THE NAVY IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

THE NAVY IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER

THAN WAR

ENTERING COLD WAR AFTER COVID-19

DESTROYER-CAPABLE FRIGATES

THE IMMENSELY CHALLENGING ROLE OF FEMALE BLUE BERETS

THE HORIZON - M

AGAZINE OF THE IN

DONESIAN

NAVY

PERSONS IN CHARGE:

CHIEF OF THE INDONESIAN NAVY:

Admiral TNI Yudo Margono, S.E., M.M.

GENERAL LEADER:

First Admiral TNI Mohamad Zaenal, S.E., M.M.,

M.Soc.Sc.

DEPUTY GENERAL LEADER:

Navy Captain Nevy Dwi Soesanto, S.T.

ADMINISTRATION IN CHIEF:

Marine Colonel Akhmad Hanifa, S.E., M.M.

ADMINISTRATIONS:

Navy Captain Drs. Ariris Mr. – Navy Captain Drs.

Heddy Sakti A.M.P. – Navy Commander Drs. Lielie

Suprijatna – Navy Commander Leila Kristian, S.E.,

M.M. – Commander Ign. M. Pundjung T., S.Sos.,

M.Sc. – Lieutenant Commander Ruli Rahmadyansah

S.Kom., M.Tr.Han – Navy Lieutenant Putu Novia

Kusumah W., S.Sos. – Superintendent III/c Mujianto

ENGLISH EDITORS:

First Admiral TNI Mohamad Zaenal, S.E., M.M.,

M.Soc.Sc. - Commander Leila Kristian, S.S., M.M.,

LAYOUT:

Arifin Anto D., S.S. – Superintendent III/c Irma

Kurniawan, A.Md.Graf. – Junior Superintendent

III/a Arab Punjabi

PHOTO EDITORS:

Ensign Diko Aris Setiawan, SST, S.Pd. – Master

Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Mirlyana – First

Corporal Supriyadi

DISTRIBUTION:

Marine Sergeant Sayidi – Petty Officer 2nd Class

Supriyadi

PUBLISHED BY:

Naval Information Service

ADDRESS:

Naval Information Service, Building B-4 2nd Floor,

Naval Headquarters Cilangkap, East Jakarta 13870,

Ph. (62 21) 8723314 - www.tnial.mil.id. No. ISSN:

0216-440x, JJM Radio 107.7 FM and 1170 AM

DESTROYER-CAPABLE FRIGATES 06

Dear readers,

2020 is a tough year for us. This year, the COVID-19 pandemic disease has gone global, intruding all aspects of human life, especially in terms of health, economic, and social. But we have to keep moving on, striving to break through all obstacles.

Regarding the current state of the world, this 2nd edition of The Horizon takes the theme Military Operations Other Than War, which are stated in articles entitled “Entering Second Cold War After COVID-19”, “Safeguarding the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes III”, “The Immensely Challenging Role of Female Blue Berets”, “Coral Reef Conservation in the South Sulawesi Sea”, “The Navy Extracts Indonesian Crew Members Off Cruise Ships”, and “Exercise Komodo: Track II Diplomacy in the South China Sea Question”.

Further articles on naval affairs provide an outlook on how the Indonesian Navy plays its role of defending the sovereignty of Indonesia and maintaining global peace.

Have a pleasant reading.

Head of Naval Information Service,First Admiral Mohamad Zaenal, S.E., M.M., M.Soc.Sc.

JA LESVEVA JAYAMAHE !

C O N T E N T

THE NAVY EXTRACTS INDONESIAN CREW MEMBERS OFF CRUISE SHIPS

13

JA LESVEVA JAYAMAHE !

ENTERING SECOND COLD WAR AFTERCOVID-19*

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN IMPLEMENTING INDONESIA’S MARITIME SECURITY

THE FUTURE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

INDONESIAN MARITIME THREATS:AN INITIAL REVIEW


CORAL REEF CONSERVATION IN THE SOUTH SULAWESI

EXERCISE KOMODO: TRACK II DIPLOMACYIN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA QUESTION

THE EVOLUTION OF NAVAL STRATEGIES

FLYING THE SICK: How Fleet Command III Handled a COVID-19 Patient

FACTS & FEATS

INDONESIA TRAPPED IN CONFLICTS OFINTEREST IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

IMPROVING EXCELLENT HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE INDONESIAN NAVY

SAFEGUARDING THE INDONESIANARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES (III)

A REALIST’S PERSPECTIVE ON THEKOREAN WAR4

31

4446

28

35

51555862

19

38

22

41

The editorial staff received articles (maximum 5 pages with 1.5 spaces) along with photos from all members of the TNI/TNI AL and the general public. The manuscript must be printed on A4 size paper and is equipped with digital data in a Compact Disc (CD) or soft copy can be sent via the editor’s e-mail.

Submissions that have been sent become the property of the editor, and the editor has the right to correct/edit without changing the content/meaning. The manuscript that is published will get the appropriate reward. The editor also accepts criticism, suggestions and brief opinions.

Articles are sent to the Horizon Editor with the address of the Naval Information Service, Building B-4 Lt. 2, Navy Headquarters Cilangkap, East Jakarta - 13870 or via email: [email protected]

THE MIGHTY OLD BEAT-UP ORION

16W A R S H I P S O NDIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

10

4 THE HORIZON 2ND EDITION 2020

THE COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic crisis are posing huge challenges, raising many unknowns and imposing wrenching trade-offs. Both crises are global, but their impacts are deeply local. The policy response to both crises needs to be rapid, even if it is rough around the edges. But countries cannot pull this off on their own—the global crises require global solidarity and coordination.

Governments must dramatically overhaul policies and invest in public health, economic stimulus, and social safety nets, to help countries recover faster from the COVID-19 pandemic. Warnings also circulate through the mass media that a patchwork of preexisting solutions will not work and points out that governments must coordinate with each other to hasten the recovery. This is a global crisis and working in silos is not an option.

Over the past months, as countries in the Pacific region were focused on battling the coronavirus, multiple sources reported that China stepped up patrols and naval exercises in the highly disputed South China Sea.

The activities of the Asian powerhouse in the region, however, did not slip by the eyes of Washington, which went on to accuse Beijing of “exploiting” its neighboring countries as they are “distracted” with the pandemic.

Longstanding tensions between the administrations of US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping also worsened in recent weeks over the origins of the coronavirus pandemic.

ENTERING SECOND COLD WAR AFTER COVID-19By Admiral (Ret.) Prof. Dr. Marsetio, S.I.P., M.M.

Professor of Maritime Defense Science at the Indonesia Defense University and former Chief of the Indonesian Navy (2012-2015)

5THE HORIZON 2nd EDITION 2020

China, Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan have overlapping claims to the South China Sea—one of the most important trade routes in the world. Powerhouse China has the biggest claim by far. It has demarcated an extensive area of the sea with a so-called “nine-dash line” that first appeared on Chinese maps in the late 1940s. The Paracel and Spratly Island chains, as well as dozens of rocky outcrops and reefs, fall within this area. These bits of land are highly contested, mainly because they are believed to be surrounded by large oil and gas deposits.

The Spratly Islands, for example, are claimed in full by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by Malaysia and the Philippines. The Paracel chain is claimed by Vietnam, China and Taiwan. Some analysists think that China’s claim to the South China Sea—the so-called “nine-dash line”—should be considered unlawful and a breach of international conventions.

In response to Beijing’s growing presence in the South China Sea, the US has also continued its naval presence in the area. The US nuclear powered aircraft carrier—the USS Theodore Roosevelt—was forced to depart from the South China Sea in March and dock in Guam due to an outbreak of COVID-19. The carrier is now seen patrolling the Philippines Sea and will most likely head back to the South China Sea.

For years, the US has been conducting the so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations in the sea in what Washington considers to be a defense strategy against potential threats to commercial shipping and alleged bullying from China against rival claimants like Malaysia and Taiwan.

In April, a Chinese vessel allegedly rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat, resulting in a diplomatic spat between the two countries. Vietnam was joined by the Philippines in denouncing the incident. China then declared two archipelagos in the South China Sea as administrative districts, which Vietnam’s foreign ministry said was a violation of the country’s sovereignty.

Despite accusations from the Trump administration, there has been some disagreement as to whether China has become increasingly aggressive in its activities in the sea or whether they simply form a part of Beijing’s long-term strategy.

Carl Thayer, an emeritus professor at Australia’s University of New South Wales disagree with Trump Administration officials that China has become more assertive or aggressive in the South China Sea by taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic. He thinks that China is conducting “business-as-usual”. According to Thayer, Beijing’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea reflects its needs not to be perceived as weak by China’s domestic audience and foreign public opinion. China is also driven by the necessity to react to perceived challenges to its sovereignty, for example US Navy patrols in the region and oil explorations by Vietnam and Malaysia.

China’s recent activities may not be escalations but most likely are reactions to political developments in the region. This includes the re-election and subsequent inauguration of Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen in addition to the White House’s growing support for Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen has called for a more independent identity for the island nation despite China’s insistence that Taiwan is a breakaway province.

The year 2020 began with a standoff in the Natuna Islands on the far southern end of the South China Sea, a territory claimed by China and Indonesia. Vessels from both countries were involved in the standoff, which began when Chinese fishing vessels started to operate inside Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Eventually, Indonesia deployed F-16 fighters and naval ships to the islands and President Joko Widodo personally flew to the area, in an unusual show of strength from the country.

So far, Indonesia has tried to avoid letting South China Sea dominate their relationship with China, but with Beijing marking its territory in the region, the days of quiet diplomacy might not last forever.

The interplay between politics, economics and security is a reality for all countries that border the South China Sea, as well as for those whose economies depend on its shipping channels—leading them to remain engaged at a military level.

A second Cold War could have knocked on the door of the world, through the development in the dynamics of the current strategic environment. One of them is between the US and China, when the pandemic ends. The return of competition between the major powers began to materialize with the US-China trade war. The pandemic, where the two powers accuse each other of being responsible for the corona viral dissemination, only makes things clearer.©


MULTIPURPOSE frigates, groundbroken by Western European countries, display effective performance in dealing with the dynamics of post-Cold War maritime security. Global naval giants such as the United States Navy and the Royal Navy are now turning to heavy frigate designs for their future surface combatants.

In the post-Cold War era, European navies are gradually reducing their surface combatants conventionally incorporated in naval combat groups and in escort aircraft carrier formations, such as cruisers and destroyers. Small-scale and asymmetrical conflicts that are looming the oceans are responded by new types of surface combatants, specifically multipurpose frigates which dimensions and tonnages a r e

greater than their standard counterparts.

Frigates have long been known by navies in the world since the seventeenth century for their role in escorting merchant ships and military transport fleets. This role remained attached to them until the end of the twentieth century. In military operations, frigates are tasked with guarding amphibious or logistical transport taskforces and maintaining security in the waters. To fight balanced opponents or escort aircraft carriers, larger vessels such as destroyers and cruisers are relied on, given that they are capable of carrying a variety of weapons to fight surface combatants, submarines, and sufficient air strikes.

A standard frigate that has an average length of 100-120 meters and weighs 2,000-4,000 tons is not optimal for deploying multitasking missions because of its limited capacity to carry the sensors and weapons needed. Therefore, a standard frigate can only carry one additional task, in addition to being capable of combating surface warships, either for anti-submarine

warfare or anti-air attack.

An anti-submarine frigate is equipped with a complete underwater sensor (hull mounted and variable depth sonar) even coupled with dipping sonar on the anti-submarine h e l i c o p t e r a b o a r d the ship. A n t i -s u b m a r i n e weapons installed are quite diverse, such as torpedoes, Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC), and depth charges. On the other hand, in a frigate, anti-air raid weapons that are added are long range and early warning radars to detect the presence of missiles or aircraft as early as possible. While mounted on the weapon system are quite layered anti-air weapons, such as surface-to-air long-range, medium-distance and short-range surface missiles and close-in weapon system (CIWS) short-range air defense cannons.

By Commander Drs. Heri Sutrisno, M.SiDESTROYER-CAPABLE FRIGATES


DESTROYER-CAPABLE FRIGATES

Two heavy frigates, the ESPS Blas de Lezo (F103) of the Spanish Navy and the German Navy’s FGS Sachsen (F219) sail in formation with the standard frigate TCG Saligreis (F246) of the Turkish Navy.


Besides limitations on its sensor and weapon systems, standard frigates are also limited in their capacity to be fitted with additional marine propulsion systems. Accordingly, the speed of this surface vessel is relatively slower, less than 28 knots. While large surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers can go up to 30-35 knots, because they have double thrusters that combine diesel engines and gas turbines, or with water jets that generates sufficient power for maneuvers either in pursuit of the enemy or evade the opponent’s gunfire.

However, the inferiority of a frigate in maneuverability and combat power is not a problem in dealing with post-Cold War situations which increasingly eliminate military conflict at sea on a large scale so that aircraft carrier combat groups that require surface combatants larger than a frigate are no longer required. The current demands of surface vessels are to oversee seaborne military operations (small-scale War Military Operations and Military Operations Other than War), to safeguard territorial waters to Exclusive Economic Zones, to secure sea lanes of communication, and to secure commercial shipping for the sake of national interests that are even off its territorial waters. The operation of large fully armed surface combatants is believed to be uneconomical in the face of asymmetrical “opponents”, such as maritime terrorism and piracy at sea.

For the navy of European countries, frigates are preferred to carry out such tasks with economic deliberations. Problems inherent in a standard frigate lies in its drawbacks which includes the durability of its operation, especially in oceans and its combat capabilities when faced with various threats.

To prevail over the disadvantages of this type of frigate, European countries are developing multipurpose frigates that are larger in size than the standard frigates. The new type of frigates, which weigh between 4,000-7,000 tons with a length of 130-140 meters, are able to deal with anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface ships, and anti-air attack as well. Moreover, these destroyer-like frigates are designed to be dependable in carrying out constabulary tasks and face asymmetrical foes.

Five years before the turn of the 21st century a number of European countries presented heavy frigates. In 2002, the Netherlands dedicated the operation of the 6,050-ton Zeven Provienciën class frigate to replace the Karel Doorman class standard frigate. A year later, the Bundesmarine inaugurated the 5,800-ton Sachsen class frigate. Spain officially used the Alvaro Bazan heavy frigate which weighed 6,391 tons in the same year. In 2006, Norway became the first Scandinavian country to invigorate the development of a heavy frigate by operating the 5,400-ton Fridtjof Nansen class. Two years later, Denmark followed Norway’s footsteps by operating the 6,645-ton Iver Huitfield class heavy frigate.

As if not to be outdone by their NATO counterparts Italy and France collaborated since 2010 to build the FREMM (Frégate Européenne Multi-Mission/Fregata Europea Multi-Missione) frigates which weighs 6,000-6,700 tons. The Royal Navy trailed in by operating a Type-26 heavy frigate weighing 8,000 tons starting in 2018—previously, the master of the sea plied standard frigates.

In eastern Europe, starting in 2018, Russia operates the first heavy frigate for its navy, the 5,400-ton Admiral Groskov class. Meanwhile in East

Asia, China is gradually building a Type-54A/Jiangkai-class frigate weighing

4,200 tons and it is also developing a 5,000-6,000-ton frigate

known as Type-54B in accordance with

t h e

building up of an anti-air strike and ballistic missile combat fleet.

The Royal Navy Type 31 frigate adopts the Danish Navy’s Iver Huitfeld-class frigate design.


GOING GLOBALTHESE heavy European frigates are proven to be reliable and efficient in carrying out the challenges of maritime security tasks today. These heavy frigates are the backbone of any operator’s country in maintaining their waters up to the EEZs. Furthermore, ships of this type have shown their effectiveness in a number of multinational maritime operations, such as Operation Atlanta which was staged by the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) to counter piracy in Somali waters and resolve the Syrian crisis. Based on their existence and performance, ships of this type have urge global naval giants such as the US Navy and Royal Navy to recalculate their need for surface vessels.

Three years in before retiring the Type 23 Duke-class frigates from the Royal Navy ranks, the British Ministry of Defense had not designed a replacement even though it had developed a new Type 26 or Glasgow class frigate. The Royal Navy has the convention of operating two frigate classes at one time. In November 2019, UK had announced the development of a General Purpose Frigate, known as Type 31, which adopted the Danish-built Iver Huitfeldt-class frigate’s platform design. The 5,700-ton future frigate will strengthen the Royal Navy in 2023.

As if following its closest ally in Europe, the United States shadows Britain in adopting a European heavy frigate design for t h e future US Navy frigate fleet known as t h e FFG(X) program. For the first time i n its history, this superpower did not design

its own warship. The Pentagon determines the Italian FREMM design as a multi-mission frigate platform with a weight of 7,400 tons and begins construction in a local shipyard in 2020. The frigate, which will be named Agility class, is projected as an attack and escort vessel featuring anti-surface, anti-submarine, anti-air attack, and electronic warfare abilities to fight asymmetrical threats and escort logistical transport convoys.

The surprise in the development of a heavy frigate came from the Bundesmarine with the Mehrzweck Kampf Schiff-180 (MKS-180) multipurpose surface combatant program that has been in progress since 2017. The German Navy will project this 9,000-ton destroyer-like frigate to carry out combat and self-defense missions, maritime mapping, maritime surveillance and embargo control, military evacuation in crisis situations, escorting commercial ships, and acting as command ships in naval task forces.

In May 2020, the Ministry of Defense decided to emulate the United Kingdom and the United States, by adopting another country’s frigate platform design, the Omega Frigate designed by Damen Schelde and was first introduced in Indo Defense 2018 in Jakarta.

Heavyweight frigates will increasingly be used in various regions. Two countries in the Middle East, i.e. Egypt and Morocco, have operated FREMM frigates made in France. Australia has transformed the Alvaro Bazan-class frigate into the Hobart-class destroyer for RAN and is adopting the Glasgow-class British frigate design for the Hunter-class frigate that will replace the Anzac-class frigate. It is also possible that these destroyer-like frigates will be operated by countries in other regions as well, especially those that are still coping with sovereignty issues in their

respective Exclusive Economic Zones.©

The future heavy frigate of the Bundesmarine, MKS-180, adopted the design of the Omega Frigate platform developed by Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding, Netherlands.


INDONESIA’S active role in creating peace in the world has gained international recognition. One of them is through Indonesia’s participation in the United Nations (UN). Indonesia has always been involved in UN peacekeeping missions by sending troops. One of them is United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Formed on March 23, 1978, UNIFIL contains a Maritime Task Force tasked with supporting the Lebanese Navy (LAF-N) in monitoring its territorial waters, guarding the Lebanese coast, preventing unauthorized entry of weapons or other related items by sea into Lebanese territory, and training of LAF-N personnel. Every year, the Indonesian Navy mobilizes its warships to be part of the MTF-UNIFIL mission.

The Indonesian Navy has diplomacy capabilities that are built through years of experience. Diplomacy is applied by the Navy by combining hard power and soft power into smart power at every opportunity to interact with other countries. The smart power approach also plays a role in balancing the foreign policy of Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) as applied by the superpowers today.

MTF-UNIFIL missions represent the Navy’s diplomatic capabilities in the form of integrated activities from

various countries that require good cooperation, great trust among participating countries, and unity of effort in its implementation. The Navy’s achievements in MTF-UNIFIL missions were not only in most of the ship’s inspection reports, but also on the results of the Sea Phase training activities during Ontask and Stage At Sea in LAF-N personnel training.

This achievement will be difficult to attain if the warships that will be sent to MTF-UNIFIL missions are not well prepared since their departure from Indonesia, especially on Sensors, Weapons, and Command (Sewaco), platforms and logistics, and especially on the ability of crew members in conducting diplomatic activities. Preparation of the operational capabilities of a warship refers to the criteria required in the LOA.

This article presents a comparative analysis of the diplomatic capabilities of the crew members of the Diponegoro-class (KRI DPN) and Bung Tomo-class (KRI TOM) corvettes of the Indonesian Navy by means of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method to decide on the best alternative selection of warships and to find the sub-criteria of the most influential diplomatic abilities when carrying out MTF-UNIFIL missions.

