge, 2004,p.178) However, these political units must derive their legitimacy from a centralbody. I think that this central body can only be identified as the state.




Concluding remarks

We have examined the nature of the self. In Chapter 1, we stated that thehuman self cannot be determined by science. Because the human self isthe actor of science, he transcends all scientific objectification. Thehuman self has a nature that has insight into his nature, i.e., thehuman self is self-reflective. Therefore, it is not sufficient to determinethe human self as a natural self (a “body”) that has also the capacity

for science (i.e., has also a “mind”), but our definition of the mind/body-unity must coincide with the self-insight of the human self intohis existence as unity of mind and body.

The first step to develop the adequate conception of the unity of mind and body has been made by Aristotle. Only when the body is un-derstood as a social organism can it be prevented that the mind is reducedto an epiphenomenon of the body; only in the relation between mindand social organism can both terms of the relation maintain their relative

independency.The second step to develop the adequate conception of the unity be-tween mind and body has been made by Hegel. Only when the relationbetween mind and social organism is understood as a relation of recogni-tion is the general freedom of the mind (expressing itself in the law of thesocial organism), compatible with the particular freedom of the mind (ex-pressing itself in the subjective freedom of the individual).

In the relation of recognition, two forms of recognition are com-bined: on the one hand, the horizontal recognition that makes that theindividuals recognize one another as the free and equal persons of a shared law; on the other hand, the vertical recognition that makes thatthe individuals recognize that their subjective existence has its groundin an absolute being. Recognition unites the dimensions of right andmorality.

The third step to develop the adequate conception between mind andbody implies the elaboration of the relation of recognition. The horizon-tal and vertical recognition of right and morality have to be developed

into an institutional entirety in which the free and equal legal personsare reconciled with the absolute value of the moral subjects. Therefore,



this institutional entirety guarantees the adequate actualization of democ-racy and human rights.

In the first part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel develops under

what conditions the social organism has to correspond in order to gener-ate citizens who can understand this social organism as the unity of rightand morality. This development, however, cannot result in the determi-nation of a concrete social law. A real social organism remains a contin-gent reality.

In the second part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel presents a contingent social organism, i.e., the Ancient Greek world, as the socialorganism that fulfills the structural conditions of the relation of recogni-tion. As the unity of the Divine Law and the Human Law , the Greek

world embodies the (immediate) unity of morality and right.Since the absolute value of the moral subject contradicts the exchan-

geability of the legal person, the immediate unity of right and morality inthe Greek world can only exist as long as the Human and Divine Law re-main separated, i.e., are assigned to different worlds. The separation be-tween these worlds, however, cannot be maintained, and the Roman Law appears as the truth of the Greek world.

The Roman Law represents the world of the first self in which the re-lation of recognition is one-sidedly actualized. The first self is the legalperson whose actualization as a moral subject remains accidental. Sincethe moral subject has an absolute value, this accidentality of is realizationhas to be overcome. Historically, the moral subject is done justice during the French Revolution, when the second self realizes himself in the form of the absolute freedom. The second self is the moral subject that makes hismoral content the content of the social law. The second self, however, ex-cludes the others. Therefore, the second self is as much one-sided as the

first self. His attempt to realize himself as a moral subject is incompatible

with the existence of a multitude of legal persons.The insight into the adequate actualization of recognition resultsfrom the philosophical reflection on the French Revolution by Rousseau,Kant and Hegel. The adequate actualization of recognition presupposesthe existence of the third self , the conscientious individual. The third self knows that he cannot immediately realize his moral subjectivity inthe legal order, because this moral subjectivity transcends all historical ob-

jectification. Nevertheless, he can understand the (legitimate) legal orderas a finite (historical) attempt to actualize his moral subjectivity. Thethird self can understand the history of states as the ongoing processthat is oriented to a better realization of the moral subject.

Concluding remarks 233



Hegel’s Philosophy of Right elaborates how the three forms of the self can be brought together in the institutional framework of the legitimatesocial order. This framework enables the individual to repeat the histor-

ical learning process in which the three selves are developed. Therefore,the institutions that are developed in the Philosophy of Right, in principle,express the adequate realization of recognition, i. e. , the adequate unity of Right and Morality. In the ethical institutions of family , civil society andstate , the three forms of the human self are, in principle, actualized. He-gel’s actual elaboration of the systematic unity of the three selves, howev-er, has to be criticized. His systematic development remains too much in-fluenced by European history. The first and second self are not adequate-ly developed as moments of the third self. As a consequence, the institu-

tions of the Philosophy of Right fail to do sufficient justice to the consci-entious individual. Hegel, however, offers the conceptual tools for an ad-equate elaboration of the unity of the three selves. This results in a revisedversion of the Philosophy of Right, in which, for example, mono-cultural-ity, the primacy of economics and the lack of a democratic public domainare overcome.

The adequate actualization of recognition coincides with the ade-quate realization of the unity between Right and Morality. This unity ap-pears in an institutional order in which the three forms of the self getshape. My thesis is that only an ethical order that does justice to the ad-equate institutionalization of the three forms of the self can be consideredas a legitimate order, i.e., as a legitimate actualization of human rightsand democracy.

