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The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

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Page 1: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

The Network Economy

Session FiveFebruary 24, 2010

Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational

Change

Page 2: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What Concerns to Beniger & Williamson Have In Common?

The Role and Cost of

Information in the

Economy.

Page 3: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

How Do Beniger’s and Williamson’s Solutions Differ

Williamson Looks to Organizational Governance Structures.

Beniger Looks to Information Technology Infrastructure.

Internal vs. External economies

Page 4: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

How Does Williamson Differ from Neo-classical Economists?

Information is impacted.

Rationality is bounded.

Institutions matter.

Page 5: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What Are the Origins of the New Institutional Economics?

Kenneth Arrow—economies are subject to ‘information failures.’

Karl Llewellyn—contracts are governance structures.

Frederick Hayek—the role of idiosyncratic knowledge at the local level.

Page 6: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

Origins, cont.

John R. Commons—business organizations as governance structures.

Frank Knight—the problem of moral hazard.

Chester Bernard—organizations are conscious, deliberate and purposeful.

Page 7: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

Origins (cont.) Herbert Simon—the notion of ‘bounded rationality.’

Alfred Chandler—organizational form is a determinant of economic performance.

Karl Polanyi—local knowledge is created within different organizational contexts.

Ronald Coase—if markets work, why organizations?

Page 8: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What Was Williamson’s Unique Contribution?

The notion of transaction costs as the central explanatory variable of economic performance and governance structures.

Page 9: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What is Williamson’s Unit of Analysis?

Transactions, Contractual Man, & the Governance Frameworks that Order Them!

Markets

Classical and neoclassical contracts.

Bilateral vs. trilateral & relational contracts

Vertically integrated firms

Page 10: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What Puzzle Led Williamson to His Investigation?

What accounts for governance structures & how they are

organized?

Page 11: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

How Does Williamson Answer This Question?

Organizational forms are best conceived of as means of addressing transaction costs.

Governance forms differ, depending on the nature of the transaction and its costs.

Explanations are local in nature.

Page 12: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What Are Transaction Costs?

The information-related costs of doing business. They include:

search costsexchange costsenforcement costs

Credit Cardsfrom Andres Rueda

Page 13: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What Are the Origins of Transaction Costs?

Bounded rationality

Opportunism with guile

Asset specificity

Page 14: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

In What Ways Can Assets Be Specific?

Site specificityPhysical asset specificity

Human asset specificity

Dedicated assets

Page 15: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

How Does Timing Affect Transaction Costs?

Adverse selection—an ex ante problem of determining risks.

Moral hazard—an ex post problem of assuring that agreements are kept.

One needs to look at this in their entirety

Agency theory—efforts to reduce these ex post uncertainties through ex ante contracts—i.e. credible commitments, which allow bargaining and contracting beyond the ex ante stage

Page 16: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

The Interdependence of Technology, Contract, & Price

K>0

A p1s

S=0

Bp2

S>0C

p3

Contracting for general vs. special purpose technologies

Page 17: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

Can Transaction Costs Explain the Company Town?

Uncertainties associated with remote location and low skill nature of the job, workers unwilling to build their houses.

Mine owners needed to be assured they could cover the costs of their investment by limiting competition.

Page 18: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

The Company Town (cont.)

Change the situation and the bargain changes. What happens when mobility is assumed—auto, mobile homes, etc.?

A means of exploitation – One needs to consider all aspects of the local situation.

Ghost Town of Coronet Worker House...from Mike Woodfin

Page 19: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What About the Vertically Integrated Firm

Backward integration-asset specificity related to location and physical plant.

Forward integration—asset specificity related to product differentiation, and specialized consumer durables.

Anti-trust implications.

Page 20: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What Are the Choices of Governance Structures?

PlanningPromiseCompetitionGovernance

Page 21: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

Matching Situations & Governance Structures

Bounded Rationali

tyOpportunis

m

AssetSpecifici

ty

Contracting

Process

0 + + Planning

+ 0 + Promise

+ + 0 Competition

+ + + Governance

Page 22: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

In What Ways Can We Characterize Transactions?

Standardized or idiosyncraticOccasional or frequentCertain or uncertain

Page 23: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

When Do Bureaucratic Solutions Justify Their Costs?

For transactions supported by considerable investments in transaction-specific assets.

In cases where there is high uncertainty.

The costs of specialized governance structures will be easier to recover for large transactions of a recurring type.

A trade-off between economizing transaction costs and neoclassical production costs.

Page 24: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

When Are Bureaucratic Solutions Inappropriate?

When governance costs of internal organizations exceed those of market organization, and there is little asset specificity.

When hierarchy creates problems of bounded rationality.

Problems of management integrity . The market is less forgiving.

Page 25: The Network Economy Session Five February 24, 2010 Information, Transaction Costs & Organizational Change

What Governance Structures are Likely Given the Prospect of Future Conditions

Blogging Question!