The research on which this article is based on was focused on comparing the diplomatic abilities of the

WARSHIPS ONDIPLOMATIC MISSIONSBy Lieutenant-Commander Iwan Hendra Susilo, S.T., M.Tr., Opsla.



The components used as criteria in making the hierarchical diagram in Figure 1 above consist of three interactions between warships and outsiders which are largely carried out during an MTF-UNIFIL

crew members of the Diponegoro and Bung Tomo-class corvettes during their assignment in UNIFIL-MTF missions. This study does not discuss Sewaco capabilities, platform and logistics, and supporting factors such as budget, personnel strength, or other aspects that may affect operations, assuming these factors are already in normal condition.

Conducting Joint Exercise (EXE) Conducting Culture Festival (CUL) Conducting International Conference (CON)

2

SUB CRITERIA ON DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS

LOALOALOA

3

REFERENCE

123

1

No

Table 1. Sub Criteria on Diplomatic Aspects of a Warship on MTF-UNIFIL missions

Source: Owned Processing Data

DIPONEGORO CLASS

BUNG TOMO CLASS

DIPONEGORO CLASS

BUNG TOMO CLASS

DIPONEGORO CLASS

BUNG TOMO CLASS

4,849

1,212

2,351

0,392

0,596

0,149

EXE (L:0.635)

CON (L:0.287)

CUL (L:0.078)

Alternatives PrioritySub Criteria

Table 2. TPV of Diplomatic Criteria


DIPLOMATIC CRITERIAINTRODUCED by Thomas L. Saaty, the method of data processing through the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) allows one to get the Total Priority Value (TPV) from the diplomatic criteria of each Indonesian Navy’s vessel as a priority for carrying out future MTF-UNIFIL missions.

The processing of data with the AHP method utilizes an Expert Choice 11 software. It is worth noting that in making decisions using the AHP method there is an absolute consistency of variable weights. The AHP hierarchy diagram is arranged based on the number of diplomatic criteria that will be analyzed through the AHP method.

Figure 1. The Hierarchical Diagram of Diplomatic Aspects of Warships in a MTF-UNIFIL Mission


DIPLOMACY

EXE

DPN TOM

CUL CON

niaawn

iijijij ,...,2,1/

1=∀

= ∑

=

Figure 1. Priority Synthetis on the Diplomatic Criteria

Inconsistency = 0.09with 0 missing judgments.


EXE .635

CON .287

CUL .078

mission. Including the ability to conduct joint exercises, On-Tasks, cultural exhibitions during a warship’s visit to ports in Lebanon as well as ports in countries around Lebanon (Cyprus and Turkey), and UNIFIL contingent conferences which are often held in the Naqoura region of southern Lebanon.

The steps in AHP include the estimation of priority weights from a set of criteria or alternatives from the square matrix used in pairwise comparisons A = [aij], where the weight value must be positive. If the pairwise comparison policy is truly consistent then an inverse comparison is made from these values. Let’s say aij = 1/aij for all i, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n. Furthermore, the final weighting of the normalized “i” factor is as follows:

A priority synthesis is fulfilled by the researcher as the next step, according to the data in the pairwise comparative table of the diplomatic criteria, with the results shown in the following table.

After testing the consistency ratio in the overall pairwise comparison, the next step is to calculate the TPV for each alternative that will be prioritized. TPV is obtained from the comparative value between all diplomatic criteria in the operational capabilities of warships with available alternatives, as shown in the following table.



10,5%

20,6%

0,4%

69,0%

70,4%

67,6%

31,0%

29,6%

32,4%

Initial

Increase to 10,1%

Decrease to 10,1%

Diplomacy

KRI DPN

KRI TOMTPV

Condition

Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis of Diplomatic Criteria


After obtaining the TPV, a sensitivity analysis is carried out to determine the variation of priority criteria to observe the effect on alternative priorities. This sensitivity analysis is practical in maximizing operational criteria which have a positive effect on overall operational capabilities. The results of the sensitivity analysis on Sensors, Weapons, and Command are shown in the following table.

Data processing by applying the AHP method in priority synthesis that results in TPV, resulted in the MTF Inter-Element Training’s sub-criteria of the Diplomatic Criteria having the greatest weight value compared to other sub-criteria, which is equal to 0.635. It also resulted in the fact that the three KRI DPN’s diplomatic sub-criteria had a priority value that was superior to the KRI DPN.

CONCLUSIONResults of the data processing utilizing the AHP method show that KRI DPN has advantages in all diplomatic sub-criteria compared to KRI TOM. This research has proven that AHP theory can be used to determine alternative priorities in the field of a warship’s operational capabilities, especially in the field of diplomacy.

The value of excellent diplomatic skills in MTF-UNIFIL missions will be obtained through effective preparation, which can support the achievement of key tasks in the framework of the Government of Indonesia’s foreign policy through the deployment of naval forces on world stage as diplomatic means. This is in line with the Sea Power theory from Alfred Thayer Mahan, which states that a country must have great naval force to expand its national interests in the world.©

The above tables explain that increasing the value of diplomatic criteria by 10.5% will increase the TPV of the KRI DPN corvette by 1.4 percent. Instead, it will reduce the KRI TOM alternative by 1.4 percent. While the decline in the value of diplomatic criteria by 10.1% will reduce the TPV of the KRI DPN to 1.4% and will increase the alternative TPV of KRI TOM by 1.4 percent.



THE Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) assisted in the extraction of Indonesian citizens (WNI) working in the cruise ships MV World Dream and Diamond Princess. To that end, TNI AL deployed the hospital ship KRI Dr. Soeharso-990 to transfer the crew members of both cruise ships to the observation site on Sebaru Island, in the Thousand Islands north of Jakarta. On both cruise ships, there were indications that some of the crew members were infected by Corona Virus Disease (Covid-19). Preventing the Indonesian crew members not to be infected with the virus, the Government of Indonesia swiftly took the initiative to relocate them and had them quarantined first, in order to observe whether they were infected or not before interacting with the community.

The evacuation was carried out in two ways: the crew members of MV World Dream were picked up in the territorial waters of the Riau Islands with transfers carried out in the middle of the sea. While for the Indonesian crew members aboard the Diamond Princess were picked by KRI Dr. Soeharso-990 at a jetty in Indramayu, West Java, belonging to a steam power plant of the State Electricity Company (PLN), as the crew was on their way to Indonesia by plane that landed at Kalijati Airport in West Java to further take the land route to the power plant’s jetty.

THE NAVY EXTRACTS INDONESIANCREW MEMBERS OFF CRUISE SHIPS


EVACUATION OF MV WORLD DREAM’S CREWIN evacuating the Indonesian crew members of the MV World Dream in the Durian Strait, Riau Islands, on Wednesday, February 26, 2020, TNI AL deployed five warships, namely the hospital ship KRI Dr. Soeharso-990, KRI Cut Nyak Dien-375, KRI Clurit-641, KRI Krait-872, and KAL (prefix designation given to non-commissioned ships that are property of the Indonesian Navy) Marapas and two Sea Riders.

There were 188 Indonesian crew members removed from the MV World Dream, consisting of 172 men and 16 women, all of whom have been declared Covid-19 negative. At the time of the departure, the sunlit weather was very accommodating, so that with the excellent cooperation between all parties involved, the evacuation went well and smooth. The personnel transfer was carried out in two sorties by means of an MV World Dream’s transfer boat to the KRI dr. Soeharso-990.

The crew members were received at KRI dr. Soeharso-990 after going through the inspection procedure according to the designated medical protocol. KRI dr. Soeharso-990 then moved towards Sebaru Island in the Thousand Islands. During the evacuation, TNI AL joined forces with a number of institutions under the auspices of the Indonesian Ministry of Health, i.e. the Batam Port Health Office (KKP), the Jakarta Health Laboratory Center (BBLK) and the Jakarta Health Research and Development Agency (Balitbangkes).

After cruising for two days from the Durian Strait in the Riau Islands, KRI dr. Soeharso-990 arrived in the Thousand Islands, on Friday (28/2). The 188 Indonesian crew members originally from the MV World Dream, who had been declared Covid-19 negative, were then transported with two Landing Craft Utility (LCU) boats to Sebaru Island. The first LCU brought 16 Indonesian citizens and their baggage, while 172 Indonesian citizens were carried with the second LCU and were immediately received by the Joint Observation Team on Sebaru Island.

KRI dr. Soeharso-990’s voyage towards Sebaru Island encountered no problems. The MV World Dream’s Indonesian crew members joined in various routine activities including worship, health check-ups, sports, psychological counseling, and other activities.

The evacuation went well thanks to the team work of various parties. In reinforcing the humanitarian operation, KRI dr. Soeharso-990 was manned by 95 members of the TNI AL, supported by 59 personnel from the Evacuation Task Force led by the Commander of the Navy’s Fleet II Naval Security Task Force, First Admiral Rachmad Jayadi, M.Tr. (Han).

EVACUATION OF THE DIAMOND PRINCESSFOLLOWING the success of evacuating 188 crew members of the cruise ship MV World Dream, the Indonesian Navy’s KRI dr. Suharso-990 returned to carry out the task of evacuating the 69 Diamond Princess’s Indonesian crew. The Evacuation Task Force carried out embarkation at the Indramayu PLTU (steam power plant) jetty in West Java, and sailed to Sebaru Island.

Up to that time, the aircraft carrying the 69 crew members of the Diamond Princess that had been declared Covid-19 negative took off from Japan’s Haneda Airport, and landed at Kertajati Airport in Majalengka, West Java, Indonesia. They then went to the Indramayu PLTU jetty by land. According to the designated medical protocol, before embarking to the KRI dr. Soeharso-990, the integrated medical team carried out rigorous medical examination.

KRI dr. Soeharso-990 then sailed to Sebaru Island, and arrived on Monday afternoon March 2, 2020, to further debark the 69 crew members who were then received by the Integrated Observation Team on Sebaru Island. In assisting humanitarian missions in Sebaru Island, the Kepulauan Seribu (Thousand Islands) Regency of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta, in addition to KRI dr. Soeharso-990 was also seconded by KRI Semarang-594 which was operated as a command center during the Covid-19 virus observation process.

KRI Semarang-594 as the headquarters of the Joint Combined Task Force (Kogasgabpad) is on guard at all times, both as a hospital ship as well as as an emergency control post tasked with distributing both logistics as well as accommodation and a fellow


observation post for Indonesian citizens associated with the Covid-19 virus.

During the voyage from the Indramayu PLTU jetty to Sebaru Island, the Diamond Princess’ Indonesian crew members underwent a number of pastimes such as body temperature checking, psychological games, psychological counseling and also workouts. Then, before being disembarked in Sebaru Island, they were again blood-tested to determine whether they were really healthy or not. Sixty eight people were all declared negative and one person had to undergo further examination in Jakarta.

On Thursday, March 5, 2020, at around 14:30 West Indonesia Time, the 68 Indonesian crew members of the Diamond Princess along with ten of their assistants were descended from KRI dr. Soeharso-990 and headed to Sebaru Island by LCUs. During the debarkation they were escorted by four Sea Riders from the Indonesian Navy’s frogman and underwater demolition unit (Kopaska) to maintain security while heading for the island. The crew members then underwent a 14-day observation.

OBSERVATION ISLANDSEBARU Island is one of the isles within the Thousand Islands’ group which seaside has white sand, unharmed coral reefs, and hemmed in sparkling waters. The island was preferred a quarantine or observation post for Indonesian crew members removed from virus-infected cruise ships, since it is a deserted island.

Sebaru Island is deemed eligible as an observation site, for there are ready-to-use buildings with accommodations. The facility was earlier a discarded drug rehabilitation facility.

The government transformed the existing cottages and the former drug rehabilitation facility into emergency sickbays and an observation post. Unlike in Natuna, which utilizes an airplane hangar with tents. Though different in physical facilities, the equipment and staff are the same as those applied at Natuna, from sanitation, nutritionists, to psychologists. Facilities on Sebaru Island can accommodate around 250 people.

The observation process on Sebaru Island is compliant with the procedures approved by the World Health Organization (WHO), similar to the observations administered on Indonesian citizens who were repatriated from Wuhan, China in Natuna.

The fashioning of Sebaru Island as an isolating spot calls for exceptionally hard work considering that one of its accesses is by sea. The KRI Banda Aceh-593 was deployed to bring hundreds of joint team members, consisting of members of the Armed Forces and State Police, the National Disaster Management

Agency (BNPB), and the Ministry of Health to Sebaru Island. The joint team was tasked with setting up an adequate observation post. In addition to people, the KRI Banda Aceh-593 also carried food and medical equipment.

For the sake of examining the Indonesian crew members, the Navy also added another hospital ship, the KRI Semarang-594, which was used as the command control center during the Covid-19 treatment on Sebaru Island. From the KRI Semarang, the Commander of the Integrated Joint Task Force (Kogasgabpad), Vice Admiral Yudo Margono, S.E., M.M. directed the entirety regarding the evacuation and observation. Beyond this, Vice Admiral Yudo Margono served as Commander of the Joint Regional Defense Command (Pangkogabwilhan) I.

The KRI Semarang-594 as the command center of the Integrated Joint Task Command (Kogasgabpad) is on alert on a daily basis, both as a hospital ship and in emergency situations. In addition, the KRI

Semarang-594 also brought hundreds of food boxes for the Indonesian crew members who were scrutinized, which were within a few kilometers from where the ship was anchored.

The KRI Semarang is a Landing Platform Dock (LPD)-type vessel 124 meters in length, 21.80 meters in width, and weighing 7,200 tons, with a maximum speed of 16 knots and cruise speed of 14 knots. Its sailing endurance reaches up to 30 days. The KRI Semarang-594 is equipped with two Landing Craft Utility (LCU) vessels each capable of carrying eight combat vehicles.

The KRI Semarang was also used in the repatriation of the crew members who had been observed in Sebaru Island. One hundred and eighty eight crew members of the MV World Dream were taken to the Military Sealift Command (Kolinlamil) dock in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta, on Saturday, March 14th, followed by the 68 Diamond Princess’ crew members on Sunday.©


NOT many aircrafts are able to go through their service for more than half a century. The P-3 Orion proves itself a legendary anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft that has existed for 58 years. In its prime of life, marked by the retirement of this aircraft by a number of its user countries, Orion continues to appear mighty as an overseer of the oceans that seems irreplaceable.

Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPA) have been known since World War II to answer the limitations of sensors of surface vessels that could not sense targets behind the horizon. So-called light flying boats and barrage balloons that were onboard large surface combatants (battle ships and cruisers) were then the platforms. Since the mid-1930s, land- and sea-based MPAs have been developed. Barrage balloons were abandoned and the trend led to medium/heavy flying boats as well as land-based fixed wing aircrafts. During World War II, this types of aircraft played a major role in the hunting of submarines, surface ships, and performed rescue operations as well, even though they only used simple sensors.

Entering the Cold War era, MPAs face new challenges that cannot be dealt with using World War II platforms and sensor technologies, especially with the development of a submarine propulsion technology capable of going fathoms deep for quite a long time. The maritime patrol aircrafts at the time did not have enough endurance to monitor the submarines that sailed in snorkeling mode or surfaced for battery charge. This condition was further complicated by nuclear submarines capable of sailing in depth for long periods of time.

The US Navy actually still relied on the P-2 Neptune as its air power to carry out anti-submarine warfare. However, the Pentagon was interested in a new transport aircraft made by Lockheed, the L-188 Electra, which took off in August 1957. The company won a tender to build a maritime patrol aircraft coded P3V-1, and its first unit passed the flight test on 15 April 1961. A year later, this type of maritime patrol aircraft officially reinforced the Patrol Squadron Eight (VP-8) and VP-44 based at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. On September 18, 1962, the US Navy officially named its new MPA the P-3 Orion.

The P-3 Orion is 35.61 meters in length, with a wingspan of 30.37 meters, height 10.27 meters and weighs of 27.900 kg (weight empty). This wide-winged aircraft is powered by four Turboprop Allison T56-A-14 engines, each with 3,661 kW power. Each engine turns a four-blade constant speed propeller, the Hamilton Standard 54H60-77 type. Based on these engine specifications, the P-3 is capable of flying at a maximum speed of 405 knots (750 km/h) and has a cruising speed of 330 knots as far as 5,600 nautical miles and is capable of flying continuously for 12 hours.

The last generation of US Navy’s P-3C Orion is capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and ground attack missiles. (navaltechnology.com)

THE M

IGHT

Y OLD

BE

AT-U

POR

ION

By Commander Drs. Heri Sutrisno, M.Si.



The aircraft, manned by 11 people, is capable of carrying mission equipment as standard anti submarine elements, i.e. 50 units of anti-submarine sensor sonobuoys, a range of anti submarine weapons weighing up to 9 tons, such as depth charges and Mk-46 or Mk-52 torpedoes stored in the bomb bay. As self defense weapon from enemy air strikes, the P-3 is equipped with a missile decoys and Maverick anti-aircraft missiles. In its development, this aircraft is also capable to launch attacks on surface combatants and air-to-land attacks with AGM-84 Harpoon and AGM-84E SLAM missiles.

Two months after entering active service with the US Navy, the P-3 Orion was drawn in the Cuban Crisis in October 1962. Its mission was to detect and block missile transports from the Soviet Union that would enter Cuban waters. By the Kremlin, the country would be made a missile base that would directly threaten the United States. This crisis ended without firing a weapon. And the Soviet Union revoked its intention to make Cuba its missile base.

Two years later Orions were deployed during the Vietnam War, in support of Operation Market Time in 1965. Their mission was to thwart the shipment of logistical supplies to the Vietcong by patrolling along the Vietnamese coast. Orions were also assigned to a number of air reconnaissance missions against enemy positions on land. During this mission, one P-3 was lightly damaged by an anti-aircraft gun shell and one was shot down by a Zuni missile fired from a

North Vietnamese MIG-17 fighter. This incident gave birth to the thinking of equipping this MPA with self-defense armament such as chaffs or decoys and anti-aircraft missiles.

P-3 Orions were part of the first US troops to arrive in Kuwait 48 hours after Iraq invaded the country on August 2, 1990. The flying machines were equipped with sensors and control systems to attack beyond-the-horizon targets, in support of Operation Outlaw Hunter to detect Iraqi ships that were trying to cross the Basra and Umm Qasar waters into Iranian waters. Reports from this MPAs’ surveillance directed the multinational forces to destroy Iraqi Navy’s vessels. During the Gulf War, of the 108 Iraqi vessels destroyed by multinational forces, 55 of them were Orion P-3 targets.

These combat aircrafts were also operated by the US Navy in the Balkan crisis in former Yugoslavia. P-3C Orions were not only used in surveillance, but were also assigned as close air support using anti-ship missiles.

The P-3 Orion is distinct in terms of quantity and the distribution of its users which is beyond other MPAs. Until 2020, 751 aircrafts have been produced which are flown for military and civilian purposes. The US Navy has the most with 227 aircraft, which since 2013 have been replaced by the P-8 Poseidon, a Maritime Multi-mission Aircraft (MMA) built by Boeing. Next to the United States, the Orion P-3 is also operated by 17 other countries, i.e. Argentina, Australia, Brazil,

A RAAF P-3C Orion releases of anti-aircraft missile decoys.



Canada, Chile, Greece, Iran, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, South Korea, Spain and Thailand. For nearly 60 years of service, this MPA has been made in 39 variants according to the operational needs of its users.

THROUGHOUT THE AGESTHE special feature of this four-engined aircraft lies in its platform which presents a high level of optimization and operating efficiency and can be modified according to any needs of the user. The United States is open to its allies to operate an aircraft that can work together with the elements of their fleet and air power. Replacing the Lockheed P-2 Neptune, the beat-up Orion has proven itself throughout the ages as the world’s leading maritime patrol aircraft. Far beyond the British Nimrod, French Atlantique, and Russia’s Ilyushin Il-38.