Concluding remarks234



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Literature 237



Author index

Antigone 73, 78 Aristophanes 75 Aristotelian 2f. Aristotle 2, 4, 36, 40f., 232

Bacchus 67, 70Berkeley, Georg 16

Bubner, Rdiger 76

Ceres 67, 70Cobben, Paul 167, 229Copernican 21, 53Creon 72

Derrida, Jacques 55Descartes, Ren 12, 22f., 93, 119

Fraser, Nancy 138Fukuyama, Francis 228–230

Habermas, Jrgen 8–11, 45, 83f. ,119f., 122, 126, 131, 165–175,197, 229

Halbig, Christoph 235Hardimon, Michael 154, 190Heinrichs, Johannes 75Held, David, 62, 112, 227

Hobbes, Thomas 28f., 34Hollak, Jan 33Homer 71Honneth, Axel 7, 9, 116–118, 120,

126, 131–135, 138, 148, 164Houlgate, Stephen 15, 36, 42, 46,

181, 188, 191Hume, David 12, 18

Jaeschke, Walter 76

Josifovic, Sasa 24, 26, 41

Kain, Philip 14

Kant, Immanuel 2, 6, 12, 19, 21, 53,57, 100, 103, 119, 124, 133,166f., 184, 223, 233

Kesselring, Thomas 155Kohlberg, Lawrence 165f.,

168–170, 172–175Kçhler, Dietmar 236

Kojve, Alexandre 9Kymlicka, Will 206

Locke, John 20Luhmann, Niklas 236Lusordo, Dominico 236

Marx, Karl 11, 45, 181, 183–185,191

Montesquieu, Charles 219

Napoleon 101Neuhouser, Frederick 143, 190, 207,

217

Patton, Alan 138, 140Pinkard, Terry 14Pippin, Robert 15, 19, 41, 43, 47Plato 2Pogge, Thomas 231

Polynices 72

Quante, Michael 235

Rawls, John 8f., 11, 119, 171, 206,229

Ricardo, David 184Ricoeur, Paul 2Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 6f., 100f.,

124, 233

Rzsa, Erzsbet 135, 137

Sasarin, Ch. 192



Say, Jean-Baptiste 16, 26, 30, 65, 68,127, 180, 184, 201, 206

Siep, Ludwig 9–11, 15Smith, Adam 184

Smith, Adam 184f.Smith, Steven 116Solon 60Steinberger, Peter 152, 154, 223

Taylor, Charles 1Theunissen, Michael 10f.

Ulrich, P. 192

Wildt, Andreas 14, 30, 112 Williams, Robert 2, 9f., 44, 139 Winfield, Richard 201

Zeus 73f., 77

Author index 239



Subject index

Abortion 228 Absoluteness 52, 54, 61f., 67f., 85,

87, 89f., 102, 111, 202–204, 219 Action 2f., 5, 30–36, 41, 43, 45–48,

51–53, 55–57, 61f., 65, 67,69–74, 78f., 82, 84, 89, 94,102f., 106–113, 121f., 125, 127,

129, 141, 150, 152f., 157f.,160–162, 166, 169f., 179f., 182,185f., 203f., 213f., 216, 220,222–226, 228

– Communicative Action 10,166–169, 172–174

Actualization 6, 50, 82, 107,122–125, 127, 131f., 135, 137,139–142, 144, 146–148, 150,152, 157f., 161, 165, 169, 172,

176–178, 180, 186, 188–190,198f., 205, 211–214, 217f.,221–223, 225f., 233f.

Administration of Justice 189-191,193, 201, 217, 218

Adulthood 151 Affection 120, 171 Affirmation 173, 175 Animal 2, 29f. , 32, 36, 39f., 43f.,

57, 67, 127, 130, 150f., 164, 181

Animal Kingdom 57, 60, 78, 139 Antiquity 8, 128, 132, 139 Antithesis 51, 61, 65, 74, 79, 107 Appearance 21, 30, 41, 48f., 68, 73,

76, 78, 85, 95, 105, 132, 135,149, 158, 163, 171f., 179, 190,193, 195, 200, 211, 219

Argumentation 94, 167, 173, 185,191

Artist 64–66, 68, 77, 160

Association 109, 207, 209– Ideological Association 206–209,220, 222, 224, 226

Asymmetry 10, 201 Authority 61, 158, 170f., 228, 231 Autonomy 3, 41, 46, 48f., 77,

82–84, 102, 106–108, 110, 113,133, 167f., 177, 189, 195f., 215,221, 229

Baby 155f.Basic Trust 159Beautiful 75Beauty 70f., 202f.Being 5, 10, 12f., 15, 17, 20, 22,

24–28, 31, 36, 38–40, 43, 46,48–51, 53, 56, 58, 63, 65–67, 70,73f., 76f., 80–93, 95–97,102–110, 112f., 124f., 127, 129,140, 147, 150, 155f., 160, 169f.,179, 181–185, 194, 198, 202,207, 228f., 231f.

– Divine Being 67f., 91, 128, 130– Human Being 4, 36, 45, 60, 64,

90, 106, 119, 125f., 129f., 133,148, 150, 181, 183, 218, 225, 227

Belief 50, 52, 81, 87, 89, 113, 177,188

Birthday 161Body 1–5, 11–28, 31, 36–44, 47f.,

52, 58, 60, 62, 69–71, 79, 88, 92,99, 103, 105f., 110f., 113,119–121, 123–127, 130–132,134, 143, 148f., 155–157, 197,224, 231f.

