The Nexus between NWFZs and the CTBT

Mr. Khaled AbdelHamid, Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary,CTBTO

Introduction Course:

Strengthening Verification, Enhancing Security: The Science and Political Significance of the CTBT18 to 22 October 2010

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

States Parties undertake:

1. Not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such explosion on their territories.

2. To refrain from causing, encouraging or participating in the carrying out of any nuclear test explosion or any other nuclear weapon explosion, or any other nuclear explosion.

Basic Obligations

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

• Bans ALL nuclear explosions on Earth

• Milestone in the history of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

• Effective measure of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

• Key role in international security architecture

• Signed by most nations, not yet in force

CTBT Significance

• Zero yield in all environments - No reservations

• Parties may not cause, encourage, or participate in carrying out of any nuclear test explosion or any other nuclear explosion

• Creates obligations for national implementation

• Constrains development and improvement of new and more advanced warheads

• Hampers development of nuclear weapons

• Contributes to preventing proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge that can be used for nuclear weapons

• Nuclear testing provides airtight proof about intentions of a state

Components of the Verification Regime

InternationalMonitoring

System

321 stations:seismic,

hydroacoustic,infrasound,

radionuclide 16 radionuclide labs

InternationalData

Centre

collect,analyse,

distributedata & products

On-SiteInspection

prepare forconduct of

on-siteinspection

The CTBT Verification Regime

To verify compliance with the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear explosions:To verify compliance with the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear explosions:

Entry into Force and Universalisation

● Signed by 182 States (out of 195) ● 153 States have ratifiedLatest ratification: Central African Republic

What are NWFZs?

• Internationally binding agreements among regionally defined groups of states that effectively prohibits “the development, manufacturing, control, possession, testing or transporting of nuclear weapons within the zone, both by regional parties and NWS” – UN definition

• NWFZ treaties permit peaceful uses & applications of nuclear energy, under IAEA safeguards

• “..zonal approach ….. to global nuclear weapon elimination by gradually shrinking the areas for which nuclear weapons were seen as a legitimate part of national or regional security” - Alfonso Garcia Robles

Criteria for NWFZs

UNGA Res 3472 B (1975):

• NWFZs result from an agreement between states on the total absence of nuclear weapons from the territory of the zone, together with a mechanism for verification and control.

• called for NWS to respect the terms of NWFZs, not to deploy nuclear weapons in them, and not to threaten state parties to the zones with nuclear weapons.

1978 UNSSOD 1:

• Encouraged the establishment of additional NWFZs

• Emphasized 6 important principles:

1. Initiative for the zone must come from the States in the region

2. Instrument establishing zone must be a legally binding treaty

3. NWFZ must establish the total absence of nuclear weapons within the zone of application

4. A verification and control system for the zone must be established

5. Geographic zone of application of the zone must be clearly defined

6. NWFZ must be recognized as such by the GA

Criteria for NWFZs

1998 UN Guidelines for NWFZ establishment

1998 UNDC Guidelines :

• NWFZ reaffirms legal obligations deriving from other nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament commitments

• Obligations of all state parties should be clearly defined, be legally binding

• Adherence to other regional and international arrangements does not entail obligations contrary to NWFZ treaties

• NWFZ should effectively prohibit development, manufacturing, control, possession, testing, stationing or transporting by state parties of nuclear explosive device for any purpose, and do not permit stationing of nuclear devices by any other states within the zone

• NWFZ should allow for effective verification of compliance, inter alia through CSA

• NWFZ should not prevent peaceful development of nuclear science and technology, rather could promote cooperation in this field

CTBT & NWFZs

●NWFZs cover territories of more than 110 countries:

• Latin America & Caribbean (Tlatelolco), • Antarctic, South Pacific (Rarotonga) • South East Asia (Bangkok), • Africa (Pelindaba), Mongolia, • Central Asia (Semipalatinsk)

● Test ban is common to NWFZs, and several zones served as catalysts for CTBT● Not all members of NWFZs have signed and ratified the CTBT ● Some NWS have not ratified Protocols to NWFZs

The 5 NWFZs

Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967)

EiF: 25 April 1969

• First NWFZ, served as a model for all future NWFZs

• Covers the LAC region and large sectors of thePacific and Atlantic Oceans

• Obligates parties not to acquire or possess NWs,nor to permit their storage or deploymenton their territories by other countries.

• Allows PNEs with transparency

• All protocols ratified but no restriction on high seas

• Verification: OPANAL created to ensure Treaty obligations met + Multi & Bilateral agreements on safeguards concluded with the IAEA.

The 5 NWFZs

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (1985) EiF: 11 December 1986

• Extends from Australia to LAC NWFZ

• Prohibits all nuclear activity except exports for peaceful uses under the NPTand IAEA

• Bans testing of nuclear explosive devices

• Verification through reports, info exchange andIAEA safeguards

• France and the UK have ratified all 3 protocols. Russia and China have ratified Protocols II and III. U.S. ratification of all 3 protocols still pending

The 5 NWFZs

Treaty of Bangkok (1995) EiF: 28 March 1997

• States decide for themselves whether to allow passage of foreign NW through zone

• Bans RW dumping, R&D on NWs

• Covers territories, continental shelves, EEZ of the States Parties

• No protocols signed

• Verification through reports, info exchange and IAEA safeguards

The 5 NWFZs

Central Asian NWFZ (2006) EiF: 21 March 2009

• Forbids development, possession of NWs. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy permitted under enhanced IAEA safeguards

• Requires efforts towards environmental rehabilitation

• Requires Additional Protocol & compliance with CTBT

• Provides for annual consultative meetings to review compliance

• Protocol not yet signed or ratified

The 5 NWFZs

EiF: 15 July 2009

• Covers the entire African continent and surrounding islands

• Prohibits weapons research, possession,testing

• Mandates program reversal

• African Commission on Nuclear Energy

• Parties required to apply full-scope IAEA safeguards

• No attacks on nuclear facilities

• Protocols I & II not ratified by USA & Russia; Protocol III not signed by Spain

Treaty of Pelindaba (1996)

Other Existing NWFZs

• Antarctic Treaty (1959)

• Outer Space Treaty (1967)

• Seabed Treaty (1971)

• Mongolia declared itself a single-state NWFZ in 1992. UN General Assembly recognized this status in 1998.

Other Existing NWFZs

• 1992 Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Agreement – not implemented

• De facto Zone in East-Central Europe, owing to 4+2 Treaty on German reunification, which prohibits foreign military forces in the former GDR, and the Bush-Gorbachev unilateral initiatives of 1991

• A number of other countries have national policies or laws prohibiting the deployment on their territory of nuclear weapons (such as Austria and Japan). Such policies or laws lack official endorsement by the UNGA.

CTBT & NWFZs

• NWZs not designed for sole purpose of prohibiting testing – aimed at preventing nuclearization . NWFZs limited to a specific region – CTBT is universal

• Legal variations exist between NWFZs about the no-test obligation:

- Tlatelolco, Art 1: prohibits testing and prevents in territories testing of any nuclear weapons, BUT Art 18 allows PNEs, provided they are carried out in conformity with the treaty – no distinction between military and peaceful devices

- Rarotonga: “prevent” testing, but not “prohibits” as CTBT- Pelindaba: “prohibits” but not “prevent”, and obligation is aimed at

states not the Region- Bangkok: ambiguous about weapons testing vs. PNEs and state

use vs. non-state entities; limited no-test verification

CTBT & NWFZs

• NWFZs have limited verification compared to IMS & IDC – verification handled by IAEA & through consultation among States

• NWFZs facilitate entry into force of the CTBT

• CTBT can help regions with no NWFZ to bridge financial and technical gaps enabling them to create NWFZs

• CTBT can operate as a confidence-building measure in specific regions

• Through the IMS & IDC, the CTBT can offer foolproof verification of NWFZs

• Way forward: The ME and Korean peninsula

Thank You!