Every decade, the Lockheed and Kawasaki-manufactured aircraft undergoes upgrades in its sensors and weapons in accordance with the development of naval technology. In 1975, an Update I Program was carried out by enhancing the aircraft’s navigation system, computer memory, and tactical display. A year later, the Update Program was again implemented by installing an infrared detection system and a sonobuoy reference system and equipped with Harpoon missiles.

The P-3 was again upgraded under the Update III Program, which was implemented in 1984. Within this program, the aircraft was equipped with sophisticated anti-submarine warfare avionics, including the IBM Proteus AN/UYS-1 acoustic processors. The upgrading process gave birth to the P-3C variant. During the 1990s, the aircraft underwent a phase IV upgrade aimed at providing advanced signal processing capabilities to respond to threats of a new generation of submarines that were fast, quiet and operating in deep seas. The upgrade also included the installation of a multi-sensor WESCAM 20 system, which contained thermal temperature sensors and CCD sensors.

In the midst of the issue that US Navy’s P-3 Orions are being retired, a number of users instead carried out a phase V upgrades

by installing the Raytheon AN/APS-137 multi-mission surveillance radar as done on 18 Orions of the Royal Australian Air Force which were upgraded to the AP-3C standard. In 2005, updates included the installation of Elta Electronics EL/M-20223 marine surveillance radar and FLIR Systems Star SAFIRE II thermal imaging.

Meanwhile, New Zealand had chosen L-3 Communications to upgrade its six P-3K aircraft with a new mission system. The upgrade also included new communication and navigation equipment. Pakistan, which bought seven former US Navy P-3C Orions, upgraded the radars of two among them, and also installed an Electronic Support Measure (ESM) electronic warfare equipment, and communications systems in 2007.

Japan, which already holds a license to make their own Orions through Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., improved the engine to be able to fly for 14 hours, two hours longer than before.

The might of this aircraft also lies in the weapons system which is integrated with the upgrading of the sensor system. The initial generation of this aircraft was armed with depth charges, torpedoes and sea mines carried in its bomb bay. The latest generation of P-3C Orion is capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and ground attack missiles, the Harpoon AGM-84.

Less than two years out of the six decades of the Orion’s service, the assignment of the legendary MPA has been reduced. The US Navy as the first user has retired most of the P-3 Orion and replaced them with a new generation, more sophisticated P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft which better responds to current task challenges. Currently, the country still operates 41 P-3Cs as MPA and 12 EP-3s as elements of strategic electronic warfare. This step was followed by countries such as Australia, Spain, the Netherlands, and Japan.

However, there are still many users that still continue the Orion’s service for the next ten years, as did Germany and South Korea. A number of other user states seem to be unwilling to lose the might of the sea eagle despite its old age. Indeed, the ocean air watchdog has never reinforced the Indonesian Air Force and the Indonesian Navy’s air arm, but we can take valuable lessons from the greatness and extensive lifetime of the P-3 Orion.©

A P-3C and an Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate, two US Navy’s defense equipment that will enter retirement. (navaltechnology.com)18 THE HORIZON 2ND EDITION 2020


Chinese claims on South China Sea as well as overlapping claims with other countries

THE South China Sea is abundant with natural resources, both oil, gas, and edible fishes. The South China Sea is also considered strategic because it is a path of trade and economic traffic from Australia (Indian Ocean), towards Asian countries, Europe and the Middle East. Hence, the South China Sea is significant for China and other claimant states as SLOC/SLOT and source for natural wealth.

Regional disputes in the South China Sea had taken place more than a decade ago, which began long before the international sea law convention (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—UNCLOS) was formulated in 1982 as a legal framework for determining territorial sea boundaries, additional zones and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as well as other rights and obligations of coastal states.

However, at present, UNCLOS has been accepted as the basis of international law. Regional disputes in the South China Sea involve China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Vietnam as well as outside parties that have interests in the region, such as the United States (US). Until now, there has been no clear resolution regarding the peaceful resolution of the problem. Although Indonesia is not one of the regional claimants against the South China Sea, Chinese claims called Nine-Dash-Line (NDL) are very likely to bring future problems for Indonesia. Indonesia, which is not a claimant state, was drawn in after the absolute claims of the PRC over the waters of the South China Sea, entered Natuna waters in 2012.

The South China Sea dispute is seen as testing the ability of ASEAN member states to maintain a united attitude as an international organization.

INDONESIA TRAPPED IN C O N F L I C T S OF INTEREST IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

By Navy Captain Cecep Hidayat, S.E., M.Si.


Sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea are strongly influenced by the strategic location of the area as maritime access and the potential of large mineral resources. The South China Sea is always crossed by various types of ships that transport energy sources, both oil, coal and natural gas. More than half of the number of commercial vessels from all over the world passing the Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait continue their journey through the South China Sea.

However, what needs to be understood is the reason that pushed China, as the leading actor behind the conflict in the South China Sea as a whole, to be so bold as to claim this territorial waters as a legitimate part of the country’s territory that contradicts all international provisions and agreements contained in UNCLOS and the most recent international decisions, the outcome of the decree made by the International Arbitration Court (Permanent Court of Arbitration—PCA) which granted the demands of the Philippines for territorial claims in the South China Sea.

One of China’s motives for claiming the South China Sea is because it has the largest population in the world today, rapid economic progress and its military strength which now measures up with the US and Russia. These factors are seen as the main reason for China to dare to disagree with other parties even when it is seen as violating all the provisions and international law that apply positively at this time.

FUTURE THREAT PREDICTIONIt can be seen that the dynamics of the use of force by the disputing parties in the South China Sea do not use the conventional paradigm of military power (hard power) to achieve goals. The balance between military power and also other forces that are more subtle as a counterweight (soft power) needs to be used together to achieve goals while maintaining harmony in their relationship, which although up and down due to the escalation of conflict, but prevent the occurrence of conflict openness that can lead to open war, which can end in the next world war. That is what China seems to realize in terms of the approach it uses to win their claims in the South China Sea.

China not only applies its rapidly increasing military power, but is also going together with an economic, diplomatic, and ideological approaches that are used in a properly calculated way. The combined approach taken by China can be classified as a smart approach (smart power). The balance of power and approaches used by China is clearly illustrated by Joseph S. Nye in an interview that illustrates that the Chinese approach is not always military force for it may alienate its allies and also increase tensions in the region.

Meanwhile, by drawing on a balanced and intelligent force will reduce the possibility of forming a coalition that will fight China. This was conveyed by Hu Jintao at the Chinese Communist Party’s congress on the importance of a smart and balanced power approach. A tougher and firmer approach to violations committed by China at several hotspots in the South China Sea can provide impetus for China to start increasing its aggressiveness by using its military power (hard power). Chinese aggressiveness can be interpreted as China’s desire to practice its desire to use more military power accompanied by an economic crackdown in the form of pressure exerted on the target country.

Indonesia’s attitude in the South China Sea conflict is expressed by not taking sides and maintains stability in the region, while Indonesia can act as an “Honest Broker” to resolve conflicts in the South China Sea. This is required in the region to maintain regional stability, bearing in mind that Indonesia’s territory covers almost two-thirds of the entire ASEAN region which is dominant with its territorial waters.

For China, Indonesia is an important country for the sustainability of its maritime “Silk Road” doctrine. Therefore, it is very likely that China will maintain its relationship with Indonesia through its economic capabilities by adopting the most likely approach for Indonesia, namely by disbursing Chinese investment in Indonesia, perhaps by facilitating the disbursement of funds and investment assistance and the technology required by Indonesia in realizing the Global Maritime Fulcrum.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISPUTE ON INDONESIAIN the political field, the dispute over the South China Sea if it continues to increase will have a negative impact on regional peace and stability. This condition clearly contradicts Indonesia’s political interests in maintaining regional peace and stability as mandated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The escalation of the South China Sea dispute will have significant political implications for Indonesia.

On the one hand, the implication is that Indonesia will be trapped in the struggle for the interests between major countries in the region, namely the United States and China. On the other hand, Indonesia’s national interests in the South China Sea are also at risk because Indonesia’s EEZ in the waters and Natuna’s borders will definitely be affected by the spill-over of the conflict. The formation of claimant states can also affect Indonesia’s foreign policy. China’s Nine-Dash Lines which overlaps with Indonesia’s EEZ if left unchecked may imperil Indonesia due to changes in the territorial boundaries claimed by other countries.

In the economic field, the prolonged conflict in the South China Sea is predicted to bring shock waves to the


Indonesian economy. The direct economic implication for Indonesia is the reduction of state revenues from oil and gas fields and fisheries in Indonesia’s EEZ in the region.

Natuna waters, which border directly with the South China Sea, is a national strategic area since it is a natural resource exploration area. The reduced exploration in the region will also have an impact on the availability of energy and food, especially the fisheries sector which is a source of income for the people in the Natuna Islands. The indirect implication of the disputes in the South China Sea is the increase in insurance costs and operational costs of commercial vessels that pass through the region or are forced to find safer alternative shipping routes.

The existence of conflicts in the region also endangers the continuity of Indonesia’s trade with countries in East Asia which are Indonesia’s important economic partners. The value of Indonesia’s trade with these countries is quite significant in maintaining the national economic wheel for the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) and the Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement (JIEPA) have been agreed.

In the field of defense, the presence of armed forces in the disputed areas in the South China Sea has created new threats and tensions for the Asian region, particularly Southeast Asia, because the presence of armed forces facing each other in one field of operation to protect the interests of each potential country may become an open conflict. South China Sea’s strategic position in defense makes every claimant state try to play its influence in the region through the deployment of troops that may have a strategic impact. This condition requires Indonesia to review its national defense system, especially in areas bordering the disputed territories. In the context of national defense, Indonesia has interests in the sovereignty of its territory on the border of the South China Sea and security guarantees on the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC).

PROTECTING THE NATUNA SEA TO expunge the implications of the South China Sea conflicts on national interests, Indonesia needs to anticipate possible scenarios in the South China Sea region by developing a comprehensive defense strategy. The best-suited defense strategy must be able to answer three basic questions: what are the ends, by what means, and how to achieve that ends (ways). Furthermore, in the national defense strategy which portrays Ends as national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security and honor, the means used are military defense integrated with non-military defense contained in the national defense posture, and how to use a multi-layered defense strategy.

Regarding open conflicts in the South China Sea, their impact on Indonesia’s national interests will greatly affect the country’s politics, economy, defense and security. In national defense strategy, objectives are set out in strategic objectives, which consist of five interrelated strategic targets, which include targets in the field of deterrence, targets in dealing with threats of military aggression, targets in overcoming military threats that do not take the form of military aggression, targets to overcome non-military threats and targets to bring about world peace and regional stability.

In the South China Sea conflict, the related strategic objectives include three national defense functions, i.e. deterrence, suppression, and recovery in the face of a possibility of military aggression and the realization of regional stability. All related resources (means) available must be used as much as possible through appropriate strategies (ways) for the achievement of the three intended national defense functions.

In addition to the military which executes strategies to respond to contingencies in the South China Sea, stakeholders involved in politics and economics also have an important role to play. Conflict resolution will be prompter to achieve and more successful if supported by conducive political conditions and supporting economic conditions. This is where synergy is needed between all parties involved. It must be understood from the start that conflict resolution in an area cannot be borne only by local territorial and military authorities, but must be an integrated unit of action that mutually reinforces one another.

Concerning the disputes in the South China Sea, Indonesia has the principle of promoting peaceful conflict resolution and seeking negotiations within a peaceful path as the main way to find common ground. This principle is basically the basic foundation of ASEAN which prioritizes the “ASEAN Way” which focuses on the principle of non-intervention and peaceful ways of resolving disputes.©

Map of the Chinese Maritime Silk Road


THE geography of Indonesia as a self-governing territory makes up of 17,504 islands, which makes it as the largest archipelago in the world. Two thirds of Indonesia’s territory is a sea area with a coastline of 108,000 kilometers and its waters cover 6,400,000 square kilometers.

The final Prime Minister of Indonesia, Djuanda Kartawidjaja (1911-1963), adopted the Djuanda Declaration on December 13, 1957, which gained international recognition on December 10, 1982 after the 3rd United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) and followed by a state political decision three years later through Law No. 17 of 1985. Since then Indonesia has the sovereign right to utilize natural resources including those on the seabed and below it as well as the provisions on the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ALKI).

The advantages of Indonesia as a country that has archipelagic sea lanes become a potential base capital in preparing the nation’s future, including in the realization of Indonesia’s vision to become a Global Maritime Fulcrum (PMD) as stated in the first point of the 2014 Nawa Cita from the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Ir. H. Joko Widodo.

International trade and transportation bustles through the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and Sea Lanes of Transportation (SLOT) in Indonesian waters reach approximately

SAFEGUARDING THE INDONESIAN

ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES (III)By Navy Captain Aries Cahyono, S.E.


40% and continue to increase. This is an economic windfall and a bargaining power if we are able to manage it properly and appropriately. In the maritime security’s context, the strategic location of Indonesia contains logical consequences in ensuring maritime security for its users as well as how to respond to a number of maritime security issues involving many countries.

Therefore, safeguarding and overseeing maritime security are highly prioritized while still paying attention to the area, especially on ALKI lanes. Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes lists the distribution of ALKI (III) lanes and their branches. Acting towards the existence of the ALKI (III) routes in accordance with the provisions and legislation is certainly not easy. There are challenges to be faced, and these need to be sustained by the best strategies.

POTENTIAL THREATSEACH ALKI has different potential threats, but ALKI (III) has potential threats in the Maluku Sea originating from the impact of the Philippine internal Moro conflict, which makes ALKI (III) a pathway of firearms smuggling activities into Maluku or North Maluku as a base for the “diving” of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) and the Free Papua Organization (OPM) separatist movements. On the other hand, the lanes also has the potential as maritime pathways for

foreign sympathizers in supporting the RMS in the Maluku and North Maluku regions.

In the ALKI (III A) lane in the Ombai Strait there is a maritime boundary between the Republic of Indonesia (RI) and the Democratic Republic of East Timor (hereinafter abbreviated as DRET), which until now is still in the process of bilaterally establishing the borderlines between the two countries, potentially a vehicle for the escape of RDTL citizens entering Indonesia. Various activities at the RI-RDTL maritime boundary can jeopardize the safety of navigation of sea operators, next to eliciting increased territorial violations by the RDTL military elements or other maritime agencies as well as the rampant smuggling of goods and human trafficking and territorial claims.

Archipelagic sea lanes are sea channels that are traversed by ships or foreign aircraft above the channel, to carry out shipping and flights in the normal manner solely for continuous, direct and fast transits and not obstructed through or over the waters of the islands and territorial seas that is adjacent to one and another part of the high seas or Indonesia’ss Exclusive Economic Zone. Eastern Indonesia is full of open space waters, with very long and winding coastlines, through large and small clusters so that the position of ALKI (III) has its own geographical characteristics. The peculiarity of the ALKI (III) should be given special attention by the Indonesian government. The critical area of ALKI (III) is located on the RI-RDTL and the

Illustrative map of the Archipelagic Baselines and Maritime Boundaries of Indonesia (Source-US Dept of State)


RI-Philippines borders where both of these areas are likely to cause smuggling of weapons, drugs and alcohol, and illegal fishing.

Based on the analysis and anomalies found by the Maritime Information Center of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Pusinfomar TNI) since January 2020, around 25 commercial vessels weighing above 10,000 GT cruised in the eastern Indonesian waters (east-west track or north-south track) and not through the ALKI (III) route. The waters of eastern Indonesia are widely used by foreign-flagged commercial ships to continuously sail around the ALKI III (the western side of Buru Island or in the Seram Sea) for approximately 12 days. The activities of these commercial vessels have led to various allegations of violations or criminal acts at sea in the form of transshipment, illegal buying and selling of oil-based fuels at sea, disruption to navigation security in the surrounding waters or disregarding conservation areas and others.

GUARD AND ENFORCER OFConforming with article 7 paragraph (2) of Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the main task of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) as referred to in paragraph (1) is carried out through Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) including

assisting the government in safeguarding shipping and aviation against piracy and smuggling. The implementation of TNI’s task of securing shipping activities takes the form of a Joint Security Operation of the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes (Opsgab Pam ALKI) and Maritime Security Operations (Ops Kamla). The Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) is also tasked with the upholding of the law and maintaining security in the nation’s territorial seas in accordance with the

provisions of national law and international law which have been ratified in the form of law enforcement operations at sea including enforcing the law on the ALKI routes. Aside from the maritime aspect, ALKI (III) security is also carried out by air. The question arises, who should guard and enforce the ALKI (III)?

Safeguarding the ALKI (III) is not only the responsibility of the Indonesian Armed Forces, specifically the TNI AL and the Indonesian Air Force (TNI AU) as a single stakeholder, but it must also involve multi-stakeholders in line with the limits of capability and authority.

The ALKI (III) is located in the eastern waters of Indonesia which is dominated by open water and many gaps. This is the challenge. The geographical condition offers an opportunity and invites sea operators (both military and non-military) to sail through or not through the ALKI III (III B and III C), and even does not comply with any ALKI provision. This non-compliance of sea operators is often spotted and recognized (visual contact) by elements of the Indonesian Navy and Air Force. The infractions were caused by two main things, namely, first, several countries did not ratify the UNCLOS 1982 and, secondly, as an effort to cut the operational costs of the ship by shortening the track to its destination. On the other hand, formal legal in the context of state political decisions at the operational level between Government Regulation No. 36 of 2002 concerning the right to peaceful crossings in Indonesian waters with Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002 concerning the ALKI’s crossing rights and obligations is still not aligned and “lack” in legal terms.

Another nontrivial challenge is the limited availability of elements of the Navy, especially frigates (which have high-end operation and deterrent capabilities) and maritime patrol aircraft as well as elements of the Air Force both multi-purpose fighter aircraft, air surveillance aircraft and maritime patrol aircraft. The readiness of operating TNI elements is still not comparable between the vast area they have to cover and the high operational tasks and regional logistical support in maintaining and securing the sea area and the air space above the ALKI (III). Finally, the security of ALKI (III) has not been involving multi-stakeholders. These challenges caused the enforcement of ALKI (III) not as expected.

OPERATIONAL REALIZATIONSTHE establishment of the Combined Defense Area Command (Kogabwilhan) itself was formed based on Presidential Decree No. 27 of 2019 concerning the formation of a combined defense area command and status of 23 Military Resort Commands. Subsequently,


the task of Kogabwilhan is to take the preliminary action in the event of a conflict in the Kogabwilhan operational area both for Military War Operations and Military Operations Other Than War, to dissuade external and internal threats and restoration of state security disturbed by security disorders which are carried out according to the policy given by the Commander the TNI.

The Kogabwilhan III is headquartered in Timika, Papua, and is responsible for land areas (Maluku, North Maluku, Papua), sea areas (waters around Maluku, North Maluku, Papua and ALKI III B and III C along with surrounding waters) and airspace (areas above Maluku, North Maluku, Papua and ALKI III B and III C and the surrounding waters).

Even though it is considered a newly formed TNI Operational Main Command, the Kogabwilhan III moved quickly through the issuance of telegram from the III Combined Defense Area Commander (Pangkogabwilhan III) number TR/01/2020 dated January 1, 2020 regarding the implementation of the Operational Plan (RO) into Operational Orders (PO) for 13 types of TNI Combined Operations in eastern Indonesia. Among these are the Combined Safeguarding Operation for ALKI III B and III C (Fleet Command-III and Air Force Operations Command-III)

The Combined Safeguarding Operation of ALKI III B and III C which is operationalized by the Commander of the Fleet Command III as Commander of the ALKI III B and III C Combined Safeguarding Operation is one of the concerns of the Combined Area Defense Command III in carrying out efforts to safeguard, oversee and take action against violations of the ALKI (III ). Based on the analysis and anomalies found by the TNI Maritime Information Center in the period of April 2020, the Kogabwilhan III conducted operational control through the deployment of elements of Fleet Command III and the Air Force Operations Command III and got the identification/visual contact of four foreign commercial ships sailing between the 7th and 26th April, 2020, not going through theALKI (III), i.e.:

1. The Marshall Islands-flagged MV Summertime Dream, sailed from Tianjin (China) to Australia and taking the Pacific-Arafuru Sea route.