Breast 156, 169

Capital 180Capitalism 11, 184, 196

Care 142, 155, 157, 159, 186–188,205, 208, 219Category 69



Categorical Imperative 53, 103,166f., 184

Character 6, 32, 73–75, 78f., 153,174, 185, 191

Child 173-177, 179, 186, 198Christ 50, 87f., 90, 98Christianity 86f.Citizen 3–7, 11, 44, 60–62, 64f. ,

68–71, 77, 79, 86, 96f., 99,101–103, 105f., 116, 122–124,154, 158f., 162, 177, 211–214,216–223, 225f., 231, 233

Cogito 26, 27, 124Coherence 80, 124, 130, 135

Comedy 74f., 77f., 162Commodity 44, 178–180, 184,194–196, 198

Community 11, 14, 62, 67, 75f.,84, 88–91, 94, 134, 157,170–172, 182, 186–188, 192,223, 228

– Culture Community 181– Legal Community 83f., 227f.Competition 181f., 184Condition 4, 15, 22, 28, 32, 34f.,

37, 41, 52f., 57–59, 69f., 82f.,85f., 89, 94, 102f., 108, 111,116, 118f., 121, 123, 125f.,130f., 133f., 138, 144, 149,165–167, 171f., 186f., 191,196f., 201, 208, 225–227, 233

– Inter-subjective Condition 137,138

– Precondition 35, 50, 74, 137,138, 233

Confession 112Conscience 3, 8, 49, 52, 64, 84,

99f., 105–112, 115, 125, 128,141–144, 146f., 187, 193, 199f.,203f., 211f., 214–218, 220–223

– Religious Conscience 8, 143, 193Consciousness 4f., 10, 14f., 17,

20f., 24, 31, 36, 39, 41–43, 46,48–53, 61, 63–65, 67–75, 77, 81,86–89, 91–94, 96, 102–108,

110–112, 120, 125, 129f., 155f.,159f., 165f., 168–175, 178f.,194f., 203, 222

– Unhappy Consciousness 10,47–52, 58–60, 62, 65–68, 75, 77,81, 86–90, 98, 104–107, 110,122–125, 128, 130, 160, 203f.

Consensus 11, 166f., 203f., 221Constitution 30f., 46, 122, 138,

164, 204, 213f., 218–220, 225Consumption 79, 85, 145, 177,

179f., 196, 217Contingence 53, 78, 114, 146,

158f., 171, 182Contingency 47, 75, 97, 102, 123f.,

128, 135, 142, 154, 159f.,162–164

Contract 28f., 140, 145, 176f., 180,185f., 192f.Contradiction 11, 13f., 26, 31, 33f.,

36, 44, 54, 66, 102–105, 110f.,119, 121, 124, 145, 161, 184,209, 215

Conviction 91, 106–109, 158f.,161, 200, 203f., 212

Corporation 8, 139, 176, 178,188f., 191f., 205, 207–209, 213,222–224

Corporeality 24, 62, 110, 113, 120,157, 173

Criminal 215, 229Crown 214f., 219Crusade 67, 88Crusader 51, 67, 88Cult 68, 72– Abstract Cult 67, 161– Actual Cult 67, 161Culture 1, 11, 14f., 29, 60, 90f.,

96–98, 100f. , 104, 138f. , 154,168, 174, 177f., 180–182,184–186, 193f., 197, 209

– Realm of Culture 5, 80f., 86–91,97f., 114, 178–181, 186, 188f.

Custom 69

Daughter 163Death 3, 28f., 31f., 34, 36f.,

39–41, 44, 48, 51, 62, 73, 81,

96f., 101, 104, 157f.Decay 26, 71, 73, 76Deception 110

Subject index 241



Decision 93, 151f., 189, 215, 221,228

Decline 5, 48f., 51, 54, 63–65, 73,78–82, 85, 87, 89, 111, 115,

123f., 147, 157, 177, 221Delusion 110Demand 6, 26, 31, 40, 57, 85, 102,

134, 136, 142, 144, 146f., 152,158, 161, 166f., 180f., 183–185,187, 190–193, 196–199, 204,206, 208, 222, 225f.

Democracy 8, 44, 148, 219f., 229,233f.

Dependency 174f. , 204

Desire 25f., 51, 88, 92, 107f., 180,196, 204Destiny 82, 101, 159, 162f., 216Devotion 50, 66–68, 90Dialectics 14, 50f., 81, 87f., 91f.,

98, 178, 203, 231Dialogue 111Dictator 33–36Dictatorship 226Disappearance of ethical life 154,

177Discourse 2, 119, 166–169, 171,

229– Practical Discourse 166, 171f.Discourse Ethics 166, 168, 172Disillusionment 113Dissemblance or Duplicity 103, 105Duty 62, 68, 107–111, 141, 146f.,

170, 193, 214, 217, 225

Education 56, 154f., 165, 178,

182f., 187, 189, 191, 197, 208f.,221

Egyptian 45Embodiment 8, 44, 48, 60, 87f., 90,

98, 150, 159, 164f., 176, 199,209–213, 217f.

Employee 192, 209Enlightenment 94f., 188– Satisfied Enlightenment 95– Unsatisfied Enlightenment 95

Epic 71f., 77, 162, 188Essence 1, 3, 7, 14, 25, 38, 41–44,46, 48, 51f., 54–58, 62–64,

66–71, 74, 79, 82, 84f., 87–96,98, 101, 105–108, 110f., 113f.,121f., 124f., 127–130, 142, 144,151, 157, 160–162, 170, 179f.,

195, 200, 218Europe 114, 116, 152, 208, 230European 14f., 228, 230European Court 232Euthanasia 228Exchange 140, 145f., 152, 167, 172,

177, 179–181, 193–196, 198f.Executive 213f., 219f., 223Experiment 99, 172f.

Faith 95, 97, 185Fall 33, 46, 66, 81, 86f., 91, 110,160, 163, 194f., 201, 203, 215

Family 5, 7f., 48, 60–62, 65, 68f.,71–73, 77, 79–81, 88–90, 97,104, 123f., 132, 138f., 142, 146,150–155, 157–165, 169–172,176f., 180–182, 188, 190,194–197, 199–201, 205–207,211f., 219, 222f., 225, 234

Fate 74–77Father 74, 89f., 155, 161Fear 33, 61– Fear of death 28, 37–42, 48, 52,

121, 158Finitude 9, 38, 40, 48, 102, 114,

129, 182, 214Force 18, 20f., 23f., 37f., 53, 65,

68, 105, 127, 130, 159, 179f.,184, 195f., 198

Freedom 2, 6–8, 40, 44, 46, 55,

58–65, 68, 71, 75, 77f., 81–83,85f., 93, 96–98, 100–102, 104,113, 115f., 121–129, 131,136–147, 151f., 155–159,161–164, 166, 169f., 172f.,177f., 182–186, 188–192, 197,200f., 206f., 209, 212–214, 216,218, 221, 225–227, 229, 232f.

– Subjective Freedom 2, 86, 96,98–102, 115, 140, 145f., 148,

157, 159–161, 164f., 172,176–178, 189, 191–193, 211,214, 217, 220, 223, 232

Subject index 242



Frenzy of Self-conceit 55, 72, 97,101, 189

Funeral 161

Generality 79, 150f. , 153, 166,180f., 207, 212f., 220

Generation 152, 172Genesis 80f., 83Gene-theory 1God 5, 43–46, 49–52, 60, 64,

66–68, 70, 72–77, 80, 87–91,94–97, 113f., 126f., 129f.,159f., 188, 216

Good 15, 58, 75, 91, 93, 108f.,

111–113, 126, 130, 134,141–143, 146–148, 157, 183,185f., 192f., 212, 214, 217f.,221, 223, 225

– Good and Conscience 141, 211,222

Government 101, 207, 214f., 219f.,223–226

Gravitation 21Greece 60

Guardian 158, 169f.Guild 188

Harmony 5f., 27, 48, 53, 63f., 70,72f., 78, 82, 103f., 141, 146f.,158, 178, 201, 212f., 220, 224

Heaven 73f., 96Hero 72, 74, 162History 14, 36, 49, 87, 114–116,

126, 144, 204f., 216, 233

– European History 5, 7f., 14f., 48,100, 102, 132, 134, 149, 234– World History 115, 137, 143f. ,

193, 215–217, 220f., 223, 226Household 155, 179, 201Hunger 156Husband 151–153Hymn 66f., 73, 160Hypocrisy 112

Identity 5f., 11, 20, 24, 26, 41, 46,49–51, 54f., 64, 91f., 95, 119,142, 146, 151, 153, 156f.,

159–162, 165, 169–172, 197,201–205

Identity Crisis 163Illusion 3, 26, 46, 62, 108–110, 215,

219, 221, 228Immediacy 16f., 102, 105, 144,

150, 163f., 176, 182, 190, 192,201, 211, 222f.

Inclination 108Income 183, 188, 199, 205Individual 3, 5, 7, 10f., 28–31,

34–37, 40–46, 48–54, 56–58,60–62, 68–73, 75–93, 95f., 98,103, 106–116, 119–121,

125–127, 133f., 136–139,141–144, 146–148, 150f., 153,155, 162, 164, 168, 175, 177,179f., 183, 186–193, 197–204,207–209, 212, 214–216, 218f.,222, 225, 227f., 232–234

– Moral Individual 11, 44, 52–61,69, 78f., 83–85, 89–96, 100, 115,119, 141f., 148, 178–180, 192,197, 209

Individuality 50, 52, 55f., 63–66,69, 71–73, 75, 80, 92, 105, 107f.,113, 201

Infrastructure 187Injustice 32, 211f.Insight 1f., 7, 14, 32, 38, 45, 47, 52,

56, 97, 100–102, 114, 121–123,125f., 131f., 135, 141, 144, 147,154, 159f., 164f., 167f., 171,174, 182, 197, 202–204, 209,221f., 228, 232f.

– Pure Insight 93–95, 186Institution 5, 7, 11, 34, 59, 79, 89,

91, 98, 116, 136–138, 142f.,147–150, 152, 163, 176, 180,187f., 190f., 193, 198, 201, 208,211, 213f., 216f., 221, 227f.,234

Intention and Welfare 141, 146,176–178, 180, 186, 222

Interest 31, 33f., 72, 75, 111, 151,

166f., 169, 192, 230Internalization 50, 80, 153Intervention 226, 228

Subject index 243



– Humanitarian Intervention 226Intimacy 203

Jurisdiction 32, 214, 220, 222, 224 f.

Justice 5, 50, 52, 61f., 65, 102, 119,127, 129, 166f., 171, 185–187,189, 192, 197, 202, 208f., 213f.,220, 233f.