2. The Panama-flagged MV Innovation Way, sailed from Singapore to the Philippines and took ALKI III A route.

3. The Greece-flagged MV Double Fortune sailed from Huang Hua (China) to Amrun (Australia) taking the Halmahera Sea-Seram Sea (North Seram Island)-North Banda Sea-Aru Islands-Arafuru Sea route.

4. The Hong Kong-flagged MV Xin Yuan sailed from Qingdao (China) to Weipa (Australia) taking the Halmahera Sea-Seram Sea (north of Seram Island)-Banda Sea-North Aru Islands-Arafuru Sea route.

SPILL-OVER OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICTTHE South China Sea (SCS) issue has always been an attention-grabbing discussion by all groups due to the intricacy of the interests in the region to date. But in the midst of a world that is collectively drudging against the Covid-19 pandemic, the intensity of the SCS conflict is heating up again. This raises many fundamental questions, is this part of the grand scenario by each country concerned? To answer it certainly requires quite a long review.

On April 23, 2020, United States warships (USS America, USS Bunker Hill, USS Barry) and the Australian Anzac-class frigate HMAS Parramatta were present at the SCS to conduct joint training maneuvers and were reported to have faced Chinese warships. The presence of US and Australian surface combatants in the West Capella region as real support for a Malaysian oil drilling has been disrupted by Chinese vessels in recent times.

The situation in the SCS is indeed difficult to predict, but if you learn from the initial series of SCS conflicts that involved many countries in the SCS region or even outside the SCS as allies of both the conflicting parties, it corresponds to a time bomb that in the end will ignite. If the SCS conflict does not end and will prolong, and eventually a war between superpowers will break out, what will be Indonesia’s strategic move to get ahead?

Many parties still hope that the SCS conflict will not turn into an open war. The importance of maintaining peace and stability in the area should be upheld. Freedom of shipping and aviation by all interest groups involved in the disputes should respect and ensure international law. Indonesia as a non-claimant state, views that the spillover effect of the SCS conflict requires a its anticipation and readiness since the early stages, especially in the aspect of defense through TNI’s readiness in incessantly maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty.

It is enormously potential for Australian naval vessels to go through the ALKI (III) from their base in Sydney, Perth, or Darwin to join US warships in the SCS region through Philippine’s waters. On the other hand, if it were true that Australia would build a naval base in the RDTL region as stated by the Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison during his visit to Dili on Friday, 30 August 2019 that coincided with the 20th anniversary of Timor Leste’s independence, then this


would be a homework especially for the TNI, which implements a strategy to maintain and secure the ALKI (III) exclusively on the RI-RDTL-Australia borders or other waters.

Indonesia has a great potential to become the crossing area of the disputing powers by utilizing the trans-transit regime. The UNCLOS 1982 lists three types of foreign vessel crossing rights including right of innocent passage Article 52 (I), right of transit passage Article 3 (2), right of archipelagic sea lanes passage Article 53. Well, at least Indonesia should take “breaches” in the form of its attitudes to regional countries that will use ALKI (III) as the crossing of their ships, especially naval vessels, as an effort to prevent conflicts between countries in the region.

Tangible steps as a form of anticipation are political statements of the state as a neutral state should be immediately voiced from time-to-time and not in favor of any country. Indonesia as an archipelagic state that has power over the ALKI (III) should upheld the supremacy of international maritime law together with strengthening the ALKI (III) Combined Safeguarding Operation supported by the readiness of operational facilities along the ALKI (III) as early as possible.

STRATEGYCONDITIONS expected to realize the empowerment of the ALKI (III) as a path through which foreign ships and aircraft are always in compliance with

the provisions of ALKI (III) in accordance with the UNCLOS 1982 as ratified through Indonesian laws and regulations (positive Indonesian law ), among others are:

• Legal instruments that are related to ALKI (III) should provide legal force and strict and clear sanctions

• Control over the ALKI (III) should not only rests on the TNI/Indonesian Navy and Air Force through the TNI Combined Operation or merely a law enforcing operation, but must also include elements of ministeries/institutions related to security and other maritime surveillance that are able to play a convincing role in enforcing the ALKI (III) provisions and control

• The state budget, especially in terms of maritime and air defenses should be supported by adequate allocation as the main capital for the presence of elements of the TNI/TNI AL and TNI AU and should uphold the right political attitude and have a strong bargaining position in placing itself as a neutral state in anticipating the impacts of the SCS conflict, especially Indonesia’s position as the country that has power over the ALKI (III).

To strengthen the ALKI (III), strategies and efforts are needed. The first strategy is by strengthening the position of the ALKI starting from:

• The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Indonesian Embassy or the Indonesian


Consulate General should communicate and disseminate information to maritime associations or shipping company associations in each country as ALKI (III) users.

• Strengthening communications with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) through TNI’s synergy with related ministries/institutions

• The TNI Headquarters should provide input through a strategic study to the President of the Republic of Indonesia on the concept of applying a ship channel pricing rate system for foreign vessels

• A concept should be addressed to the Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the control system of the ALKI (III) lanes which are located on the Alor Island (ALKI IIIA) and the Leti Island (ALKI IIIB) which are integrated with TNI infrastructure facilities especially elements of the Navy for detection, identification, and enforcement of the law.

The second strategy is to strengthen the ALKI (III) regulatory instruments starting with:

• Proposing the revision of Law No. 17 of 1985 and the synchronization between Government Regulation No. 36 of 2002 with GR No. 37 of 2002 related to the bolstering of sanctions

• The TNI Headquarters should initiate focus group discussions as TNI’s concern in realizing the ALKI (III) enforcement.

The third strategy is by optimizing the control, guidance and enforcement systems through:

• Increasing the presence and development of the operational pattern of the elements of the TNI Combined Operations under the control of the Kogabwilhan III through the ALKI (III) Combined Safeguarding Operation pooled with other TNI Combined Operastions that are strongly correlated with the ALKI (III) routes.

• Integrating the TNI Combined Operations under the control of the Kogabwilhan II and III

• Deploying an ALKI (III) Integrated Security Operations involving the Kogabwilhan III-Fleet Command III-Air Force Operational Command III-Port Authorities-Indonesian Maritime Security Agency

• The TNI Headquarters provides ALKI (III) regular situation reports periodically to the President

of the Republic of Indonesia accompanied by copies to relevant ministries/institutions

• Increasing the development of TNI’s main equipment and weapons systems (ocean-going vessels, maritime patrol aircraft and fighter aircraft)

• The TNI Headquarters through the TNI Maritime Information Center bring about cooperation with the Indonesian Ministry of Transportation to create a public website that contains news updates about the ALKI (III)

• Developing and integrating sea level sensory systems in several ALKI (III) Choke Points

• Reinforcing the Rules of Engagement specifically for the ALKI (III)

• The TNI Headquarters together with the Indonesian Ministry of Transportation, the Maritime Security Agency and other relevant ministries/institutions should develope the ALKI (III) Integrated Security Procedure

• The TNI Headquarters should continue the collaboration (MoU) with the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency which ended in 2019 by completing the cooperation in the security sector of the ALKI (III)

• Establishing an ALKI Supervisory Coordinating Body (BAKORWAS-ALKI) consisting of all national stakeholders that have assets and the capability of control and enforcement in the ALKI (III) routes, including: the armed forces, the Maritime Security Agency, State Police, Ministry of Defense, Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Transportation and other related agencies.

The fifth strategy is to build the nation’s vision and perspective of the ALKI as a pillar of maritime sovereignty and the nation’s future, starting with:

• Strengthening knowledge about the Archipelagic Sea Lanes starting from junior high school level

• Massively publicizing or popularizing the ALKI pathways and positions and what the prospects are for the nation and how to maintain the ALKI pathways especially for people living on islands close to the ALKI through TNI public service sub-programs or empowering coastal village communities.


AN important moment in the history of the United Nations peacekeeping force occurred on May 12, 2014. At that time, Major General Kristin

Lund from Norway became the first woman to be appointed the Force Commander of a UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus.

Major General Lund’s appointment is the first major acknowledgement of the implementation of the year 2000 UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The resolution highlighted a shift in UN policy to engage more females in peacekeeping operations

around the world. It affirmed the role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, negotiations, peacekeeping, humanitarian

responses and post-conflict reconstruction. Further, it stressed the need to integrate a gender perspective in these areas, including in

peacekeeping operations.

The role of women in UN peacekeeping operations covers all police, military and

civilian levels, and women play a greater role in UN peacekeeping operations than in the past. In 1993,

only one percent of all uniformed personnel deployed were women. In 2012, women made up three percent of the military and ten percent of police personnel in UN peacekeeping operations. At present, women account for nearly 30 percent of international civilians working on peacekeeping and special protection missions.

GREAT VALUEPEACEKEEPING is a soldier-intensive business in which the quality of troops matters as much as the

quantity. It is not just soldiering under a different color helmet; it differs in kind from anything else

soldiers do. There are medals and rewards (mainly, the satisfaction of saving lives), but there are also casualties.

And no victories. It is not a risk-free enterprise. In Bosnia, mines, snipers, mountainous terrain, extreme weather conditions, and possible civil disturbances were major

By Commander Tuti Marwaty, S.H., M.H., M.Tr.Hanla (from Naqoura, Lebanon)



threats that had to be dealt with from the outset of the operation. Dag Hammarskjold once remarked, “Peacekeeping is a job not suited to soldiers, but a job only soldiers can do.”

Humanitarianism conflicts with peacekeeping and still more with peace enforcement. The threat of force, if it is to be effective, will sooner or later involve the use of force. For example, the same UN soldiers in Bosnia under a different command and mandate essentially turned belligerence into compliance overnight, demonstrating that a credible threat of force can yield results. Unlike the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the NATO-led Implementation Force was a military success and helped bring stability to the region and to provide an “environment of hope” in which a nation can be reborn. It is now up to a complex array of international civil agencies to assist in putting in place lasting structures for democratic government and the will of the international community to ensure a lasting peace.

To ensure that peace operations are effective and that senior leaders are prepared for both the daily challenges and the inevitable crises of peacekeeping, comprehensive leadership training is necessary. A gender perspective is of central importance to such training.

Female peacekeepers are of great value to peacekeeping missions worldwide. In April 2019, I was one of the female officers working for the armed forces globally participated in the UN Female Military Officers Course

(FMOC) in the Netherlands. The course is an initiative of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women—also known as UN Women—and is organized in close cooperation with the Chinese Peacekeeping Affair Center in Beijing. The Netherlands values such initiatives and financially supported the course.

The focus of the course was on female peacekeepers worldwide and how essential their influence and participation is for the success of such missions. The participants valued the all-female participant list which enabled them to share and discuss experiences and expectations at ease.

The course program consist of a wide variety of subjects. It covers generic subjects like the Principles of Peacekeeping—but also delves deeper in into topics specifically for women. For example, the module “Introduction to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence” focuses on sexual violence as a brutal form of physical and psychological warfare in conflict zones with roots in gender inequality. The persistence of such forms of violence undermines peace and security while shattering community and family ties.

To be able to help local people in conflict zones efficiently and to get a better idea of what’s going on within a community, it is necessary to encourage engagement across genders and age brackets. This means not only talking to the elderly men, but also the women—and the children. Many times female citizens

The author in front of two armored vehicles belonging to the Indonesian group of UN

peacekeepers in Lebanon


are not comfortable in sharing details of trauma with male officers—that ends up distorting the overview of peacekeeping missions.

For most women who are participating, this course is the first and probably the only time that they are participating in a course which is exclusive to women. Because there are only female officers sitting in class, you feel a very special and open atmosphere in which lots of these women feel freer to speak. Also, the course gives participants the opportunity to build up an international support network of women in the military and some are even being sent to the same mission.

The participation in this course will increase the chances for women to be deployed. It teaches them about all the issues they will be facing when they are being sent on a mission. Seventy-five percent of the participants of this course are being sent on mission. The more women are empowered through the FMOC, the better!

HOLISTIC APPROACHWITH an emphasis on scenario-based and roleplaying exercises, the range of skills and knowledge that the participants are trained on include communication techniques to interact with victims and address intimate or sensitive information; civil-military coordination; knowledge about the nature, physical and psychological consequences of violence against women in peacekeeping theaters, including sexual violence; knowledge of mandates and operational guidance on women, peace and security; early warning signs of conflict-related sexual violence; information/intelligence gathering to identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities; knowledge of child protection; how to operate in mixed military teams and with civilian colleagues from relevant components of the mission; service referrals for female survivors; and community outreach and expectations management; interview and screening techniques; and knowledge of gender-responsive peacekeeping in general.

The instructors’ team is a combination of military and civilian men and women led by a retired general with

experience in multiple peacekeeping operations. UN Women, through the Military Advisors of the Permanent Missions to the UN, sends a call for nominations to participants from major troop contributing countries (TCC) from all over the world. Candidates must be interested in and eligible for deployment in peace operations. Each course takes a maximum of 40 participants, and UN Women sponsors all the costs of the participation of candidates from the Global South, which represent a large majority of the largest TCC.

The UN has called for more female peacekeepers to enhance the overall holistic approach to current peacekeeping operations. There is clearly more work to be done to integrate more female peacekeepers into UN missions. More skilled and trained female peacekeepers can only be an asset to future peacekeeping operations. Through the FMOC, perhaps a new generation of blue-bereted women will be inspired to take on the immensely challenging role of peacekeeping.©

A female UN peacekeeper assists in the installing of a Premier Mobile Data Computer (PMDC) on a Elli-class frigate operated by the

Hellenic Navy in Beirut, Lebanon,

Woman’s Day celebration with the Chief Of Staff of UNIFIL, Brigadier General Frédéric Boucher on 8 March 2020.


Indonesia’s position makes it having the power over four of the world’s nine Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), namely:

a. Indonesia as a strategic international shipping junction;

b. Indonesia as a strategic fishing ground; c. Indonesia as a strategic potential

bussines; and d. Indonesia as a strategic key partner to

major countries.

This has brought logical consequences regarding the defense and security of the country at sea, namely the emergence of threats and disturbances that affect the concept and strategy of national defense. In the attachment of Law No. 17 of 2007 concerning the National Long-Term

WITH its geographical conditions and the natural resources it contains, Indonesia becomes the Center of Gravity (CoG) and a Global Supply Chain System. This causes Indonesia to face innumerable threats, disturbances and obstacles that have implications on maritime security in the region. For this reason, the support of a strong defense and security system is a vital requirement. The government must also change the pattern of defense buildup which is not only concerned with land but must also put emphasis on the sea.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN IMPLEMENTING INDONESIA’S MARITIME SECURITY

By Navy Lieutenant M. Imam Chadafi, S. Tr.Han, M.M.


Development Plan of 2005-2025 it is explained that marine resources cannot be utilized optimally because of several things, including:

a. No maritime boundary arrangement yet;b. Conflicts in the use of space at sea;c. No guarantees on security and safety at sea;d. Existence of regional autonomy that causes the

absence of a shared understanding of marine resource management;

e. A limited ability of human resources in managing marine resources; and

f. Absence of research on marine science and technology.

Indonesia’s potential can be both a strength and a challenge with a high level of vulnerability and can disrupt security stability that can pressurize the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Indonesia’s very open position provides opportunities for other countries to enter Indonesian territory by sea and carry out activities in the territory with various impacts, so it needs to be re-considered for maritime security conditions.

As an archipelago, Indonesia is required to have a navy capable of protecting the entire territorial waters from threats and disturbances arising from within and outside the country. The Indonesian Navy or TNI AL as an integral part of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) plays a major part in the defense of the country at sea, carries out its duties based on state policies and political decisions to uphold national sovereignty, maintain the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as well as protect the entire nation and all of Indonesia’s homeland from threats and disruption to the integrity of the nation and state through the implementation of Military Operations for War and Military Operations Other Than War.

Problems in the North Natuna Sea compel Indonesia to be firm. Chinese unilateral claim about the nine dash-lines and Vietnamese illegal fishing in the undelimited area (Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone) are proof that the threat faced by Indonesia today is not only a military threat, but has expanded to non- military threats as well.

Besides problems in the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia also faces other threats, such as piracy, pollution and destruction of marine ecosystems, conflicts over management of marine resources and smuggling. These threats have an impact on the country’s economy because it lost at least IDR300 trillion every year.

Law enforcement is very necessary so that maritime security in the Indonesian sea area can be realized, but law enforcement cannot stand alone without any law-making functions. Law enforcement is also influenced

by regulations produced by the government and the House of Representatives (DPR). It is hoped that the resulting regulation can adjust the involvement of each stakeholder involved in security and enforcement in Indonesian waters. Law enforcement will be fulfilled if the pillars of the law are carried out in a good manner, namely:

a. Good legal instruments;b. Rugged law enforcement officers;c. Adequate equipment;d. Law-aware society; ande. Supporting bureaucracy.

Law enforcement at sea cannot be separated from the enforcement of state sovereignty at sea, so that a definition can be made, that law enforcement at sea is the process of arresting and investigating a case that arises as a result of violations of international and national laws, so that the implementation of sovereignty enforcement and law enforcement at sea can be carried out simultaneously.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENTTHE basic meaning of the rules of engagement are directives for the use of force and attacks from military units to deal with hostilities. Another meaning, rules of engagement are operational orders or instructions to govern, both for the use of force and action that can be explained as provocative actions.

The rules of engagement made for the lowest level of command, commanders and troops are rules governing and the use of force and actions that can potentially influence or regulate the escalation of the use of force or combat in the area of operation. NATO states the rules of engagement as “directive to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner in which forces or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied” (Military Decision, 2003 ), i.e. instructions for military forces including individuals who determine about circumstances, conditions, degrees and ways or actions that might be explained as provocative actions.

Whereas the United States Armed Forces states the rules of engagement as “directive issued by a military authority that delineates the circumstances and limitations under which the United States forces will initiate and continue combat engagement with other forces encountered” (Joint Publication 1-04 , 2010), i.e. directives issued by the military authority that describe the circumstances and boundaries under the power of the United States will begin and or continue the war faced with other forces. In other words, rules of engagement are operational orders or instructions to govern, both for the use of force and action that can be explained as provocative actions. They display and reflect operational


and political policy guidelines based on operations or tasks they issue and are certainly legally valid so that no one will give freedom except those that can be used legally both at national and international levels under ambient circumstances.

The rules of engagement turn out to have a dominant influence on political, economic and military factors. In this case it is in line with the factors that are the pillars supporting the national security strategy. The rules of engagement are the answer, since it allows commanders of elements and units in the field to take actions and decisions for they are protected by a legal basis both national and international law. The rules of engagement in an operation must also be adjusted to where the problem is located. Different places have their own different risks. The rules of engagement have a very important role in a marine security operation in an area sea operators have the difficulty of understanding the dos and the don’ts. Following are functions of the rules of engagement.

a. Will not violate armed conflicts in peacetime;b. Will not violate international and national laws

related to maritime security;c. Minimize collateral damage;d. Avoid unnecessary victims;e. No losses occuring in the field;f. Commanders can make firm and proportional

decisions;g. Maintaining the country’s authority in the eyes of the

international world;h. Can proportionally protect national interests;i. Describe the state of a strategic environment and

the limitations in the strength of a country’s armed forces;

j. As a guideline when carrying out operations;k. Explain the rules that elucidate the authority

possessed by a KRI (ship prefix of the Indonesian Navy) Commander, for example the provisions in carrying out inspections, the shooting provisions which are divided for warnings, paralyzing or deadly, and many other rules.

The rules of engagement have a military nature which is of itself and follows the logic of its role in a military context which has a legal basis and is politically accepted.

In addition to the military nature, another attribute of rules of engagement is its concise nature, that is, things that do not make sense or cannot be used by those who carry out operations need not be included.