Knowledge 2, 10, 14, 16, 31f., 34,38, 40, 46, 49, 90, 113, 146,155f., 192, 202, 208

– Absolute Knowledge 115, 129,205

Labor 5, 11, 29, 41, 43, 45–47,51f., 56, 68, 72, 121, 127, 137,144f., 151f., 180, 182–184, 187,190–192, 196–198, 208f., 217,226

– Child Labor 226– Division of Labor 45, 182–184,

197– Labor Division 45, 191, 197– Labor Organization 45– Labor Process 45, 180, 182, 185,

191, 196–198– Unskilled Labor 184f., 191, 198f.Language 20, 66, 92f., 149, 158,

160, 170, 182, 214– Language of Disruption 93, 181– Language of Flattery 92f., 180Law 2–6, 9, 14, 21, 23, 28–37, 41,

43f., 55–62, 64, 69f., 72f., 77,85f., 95–99, 101–105, 113, 116,

121–124, 127f., 138f., 143, 146,153, 163, 166, 168, 185–189,199, 205, 213f., 218–220,223–225, 228–233

– Divine Law 52, 60–62, 68, 70,72f., 80f., 89, 97f., 123, 153,159, 189, 219, 233

– Human Law 3, 60–62, 64f.,68–73, 75, 77–80, 88, 97f., 102,104, 113, 122–132, 153, 219,

233– International Law 8, 215, 225,227–231

– Law of the Heart 55f., 72, 97,101, 141, 189

– Law Proposal 224– Law System 58, 224, 230f.

– Natural law 53, 57, 121– Positive Law 187, 218– Roman Law 5, 46, 79f., 96–98,

100, 102, 104, 113, 139f., 153,177, 233

– Rule of Law 136, 148, 185f.,197, 230

Legislature 213f., 219Legitimacy 29, 33, 35, 56, 78, 91,

127, 228f., 231

Lethe 73Life 8, 14–16, 19, 22f., 25f., 28f.,31, 36f., 39, 41, 48, 51, 53, 61,67, 69f., 73f., 80, 96, 116, 134,146, 150f., 153, 157f., 161f.,164f., 170–172, 177, 188, 194,204f., 207, 209

– Ethical Life 7–10, 76, 97,133–135, 137f., 142, 152, 154,164f., 177, 188, 193f., 196,212–214, 217, 222

– Good Life 5, 133, 186, 188,191f., 198, 205–207, 210,212–215, 217–221, 223–226,228

– Plan of Life 119Lord 2–5, 39–49, 51f., 54, 60f., 79,

87f., 91f., 97, 101, 103, 105f.,108, 111–115, 121f., 124f., 127,129, 144, 148, 151f., 157f., 161,180, 186, 196, 212, 217

– Lord/bondsman relation 42–45,60, 88, 181

Loss 49f., 62, 65, 68, 81, 110, 154,159

Love 57, 132, 151, 153, 164, 188,201–203, 213

Machine 182, 184, 190f. , 197–199Majesty 108, 215, 218Majority 221, 226

Market 154, 178–185, 187–192,194–199, 205f., 208f., 213f.,222, 224–227, 230

Subject index 244



Marriage 151–154, 165, 194, 200f. ,222

Mask 74, 79, 162Matter 2, 13, 47, 95, 104, 106, 129,

137, 139, 173, 175– Matter in Hand 57, 60, 69Memory 62, 65, 68, 81Metaphor 2, 9, 49, 103, 114, 121,

148, 155Metaphysics 118, 126, 131, 134Middle Ages 5, 8, 128, 132, 139Mind 1–5, 11–28, 31, 36–40,

42–44, 46–48, 50, 52, 58, 60,69–71, 74, 79, 88, 92, 99, 103,

105f., 110f., 113, 115, 119–121,123–127, 130–132, 134, 143,148f., 155, 170, 182, 184, 197,201, 206, 212, 215, 232

Modernity 8, 10, 128, 132, 139Monarch 92f., 180, 193, 211–218,

220f.Monasteries 187Morality 1, 3–7, 44, 47, 52, 55f.,

60, 80, 83, 98, 100, 103f., 115f.,

124, 133, 137–143, 146–148,152, 176f., 192f., 203, 208,211f. , 217f. , 232–234

Mother 155f., 161, 169Multi-culturality 8, 11, 182, 207

Naturalness 186Nature 1–3, 5f., 10, 14, 16–24,

28f., 31–33, 36–40, 42, 45–48,51–53, 64, 70f., 75, 82, 85, 88,

92, 103–105, 107–109, 113, 118,120, 127, 129, 164, 169–171,179–182, 185f., 189, 195, 197,215, 219, 232

Necessity 12, 16, 55, 69, 71–75, 94,97, 134, 141, 161, 187f., 198,228

Need 10, 18, 25f., 34, 37, 39, 42,52, 61–63, 68, 72, 89, 92–94,103, 116, 118, 132, 144f., 154,

156f., 170, 179–182, 185f.,189–198, 205, 209, 224, 230Neediness 25, 156f., 169f.

Norm 33, 43, 57f., 127, 145, 154,158–164, 166f., 170f., 177,181f., 188, 192–194, 197, 199f.,205–207, 209, 220–223, 229f.

Notion 33, 47–50, 64, 72f., 115,129, 139, 141–143, 148, 155,163, 202

Objectivity 10, 20, 31, 36f. , 66, 88,90, 109, 135, 145, 161f.,178–180, 194–196, 201, 203,205

Offspring 150f., 219Organism 1, 4–6, 12, 15, 18–20,

22–28, 31, 37–42, 52f., 58f.,78–80, 95, 97, 116, 120–123,146f., 151, 153, 156f., 159–162,164, 170, 187, 192, 200, 212f.,218, 220, 223

– Natural Organism 121, 129,157f., 170, 192

– Social Organism 2–7, 14, 36f.,42–44, 46–49, 51–61, 77–79, 81,87–98, 101–108, 113–116,121–129, 131, 137, 141–148,151f., 155, 157f., 160f.,163–165, 187–189, 209,218–220, 222f., 232f.

Origin 30f., 33, 54, 60, 62, 105,163, 204

Parents 15, 151f., 157–161, 163f.,188

Parliament 208, 220f., 223f.Particularity 67, 80, 84, 86, 97, 109,

151, 153, 160, 180f., 185, 192,209, 212f., 220, 223

Partner 29, 119, 151–153, 165, 167,194, 200–205, 222f.

– Discussion Partner 167Party 208, 223– Political Party 207Pathos 65f., 68, 153, 190Patriotism 212, 218, 223Peace 29, 74

– Eternal Peace 226f.Perception 13, 16, 20, 92, 130, 156,179, 194

Subject index 245



Pharaoh 45, 60, 130Phase 9, 33, 169–171– Conventional Phase 170– Post-conventional Phase 169, 171

– Pre-conventional Phase 169f.Philosophy 7–11, 28, 52, 100f. ,

103, 116, 133–138, 141–147,149–155, 159, 163–165, 167f.,173–176, 178, 181, 185, 187,190, 193f., 197f., 200, 205,207–209, 211, 213f., 216–219,221–224, 226, 234

Pleasure 54f., 69, 71f., 94, 141,182, 187, 198

Police 187–189, 191, 198f., 213,222, 225Polis 4f., 31, 60–66, 68–82, 88–91,

97f., 100, 102, 122f., 128, 135,153f., 158–160

Possession 55, 56, 71, 149Power 5, 29f., 32–34, 36f., 39–41,

44–46, 48f., 55f., 69, 72–77,81–84, 88, 92, 101, 113, 119,124–127, 129, 157, 170, 182f.,185, 191, 199, 202f., 213–215,219–221, 223–227, 229f.

Prayer 88Pregnancy 150Presidency 219President 214, 218–220, 224Presupposition 7, 26, 29, 63, 68, 76,

81, 84, 94f., 102, 113, 118, 123,126, 132f., 152, 167, 174, 183f.,186, 192, 220, 227

Principle of Universalization 166

Professional 187f., 191f., 208f.,213

Profit 29, 67, 93, 168, 231Property 5, 10, 20, 27, 29, 38, 58,

79–82, 85, 98, 102, 124, 139f.,144f., 152–154, 163, 177, 183,185

– Property Order 81–86, 140Psychology 135, 173– Development Psychology 155,

173– Social Psychology 7, 118, 132f. ,135

Punishment 32, 67Purpose and Responsibility 141,

146, 222

Realm 26, 90f., 98, 100, 102, 216,228

– Realm of Culture, see Culture– Realm of Education 124, 135– Realm of Morality 100–102, 114– Realm of Utility 95Reason 12, 14f., 20f., 39, 47, 53f.,

57f., 61, 68–70, 72, 75, 79, 100,103, 112, 122f., 127–130, 136,139, 157, 183f., 190, 194, 201,

212, 224, 228f.– Active Reason 54, 58f., 69, 71,74, 78, 88, 90, 94, 97f., 101, 141,178, 184, 186f., 189, 198, 222

– Cunning of Reason 216f.– Kantian Reason 167– Lawgiving Reason 78, 96– Observing Reason 53f., 69f., 78,

91–93, 139f., 144f., 162,178–180, 184, 186, 194–196,222

– Practical Reason 103– Reason as testing Laws 58, 116,

136, 139, 142f.– Theoretical Reason 58Recognition 1–3, 7, 9–11, 28,

41–44, 56, 69, 80, 112f., 116,118, 121, 127, 131–134, 138,140, 145, 148, 157, 164, 193,204–206, 212, 225, 232–234

– Horizontal Recognition 3–5, 44,

139, 148, 232– Mutual Recognition 9, 109, 118,

139, 148, 177, 204, 215, 221, 225– Struggle for Recognition 11, 13, 14,

32, 122, 136, 137, 210, 240– Vertical Recognition 3f., 43f.,

148, 217, 232Reconciliation 10, 47, 50, 56, 73,

109, 112f., 134Reconstruction 28, 61, 78f., 117,

126, 129, 155, 159, 165, 168– Hypothetical Reconstruction 78,168, 173

Subject index 246



Reification 185Relation 2f., 7f., 10–19, 21–31,

36–43, 51–55, 57f., 60f., 68–73,76–80, 83f., 86, 88f., 91–95, 97,

100–103, 105, 108–111,113–116, 119–130, 132–134,136f., 139–141, 143–146, 148,150–153, 155–158, 160f., 163f.,167, 169f., 173–178, 180–182,185–187, 193–196, 198, 207,211f., 215–217, 219, 221,225–233

– Dialogical Relation 123, 125– Market Relation 183, 188

Religion 44, 48, 63, 65, 75f., 80,87, 89, 94, 113–115, 126,129–131, 135, 137, 143, 154,159f., 165, 216f., 228

– Religion of Art 90, 98, 130, 135,216

– Religion of Nature 129f.– Religion of the Artificer 45, 130– Revealed Religion 89f., 94, 98,

113f., 130, 135, 216

Remembrance 50, 71, 97Repetition 7, 51, 56, 88, 94, 98,

108, 178, 192, 194, 196Representation 3, 42f., 49–52, 63,

65f., 70–78, 82–85, 87, 89f., 97,101, 113–115, 127–130, 145,157, 159f., 162, 177, 202, 212,220

Research 106, 111, 132, 155,173–175

Revolution 20, 101– French Revolution 5–7, 49, 86,96, 98–102, 104, 124, 129, 177,189, 206, 233

Reward 67, 70, 93Right 1, 3–11, 29, 36, 41, 43f., 47,

52, 55f., 60, 62, 79f., 83f., 94,98, 100, 115f., 124, 133–155,159, 163–165, 172, 176–178,181, 185, 187f., 190, 193f.,

197f., 200f., 203, 205, 207–209,211–219, 221–224, 226f., 229,232–234

– Abstract Right 10, 137, 139f.,142, 145–147, 152, 176, 211f.,218

– Human Rights 8, 44, 148, 218f.,

225–227, 229, 231, 233f.Role 4, 30, 37, 40, 42, 44, 55f., 62,

64, 79, 91, 108f., 111, 127, 135,140, 152, 158, 161f., 170, 172f.,200, 212, 218, 221, 228, 231

– Gender Role 151, 154, 163,200f., 212

Roman emperor 5, 80Roman Empire 5, 48f., 78–82, 86f.,

89, 91, 100, 102, 124, 177

Satisfaction 15, 26f., 51, 69, 103,156, 166, 170, 180, 196, 205

Scepticism 107, 114, 175School 208f.Science 21, 116, 133, 135, 137,

174f., 232– Empirical Science 120, 139– Modern Science 20f.– Reconstructive Science 173f.Scientification 183f.Sculptor 65f.Self-consciousness 5, 10, 15, 19, 22,

24–32, 34–41, 43f., 46–49, 51f.,54, 56, 63, 65f., 69–72, 74f., 77,81f., 84, 86, 88, 91f., 94, 97,103f., 106f., 118, 120, 125,129f., 155, 178f., 194f., 203,222

Self-expression 53, 108, 124f. ,128–130, 135, 142, 147, 158,

204Self – First Self 5, 41, 60, 79, 86, 96,

98, 100, 116, 125, 137, 139,144f., 150, 153, 164f., 212, 233

– Human Self 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15,16f., 152, 153, 236, 238

– Pure Self 23–27, 38–55, 57f.,60–72, 74, 76–82, 87f., 90–92,94–97, 101–105, 108, 113f., 116,

120–125, 127, 130–132, 137,143–145, 153, 158–160, 177,186, 195, 217

Subject index 247



– Real Self 40, 47, 52, 58, 63, 67f.,72, 77f., 87f., 121, 126

– Second Self 5–7, 80f., 86, 96,98–100, 115f., 125, 137,

140–144, 146, 165, 176, 187,193, 199, 209, 212f., 233f.

– Self-awareness 156– Third Self 7f., 99f., 105, 115f.,

125, 137, 142, 186, 210–214,217f., 220f., 233f.

Sense-Certainty 19, 91, 106, 120,129, 155, 178, 194

Similarity 153Singularity 63, 212–214, 220, 224

Soap 162Socialization 155, 158, 180, 185,

197Social Security 188Society 2f., 8, 11, 30, 34, 57, 60, 64,

72, 78, 82, 86, 101, 123, 126,128f., 132, 138, 144, 170f., 184,188, 198f., 205–208, 220, 223f.,228

– Civil Society 7f., 11, 132, 138,

142, 152, 154, 164f., 172,176–178, 180f., 183–185, 187,190f., 193, 198–200, 205f.,208f., 211, 213, 218, 220, 222,224f., 234

– Multicultural Society 162Son 87, 89–91, 94, 163, 187, 219Soul 16f., 67f., 204– Beautiful Soul 106, 110, 215, 221Soulmateship 204

Species 29, 36, 40f., 53, 116, 150f.– Human Species 36, 40Speech 71, 109f., 204Spirit 1f., 6–10, 14f., 17, 19, 21,

44, 48–50, 52f., 60, 64, 66, 80,89, 91–94, 96, 105f., 108f.,113–122, 126, 129, 131–137,139–143, 149f., 152–155, 164f.,176, 178, 190, 193, 198, 203,211, 214–218, 220–222, 233

– Absolute Spirit 7, 11, 106,113–116, 119f., 123, 125f., 128,130f., 134f., 137, 142f., 147f.,

165, 193, 211, 214–219, 221f.,225

– Holy Spirit 50, 87, 89, 94, 98– Objective Spirit 8f., 11, 137, 152,

165, 193, 218– Spirit-Chapter 122f., 125–131,

134f.– Subjective Spirit 16f.Spiritual 23, 26, 43f., 57, 60, 67,

70f., 74–78, 92, 98, 125, 137,139, 162, 181, 185, 191, 204

State 2–4, 7–9, 29, 36f., 41, 43,60–63, 68–70, 72, 74, 77–79,109, 132, 137–139, 142, 145,

147f., 152, 188–190, 192,205–231, 233f.

– Democratic State 225– Nation State 8, 211, 226–231– State Power 73, 92f., 179, 186,

207, 223f.Statue 64–66, 68, 70, 76f., 159f.Status 2, 13, 21, 28f., 31f., 34–36,

45, 63, 66, 84, 131, 135, 155,159, 162, 165, 167f., 174f., 178,

200, 203f., 219– Legal Status 28–37, 46Stoicism 46–48, 56, 60f., 64, 79f.,

93, 97, 102, 104, 107, 109, 186,204

Strangeness 31, 110, 170f.Struggle 7, 9f., 28–31, 36f., 47,

50f., 55, 66, 76, 96, 109, 118,132f., 138, 158, 188, 206, 215,227

– Moral Struggle 118, 134Subject 1, 10, 17, 19, 21, 29f.,32–34, 41, 46, 54–56, 69, 77,83–86, 89, 94, 96, 98, 112, 116,118–120, 126, 129–131, 135,137f., 141, 146, 166–171, 177f.,180f., 186–188, 190f., 193, 195,198–200, 207, 209, 215, 222,232f.

Subjectivity 9, 13, 16, 20, 24, 26,

43, 79, 87, 138, 142, 157, 160,162–165, 176, 190–192, 197,199f., 202, 211, 215, 233

Subject index 248



Substance 2, 10, 14, 43, 49, 63–66,69f., 73–75, 89, 94, 107, 109,119f., 123f., 126, 130f., 135,137, 153

Superstition 94f., 188Supply 181, 183–185, 187, 191,

196–199, 222Survival 24, 29f., 34–36, 79, 124,

199, 216Suspicion 159, 226System 8, 11, 23, 45f., 127, 170,

180, 182–184, 186–193, 198,205–207, 209, 213, 222–224,228f.

– Labor System 15, 49, 50, 184,186-188, 213– System of Needs 11, 182–188,

205f., 217, 222

Teleology 116, 126Temple 64–66, 68, 76f., 159Terror 6, 96–99, 101, 104, 124, 189Theory 1f., 10–12, 14f., 43,

132–134, 143, 149, 154,

166–169, 172–175, 190f., 207,229

– Theory of justice 171Thesis 2, 8, 14, 19, 43, 118, 126,

134, 136, 139, 191, 234Thing 14, 18–20, 39, 42, 44, 54,

57f., 64, 66, 72, 92f., 95, 130,139f., 144–146, 184f., 190, 198,201, 203

– Pure Thing 97

Thirst 156Threat 25, 63, 71, 77, 225Token 145Trade Union 188Tradition 4–7, 10, 28, 36, 42, 57,

76, 91, 101, 118, 124f., 127f.,133–135, 153–155, 158f., 164f.,168, 170–172, 200

Tragedy 73f., 77, 79, 162, 189Transcendence 48, 115, 181, 214f.

Treaty 229Truth 10, 26, 43, 49, 52, 57, 96,105, 167, 205, 233

Understanding 8, 14, 18, 21f., 38,92, 124, 130, 144, 162, 169,173f., 179, 182, 192, 195, 206

Unity 1–7, 9, 11–27, 30f., 37–44,

46–49, 51f., 58, 60f., 63, 65–74,79–81, 92, 94f., 98–100, 102f.,105f., 111, 113, 119–121,123–128, 130–132, 134, 138,140, 142f., 147–149, 152, 155,176f., 179, 192, 194f., 201,203–207, 211–213, 217f., 220,224, 232–234

– Substantial Unity 124–126,130f., 134

Universalizability 166University 1, 7, 9, 11, 18, 229

Value 12, 28, 41, 43f., 57f., 111,127, 134, 145f., 152, 154,158–164, 177, 179, 181f., 185,187f., 191–195, 197–200,205–207, 209f., 220–223, 226,228–230, 232f.

– Exchange-value 183, 185, 198,199

– Labor Value 180, 184f., 191– Use-value 154, 178f., 181,

194–196 Violence 33–35, 82 Virtue 55, 69, 73f., 101, 141 Volont de tous 6 Volont gnrale 6, 101–105, 124

Wage 180, 185, 226 Wealth 92f., 179, 183

Welfare 141f., 146, 178, 180, 185,188, 193f., 198f., 205, 208, 213,222

– General Welfare 147– Particular Welfare 147, 180

Will 3–6, 10f., 13–15, 17, 19f.,22f., 25f., 28, 30–33, 35–37, 39,43f., 46–48, 51f., 55, 59, 61,63–65, 67, 70f., 76, 79f., 84, 86,89, 93, 98–100, 102–107, 110f.,

114–118, 120, 124, 129, 132f.,135–139, 142f., 145f., 148, 150,152, 154, 157, 159f., 162, 165,

Subject index 249



168–170, 172f., 176, 178, 180,184, 186–188, 190, 193,196–198, 201, 203, 206, 208,210–213, 215f., 219f., 226–228

– General Will 6f., 102, 212 Work 7, 9, 37, 42f., 45f., 52,

62–69, 71, 76, 78, 101, 117f.,127, 132, 134–137, 165,182–184, 188, 190, 197, 205,209

– Work of Art 63–71, 75–78, 90f.,98, 113f., 154, 159f., 162

World 5–7, 12f., 15, 17–20, 22–27,29, 35, 46, 49–52, 55, 57, 60, 62,

64–67, 69, 71–75, 77–80, 83,

87–91, 93–98, 100, 103–105,110, 113f., 116, 124, 130, 136,138f., 145, 147f., 150, 153,155–157, 161f., 165, 169–171,

173, 176–179, 182, 192, 194f.,197f., 200f., 206f., 211, 214,216, 218, 220, 224–231, 233

– Ancient Greek World 4, 48, 59,162, 233

– Egyptian World 45, 60– Underworld 62f., 72f., 77, 98– Way of the World 55f., 74, 101,

141 Worship 110

Wrong 35, 63, 113, 140, 145

Subject index 250





Documents

The Nature of the Self Recogni