A legal nature, namely as a basic and vital element and helps secure the legality of the use of force given in operations. When the rules of engagement require review and input from legal advisors, they do not have to consider legal documents or specific areas of their legal advisors.

Furthermore, the third characteristic is political nature, for the military always carries out political objectives and forces are spread separately or specifically to achieve political objectives. So it can be concluded that the rules of engagement are the result of political leaders in power and responsible for operations. Based on the deepening of the theory and research that has been carried out, it turns out that rules of engagement must be supplemented by a risk register.

When linking the influence of a risk register to the rules of engagement, there is a fairly close correlation, that is, the rule of engagement is the result compiled by political leaders in power and responsible for operations. The presence of a risk register as a component of the rules of engagement is considered crucial because if risks are not included, a leader cannot predict the steps, limits and decisions that will be stipulated in the rules of engagement.

The existence of trust and capability has provided the greatest opportunity for the birth of a risk register as the fifth component, because in the process there has been a discussion between military operations experts, military operations practitioners with legal expert staff and operational units. It is expected that by obtaining information related to the risks that have been summarized in the form of a risk register, the political leadership in charge and responsible for operations can draw up rules of engagement according to the conditions and needs of the commanders of elements and units in the area of operation. Following are the components of the rules of engagement.

a. Policy;b. Diplomacy;c. Operations;d. Law); ande. Risk register.

China Coast Guard ship seen from an Indonesian Naval ship during a patrol north of the Natuna Islands, Indonesia, January 11, 2020


Risk registers reported by commanders of elements and units are expected to be important information and specifically provide a more detailed tactical picture to explain what risks will be faced by actors in the area of operation. With the important information regarding rehearsal, rules of engagement are needed in accordance with the latest conditions in the field so that it can reduce, suppress and eliminate existing risks.

Moreover, with rules of engagement, commanders of both elements and units can quickly and accurately make decisions when faced with difficult circumstances and short time. This is a very crucial decision because if the decision made is not right, it will affect national stability and can even increase the escalation and tension between related parties.

MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY MANAGEMENTSTRATEGY management is the science of the formulation, implementation and evaluation of cross-functional decisions that enable an organization to achieve its objectives. Explained in detail, strategy management is used to recognize and analyze the environment, formulate strategies, implement strategies and evaluate and control. The following is a comprehensive explanation of strategy management.

a. Strategy management is realized in a large-scale planning, covering all components in the organizational environment as outlined in a strategic plan, then translated into operational planning and work programs;

b. Strategic plans are oriented towards reaching of future objectives;

c. Vision, mission, and strategy selection that produces the main strategy and long-term strategic objectives are the guidelines in formulating the strategic plan;

d. The strategic plan is translated into an operational plan that contains operational programs, medium term objectives and top management decisions;

e. Determination of the strategic plan and operational plan must involve top management for it is very fundamental in the implementation of all missions to maintain, and develop medium and long term existences; and

f. Implement strategies in programs to achieve goals through management functions that include organizing, implementing, budgeting and control.

A strategy management has several stages, namely:

a. Formulating the strategy, including activities to develop the organization’s vision and mission, identify external opportunities and threats, determine internal strengths and weaknesses, set long-term goals, make a number of alternative strategies and choose specific strategies to use;

b. Implementating the strategy, through setting targets, making policies, allocating resources so that the formulation of the strategy can be carried out;

c. Implementation of the strategy includes developing a culture that supports the strategy, creating an effective structure, developing and utilizing information systems; and

d. Evaluating the strategy by reviewing internal and external factors, measuring performance and taking corrective actions.

Based on the meaning and elucidation of strategy management, it can be concluded that the formulation of rules of engagement is a form of management of the Government of Indonesia’s strategy to strengthen the maritime security of Indonesia. From the regulation aspect, maritime security is closely related to the laws and regulations governing the sea and all activities related to the sea. Existing regulations have given institutional authority to enforce law at sea in accordance with the contents stipulated in the Law, but regulations in the field of maritime have not been implemented effectively and efficiently. Due to frequent conflicts in legal arrangements and responsible institutional authorities at sea, it is necessary to harmonize the legal system and legislation to strengthen maritime security in Indonesian territorial and jurisdictional waters.

The formulation and establishment of rules of engagement is a solution to maritime threats faced by Indonesia. As the threats that occur at sea have been going on for a very long time and involve many parties, not only the state but also certain organizations, so that illegal crimes at sea have become transnational crimes. With rules of engagement, the Indonesian Navy as a law enforcement outfit at sea will be more professional in carrying out its tasks, because it has been arranged in a clear and applicable manner. Into the bargain, the operational readiness of the Navy’s forces will increase, because there is no doubt for the leadership or Commander of the KRI to serve in the area of operation.©

Members of the Indonesian Navy holding crew members of a Chinese trawler intercepted in Indonesian waters. Belawan, North Sumatra, April 23, 2016


SUSTAINING the conservation of coral reefs is very important for coral reefs have a major role in maintaining the stability of marine biota culture, especially fish. Also plays a role in protecting the coast from degradation, abrasion and erosion.

Therefore, an event was held in Indonesia recently themed “Garuda di Lautku, Lestari Terumbu Karangku, Sejahtera Bangsaku” (The Garuda in My Seas, My Coral Reefs will be Preserved, and my Nation wil Prosper). It was successfully organized on March 18, 2020 on the seabed of Kodingareng Keke, South Sulawesi. The event was carried out in order to promote conservation activities to save coral reefs in Indonesia so that they would not become extinct and ready to become a national and even a global coral reef laboratory, as an effort to restore the marine ecosystem.

Results of the coral reef transplantation is appears to be very beautiful when seen from the air as it resembles

the Garuda Pancasila bird gripping on the seabed. The Garuda bird-shaped transplant media was assembled and planted at a shallow depth of 6 meters and deepest was 18 meters with a transplanting frame made of steel 40 x 40 meters with a wing span of 1 meter, the Garuda’s head and a 2-meter ribbon and a 3-meter shield.

This event has carved a new history for Indonesia because for the first time a giant Garuda bird with a sturdy iron frame as a medium for the transplantation of coral reefs appeared on the seabed of Indonesia, in Kodingareng Keke Island.

The national scaled event was initiated by the Indonesian Navy in the operational area of the Main Nany Base VI Makassar in collaboration with the South Sulawesi Provincial Government, the Makassar Municipal Government and the Regional Leadership Coordination Forum and the people of South Sulawesi, especially millennials, by focusing on conservation

CORAL REEF CONSERVATIONIN THE SOUTHSULAWESI SEA

The Garuda bird-shaped transplanting frame made of steel


efforts through coral reef transplantation techniques. The transplantation steel frames took the the form of a Garuda bird, which is the national emblem of the Republic of Indonesia. It represents the Indonesian people faithfully guarding the independence of the nation. The Garuda bird also glued the unity of the Indonesian nation.

The Garuda bird grips the national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Old Javanese phrase translated as “unity in diversity”), that has inspired millions of Indonesians to maintain the unity and integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). In addition, the NKRI cannot be disjointed from the Djuanda Declaration which places the sea as one regional unit that binds all islands in the archipelago into one unit, namely the Republic of Indonesia.

The Kodingareng Keke Island was chosen as the place of the event, due to its geographical position which is right in the middle of the Indonesian Archipelago and is icon of South Sulawesi’s marine tourism worth promoting globally.

CORAL TRANSPLANTSIN the Coral Stock Center (CSR) technical guidelines it is mentioned that coral transplantation is an attempt to transplant or cut live corals to be planted elsewhere or in places where corals have been damaged, as a rehabilitation effort.

At present, coral transplants have also been further developed to support sustainability. Coral transplants are also used to make dive sites become more scenic and attractive, thus boosting an increase in the number of tourists.

One of the purposes of making a Coral Stock Center is to make a center where elementary, secondary, and high school students and college students and the

general public can study coral biology.

The transplanting of coral reefs with steel frames in the form of a Garuda bird on the seabed of Kodingareng Keke Island will have a positive impact to restore the surrounding marine ecosystem in coordination with the Makassar Coastal and Marine Resource Management Center (BPSPL) on how to plant coral reefs.

Commander of the Main Navy Base VI, First Admiral Hanarko Djodi Pamungkas as Chairperson of the Organizing Committee stressed that the “Garuda di Lautku” event besides protecting marine ecosystems was also intended to enhance nationalism for the nation’s next generation, to promote values of the Pancasila on our oceans, encourage development of national marine tourism and awaken cultural potential in the millennial era and local wisdom of South Sulawesi as a national asset.

“The spirit of of the Garuda di Lautku must spread throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Since it was held in Makassar City in October 2019, this big event can spread its wings to various parts of the archipelago,” said the Commander.

SERIES OF ACTIVITIESVARIOUS activities were carried out during the event, including free health services, breadfruit tree planting, social communication, social services in a so-called Creative Development of Maritime Potential activity, Saturday-Sunday Saka Bahari Scouting Camp, open ship KRI Dewa Ruci and KRI Bima Suci, cleaning the environment of Kodingareng Keke Island, and a Bank Indonesia currency exchange program for the island’s coastal communities.

Competitions were also held to enliven the “Garuda di Lautku” event, from a photo contest to the ornamental boat race to entertain the general public which was held on January 15, 2020 at the Losari Beach Pier in Makassar.

Two Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) from the KRI Teluk Ende (TLE-517) support and transport the divers of the “Garuda di Lautku” to plant the Coral Reef Transplantation module.

The planting of the Garuda bird-shaped coral reef media by Navy frogmen


The Losari Beach which was previously quiet for the cloudy weather was suddenly crowded by participants of the ornamental boat race and photo contest ready to compete. Not only that, many residents, from both Makassar and from outside the city came to watch. The the boats are decorated in such a way that they look so charming and grabbed the attention of the people in Losari Beach.

Various models and boat decorations are displayed by the participants of the ornamental boat race, ranging from colorful boat paints to various colorful flags, streamers, and pennons.

During the race, the community was also entertained by drum corps of midshipmen from the Makassar Merchant Marine Polytechnic (PIP).

The Navy Main Base VI also held a joint prayer followed by cutting a yellow rice cone as a sign of gratitude for the grand launching of the “Garuda di Lautku”, located in front of the Jami’atul Bahari Mosque in the Command Headquarters of the Navy Main Base VI, on January 17, 2020. The grand launching was the beginning of the “Garuda di Lautku” campaign. Achievements that have been made by the Commander of the Navy Main Base VI Commander and members of the organizing committee were amazing.

Thousands of lanterns were flown during the grand launch of the “Garuda di Lautku” campaign around the Wisma Negara Center Point of Indonesia (CPI) on Jalan Metro Tanjung Bunga, Makassar City, South Sulawesi, on the night of January 17, 2020. Thousands of people of Makassar City also participated in the release of the lanterns that immediately illuminated the sky of Makassar.

The enthusiasm of the people of Makassar City was seen just before the release of thousands of these

lanterns. Residents were seen all over the streets and around Wisma Negara which is also located not far from the Losari Beach in Makassar.

The sky of Makassar City that night looked breath-taking with the lanterns. Invited guests that attended the grand launching of the “Garuda di Lautku” campaign and the public seemed fascinated by the beauty for this happened for the first time in Makassar. The release of thousands of lanterns is the closing event of the grand launching of the “Garuda di Lautku”.

Millennial style attractions livened up a band parade with hundreds of guitarists and other musicians at the Pavilion of the City of Makassar in Losari Beach, lining up to form a Garuda bird to accompany uplifting songs. The local Padupa Dance, the Four Ethnic Dance and Cultural Parade were also staged.

The grand launching of the “Garuda di Lautku” that was presented in millennial style was successful in generating the nationalistic spirit of the Indonesian youth, as evidenced by the attendance of thousands of people jampacking the Wisma Negara building with young people from various circles among them.

The event was widely reported by various mass media and even viral on online media and social media such as Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and Youtube so that it received a very positive response from the larger community, especially millennials. This symbolizes the love for the sea which is based on the spirit of diversity and national defense.

The coral reef transplanting movement that was held was not just a symbolic event, but is a real continuous action in preserving nature and of course this had a positive impact in restoring marine ecosystems as well as awakening the national spirit and encouraging marine tourism.©

Coral reefs in Kodingareng Keke Island’s seabed


HUMAN Resources (HR) is the most essential asset in an organization for it has an extremely strategic value compared to equipment, technology and systems contained in the organization. The empowerment of HR emphasizes “empowerment” which generally means “more powerful than ever, both in terms of authority, responsibility and individual abilities possessed”.

The empowerment of HR is related to trust, motivation, decision-making and passing the barriers between management and existing human resources. Empowerment enables soldiers to participate in decision-making, helping them get out of trouble in a stagnant mindset to take risks and try something new.

In order to realize the empowerment, there are several approaches for application, namely Enabling, Empowering, Protecting, Supporting, and Fostering.

The development of the existing situation at the national, regional and global level has forced people to get out of their comfort zones to be able to deal with current situations and conditions. Changing times have

influenced the patterns and ways of thinking of people to be able to survive in the current situation.

As the second largest archipelago in the world, Indonesia has enormous homework, especially related to securing its territorial waters and natural resources at sea. Hence it must build the strength of the Navy to face challenges, threats, obstacles and disturbances that exist both from within and outside the country.

The rejuvenation and improvement of the quantity and quality of the main equipment and weapon systems of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), especially the Navy (TNI AL), must be well-adjusted with the development of the capabilities of Navy personnel to be able to maneuver all the latest defense equipment equipped with advanced technology. In a state address delivered by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Ir. Joko Widodo said that: “Our vision for 2045 is that Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product reaches seven trillion US dollars and Indonesia already enters the top five world economies with poverty approaching zero percent.”

IMPROVING EXCELLENT HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE INDONESIAN NAVY

By Commander M. Sati Lubis, S.T., M.Sc., CHRMP


This is in line with the National Medium-Term Development Plan IV (RPJMN IV, 2020-2024), which is accelerating development by emphasizing the construction of a solid economic structure based on competitive advantage in various regions supported by qualified and competitive human resources.

One important aspect that supports increased economic growth is the realization of stable defense and security. In order to realize a strong Navy, the Chief of the Indonesian Navy, Admiral Yudo Margono, S.E., M.M., is committed to develop Indonesian Navy personnel to become superior and professional human resources who are resilient in facing all threats.

INDIVIDUAL RESILIENCEAS an organization that has a strong identity and culture, the Navy has the “Trisila TNI Angkatan Laut” (three precepts of the Indonesian Navy, i.e. Discipline, Hierarchy, and Military Honor) motto, which has always been the identity and principle that is adhered to by all members of the Navy in carrying out all their duties and so that their actions and attitudes reflect the characteristics of a Navy soldier. The three precepts can be said to be an organizational culture that can maintain and enhance the resilience of an individual member of the Navy so that he or she always runs and serves within the corridor.

Based on the meaning, individual resilience is the basic foundation of family, environmental and regional resiliences that support national resilience. National resilience, in the form of the ability, tenacity and resilience of a nation to ensure its survival in realizing the glory of the nation and state, is very dependent on the resilience of the individuals involved in a state life.

The concepts of individual and national resilience are not very popular compared to economic or political development, even though this is a very basic thing that determines the progress of a nation. Individual resilience or personal resilience is that the individual as God’s creation must have the attitude and strength as well as the ability to face and overcome all kinds of challenges, threats, obstacles and disturbances both coming from inside as well as outside.

Knowing broadly the elements of the human personality will help us determine how to increase personal resilience with the right efforts and processes in life. Personal or individual resilience is a dynamic condition or appearance of a person consisting of tenacity, resilience, and ability to develop self-strength in the face of threats, challenges, obstacles and disturbances that come from inside and outside him that endanger his integrity, identity, and existence to achieve goals and ideals according to the personal vision that they have. There are several efforts to improve personal resilience, namely through education, teaching and training, the development of self-discipline, training in discipline and independence, having a personal

vision, training in healthy living habits physically and spiritually to become meaningful human beings in the process of regional/national development.

There are two factors that affect the individual resilience of members of the Indonesian Navy, namely external and internal factors.

External factors are factors that originate from outside oneself or an individual. This factor includes the surrounding environment including those closest to you. External factors that spark the emergence of social problems are natural factors, population factors, location factors, economic factors, environmental factors and social factors. There are a number of things that affect a soldier’s individual endurance, where in the present condition of individual resilience the main concern is the issue of Human Resources, Welfare and Performance.

Of the three issues raised there are things that affect and come from outside individuals and organizations, among other things the advances in science and technology. The community plays a major role in the development of science and technology. In addition to providing a lot of positive influences and benefits, the development of science and technology also give negative impacts. In everyday life the negative impacts have been felt and eventually become commonplace for each individual who has started to being absorbed in their respective preoccupation. Faced with the current conditions in which the equipment in naval vessels has applied the latest technology, reliable personnel who are able to use the equipment are certainly needed, and it is our common responsibility. A warship commander is responsible for carrying out the advancement of personnel both at the base and even more so during operations so that the main tasks and objectives of any operation can be achieved.

Indonesian Navy and U.S. Navy officers work through a freedom of navigation exercise during a legal training symposium. The exercise is part of Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT).


Internal factors are factors that originate from within a person or individual itself. Internal factors that affect the individual resilience of Navy soldiers include personnel training patterns, schools and courses, and health services.

EMPOWERING THE CAPABILITIES OF NAVY PERSONNELIN the framework of empowering the capabilities of Navy personnel, empowerment of human capital must be carried out. Literally, human capital is knowledge, expertise, ability and skills so as to make Navy soldiers as capital or assets that are very

strategic for the organization. A human capital then can be defined as a unique unit of expertise, skills and knowledge.

In the context of existing organizational culture, good relations or kinship become one of the important factors as motivator for soldiers to increase their ability to work and develop themselves.

Good communication and an effective organizational structure will reinforce the soldiers. The development and strengthening of knowledge and skills in accordance with their respective fields are needed, especially in classifying abilities and competencies at the technical to strategic levels. Then, soldiers must also have analytical skills. The leadership has an obligation to develop the capabilities of his or her soldiers in accordance with their respective fields

Protection of soldiers is an important aspect, so that all soldiers feel they have the same opportunity without discrimination or unfair competition between soldiers.

Support can be given by providing motivation and opportunity as well as openness to communicate between leaders and subordinates, so that a good two-way relationship occurs.

Leadership style is an important key to realize good maintenance. Each leader has a different art in how to lead; giving examples is the best leadership style. What must be avoided is the presence of vacant positions and functions in an organizational structure both in operational units up to the leadership echelon. Vacant positions require one person to hold two positions concurrently that may open opportunities for weak maintenance systems in an organization.

35 Navy personnel complete a special education for officers in the Navy’s Doctrine, Education and Training Training Command

(Kodiklatal)

The 4th Armada Jaya training of the Indonesian Navy involved thousands of soldiers and various defense equipment


THE end of World War II apparently did not end conflicts between many countries in the world. Instead of returning to peace and order, the world has become a field of endless chaos. The emergence of two global powers, the US and the USSR, resulted in a number of countries and nations divided. One of them is Korea. After a declaration of war was broadcast throughout the country by Radio Pyongyang, on June 25, 1950, North Korea launched a surprise attack on South Korea. The episode that day was connected to a series of events five years earlier.

The Yalta Conference, held 4-11 February 1945, resulted in being the approval of the Soviet Union to enter the war in Asia against Japan. The Soviet Union launched an attack on Japanese forces on August 8, 1945. The attack of Soviet troops through the Korean Peninsula penetrated Japanese defenses, eventually reaching the 38th parallel.

After six days of fighting, the Soviet Union came out a victor. On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered to Allied forces provided that Japanese troops in the 38th Parallel capitulated to the Soviet Union, while Japanese troops on the south side of the 38th Parallel laid down arms to US forces. This became the basis for the division of Korea, so that the 38th Parallel became the demarcation line between North and South Korea.

The Korean War that ensued was not limited to a war between North and South Korea. Both parties were supported by their allies that rallied around during the war. Aware of the Soviet Union being behind North Korea,

A REALIST’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE KOREAN WARBy Marine Colonel Pangestu Widiatmoko



the United States decided to augment South Korea. China then also entered the war on the North’s side.

This article discusses the attitudes of non-Korean stakeholders that fought along in the Korean War, namely the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and their realistic perspectives on the reasons they were involved in the war. The author also highlights the relevance of this event to the current Indo-Pacific strategic environment. According to Dunne and Schmidt (2004), realists argue that the basic structure of international relations is anarchy in which independent sovereign states consider themselves to be their own supreme authority and do not recognize the superior power above them.

THE UNITED STATESAFTER World War II, the United States became apprehensive about the spread of communism, especially by the Soviet Union. In the view of the United States, the Soviet-backed North Korean attack was to expand communism. Hence, the US assisted South Korea. On the other hand, South Korea then was politically unstable and militarily unprepared, so South Korea had to seek assistance from other countries.

Events in the late 1940s and early 1950s also influenced US involvement in the Korean War. The atomic bomb test by the Soviet Union in 1949 ended US monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons. The interference of the Soviet Union in Greece and Turkey also caused the US to increase its assistance through the Marshall Plan to prevent the dissection of Europe and prevent the spread of communism. Internally, the US government was also under pressure to carry out its commitment to prevent the spread of communism.

The 1949 Chinese revolution that brought the Communist Party to power and all together expelled the Nationalists to Formosa (Taiwan) was also one of the triggers. Consequently, the Korean War created opportunities for the US to compete against the Soviet Union, while simultaneously carrying out its moral responsibilities in the fight against communism.

On June 27, 1950, President Truman assured his staff that if the United States did not take the fight now, “no one knows what they will do” (Anon., N.d.). To justify the intervention, Truman ensured that the action was within the framework of the United Nations by getting

its support.

THE SOVIET UNIONSOVIET’S involvement in the Korean War was very strong, despite opposition at the time. The Soviet contribution was imperative: it provided diplomatic support, strategic and tactical planning—including for the invasion of South Korea, as well as critical logistical support. Chinese and North Korean fighter pilots also underwent training from the Soviet Air Force.

Campbell’s research led him to conclude that the Soviet leadership was characterized by strong realist thinking on issues of national interest. As an initial stage, they agreed on North Korea’s plan to attack South Korea, and pushed for a prolongation of the war during the intermediary phases. But they then sought all possible means to end the war when it became a burden to the post-Stalin foreign policy of Soviet Union.

Among the leaders of the three communist countries—the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, Stalin was the strongest. He was the main decision maker who had full authority to decide whether South Korea should be attacked or not. Compatible with the US, the successful Chinese communist revolution had an impact on the decision made by the Soviets to give the green light for North Korea to launch an attack.

The emergence of a new communist force compelled the Soviet Union to re-evaluate its Far Eastern strategic policies (Campbell, 2014: 8). Another possible reason for the Soviets to support the war is to fight America’s “containment policy” to stop them from gaining influence outside their borders.

CHINAA meeting between North Korean, Soviet and Chinese leaders was held before the attack, but China had no plans to put its oar in the Korean War. However, China unhesitatingly joined in when US forces pushed to the north of the 38th Parallel which, at the time, was a North

North Korean troops backed by Soviet-made tanks advance through Seoul in June 1950 a few days after the invasion began.

Soldiers from the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division in action near the Ch’ongch’on River, 20 November 1950



Korean territory, and then moved towards a Chinese territory in Manchuria.

When US troops moved towards the Yalu River on the Chinese-North Korean border, China saw it as a threat to its national security. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese People’s Volunteer Army troops crossed the Yalu River into North Korea.

Apart from making sure of it’s sovereignty, there were other contributing factors that led China to intervene: shared communist ideology with North Korea and the Soviet Union, the geo-strategic position of China adjacent to Korea, historical connections and the image of the US which is notorious for its efforts to stem communist forces. Although US forces had superior material capability, based on decades of experience conducting protracted war, Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, decided to intervene in the Korean War anyway, with the belief that the CPVA would be able to defeat technologically advanced enemy through superior will and morale (Boose, 1998).

Negotiations were conducted throughout the war but were hardly effective in reducing the conflict. After a series of talks, both sides were finally settled on an armistice. Hostilities ceased on July 27, 1953 when the United States, the People’s Republic of China and North Korea signed a ceasefire agreement. Although the then-South Korean President, Syngman Rhee, declined signing, he promised to respect the ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, tensions on the Korean Peninsula still remain ingrained.

Major casualties were suffered by both sides until the war ended on July 27, 1953. The US lost 36,914 men, whereas South Korea 415,005 men. North Korea, according to the US Department of Defense, lost two million soldiers, which was quite a large number for a three-year war (Dewi, n.d.). Like preceding wars, no one came out a victor—the one who got ahead in triumphing over its opponent must suffer huge losses too. The hope that the cessation of hostilities between both parties could bring peace to the Korean Peninsula did not become a reality.

THE ASIA-PACIFIC ENVIRONMENTTHE current strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region is still shaped by some of the long-term effects of the Korean War. First, the US still plays an important security role in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in providing a security umbrella for its allies. South Korea

Chinese soldiers from 348th Regiment assaulting positions held by South Korean troops

Delegates sign the Korean Armistice Agreement in P’anmunjŏm, July 27, 1953

may economically be far ahead of North Korea, but it is exceedingly reliant on the US for its security. North Korea, on the other hand, is self-determined, not dependent on other countries. In fact, North Korea has been able to make itself a major threat to major countries such as the US, Russia and China through the development of their nuclear weapons.

The second factor is the rise of China as one of the great powers in the world. America’s misperception of China is also evident from its assumption that China, with its smaller military capabilities, will not take military action. In the Korean War, for the first time in history, the Chinese People’s Voluntary Army operated outside their jurisdiction and exceeded the expectations of every participant of the war—it can be done once again if they want it.

Third, apart from relations between the two Koreas, relations between several countries are currently at the same stage as in post-Korean conflicts. An example of this is the relationship between North Korea and Japan—because Japan gave full support to US troops in the war, Japan-North Korea relations remained unstable.

To sum up, in the Neo-Classical’s realist view, as a self-governing actor, the state always prioritizes its existence and has the potential to comport itself differently from other countries based on their own national interests. This has some bearing on a number of factors such as: the international situation, the domestic situation, the perception of the ruling elite, and the ability to maximize the power or ability of the state manifested in the form of a foreign policy. Beyond doubt, each country’s foreign policy is solely aimed at achieving national interests.©


THE question of how the future of naval intelligence—as well as from other services in the armed forces—is almost the same as what a naval intelligence’s mission really is for lay people in the navy itself: Covered in fog!

In the current so-called Disruption era, or in today’s style of information warfare, with a variety of information milling about in various media—traditional and contemporary, prodding the correct information with disinformation or misinformation, adding to the burden of naval intelligence’s tasks with multilayered analytic criticism.

Naval intelligence must now be prepared to take to the fleet vital skills necessary in support of traditional combat operations, irregular warfare and other critical tenets of a nation’s maritime strategy. In today’s navy, the business of naval intelligence is conducted by a selective cadre of personnel, both officers, enlisted men, as well as civilian professionals—a community that is increasingly in demand in an increasingly complex and dangerous world.

Navies in the world are today compelled to adapt quickly to assure they expand their capability and capacity to provide intelligence support to growing irregular warfare operations, while at the same time strengthening intelligence support to traditional war-fighting missions.

TECHNOLOGY OVERREACHTHE role of naval intelligence is unique, acting as the eyes and ears of the navy. According to Naval Doctrine

Publication 2 (United States Department of the Navy, 1994), naval intelligence is to furnish insights in both peace and war, estimates of situations, and forecast likely adversary courses of action. In addition to developing estimates and forecasts for the naval chain of command, it “provides indications and warning, cuing for surveillance efforts, and discrimination between friendly, neutral and potentially hostile forces. It gives the commander, their staff, and subordinate commands the information they need to plan and execute combat action, and to evaluate the results.” The role of naval intelligence is set to grow.

The growing societal reliance on cyber technologies has increased exposure to dangerous sources of information warfare threats. Navy leaders must be aware of the diversity of potential attacks, including from high-tech espionage, organized crime, perception battles, and attacks from ordinary hackers or groups sponsored by nation-states.

Technology has enabled faster communications, the ability to distribute information over a global network, and the collection of data at a historically unprecedented level. However, what happens when that system goes down—as the intelligence community has experienced with classified and unclassified networks—or a new command takes weeks or months simply to get a new member an account to start their work? More importantly, does more technology make for better analysts?

Today’s naval intelligence environment runs the risk of

THE FUTURE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

By Arifin Anto DS



technology overreach or the inability to properly attend to legacy systems. In his book The Last Navigator: A Young Man, an Ancient Mariner, the Secrets of the Sea (2009), Stephen D. Thomas relates how he learned to navigate an outrigger canoe using only the elements—the ocean, the current, the birds—from island elders. It was a skill that had been used to populate most Pacific islands long before Columbus reached the new world. Basic knowledge and skills are necessary as a back-up when technology fails. If an electromagnetic pulse affected systems, could operators find non-technical methods to achieve their mission?

This single-minded, over-adherence to technology is like governing a system of assimilating new technologies, demanding compliance but with an addiction to technology that renders the system unable to be reasoned with. It fails to understand the potential consequences, which could render the system vulnerable to lack of initiative and innovation. Any initiative from non-compliant agents is dismissed at best or destroyed at worst. As Andrew Gordon—in his book The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (2005)—points out, “the capacity of modern communications systems is outpacing the ability of the user to absorb it all.” There must be balance!

The use of technology can be beneficial, but analysts must also be able to independently research and come to their own conclusions. Some Royal Navy officers before Jutland (a naval battle between Britain’s Royal Navy Grand Fleet and the Imperial German Navy’s High Seas Fleet from May 31 to June 1, 1916) recognized that signals are valuable servants but must not be allowed to become masters.

COMPLEX KIT OF SKILLSTODAY’S naval intelligence specialists require a complex tool kit of skills that crosses both the irregular and traditional war-fighting domains. Irregular warfare includes violent struggles among nontraditional warring groups, such as “naval guerilla warfare”—which has been considered an oxymoron, but in fact over the past century the submarine has acted as de facto guerilla warship. This type of warfare depends not just on military prowess but also the understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences and cultural mores.

Certainly, naval intelligence personnel must focus primarily on threats, but they cannot give their operational customers sophisticated threat assessments unless they also have strong foundational knowledge of their own country’s as well as other countries’ military capabilities, particularly naval ones.

Operational commanders need intelligence professionals who can clearly communicate what an adversary can do, is doing, and might do in the future. That will never change. It is and will remain the

intelligence profession’s primary purpose. Thus, any conversation about adversary intentions and behavior also must consider how adversaries view a country’s naval power and operations. Without such insights, when intelligence officers stand up and deliver enemy weapon ranges and basic tactics and doctrine, they are describing only part of the story.

For decades, independent analysis has sometimes been dismissed by chains of command. Some commands may find analysis by googling, or may rely too heavily on statements from other offices and commands. Analysts or commands may be unwilling to risk fielding analyses that may be contrary to those provided elsewhere. The default becomes not to propose independent analysis but to defer to others. Naval intelligence commands, stations, or ships may simply copy-and-paste what other commands have already assessed through classified networks. The danger of doing so can be drawn from the study of history, which revealed the fact that drawing upon secondary sources means a historian’s own sources are tainted by pre-selection, forcing him or her to heavily focus upon primary sources.

Common intelligence training likewise requires a time investment that would be better spent reading even open source coverage such as The Economist over the long term to understand the world. Learning the processes of administration might make for knowledgeable administrators—and good administration is extremely valuable—but it does not necessarily produce good leaders who understand and can foster an environment of real research and analysis.

THE HUMAN ELEMENTNAVAL intelligence must assess its shortfalls and debate ways to educate intelligence officers on analyzing and reporting on naval operations, combat capabilities, etc. Top-down solutions, even the adoption of the suggestions offered here, will not by themselves close the community’s knowledge gap. The best intelligence officers will do what they have always done—educate themselves the best they can on “operations and threats”—but the community needs to consider innovative ideas.

The future recognizes the development and maintenance of a high-level understanding of threats and how the navy overcomes these threats with the defense equipment available in its arsenal. Naturally, understanding comes from the human element—knowledge, analytical capability, and ingenuity in the naval intelligence community—that guides to victory, defeat, or stalemate as it has since wars were first fought.

That is why we must reassess how time is best spent for analysts, what extraneous collateral functions that have no inherent war-fighting purpose can be eliminated, and how to re-invest in education and training that is geared toward war-fighting. We must recognize the rules of the naval intelligence game.©



THREATS that occur in maritime regions have begun since the days of the sailing ships to the present. The types and forms of threats vary greatly depending on the country’s geographical conditions and the magnitude of a country’s sea lanes.

Some global events related to security and safety around the world include the terrorist attack on the French MV Limburg on October 6, 2002, the suicide bombing on USS Cole (DDG-67) on October 12, 2000, piracy at sea, smuggling, cybercrime, human trafficking, corruption, and internal threats. Threats at sea in the context of maintaining shipping consist of local wars, terrorism, piracy, unwanted dangers, attacks on cargo ships by terrorists, drug smuggling, and human smuggling.

In addition, there are also problems in certain sea areas that are not guarded (sea blindness), uncertainty of what lays ahead, analysis of freedom of access,

problems of resource levels, military strategy and policy, state apparatus, inter-service relations, naval and maritime approaches, intrinsic acquisitions, industrial capacity, plans and also reality. Within the Navy and the coast guard themselves, there are common problems such as defense budget inflation, budget constraints, commitment gap resources, certain unprotected sea areas and strong land culture.

Furthermore, maritime issues as stated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) include international ship and port security, cyber security, armed piracy against ships, stowaways, mixed migration by sea, terrorism, transport of dangerous and toxic substances by sea, accidents at sea, air pollution due to shipping, pollution from ships such as oil, hazardous liquid substances (chemicals carried in large quantities; hazardous substances carried in packages, sewage and ship waste into the sea), underwater sounds that have a

INDONESIAN MARITIME THREATS: AN INITIAL REVIEWBy Navy Captain Buddy Suseto M.si. (Han), PhD (Strategy and Security Studies)


negative impact on marine mammals, and illegal fishing (IMO 2018). This threatens marine life and the natural surroundings.

SECURITY THREATSTHE UN Secretary-General in his 2008 report on the oceans and the Law of the Sea identified seven threats to maritime security, namely:

1. Piracy and armed robbery attacking ships2. Acts of violence against shipping, offshore

installations and other maritime interests;3. Illicit trade of weapons and weapons of mass

destruction;4. Illicit trade of narcotics and psychotropic substances;5. Smuggling in maritime processes and human

trafficking by sea;6. Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing; and 7. Intentional and unlawful damage to the marine

environment.New and developing transnational crimes that have been identified by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) in 2010 include cybercrimes, identity-related crimes, illicit trade in cultural heritage objects and illegal trade, IUU Fishing, environmental crimes, piracy at sea, and illicit trade of body organs.

The fundamental issues of Indonesia’s marine development include sea sand mining, fisheries, small islands, degradation of the coastal and marine environment, maritime security, institutions (levies on fishery products), and small border islands.

There are two threats namely traditional and non-traditional. Traditional threats, for one, are unclear border issues. And non-traditional threats, such as piracy at sea, environmental problems, climate change, fish theft, smuggling of goods, oil, weapons, and narcotics. Traditional threats are difficult to overcome, whereas non-traditional threats are relatively trouble-free, as long as one is committed to it. But even more difficult is the threat in the South China Sea (LCS), because no doctrine exists at this time.

ILLEGAL ACTIVITIESBASED on data from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), crime activities at sea such as armed piracy and robbery in a five-year period, 2012-2016, Indonesia ranks highest, followed by Nigeria and India (ICC 2017).

According to the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment, minor criminal offenses occur at many ports. Until a strong perception emerged that Indonesia recorded the highest number of criminal acts, given the large number of ports in Indonesia. Indonesia faced this problem in early 2000, but action was taken in 2004 and the number of annual attacks on ships and piracy dropped dramatically, and in 2016 threats did not appear in the Strait of Malacca anymore. Operations

conducted by the government in the fight against fish theft can reduce the number of violations by fish thieves, but Indonesia’s vast maritime territory needs to be strengthened further with technology supported by the synergy of the Navy, Air Force, and other related institutions, as well as cooperation with other countries to exchange intelligence information.

Likewise, the issue of the rise of the sea level, coral bleaching, and sea warming due to global climate change which will result in the sinking of small islands, become the main concern of the Indonesian government and this climate issue became one of the concerns at the World Ocean Conference (WOC) meeting in 2009.

Meanwhile, threats in other Indonesian maritime areas are: fish theft, illegal immigrants, human trafficking, smuggling, piracy, maritime terrorism, offshore threats, port problems; corruption in informal/export-import payments, tip-giving culture, organized criminal groups, general and ship theft, strikes and work stoppages, protests and demonstrations, piracy at sea, coastal and logistical threats; criminals, insiders such as crew members, contractors, civilians, groups which oppose state policies or actions, organized or individual terrorism.

The forms of threats include military, non-military, internal, state, non-state, national, regional, and international. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense defines the threats in the next five years based on the 2015 Defense White Paper, as: “Real threats such as terrorism and radicalism, separatism/armed insurrection, natural disasters, border region violations, piracy and theft of natural resources, epidemics, cyber-attacks and espionage, drug trafficking and abuse; threats that are not yet real, such as forms of threats that are still not prioritized based on strategic analysis, and threats that may lead to open conflicts or conventional war.”

Problems at sea include the overlapping demands of Indonesia’s sea boundaries with neighboring countries, the ability to protect the entire sea area, the security of the Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes, the management of maritime elements, and refugees. Whereas in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy it is stated that Indonesia pays special attention to new and developing transnational crimes. In this context, there are several transnational crime issues in which Indonesia plays an active role, including human trafficking, prevention and eradication of corruption, eradication of environmental crime that includes wildlife trade, illegal logging, illegal fishing, illegal money laundering, and illegal trade in cultural-related objects, and the eradication of narcotics and psychotropic substances.

Likewise, there are criminal acts committed by fishermen in Indonesia, namely:

• Falsification of ship documents;• Double marking and double registration;• Fishing without appropriate permits/documents


(navigating without port and sea worthiness permit);• Modification of illegal vessels (including reduction

of signs, changing of call marks, engines);• Using foreign captains and sailors;• Conversion of large foreign fishing vessels into

small pump boats to enter Indonesian waters by falsifying ship documents and Indonesian identities of the crew;

• Deactivating of vessel transmitter (VMS and AIS);• Illegal transportation at sea;• Counterfeiting the logbooks;• Violations of fishing grounds;• Using prohibited fishing gear; and• Non-compliance in owning/partnering with fish

processing units.Other types of crimes (related to fisheries) in Indonesia include illegal fuel transactions, crimes related to immigration, crimes related to customs, money laundering, tax crimes, corruption, human rights violations, and illicit drug trafficking.

At the 2017 International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS) in Bali, regarding types of crime at sea, Sawyer expressed his opinion that Russia’s maritime security challenges such as piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, transnational terrorism and to some extent, disaster relief are examples of challenges stemming from instability based on land but then have an impact on the sea. While the maritime security challenges faced by Indonesia are the problems in the Malacca Strait. The condition of the coastal states in the Malacca Strait varies, ranging from economic matters, military capabilities, development needs, social norms, political-religious status, to security alliances. Therefore, extensive cooperation is needed to deal with threats in the Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes (alur laut kepulauan Indonesia or ALKI). Threats in the Malacca Strait have a real threat to regional security.

MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTESTHE trouble in Indonesia’s maritime territory is more often than not linking to maritime boundary disputes in the South China Sea, armed robbery against ships, the situation in the Southern Philippines, terrorism, and illegal fishing.

The issue of maritime boundary demands poses serious obstacles to regional cooperation such as the joint exploration commitment between the Philippines, China and Vietnam in 2005 that has yet to materialize.

Another question is the presence of foreign submarines passing under the sea through an ALKI lane which is tracked by an Indonesian Navy patrol boat (Daud 2017), which is not in accordance with the shipping provisions at ALKI based on the rules of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 concerning peaceful cross-border voyages. In addition is the question of foreign aircraft flights above Indonesian territorial sea areas such as the US Navy’s Hornet F/A-18 fighter plane that crossed over Bawean Island in 2003.

Furthermore, there is no official body from the Indonesian government to deal with crimes at sea, as a reference for the government or other countries, so that we can know the exact number of crimes that occur during a year in Indonesian sea areas. So that there are often differences in data provided by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in the United Kingdom, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in Singapore, and Indonesia’s government-appointed Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla).

One important consideration regarding threats to the Indonesian maritime territory is the large number of threats to illegal activities at sea, especially in the Malacca Strait in 2010, which had a significant impact on economic development, especially trade by sea. If something happens in the Malacca Strait, alternative route scenarios to the South China Sea will go through the Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait or turn around to Australia. This will result in increased shipping costs.

Many government bodies are involved in handling illegal activities at sea such as the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Transportation and Communication, State Ministry of Environment, the Indonesian Navy, Indonesian Air Force, Water Police, Directorate General of Immigration, Directorate General of Customs and Excise. This causes less effective handling of illegal activities at sea.

These problems are caused by several interrelated factors, namely:

• Limited enforcement resources, including funds, personnel and facilities;

• Gaps and lack of integration in laws and regulations for the management of coastal and marine resources;

• Lack of coordination mechanisms between institutions and communication between various law enforcement agencies;

• Lack of environmental and natural resource awareness of the problems and short, medium and long term impacts of illegal or destructive practices for the sake of food security and the livelihoods of coastal communities;

• Lack of an appropriate, competent and committed justice court system with regard to marine resource matters; and

• Large geographical areas require supervision and law enforcement.

In addition, there are also issues regarding maritime boundaries with ten neighboring countries such as India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Australia and East Timor which have not yet been finalized. Resolving these border issues has been a priority of the government since 2004, because it is important to maintain the


security and unity of Indonesia’s territory and to reduce disputes with neighboring countries.

There are three types of threats namely military threats, non-military threats and hybrid threats. For example, in the Philippine’s sea area, hostages were often carried out by the Abu Sayyaf group and is suspected that members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had entered the area.

For maritime safety, Indonesia is classified as quite good, among others, by the completeness of navigation marks and signs, and sea maps provided by the Navy Hydrographic and Oceanographic Center. But maritime security is still lacking because there are still many problems, such as human trafficking, narcotics, people smuggling, goods, and pollution. Threats also include violence at sea such as armed piracy, the threat of navigation, fire disasters, lack of safety equipment on board, theft of sinking cargo, pollution, destruction of marine ecosystems, and violations of the law, such as the smuggling of food, clothes, and rattan.

FUTURE SOLUTIONSTHREATS in Indonesia’s maritime territory require

resolution. Some government efforts that have been carried out include:

• Joint maritime patrols of elements from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines;

• Efforts to maintain national unity;• In archipelagic states, such as the Philippines and

Indonesia, the integration of countries depends on sea communications which bind the two together or allow them to stay away.

• Formulating the operationalization of Maritime Patrol Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and providing assistance;

• Operating guidelines for information and intelligencece data sharing; and

• Joint communication.The Government also formed a Joint Task Force (TF) 115 consisting of the Indonesian Navy, the Water Police, the Republic of Indonesia’s National Police Security Maintenance Agency, the Maritime Security Agency, and the Agency for the Supervision of Maritime and Fisheries Resources (PSDKP), the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. The TF 115 is to carry out the arrest of perpetrators of criminal acts, such as fishing in the Fisheries Management Area of the Republic of Indonesia without valid documents (for foreign


flagged vessels), fishing using prohibited fishing gear and damaging the environment, fishing without legal licenses (for Indonesian ships). The results of the TF 115 operation were quite effective and by 2018 the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries had sunk 488 foreign fishing vessels.

In handling irregular migration issues, Indonesia adheres to two principles. The first principle is for burdens where countries must jointly look for solutions to irregular migration problems and avoid transferring burdens to other countries. The second principle is shared responsibility where there is joint responsibility between the country of origin, transit and destination in handling irregular migration. Indonesia also puts forward a comprehensive and balanced approach between law enforcement and humanity, based on the pillars of prevention, early tracking, victim protection and arrest of perpetrators of crimes.

Security issues in waters around Indonesia in recent years, for example, are largely due to a lack of governance on land. To help deal with these causes, the Navy must be able to influence events on land and in this case the Navy may be in the most strategic and effective position. As happened in the Zulu Sea, piracy and hostage taking by pirates from the Abu Sayyaf group was initially due to problems on land that developed into the sea.

SETTLEMENT STEPSSECURING the sea requires an integrated and comprehensive settlement steps between the ministries and other maritime elements. Some examples are the absence of rules in additional zones, the lack of quality human resources and the absence of efforts to make new marine laws. Patrol cooperation between regional navies, sharing experiences, information and education can face problems in different places in other parts of the world. An integrated maritime strategy is also needed to affect maritime problems.

It is necessary to develop a maritime force that is commensurate between the broad areas of responsibility and existing threats, which is planned comprehensively for the long term, and involves all maritime elements both civil and military so that there is a common understanding in building the posture of maritime power or national sea power and reducing the occurrence of sectorial egos.

Increasing academic studies from professionals, academics, government, observers, and community involvement in discussing existing problems such as maritime seminars, discussion forums on maritime both domestically and abroad, can be inputs for decision makers and increase maritime awareness. As the Navy has done by holding several seminars on maritime security (IMSS) in Bali, Padang, and Lombok, maritime seminars at the Navy Staff and Command School (Seskoal), the Naval Academy (AAL), the Naval College of Technology (STTAL), Naval Doctrine, Education and Training Command (Kodiklatal), the Naval Bases (Lantamal) and at several universities and ministries.

Indonesia’s vast maritime territory requires a great responsibility to comprehensively manage and secure it from various types of maritime threats. Moreover, the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes becomes an international channel that accommodates world interests, meaning that if there is a security disturbance in the area the impact will be felt not only locally, but internationally. Therefore, reducing the number of threats becomes the main task of the government and the community in order to maintain regional unity and regional and international security. An integrated approach to dealing with maritime threats is the key and increasing maritime power in balance with maritime area and threats become a prerequisite for maritime states. Maintaining the stability of Indonesia’s maritime security plays a very strategic role in the waters of the world.©


IN the past several decades, demands for maritime security have increased in significant numbers as indicated by the growing challenge in the seas, promoting various strategic ways to identify problems and to seek the best solutions to the problems. Negotiating a resolution for the South China Sea disputes and a political solution, at the top political and military level, was an obvious priority for peace brokers in the disputed areas.

A quandary of the first track and official diplomatic efforts has pursued the confidence of the government, claimant states, and regional states to negotiate and implement a conflict-settlement agreement. The limitations of the first-track approach have associated with the hard way and a deadlock in making peace and settling the conflict.

On the other side, Track II or second track diplomacy (STRAD) played a minimal role in facilitating the signing of a settlement, though it served as a reconciliatory effort at the unauthorized level. STRAD critically contributed to the formal peace process by providing

the unarmed actors with an informal opportunity to voice their interests in the disputes. Unsanctioned STRAD efforts outside the legitimate ones serve to provide an alternative solution with a platform of interaction and engagement.

SECOND TRACK DIPLOMACY (STRAD) CONCEPT IN 1981, Joseph V. Montville, then a U.S. State Department employee, coined the phrases Track One and Track Two diplomacy in “Foreign Policy According to Freud”, which appeared in Foreign Policy (Davidson and Montville, 1981). Montville needs to label the differences between efforts, which was people to people and that government to government. In its original conception, “track two” or “citizen” diplomacy refers to private citizens discussing issues that usually reserved for official negotiations (Peter Jones, 2015).

Track One diplomacy was what diplomats did—formal negotiations between nations conducted by professional diplomats. Track Two diplomacy referred


EXERCISE KOMODO:TRACK II DIPLOMACY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA QUESTIONBy Rear Admiral Angkasa Dipua, S.E., M.M. and Commander Dr. Dickry Rizanny Nurdiansyah, PSC(J), MMDS


to conflict resolution efforts by professional non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners and theorists. Track Two has as its object the reduction or resolution of conflict, within a country or between countries, by lowering the anger or tension or fear that exists, through improved communication and a better understanding of each other›s point of view (McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987).

STRAD rises above the narrow power-based approaches of traditional diplomacy by substituting the nation-state as the primary resolution of disputes. In other words, rather than only pursuing strategic interests by achieving favorable discussions with exclusively governments, a fundamental characteristic of Track One diplomacies, STRAD seeks to include all parties to the conflict. STRAD recognizes its part as a practice of mounting shared views between larger citizen groups, while a Track One diplomacy tends to limit its focus to the constricted domain of politicians or military leaders. STRAD tries to make its impact felt on the entirety of what it describes as identity groups, i.e. communities that share a specific ethnic, regional, national, socio-economic, or other identities. Rather than just trying to inspire military leaders or politicians to make decisions based on standard calculations of interests and options, STRAD seeks to help all the people involved to change their way of thinking.

The STRAD concept stems from the belief that conflicts can be prevented by creating linkages of friendship and shared understanding between people. Changes in the way they are thinking, settlement of the dispute, and obtaining the best possible solutions are the objectives to bring people together. Along these lines, STRAD can transform conflicts into a constructive dialogue between those involved in disputes.

Engagements between citizens of different political standpoints adapt the requirements of techniques of bargaining and negotiation. STRAD, therefore, entails processes such as problem-solving workshops, dialogues, cultural exchanges, and between people mutually engaged in a dispute. These methods are a must for STRAD practitioners who have neither acquired such skills nor developed them appropriately.

Although STRAD may occur between two or more groups in a dispute, it is also designed to work with a single agent to gain a proper understanding of other people’s positions. Working with a single agent can be useful in facilitating group cohesiveness where individuals become marginalized by their group.

“Power-based, official, and frequently inflexible methods of formal interface amongst briefed governments of free states” are recognized as the First Track diplomacy (McDonald 1991:201-202). Additionally, Track I practices can easily construe as interfering in the internal affairs of a free nation. Under such situations, while First Track communications can easily break down, STRAD channels can resume dialogue and interaction needed

for a settlement of a conflict.

STRAD is a non-governmental, unofficial, and informal form of conflict settlement that has potentially reduced the tendency for prolonged disputes by improving dialogues and encouraging shared interests amongst the opposing groups. The importance of chasing informal communication among groups on conflicting edges is that they have the ability of scaling down a conflict before any formal talks can be established. Unofficial interventions are more ready for handling intra-state conflicts.

Indeed, STRAD should not substitute the First Track diplomacy but rather as an additional channel that offers a preliminary segment for productive dialogues. As a pre-dialogue instrument, STRAD provides crucial information to pave the way for a peaceful resolution. In general, back-channel diplomacies can be most effective when linked to the formal peace process at the governmental level.

Despite STRAD being a fairly recent practice, it has



been able to achieve some successes. A classic example of this is a contribution made by former Vice President of Indonesia, Jusuf Kalla, who represented the Indonesian government in a negotiation with the Free Aceh Movement (FAM). The 2004 tsunami in Aceh eventually became a turning point for the FAM, as well as the Aceh people and the Indonesian government (Kompas, December 26, 2019). The central government’s assistance to victims of the natural disaster managed to persuade FAM leaders to start a dialogue. The people of Aceh, who were gripped by terror during the establishment of the Military Operations Area in the Aceh, could breathe with relief from a cessation of hostilities. Kalla played a central role in negotiations between the central government and FAM.

On August 15, 2005, the signing of the Helsinki Agreement by FAM and the Indonesian government proved that peace had been achieved in Aceh. The peace process was an example of STRAD’s success. “It was a long-term process with time spent building trust

between all parties involved in the negotiations. It was not published and was kept confidential” (Mitchell, 1993: 8).

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT THE conflict in the South China Sea is one of the most complex cases of regional disputes that have occurred in Southeast Asia. The disputes do not only involve several parties, namely Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, Malaysia, China, Taiwan and Vietnam, but also embrace a number of issues relating to overlapping territorial claims and retraction of sea boundaries in the region. Although the current disputes in the South China Sea are relatively calm, the fact that they have not been fully resolved allow frictions or even future military confrontations. Trends in the past five years show that tensions arising between disputing parties show a higher level than in the previous decade. For this reason, a clear resolution framework is mandatory to avoid a worsening situation in the future.

However, the conflict resolution that has been attempted so far has not been able to resolve disputes that have existed since four decades ago. In the First Track diplomacy, a regional approach by Indonesia had been applied. The approval of the Declaration of the Conduct (DoC) of Parties in the South China Sea was quite successful in dealing with the disputes, but this approach has not been able to support the resolution of disputes on an ongoing basis. In addition to difficulties in mediating the conflicts, given that some Southeast Asian countries are also claimant states, several other factors have hampered regional approaches, such as ASEAN member countries that wanted a role in resolving conflicts and countries that wanted bilateral resolutions such as those implemented by China.

In other situations in the First Track diplomacy level, the bilateral approach initiated by China also has limitations. First and foremost, an approach that tends towards a divide-and-rule towards countries in the region that is in line with Chinese interests in the long run. Second, the increasingly strict policies of China in this dispute will be counterproductive in a bilateral approach.

Reflecting on the limitations of the First Track diplomacy performed by ASEAN, Indonesia and China, is a viable approach to resolution, if it refers to the multi-track diplomacy theory, that will be more likely to be achieved if it involves and empowers other potentials at all levels of existing diplomacies. In this case, the Second Track diplomacy is one of the potentials to support and cover the limitations that exist in the First Track diplomacy.

INDONESIAN NAVY’S STRAD THE Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK) organized by the Indonesian Navy is an example of a Track II diplomacy. The exercise, themed “a

A number of warships are anchored before the opening of the 2016 Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK) in Teluk Bayur,

Padang, West Sumatra.



cooperation to strengthen international maritime security” focuses on non-warfighting manoeuvres and aims to elevate and articulate common interests in increasing interoperability between navies, in order to maintain the stability of regional maritime security. This exercise allows the military in general, without the use of weapons, to carry out greater coordination of their programs and opportunities to organize themselves in resolving the South China Sea conflict.

In this exercise, navies from various countries worked together to carry out a series of humanitarian aid mission activities, such as the Medical Civic Action Project (MEDCAP), the Engineering Civic Action Project (ENCAP), and the Maritime Peace Keeping Operations (MPKO). The Komodo exercise aims to be prepared in supporting peace and maintaining stability in the region and globally.

One of the STRADs implemented by the Indonesian Navy was a symposium during the exercise. In the second MNEK in 2016, the Indonesian Navy also hosted the 15th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) with the subject “Maritime partnership for stability in the Western Pacific region”. In this goings-on, experts and practitioners had shared knowledge and insights about maritime security and stability in the region. In an effort to support maritime security, regional countries generally seek cooperation and partnership in the face of any threat. All countries realize that they cannot face challenges single-handedly.

The WPNS is an important forum for implementing regional maritime partnerships that will require a strong foundation and mutual trust between the state or the navy. WPNS is also a proof of the effectiveness of the Track II diplomacy performed by the navy. The key to successful diplomacy in developing mutual trust lies in the actors to develop collective trust and peaceful cooperation for mutual interests and benefits.

The symposium is one example of a Track II diplomacy that has been carried out so far and is potentially able to support ongoing dispute resolution carried out in a Track I diplomacy. There are at least two important things that are the reason for the Track II diplomacy in resolving this conflict.

First, by emphasizing in this symposium that the informal Track II diplomacy provides an opportunity for the disputing parties to be able to attend in their personal capacity and express their opinions more openly without pressure as occurred in a Track I diplomacy. The second reason for the importance of this Symposium as a potential supporter of the ongoing resolution of disputes relating to Indonesia itself as the host country. In addition to the fact that Indonesia is not a claimant state, which makes its position as a mediator more acceptable to all parties, Indonesia also acts as a normative leader in an area that is often trusted to mediate disputes.

CONCLUSION THERE have been several attempts by the Indonesian Navy to implement a mechanism for managing and resolving South China Sea disputes that has been applied to the Track II diplomacy. As part of the Track II diplomacy, MNEK has grown, mingling with the global naval network and person-to-person relations. Not only is the seamen’s network entwined, but it goes beyond that, and has given effective results. Indonesia has contributed to the progress of STRAD. First, Indonesia, as a representative of ASEAN member countries, plays an important role in the driver’s seat. This has made the “competition for regional power” becoming more cosy. Second, the relative success of the Track II has complemented and increased the influence of Indonesian diplomacy, especially in the Asian region.


Warships from a number of 2018 Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK) participating countries in Lembar, West Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, on May 3, 2018.


NAVAL strategy, and the related concept of maritime strategy, concerns the overall strategy for achieving victory at sea, including the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of naval forces by which a commander secures the advantage of fighting at a place convenient to himself, and the deception of the enemy.

The great aims of a fleet in war must be to keep the coast of its own country free from attack, to secure the freedom of its trade, and to destroy the enemy’s fleet or confine it to port. The first and second of these aims can be attained by the successful achievement of the third—the destruction or paralysis of the hostile fleet. A fleet that secures the freedom of its own communications from attack is said to have command of the sea.

Naval strategy is fundamentally different from land-based military strategy. At sea, there is no territory to occupy. Apart from the fisheries and, more recently, offshore oilfields, there are no economic assets that can be denied to the enemy and no resources that a fleet can exploit. While an army can live off the land, a fleet must rely on whatever supplies it carries with it or can be brought to it.

FLEET IN BEINGTHE British Admiral, the Earl of Torrington allegedly originated the expression “fleet in being”. Faced with a clearly superior French fleet in the summer of 1690 during the War of the Grand Alliance, Torrington proposed avoiding battle, except under very favorable conditions, until the arrival of reinforcements. By

maintaining his fleet in being, he would prevent the French from gaining command of the sea, which would allow them to invade England. Although Torrington was forced to fight at the Battle of Beachy Head (June 1690), the French victory there gave Paris control of the English Channel for only a few weeks.

In naval warfare, a “fleet in being” is a naval force that extends a controlling influence without ever leaving port. Were the fleet to leave port and face the enemy, it might lose in battle and no longer influence the enemy’s actions, but while it remains safely in port, the enemy is forced to continually deploy forces to guard against it. A “fleet in being” can be part of a sea denial doctrine, but not one of sea control.

The “fleet in being” concept is based on the assumption that the fleet is relatively safe in port, even if near the enemy. After the battle of Taranto and the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, it became obvious that air power made a fleet concentrated in a port vulnerable, and a fleet in being was normally no longer a safe option. It is, of course, possible to imagine a situation where a fleet is still relatively safe in harbor, such as the opponent being unwilling to attack them in harbor for political reasons.

The idea of a “fleet in being” can be generalized to forces other than naval. A fortress under siege is essentially an “army in being”, which ties up enemy forces without leaving the fortress or doing much fighting. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein used his air force with an operational doctrine analogous to “fleet in being”: The mere presence of the Iraqi Air Force in hardened bunkers forced the coalition

THE EVOLUTION OF NAVAL STRATEGIES

By Navy Captain Kunto Wibowo AP



attacking Iraq to act cautiously and to escort its bomber sorties, until the aircraft shelters were found to be vulnerable.

WAR ON TRADEBY the mid-1690s, private ships from French Atlantic ports, particularly St. Malo and Dunkirk, were a major threat to Anglo-Dutch commerce. The threat forced the English government to divert warships to the defense of trade, as convoy escorts and cruisers to hunt down the privateers. In France, the success of privateers against the Anglo-Dutch war effort stimulated a gradual shift from the employment of the Royal warships as battle fleets (guerre d’escadre) towards supporting the war on trade (guerre de course).

Commerce raiding (German: handelskrieg, “trade war”) is a form of naval warfare used to destroy or disrupt logistics of the enemy on the open sea by attacking its merchant shipping, rather than engaging its combatants or enforcing a blockade against them.

During World War II, the Battle of the Atlantic saw Nazi Germany conducting commerce raiding against Britain and its allies, again using U-boats, auxiliary cruisers, and small groups of cruisers and battleships (raiders). Limitations set by the Treaty of Versailles meant Germany could not build a large battle fleet as she had in the time leading up to the World War I, and chose to covertly develop her submarines instead. U-boats were cheaper and quicker to build than capital ships, and consequently Germany built up a submarine force rather than a surface fleet. This meant Germany was not able to fight a guerre d’escadre (battles between fleets), and therefore pursued guerre de course; what small numbers of surface warships Germany possessed, such as the Deutschlands, as well as her auxiliary cruisers, also participated in this strategy. In addition, a number of commercial vessels were converted.

The disadvantage of the commerce raiding when pursued as a battle fleet strategy, rather than just by smaller vessels, is that it leaves a country’s own trade defenseless. Individual raiding squadrons are also vulnerable to defeat in detail if the enemy sends larger squadrons in pursuit, as happened to Leissegues at the Battle of San Domingo in 1806 and Von Spee at the Battle of the Falkland Islands in 1914.

CLOSE BLOCKADEUNTIL after the end of the 17th century it was thought impossible, or at least very rash, to keep the great ships out of port between September and May or June. Therefore, continuous watch on an enemy by blockading his ports was beyond the power of any navy. Therefore, too, as an enemy fleet might be at sea before it could be stopped, the movements of fleets were much subordinated to the need for providing convoy to the trade.

A blockade is an effort to cut off supplies, war material or communications from a particular area by force, either in part or totally. A blockade should not be confused with an embargo or sanctions, which are legal barriers to trade. It is also distinct from a siege in

that a blockade is usually directed at an entire country or region, rather than a fortress or city. While most blockades historically took place at sea, blockade is still used on land to prevent someone coming into a certain area.

A blockading power can seek to cut off all maritime transport from and to the blockaded country; although stopping all land transport to and from an area may also be considered a blockade. Blockades restrict the trading rights of neutrals, who must submit for inspection for contraband, which the blockading power may define narrowly or broadly, sometimes including food and medicine. In the 20th century air power has also been used to enhance the effectiveness of the blockade by halting air traffic within the blockaded airspace.

During the revolutionary years in Indonesia, 1945-1949, the Dutch imposed a naval blockade around Singapore to stop illegal activities by Indonesian freedom fighters. In 1947, Jahja Daniel Darma, also known as John Lie Tjeng Tjoan, was assigned the duty of escorting boats smuggling products to Singapore to be sold for financing the Indonesian independence war. Starting his navy career as a ship-navigator on a Dutch merchant vessel, one of his first duties was to escort a convoy of small boats that was carrying 800 tons of rubber to the Chief Representative of the Republic of Indonesia in Singapore. Commander (retired from the navy on December 1966 with the rank of rear admiral) John Lie’s duties were to penetrate the blockade and smuggle rubber and other products in exchange for weapons. The weapons were then handed over to the Indonesian revolutionary troops in Sumatra.

The strategic importance of the blockade was cemented during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, during which successful blockades on France were imposed by the Royal Navy, leading to major economic disruptions. The Union blockade of southern ports was a major factor in the American Civil War, as was the failure of the U-boat blockade in World War I and again in World War II. Julian Corbett and A.T. Mahan emphasized that naval operations were chiefly to be won by decisive battles and blockade.

CONTROL OF THE SEAIT was only at the very end of the 19th century that theories of naval strategy were first codified, even though British statesmen and admirals had been practising it for centuries.

Influenced by Jomini’s principles of strategy, the American naval officer and historian, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) argued that in the coming wars, control of the sea would grant the power to control the trade and resources needed to wage war. Mahan’s premise was that in the contests between France and Britain in the 18th century, domination of the sea through naval power was the deciding factor in the outcome, and therefore, that control of seaborne commerce was secondary to domination in war. In Mahan’s view, a country obtained “command of the sea” by concentrating its naval forces at the decisive point to destroy or master the enemy’s battle fleet; blockade of enemy ports and disruption



of the enemy’s maritime communications would follow. Mahan believed that the true objective in a naval war was always the enemy fleet.

Mahan’s writings were highly influential. His best-known books, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812, were published in 1890 and 1892 respectively and his theories contributed to the naval arms race between 1898 and 1914.

Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922), on the other hand, differed from Mahan in placing much less emphasis on fleet battle. A British naval historian who became a lecturer at the Royal Naval War College in Great Britain, Corbett emphasized the interdependence of naval and land warfare and tended to concentrate on the importance of sea communications rather than battle. Battle at sea was not an end in itself; the primary objective of the fleet was to secure one’s own communications and disrupt those of the enemy, not necessarily to seek out and destroy the enemy’s fleet. To Corbett, command of the sea was a relative and not an absolute which could be categorized as general or local, temporary or permanent. Corbett defined the two fundamental methods of obtaining control of the lines of communication as the actual physical destruction or capture of enemy warships and merchants, and or a naval blockade. His most famous work, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, remains a classic.

CONSTANTLY EVOLVINGNAVAL strategy has increasingly been merged with general strategy involving land and air warfare. Naval strategy constantly evolves as improved technologies become available. During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Navy shifted from a strategy of directly contending against NATO for control of the blue-water oceans to a concentrated defense of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk bastions.

Latest naval strategies recognize the economic links of the global system and how any disruption due to regional crises—man-made or natural—can adversely impact a country’s economy and quality of life. State-of-the-art strategies chart a course for a country’s sea services to work collectively with each other and international partners to prevent these crises from occurring or reacting quickly should one occur to avoid negative impacts to the country. Sometimes a military force is used as a preventative measure to avoid war, not cause it.

In the case of Indonesia, the country’s defense system has long favored the land forces over sea forces. In various defense documents, threat assessments highly prioritize internal threats, such as disintegration and separatism, over external threats that may come from the sea. However, there have been changes to that trend. President Joko Widodo has pledged to reassert Indonesia‘s maritime identity under the banner of the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). Under this new maritime outlook, Indonesia seeks to be a major regional player in the Asia-Pacific. In order to

achieve this goal, Indonesia would need to increase its attention on the Navy as an essential element in ensuring its maritime security, both in a domestic and regional sense.

The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is the second-largest branch of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, yet it possesses the most daunting task related to national defense. With only 65,000 personnel, the TNI-AL shoulders a big responsibility safeguarding the vast extent of Indonesia‘s maritime territory, which covers a combined area of roughly 140,000 square kilometers of water and coastline. From its inception, it has struggled to reconcile its relatively small capabilities with its large responsibilities. There are four chief problems that the TNI-AL continues to face today, namely (1) a lack of a comprehensive maritime outlook, (2) stringent budgetary conditions, (3) a continental-oriented command and control structure, and (4) turf wars between related agencies in the government. These problems are rooted deep in the history of the Indonesian Armed Forces and are a result of a complex interaction between social, cultural, political, and strategic factors.

When it comes to its overall maritime strategy, Indonesia has insisted on maintaining its inward-looking posture. Defense White Papers from 1997 to 2008 maintain the continental element of Wasantara (Wawasan Nusantara or Archipelagic Outlook) as a core focal point of Indonesia‘s strategic outlook, indicating a degree of political hesitance in looking outward.

It was not until 2014 when Joko Widodo proposed the Global Maritime Fulcrum, which promised a new strategic outlook that would put heavy emphasis on the maritime realm and Indonesia‘s regional contributions to maritime security; a more outward-looking Indonesia. It aims to capitalize on Indonesia‘s geopolitical position and increase Indonesia‘s regional role as a global maritime fulcrum for the Asia-Pacific region by building on five pillars which included maritime culture, resources, infrastructure, diplomacy, and security.

In 2016, a GMF White Paper was published by the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs. The publication provided an authoritative elaboration on the aspects of the GMF and presented itself as a plan of action. However, it remains a lackluster document. The publication only provided a brief reiteration of the goals of the GMF rather than an elaboration of the means that have and will be taken to achieve the overall goal, making it objective-based rather than means-based.

The TNI-AL still operates based on its Eka Sasana Jaya doctrine, which has been in effect since 1965. Overall, the doctrine outlines the basics of naval combat, the role of the TNI-AL in maritime security, and conditions in which naval force will be used. In this sense, the GMF could not be considered a doctrine; it is more of a maritime strategy, albeit an unclear one at best. It would still take some time for the concept to permeate in Indonesian strategic thinking and even more so for it to diffuse into the operational and tactical levels due to organizational and operational constraints.



MEDICAL evacuation, often shortened to Medevac, is the timely and efficient movement and en route care provided by medical personnel to wounded being evacuated from a battlefield, to injured patients being evacuated from the scene of an accident to receiving medical facilities, or to patients at a rural hospital requiring urgent care at a better-equipped facility using medically equipped ground vehicles (ambulances) or aircraft (air ambulances). Basically, there are three types of Medevac, i.e. ground medical evacuation, maritime medical evacuation and air medical evacuation. Ground Medevac employs land transport, such as ambulances, maritime Medevac benefits maritime transport, such as ships, and air Medevac makes use of air travel, by means of helicopters or fixed wing aircraft. In a situation that requires rapid, urgent, and even critical treatments, air Medevac is one of the most looked-for and primary medical aid to save a person’s life.

FLYING THE SICKHOW FLEET COMMAND III DEALS WITH COVID-19 PATIENTS

“It wasn’t raining when Noah built the ark.”—Howard Ruff (1931-2016)

MEDICAL EVACUATION

LAND SEA AIR

GROUND VEHICLES SHIPS FIXED WING

SEATED CASE

BOATS ROTARY WING

STRETCHER CASE

Fig. 1. Medical Evacuation Scheme according to the type of transportation and handling.

By Navy Captain Ridwan Prawira, S.T., M.Han


Long Range Medical Evacuation (LRME) is a method of long-distance air Medevac by prioritizing standard operating procedures and health protocols, which take patients from one place to another that has wide-ranging medical equipment and health facilities, with the aim of evacuating patients that requires swift treatment, advanced medical aid, critical or emergency by greatly utilizing fixed wing aircraft in the shortest possible time. This kind of evacuation may reduce the risk of harm to the patient without delay, precisely and safely. Therefore, this long-distance air medical evacuation service is one of the prioritized medical aids to save human lives.

The Corona Virus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic which began at the end of 2019, has had a huge impact on Indonesia and has spread to all corners of the country, including Papua; not only civilians, but Indonesian Navy personnel serving in Fleet Command III too are infected by this disease. This challenges the health care in this region, for medical personnel and supporting facilities for anti-COVID-19 are still very minimal. The massive spread of COVID-19 needs to be taken seriously by various parties, especially for COVID-19 patients who need more intensive medical treatment. LRME is the best alternative for promptly evacuating COVID-19 patients from areas with inadequate health facilities to more far-reaching health facilities/hospitals.

LRME IN HANDLING COVID-19 PATIENTSTHE handling of personnel infected with COVID-19 has received great attention from the Chief of the Indonesian Navy. After taken delivery of a report from the commander of Fleet Command III regarding a soldier who was tested positive for COVID-19, the Navy Chief ordered the Fleet Command III commander to evacuate the personnel to a better and extensive health facility.

The commander of Fleet Command III carried out an immediate response through LRME to speed up the evacuation process. On Saturday, 18 July 2020, an Indonesian Navy’s P-8304 (CN-235) aircraft which traveled 1,174 nautical miles with actual use of flight hours without refuel for six hours and thirty minutes direct from endurance of seven hours and thirty minutes, flown the sick personnel from the Home Base of Fleet Command III in Sorong (dr. Oetojo Naval Hospital), West Papua, to a more comprehensive health facility at dr. Ramelan Naval Hospital in Surabaya, East Java.

Technically, the LRME kind of air Medevac has the following procedure: after entering the plane, COVID-19 patients who have not reached the critical level are put in the Seated Case position, which is a sitting arrangement; otherwise, they are required to be in the Stretcher Case position (reclining on a stretcher). COVID-19 virus spread prevention and

Fig. 2. A CN-235 aircraft cabin’s emergency compartment scheme for the handling of COVID-19 patients (compartment partitions use coated plastic sheeting).

Access door for crew and medical personnel

Access door for patients

Isolation 2 CompartmentUsed as a transit point for the decontamination of medical personnel after leaving the Isolation 3 Compartment, and before entering Isolation 1 Compartment.

Isolation 3 CompartmentThe cabin for COVID-19 patients can accommodate five patients in a sitting position.

Isolation 1 CompartmentFor air crew and medical personnel only


control measures are taken from the start of the flight, during the flight to the end of the flight, carried out by following the standard operating procedures for the anti-COVID-19 protocol.

The restriction of areas prone to contamination and the separation of potentially contaminated spaces on board the aircraft uses coated plastic sheeting to separate flight crew and medical personnel from COVID-19 patients when airborne. The crew and medics wear Level 3 personal protective equipment and fitted out with boots and hoods, dual layer gloves, and powered air-purifying respirators or N95 masks with face shields. The same applies to COVID-19 patients according to the COVID-19 health protocol.

The aircraft cabin is divided into three compartments to prevent and avoid the transmission of COVID-19. These compartments are Isolation 1 compartment which is used for crew and medical personnel, Isolation 2 is used as a transit space for the decontamination of medical personnel when handling COVID-19 patients in Isolation 3 before entering Isolation 1, and Compartment 3 is used specifically for COVID-19 patients on board. The decontamination in the aircraft cabin is carried out before the flight to remove the COVID-19 virus contamination on the plane as well as at the end of the flight at the Base Ops of Juanda Naval Air Base in Surabaya.

This LRME procedure is the first in the history of Fleet Command III and the Naval Aviation Center. It was represented in an air medical evacuation, which is

an extraordinary duty of humanitarian action, in the form of transferring a highly contagious COVID-19 patient, without the risk of infection and transmission to both the air crew as well as the medical evacuation personnel. The systematic execution of an air Medevac in accordance with the strict operational standard procedures of the anti-COVID-19 protocol must be properly and successfully carried out by flight crew, medical personnel and patients in accordance with the previously planned mission, so that evacuated patients can be immediately transferred and treated at the dr. Ramelan Naval Hospital in Surabaya swiftly, precisely and safely.

THE FUTURE OF LRME FOR THE INDONESIAN NAVYTHE flying of COVID-19 patients in the framework of Long Range Medical Evacuation (LRME) that had been carried out by the Fleet Command III supported by the Indonesian Naval Aviation Center, an LRME standard operating procedure is called for to evacuate other Indonesian Navy personnel serving in remote areas. According to Aviation Medicine Specialist and member of the Indonesian Presidential Expert Panel of Medical Doctors, Dr. dr. Wawan Mulyawan, SpBS (K), SpKP, AAK, FINSS, FINPS, a medical evacuation is divided into three levels, namely:

1. Urgent Level. The air medical evacuation in this category applies to emergency patients such as victims of accidents in military operations, accidents during training, critical illnesses that

Fig. 3. The implementation process of a Long Range Medical Evacuation (LRME) for COVID-19

patients from dr. Oetojo Naval Hospital in Sorong, West Papua, to dr. Ramelan Naval Hospital in

Surabaya, East Java.


require extensive health facilities, victims of natural disasters and work accidents which with rapid medical evacuation can save their lives/organs, prevent severe complications and ward off permanent disability.

2. Priority Level. The air medical evacuation in this category is for patients requiring special/follow-up care while on-site health facilities and medical equipment fall short, and may reduce their distress/disability if an evacuation is not delayed.

3. Routine Level. The air medical evacuation in this category is for patients who need treatment at one place that is considered better or at the request of the patient or his or her family and may well use scheduled flights.

The LRME for the COVID-19 patient at Fleet Command III is expected to become a reference for air medical evacuations. To evacuate a larger number of patients

Fig. 4. Schematic of an aircraft cabin compartment for medical treatment in the LRME framework in an aircraft larger than CN-235.

The CN-295 is a development of the Spanish-Indonesian transport aircraft CASA/IPTN CN-235, but with a stretched

fuselage, 50% more payload capability and new Pratt & Whitney Canada PW127G turboprop engines.

A Stretcher with a locking systemdirectly on the cabin floor

Air Crew CompartmentFor aircraft crew only

Medical CompartmentThe cabin for medical personnel and patients suffering from

infectious diseases which can accommodate up to four medical personnel and six patients in a reclining position.

Portable Medical life support equipment consisting of a cardiac monitor, ECG, a ventilator, oxygen system, etc.

which at the same time enables the paramedic team to carry out internal communication activities and focus on handling patients during on flight treatment, an aircraft that has endurance and a capacity greater than the CN-235 currently owned by the Indonesian Naval Aviation Center is needed.

An alternative aircraft suited for LRME which is larger than the CN-235 is the CN-295. On the CN-295, the aircraft compartment can be divided into two parts, namely the crew compartment and the medical compartment. In the medical compartment, the cabin is isolated by way of a cabin compartment partition so that patient treatment is more concentrated while still able to pay attention to health protocols. With the governmental policy on New Normal and the increasing number of people tested positive for COVID-19, the CN-295 aircraft is one of the answers for long-distance air medical evacuation with a greater carrying capacity.

FACTS & FEATS

Chief of the Indonesian Navy, Admiral Yudo Margono, SE, MM, was appointed as an honorary member of the Indonesian Marine Corps through a procession of handing over to him the Marine

purple beret by the Marine Corps Commander, Major General Suhartono, M.Tr. (Han.), at Todak Beach in

Dabo Singkep, Riau Islands, Friday, (24/7).

Chief of the Indonesian Navy, Admiral Yudo Margono, S.E., M.M., received an honorary brevet

and was appointed as an honorary member of Indonesian Naval Aviation, directly pinned by the Commander of the Naval Aviation Center, First

Admiral TNI Edwin, SH, M.Han. at the Apron “A” of Juanda International Airport in Sidoarjo, East Java,

Wednesday (24/06).

Indonesian Armed Forces Commander, Air Marshal Dr. (HC) Hadi Tjahjanto, SIP, presided the Handover Ceremony of the Indonesian Navy Chief’s post, from Admiral Siwi Sukma Adji, S.E., M.M. to Admiral Yudo

Margono, S.E., M.M., at the Main Building of the Navy Headquarters, Wednesday (20/5). Admiral Yudo Margono was the Commander of the Joint Regional Defense Command I since 2019.


The Indonesian Navy continues to evacuate Indonesian crew members working on foreign cruise ships during the COVID-19 pandemic. They were then taken to isolation at the Pullman Central Park Hotel, West Jakarta to

undergo swab tests and self-quarantine for 14 days. As part of the Evacuation Task Force, the Navy coordinates with relevant ministries.

The Chief of the Indonesian Navy, Admiral Yudo Margono, S.E., M.M. together with the Chairperson of Jalasenastri (association of the wives of

members of the Indonesian Navy), Mrs. Vero Yudo Margono dedicated the Pasir Angin Naval COVID-19 Emergency Hospital in the Navy Residential Complex in Pasir Angin in the Cileungsi District of Bogor Regency, West

Java, on Tuesday (7/21).

Command Fleet I held a Level 3 (L-3) Combat Task Exercise in the Java Sea, Karimata Strait, and waters around Singkep Island, Riau Islands, on Friday

(24/7). The exercise to realize the readiness of elements of Fleet Command I in carrying out Combined Sea Operations and Amphibious Operations in

support of TNI Joint Operations.

Chief of the Indonesian Navy, Admiral Yudo Margono, S.E., M.M. aboard the KRI Semarang-594, observing Indonesian Navy’s Level 3 Combined Task Force Exercise in the waters around Dabo Singkep, Riau Islands, Thursday (23/7). The KRI Semarang is a Makassar-class Landing Platform Dock-typed

hospital auxiliary ship in the Indonesian Navy’s inventory that plays an important role during the COVID-19 pandemic.


Documents

THE NAVY IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR