The Opening of Genesis Part VIII. And God said: "Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven, to divide the day and the night…."

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The Opening of Genesis Part VIII.

And God said, “Let there be lights made in the firmament

of heaven, to divide the day and the night….”

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

§

1



TEXTS.

1. Gen 1:14: Parallel translations:

14: And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven to divide the day from

the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years: (AV)

14 And God said, “Let there be lights in the firmament of the heavens to separate the day

from the night; and let them be for signs and for seasons and for days and years, (RSVCE)

14 κα ε πεν θεός γενηθήτωσαν φωστ ρες ν τ στερεώματι το ο ρανο ε ς φα σινὶ ἶ ὁ ῆ ἐ ῷ ῦ ὐ ῦ ἰ ῦ τ ς γ ς το διαχωρίζειν ν μέσον τ ς μέρας κα ν μέσον τ ς νυκτ ς κα στωσανῆ ῆ ῦ ἀ ὰ ῆ ἡ ὶ ἀ ὰ ῆ ὸ ὶ ἔ

ε ς σημε α κα ε ς καιρο ς κα ε ς μέρας κα ε ς νιαυτο ς (LXX)ἰ ῖ ὶ ἰ ὺ ὶ ἰ ἡ ὶ ἰ ἐ ὺ

14 Dixit autem Deus: Fiant luminaria in firmamento cæli, et dividant diem ac noctem, et sint

in signa et tempora, et dies et annos: (Vulg.)

1:14. And God said: Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven, to divide the day

and the night, and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years: (Douay-

Rheims Challoner Revision)

§

2



CONTENTS

I. ON THE WORK OF THE FOURTH DAY.

II. THE MAKEUP OF THE UNIVERSE: ON WHAT WAS CREATED AT THE

BEGINNING.

III. ON SEMINAL REASONS.

IV. ON BEING THE FIRST BEGINNING OR INCEPTION OF SOMETHING.

§

3



I. ON THE WORK OF THE FOURTH DAY.

1. St. Thomas’ Proem and the three articles.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 70, Proem (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY (THREEARTICLES)

Consequenter considerandum est de opere

ornatus. Et primo, de singulis diebus secun-

dum se; secundo, de omnibus sex diebus in

communi.

Circa primum ergo, considerandum est primo

de opere quartae diei, secundo, de opere quin-

tae; tertio, de opere sextae; quarto, de iis quae

pertinent ad septimum diem.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, de pro-ductione luminarium. Secundo, de fine pro-

ductionis eorum. Tertio, utrum sint animata.

We must next consider the work of adorn-

ment, first as to each day by itself, secondly as

to all seven days in general.

In the first place, then, we consider the work

of the fourth day, secondly, that of the fifth

day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and fourthly,

such matters as belong to the seventh day.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) As to the production of the lights;

(2) As to the end of their production; (3)

Whether they are living beings?

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 70, art. 1 (tr. English Dominican Fathers;

slightly rev. B.A.M.):

Ad primum sic proceditur.

Videtur quod luminaria non debuerint produci

quarta die. Luminaria enim sunt corpora incur-ruptibilia naturaliter. Ergo eorum materia non

potest esse absque formis eorum. Sed eorum

materia producta est in opere creationis, ante

omnem diem. Ergo et eorum formae. Non ergo

sunt facta quarta die.

Praeterea, luminaria sunt quasi vasa luminis.

Sed lux est facta prima die. Ergo luminaria

fieri debuerunt prima die, et non quarta.

Praeterea, sicut plantae fixae sunt in terra,

ita luminaria fixa sunt in firmamento, unde

Scriptura dicit quod posuit ea in firma-

mento. Sed productio plantarum simul de-

scribitur cum formatione terrae, cui inhaer-

ent.

Whether the lights ought to have been pro-

duced on the fourth day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the lights

ought not to have been produced on the fourthday. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature

incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter

cannot exist without their form. But as their

matter was produced in the work of creation,

before there was any day, so therefore were

their forms. It follows, then, that the lights

were not produced on the fourth day.

Objection 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it

were, vessels of light. But light was made on

the first day. The luminaries, therefore, should

have been made on the first day, not on thefourth.

Objection 3: Further, the lights are fixed in

the firmament, as plants are fixed in the

earth. For, the Scripture says: “He set them

in the firmament.” But plants are described

as produced when the earth, to which they

are attached, received its form.

4



Ergo et productio luminarium simul debuit

poni, secunda die, cum productione firma-

menti.

Praeterea, sol et luna et alia luminaria sunt

causae plantarum. Sed naturali ordine causa

praecedit effectum. Ergo luminaria non debu-

erunt fieri quarta die, sed tertia vel ante.

Praeterea, multae stellae, secundum astro-

logos, sunt luna maiores. Non ergo tantum sol

et luna debuerunt poni duo magna luminaria.

Sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scrip-

turae.

Respondeo dicendum quod in recapitulatione

divinorum operum, Scriptura sic dicit, igitur perfecti sunt caeli et terra, et omnis ornatuseorum. In quibus verbis triplex opus intelligi

potest, scilicet opus creationis, per quod cae-

lum et terra producta leguntur, sed informia.

Et opus distinctionis, per quod caelum et terra

sunt perfecta, sive per formas substantiales

attributas materiae omnino informi, ut Augus-

tinus vult; sive quantum ad convenientem

decorem et ordinem, ut alii sancti dicunt.

Et his duobus operibus additur ornatus. Et

differt ornatus a perfectione. Nam perfectio

caeli et terrae ad ea pertinere videtur quae

caelo et terrae sunt intrinseca, ornatus vero

ad ea quae sunt a caelo et terra distincta.

Sicut homo perficitur per proprias partes et

formas, ornatur autem per vestimenta, vel

aliquid huiusmodi.

Distinctio autem aliquorum maxime manife-

statur per motum localem, quo ab invicem

separantur. Et ideo ad opus ornatus pertinet

productio illarum rerum quae habent motum in

caelo et in terra.

The lights, therefore, should have been pro-

duced at the same time as the firmament,

that is to say, on the second day.

Objection 4: Further, plants are an effect of

the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies.

Now, cause precedes effect in the order of

nature. The lights, therefore, ought not to have

been produced on the fourth day, but on thethird day [or earlier].

Objection 5: Further, as astronomers say,

there are many stars larger than the moon.

Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not

correctly described as the “two great lights.”

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of

Scripture.

I answer that, in recapitulating the Divine

works, Scripture says (Gn. 2:1): “So theheavens and the earth were finished and all the

furniture of them,” in which words a threefold

work may be understood, namely, [to begin

with], the work of creation, by which the

heaven and the earth were appointed, but as

yet without form.

And [in the second place] the work of dis-

tinction, by which the heaven and the earth

were perfected, either by adding substantial

form to formless matter, as Augustine holds

(Gen. ad lit . ii, 11), or by giving them theorder and beauty due to them, as other holy

writers suppose.

To these two works is added the work of

adornment, which differs from perfection.

For the perfection of the heaven and the

earth seem to pertain to those things which

are intrinsic to heaven and earth, but

adornment to those things which are dis-

tinct from heaven and earth, just as the

perfection of a man lies in his proper parts

and forms, but he is adorned by clothing orsomething of the sort.

Now just as distinction of certain things is

made most evident by their local movement,

as separating one from another; so the work of

adornment is set forth by the production of

things having movement in the heavens, and

upon the earth.

5



Sicut autem supra dictum est, de tribus fit

mentio in creatione, scilicet de caelo et aqua et

terra. Et haec tria etiam formantur per opusdistinctionis tribus diebus, primo die, caelum;

secundo die distinguuntur aquae; tertio die fit

distinctio in terra, maris et aridae.

Et similiter in opere ornatus, primo die, qui est

quartus, producuntur luminaria, quae moven-

tur in caelo, ad ornatum ipsius. Secundo die,

qui est quintus, aves et pisces, ad ornatum

medii elementi, quia habent motum in aere et

aqua, quae pro uno accipiuntur. Tertio die, qui

est sextus, producuntur animalia quae habent

motum in terra, ad ornatum ipsius.

Sed sciendum est quod in productione lu-

minarium non discordat Augustinus ab aliis

sanctis. Dicit enim luminaria esse facta in

actu, non in virtute tantum, non enim habet

firmamentum virtutem productivam lumin-

arium, sicut habet terra virtutem produc-

tivam plantarum. Unde Scriptura non dicit,

producat firmamentum luminaria; sicut

dicit, germinet terra herbam virentem.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum

Augustinum, nulla difficultas ex hoc oritur. Non enim ponit successionem temporis in istis

operibus, et ideo non oportet dicere quod

materia luminarium fuerit sub alia forma.

Secundum etiam eos qui ponunt caelestiacorpora ex natura quatuor elementorum, nulla

difficultas accidit, quia potest dici quod sunt

formata ex praeiacenti materia, sicut animalia

et plantae.

Sed secundum eos qui ponunt corpora cae-lestia esse alterius naturae ab elementis et

incorruptibilia per naturam, oportet dicere

quod substantia luminarium a principio fuit

creata; sed prius erat informis, et nuncformatur; non quidem forma substantiali,

sed per collationem determinatae virtutis.

Now as was stated above (Question [69],

Article [1]), mention is made of three things in

creation, namely, heaven and water and earth.And these three received their form from the

three days’ work of distinction, on the first day

heaven; on the second day the waters were

distinguished; and on the third day, the earth

was divided into sea and dry land.

So also is it in the work of adornment; on the

first day of this work, which is the fourth of

creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the

heaven by their movements; on the second

day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes are

called into being, to make beautiful the inter-

mediate element, for they move in air and

water, which are here taken as one; while on

the third day, which is the sixth, animals are

brought forth,1 to move upon the earth and

adorn it.

It must also here be noted that Augustine’s

opinion (Gen. ad lit . v, 5) on the production

of lights is not at variance with that of other

holy writers, since he says that they were

made actually, and not merely virtually, for

the firmament has not the power of pro-

ducing lights, as the earth has of producing

plants.2 Wherefore Scripture does not say:

“Let the firmament produce lights,” though

it says: “Let the earth bring forth the greenherb.”

Reply to Objection 1: In Augustine’s opinion

there is no difficulty here; for he does not holda succession of time in these works, and so

there was no need for the matter of the lights

to exist under another form. Nor is there any

difficulty in the opinion of those who hold theheavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four

elements, for it may be said that they were

formed out of matter already existing, as

animals and plants were formed.

For those, however, who hold the heavenlybodies to be of another nature from the ele-

ments, and naturally incorruptible, the ans-

wer must be that the lights were substantially

created at the beginning, but that their sub-

stance, at first formless, is formed on this

day, by receiving not its substantial form, but

a determination of power.1 Are men to be included under “animals” here?2 On this claim, see my separate discussion below.

6



N.B. While I will deal with many issues raised by this article below, here I will briefly re-mark on the division of God’s work into three. As we have seen, St. Thomas takes the first

verse to describe the opus creationis, the work of creation, as though it were the first of

three works. Yet there is a respectable tradition in Catholic interpretation understandingthis work as embracing the following two works, those of distinction and adornment, as its

composing parts. That is to say, Genesis 1 states universally that God created all that is

(meaning the visible creation), which He afterwards brought to completion and adornment.

§

3 Cf. Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names. In Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works. Trans.

Colm Luibheid. Classics of Western Spirituality (New York, 1987), ch. 4, n. 4, p. 75:

Light too is the measure and the enumerator of the hours, of the days, and indeed of all the time we

have. It was this light, then unshaped , which according to the divine Moses, marked the first

three days at the beginning of time.138 [138 Gn 1:3-5, 19] (emphasis added)

7



Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 70, art. 2 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Ad secundum sic proceditur.

Videtur quod inconvenienter causa produc-

tionis luminarium describatur. Dicitur enim

Ierem. X, a signis caeli nolite metuere, quae

gentes timent . Non ergo luminaria in signafacta sunt.

Praeterea, signum contra causam dividitur.

Sed luminaria sunt causa eorum quae hic

aguntur. Ergo non sunt signa.

Praeterea, distinctio temporum et dierum in-

coepit a primo die. Non ergo facta sunt lumin-

aria in tempora et dies et annos, idest in horum

distinctionem.

Praeterea, nihil fit propter vilius se, quia finis

est melior iis quae sunt ad finem. Sed lumin-

aria sunt meliora quam terra. Non ergo facta

sunt ut illuminent terram.

Praeterea, luna non praeest nocti quando est

prima. Probabile autem est quod luna facta

fuerit prima, sic enim homines incipiunt com-

putare. Ergo luna non est facta ut praesit nocti.

In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est

supra, creatura aliqua corporalis potest dici

esse facta vel propter actum proprium, vel

propter aliam creaturam, vel propter totum

universum, vel propter gloriam Dei. Sed

Moyses, ut populum ab idololatria revocaret,

illam solam causam tetigit, secundum quod

sunt facta ad utilitatem hominum. Unde dicitur Deut. IV, ne forte, elevatis oculis ad caelum,videas solem et lunam et omnia astra caeli, et errore deceptus adores ea et colas, quae crea-vit dominus Deus in ministerium cunctis genti-bus. Hoc autem ministerium explicat in prin-

cipio Genesis per tria.

Whether the cause assigned for the productionof the lights is reasonable?

Objection 1: It would seem that the cause

assigned for the production of the lights is not

reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): “Be not

afraid of the signs of heaven, which theheathens fear.” Therefore the heavenly lights

were not made to be signs.

Objection 2: Further, sign is contradicting-

uished from cause. But the lights are the cause

of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore

they are not signs.

Objection 3: Further, the distinction of

seasons and days began from the first day.

Therefore the lights were not made “for

seasons, and days, and years,” that is, in order to distinguish them.

Objection 4: Further, nothing is made for the

sake of that which is inferior to itself, “since

the end is better than the means” (Topic. iii).

But the lights are nobler than the earth. There-

fore they were not made “to enlighten it.”

Objection 5: Further, the new moon cannot

be said “to rule the night.” But such it pro-

bably did when first made; for men begin to

count from the new moon. The moon,

therefore, was not made “to rule the night.”

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of

Scripture.

I answer that, As we have said above

(Question [65], Article [2]), a corporeal cre-

ature can be considered as made either for

the sake of its proper act, or for other crea-

tures, or for the whole universe, or for the

glory of God. Of these reasons only that

which points out the usefulness of these things

to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order towithdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is

written (Dt. 4:19): “Lest perhaps lifting up thy

eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon

and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived

by error thou adore and serve them, which the

Lord thy God created for the service of all

nations.” Now, he explains this service at the

beginning of Genesis as threefold.

8



Primo enim provenit utilitas hominibus ex

luminaribus quantum ad visum, qui est direc-tivus in operibus, et maxime utilis ad cognos-

cendas res. Et quantum ad hoc, dicit, ut luceant in firmamento, et illuminent terram.

Secundo, quantum ad vicissitudines temporum, quibus et fastidium tollitur et valetudo

conservatur, et necessaria victui oriuntur quae

non essent, si semper esset aut aestas aut

hiems. Et quantum ad hoc, dicit, ut sint in tempora et dies et annos.

Tertio, quantum ad opportunitatem negoti-

orum et operum, inquantum ex luminaribus

caeli accipitur significatio pluviosi temporis

vel sereni quae sunt apta diversis negotiis. Et

quantum ad hoc dicit, ut sint in signa.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod luminaria

sunt in signa corporalium transmutationum,

non autem eorum quae dependent ex libero

arbitrio.

Ad secundum dicendum quod per causam

sensibilem quandoque ducimur in cognitionem

effectus occulti, sicut et e converso. Unde nihil

prohibet causam sensibilem esse signum. Ideo

tamen potius dicit signa quam causas, utoccasionem idololatriae tolleret.

Ad tertium dicendum quod in prima die

facta est communis distinctio temporis per

diem et noctem, secundum motum diur-

num, qui est communis totius caeli; qui po-

test intelligi incoepisse primo die.

Sed speciales distinctiones dierum et tem-

porum, secundum quod dies est calidior die,

et tempus tempore, et annus anno, fiuntsecundum speciales motus stellarum; qui

possunt intelligi quarto die incoepisse.

First, the lights are of service to man, in regard

to sight, which directs him in his works, and ismost useful for perceiving objects. In refer-

ence to this he says: “Let them shine in the

firmament and give life to the earth.”

Secondly, as regards the changes of the sea-sons, which prevent weariness, preserve

health, and provide for the necessities of food;

all of which things could not be secured if it

were always summer or winter. In reference to

this he says: “Let them be for seasons, and for

days, and years.”

Thirdly, as regards the convenience of busi-

ness and work, in so far as the lights are set in

the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as

favorable to various occupations. And in this

respect he says: “Let them be for signs.”

Reply to Objection 1: The lights in the

heaven are set for signs of changes effected in

corporeal creatures, but not of those changes

which depend upon the free-will.

Reply to Objection 2: We are sometimes

brought to the knowledge of hidden effects

through their sensible causes, and conversely.

Hence nothing prevents a sensible cause from

being a sign. But he says “signs,” rather than“causes,” to guard against idolatry.

Reply to Objection 3: The general division

of time into day and night took place on the

first day, as regards the diurnal movement,

which is common to the whole heaven and

may be understood to have begun on that

first day.

But the particular distinctions of days and

seasons and years, according as one day is

hotter than another, one season than ano-ther, and one year than another, are due to

certain particular movements of the stars:

which movements may have had their be-

ginning on the fourth day.4

4 On the distinction of heavens here, cf. Ia, q. 68, art. 1, ad 1 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

According to Bede ( Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the

firmament made on the second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene ( De Fide Orth. ii)

9



§

that of the first day was spherical in form and without stars, the same, in fact, that the philosophersspeak of, calling it the ninth sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal move-

ment: while by the firmament made on the second day he understands the starry heaven. According to

another theory, touched upon by Augustine [*Gen. ad lit . ii, 1] the heaven made on the first day was

the starry heaven, and the firmament made on the second day was that region of the air where the

clouds are collected, which is also called heaven, but equivocally.

5 It is surprising to find St. Thomas conclude as though preferring the solution proper to the Ambrosian

interpretative tradition over that of St. Augustine.

10




Ad tertium sic proceditur.

Videtur quod luminaria caeli sint animata.

Superius enim corpus nobilioribus ornamentis

ornari debet. Sed ea quae pertinent ad ornatum

inferiorum corporum, sunt animata; scilicet pisces, aves et terrestria animalia. Ergo et lu-

minaria, quae pertinent ad ornatum caeli.

Praeterea, nobilioris corporis nobilior est

forma. Sed sol et luna et alia luminaria sunt

nobiliora quam corpora plantarum et ani-malium. Ergo habent nobiliorem formam. No-

bilissima autem forma est anima, quae est

principium vitae, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in

libro de vera Relig., quaelibet substantiavivens naturae ordine praefertur substantiaenon viventi. Ergo luminaria caeli sunt animata.

Praeterea, causa nobilior est effectu. Sed sol et

luna et alia luminaria sunt causa vitae, ut patet

maxime in animalibus ex putrefactione

generatis, quae virtute solis et stellarum vitam

consequuntur. Ergo multo magis corpora

caelestia vivunt et sunt animata.

Praeterea, motus caeli et caelestium cor-

porum sunt naturales, ut patet in I de caelo.

Motus autem naturalis est a principio intrin-

seco. Cum igitur principium motus caeles-

tium corporum sit aliqua substantia appre-

hensiva, quae movetur sicut desiderans a

desiderato, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys.; vide-

tur quod principium apprehendens sit princi-

pium intrinsecum corporibus caelestibus.

Ergo sunt animata.

Praeterea, primum mobile est caelum. Ingenere autem mobilium, primum est movens

seipsum, ut probatur in VIII Physic., quia quod

est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud. Sola

autem animata movent seipsa, ut in eodem

libro ostenditur. Ergo corpora caelestia sunt

animata.

Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?

Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of

heaven are living beings. For the nobler a

body is, the more nobly it should be adorned.

But a body less noble than the heaven, isadorned with living beings, with fish, birds,

and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights

of heaven, as pertaining to its adornment,

should be living beings also.

Objection 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the

nobler must be its form. But the sun, moon,

and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals, and must therefore have nobler

forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the

soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence

Augustine ( De Vera Relig . xxix) says: “Everyliving substance stands higher in the order of

nature than one that has not life.” The lights of

heaven, therefore, are living beings.

Objection 3: Further, a cause is nobler than

its effect. But the sun, moon, and stars are a

cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the

case of animals generated from putrefaction,

which receive life from the power of the sun

and stars. Much more, therefore, have the

heavenly bodies a living soul.

Objection 4: Further, the movement of the

heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural

(De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and natural movement

is from an intrinsic principle. Now the prin-

ciple of movement in the heavenly bodies is a

substance capable of apprehension, and is

moved as the desirer is moved by the object

desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36). Therefore,

seemingly, the apprehending principle is

intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and con-

sequently they are living beings.

Objection 5: Further, the first of movables isthe heaven. Now, of all things that are en-

dowed with movement the first moves itself,

as is proved in Phys. viii, text. 34, because,

what is such of itself precedes that which is by

another. But only beings that are living move

themselves, as is shown in the same book

(text. 27). Therefore the heavenly bodies are

living beings.

11



Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in libro

II, nullus animatos caelos vel luminariaaestimet; inanimati enim sunt et insensibiles.

Respondeo dicendum quod circa istam quaes-

tionem apud philosophos fuit diversa opinio.

Anaxagoras enim, ut Augustinus refert Lib.

XVIII de Civ. Dei, factus est reus apud Athenienses, quia dixit solem esse lapidemardentem, negans utique ipsum esse Deum, vel

aliquid animatum. Platonici vero posuerunt

corpora caelestia animata. Similiter etiam apud

doctores fidei, fuit circa hoc diversa opinio.

Origenes enim posuit corpora caelestia ani-

mata. Hieronymus etiam idem sentire videtur,

exponens illud Eccle. I, lustrans universa, per circuitum pergit spiritus. Basilius vero et

Damascenus asserunt corpora caelestia non

esse animata. Augustinus vero sub dubio

dereliquit, in neutram partem declinans, ut patet in II supra Gen. ad Litt.; et in Enchirid.,

ubi etiam dicit quod, si sunt animata caelestia

corpora, pertinent ad societatem Angelorum

eorum ani-mae.

In hac autem opinionum diversitate, ut veritas

aliquatenus innotescat, considerandum est

quod unio animae et corporis non est propter

corpus, sed propter animam, non enim forma

est propter materiam, sed e converso.

Natura autem et virtus animae deprehenditur

ex eius operatione, quae etiam quodammodo

est finis eius. Invenitur autem corpus neces-sarium ad aliquam operationem animae, quae

mediante corpore exercetur; sicut patet in

operabus animae sensitivae et nutritivae. Unde

necesse est tales animas unitas esse corporibus

propter suas operationes. Est autem aliqua

operatio animae, quae non exercetur corporemediante, sed tamen ex corpore ali-quod ad-

miniculum tali operationi exhibetur; sicut per

corpus exhibentur animae humanae phan-

tasmata, quibus indiget ad intelligendum.

Unde etiam talem animam necesse est corpori

uniri propter suam operationem, licet contingat

ipsam separari.

On the contrary, Damascene says ( De FideOrth. ii), “Let no one esteem the heavens or

the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have neither life nor sense.”

I answer that, Philosophers have differed on

this question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Au-

gustine mentions ( De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), “was

condemned by the Athenians for teaching thatthe sun was a fiery mass of stone, and neither

a god nor even a living being.” On the other

hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly

bodies have life. Nor was there less diversity

of opinion among the Doctors of the Church.

It was the belief of Origen ( Peri Archon i) and

Jerome that these bodies were alive, and the

latter seems to explain in that sense the words

(Eccles. 1:6), “The spirit goeth forward, sur-

veying all places round about.” But Basil

( Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene ( De

Fide Orth. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the

matter in doubt, without committing himself to

either theory, though he goes so far as to say

that if the heavenly bodies are really living

beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic

nature (Gen. ad lit . ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).

In examining the truth of this question,

where such diversity of opinion exists, we

shall do well to bear in mind that the union of

soul and body exists for the sake of the soul

and not of the body; for the form does notexist for the matter, but the matter for the

form.

Now the nature and power of the soul are ap-

prehended through its operation, which is to a

certain extent its end. Yet for some of theseoperations, as sensation and nutrition, our

body is a necessary instrument. Hence it is

clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must

be united to a body in order to exercise their

functions. There are, however, operations of

the soul which are not exercised through themedium of the body, though the body mini-

sters, as it were, to their production. The intel-

lect, for example, makes use of the phantasms

derived from the bodily senses, and thus far is

dependent on the body, although capable of

existing apart from it.

12



Manifestum est autem quod anima caelestis

corporis non potest habere operationes nutria-

tivae animae, quae sunt nutrire, augere etgenerare, huiusmodi enim operationes non

competunt corpori incorruptibili per naturam.

Similiter etiam nec operationes animae sen-

sitivae corpori caelesti conveniunt, quia omnes

sensus fundantur super tactum, qui est appre-

hensivus qualitatum elementarium. Omniaetiam organa potentiarum sensitivarum requi-

runt determinatam proportionem secun-dum

commixtionem aliquam elementorum, a quo-

rum natura corpora caelestia ponuntur remota.

Relinquitur ergo quod de operationibus

animae nulla potest competere animae caelesti

nisi duae, intelligere et movere, nam appetere

consequitur sensum et intellectum, et cum

utroque ordinatur.

Intellectualis autem operatio, cum non

exerceatur per corpus, non indiget corpore nisi

inquantum ei per sensus ministrantur phan-

tasmata. Operationes autem sensitivae animae

corporibus caelestibus non conveniunt, ut

dictum est.

Sic igitur propter operationem intellectualem,

anima caelesti corpori non uniretur. Relin-

quitur ergo quod propter solam motionem. Ad

hoc autem quod moveat, non oportet quoduniatur ei ut forma; sed per contactum virtutis,

sicut motor unitur mobili.

Unde Aristoteles, libro VIII Physic., post-

quam ostendit quod primum movens seipsum

componitur ex duabus partibus, quarum una

est movens et alia mota; assignans quomodo

hae duae partes uniantur, dicit quod per

contactum vel duorum ad invicem, si utrum-que sit corpus, vel unius ad alterum et non e

converso, si unum sit corpus et aliud non

corpus. Platonici etiam animas corporibus

uniri non ponebant nisi per contactum

virtutis, sicut motor mobili. Et sic per hoc

quod Plato ponit corpora caelestia animata,

nihil aliud datur intelligi, quam quod sub-

stantiae spirituales uniuntur corporibus cae-

It is not, however, possible that the functions

of nutrition, growth, and generation, through

which the nutritive soul operates, can be ex-ercised by the heavenly bodies, for such oper-

ations are incompatible with a body natur-ally

incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that the

functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to

the heavenly body, since all the senses depend

on the sense of touch, which perceives ele-mental qualities, and all the organs of the

senses require a certain proportion in the ad-

mixture of elements, whereas the nature of the

heavenly bodies is not elemental.

It follows, then, that of the operations of the

soul the only ones left to be attributed to the

heavenly bodies are those of understanding

and moving; for appetite follows both sensi-

tive and intellectual perception, and is in pro-

portion thereto.

But the operations of the intellect, which does

not act through the body, do not need a body

as their instrument, except to supply phan-

tasms through the senses. Moreover, the

operations of the sensitive soul, as we have

seen, cannot be attributed to the heavenly

bodies.

Accordingly, the union of a soul to a heavenly

body cannot be for the purpose of the oper-

ations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to

consider whether the movement of theheavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive

power, not that the soul, in order to move theheavenly body, need be united to the latter as

its form; but by contact of power, as a mover

is united to that which he moves.

Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43),

after showing that the first mover is made up

of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes

on to show the nature of the union between

these two parts. This, he says, is effected by

contact which is mutual if both are bodies;on the part of one only, if one is a body and

the other not. The Platonists explain the

union of soul and body in the same way, as a

contact of a moving power with the object

moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly

bodies to be living beings, this means nothing

else but that substances of spiritual nature

are united to them, and act as their moving

13



lestibus ut motores mobilibus. Quod autem

corpora caelestia moveantur ab aliqua sub-

stantia apprehenddente, et non solum a

natura, sicut gravia et levia, patet ex hoc,

quod natura non movet nisi ad unum, quo

habito quiescit, quod in motu corporum cael-

estium non apparet. Unde relinquitur quod

moventur ab aliqua substantia apprehend-

dente.

Augustinus etiam dicit, III de Trin., corpora

omnia administrari a Deo per spiritum vitae.

Sic igitur patet quod corpora caelestia non

sunt animata eo modo quo plantae et ani-

malia, sed aequivoce.

Unde inter ponentes ea esse animata, et po-

nentes ea inanimata, parva vel nulla differentia

invenitur in re, sed in voce tantum.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad orna-

tum pertinent aliqua secundum proprium

motum. Et quantum ad hoc, luminaria caeli

conveniunt cum aliis quae ad ornatum per-

tinent, quia moventur a substantia vivente.

Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet

aliquid esse nobilius simpliciter, quod tamennon est nobilius quantum ad aliquid. Forma

ergo caelestis corporis, etsi non sit simpliciter

nobilior anima animalis, est tamen nobilior

quantum ad rationem formae, perficit enim to-taliter suam materiam, ut non sit in potentia ad

aliam formam; quod anima non facit. Quan-

tum etiam ad motum, moventur corpora cae-

lestia a nobilioribus motoribus.

Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus caeleste,

cum sit movens motum, habet rationem

instrumenti, quod agit in virtute principalisagentis. Et ideo ex virtute sui motoris, qui

est substantia vivens, potest causare vitam.

power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are

moved by the direct influence and contact of

some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies

of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact

that whereas nature moves to one fixed end

which having attained, it rests; this does not

appear in the movement of heavenly bodies.

Hence it follows that they are moved by some

intellectual substances.

Augustine appears to be of the same opinion

when he expresses his belief that all corporeal

things are ruled by God through the spirit of

life ( De Trin. iii, 4).

From what has been said, then, it is clear

that the heavenly bodies are not living beings

in the same sense as plants and animals, and

that if they are called so, it can only be equi-

vocally.

It will also be seen that the difference of

opinion between those who affirm, and those

who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a

difference of things but of words.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong

to the adornment of the universe by reason

of their proper movement; and in this way

the heavenly luminaries agree with others

that conduce to that adornment, for theyare moved by a living substance.

Reply to Objection 2: One being may be

nobler than another absolutely, but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not con-

ceded that the souls of heavenly bodies are

nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it

must be conceded that they are superior tothem with regard to their respective forms,

since their form perfects their matter entirely,

which is not in potentiality to other forms;

whereas a soul does not do this. Also as re-

gards movement the power that moves the

heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly

body is a mover moved, it is of the nature of

an instrument, which acts in virtue of theagent: and therefore since this agent is a

living substance the heavenly body can im-

part life in virtue of that agent.

14



Ad quartum dicendum quod motus corporis

caelestis est naturalis, non propter principium

activum, sed propter principium passivum,quia scilicet habet in sua natura aptitudinem ut

tali motu ab intellectu moveatur.

Ad quintum dicendum quod caelum dicitur

movere seipsum, inquantum componitur exmotore et mobili, non sicut ex forma et

materia, sed secundum contactum virtutis,

ut dictum est. Et hoc etiam modo potest dici

quod eius motor est principium intrins-ecum, ut sic etiam motus caeli possit dici

naturalis ex parte principii activi; sicut

motus voluntarius dicitur esse naturalis

animali inquantum est animal, ut dicitur inVIII Physic.

Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the

heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of

their active principle, but on account of their passive principle; that is to say, from a certain

natural aptitude for being moved by an

intelligent power.

Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to

move itself in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the

mover, as the form, with the moved, as the

matter, but by contact with the motive power,

as we have said . So far, then, the principlethat moves it may be called intrinsic, and

consequently its movement natural with re-

spect to that active principle; just as we say

that voluntary movement is natural to theanimal as animal ( Phys. viii, text. 27). (em-

phasis added)

Hence, in St. Thomas’ opinion, strictly speaking, the principle of the motion of the heavensis not conjoined to the outermost sphere in the manner of a form, but by contact of power

as its mover, a relationship sufficient to found the comparison made between them.

For an account of the heavenly bodies from earlier in his career, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,

Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard , Book II, Distinction 14, Question 1, art.

3 (tr. Erik Norvelle):6

Article 3: Whether the motion of the heavens is due to an intelligence

Regarding the third issue, we proceed as follows. 1) It appears that the motion of the heavens

is not from a soul or from an intelligence. For the motion of the heavens is a natural motion,

as the Philosopher states in On the Heavens, Book I. But a natural motion is that whose

principle is a form of a natural body. Therefore it appears that the motion of the heavens is

from its natural form, and not from anything which moves by understanding.

2) Further, every motion [caused] by a soul is accompanied by labor and suffering, as isstated in On the Heavens, Book II. But the motion of the heavens is not of this sort, because

it would not be able to be continuous and uniform. Therefore it is not moved by a soul.

3) Further, an intellective soul is not connected to a body except by the sensitive and

vegetative soul, as is clear from the comparison of the parts of the soul with the species of

figures in On the Soul , Book II. But the heavenly bodies cannot have a sensitive or

vegetative soul, because they do not have a composite body, which would be required in

order that it be an instrument for a vegetative and sensitive soul. Therefore it appears that

[the heavens] cannot be moved by an intellective soul.

6 “This translation is based on the Latin text contained in Scriptum super Sententiis Petri Lombardi. Parma,

1856…. Translation by Erik Norvelle, published under a Creative Commons 2.0 Non-Commercial Share-

Alike license.” (Norvelle’s note)

15



4) Further, every body moved by a soul has a left and a right, as well as other differences of

position. But the heavenly body, being completely uniform, does not have this kind of

diversity of parts. Therefore it appears that it cannot be moved by a soul.

But on the contrary, 1) it is proven in Physics, Book VII, that [the heavenly body] is moved

by itself. But something moved by itself cannot exist, as is shown in the same place, unless it

is that sort of thing of which one part is a mover, and another part the moved. But every such

motion is the motion of an apprehensive power. Therefore it is necessary that the motion of

the heaven be from some apprehensive power.

2) Every natural motion is from a body existing outside of its own location. But this isimpossible to posit in the heavens. Therefore, the motion of the heavens is from some kind

of apprehension.

I respond by saying that concerning this issue there are multiple opinions. For some say that, just as the motion of other simple bodies is from their corporal natures, so also will be the

motion of the celestial body. But this appears not to be true. For every motion is from some

motor. But in the motion of simple bodies, even though the natural form is the principle of

motion, it is nevertheless not the motor. The essential motor, however, is the generator

which gives form, and the accidental [motor] is that which removes that which blocks

motion, as is proven in Physics, Book VIII, but this is totally inappropriate for the celestial body. And further, a natural motion is to one place only, and is perfected by natural rest, and

is of a body which exists outside of its natural place, all of which is also foreign to the

heavenly body. And thus others say that it must be the case that the motion of the heavenly

body is from another intelligent being endowed with will, but not immediately from God

Himself: for this does not correspond to the order of divine wisdom, the effect of which

comes to the last things through middle things, as Dionysius states. And thus Gregory [the

Great] states that corporeal creatures are governed by spiritual creatures; and thus it is

probable that some created intellect is the proximate motor of the heavens. Nevertheless itshould be known that the philosophers posited diverse motors in diverse moved and mobile

things, and thus they demonstrated the number of intelligent movers on the basis of the

number of these [moved and mobile things]. However, they assigned to every sphere two

motors: one conjoined, which they called the soul of the sphere, and another separated,which they called an Intelligence. The reason for this position was that an Intelligence,

according to these thinkers, possesses universal forms, and is therefore not appropriate for

immediately directing the renewals of the diverse motions of the heavens, or those things

which are educed by the motor of the heavens. Hence it is necessary that there be a motor in

which there are the particular forms which direct [the lesser things] in motion, and this they

called the soul of the sphere.

But this position is partly heretical, and partly can be held in a Catholic manner. For these

same [thinkers] hold that things proceed in an ordered fashion from God, i.e. the

Intelligences are created immediately by the First Cause, which is God, and from [the

Intelligences] the soul of the sphere proceeds; and from this there is produced the substance

of the sphere itself. Therefore it can be said that the proximate motor is its form or soul, because it gives itself existence, like a cause proportioned to itself. But this our faith does

not suffer, since it posits that only God is the creator of things, as was stated above. And

thus we can say that the Angels, which move the spheres in a proximate fashion, are

motors, but not forms or souls, because the spheres receive only motion from them, but

not existence. But we can sustain [their position] in this respect, as we said, in that the

higher Angels, which have more universal forms, are separated and remote motors; whereasthe inferior Angels, which have more particular forms, as was stated before, are proximate

motors.

16



Thus also Avicenna says that [those beings] called Intelligences by the philosophers are

what, according to the Law, are called higher Angels, such as Cherubim and Seraphim;

whereas the Souls of the spheres are said to be lesser, and these are called ministering

Angels.

1) In response to the first argument, it should be stated that, just as the Commentator says in

the first book of his commentary on On the Heavens, the motion of the heavens is said to be

natural, not because its active principle is some natural form, but because the celestial body

itself is of such a nature that it naturally is susceptible to such a motion [imparted] by someintellect, not having a natural repugnance to this voluntary motion, as there is in us. For

nature is not said only in regards to the form, but also in regards to matter.

2) Regarding the second argument: the Philosopher is speaking against those who posited the

heavens to be of the [same] nature as the inferior bodies, for then that motion would be

caused by a soul against the nature of the moved body, and thus labor and suffering would be necessary present in causing motion. But if we posit that that motion is from an intellect

according to the condition of the body moved, there will not then be violence nor labor.

3) Regarding the third argument: as the Commentator states in his book On the Substance of the Spheres, the heavenly body is neither generable nor corruptible, as are our bodies; and

thus it does not need any vegetative form. Similarly, also, its motor does not acquirecognition from things, but has a kind of active knowledge; and thus it does not need a

sensitive soul; and thus according to the philosophers the soul of the heavens and that of man

are not said univocally.

4) Regarding the fourth argument: according to the Philosopher, the celestial body can be

assigned differences of position; and thus its ‘right’ is said to be the East, from whence the

motion originates; and its ‘left’ is the West, and ‘above’ is the southern pole, and ‘below’ is

the Northern pole, and ‘ahead’ is the upper hemisphere, and ‘behind’ is the lower hemi-sphere. Nevertheless, these parts, as the Commentator himself states, are assigned differently

to the heavenly body and to our bodies, in two regards. First, in us these parts are diversified

by figure and power, but this is not the case in the heavenly body, since it is spherical

everywhere. Secondly, in us that determinate part which is right never becomes left, but inthe heavenly body that part of the sphere which is now right, later becomes left, because the

part which is now in the East will later be in the West. This occurs because the power which

brings out motion in us is the act of the body to whom organs are affixed, i.e. muscles and

nerves, but this is not the case in the heavenly body. (emphasis added)

On things being joined by “contact of power”, cf. Commentary By Saint Thomas AquinasOn the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. (n.d.), 11-5, on 11:23-

24:

11-5

1 Cor. 11:23-24

649. – Then when he says, he took bread, he shows the manner of the institution: first, he

relates what Christ said and did in instituting this sacrament; secondly, he explains (v. 26). In

regard to the first he does two things: first, he deals with the institution of this sacrament as

to the body of Christ; secondly, as to His blood (v. 25).

650. – In regard to the first, before explaining the text one must first consider the need for

instituting this sacrament. So it should be noted that the sacraments were instituted on

account of a need in the spiritual life. And because bodily things are likenesses of spiritual

17



things, it is fitting that the sacrament be proportionate to things which are necessary to

bodily life, in which generation comes first, to which baptism is proportionate and through

which one is reborn into the spiritual life. Secondly, for bodily life is required growth, by

which one is brought to perfect size and power. To this is proportionate the sacrament of

confirmation, in which the Holy Spirit is given for strength. Thirdly, for the spiritual life is

required food, by which man’s body is sustained, and likewise the spiritual life is fed by the

sacrament of the Eucharist, as it says in Ps 23 (v. 2): “He make me lie down in green

pastures. He leads me beside still waters.”7

651. – It should be known that the cause of generation is not joined according to its sub-

stance to the one generated, but only according to its power; but food is joined according toits substance to the fed. Hence in the sacrament of baptism, by which Christ regenerates us

to salvation, it is not Christ according to His substance but only according to His power. But

in the sacrament of this Eucharist, which is spiritual food, Christ is there according to His

substance. (emphasis added)

On the mode of the union of the soul with the body, cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, SummaTheologiae, Ia, q. 76, art. 8, c. (tr. B.A.M.).

I reply that it must be said that, as has already been said in other [places], if the soul were

united to the body solely as mover, it could be said that it would not be in any part of the body but in one alone, through which it would move the others. But since the soul is united

to the body as form, it must be that it is in the whole as well as in any part of the body. For it

is not an accidental form, but a substantial one. But a substantial form is not only the per-

fection of the whole, but of any part. For when a whole consists of parts, the form of the

whole which does not give being to the individual parts is a form which is composition

and order, like the form of a house, and such a form is accidental. But the soul is a sub-

stantial form, and so it must be the form and act not only of the whole, but also of any

of the parts. And so when the soul departs, just as a thing is not called an animal or a manexcept equi-vocally, in the manner of an animal that has been painted or fashioned of stone

—so it is in the case of a hand or an eye, or of flesh and bones, as the Philosophers says. The

sign of this is that no part of the body has its proper work when the soul departs, since

everything which retains its species would retain the activity of the species. But an act is inthat of which it is the act. And so the soul must be in the whole body, as well as in any part

of it…. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures , translated by Mary C.Fitzpatrick and John J. Wellmuth (slightly rev. B.A.M.) (Milwaukee, 1949), art. 4, obj. 4,

ad 4:

4. Furthermore, no form which demands a dissimilarity of parts is found in every part; as is

clear regarding the form “house”, which is not in every part of a house but in the house as a

whole. But forms which do not demand a dissimilarity of parts are in the individual parts, as,

for instance, the form “fire” and the form “air”. Now the soul is a form that demands a

dissimilarity of parts, as is clear in the case of all animate things. Therefore the soul is not in

every part of the body.

7 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Book IV of the Sentences, d.12, q.2, a.11 (taken from the Internet):

“Material food first changes into the one who eats it, and then, as a consequence, restores to him lost strength

and increases his vitality. Spiritual food, on the other hand, changes the person who eats it into itself. Thus

the effect proper to this Sacrament is the conversion of a man into Christ, so that he may no longer live, but

Christ lives in him; consequently, it has the double effect of restoring the spiritual strength he had lost by his

sins and defects, and of increasing the strength of his virtues.”

18



<…>

ad 4. With respect to the fourth, it must be said that the form “house”, since it is accidental,

does not give specific being to the individual parts of the house, as the soul gives it to theindividual parts of the body; and consequently there is no comparison.

Note that the first mover of the heaven is in it in the way in which the soul is in the first

principal part of the animal body—that is, to say, in the heart, as St. Thomas explains in his

little work De Motu Cordis, for which, see my separate treatment.

§

19



II. THE MAKEUP OF THE UNIVERSE: ON WHAT WAS CREATED AT THE

BEGINNING.

1. That the material universe consists of essential parts as well as adornment.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Compendium of Theology (St. Louis, 1947); translated by

Cyril Vollert, S.J., ch. 170:

CHAPTER 170

RENOVATION RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN CLASSES OF CREATURES

…We can argue reasonably to the same conclusion from the nature of the universe. Since

man is a part of the material universe, the material universe should remain when man is

brought to his final consummation; a part would seem to lack its proper perfection if it were

to exist without the whole. On the other hand, the material universe cannot remain in

existence without its essential parts. But the essential parts of the universe are the

heavenly bodies and the elements, for the entire world machine is made up of them [ ex

quibus tota mundi machina consistit ] . Other bodies do not, apparently, pertain to the

integrity of the material universe, but contribute rather to its adornment and beauty . They

befit its changeable state in the sense that, with a heavenly body acting as efficientcause, and with the elements as material causes, animals and plants and minerals are

brought into being. But in the state of final consummation another kind of adornment will

be given to the elements, in keeping with their condition of incorruption. In that state,accordingly, there will remain men, elements, and heavenly bodies, but not animals or plants

or minerals. (emphasis added)

In sum:

• “the essential parts of the universe are the heavenly bodies and the elements”

• the remaining parts are those which “contribute rather to its adornment and

beauty”, namely, “animals, plants, and minerals”

(Note that the spiritual creation is not at issue in the foregoing text.)

2. On the essential, which are also principal, parts of the universe including the angels.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by

Thomas Aquinas, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD, 1952),

q. 4, art. 2, replies to the contrary 3:

3. The disposition of a thing that is already complete is not the same as its disposition

while yet in the making: wherefore although the nature of a perfect and complete

world requires that all the essential parts of the universe exist together , it could be other-wise when the world was as yet in its beginning: thus in a complete man there cannot be

a heart without his other parts, yet in the formation of the embryo the heart is fashioned

before any other part . It may also be replied that in this beginning of things the

heavenly bodies and all the elements with their substantial forms were produced

together with the angels, all of which are the principal parts of the universe; and that onthe following days, something was done in the nature already created, and pertaining

to the perfection and adornment of the parts already produced. (emphasis added)

20



Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences, Book II. In Thomas Aquinas,Selected Writings. Edited and translated with an introduction and notes by Ralph McInerny(London, 1998), dist. 12, art. 2, obj. 6, ad 6:

6. Moreover, the parts of the universe are mutually dependent and the lower are especially

dependent on the higher. But where things depend on one another, one is not found without

the other. Therefore it seems unfitting to say that first there was water and earth and

afterwards the stars were made. <…>

Ad 6. It should be said that a thing does not have the same nature as once perfected

and in its coming to be, and thus although the nature of the completed world requires

that all essential parts of the universe exist simultaneously it can be otherwise in the

making of the world, just as in the perfected man the heart cannot be without the other

parts, and yet in the formation of the embryo the heart is generated before all the other

members. (emphasis added)

3. What was created in the beginning according to the Ambrosian position on the Work of

the Six Days.

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas,translated by the English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD, 1952), q. 4, art. 2, c.:

…Because (as stated in the preceding article) by the formless condition of matter they

did not understand the lack and exclusion of all form (since heaven, water and earth by

which they understood the heavenly bodies, were already in existence, besides spiritual

substances, and the four elements under their respective forms) but the mere absence and

exclusion of the due distinction and perfect comeliness of each thing, in that it was

lacking in that finish and beauty now to be seen in the corporeal creature. Thus we cangather from the text of Genesis, that the corporeal nature was lacking in a threefold beauty,

for which reason it is described as being formless. (emphasis added)

In sum, according to this tradition of interpretation, the first things created were theheavenly bodies, the four elements, and the spiritual substances; the remaining parts of creation, the several species of living things, being supposed to have also been created in

act, for which, see further below.

4. What was created in the beginning according to the Augustinian position on the Work of

the Six Days: Things specifically distinct and seminal reasons.

Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia Dei., op.cit., q. 4, art. 2, ad 29:

Reply to the Twenty-ninth Objection. It belongs to the wisdom of an artificer whose works,

like God’s, are all perfect, to make neither the whole separate from its chief part, nor the parts separate from the whole: since neither the whole separate from the chief part, or the

parts separate from the whole have perfect being. Since then the angels in their various

species, together with the heavenly bodies and the four elements are the chief parts con-

stituting the one universe, inasmuch as they are mutually ordered to one another and of service the one to the other; it follows that it belongs to God’s wisdom to produce the whole

universe, together with all its parts at the same time and not by degrees. The reason whereof is that of one whole together with all its parts there should be but one production, and that to

produce the one before the other is a mark of weakness in the agent. (emphasis added)

21



Cf. also a text given below, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., q. 4, art. 2, ad 22 (in part).

Cf. another text given below: St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard , In II Sent, dist. 12, q. 1, art. 2, c.

St. Augustine’s position in sum:

•

“certain things specifically distinct in their respective, natures, such as the four ele-ments produced from nothing, as well as the heavenly bodies8 and spiritual sub-

stances” (the latter being understood as “the angels in their various species”)

• “Also that other things are stated to have been created in their seed-forms, for

example animals, plants and men”

We may sum up the foregoing doctrine as follows:

What was created in the beginning in sum (being things seen and unseen):

1. spiritual substances, understood as the angels in their various grades and orders(unseen)

2. material or corporeal substances; things that are or have bodies (seen):

(a) the heavenly bodies (‘the lights of heaven’, the sun, the moon, and the stars)(b) the four elements (earth and water being mentioned by name, air being inti-

mated by the movement of the Spirit of God over the waters and fire by the

creation of light) (= inanimate nature) ); also minerals as composites of these(c) plants, animals, and men (= animate nature)

N.B. While there is perfect agreement between the two traditions regarding the parts of the

universe, according to St. Augustine, the several species of living things were created inseed-form, called ‘seminal reasons’, and afterwards, by the work of propagation, were

produced in act, a matter I consider at length below.

N.B.B. Note here as well that, as natural philosophy makes clear, the existence of spiritual

creatures is demanded as an explanation of motion. Note also that in the Work of the Six

Days, the complete order of nature is given: the whole of creation consisting in the materialand the immaterial substances, with non-living coming first, followed by living in the form

of plant-life. Then comes the various species of animal, and then man. Thus before the

living comes the non-living, and before the rational comes the sensitive or animal, and be-fore the animal comes the vegetative, just as is made known by philosophy, another matter

I discuss below.

5. Supplement. On the two orders of creature God created in the beginning.

Cf. the Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) (= Canon 1; Denzinger-

Schönmetzer, 800) (tr. B.A.M.):

8 Recognizing that by the ‘heaven and earth’ God created in the beginning is understood formless spiritual

and formless corporeal natures, to which afterwards was added substantial form, as is elsewhere explained.

22



Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur,

quod unus solus est verus Deus,

…unum universorum principium; creator om-

nium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et

corporalium; qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul

ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit

creaturam spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam

videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam,quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore consti-

tutam.

We firmly believe, and simply confess, that

there is only one true God,

…one principle of all things; creator of all

things visible and invisible, spiritual and cor-

poreal; who, by His almighty power, estab-

lished together out of nothing from the begin-

ning of time both orders of creature, the spiritual

and the corporeal, the angelic, namely, and themundane, and then the human, consitituted as it

were in common (with both)9 from spirit and

body.

6. Anatomy of the argument:

By His almighty power the one true God from the beginning of time established together

out of nothing

1. the spiritual (order of) creature, and

2. the corporeal

that is

(a) the angelic and(b) the mundane (both being sorts of nature, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains in his

commentary)

and then

3. the human,

constituted, as it were in common (with both [of the foregoing orders]),

from spirit and body.10

And so, in addition to the angelic and mundane natures, there is

(c) a nature in part angelic and in part mundane.

In sum, it is the teaching of the Decree that from the beginning of time God established to-gether out of nothing

1. the spiritual creature, understood as possessing the nature called ‘angelic’, and

2. the corporeal, the nature of which is ‘mundane’ or ‘this worldly’,

and then

9 Sc. of the foregoing natures.10 The “as it were” indicating that the nature called ‘human’ is not constituted from an angel and a body as its

composing parts, but rather shares in the natures of the spiritual and corporeal orders of creature.

23



3. the creature in part spiritual and in part corporeal —that is say, the order of creature

having something in common with the angelic or ‘other-worldly’ nature, as well asthe mundane or ‘this-worldly’, which is the creature man.

In this regard, compare the following:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 50, Proem (excerpt) (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

Post haec considerandum est de distinctione

corporalis et spiritualis creaturae. Et primo, de

creatura pure spirituali, quae in Scriptura sacra

Angelus nominatur; secundo, de creatura pure

corporali; tertio, de creatura composita ex cor-

porali et spirituali, quae est homo.

Now we consider the distinction of corporeal

and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely

spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is

called angel; secondly, the creature wholly

corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature,

corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

That is to say, after the foregoing matters have been treated, the distinction between thecorporeal and the spiritual creature is to be considered. And first , (a consideration is to be

made) about the purely spiritual creature, angel ; second , about the purely corporeal crea-

ture (left unnamed here, but which is properly called body), and third , about the creaturecomposed of the corporeal and the spiritual (which is to say, having a composite nature),

which is man.

Cf. ibid., Ia, q. 75, Proem (excerpt) (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Post considerationem creaturae spiritualis et

corporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex

spirituali et corporali substantia componitur.

Having treated of the spiritual and of the cor-

poreal creature, we now proceed to treat of man,

who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal

substance.

That is to say, after the consideration of the spiritual and the corporeal creature, the nextsubject to be considered is man, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance.

The several orders of creature in sum, then, are the spiritual (angel ), the corporeal (body),and the thing composed, in a manner of speaking, of both (man).Their three natures in sum: the angelic, the mundane, and human.

Their order of creation: the spiritual and the corporeal established together at the first , and then the creature partaking of both orders, and hence, so to speak, common.

N.B. For a detailed treatment of the Decree Firmiter , see PART VII of these series.

§

N.B. Before proceeding further, it must be noted here that St. Thomas’ consideration of

what was created in the beginning, whether in perfection or in seminal form, is quite complex, being marked by puzzling statements and apparent inconsistencies, and therefore de-

manding a thorough review; such a consideration being particularly necessitated inasmuch

as the interpretation we put forward, while indebted to his, nevertheless differs from it inseveral fundamental respects.

24



7. On the constitution of things in the very beginning of creation.

For his explicit teaching in relation to the production of plants, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,

Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 69, art. 2, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

I answer that, On the third day, as said (Article [1]), the formless state of the earth comes to

an end. But this state is described as twofold. On the one hand, the earth was “invisible” or

“void,” being covered by the waters; on the other hand, it was “shapeless” or “empty,” that

is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it, as it were, with a gar-

ment. Thus, therefore, in either respect this formless state ends on the third day: first, when

“the waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared”; secondly,

when “the earth brought forth the green herb.” But concerning the production of plants,

Augustine’s opinion differs from that of others. For other commentators, in accordance

with the surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in their

various species on this third day; whereas Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the

earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then

the power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of Scripture, for it is said

(Gn. 2:4,5): “These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created,in the day that . . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it

sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew.” 11 Therefore, the pro-

duction of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from theearth’s surface. And this is confirmed by reason, as follows.

In these first days God created all things12 in their origin or causes and from this work

He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in the work of propa-

gation, “He worketh until now.” Now the production of plants from out the earth is a work

of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their

causes only.13 However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the first con-

stitution of species belongs to the work of the six days, but the reproduction among them

of like from like, to the government of the universe. 14 And Scripture indicates this in the

words, “before it sprung up in the earth,” and “before it grew,” that is, before like was

produced from like; just as now happens in the natural course by the production of seed.

Wherefore Scripture says pointedly (Gn. 1:11): “Let the earth bring forth the green herb,

and such as may seed,” as indicating the production of perfection of perfect species, fromwhich the seed of others should arise.15 Nor does the question where the seminal power may

reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect the argument.

11 As many commentators note, the plants referred to in the latter account are those requiring rainfall as well

as the husbandry of man for their production, and so are quite distinct from the plants produced at the end of

the third day, thereby undermining the essential presupposition of St. Augustine’s interpretation. See our re-marks following, as well as the next footnote, and also my separate treatment below.12 In illis primis diebus condidit Deus creaturam originaliter vel causaliter ; literally, “In those first days God

established the creature originally [‘in its origin’] or causally”—that is, all living things, not all things simply;

the reading given, if uncorrected, leading to a manifest contradiction with what St. Thomas maintains.13 In the face of this assertion, I must remark that it is inexplicable to me that St. Augustine could have pro-

posed, and that St. Thomas could have approved, an interpretation of Gen 1:11-12 that so openly contradictsthe plain meaning of the text: the account of the appearance of the several species of plant life making quite

clear that God caused them to sprout up out of the ground [cf. “germinet terra”] in perfection. Cf. fn. 15.14 This is to suppose that all things were at the first created in their perfected forms rather than seminally.15 Unde signanter Scriptura dicit, germinet terra herbam virentem et facientem semen, quia scilicet sunt productae perfectae species plantarum, ex quibus semina aliarum orirentur . “And so Scripture pointedly

says, ‘Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed,’ meaning that the species of plants were

produced perfect, from which the seed of others [i.e. of other plants, which they reproduce] should arise.” (tr.

B.A.M.) That is to say, the species of plants were produced in perfection, since they were able to reproduce

right from the start, just as were Adam and Eve.

25



According to the foregoing text, Augustine maintains that

1. In these first days God established all creatures in their origin or causes (that is

to say, all living things), and from this work He subsequently rested. (Presumably,

this remark presupposes the establishment of everything else in their own natures)2. Yet afterwards, by governing his creatures, in the work of propagation, “He

worketh until now” (which is to produce things in act from seminal causes).

But according to other writers,

1. the first constitution of species belongs to the Work of the Six Days,

2. but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government of the uni-verse (the former positing them as first existing in perfection)

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas,translated by the English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD, 1952), q. 4, art. 2, obj. 28;

ad 28:

28. It is written (Gen. ii, 5) that God made every plant of the field before it sprung up in theearth, and every herb of the ground before it grew. Now the herbs were brought forth on the

third day. Hence some things were made before the third day, and all were not made at the

same time. <…>16

Reply to the Twenty-eighth Objection. In Augustine’s opinion the words, Let the earth

bring forth the green herb do not signify that plants were actually produced then in

their own nature, but that the earth then received certain forces of production to be

brought into action in the work of propagation: so that we may understand that theearth did then bring forth the green herb and the fruit-tree yielding fruit in the sense

that then it was made capable of bringing them forth. This is confirmed by the author-

ity of Scripture (Gen. ii, 4, 5) where we read: These are the generations of the heaven

and the earth when they were created in the day that the Lord God made the heaven and

the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of

the ground before it grew. Whence two conclusions are to be inferred. First, that all the

works of the six days were created on the day when God made heaven and earth and

every plant of the field, so that the plants, which are stated to have been made on the

third day were produced at the same time as heaven and earth were created by God.

Secondly, that the plants were brought forth then, not into actual existence, but only in

certain seed-forms, inasmuch as the earth was enabled to produce them. This is signified

when it is stated that God brought forth every plant of the field before it actually sprung up

in the earth by the work of administration, and every herb of the ground before it grew.

Accordingly before they actually grew above the earth they were produced causally in the

earth. It is also confirmed by the following argument. In those first days God produced the

creature in its cause, in its origin, or actual existence, by a work from which he rested

subsequently, and yet afterwards in the administration of things which he had made, hecontinues to work even until now in the work of propagation. Now the production of plantsfrom the earth into actual existence belongs to the work of propagation, since the

powers of the heavenly body as father, and of the earth as mother suffice for their

production.

16 It must be noted that, as with other parts of his Disputed Questions, St. Thomas’ reply here is missing; the

text given being a translation of the continuation supplied by the Dominican Vincent de Castro Novo, which

I give strictly for purposes of comparison. The same applies to the subsequent excerpt.

26



Hence the plants were not actually produced on the third day but only in their causes: and

after the six days they were brought into actual existence in their respective species and

natures by the work of government. Consequently before the plants were produced

causally, nothing was produced, but they were produced together with the heaven and

the earth. In like manner the fishes, birds and animals were produced in those six days

causally and not actually. (emphasis added)

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas,

translated by the English Dominican Fathers (1952), q. 4, art. 2, ad 22 (= the continuationof Vincent):

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. Augustine (Super Gen. v, 12, 14) holds that at the

very beginning of creation certain things specifically distinct were produced in their re-

spective natures, such as the four elements produced from nothing, as well as the

heavenly bodies and spiritual substances: for this kind of production requires no matter

either out of which or in which a thing is made. Also that other things are stated to have

been created in their seed-forms, for example animals, plants and men, and that these

were all subse-quently produced in their respective natures in that work by which God

after the six days attends to nature previously established , of which work it is said (Jo. v,

17): My Father worketh until now. Moreover he holds that in the production and distinction

of things we should see an order not of time but of nature: inasmuch as all the works of thesix days were wrought in the one instant of time either actually, or potentially in their seed-

forms, in that afterwards they could be made from pre-existent matter either by the Word, or

by the active forces with which the creature was endowed in its creation. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (= In II Sent.,dist. 12, q. 1, art. 2, c.: Parallel Translations:17

(tr. Msgr. John F. McCarthy)

For certain things are per se the substance of the

Faith, as that God is three and one, and other

things of this kind, in which no one is

authorized to think otherwise.

Thus the Apostle says in Galatians 1 that if an

angel of God preached diversely from what he

had taught, let him be anathema.

(tr. Ralph McInerny)

Article 2: Are all things created simultaneously,distinct in their species?

<…>

RESPONSE

It should be said that what pertains to faith is

distinguished in two ways, for some are as such

of the substance of faith, such that God is three

and one, and the like, about which no one may

licitly think otherwise.

Hence the Apostle in Galatians 1:8, ‘But even if

we or an angel from heaven should preach a

gospel to you other than that which we have

preached to you, let him be anathema!’

17 Cf. Msgr. John F. McCarthy, “A Neo-Patristic Return to the First Day of Creation.” PART V. The First

Four Days According to St. Thomas (http://www.rtforum.org/lt/lt49.html [1/14/09]). Cf. Ralph McInerny,Thomas Aquinas, Selected Writings (London, 1998), pp. 91-92.

27



But certain things (pertain to the faith) only

incidentally ( per accidens), inasmuch, that is, as

they are handed down in Scripture, which faith

supposes to have been promulgated under the

dictation of the Holy Spirit.

And these things can without danger remain

unknown by those who are not held to be know-

ledgeable about the Scriptures, for example,many items of history.

In these things even the Fathers have thought

differently and have explained the Scriptures in

different ways.

So, therefore, with regard to the beginning of

the world, there is something which pertains to

the substance of the Faith, namely, that the

world was created to begin with. And this all the

Fathers agree in saying.

But how and in what order it was made does not

pertain to the Faith except per accidens,inasmuch as it is presented in Scripture, the

truth of which the Fathers retained in their

varying explanations as they arrived at different

conclusions.

For Augustine maintains that at the very be-

ginning of creation certain things were separ-

ated out by species in their own proper

nature, such as the elements, the celestial

bodies, and the spiritual substances,

while other things were distinguished in sem-

inal reasons only, such as animals, plants,

and men, and that all of these latter things

were later produced in their own natures in

the activity by which after those six days God

governs nature created beforehand.

Concerning this activity in Jn 5:17 it is stated:

“My Father works even until now, and I work.”

(For Augustine) in the distinguishing of thingsthe focus is not on an order of time, but of

nature and of teaching.

Of nature, just as sound precedes song by nature

but not in time, thus things that are prior in

nature are recorded earlier, as the earth ismentioned before the animals and water before

the fish, and so with the other things.

Other things are only incidental to faith insofar

as they are treated in Scripture, which faith

holds to be promulgated under the dictation of

the Holy Spirit,

but which can be ignored by those who are not

held to know scripture, such as many of the

historical works.

On such matters even the saints disagree,

explaining scripture in different ways.

Thus with respect to the beginning of the world

something pertains to the substance of faith,

namely that the world began to be by creation,

and all the saints agree in this.

But how and in what order this was done

pertains to faith only incidentally insofar as it is

treated in scripture, the truth of which the saints

save in the different explanations they offer.

For Augustine holds that at the very begin-

ning of creation there were some things speci-

fically distinct in their proper nature, such as

the elements, celestial bodies and spiritual

substances,

but others existed in seminal notions alone,

such as animals, plants and men, all of which

were produced in their proper nature in that

work that God governs after it was consti-

tuted in the work of the six days.

Of this work we read in John 5:17, ‘My Father

works even until now, and I work.’

With respect to the distinction of things weought to attend to the order of nature and

doctrine, not to the order of time.

As to nature, just as sound precedes song in

nature, though not in time, so things which are

naturally prior are mentioned first, as earth before animals, and water before fish, and so

with other things.

28



And of teaching, [there is an] order, as is

evident in the teaching of geometry, for

although the parts of a figure make up the figure

without any order of time, nevertheless,

geometry teaches that the construction is made

by extending line after line.

And this was the example of Plato, as it is saidat the beginning of the De caelo et mundo.

Thus also Moses, in instructing an unlettered

people regarding the creation of the world,

divided into parts the things that were made at

the same time.3

Ambrose, on the other hand, and other Fathers

claim that an order of time was observed in the

cutting out of things, and this position is both

more common and seemingly more in keeping

with the surface of the literal sense (littera).

But the former opinion (that of Augustine) is

more reasonable and defends Sacred Scripture

more from the derision of non-believers, a

factor which Augustine, in his Letter of Genesis(bk. I, ch. 19) teaches us is to be kept well in

mind, so that the Scriptures may be expounded

in such a way that they not be mocked bynonbelievers. This opinion pleases me more.

Nevertheless, replies in support of both

positions will be given to all of the objections.4

3. A more detailed exposition of the opinion of

St. Augustine is given above in Part III ( Living Tra-dition 47, July 1993).

4. Aquinas, II Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, art. 2, corp.

But in the order of teaching, as is evident in

those teaching geometry, although the parts of

the figure make up the figure without any order

of time, still the geometer teaches the consti-

tution as coming to be by the extension of line

from line.

And this was the example of Plato, as we aretold at the beginning of On the Heavens.

So too Moses, instructing an uncultivated

people on the creation of the world, divides into

parts what was done simultaneously.

Ambrose, however, and other saints hold the

order of time is saved in the distinction of

things. This is the more common opinion and

superficially seems more consonant with the

text,

but the first is more reasonable and better

protects Sacred Scripture from the derision of

infidels, which Augustine teaches in his literal

interpretation of Genesis is especially to be

considered, and so scripture must be explained

in such a way that the infidel cannot mock, and

this opinion is more pleasing to me. However,the arguments sustaining both will be responded

to. (emphasis added)

For the complete text of the foregoing question, as well as an additional article, cf. St.Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Sentences 2.2, d. 12. In Thomas Aquinas, Selected Writings. Edited and translated with an introduction and notes by Ralph McInerny (Lon-

don, 1998), art. 2-3:

Article 2: Are all things created simultaneously, distinct in their species?

It seems that they are.

1. It is said in Sirach 18:1, ‘He who lives for ever created all things together.’

2. Moreover, there is more distance between the spiritual and corporeal creature than

between two corporeal creatures. But spiritual and corporeal things are held to have been

made at the same time. Therefore much more so must all corporeal things.

29



3. Moreover, as is said in Deuteronomy 32:4, ‘The works of God are perfect,’ nor can any

reason be given why their perfection should be deferred in time, something a creature cannot

achieve by itself nor from any one other than God. Therefore since species are distinguished

by their specific perfections, it seems that from the beginning all things are created distinct

in species.

4. Moreover, the work of creation manifests the divine power. But the power of an agent

shows less when its effect is completed successively than when it is produced immediately

in its perfection. Therefore it seems that all things are distinct from the beginning.

5. Moreover, it is clear that God produced the whole work of one day in one moment.Therefore it seems ridiculous to say that he stopped acting for a whole day until the

beginning of the next, as if he were exhausted. Therefore it seems that creatures are not

distinguished by the succession of days, but from the beginning of creation.

6. Moreover, the parts of the universe are mutually dependent and the lower are especially

dependent on the higher. But where things depend on one another, one is not found without

the other. Therefore it seems unfitting to say that first there was water and earth and

afterwards the stars were made.

ON THE CONTRARY:

Augustine says that the authority of Scripture at the beginning of Genesis is greater than the

most perspicacious human genius. But there it is written that different creatures came to be

over the course of six days. Therefore it seems necessary to maintain this. Moreover, nature

imitates the activity of the creator, but in natural activity there is a process from the

imper-fect to the perfect. Therefore it seems that this should be so also in the work of

creation. Therefore it seems that all things are not distinct from the very beginning of

creation.

RESPONSE:

It should be said that what pertains to faith is distinguished in two ways, for some are assuch of the substance of faith, such that God is three and one, and the like, about which

no one may licitly think otherwise. Hence the Apostle in Galatians 1:8, ‘But even if we or

an angel from heaven should preach a gospel to you other than that which we have preached

to you, let him be anathema!’

Other things are only incidental to faith insofar as they are treated in Scripture, which

faith holds to be promulgated under the dictation of the Holy Spirit, but which can be

ignored by those who are not held to know scripture, such as many of the historical works.

On such matters even the saints disagree, explaining scripture in different ways. Thus with

respect to the beginning of the world something pertains to the substance of faith, namely

that the world began to be by creation, and all the saints agree in this. But how and in what

order this was done pertains to faith only incidentally insofar as it is treated in scripture, thetruth of which the saints save in the different explanations they offer. For Augustine holds

that at the very beginning of creation there were some things specifically distinct in their

proper nature, such as the elements, celestial bodies and spiritual substances, but others

existed in seminal notions alone, such as animals, plants and men, all of which were

produced in their proper nature in that work that God governs after it was constituted in

the work of the six days. Of this work we read in John 5:17, ‘My Father works even

until now, and I work.’ With respect to the distinction of things we ought to attend to

the order of nature and doctrine, not to the order of time.

30



As to nature, just as sound precedes song in nature, though not in time, so things which are

naturally prior are mentioned first, as earth before animals, and water before fish, and so

with other things. But in the order of teaching, as is evident in those teaching geometry,

although the parts of the figure make up the figure without any order of time, still the

geometer teaches the constitution as coming to be by the extension of line from line. And

this was the example of Plato, as we are told at the beginning of On the Heavens. So too

Moses, instructing an uncultivated people on the creation of the world, divides into parts

what was done simultaneously.

Ambrose, however, and other saints hold the order of time is saved in the distinction of

things. This is the more common opinion and superficially seems more consonant with

the text, but the first is more reasonable and better protects Sacred Scripture from the

derision of infidels, which Augustine teaches in his literal interpretation of Genesis is

especially to be considered, and so scripture must be explained in such a way that the

infidel cannot mock, and this opinion is more pleasing to me. However, the arguments

sustaining both will be responded to.

Ad 1. It should be said that, according to Gregory, all things are said to be created together in

the substance of matter not in specific form, or even in its likeness, such as the rational soul,

which is like the angels and is not produced from matter.

Ad 2. It should be said that all corporeal things share in matter, whether it be one or several,

and because matter does not precede the compound [composite], therefore in order that the

order of time might respond to the order of nature, corporeal matter is first made and then

distinguished by forms. But corporeal nature is not produced from the spiritual either as from

matter or as from efficient cause, and therefore the argument does not work.

Ad 3. It should be said that just as the creature does not have existence of itself neither

does it have perfection, and therefore in order to show both, God wills that the creature

does not exist at first and afterwards does, and similarly it was first imperfect and

afterwards perfect.

Ad 4. It should be said that not only power should be shown in creation, but also the order of wisdom, such that the things which are prior in nature are first created.

Ad 5. It should be said that in order to show the diverse natures of distinct things, God

willed that one day should answer to each distinction of things, not out of any necessity or

weariness of the agent.

Ad 6. It should be said that a thing does not have the same nature as once perfected and

in its coming to be, and thus although the nature of the completed world requires that all

es-sential parts of the universe exist simultaneously it can be otherwise in the making of

the world, just as in the perfected man the heart cannot be without the other parts, and yet

in the formation of the embryo the heart is generated before all the other members.

Ad 7. It should be said that the authority of Sacred Scripture is not derogated when it is

differently explained, the faith being saved, because the Holy Spirit made it fruitful with agreater truth than any man can discover.

Ad 8. It should be said that it is due to the imperfection of nature that it comes from the

imperfect to perfection, since without doubt it would give the ultimate perfection of which

it is capable, saving, however, the condition of the work. Therefore it is not necessary that

in this the divine work be similar to the operation of the creature. (emphasis added)

31



Article 3: Does Augustine’s interpretation retain the distinction of the days?

It seems that it does not.

1. Day signifies a certain time; but in the formation of things, according to Augustine, there

was no succession of time. Therefore he does not retain the distinction of days.

2. Since day implies a kind of illumination, it is necessary that day be understood according

to the illumination of some corporeal or intellectual light. But not corporeal light, becausethis would cause a day only by several revolutions which would be completed in a success-

sion of times. Nor by intellectual light, because a created intellectual light does not flow byway of irradiation to the creation of things; but the notion of day required some irradiation;

therefore it seems that these days are not properly assigned.

3. Moreover, spiritual illumination does not have different parts, but different parts areassigned to a day, namely morning and evening. Therefore it seems that those days cannot be

understood according to the illumination of spiritual light.

4. If it should be said that the morning of the day is according to the knowledge of things in

the Word and evening according to the knowledge of things in their proper nature, on the

contrary: a thing is said to be known by that which receives its likeness. But the angels donot have knowledge through likenesses drawn from things but in species flowing into their

minds from the Word. Therefore they know created things only in the Word and not in their

proper nature, and thus they have only morning, not evening knowledge.

5. Moreover, wherever a thing is, there it can be known; but the created thing has a threefold

existence, in the Word, in the angelic mind, and in its proper nature. Augustine indicates this

in his literal exposition of Genesis by saying that the existence of things comes to be in the

Word, it was made in the mind of the angel and it acts in its proper nature. Therefore three parts of the day should be recognized.

6. Moreover, a day in the usual sense has morning and evening and midday as well.

Therefore, just as we talk of morning and evening knowledge, we should speak of noontimeknowledge.

7. Moreover, all days should be uniform. But the first days had no morning, because the

morning of the first day did not follow on night, but ended in it, whereas the seventh day

is held to have a morning in which the sixth day ends, but not an evening. Therefore

morning and evening ought not both to be assigned to the other days.

8. Moreover, one comes from evening to morning only by way of night. But no mention is

made of night. Therefore the order of the days is insufficiently treated.

RESPONSE.

It should be said that, according to Augustine, those six days are one day, six by the

distinctions of things, according to which they are numbered, presented at the same time;

just as there is one Word whereby all things are made, namely the Son of God, although

we frequently read, ‘God said.’ And just as those works are saved in all things subsequently

propagated by the activity of nature, so those six days remain in the whole subsequent time.

We must see how this can be.

32



The angelic intellectual nature is light, and if it is properly light, its illumination must be

called a day. The angelic nature at the beginning of the establishment of things receives

knowledge of them and thus in a certain way the light of its intellect is presented to

created things insofar as they are known; hence the knowledge of things themselves is

called a day, and according to the different kinds of things known and their order the days

are distinguished and ordered; as in the first day is understood the formation of the

spiritual creature by conversion to the Word; in the second day the formation of the bodily

creature with respect to the higher part, which is called the firmament; in the third with

respect to the lower part, namely earth, water and things in the vicinity of air; in the fourth, the higher part, the furnished firmament; in the fifth, the lower with respect to the

earth.

But since God is the fullness of light and the darkness is not in him (1 John 1:5) the know-

ledge of God himself in himself is the fullness of light, but because the creature is from

nothing, has the darkness of possibility and imperfection, therefore the knowledge by which

the creature is known, is mixed with darkness. But they can be known in two ways: either in

the Word, as they issue forth from the divine art, and their knowledge is called morning,

because just as morning is the end of darkness and the beginning of light, so the creation also

takes the beginning of light from the Word after first not having been. It is also known as

existing in its proper nature, and such knowledge is called evening because evening is the

end of light and tends towards night, so also the creature subsisting in itself is thetermination of the operation of the Word, as made by the Word, and of itself defective and

tending towards darkness unless it is sustained in the Word. Nevertheless this knowledge is

called day because just as in comparison to the knowledge of the Word it is shadowy, so it is

light in comparison with ignorance, which is wholly darkness, just as the present life of the just is said to be misty with respect to future glory, which, however, is light in comparison to

the life of sin, and thus there is a certain circulation between morning and evening, according

to which the angel knowing himself in his own nature, takes this knowledge back to the

Word as to its end, in which he takes knowledge of subsequent work in its beginning, andthus this sort of morning is the end of the preceding day and the beginning of the following.

This exposition is subtle and congruous so long as light and day are said properly and not

metaphorically in spiritual things, as Augustine says in the literal commentary on Genesis;

otherwise it would be a mystical and not a literal interpretation. But because it is denied by

many, we, sustaining with Augustine that all things are created immediately distinct in

species, can say that days are taken according to the illustration of bodily light. Such that the

order of the days is taken according to the order and distinction of things in which bodily

light shines forth, for just as the angels receive knowledge of all natural creatures, so too the

light flows into all bodily things, as Dionysius says, but differently received in differentthings, according to the diversity of the recipients.

Therefore just as Augustine distinguishes six days according to the presentation of spiritual

light, which is said to be made on the first day, by the six kinds of things, so according to the

presentation of bodily light the six kinds of things can in a certain way be distinguished into

six days without the distinction of time. And because the period of each bodily thing is

prefigured according to the influence of light between two terms, since each bodily power is

finite, therefore those terms beyond which the power of the thing does not extend are called

morning and evening.

Ad 1. It should be said that day is also a part of time and the effect of light. Therefore the

distinction of the first days is not drawn from the side of time, but from the side of light,

insofar as different things are declared by light either with respect to angelic knowledge, or

with respect to the influence of bodily light on different things.

33





Ad 8. It should be said that if the angel, by knowledge taken from creatures, did not refer it

to the praise of the creator but dwelled in the creature itself, night would come to be in him,

for this would be to enjoy the creature perversely and this is not fitting to the blessed angels,

who are signified by light, and therefore in the sixth of those days night is not mentioned. Or

it can be said according to another path that morning and evening are mentioned because

they are the beginnings of day and night. But there the institution of the principles of nature

is shown, from which all things are propagated, and therefore the extremes are given and the

intermediates set aside. (emphasis added)

For St. Augustine’s interpretation of the meaning of “one day”, cf. Pete Holter, “Re: Aug-

ustine and creation?” (Comment posted to Catholic Answers, 26 Dec. 2009): 18

In his The Literal Meaning of Genesis: An Unfinished Book , 7:28, Augustine quotes from

Sirach 18:1, “He Who lives forever created all things simultaneously”19 (Latin: “Qui manet in aeternum creavit omnia simul ”), and this understanding of this verse becomes one of his

interpretive keys to Genesis 1. Likewise, in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 5, 3:6,

he quotes from this verse in Sirach again as he is working out the meaning of Genesis 2:4.

Augustine understands “the day that the LORD God made the earth and the heavens” of 2:4

to be the only “day,” and to be repeated over the course of the six “days” of Genesis 1. After

quoting Genesis 2:4, he says, “[n]ow surely gains more influence the view that God created asingle day, from which six or seven days could be enumerated because of the repetition of

that single day” (Bk. 5, 1:1). In Book 4, 33:52 of the same work he suggests that the Scrip-

tures break down the simultaneity of creation over the course of a six day narrative in con-

sideration of our slowness of mind, to bring us to comprehend this unspeakable event over the course of manageable steps. However, in Book 6 (see 5:7 and 6:10) he explains that the

events taking place in Genesis 2 – the planting of the garden, the naming of the animals, etc.

– do not belong to the creative activity described in the six days of Genesis 1 because, in the

second narration, the events described require a passage of time. And so he refers thesethings to the Father’s work that continues even to this day (cf. John 5:17), and he under-

stands the double narratives of overlapping subjects (such as the creation of male and female

on the sixth day of Chapter 1, and then again at the planting of the garden in Chapter 2) to be

indicators that the things created during the primordial “days” of Genesis 1 were created insome way in potentiality and causality [ sic]. And during the normal course of history

narrated in Genesis 2, this created potential unfolds into a greater actuality. However, in

dividing things in this way, it must be appreciated that the seed-like reality of everything that

exists, existed from the first moment of creation.

So the answer to your question about why Augustine understood creation as being all at once

is, for the most part, Genesis 2:4 and Sirach 18:1. He seems to have supplied additional

reasons, such as (1) the relationship that exists between the creative “words” of Genesis 1

and the Eternal Creator-Word, and (2) the fact that the first day of creation is not referred to

as the “ first day,” but as “one day” (Genesis 1:5); but I am afraid to elaborate on them herelest I misrepresent Augustine even more than I may have already done. My warning to you is

that I am working with languages that I do not know, and with works of Augustine that Ihave not read in their entirety. If I am wrong even in what I have presented here, I am sorry

to have misled anyone and to have misrepresented this great Saint, and I hope that someonewill come behind me and correct my errors.

18 (http://forums.catholic.com/showpost.php?p=6096831&postcount=12 [4/7/11])19 As I argue in my paper on the Decree Firmiter , it is probable that simul is to be translated as “together”,

and so as open to meaning ‘in a single moment of time’, as opposed to understanding God’s creative activity

as taking place over a period of time, and hence successively.

35



Cf. Augustine of Hippo, De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectus Liber , VII. 28:

Gen 1, 5 diem a mane ad mane sequens notat.

7. 28. Et facta est vespera, et factum est mane dies unus33. Non eodem modo nunc appellatur

dies, quo cum diceretur: Et vocavit Deus lucem diem; sed eo modo quo dicimus, verbi gratia,

triginta dies habere mensem: hic enim nomine diei noctes quoque includimus; superius

autem ita dictus est dies, ut a nocte seiungeretur. Itaque cum illa operatio Dei per lucem

gesta insinuaretur, consequenter dicitur factam esse vesperam, et factum esse mane unumdiem, ut sit scilicet sit unus dies a coepto die usque ad coeptum diem, id est a mane usque ad

mane, quales dies annumeratis, ut dixi, noctibus appellamus. Sed quomodo facta est vespera,et factum est mane? An tanta mora temporis fecit lucem Deus, et divisit inter lucem et

tenebras, quanta mora tenditur dies lucens, id est non annumerata nocte? Et ubi est quod

scriptum est: Subest enim tibi, cum voles posse34, si opus est Deo productione temporis, ut

aliquid perficiat? An omnia quidem tamquam in arte atque ratione perfecta sunt Deo, non in

productione temporis, sed in ipsa vi quae illas etiam res, quas non stare, sed transire

cernimus, stabiliter efficit? Non enim et in sermone nostro cum verba alia transeant, et alia

succedant, credibile est ita fieri in arte ipsa, qua operante stabiliter artificiosa occurrit oratio.

Quamquam ergo sine productione temporis faciat Deus, cui subest posse cum volet; ipsae

tamen naturae temporales motus suos temporaliter peragunt. Ita ergo fortasse dictum est: Et

facta est vespera, et factum est mane dies unus, sicut ratione prospicitur ita fieri debere aut posse, non ita ut fit temporibus tractatibus. Nam in ipsa ratione operationem contemplatus

est in Spiritu Sancto, ille, qui dixit: Qui manet in aeternum creavit omnia simul 35: sed

commodissime in hoc libro, quasi morarum per intervalla factarum a Deo rerum digesta

narratio est, ut ipsa dispositio, quae ab infirmioribus animis contemplatione stabili videri non

poterat, per huiusmodi ordinem sermonis exposita quasi istis oculis cerneretur.

33 - Gen 1, 5.

34 - Sap 12, 18.35 - Eccli 18, 1.

Cf. Augustine of Hippo, De Genesi ad Litteram Libri Duodecim, V. 1.1:

1. 1. Hic est liber creaturae coeli et terrae, cum factus est dies, fecit Deus coelum et terram,et omne viride agri, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum agri, antequam exortumest. Non enim pluerat super terram Deus: et homo non erat qui operaretur terram. Fonsautem ascendebat de terra, et irrigabat omnem faciem terrae1. Nunc certe firmior fit illa sen-

tentia qua intellegitur unum diem fecisse Deum, unde iam illi sex vel septem dies unius

huius repetitione numerari potuerint; quandoquidem apertius sancta Scriptura iam dicit, con-

cludens quodammodo cuncta quae ab initio usque ad hunc locum dixerat, atque infert: Hicest liber creaturae vel facturae coeli et terrae, cum factus est dies. Neque enim quisque dic-

turus est coelum et terram hic ita commemorata, sicut dictum erat antequam conditus insinu-

aretur dies: In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram2. Illud enim si eo modo intellegitur, ut

aliquid Deus fecerit sine die, priusquam faceret diem, qua ratione id possit accipi, suo loco

dixi, quod dicendum putavi, nulli intercludens melius intellegendi licentiam. Nunc autem: Hic est, inquit, liber creaturae coeli et terrae, cum factus est dies: satis, ut opinor, ostendens,

non hic se ita commemorasse coelum et terram, sicut in principio antequam feret dies, cum

tenebrae essent super abyssum; sed quomodo factum est coelum et terra, cum factus est dies,

id est iam formatis atque distinctis partibus et generibus rerum, quibus universa creatura dis-

posita atque composita reddit hanc speciem quae mundus vocatur.

1 - Gen 2, 4-6.

2 - Gen 1, 1.

36

http://www.augustinus.it/latino/genesi_lettera/genesi_lettera_05_note.htm#N2

http://www.augustinus.it/latino/genesi_lettera/genesi_lettera_05_note.htm#N2



Cf. Louis Lavalle, “Augustine and Orthodoxy in the Creation Day Debate” (The Presby-terian Witness. Fall, 1998), pp. 2-4:

However, particularly in his earlier commentary, Augustine’s interpretation of Scripturewas influenced by Greek philosophy and science. Through both Neoplatonist philosophy

and the “science” of spontaneous generation, Augustine saw three phases of creation: the“unchangeable forms in the Word of God,” “seminal [reasons]” created in the instant of

creation, and a later “springing forth” in the course of time. <...>

How did these secular beliefs affect Augustine’s view of the six creation days? In thewords of Louis Berkhof, Augustine “was evidently inclined to think God created all

things in a moment of time, and that the thought of days was simply introduced to aidthe finite intelligence.”8 Looking at Augustine’s own words, taken from his Genesis com-

mentary, we read, “In this narrative of creation Holy Scripture has said of the Creator that

He completed His works in six days, and elsewhere, without contradicting this, it has been

written of the same Creator that He created all things together . . . Why then was there any

need for six distinct days to be set forth in the narrative one after the other? The reason is

that those who cannot understand the meaning of the text, He created all things together,

cannot understand the meaning of the Scripture unless the narrative proceeds slowly step by

step . . . For this Scripture text [2-3] that narrates the works of God according to the days

mentioned above, and that Scripture text that says God created all things together, are both

true.”9

Augustine’s references to Sirach, an Apocryphal book, have been italicized for emphasis.

Sirach 18:1 was Augustine’s key verse to defend that everything recorded in Genesis 1 and 2

had been created simultaneously. It provided the Biblical support for his philosophy andscience. A Platonic god could not be involved in his creation on a day by day basis. And

spontaneous generation provided for things coming into existence after creation, but not just

in six days, since everyone knew that it was still occurring.

Augustine reasoned he was giving priority to the authority of Scripture because he accepted

the Apocrypha as Scripture. The Apocrypha was part of the Old Latin version upon which

Augustine depended, for he could not read Hebrew and was not proficient in Greek when he

wrote his commentary. This hindered his study of Scripture and limited his access to the

early Greek fathers, such as Theophilus of Antioch, who defended six-day creation.10

Although we do not share Augustine’s view of the Apocrypha, his rationale from Sirach 18:1

disappears if one examines the original Greek on which the Old Latin was based. The Old

Latin reads, according to Taylor, the translator of Augustine’s commentary, “He who lives

forever created all things together,”11 or “at the same time,” from the Latin simul , from

which we get simultaneous. The original Greek reads, “He who lives forever created all

things in common,” from the Greek, koine, the same word used in speaking of the common

or koine Greek of the time of Christ. The RSV which included a new translation of the Apo-

crypha from the Greek paraphrased this into, “created the whole universe.” There is noextant Hebrew text of Sirach 18:1.

Since Jerome did not accept the Apocryphal books as canonical, he never retranslated

Sirach. The Roman Catholic church, which kept the Apocrypha in the Bible, incorporated

the Old Latin text of Sirach into the Vulgate. [See Figure 1.] Perhaps due to his corres-

pondence with Jerome and his study of Greek, Augustine appears to have moderated his

position in The City of God . <…> Sirach 18:1, the key verse in his commentary, was never

mentioned in his lengthy discussion of creation in The City of God . [3-4]

37



Figure 1

Sirach 18:1, Augustine’s Key Verse in his Commentary

OL & VG Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul.

tr. he who lives forever created all things simultaneously.

LXX Ho zon eis ton aiona ektisen ta panta koinei

tr. He who lives forever created all things in common.

There is no extant Hebrew text.

Key: OL-Old Latin; VG-Vulgate; LXX-Septuagint; tr.-author’s translation.

8 Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977(1938), 127.9 Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 4.33-34, 52-53.10 John H. Taylor, note in Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1, 271. See

Theophilus, To Autolycus, 2.4, 10, 15, Oxford Early Christian Texts, and author’s “The

Early Church Defended Creation Science,” Impact No. 160, Institute for Creation Research,October 1986.11 John H. Taylor, note in Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1, 254.

In addition to the foregoing, cf. John B. Jordan, “Stanley Jaki on Genesis 1,” Biblical Chronology, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1998:

In his third lecture, Jaki surveys the interpretations offered by the early Church writers. His

survey is interesting. It shows that the early Church firmly believed in a literal six-daycreation week, though many preached the passage typologically and/or allegorically. Some,

such as Basil, tried to reconcile the passage with the scientific-philosophical thinking of their

day, but never denied its historicity. Augustine was an exception. He held that the work of

the week of creation took place instantaneously, because of a verse in the apocrypha that hetook to mean that. The cosmogony in Genesis 1, however, he took quite literally, and ex-

pounded at length on what it meant as regards the actual arrangement of the universe. All

this Jaki finds regrettable.

(The Wisdom of Ben Sirach, or Ecclesiasticus, says in 18:1, “He who lives forever created

the universe.” In the Latin version that Augustine used, however, this statement was

mistranslated as “He who lives forever created all things simultaneously.”)

However one translate Sirach, it is certainly true that, from the first moment of its exis-

tence, the universus which God created had to exist under one or more determinate forms.

It will be noted, however, that in the beginning God could have created a being or beingshaving independent existence and still have worked successively by imparting to it or to

them their forms and natures by processes of formation taking place subsequent to the

initial act of creation, which processes are represented as taking place over six successivedays, a position I argue for elsewhere in my exegesis.

§

38



Before taking our leave of this section, let us consider the following texts treating matters

touched on above:

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas,

translated by the English Dominican Fathers (1952), q. 3, art. 10, obj. 14; ad 14:

14. The work of creation preceded the work of increase. But this would not be, if souls becreated as bodies increase in number. Therefore they were created before bodies.

<…>

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It behooved the work of creation whereby the principles

of nature were established to precede the work of propagation: but the creation of souls is

not a work of that kind. (emphasis added)

Notice that the work of creation is described as that “whereby the principles of nature wereestablished”, and that this preceded, and so is distinct from, “the work of increase”.

For the corporeal creation in distinction from the spiritual in this regard, cf. St. Thomas

Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 62, art. 1, ad 2 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Reply Obj. 2. The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not

have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation; consequently, according to

Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v. 4, 23; viii. 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take

place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants

was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the beginning of

its existence had the perfection of its nature; but it did not have the perfection to which

it had to come by its operation. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 62. art. 5, c. (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

…Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its natural perfection not by passing

from one stage to another; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above (A. 1;

Q. 58, AA. 3, 4). (emphasis added)

For the earlier text just mentioned, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 58. art. 3,

c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

I answer that, As has often been stated (A. 1; Q. 55, A. 1), the angels hold that grade among

spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances: for

Dionysius calls them heavenly minds (loc. cit.). Now, the difference between heavenly and

earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by change and

movement: while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very

nature…. (emphasis added)

§

N.B. As we have seen, the consideration of what was created in the beginning involves a

consideration of seminal reasons, a subject to which we turn next.

39





Cf. The Physical System of St. Thomas by Father Giovanni Maria Cornoldi, S.J. translated

by Edward Heneage Dering (London, 1893), sec. VII:

VII.

SEMINAL CAUSES.

IN creating matter actuated by substantial forms God produced also what may be

called the seminal causes of things, which enable substances to produce others like orunlike themselves. Strictly speaking, however, this term expresses the virtue communi-

cated by God to a living substance, and through it to its seed, by which it generates

another substance of the same species. Furthermore it expresses the virtue by which even

things without life are the causes of substantial change. “From that which is more per-

fect,” says St. Thomas, “the denominations of things are taken. Now the most perfect of all corporeal substances are living substances. . . . But evidently the seeds from which

they are generated are their active and passive principles; and therefore all the active

and passive virtues that are principles of generation and of natural changes are suita-

bly called by St. Augustine [3 De Trinitate] seminales rationes. The active and passive

virtues may be considered in a manifold order. Firstly, as St. Augustine says, {1} they are

principally and originally in the very Word of God, as ideal essences. Secondly, they

are in the elements of the world, where from the beginning they were produced at once,as universal causes. In a third way they are found in those things that out of universal

causes are in course of time produced, for instance, in this plant or that animal, as in

particular causes. In a fourth way they are in the seeds produced by animals and

plants.”{2} . . . Without these seminal virtues, given by God, the living things first created

would have disappeared from the earth, and that continual transformation of substances,

which is so necessary for the maintenance of such, would have ceased.

This most wise providence of the Creator is thus described by St. Thomas: “The coming

forth of creatures from God is like the coming forth of artistic works from an artist;

and therefore, as artificial forms in matter proceed from the artificer, so do natural

forms and virtues descend from the ideas in the Divine Mind. . . But the works of God

differ in two respects from those of the artificer. Firstly, on the part of the matter; forthe artificer does not produce that, but works on it, and never could give to it the power

of receiving those forms which he communicates thereto; but God, Who is the cause of

all being, not only gave to things their forms and natural being, but also communicated

to [first] matter (materia prima) the power of receiving whatever He may please to

operate in it. Secondly, on the part of the forms; for the forms introduced by the arti-

ficer are not able to produce a being like themselves. A wooden bed cannot bring forth

another wooden bed, though, if reduced to ashes, it may help to form a plant; but the

natural forms can produce the same things, and therefore have the property of seed, in

virtue of which they may be called seminal.”{3}

{1} 6 De Gen., ad litt.

{2} Summa, P. i. Q. cxv. a. 2.{3} In II. Sent., Dist. xviii. 1, 2. (emphasis added) [For my complete translation, see below.]

Cf. Itinerarium Mentis in Deum by St. Bonaventure. With an Introduction, Translation andCommentary by Philotheus Boehner, OFM, Ph.D., Ch. 1, n. 14:

The Steps in the Ascent to God and the Consideration of Himthrough His Footsteps in the Universe

41



14. We may extend this consideration to the sevenfold general properties of creatures, 19

which bear a sevenfold witness to the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, if we consider

the origin, greatness, multitude, beauty, plenitude, activity, and order of all things.

The origin of things, according to their creation, distinction,20 and adornment21 as the

work of the six days, proclaims the power of God that produced all things out of nothing,

the wisdom of God that clearly differentiated all things, the goodness of God that lavishly

adorned all things. The greatness of things also – looking at their vast extension, latitude,

and profundity, at the immense power extending itself in the diffusion of light, and the effic-iency of their inner uninterrupted and diffusive operation, as manifest in the action of fire –

clearly portrays the immensity of the power, wisdom, and the goodness of the Triune God,Who, uncircumscribed, exists in all things by His power, presence, and essence. 22 Likewise,

the multitude of things in their generic, specific, and individual diversity of substance, form,

of figure, and the efficiency which is beyond all human estimation, manifestly suggests and

shows the immensity of the three above-mentioned attributes in God. The beauty of things,too, if we but consider the diversity of lights, forms, and colors in elementary, inorganic, and

organic bodies, as in heavenly bodies and in minerals, in stones and metals, and in plants and

animals, clearly proclaims these three attributes of God. In so far as matter is full of forms

because of the seminal principles,23 and form is full of power because of its active

potentialities, while power is capable of many effects because of its efficiency, the

plenitude of things clearly proclaims the same three attributes. In like manner, manifoldactivity, whether natural, cultural, or moral, by its infinitely multiple variety, shows forth the

immensity of that power, art,24 and goodness, which is for all things “the cause of being, the

basis of understanding, and the norm of orderly conduct.” Finally, when we consider order in

reference to duration, position, and influence, that is, from the standpoint of prior and

posterior, superior and inferior, more noble and more ignoble, it clearly points out, first of

all, in the book of creation, the primacy, sublimity, and dignity of the First Principle, and

thus the infinity of His power; secondly, in the book of Scriptures, the order of divine laws,

commands, and judgments, and thus the immensity of His wisdom; and lastly, in the body of the Church, the order of the divine Sacraments, benefices, and rewards, and thus the

immensity of His goodness. So it is that order leads us to that which is first and highest, most

powerful, most wise, and best.

[19] Septiformem conditionem creaturarum, the sevenfold general properties of creatures. The

following consideration of the sevenfold condition of creatures shows the influence of Hugo

of Saint Victor, Didascaleion, VII, 1-12 (PL 176, 811-822).

[20] Distinctio, distinction. The term here refers to the creation of the world. The works of

distinctio are the separation of light from darkness (first day), the separation of the waters

beneath and above the firmament (second day) and the separation of the waters from the land

(third day). Cf. Brevil. II, 2 (V, 220.)

[21] Ornatus, adornment. This refers to the following three days of creation: luminous nature

adorned by the sun, moon, and stars (fourth day); perspicuous nature, water and air, adorned

by the fishes and the birds (fifth day); opaque nature, land, adorned by beasts, reptiles, andman (sixth day). Cf. ibid.

[22] Per potentiam, praesentiam et essentiam, by His power, presence, and essence. The

presence of God in all things per potentiam, praesentiam et essentiam is a time-honored

formula, the explanation of which caused considerable difficulty to the scholastics. It was

referred to Gregory the Great, but it is actually found in Glossa Ordinaria, Cant. Cant., 5, 17(PL 113, 1157). Cf. Adrian Fuerst, O. S. B., An Historical Study of the Doctrine of theOmnipresence of God in Selected Writings between 1220 to 1270 , The Catholic University

42



of America Studies in Sacred Theology (second series) no. 62, Catholic University of

America Press, 1951, p. 18 et passim. Saint Bonaventure explains: “Assignatio autem beati

Gregorii accipitur quantum ad conditiones modorum essendi. In his enim tribus

circumloquitur beatus Gregorius perfectionem modorum existendi Deum in omnibus, in

quibus est hoc modo. Aliquid enim est in aliquo secundum praesentialitatis indistantiam, ut

contentum in continente, ut aqua in vase, aliquid secundum virtutis influentiam, ut motor in

mobili; aliquid secundum intimitatis existentiam ut illud quod est continens intra, ut anima in

corpore. Et omne quod perfecte est in re, necesse est esse quantum ad hanc triplicem

conditionem; et hoc modo est Deus. Et ideo dicitur esse potentialiter, praesentialiter etessentialiter, quia secundum praesentialitatis indistantiam, secundum virtutis influentiam,

secundum intimitatis existentiam.” I Sent., 37, I, 3, 2 (I, 648).

[23] Rationes seminales, seminal principles. This idea goes back to the logoi spermatikoi

of the Stoics. It was adopted by Saint Augustine, from whom Saint Bonaventure derived it.

According to Saint Bonaventure, the rationes seminales are active and positive potenti-

alities which the Creator has inserted and concealed in the seminarium of this world.

They are the essences or forms of things to be produced. Production and generation, how-

ever, are only the awakening of this positive potentiality and the stimulation for its devel-

opment to a complete and visible state. Corruption means the reversion of the seminal

reason from visible to invisible state. “Cum satis constet rationem seminalem esse potentiam

activam inditam materiae, et illam potentiam activam constet esse essentiam formam cum exea fiat forma mediante operatione naturae, quae non producit aliquid ex nihil; satis ratio-

nabiliter ponitur quod ratio seminalis est essentia formae producendae, differens ab illa

secundum esse completum et incompletum, sive secundum esse in potentia et in actu.” II

Sent., 18, I, 3 (II, 440). The two states of implication (active potentiality) and explication(the visible creature) are likened to a rosebud and a rose. Cf. ibid., 15, I, 1 (II, 374).

[24] Quod est artificiales . . . artis. These terms had a broader meaning in the Middle Ages

than they have today. Ars here means everything that is done by man acting as a rational being; hence it includes every object of culture made by man. Artificiales has much the same

connotation. It is applied to what we would call artistic works as well as to those things done

by human ingenuity as opposed to nature. (emphasis added)

Cf. Jules Lebreton, “The Logos”, The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 9 (New York, 1910):

The Logos

The word Logos is the term by which Christian theology in the Greek language designates

the Word of God, or Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. Before St. John had consecrated

this term by adopting it, the Greeks and the Jews had used it to express religious conceptions

which, under various titles, have exercised a certain influence on Christian theology, and of

which it is necessary to say something.

I. THE LOGOS IN HELLENISM

It is in Heraclitus that the theory of the Logos appears for the first time, and it is doubtless

for this reason that, first among the Greek philosophers, Heraclitus was regarded by St.

Justin ( Apol . I, 46) as a Christian before Christ. For him the Logos, which he seems to

identify with fire, is that universal principle which animates and rules the world. This

conception could only find place in a materialistic monism. The philosophers of the fifth and

fourth centuries before Christ were dualists, and conceived of God as transcendent, so that

neither in Plato (whatever may have been said on the subject) nor in Aristotle do we find the

theory of the Logos.

43



It reappears in the writings of the Stoics, and it is especially by them that this theory

is developed. God, according to them, “did not make the world as an artisan does his

work, but it is by wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the universe”

(Galen, “De qual. incorp.” in “Fr. Stoic.”, ed. von Arnim, II, 6); He penetrates the world

“as honey does the honeycomb” (Tertullian, “Adv. Hermogenem”, 44), this God so inti-

mately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle

controlling the universe, He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He is the germ from which

all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). This Logos is at the

same time a force and a law, an irresistible force which bears along the entire worldand all creatures to a common end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can

withdraw itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly (Cleanthus,

“Hymn to Zeus” in “Fr. Stoic.” I, 527-cf. 537). Conformably to their exegetical habits,

the Stoics made of the different gods personifications of the Logos, e. g. of Zeus and

above all of Hermes.

At Alexandria, Hermes was identified with Thoth, the god of Hermopolis, known later asthe great Hermes, “Hermes Trismegistus”, and represented as the revealer of all letters and

all religion. Simultaneously, the Logos theory conformed to the current Neoplatonistic

dualism in Alexandria: the Logos is not conceived of as nature or immanent necessity, but as

an intermediary agent by which the transcendent God governs the world. This conception

appears in Plutarch, especially in his “Isis and Osiris”; from an early date in the first century

of the Christian era, it influenced profoundly the Jewish philosopher Philo. (emphasis added)

On God as the beginning and Christ as Logos, cf. Tatian, Address to the Greeks, c. v (tr. J.E. Ryland):

CHAP. V.--THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHRISTIANS AS TO THE CREATION OF THE

WORLD.

God was in the beginning; but the beginning, we have been taught, is the power of the

Logos. For the Lord of the universe, who is Himself the necessary ground (hupostasis) of all

being, inasmuch as no creature was yet in existence, was alone; but inasmuch as He was all

power, Himself the necessary ground of things visible and invisible, with Him were all

things; with Him, by Logos-power (dia logikes dunameos), the Logos Himself also, who wasin Him, subsists. And by His simple will the Logos springs forth; and the Logos, not coming

forth in vain, becomes the first-begotten work of the Father. Him (the Logos) we know to

be the beginning of the world. But He came into being by participation, not by abscission;

for what is cut off is separated from the original substance, but that which comes by

participation, making its choice of function, does not render him deficient from whom it is

taken. For just as from one torch many fires are lighted, but the light of the first torch is not

lessened by the kindling of many torches, so the Logos, coming forth from the Logos-power

of the Father, has not divested of the Logos-power Him who begat Him. I myself, for

instance, talk, and you hear; yet, certainly, I who converse do not become destitute of speech

(logos) by the transmission of speech, but by the utterance of my voice I endeavour to reduceto order the unarranged matter in your minds. And as the Logos begotten in the beginning,

begat in turn our world, having first created for Himself the necessary matter , so also I, inimitation of the Logos, being begotten again, and having become possessed of the truth,

am trying to reduce to order the confused matter which is kindred with myself. For

matter is not, like God, without beginning, nor, as having no beginning, is of equal

power with God; it is begotten, and not produced by any other being, but brought into

existence by the Framer of all things alone. (emphasis added)

§

44



2. Seminal reasons according to the Bishop of Hippo.

Cf. St. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Translated and annotated by John

Hammond Taylor, S.J., Vol. I, Books 1-6. Ancient Christian Writers. The Works of the

Fathers in Translation. No. 41 (New York, 1982), Bk. 6, ch.10, nn.17-18, pp. 189-191:

Chapter 10

Under the influence of the primordial reasons the crops came forth from the earth and then the seeds from the crops

17. Nevertheless, under one aspect these things are in the Word of God, where they are

not made but eternally existing; under another aspect they are in the elements of the uni-

verse, where all things destined to be were made simultaneously; under another aspect they

are in things no longer created simultaneously but rather separately each in its own due

time, made according to their causes which were created simultaneously—among which was

Adam, formed from the slime and animated by the breath of God, like the grass sprung from

the earth;36 under another aspect they are in seeds, in which they are found again as quasi-

primordial causes (quasi primordiales causae) which derive from creatures that have come

forth according to the causes which God first stored up in the world —and thus we have

the crops from the earth, and the seed from the crops.37

In all these things, beings already created received at their own proper time their

manner of being and of acting, which developed into visible forms and natures from the

hidden and invisible reasons which are latent in creatures as causes . Thus the [198-190]

crops came forth on the earth, and man was made as a living being, and so of the other creatures, whether plants or animals, belonging to the work of God as He works even at this

time. But these beings have duplicates of themselves, as it were, carried invisibly within

them by reason of the hidden power of reproduction that they possess . They have this

power through their primordial causes, in which they were placed in the created world

when day was made, before they came forth in the visible shape proper to their kind.

Chapter 11

Creatures were in one sense completed and in another sense just begun: completed because they were made in their causal

reasons, just begun because God subsequently would bring them forth in their visible form

18. Now, if the original works of God, when He created all things simultaneously, were

not perfect according to the limits of their nature, no doubt there would later be added the

perfections needed to complete their being; and thus the perfection of all the world is made

up of what we might call two halves. As they are like parts of a whole, the total universe,

whose parts they are, is completed by their union. Moreover, if these creatures attained perfection in the sense that they are perfected when they are brought forth individually, each

at its own time, in their visible form and reality, 38 it is surely true that either nothing wouldcome from them later as time unfolds, or God would unceasingly produce from them the

effects which is due time have their origin in them.

But these works in a certain sense are already perfected, and in another sense they are

just begun. They were made by God when in the beginning He made the world and

created simultaneously all things to be unfolded in the ages to follow. They are perfected

because in their proper natures by which they fulfill their role in time they have nothing

that was not present in them as made in its causes. They are just begun, however, since

45



[190-191] in them are seeds, as it were, of future perfections to be put forth from their

hidden state and made manifest during the ages at the appropriate time.

The words of Scripture make this very clear to anyone who reads the text attentively. For it

says that they were both perfected and just begun. Certainly, if they were not perfected,

Scripture would not have said, Thus the heavens and the earth were finished and all their array. And on the sixth day God finished the works He had made…. And God blessed the seventh day and made it holy.39 On the other hand, unless they had just begun, Scripture

would not go on to say that God rested on that day from all the works He had begun to

make.40

19. If someone should ask how God completed His works and at the same time just

began them, the answer is clear from what I have said above. For He did not complete

some and begin others, but the reference is to the same works from which He rested on

the seventh day. We can see that God completed these works when He created all things

simultaneously in such a finished state that nothing would have to be created by Him in

the temporal order of causes; and at the same time we understand that God began these

works in the sense that what He had originally established here in causes He later

fulfilled in effects.

Thus God formed the dust of the earth ( or the slime of the earth) into man; that is He

formed man from the dust or the slime of the earth. And He breathed ( or blew) into his facethe breath of life; and man was made a living being .41 He was not predestined at that time,

for that happened before the ages in the foreknowledge of the Creator. Nor was he at thattime made in causes, whether begun in a completed state or completed in a beginning state,

for that happened with the commencement of the ages in the primordial reasons when all

things were created simultaneously. But he was created in time, visibly in the body, invisibly

in the soul, being made up of soul and body.

NOTES (pp. 264-265)

36 Notice here the three modes of existence of created living beings: (1) existing eternally inGod; (2) existing potentially in nature; (3) existing in their fully developed forms.37 It is important to note that in Augustine’s view the world in which God created all

things simultaneously contained potentially, by reason of the causes (or seminal re-

asons) which were created simultaneously with the world (secundum causas simul creatas), all the living things that would spring forth contained in seeds ( in seminibus)

which are quasi-primordial causes ( primordiales causae). Seeds, therefore, are visible

tangible substances containing potentially the organisms [264-265] that will grow from

them. But beyond these are the primordial causes, the rationes seminales or “seminal

reasons”, which are not tangible substances but creative forces hidden in nature and

causing seeds to grow. It should be noted, however, that the first appearance of crops

on the earth is not caused by seeds,22 according to Augustine, but by God’s creative

power working through sun and water and the seminal reasons. We have, therefore,

crops from the earth, then seeds from crops, then subsequently crops from seeds.

Augustine is led to this theory by Gen. 1:12: The earth brought forth the nourishing

crops, seed-bearing according to their kind . See Augustine’s explanation in 5.4.9 supra.38

“In their visible form and reality,” in manifestas formas actusque. Actus is used here in thesame sense as actio in ch. 9 supra: see n. 35.39 Gen. 2.3.40 Gen. 2.7.41 Gen.2.1-3. [remainder of the endnote omitted] (emphasis added)

§

22 On this startling, counterintuitive proposition, see further below.

46



3. Seminal reasons according to Peter Lombard.

Cf. Peter Lombard The Books of the Sentences, Book II, dist. 18, cap. 5:

Magistri Petri Lombardi

Arch. Episc. ParisiensisMaster Peter Lombard

Archbishop of ParisSententiarum Quatuor Libri The Four Books of Sentences

LIBER SECUNDUS SENTENTIARUM.

DE RERUM CREATIONE ET FORMATIONE CORPORALIUM ET

SPIRITUALIUMET ALIIS PLURIBUS EO PERTINENTIBUS

THE SECOND BOOK OF

THE SENTENCES

ON THE CREATION ANDFORMATION OF THINGS

CORPORAL AND

SPIRITUAL AND MANY

OTHERS PERTAINING TO

THIS

DISTINCTIO XVIII. DISTINCTION 18

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,

Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 429-431.

Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Latin text taken from Opera

Omnia S. Bonaventurae,

Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol.

2, pp. 429-431. Notes by the Quaracchi

Editors.

Cap. V.

De causis superioribus et inferioribus.

Chapter V.

On superior and inferior causes.

Sed quaeritur, an ratio, quam Deus primis operibus concreavit, id haberet,

ut secundum ipsam ex viri latere feminam fieri necesse foret; an hoc

tantum, ut fieri posset. —

« Ad quod sciendum est, omnium rerum causas in Deo ab aeterno esse. Utenim homo sic fieret, vel equus et huiusmodi, in Dei potentia et

dispositione ab aeterno fuit.

Hae dicuntur primordiales causae, quia istas aliae non praecedunt, sed

istae alias, quae sunt causae causarum.

Cumque unum sit divina potentia, dispositio sive voluntas, et ideo una

omnium principalis causa, tamen propter effectus diversos pluraliter dicitAugustinus,2 causas primordiales omnium rerum in Deo esse, inducens

similitudinem artificis, in cuius dispositione est, qualis futura sit arca.

Ita et in Deo uniuscuiusque rei furturae causa praecessit.

In creaturis vero quarundam rerum, sed non omnium, causae sunt, ut ait

But there is asked,23 whether

the reason, which God co-

created with (His) first works,had this, that according to the

same it would be necessary

that a woman [femina] be

made from the side of theman; or whether this alone,

that she would be able to be

made. —

« Regarding which it must be

known, that the causes of all

things are in God from

eternity. For that man, and/or

a horse and (things) of this

kind, be made thus was inGod’s Power and Disposition

from eternity.

These are said (to be)24 “the primordial causes”, because

no others precede them, but

these (precede) the others,

23 Read rather, “But it is asked,” etc. I will offer further alternatives to awkward translations below.24 “These are called primordial causes, ” etc.

47



Augustinus, quia inseruit Deus seminales rationes rebus, secundum quas

alia ex aliis proveniunt, ut de hoc semine tale granum, de hac arbore talis

fructus, et huiusmodi.

Et hae quoque dicuntur primordiales causae, etsi non adeo proprie, quia

habent ante se causam aeternam, quae proprie et universaliter prima est.

Illae vero ad res aliquas dicuntur primae, quae scilicet ex eis proveniunt.

Ideo etiam primordiales dicuntur, quia in prima rerum conditione rebus aDeo insitae sunt.

Et sicut creaturae mutabiles sunt, ita et hae causae mutari possunt »;3 quaeautem in immutabili Deo causa est, mutari non potest.

which are the causes of

causes.

And since one is the Divine

Power, Disposition or Will,

and (since) for that reason

(there is) one principal Cause

of all (things), yet on account

of (its) diverse effects (St.)Augustine[2] says in the plural,

that the primordial causes of all things are in God, bringing

forward (as he does) the

similitude of a craftsman, in

which disposition it is,25 whichkind of chest it is going to be.

Thus too in God the cause of

each future thing preceded.

But in creatures there arecauses of certain things, but

not of all, as (St.) Augustine

says, because God inserted

seminal reasons into things,

according to which some

come forth from others, so that

such a grain (comes forth)

from this seed, and such a fruitfrom this tree, and (things) of

this kind.

And these too are said (to be)26 “the primordial causes”,

even if (they are said to be

such) not so properly, because

they have before them an

eternal Cause, which is

properly and universally the

First (Cause). However the

former are said regarding

some things (to be) “first”,

which, namely, come forth

from the latter. For that reason

they are also said (to be)“ primordial ”, because they

have been engrafted in things by God at the first foundation

of things.

And just as creatures are

25 “…in whose disposition”, etc.26 “These are called primordial causes, even if they are not called so properly”, etc.

48



mutable, so too can these

causes be changed »;[3]

however that which is a cause

in the Immutable God, cannot

be changed.

2 Cfr. IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 16. et 17. n. 32. Cfr.

etiam 83 Qq. q. 46, et quoad praecedentia cfr. de

Gen. loc. cit. c. 18. n. 33.

3 Haec omnia et quae sequuntur sunt ex Hugone,

Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 3, qui ea ex multis locis

Augustini compilavit.

2 Cf. On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. IX,

chs. 16 and 17, n. 32. Cf. also Eighty-Three

Questions, q. 46, and in regard to the preceding, cf.On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, loc. cit., ch. 18,

n. 33.

3 All these and those which follow are from Hugo,

Summa of Sentences, tr. 3, ch. 3, who compiled

them from many passages in (St.) Augustine.

§

49



4. Seminal reasons according to St. Thomas Aquinas.


SECOND ARTICLE

Whether There Are Any Seminal Virtues in Corporeal Matter?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Obj. 1. It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue

(ratio) implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists

spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore

there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine ( De Trin. iii. 8, 9) says that demons produce certain results by

employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But

bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to

say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3. Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in cor-

poreal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (A. 1, ad 2,

4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 4. Further, there are said to be certain causal virtues (Augustine, Gen. ad lit. v. 4)

which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal

virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues.

Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

On the contrary, Augustine says ( De Trin. iii. 8): Of all the things which are generated in

a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this

world.

I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the

Philosopher says ( De Anima ii. 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are

the most perfect: wherefore the word nature has been transferred from living things toall natural things. For the word itself, nature, as the Philosopher says ( Metaph. v. Did .

iv. 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity:

and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a

tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word

nature has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved.

Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living

things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine

fittingly gave the name of seminal virtues (seminales rationes) to all those active and

passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement. These

active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as

Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi. 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of

God, as typal ideas. Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were

produced altogether at the beginning, as in universal causes. Thirdly, they are in those

things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance

in this plant, and in that animal, as in particular causes. Fourthly, they are in the seeds

produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular

effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.

50



Reply Obj. 1. These active and passive virtues of natural things, though not called virtues(rationes) by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in

respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas (rationes ideales).27

Reply Obj. 2. These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and

when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak

of the demons as employing seeds.

Reply Obj. 3. The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal.But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. And

thus the word seed covers both active and passive principles.

Reply Obj. 4. From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is

easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says ( DeTrin. iii. 9) that, as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things. Nevertheless, the typal ideas can be called causal virtues, but not, strictly speaking, seminal virtues, because seed is not a separate principle;

and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither

are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature,

that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be

wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities whichare ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are

wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues. (emphasis added)

For an alternate translation of the corpus of the foregoing article, cf. the following by.

Alfred J. Freddoso:

Now it is obvious that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things

are the seeds from which the living things are generated . And so Augustine appropriately

labels as ‘seminal natures’ all the active and passive powers that are principles of

generation and natural motion. Now active and passive powers of this sort can be

thought of according to a multiple ordering. For, first of all, as Augustine explains in

Super Genesim ad Litteram 6, they exist principally and originally in the very Word of Godas ideal natures (rationes ideales). Second, they exist in the elements of the world, where

they were produced together at the beginning, as in universal causes. In a third way, they

exist in the things that are produced from the universal causes in temporal sequence; for

instance, they exist in this plant and in that animal as in particular causes.28 In a fourth way,

they exist in the seeds that are produced by animals and plants. Again, the latter are related

to other particular effects in the way that the primordial universal causes are related to thefirst effects they produce. (emphasis added)

Hence, according to St. Thomas Aquinas (following St. Augustine’s teaching which we

have excerpted above), seminal reasons, understood as “the active and passive principles

of the generation of living things…”—that is, as the principles “from which living things

are generated”, are found in the following four orders:

27 N.B. That a ratio seminalis is a virtue in no way justifies the translation of the word ratio by virtue. Indeed,

to say that “virtue (ratio) implies something of a spiritual order” (obj. 1 supra) is by no means true of the

word in English usage, since there are bodily virtues, such as health and strength.28 Note that in this third order one must further distinguish each seed-producing descendent from the pro-

genitor of the line, which stands as the first bearer of the nature, as one distinguishes his parents from Adam

and Eve. Cf. Ia, q. 73, art. 1, ad 3, which I give below, where St. Thomas identifies things created “in their

causes” with “the first of their kind”.

51



1. in typal ideas or natures [lit. ‘ideal reasons’] in the Word of God (= exemplarycauses)

2. in the elements of the world as in universal causes (on which order, see further

below)3. in particular causes brought forth from them in the process of time (which causes

are the first effects produced)

4. in the seeds of animals and plants (= “seeds,” properly speaking)

For the role of seminal reasons in the formation of man, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, SummaTheol., Ia, q. 91, art. 2, obj. 2-4, ad 2-4 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso):

Objection 2: It is unnecessary for anything that can be effected by a created power to be

produced directly by God. But the human body can be produced through the power of a

celestial body; for instance, certain animals are generated by putrefaction through the active

power of a celestial body, and Albumasar says that men are generated only in places with

temperate climates (in locis temperatis tantis) and not in places where heat or cold is

excessive. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the human body to be formed directly by God.

Objection 3: Nothing is made from corporeal matter except through matter’s being trans-formed ( per aliquam materiae transmutationem). But every corporeal transformation has

as a cause the motion of a celestial body that is the first motion. Therefore, since the

human body is produced from corporeal matter, it seems that some celestial body contri-

buted something to the human body’s being formed.

Objection 4: In Super Genesim ad Litteram Augustine says that man’s body was made

during the work of the six days in the sense that God placed certain causal principles

within corporeal creation (secundum causales rationes quas Deus inseruit creaturae

corporali ), whereas later on man’s body was formed in actuality . But that which pre-

exists by means of its causal principles in corporeal creation can be produced through a

corporeal power. Therefore, the human body was produced by some created power and not

directly by God.

<…>

Reply to objection 2: Perfect animals, which are generated from semen, cannot be gen-

erated solely through the power of a celestial body in the way that Avicenna ima-gines 29

— this, despite the fact that the power of a celestial body does cooperate in the natural

generation of perfect animals, in keeping with the Philosopher’s claim in Physics 2 that

“a man and the sun generate a man from matter .” This is why a place with a tem-perate

climate is required for the generation of men and other perfect animals. However, the power

of celestial bodies is indeed sufficient for generating certain imperfect animals from properly

disposed matter, since it is clear that more is required for the production of a perfect thing

than for the production of an imperfect thing.

Reply to objection 3: The motion of the heavens is a cause of natural transformations ,

but not of transformations that are effected outside the order of nature ( praeter naturae

29 Cf. Ia, q. 70, art. 2, ad 1 infra: “It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be generated by

various minglings of the elements, and naturally, without any kind of seed This, however, seems repugnant to

the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and consequently, those things that are

naturally generated from seed cannot be generated naturally in any other way.”

52



ordinem) and by God’s power alone, e.g., raising the dead and giving sight to the blind.

It is these transformations that are similar to man’s being formed from the slime of the earth.

Reply to objection 4: There are two ways in which, among creatures, something is said

to preexist through its causal principles. In the first way it preexists in virtue of both an

active and a passive power; that is, the thing preexists not only in the sense that it can be

made out of preexisting matter, but also in the sense that there is some preexisting

creature that is able to make it. In the second way it preexists in virtue of a passive power

alone, i.e., in the sense that it can be made by God from preexisting matter. It is in this

sense that, according to Augustine, the human body preexisted through causal princi-ples in the works that were produced. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 62, art. 3. c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers;

slightly rev. B.A.M.):

I answer that , Although there are conflicting opinions on this point, some holding that the

angels were created only in a natural state, while others maintain that they were created in

grace; yet it seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that

they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in the process of

time, by the work of Divine Providence, being brought forth by the operation of God, were

brought forth in the first fashioning of things according to seminal reasons, as Augustine

says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the

natural effect; hence (1 Jn. 3:9) grace is called the “seed” of God. As, then, in Augus-

tine’s opinion it is contended that the seminal reasons of all natural effects were im-

planted in the creature when corporeally created, so straightway from the beginning the

angels were created in grace. (emphasis added)

§

53



For his most comprehensive account of these rationes, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commen-tary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard , Bk. II, dist. 18, q. 1, art. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

Utrum Deus convenienter indiderit materiae

rationes seminales

Ad secundum sic proceditur.

Videtur quod inconvenienter dicatur rationesseminales materiae Deus indidisse. Quod enimrecipitur in materia sensibili, est in ea per esse

naturae, et non per esse intentionis; quia materia

cognoscitiva non est formarum quas recipit, sed

per eas in esse specifico perficitur. Sed ratio non

nominat formam secundum esse naturae, sed per

modum intentionis. Ergo virtutes rebus sensi-

bilibus inditae rationes dici non debent.

Praeterea, semen, ut ex 2 Physic. habetur, principium activum nominat. Potentia autem

materiae non est activa, sed passiva, cum nihil

agat nisi secundum quod est in actu. Ergo ratioseminalis materiae attributa non est.

Praeterea, quod est in aliquo, non producitur abeo nisi per modum exitus. Si ergo omnium re-

rum semina Deus in natura prius posuit, videtur

quod generatio rerum sit per exitum unius rei ab

alia, et sic redibit error Anaxagorae, qui posuit

quod-libet esse in quolibet, et nihil pure essehoc vel illud, ut os vel caro; sed unumquodque

nominari ex praedominante: quod in 1 Physic.

improbatur.

Whether God appropriately placed seminal

reasons in things

One proceeds to the second as follows.

Obj. 1. It seems that one speaks inappropriatelyof seminal reasons God placed in matter. For what is received in sensible matter is in it by

way of natural being and not intentional being;

seeing that matter is not aware of the forms

which it receives, but through them is perfected

in specific being. But ‘reason’ does not give a

name to a form according to natural being, but

does so in the manner of an intention. Therefore

the sensible virtues [or ‘powers’] placed in

things ought not to be called ‘reasons’.

Obj. 2. Further ‘seed’, as one may gather from Physics II [ch. 3, 195a 21ff.], names an active

principle. Now the potency of matter is not

active but passive, since nothing acts exceptinsofar as it is in act. Therefore a seminal reason

is not attributed to matter.

Obj. 3. Further, what is in something is not pro-duced from it except in the manner of a going

out [or ‘exit’]. If therefore God placed the seeds

of all things in nature beforehand, it seems that

the generation of things [would] take place by

the going out of one thing from another, andthus would be revived the error of Anaxagoras,

who held everything to be in everything, and

nothing is purely this or that, as bones or flesh;

but each thing is named from what predom-

inates in it; a position disproved in Physics I.

(ch. 4, esp. 187a 27ff.)30

30 If every sort of thing existed in every other sort of thing, such that infinite parts of bone and flesh, etc.

existed in every part of matter, how could any one of them predominate in a given subject? On the error of

Anaxagoras, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens, trans. P. Conway

and F. R Larcher (Ohio, 1964), Book III, lect. 8, n. 602:

602. Then at [456] he shows how Anaxagoras differed from Empedocles on the question of bodily

elements. First he presents the opinions of each; Secondly, he shows which opinion is to be preferred,at 603.

He says therefore first [456] that Anaxagoras and Empedocles held contrary opinions on elements.

For Empedocles posited that fire and earth, and other intermediates, which are elements with these,

are the elemental bodies of bodies, from which all other bodies are composed. But Anaxagoras says

the contrary, namely, that other “homoemeric” bodies, i.e., of similar parts, for example, flesh and

bone and the like, are the elements of bodies, while air and fire and earth and water he said to be

compounded out of the foregoing, i.e., out of flesh and bone and all the other seeds of natural bodies.

54



Praeterea, ad generationem rerum naturalium

non tantum sunt necessariae virtutes activae, sed

etiam passivae. Cum ergo in seminalibus ratio-nibus virtutes passivae non includantur, videtur

quod praeter rationes seminales etiam aliae

rationes rebus inditae debeant dici.

Praeterea, in natura inferiori effectus non

procedunt ex suis causis ut semper vel neces-sario, sed ut frequenter. Cum ergo in littera de-

scribantur rationes seminales secundum quas

necesse est aliquid fieri, videtur quod ad minus

in natura inferiori rationes seminales positae

non sint.

Obj. 4. Further, for the generation of natural

things not only are active virtues necessary, but

also passive ones. Therefore, since passive vir-tues are not included in seminal reasons, it

seems that one ought to say that other reasons

besides seminal reasons are placed in things.

Obj. 5. Further, in lower natures effects do not

proceed from their causes always or necessarily, but do so for the most part. Since, therefore, in

the text seminal reasons are described according

as something comes to be of necessity, it seems

at the very least that seminal reasons should not

be posited in lower natures.

Sed contra: quia, ut dicit Gregorius, benedictio

Dei dicitur bonorum ejus collatio et eorumdem

multiplicatio. Cum ergo Deus legatur Gen. 1 sua

opera benedixisse, videtur quod eis dederit

virtutes quibus fieret eorum multiplicatio. Hoc

autem importat ratio seminalis. Ergo rationesseminales a Deo rebus inditae sunt.

Praeterea, Deuter. 32, 4, dicitur: Dei perfecta sunt opera. Perfectum autem unumquodque est,

ut in 4 Meteor. dicitur, quando potest alterum

tale producere quale ipsum est. Ergo virtutes

quibus hoc fieri possit, rebus attributae sunt, et

hae sunt rationes seminales: ergo et cetera.

Respondeo dicendum, quod emanatio crea-

turarum a Deo est sicut exitus artificiatorum ab

artifice; unde sicut ab arte artificis effluunt

formae artificiales in materia, ita etiam ab ideis

in mente divina existentibus fluunt omnes

formae et virtutes naturales. Sed quia, ut

Dionysius dicit, ea quae sunt causatorumabundanter praeinsunt causis, formae receptae

in materia non adaequant virtutem vel artem

increatam a qua procedunt;

s.c. But to the contrary, as Gregory says (Am-

brose, De benedict. Patriarch. 1), The blessing of God means His conferring of good things aswell as their multiplication. Therefore, since we

read in Genesis 1 that God blessed His works, it

appears that He gave to them the virtues throughwhich their multiplication would come about.

Now this implies a seminal reason. Therefore

seminal reasons are placed in things by God.

Further, Deuteronomy (32, 4) states, The worksof God are perfect . But, as is said in Meteor-ology IV [ch. 3, 380a 15], each thing is perfect

when it can produce another like itself. There-

fore the virtues by means of which this may re-

sult are attributed to things, and these are se-

minal reasons: Therefore, etc.

c. I reply that it must be said that the coming

forth of creatures from God is akin to the going

out of an artwork from an artisan; and therefore

just as artificial forms flow into matter from the

art of the artisan, so also every form and natural

virtue flows from ideas existing in the divine

mind. But because, as Dionysius says ( De div.nom. 2), Those things which are caused preexist in their causes by way of abundance, forms

received in matter do not measure up to the un-

created virtue or art from which they proceed.

For Anaxagoras posited that infinite and indivisible parts of similar bodies were the seeds of all things that appear in nature, in the sense that, by their extraction from some compound, all natural sensible bodies are generated . Therefore, because all other bodies seem to be generated from fire and

earth and the like, he estimated that fire and earth and other intermediate things resulted from all the

indivisible similar parts assembled together. And according to this, he posited the consimilar parts to

be the elements of these four bodies, from which he nevertheless said all things come to be on account

of the seeds existing therein. And since he did not mention fire, therefore, lest any doubt arise con-

cerning this, he adds that he [Anaxagoras] called fire “aether.” (emphasis added)

55



unde apud artificem remanet ex arte sua virtus

aliquid aliter operandi circa ipsa artificiata,

quibus virtus artis alligata non est: et similiter invirtute divina est ut aliquid rebus creatis addat

vel mutet vel abstrahat.

In duobus autem differt operatio Dei ab

operatione artificis. Primo ex parte materiae:quia cum artifex materiam non producat, sed ex

materia data operetur, potentiam materiae non

confert ad recipiendum formas quas materiae

inducit, nec inferre in materiam potest; Deus

autem, qui totius rei auctor est, non solum

formas et virtutes naturales rebus contulit, sed

etiam potentiam recipiendi illud quod ipse in

materia facere vult.

Secundo ex parte formae: quia formae quas

inducit artifex, non producunt sibi similes: quialectus putrescens non pullulat in lectum, sed in

plantam, ut ex 1 [lege 2] Physic. patet: formae

autem naturales sibi similes producere possunt;

et ideo proprietatem seminis habent, et semi-

nales dici possunt.

Formae autem rerum secundum quod in arte

divina existunt, primordiales esse dicuntur, eo

quod ipsae sunt prima principia simpliciter rerum producendarum: potentia autem quae

rebus indita est ad suscipiendum illud in se quodvoluntas Dei disponit, rationes obedientiales a

quibusdam dicuntur, secundum quas inest

materiae ut fieri possit ex ea quod Deus vult.

Ipsae autem virtutes in materia positae, per quas

naturales effectus consequuntur, rationes semin-

ales dicuntur. Sed quid sint secundum rem

seminales rationes, a diversis diversimode assig-

natur. Quidam enim dicunt, quod forma specieinon recipitur in materia nisi mediante forma

generis; adeo quod est alia forma numero per

quam ignis est ignis, et per quam ignis est

corpus. Illa ergo forma generalis incompleta

ratio seminalis dicitur: quia propter talem form-

am inest materiae quaedam inclinatio ad recipi-

endum formas specificas.

And so there remains in the artisan some virtue

from his art for working otherwise on the arti-

facts themselves, by which virtue His art is not bound. And likewise in the divine power He

may add or change or withdraw something in

created things.

But God’s working differs from that of the arti-

san in two things. First on the part of matter: because, seeing that the artisan does not produce

the matter but rather works on a given matter, he

does not bestow on matter a power for re-

ceiving the forms which he introduces into

matter, nor can he enter into matter; but God,

who is the Author of the whole [of created

nature], not only bestows forms and natural vir-

tues on things, but also the power of receiving

that which He wishes to make in matter.

Second, on the part of form: because the forms

which the artisan introduces do not producesomething similar to themselves; seeing that a

wooden bed in the process of rotting does not

turn into [another] bed, but rather [if it could

turn into anything at all] into a plant, as is clear

from Physics II [ch. 1, 193a 12-16]. But natural

forms are able to produce things similar to

themselves, and so they have what is proper to

seed , and [so] may be called ‘seminal’.

But the forms of things according as they exist

in the divine art are called ‘primordial’; the

reason being that they are first principles simplyof the things to be produced: but the power

which is placed in things in order to be recep-tive to what the will of God disposes in them,

are called by some ‘obediental reasons’, accord-

ing to which what God wishes to come to be

from them exists in matter.

Now the very virtues themselves placed in mat-

ter, upon which natural effects follow, are called

‘seminal reasons’. But what seminal reasons are

in the thing is explained by different people in

different ways. For some people say that theform of a species is not received in matter ex-

cept by the mediation of the form of the genus;

and so that there is one form in number by

which fire is fire, and another by which fire is a

body. Therefore that incomplete generic form is

called a ‘seminal reason’; the reason being that

such a form in matter is a certain inclination for

receiving specific forms.

56



Hoc autem non videtur esse verum: quia omnis

forma quae advenit post aliquod esse substan-

tiale, est forma accidentalis. Si enim post esse ingenere substantiae constitutum advenit, ergo ea

recedente, adhuc remanet individuum in genere

substantiae; quod est contra rationem formae

substantialis, sicut dicitur in 2 de anima.

Et praeterea, cum omnis forma det aliquod esse,

et impossibile sit unam rem habere duplex esse

substantiale, oportet, si prima forma substanti-

alis adveniens materiae det sibi esse substanti-

ale, quod secunda superveniens det esse acci-

dentale: et ideo non est alia forma qua ignis est

ignis, et qua est corpus, ut Avicenna vult.

Et si Commentator dicat in 2 Metaph. genus nonesse materiam sed formam mediam inter

materiam et ultimam formam: hoc non dicitur

ad significandum ordinem formarum secundum

rem sed secundum rationem: quia genus

quamvis significet totum, ut Avicenna dicit,

significat tamen ut indistinctum, et ita propinque

se habet ad rationem materiae. Et praeterea

sequeretur quod res signata per genus esset pars

speciei constitutae per formam superadditam, et

ita de specie praedicari non posset.

Nec etiam hoc convenit secundum intentionemAugustini: quia ex virtute formae generalis non

necessario sequitur forma specialis: unde non

est talis virtus secundum quam necesse sit fieri,

sed secundum quam fieri potest.

Ideo alii dicunt, quod cum omnes formae,

secundum philosophum, de potentia materiae

educantur, oportet ipsas formas praeexistere in

materia incomplete, secundum quamdam quasiinchoationem; et quia non sunt in esse suo per-

fectae, non habent perfectam virtutem agendi,

sed incompletam; et ideo non possunt per se

exire in actus, nisi sit agens exterius quod

excitet formam incompletam ad agendum, ut sic

But this does not appear to be true, since every

form which arrives after something is substan-

tial is an accidental form. For if it arrives after itis constituted in the genus of substance, there-

fore upon its departure there would remain be-

sides an individual in the genus of substance,

which goes against the nature of a substantial

form, as is said in De Anima II (see ch. 2, 414a

25ff.).

Furthermore, since every form confers some

being, and it is impossible for one thing to have

a twofold substantial being, if the first arriving

substantial form were to confer substantial be-

ing, then it would have to be the case that the

second one upon its arrival would confer acci-

dental being: and so there is not one form by

which fire is fire, and another by which it is a

body, as Avicenna wanted to have it.

And even though the Commentator in Meta- physics II says the genus is not matter but a

form intermediate between matter and the ulti-

mate form, this is not said in order to signify an

order of forms with respect to reality but with

respect to reason, seeing that genus, although it

signify the whole, nevertheless signifies it as in-

distinct, and so stands nearer to the nature of

matter. And besides, it would follow that the

thing designated by the genus would be part of

the species constituted by the form added to it,

and thus it could not be predicated of the

species.

Nor does this even agree with the intention of Augustine, seeing that from the virtue of a gen-

eric form a particular form does not necessarily

follow, and therefore there is no such virtue

according to which it must of necessity result, but according to which it can result.

And therefore others say that since all forms,

according to the Philosopher, are drawn out of

the potency of matter, it must be the case that

forms preexist in matter incompletely, accord-ing to a certain ‘inchoateness’,31 so to speak; and

because they do not exist in their perfected

being they do not possess a perfect virtue of

acting, but an incomplete one; and therefore

they cannot go out into act unless there be an

31 Or ‘incipience’, or ‘incipient form’; that is, in an as-of-yet undeveloped state; the position here amounting

to the supposition that a seminal virtue is an incomplete active potency, whereas St. Thomas will argue below

that the potency of matter is a complete passive one.

57



cooperetur agenti exteriori; aliter enim non esset

generatio mutatio naturalis, sed violenta:

quia, ut in 3 Ethic. dicitur, violentum est cujus prin-cipium est extra, nil conferente vim passo.

Has ergo virtutes incompletas in materia prae-

existentes, rationes seminales dicunt, quia sunt

secundum esse [in]completum in materia, sicut

vir-tus formativa in semine.

Hoc autem verum non videtur; quia quamvis

formae educantur de potentia materiae, illa

tamen potentia materiae non est activa, sed

passiva tantum; sicut enim, ut Commentator

dicit in 8 Physic., in motu locali oportet esse

aliud movens et motum; ita etiam in motu

alterationis; et ponit exemplum quod quandocorpus naturaliter sanatur, cor est sanans, et alia

membra sanata; et ideo sicut in corporibus

simplicibus non dicimus quod sint mota ex se

secundum locum, quia ignis non potest dividi in

movens et motum;

ita etiam non potest esse alteratum ex se, quasi

aliqua potentia existens in materia aliquo modo

agat in ipsam materiam in qua est, educendo

eam in actum.

Sed utrumque contingit in animatis, quia sunt

mota secundum locum ex se, et etiam alterata, propter distinctionem organorum vel partium,

quarum una est movens et alterans, et alia mota

et alterata; et ideo non hoc modo potest accipi

virtus seminalis in aliis rebus sicut in habentibusanimam.

Nec tamen sequitur, si in materia est potentia

passiva tantum, quod non sit generatio naturalis:

quia materia coadjuvat ad generationem nonagendo, sed inquantum est habilis ad recip-

iendum talem actionem: quae etiam habilitas

appetitus materiae dicitur, et inchoatio formae.

extrinsic agent which stimulates the incomplete

form in order to act, such that it co-operate with

an exterior agent; for otherwise generationwould not be a natural change but a violent one,

because, as is said in Ethics III (ch. 1, 1110a 1),

The violent is that of which the principle iswithout, the thing suffering contributing nothing .

Therefore these incomplete virtues preexisting

in matter are called “seminal reasons” because

they exist according to a[n] [in]complete being

in matter, as does the formative power in seed.

But this does not appear to be true, the reason

being that, although forms are drawn out of the

potency of matter, nevertheless that potency is

not active but passive only. For just as the

Commentator says in Physics VIII (cf. ch. 5,

258aff.), in local motion there must be some-

thing moving [another] and something moved; so also in the motion of alteration; and he gives

as an example that when the body is healed nat-

urally, the heart is the healer and the other mem-

bers are the healed; and therefore just as in the

case of simple bodies we do not say that they

are moved by themselves according to place,

because fire cannot be divided into a mover and

a thing moved, so also it cannot be altered by it-

self, as if some virtue existing in matter in some

way were to act on the matter itself in which it

exists, by drawing it out into act.

But both things happen in living things because

they are moved in place by themselves, as wellas being altered, by reason of a distinction of or-

gans or parts, one of which moves and alters,

and the other which is moved and altered; and

so a seminal virtue cannot be taken in this wayin other things just as they are in things having a

soul.

Nor does it follow, if in matter there is only a

passive potency, that there is no natural gener-

ation; the reason being that matter assists ingeneration not by acting, but inasmuch as it is

endowed with a capacity for receiving such an

action, which capacity is also called an ‘ap-

petite’ of matter, and an ‘inchoateness’ [or ‘in-

ception’] of form.32

32 On matter as an “appetite for form”, cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by

Thomas Aquinas, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD, 1952), q. 4, art. 1, obj. 2

“on the other side”; ad 2: [cont.]

58



Non enim eodem modo omnes motus naturales

dicuntur, ut in 2 Physic. et in 1 Cael. et Mund.

Commentator dicit, sed quidam propter principium activum intus existens, ut motus

localis gravium et levium; et quidam propter

principium passivum quod est secundum

potentiam ab agente naturali natam in actum

educi, ut in generatione et alteratione simpli-

cium corporum: unde et natura dividitur inmateriam et formam.

Et ideo concedo quod in materia nulla potentia

activa est, sed pure passiva; et quod rationes

seminales dicuntur virtutes activae completae in

natura cum propriis passivis, ut calor et frigus,

et forma ignis, et virtus solis, et hujusmodi; et

dicuntur seminales non propter esse imper-

fectum quod habeant, sicut virtus formativa in

semine; sed quia rerum individuis primo creatis

hujusmodi virtutes collatae sunt, per opera sex

dierum, ut ex eis quasi ex quibusdam seminibus producerentur et multiplicarentur res naturales.

For not all natural motions are spoken of in the

same way, as the Commentator says in PhysicsII and De Caelo et Mundo I, but some by reasonof an active principle existing within, as with

the local motion of heavy and light things;33 and

certain ones by reason of a passive principle

which is naturally apt to be drawn out into act

according to a power from a natural agent, as in

the generation and alteration of simple bodies:whence nature is divided into matter and form.

And therefore I concede that there is no active

potency in matter but a purely passive one; and

that active virtues complete in nature along with

their passive counterparts are called “seminal

reasons”, as hot and cold, and the form of fire,

and the virtue of the sun, and the like. And they

are called ‘seminal’ not by reason of the imper-

fect being they have, as with the formative vir-

tue in seed, but because virtues of this sort have

been conferred upon the first created individualsof things by the works of the Six Days, so that

out of them, as it were out of certain ‘seeds’,

2. Again, that which is not cannot exercise an operation. Now formless matter exercises an operation,

since it is appetent of a form ( Phys. iii). Therefore matter can be without a form, and thus it is not

unreasonable to suppose that formless matter preceded the formation of things in point of duration.

<…>

2. [To the second it must be said that] [a]ppetence of form is not an act of matter but a certain rela-

tionship in matter in respect of a form, in so far as matter has the form potentially , as the Com-mentator states ( Phys. i, 81). (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. Books I-II translated byRichard J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath & W. Edmund Thirlkel (New Haven, 1963), Book I,

lect. 15, n. 136:

136. Next where he says, ‘the other such...’ (192 a 18), he proves the same thing by an argumentwhich reduces [the opposite position] to the impossible. Since form is a sort of good and is desir-

able, matter, which is other than privation and other than form, naturally seeks and desiresform according to its nature. But for those who do not distinguish matter from privation, this in-

volves the absurdity that a contrary seeks its own corruption, which is absurd. That this is so he shows

as follows. If matter seeks form, it does not seek a form insofar as it is under this form. For in this

latter case the matter does not stand in need of being through this form. (Every appetite exists be-

cause of a need, for an appetite is a desire for what is not possessed .) In like manner matter does

not seek form insofar as it is under the contrary or privation, for one of the contraries is cor-

ruptive of the other, and thus something would seek its own corruption. It is clear, therefore, that

matter, which seeks form, is other in nature [ratio] from both form and privation. For if matter seeksform according to its proper nature, as was said, and if it is held that matter and privation are the same

in nature [ratio], it follows that privation seeks form, and thus seeks its own corruption, which is im-

possible. Hence it is also impossible that matter and privation be the same in nature [ratio]. (empha-

sis added)

33 It being the form of an element which is the intrinsic active principle of its motion, whereas the moving

cause is the thing which generated it in the first place, or whatever removes an obstruction (cf. Phys., VIII. 4,

256a 1; SCG III, 23, n. 4; ibid., n. 8).

59



natural things might be produced and multi-

plied.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hujusmodivirtutes activae in natura dicuntur rationes, non

quod sint in materia per modum intentionis, sed

quia ab arte divina producuntur, et manet in eis

ordo et directio intellectus divini, sicut in re

artificiata manet directio artificis in finemdeterminatum.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod rationes semin-

ales dicuntur materiae inditae, non quia sint in-

telligendae praeexistere in materia ante adven-

tum formae completae, quasi pertinentes ad es-

sentiam materiae, vel ad rationem ejus, secun-

dum quod est materia; sed per modum quo

etiam formae completae in materia esse dicun-

tur.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod Anaxagoras pone- bat, in aere, ex quo generabatur ignis, prae-

existere quasdam partes ignis in actu latentes,

per quarum exitum et congregationem, ignis

generari videbatur. Hoc autem nos non ponimus;

sed quod in materia aeris praecessit aptitudo ad

formam ignis, et in igne generante virtus activa,

per quam haec aptitudo in actum reducitur: et

hoc non est inconveniens.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod sub rationibus se-minalibus comprehenduntur tam virtutes activae

quam etiam passivae, quae perfici possunt per

agentia naturalia; sicut et in generatione ani-

malis semen extento nomine dicitur non solum

sperma, sed etiam menstruum.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod concurrentibusomnibus causis naturalibus, ex quibus omnibus

una perfecta causa constat, necesse est effectum

sequi, nisi aliquid impediat: et hoc modo lo-

quitur Augustinus.

ad 1. To the first, therefore, it must be said thatactive virtues of this sort in nature are called

‘reasons’ not because they exist in matter in the

manner of an intention, but because they are

produced by divine art, and the order and dir-

ection of the divine intellect remains in them, just as in artworks there remains the direction of

the artwork to a determinate end.34

ad 2. To the second it must be said that seminal

reasons are said to be placed in matter not be-

cause they are to be understood as preexisting in

matter before the arrival of the complete form,

as if pertaining to the essence of matter, or to its

account according as it is matter, but in the

manner in which even complete forms are said

to be in matter.35

ad 3. To the third it must be said that Anaxag-oras held that in air, out of which fire is gen-

erated, preexist certain parts of fire hiding in

act, by means of the exit or gathering together

of which fire appears to be generated. Now this

[position] we do not hold, but that in the matter

of air there precedes an aptitude for the form of

fire, and in the fire generating an active virtue

by means of which this aptitude is reduced to

act; and this is by no means unfitting.

ad 4. To the fourth it must be said that under ‘seminal reasons’ are comprehended both active

as well as passive virtues, which may be per-

fected by a natural agency, just as in animal

generation the name ‘seed’ has been extended

not only to sperm, but also to menstrual blood.36

ad 5. To the fifth it must be said that, upon theconcurrence of every natural cause from the

ensemble of which one perfect cause is con-

stituted, the effect necessarily follows, unless

something stand in the way, and Augustine

34 Understanding art here as right reason about things to be made, or ‘about makable things’ (cf. Ia-IIae, q.57, art. 3, c.), it is seen to consist in a series of steps ordered to attaining a due end through determinate

means, as Aristotle and St. Thomas elsewhere explain (see, e.g., In I Post. An., lect. 1, n. 1).35 That is, as ‘inchoate’ or incipient; being an appetite for form, in the manner explained above.36 Cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 115, art.2, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the third it must be said that the seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an ani-

mal. But that can also be called ‘seed’ which the female contributes as the passive principle. And thus

under ‘seed’ both active and passive principles may be comprehended.

60



speaks in this way [in the passage under dis-

cussion].

For more on what St. Thomas calls an “inchoateness of form”, cf. Commentary on Aris-totle’s Physics. Books I-II translated by Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath & W. Ed-

mund Thirlkel (New Haven, 1963), Book II, lect. 1, nn. 141-144:

BOOK II

THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL SCIENCE

LECTURE 1 (192 b 8-193 a 8)WHAT IS NATURE? WHAT THINGS HAVE A NATURE? WHAT THINGS ARE

‘ACCORDING TO NATURE’?

141. After the Philosopher has treated the principles of natural things in Book I, he here

treats the principles of natural science.

Now the things which we ought to know first in any science are its subject and the method

by which it demonstrates.

Hence Book II is divided into two parts. First he determines what things belong to the

consideration of natural science, and secondly, where he says, ‘Now that we have

established...’(194 b 16; L5 #176ff), he points out the causes from which it demonstrates.

The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows what nature is. Secondly, where he

says, ‘We have distinguished ...’ (193 b 23; L3 #157ff), he determines what things natural

science considers.

The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows what nature is. Secondly the number of ways [in which the name nature is used] is pointed out, where he says, ‘Some identify...’

(193 a 9; L2 #149ff).

The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows what nature is. Secondly, where he

says, ‘That nature exists ...’ (193 a 2 #148), he refutes the position of those who attempt to

demonstrate that nature exists.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he states what nature is. Secondly, where

he says, ‘Things “have a nature” (192 b 33 #146), he designates those things which are

called ‘nature’.

Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he inquires into the definition of nature.

Secondly he arrives at the definition, where he says, ‘... nature is ...’(192 b 22 #145).

Thirdly, he explains this definition, where he says, ‘I say ...’ (192 b 23 #145).

142. He says, therefore, first that we say that of all beings some are from nature, whereas

others are from other causes, for example, from art or from chance. Now we say that the

following things are from nature: every sort of animal, and their parts, such as flesh and blood, and also plants and simple bodies, i.e., the elements, such as earth, fire, air and water,

which are not resolved into any prior bodies. For these and all things like them are said to be

from nature.

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All of these things differ from the things which are not from nature because all things of this

sort seem to have in themselves a principle of motion and rest; some according to place, such

as the heavy and the light, and also the celestial bodies, some according to increase and

decrease, such as the animals and plants, and some according to alteration, such as the

simple bodies and everything which is composed of them. But things which are not from

nature, such as a bed and clothing and like things, which are spoken of in this way because

they are from art, have in themselves no principle of mutation, except per accidens, insofar

as the matter and substance of artificial bodies are natural things. Thus insofar as artificial

things happen to be iron or stone, they have a principle of motion in them, but not insofar asthey are artifacts. For a knife has in itself a principle of downward motion, not insofar as it is

a knife, but insofar as it is iron.

143. But it does not seem to be true that in every change of natural things a principle of motion is in that which is moved. For in the alteration and the generation of simple bodies,the whole principle of motion seems to be from an external agent. For example, when water is heated, or air is converted into fire, the principle of the change is from an external agent.Therefore, some say that even in changes of this sort an active principle of motion is in

that which is moved, not perfectly, but imperfectly, which principle helps the action of the

external agent. For they say that in matter there is a certain inchoateness of form, which

they say is privation, the third principle of nature. And the generations and alterations of

simple bodies are said to be from this intrinsic principle. But this cannot be. Since a thing acts only insofar as it is in act, the aforesaid inchoate state of form, since it is not act, but

a certain disposition for act, cannot be an active principle. And furthermore, even if it

were a complete form, it would not act on its own subject by changing it. For the form

does not act, rather the composite acts. And the composite cannot alter itself unlessthere are two parts in it, one of which alters, the other of which is altered.

144. And so it must be said that a principle of motion is in natural things in the way in

which motion belongs to them. Therefore in those things to which it belongs to move,

there is an active principle of motion. Whereas in those things to which it belongs to be

moved, there is a passive principle, which is matter. And this principle, insofar as it has

a natural potency for such a form and motion, makes the motion to be natural . And for

this reason the production of artificial things is not natural. For even though the mater-ial principle is in that which comes to be, it does not have a natural potency for such a

form. So also the local motion of the celestial bodies is natural, even though it is from a

separated mover, inasmuch as there is in the celestial body itself a natural potency for

such a motion. However in heavy and light bodies there is a formal principle of motion.

(But a formal principle of this sort cannot be called the active potency to which this

motion pertains. Rather it is understood as a passive potency. For heaviness in earth is

not a principle for moving, but rather for being moved.)37 For just as the other

accidents are consequent upon substantial form, so also is place, and thus also ‘to be

moved to place’. However the natural form is not the mover. Rather the mover is that

which generates and gives such and such a form upon which such a motion follows.

(emphasis added)

§

37 Likewise it is a principle for not being moved, inasmuch as it resists the force impressed on it by another.

62



5. Seminal reasons in the Work of the Six Days.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 73, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but all things subsequently made had

in a sense been made before in the work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had aprevious existence materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God

formed Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causes, as thoseindividual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their kind. 38 Species,

also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so

that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by

the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning . Again, animals of new

kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species, as

the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in their

causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed beforehand by way of similitude, as

the souls now created. And the work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as

we read (Phil. 2:7), The Son of God “was made in the likeness of men.” And again, the glory

that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude; and that of the body in the

heaven, especially the empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), “Nothing under the sun

is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us.” (emphasis added)

For seminal reasons in the elements of the world, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol.Ia, q. 70, art. 2, ad 1 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Reply to Objection 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be

generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally, without any kind of

seed.39 This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature produces its effects by

determinate means, and consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed

cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, rather to be said that in the

natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the

formative power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, the

formative power of is the influence of the heavenly bodies. The material principle, however,

in the generation of either kind of animals, is either some element, or something

compounded of the elements.

But at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which

produced animals from material elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or

virtually, as Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of

producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as Avicenna held,

but in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter

by the power of seed or the influence of the stars. (emphasis added)

Although he mentions only the Son here, that the Third Person must also be assigned a rolein the aforementioned process is made clear by the following considerations:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 44, art. 6, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

38 Cf. our remark on the progenitor of a line above.39 Cf. Ia, q. 91, art. 2, ad 2 supra.

63



I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And

as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of

the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God

according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to

create is not proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity. Nevertheless the

divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, [each] have a causality

respecting the creation of things. For as was said above (Q[14], A[8]; Q[19], A[4]), when

treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and

will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsmanworks through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding

some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is

His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost.40 And so the processions of the

Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the

essential attributes, knowledge and will . (emphasis added)

Hence, the Holy Spirit must be recognized as having been at work in the foregoing process, being responsible for making fertile the seeds of things present in the elements at

the outset of the first day, a conclusion which is also clear from the following: Cf. ibid., Ia,

q. 74, art. 3, ad 4:

Reply to Objection 4: …Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved over thatwhich was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is not one of place, but of pre-

eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit . i, 7). It is the opinion, however, of Basil

( Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit moved over the element of water, “fostering and

quickening its nature and impressing vital power , as the hen broods over her chickens.”

For water has especially a life-giving power, since many animals are generated in

water, and the seed of all animals is liquid [read moist ]…. (emphasis added)

For an analogous case making clear the causality of the Spirit here, cf. St. Thomas

Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa, q., 32, art. 1, ad 1 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Reply to Objection 1: The work of the conception is indeed common to the whole Trinity;

yet in some way it is attributed to each of the Persons. For to the Father is attributedauthority in regard to the Person of the Son, who by this conception took to Himself (human

nature). The taking itself (of human nature) is attributed to the Son: but the formation of the

body taken by the Son is attributed to the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the

Son, according to Gal. 4:6: “God sent the Spirit of His Son.” For just as the power of the

soul which is in the semen, through the spirit enclosed therein, fashions the body in the

generation of other men, so the Power of God, which is the Son Himself, according to 1

Cor. 1:24: “Christ, the Power of God,” through the Holy Ghost formed the body which

He assumed . (emphasis added)

40 Cf. also Ia, q. 66, art. 1, reply to the second argument in the contrary sense (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

[Now] by the words “Spirit of God” Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to “move

over the waters,” not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman’s will may be said to move over

the material to which he intends to give a form.

For the basis of this comparison in Augustine, cf. De Gen. Opus Imperf . 4.16 (tr. Edward Heneage Dering):

And the Spirit of God bore Himself over the water, not as oil floats on water . . . . but with a certain

effective and making virtue [vi quadam effectoria et fabricatoria], by which that over which He bears

Himself is made and constructed, as the will of an artificer acts on the wood or other material on

which he works, or on the limbs of his own body when he moves them to the work.

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It is therefore evident that the principles at work in the Incarnation were operative in the

Work of the Six Days. The role of the Spirit of God in making fertile the seed-forms in theelements may therefore be summed up as follows: For, inasmuch as “the active principle”

“at the first beginning of the world” is “the Word of God”, understood as “the Power of

God, which is the Son Himself”; and inasmuch as this selfsame Power corresponds to “theactive principle” which “lies in the formative power of the seed” (cf. Ia, q. 71, art. 2, ad 1)

—that is to say, with “the power of the soul which is in the semen” (cf. IIIa, q. 32, art. 1,

ad 1), but the Holy Spirit, understood as the Spirit of God, corresponds to the instrumentused by that power—it must be the case that, just as that principle, “through the spiritenclosed therein, fashions the body in the generation of other men” (idem), so in the

present case, it fashioned every species of living thing through the Holy Spirit; with respect

to the work in question, the selfsame Spirit having “produced animals from material ele-ments” (Summa, op. cit.). But to conclude thus is to say that every species of living thing sprang out of its native element as from a seed . Hence, to suppose plants, animals, and

men, were produced in perfection on their respective days actually presupposes, and so de-mands, that they be understood to have arisen from their respective seed-forms. In fact, as I

shall go on to argue below, every component of created reality, both spiritual and material, was established in its seed-form and afterwards “produced perfect”. Butinasmuch as St. Augustine held that plants and all other such creatures did not originally

come forth from seed, we must examine his arguments in the next place.

Cf. St. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, op.cit., Bk. 5, ch. 4, nn.7-11, pp 150-153:

Chapter 10

Gen. 1:12 means that earth received the power of bringing forthcrops and trees.

7. What, then, is the meaning of the words that follow? The text reads thus: When day was

made, God made heaven and earth and [150-151] every green thing of the field before it appeared above the earth, and all the grass of the field before it sprang forth.

What are we to make of this? Must we not ask where God made these things before they

sprang forth? One might be much more inclined to believe that God made them at the time

when they sprang forth, were we not informed by the sacred text that it was before they

sprang forth that God made them. As a result, if the reader cannot discover where they were

made, he will nevertheless believe that they were made before they sprang forth, if he

piously believes Holy Scripture. It is impious, of course, not to believe it.

8. When, then, shall we say? Shall we follow the opinion of those who say that it was in

the Word of God that all things were made before they sprang forth on the earth? But if this

is the way they were created, it was not when day was made but before the making of day

that they were created. Scripture says quite plainly, When day was made, God made heaven

and earth and every green thing of the field before it appeared above the earth, and all the grass of the field before it sprang forth . If, therefore, this was when day was made, it was

surely not before day was made. Hence, it was not in the Word, who is coeternal with theFather before day or anything else was made, but it was only when day was made. For those

things that are in the Word of God before all creation were certainly not made, but they were

made when day was made, as the words of Scripture declare, although this took place before

they appeared above the earth and before they sprang forth, as Scripture says concerning the

green things and the grass of the field.

65



9. Where, then, were they? Were they in the earth in the “reasons” or causes from

which they would spring, as all things already exist in their seeds before they evolve in

one form or another and grow into their proper kinds in the course of time? But these

seeds that we see are already above the earth and have already sprung forth. Or shall

we say that they were not above the earth but within the earth, and that, therefore,

before they sprang forth they were made, because they only sprang forth [151-152]

when their seeds germinated and with the process burst up above ground? For this iswhat we see happening in due course of time in the case of each plant. Were the seeds,

therefore, made when day was made, and in them was there every green thing of thefield and all the grass, not with the appearance they have when they have sprung forth

above the earth, but with the power they have in the formative principles of the seeds?

Did earth, then, first produce the seeds?

But that is not the way Scripture put the matter when it said And the earth brought

forth the nourishing crops ( or grain), scattering the seeds according to their kind and

their likeness, and the fruit trees bearing its fruit, containing within itself its seed accord-

ing to its kind upon the earth.12 From these words it appears rather that the seeds

sprang from the crops and the trees, and that the crops and trees themselves came

forth not from seeds but from the earth. This is what the word of God itself declares.

For it does not say, “Let the seeds in the earth bring forth the grain and the fruit-bear-

ing tree”; but it says, Let the earth bring forth the grass scattering its seed .13 It thus re-

veals that the seed is from the crops, not the crops from the seed. And thus was it done, and the earth brought them forth.14 That is to say, it was thus done first in the knowledge of the

Day mentioned above,15 and earth now brought these creatures forth, so that they would now

be made also in themselves in the created world.

10. How, then, was this done before they appeared above the earth the earth and before

they sprang forth? On the one hand, they were made with heaven and earth when that day

transcending our knowledge and experience was made, which God first made; and on the

other hand, they sprang forth above the earth, a thing that could not happen except on days

marked by the course of the sun after the proper lapse of time for each kind. Are these twothings, then, distinct? If this is so, and if that day is the society of supercelestial angels and

powers united together, then God’s creatures are undoubtedly known to angels with a

knowledge different from ours. Apart from the fact that they know creatures in the Word of

God, through whom all things have been made, I believe that their knowledge of creatures inthemselves is far different from ours. They have what [152-153] we might call a primordial

or original knowledge of the creatures God first made before He rested from His works, not

creating anything further. Our knowledge, on the other hand, is dependent upon the

governance of creatures already made, as this takes place in time, inasmuch as God, in the

unfolding of His creatures according to the perfection of the number six, is working still.16

11. It is, therefore, causally (causaliter ) that Scripture has said that earth brought

forth the crops and the trees, in the sense that it received the power of bringing them

forth. In the earth from the beginning, in what I might call the roots of time, God

created what was to be in times to come. For God later planted a paradise in the East, and

there from the earth He made every tree to grow, beautiful to the sight and good for food .17

But we must not say that He then added to creation something He had not previously made,

something that was afterwards to be added to the completeness in which He had finished allthat was very good on the sixth day. All the plants and trees had already been made in the

first creation, and God rested from that creation, moving and governing in the course of history the things which He created before resting from His creation. It is in this sense that

He planted not only Paradise but even now all that earth brings forth. For who now creates

these things unless it is He who is working even now? But He now creates from what

already exists, whereas in the beginning creatures were made by Him when none of themexisted at all. It was then that the day was created which is not to be identified with Him but

rather with the spiritual and intellectual creation.18

66



NOTES (pp. 255-256)

12 Gen 1:12. Augustine’s text here reads: Et produxit terra herbam pabuli (vel herbam feni), seminans semen secundum genus et secundum similitudinem, et lignum fructuosum faciens fructum, cuius semen suum in se secundum genus super terram. (I have found no support for

the reading of m in this place, seminantem semen for seminans semen.) Earlier (2.12.23

supra) Augustine quoted the text in the following form: Et eiecit terra herbam pabuli semenhabentem secundum suum genus et secundum similitudinem.41 Augustine’s revision of the

text, changing semen habentem to seminans semen, is probably due to his desire to followmore closely the LXX, which reads spei=ron sper/ma. It is difficult, however, to

understand how Augustine construed the phrase. One might take the participle sub- [255-

256] stantively, in apposition with herbam; or one might possibly understand semen as a

second subject of produxit , with seminans in agreement but taking no object. In any case, themeaning of Augustine is clear, and the grammatical difficulty with the text does not obscure

his interpretation. For he argues that God, through the causal reasons in the earth, made

the crops, which scattered their seeds and thus produced more crops. The original pro-

duction of crops on the earth, therefore, was not caused by seeds but by God’s power

working in the earth through the causal reasons.13 Gen 1:11. The textual problem about the form of the participle discussed in the preceding

note occurs here again.14

Gen. 1:12.15 The “Day” in Augustine’s interpretation refers to the angels. See 4.22.39 supra, and n. 18

to Book 2 supra.16 Cf. John 5.17.17 Gen. 2.8-9.18 Namely, the angels. (emphasis added)

With regard to St. Augustine’s opinion here, consider the implication of a passage excerp-

ted from St. Thomas above:

Reply to Objection 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be

generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally, without any kind of

seed.42 This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature produces its effects bydeterminate means, and consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed

cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, rather to be said that in the

natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the

formative power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, the

formative power of is the influence of the heavenly bodies. But at the first beginning of the

world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material

elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine teaches. Not as

though the power possessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth

and the water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the

elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence

of the stars. (Ia, q. 70, art. 2, ad 1) (emphasis added)

41 The Clementine text of the Vulgate reads: Et ait: Germinet terra herbam virentem, et facientem semen, et lignum pomiferum faciens fructum juxta genus suum, cujus semen in semetipso sit super terram. Et factumest ita. “And he said: let the earth bring forth green herb, and such as may seed, and the fruit tree yielding

fruit after its kind, which may have seed in itself upon the earth. And it was so done.” (Douay-Rheims

Challoner Revision)42 Cf. Ia, q. 91, art. 2, ad 2, where St. Thomas explains that “[p]erfect animals, which are generated from

semen, cannot be generated solely through the power of a celestial body in the way that Avicenna

imagines….”

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From the foregoing remarks, it is quite evident that the Angelic Doctor does not agree with

his great predecessor on this point; there being no reason whatsoever to suppose that suchthings did not spring up from seeds; the reason the Bishop of Hippo adduces having no

force whatsoever. For the fact that the text of Genesis states that plants sprang up out of theearth in no way necessitates such a denial; this being a perfectly natural way of expressingthe same notion; the point of the inspired author being to show that each species of crea-

ture arose from its proper element; there being no need to state in the case of plants that

they also sprang up from seeds in the earth when this is quite evident. Even today one mayspeak of plants “growing up out of the earth” without being thought to deny thereby thatthey also come from seeds. Moreover, as is clear from the text of St. Thomas just cited, thevery power given to the elements in the beginning for producing such effects is nothing other than the seed or seeds of the things from which creatures were destined to come forth.

N.B. For more on the role of “the influence of the stars” here, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,Summa Theol., Ia, q. 115, art. 3 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of What Is Produced in Bodies Here Below?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Obj. 1. It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in

bodies here below. For Damascene says ( De Fide Orth. ii. 7): We say that they —namely, the

heavenly bodies— are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes.

Obj. 2. Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things

here below there is passive matter; and there are contrary agents—heat and cold, and the

like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality

to the heavenly bodies.

Obj. 3. Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything whichis produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and

dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the

heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says ( De Civ. Dei v. 6): Nothing is more corporeal than sex. But

sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that of twins born under the same

constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the

cause of things produced in bodies here below.

On the contrary, Augustine says ( De Trin. iii. 4): Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature

are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature. And Dionysius

( Div. Nom. iv) says that the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies,moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection.

I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immov-

able is always in the same way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways of

being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds

from the immovable. Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are

they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of

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Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to

the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female.

Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the

stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.

(emphasis added)

On the modes of likeness at issue here, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol . Ia, q. 4, art.

3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that, since a likeness is looked to according to an agreement or

communication in form,47 likeness is manifold, according to the many ways of communi-cation in form. For certain things are called ‘like’ which communicate in the same form

according to the same notion and according to the same mode, and these things are not only

called ‘like’ but ‘equal’ in their likeness, just as two things equally white are called alike in

whiteness. And this is the most perfect likeness. In another way things are called ‘like’

which communicate in form according to the same notion, and not according to the same

mode, but according to more or less, as the less white is said to be ‘like’ the more white. And

this is an imperfect likeness. In a third way things are called ‘like’ which communicate in

the same form but not according to the same notion, as is clear in non-univocal agents .

For, since every agent makes something similar to itself inasmuch as it is an agent, but it

makes each thing according to its own form, a likeness to the form of the agent must be inthe effect . If, then, the agent is contained in the same species with its effect, there will be

a likeness in form between the maker and the thing made according to the same notion

of the species, just as man generates man. But if the agent is not contained in the same

species, there will [still] be a likeness, but not according to the same notion of the species,

just as the things generated by the power of the sun approach to some likeness to the sun,

but not such that they receive the form of the sun according to a likeness in species, but

according to a likeness in genus. If, then, there be any agents which are not contained in

a genus, their effects would even more remotely approach to a likeness of the form of

the agent, yet not such that they share in a likeness to the form of the agent according

to the same notion of the species, but according to some sort of analogy, just as being

itself is common to everything. And in this way the things that are from God are

likened to Him inasmuch as they are beings, as to the first and universal principal of their whole being. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Boethium De Trinitate, Questions 1-4, translated by Rose

E. Brennan, S.H.N. (Herder, 1946) Questions 5-6, translated by Armand Maurer (Toronto,1953):

Question 1, Article 4

Whether the Human Mind Is Capable of Arriving at a Knowledge of the Divine Trinity

Through Natural Reason

Objections

In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the ad-

aptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the

one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the

various adaptability of matter. (emphasis added)

47 Cf. Ia, q. 93, art. 9, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers): “Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality

causes likeness, as the Philosopher says....”

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4. Anything that is equivocal is reducible to what is univocal: but the issuing forth of

creatures from God is equivocal; it is needful, therefore, to presume as prior to it a univocal

procession, by which God proceeds from God, by reason of which a Trinity of persons

ensues.

Answer to objections

4. It must be said: Although anything equivocal is reducible to what is univocal, it is not

necessary that equivocal generation should be reduced to univocal generation, but that itshould be reduced to a generator which is univocal in itself. Now, in natural things we see

that equivocal generations are prior to univocal because equivocal causes have an influxextending to the total species, whereas univocal causes have not, their influence extending

only to one individual; and thus they are quasi-instruments of equivocal causes, just as

inferior bodies are of superior.

§

N.B. Let us turn next to our argument that not just the living but all things were created in

seminal form.

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2. On ‘seed’ understood as the starting-point of a generation.

In order to understood more adequately the nature of seed , let us begin with the following:

Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I. 1 (641b 15-39): Parallel Translations:

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(tr. William H. Ogle)

And that the heaven, [15] if it had an origin, was

evolved and is maintained by such a cause, there

is therefore even more reason to believe, than

that mortal animals so originated. For order and

definiteness are much more plainly manifest in

the celestial bodies than in our own frame;

while change and chance are characteristic of the perishable things of earth. [20] Yet there are

some who, while they allow that every animalexists and was generated by nature, nevertheless

hold that the heaven was constructed to be what

it is by chance and spontaneity; the heaven, in

which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible!

Again, whenever there is plainly some final end,

to which a motion tends should nothing stand in

the way, we always say that such final [25] end

is the aim or purpose of the motion; and fromthis it is evident that there must be a something

or other really existing, corresponding to what

we call by the name of Nature.

For a given seed does not give rise to any

chance living being, nor spring from any chance

one; but each seed springs from a definite parent

and gives rise to a definite progeny. And thus it

is the seed that is the ruling influence and

fabricator of the offspring. For these it is by

nature, the offspring being at [30] any rate that

which in nature will spring from it.

At the same time the offspring is anterior to the

seed [actually, it is the progenitor which comes

first (B.A.M.)]; for seed and perfected pro-

geny are related as the developmental pro-

cess and the result. Anterior, however, to both

seed and product is the organism from which

the seed was [35] derived. For every seed im-

plies two organisms, the parent and the progeny.

For germ or seed is both the seed of the organ-

ism from which it came, of the horse, for in-stance, from which it was derived, and the seed

of the organism that will eventually arise from

it, of the mule, for example, which is developed

from the seed of the horse. The same seed then

(tr. Hippocrates G. Apostle)

For this reason, it is probable [15] that the

heavens, more than mortal animals, were origin-

ated by such a cause, if they were originated;

for, at any rate, order and definiteness appear in

heavenly objects much more than in us, whereas

change and luck [20] exist rather in mortal

things. Yet some thinkers say that the heavens,in which nothing appears to be by chance or in

disorder, were formed by luck or by chance.

But, whenever there appears to be some end

towards which motion, if not obstructed, is

directed and finally terminates, we say that this

is [always and [25] definitely] for the sake of that . So there appears to be such a thing which

we call “nature.”

For indeed it is not from any chance seed that a

certain kind of living thing is generated, nor any

chance seed from a certain kind of living thing.

Each kind of seed, then, is a principle which

develops into a definite kind of living thing;

for it exists by [a certain kind of form] as a [30]

nature, or, at any rate, it develops from it.

Moreover, that from which the seed comes is

prior [as mover, as form, and as final cause] to

the seed itself; for the seed is the starting-

point of a generation {= genesis},49 whereas

its end [or perfection] {= telos} is the sub-

stance [generated]. But there is something

prior [in existence] to both the seed and that into

which the seed [35] develops, and that is [the

perfect living substance] from which the seed

comes.

For a seed may be viewed in two ways: (a) from

its [source] and (b) from what it finally be-comes, for it is a seed from where it came, e.g.

from a horse, and a seed from what something

else, e.g. a mule [or a horse] will develop, so it

is a seed related to a horse and a mule [or an-

49 Inserted by me for purposes of clarification, as is also the next phrase. For further illumination on seed as a

the starting point of genesis, see the definition of art excerpted from the Nicomachean Ethics below.

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is the seed both of the horse and of the mule,

though in different ways as here set forth. More-

over, the seed is potentially that which will

spring from it, and [642a] the relation of poten-

tiality to actuality we know.

other horse] not in the same way, but as stated.

Further, the seed exists as potentiality [for

something] and we [642a] already know how

potentiality is related to actuality.50

Notice how Aristotle explains that the seed is of the parent in one way, and of the offspring

in another: it is of the parent by proceeding from it as from its generator; it is of the off-

spring as that from which comes its progeny; the seed coming before the offspring, but the progenitor coming before the seed (the seed therefore being understood as the starting- point of generation [genesis]; the substance which results from the process being the telosor end result),51 with all three sharing in the specific nature of the living thing.

Note as well that, inasmuch as the progenitor produces offspring of the same species, this

generation is univocal, whereas the production of the first progenitors is equivocal.

With respect to the way in which potentiality is related to actuality, cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by John P. Rowan (Chicago,

1961), Book I, lect. 12, n. 188 (in part):

188. It should be noted, however, that it is a different thing to look for what is prior in one

and the same entity and for what is prior without qualification. For if one seeks what is prior

without qualification, the perfect must be prior to the imperfect, just as actuality is prior to

potentiality; because a thing is brought from a state of imperfection to one of perfection, or

from potentiality to actuality, only by something completely actual. Therefore, if we speak

of what is first in the whole universe, it must be the most perfect thing. But in the case of one

particular thing which goes from potentiality to complete actuality, potentiality is prior to

actuality in time, although it is subsequent in nature. It is also clear that the first of all things

must be one that is simplest; for the composite depends on the simple, and not the reverse.

50 Cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by John P. Rowan)

(Chicago, 1961), Book XII, lect. 6, n. 2503:

n. 11. For those things which are in potentiality only, or which come entirely under privation, or be-

long to some confused mass, cannot be moved so as to be brought to actuality unless there is some

moving cause which is existing actually. For in things made by art the matter does not move itself, but

an agent moves it, i.e., “technical knowledge,” or art. Neither does the menstrual blood, which is the

matter from which an animal is generated, move itself, but “semen,” i.e., the sperm of the animal,moves it. Nor does earth, which is the material from which plants are generated, move itself, but “the

seed,” i.e., the seeds of plants, move it.

Cf. also Aristotle, De Anima, II. 1 (412b 25) (R. Glen Coughlin): “It is not what has thrown off the soul that

is what is potentially in a manner that it might live, but what has [a soul]. But the seed and the fruit are such

bodies potentially.” That is to say, whereas the body of a living thing is potentially capable of living, the seed

and the fruit are at a prior remove from such a capability; which is to say, they are such bodies potentially.51 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 69, art. 2, ad 5: “For although the perfect is developed from

the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect.”

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Consequently we have to say with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) that this light was the light of

the sun, of a formless sun however, in respect of what was already the substance of the

sun: and that it had an illuminating power in a general way, and that on the fourth day it

received a special definite power for the production of its peculiar and particular effects.

And thus day and night resulted from the circular movement whereby this light approached

and receded. Nor is it unlikely that the substances of the spheres which by their common

diurnal movement caused this light to revolve, existed from the very beginning, and that

subsequently they received certain powers in the works of distinction and adornment.

(emphasis added)

St. Thomas, then, understands the light of the first day to imply the existence of “the sub-

stance of the sun” (as well as “the substance of the [other] luminaries”), having “illumin-ative power in a general way”, which substance afterwards on the fourth day “received a

special definite power for the production of its peculiar and particular effects”, such that a

passage is made from what was at first common to something more determinate, a subjectwhich we must examine more closely and so to which we turn our attention next.

4. On the procedure from the more common to the less common in the order of nature: The

case of light.

Let us begin our investigation by considering what St. Thomas calls “the common nature

of light”: Cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 67, art. 4, c. (tr. “Filius Ancillae,” at the Veritas website;supplemented by B.A.M.):

Necessarium autem fuit ut informitas tenebrar-

um primo removeretur per lucis productionem,

propter duo.

Primo quidem, quia lux, ut dictum est, est quail-

tas primi corporis, unde secundum eam primo

fuit mundus formandus.

Secundo, propter communitatem lucis, commu-

nicant enim in ea inferiora corpora cum super-ioribus.

Now it was necessary that the formlessness of

darkness first of all be removed by the pro-

duction of light, for two reasons.

The first is because light is a quality of the first

body 52 whence it was according to [it] that the

world should first receive its form.53

The second is on account of the common nature

of light; it shares even in lower bodies, as wellas in higher things54 …

52 I.e. of heaven, the transparent body, which, being the noblest thing, comes first.53 I.e. because the heaven is the first body, its formlessness, which was darkness, is fittingly removed first by

the production of light.54 More literally, “The second is on account of the community [or ‘commonness’] of light, for lower

bodies along with the higher communicate in it ”; that is, both lower and higher bodies have a share in

light, as with terrestrial air and celestial aether: Cf. Ia, q. 68, art. 4, sc., c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks

of heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when

it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature.…

In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the

heavenly body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential . Thus Damascene ( De Fide Orth. ii)

holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon’s orb, calling it the aerial. Accord-

ing to him, then, there are three heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of

which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was “rapt to the third

heaven.” (emphasis added)

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Sicut autem in cognitione proceditur a commun-

ioribus, ita etiam in operatione, nam prius gen-

eratur vivum quam animal, et animal quamhomo, ut dicitur in libro de Gener. Animal.

Sic ergo oportuit ordinem divinae sapientiae

manifestari, ut primo inter opera distinctionis produceretur lux, tanquam primi corporis forma,

et tanquam communior.

Basilius autem ponit tertiam rationem, quia per

lucem omnia alia manifestantur. Potest et quarta

ratio addi, quae in obiiciendo est tacta, quia dies

non potest esse sine luce; unde oportuit in prima

die fieri lucem.

Now just as in knowledge there is a procedure

from more common things,55 so also in [any]

work [of nature], for a living thing is generated before an animal, and an animal before man, as

is said in the book On the Generation of Animals.

Therefore it was fitting [read: ‘necessary’] for

the order of divine wisdom to be revealed in thisway, so that light might be produced first among

the works of distinction, as the form of the first

body, and according to its common nature [or

‘and as the more common’.]

Basil gives a third reason, that it is through light

that all other things are revealed. A fourth

reason is also to be added, that day cannot exist

without light; whence it was necessary for light

to be made on the first day.

Before proceeding to unfold the meaning of the foregoing passage, it will be helpful hereto examine an additional text furnishing another witness as to why the work of creation

begins with the production of light:

Cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by John P.

Rowan (Chicago, 1961), Book XII, lect. 6, n. 2508:

LESSON 6

Eternal Motion Requires An Eternal Mover

COMMENTARY

<…>

2508. Hence Chaos or Night (1064).

Then he uses the answer to the question given above to clarify a point previously estab-

lished, and in regard to this he does three things. First (1064:C 25o8), in the light of the

things established above he concludes that generation must be eternal. Second (1065:C

2510), on the ground that generation is eternal he concludes that the motion of the heavens

must be eternal (“Therefore, if something”). Third (1066:C 2517), on the ground that the

motion of the heavens is eternal he concludes that the first unmoved mover must be eternal

(“Therefore there is”).

55 a communioribus, etc. The English Dominican Fathers translate: “But as in knowledge we proceed from general principles…”, etc. Compare the similarly translated remark from the De Magistro given below. For

the reason why the commonness at issue is like that observed “in every work”, so as to found a comparison

with the passage from the more common to the less common in the order of knowledge, see the excerpt I give

next. Here I will only remark that the comparison with knowledge appears to be verfied of light insofar as the

light of the first day, understood as the substance of the sun, first possessed “illuminative power in a general

way” prior to being given a power for producing determinate effects.

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since the cause is not removed through the removal of its effect. As a consequence, the man

remains a being. So when the individual is not a man, it is an animal, and, if it is not an

animal, it is only a being. It is, therefore, now clear and plain that the first remote cause is

more comprehensively and more powerfully the cause of a thing than the proximate cause.

For this reason, its activity comes to adhere more powerfully to the thing than the activity of

the proximate cause. It happens in this way only because a thing first of all is affected by the

remote power alone and then is secondly affected by the power that is below the first.

The first cause aids the second cause in its activity, because the first cause also effects everyactivity that the second cause effects, although it effects it in another way [which is] higher

and more sublime.….

COMMENTARY

Every primary cause infuses its effect more powerfully than does a universal second cause.

To make this clear [the author] introduces a corollary through which he clarifies the first

point as through a certain sign. So he adds: Now when a universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not withdraw its power from it. To prove

this he introduces a third point, saying: This is because the universal first cause acts on the

effect of the second cause before the universal second cause acts on it. From this he inferswhat he asserted in the corollary, and rightly so, because what arrives first must depart last,

for we see that those things that are prior in composition are last in resolution. The meaning

of this proposition, therefore, consists in these three points: (1) that the first cause infuses the

effect more powerfully than does the second cause; (2) that the impression of the first cause

recedes later from the effect; (3) that it reaches the effect first. Proclus makes these three

points in two propositions. The first is in Proposition 56 of his book, which is as follows:

“Everything that is produced by what is secondary is produced more eminently by what is

prior and more causally efficacious, by which what is secondary is also produced.”‘ Hemakes the other two points in the next proposition, which is as follows: “Every cause both

acts prior to its effect and is the basis of more things after it.” After making these three

points, the author proceeds to clarify them, first through an example, second through an

argument, at: The first cause aids.

Now the example seems to pertain to formal causes in which the more universal a form is

the greater priority it seems to have. So, if we take a man, [for example], his specific

form is observed in the fact that he is rational. But the generic form is observed in the

fact that he is living or animal. Finally there is that which is common to all, being. Now

it is clear that in the generation of one particular man, the first thing found in the

material subject is being, then living, and after that man, for he is animal before he is

man, as is said in Book 2 of On the Generation of Animals. Again, in the process of

corruption he first loses the use of reason, while living and breathing remain. Second

he loses life, while being itself remains, because he does not corrupt into nothing. And in

this way the example can be understood with reference to the generation and corruption of

some individual. That this is his intent is clear from what he says: So when the individual isnot a man, that is, according to the act proper to man, it is an animal, because animal activity, which consists in movement and sense, still remains in it, and when it is not ananimal, it is only a being, because a completely inanimate body remains . This example is

verified in the very order of things, for existing things are prior to living things and living

things are prior to men, because when man is removed what animal entails is not

removed. instead, the opposite is the case, because, if there is no animal, there is no man.

The same argument applies to animal and being . (emphasis added)

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5. What it is to be a seminal principle.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas Quaestiones Disputate de Veritate (The Disputed Questions onTruth). In Truth, translated by Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn, Robert William

Schmidt, q. 11. art. 1, c. (Lat. ed. Busa):

similiter etiam dicendum est de scientiae

acquisitione;

quod praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scient-

iarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones

intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus

agentis cognoscuntur per species a sensibili-

bus abstractas, sive sint complexa, sicut digni-

tates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius,

et huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus appre-

hendit.

in istis autem principiis universalibus omnia

sequentia includuntur, sicut in quibusdam

rationibus seminalibus.

quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus

mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia,

quae prius in universali et quasi in potentia

cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam

acquirere.

We must give a similar explanation of the ac-

quisition of knowledge.

For certain seeds of knowledge pre-exist in

us, namely, the first concepts of [the] under-

standing, which by the light of the agent in-

tellect are immediately known through the

species abstracted from sensible things. These

are either complex, as axioms, or simple, as the

notions of being, of the one, and so on, which

the understanding grasps immediately.

In these general principles, however, all the

consequences are included as in certain se-

minal principles .56

When, therefore, the mind is led from these

general notions to actual knowledge of the particular things, which it knew previously in

general and, as it were, potentially, then one is

said to acquire knowledge. (emphasis added)

But to stand in such a relation is to be a certain kind of substance, as St. Thomas explains:

Cf. Summa Theol ., IIa-IIae, q. 4, art. 1, c. (tr . English Dominican Fathers):

…Now it has been already stated (Q[1], AA[1],4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, asunseen, and whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the aspect

of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act of faith, which aspect is that of

a thing hoped for, according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:25): “We hope for that which we see

not”: because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has already,

but for what one has not, as stated above (FS, Q[67], A[4]). Accordingly the relation of the

act of faith to its end which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: “Faith is the

substance of things to be hoped for.” For we are wont to call by the name of substance, the

first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is virtually con-

tained in the first beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident prin-

ciples are the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us the first be-

ginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way

then faith is said to be the “substance of things to be hoped for,” for the reason that in us thefirst beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which

contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through

seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were

speaking of happiness (FS, Q[3], A[8]; FS, Q[4], A[3]). (emphasis added)

56 Literally, “in these universal principles, however, are included all the things following upon them, as in

certain seminal reasons”; but to be included thus is to be contained virtually, as the next excerpt makes clear,

Hence, for a subject to contain what follows on it in this way makes it to be a seed-form of that thing.

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Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14, art. 2, c. (tr.

Alfred J. Freddoso):

…Hence, in order for a human being to be ordered toward the good of eternal life, it is alsonecessary that a sort of inception of that good should come to exist in the one who is

promised eternal life. But eternal life consists in the full cognition of God, as is evident from

John 17:3: “This is eternal life, that they should know you, the only true God.” Hence, it is

necessary that some inception of this supernatural cognition should come to exist in us. And

this inception comes through faith, which on the basis of an infused light holds fast to thingsthat by nature exceed our cognition. Now in wholes that have ordered parts it is customary

for the first part, in which there exists an inception of the whole, to be called the

substance of the whole, e.g., the foundation of a house and the keel of a ship. This is why

the Philosopher claims in Metaphysics II that if being were a single whole, its first part

would be substance. And so it is that faith, insofar as it is a sort of inception within us of the

eternal life that we hope for because of God’s promise, is called the substance of things to be

hoped for. And so here one touches upon the relation of faith to the good that moves the will

when it determines the intellect. (emphasis added)

Hence, as with the principles of science which contain virtually everything that follows

from them, so also with the subject producing light on the first day: it contained virtuallythe power for producing the determinate effects brought forth from it by the work of the

fourth day, for which reason it may rightly be called “substance”, not merely in the sense

of “the supreme genus condivided with the other genera,” as St. Thomas elsewhereexplains (cf. Ia, q. 4, art. 1, ad 1), “but for that likeness to substance which is found in each

genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains the others virtually and is said to bethe substance thereof ”. But if so, we may therefore suppose that this light was the sole principle of the other lights of heaven, inasmuch as only a single light is spoken of on the

first day, such that there were not separate substances of the moon and the stars.

From the foregoing considerations, then, we may observe how the light created onthe first day had a seed-like existence, and so also how it may be called ‘substance’; the

seeds of things being understood as “substance” containing virtually “the inception of the

whole”—that is, “the whole subsequent thing”, just as the first principles of sciencecontain virtually whatever follows from them. But that is the very relation that the light of the first day has to the lights of the fourth (the passage being made from the common or

general to the proper or particular)—such that the luminaries of the fourth day relate to the

light of the first as the perfection of a nature relates to its first beginning.57 One must there-fore conclude that the unitary light of the first day was seminal in form and afterward

brought to completion in the lights of the fourth, so that, contrary to what St. Thomas

thought to be the case (cf. Ia, q. 70, art. 1, c. supra), the heavens (and hence not thefirmament properly) do indeed have “the power of producing lights, as the earth has of

producing plants”. Let us now consider the most forward reasons in support of our view.

To begin with, it should be noted here that one might very well believe the afore-

mentioned view of the derivation of the luminaries to arise first and foremost because the placement of this work in sequence with the others implies just that , a conclusion the

following considerations make quite plain: To explain in brief, there are three points in

which the lights of heaven agree with the other creatures produced right before and rightafter them, all of which imply a fourth:

57 Thus these lights are understood to be universal causes in one way, but particular causes in another, and so

to come under the second and third orders of seminal reasons Sts. Thomas and Augustine outlined above.

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A careful consideration of their production makes it plain that the various orders of

creature produced on their respective days have the following points in common: They are(1) living things, (2) produced in being out of their native element , (3) having beenbrought forth able to reproduce their like, and therefore perfect ; “for a thing is perfect

when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says ( Meteor . IV; cf. ch. 3, 380a 16)” (Ia,q. 5, art. 4, c.). Thus we observe that each of the aforementioned species was “produced

perfect”, as plants from their element of earth, birds from the air, and fish from the waters

of the sea, and so on with the rest. But the foregoing commonalities make unmistakablyevident a fourth, namely, that each order of creature proceded from its element as from a seminal principle. But it is equally evident that in agreement with the other orders of

creature the lights of heaven are (1) living things, (2) produced in being out of their nativeelement, (3) able to reproduce their like; being equivocal rather than univocal causes of thegeneration of all other things, as has been elsewhere explained. 58 Now inasmuch as it is

undeniable that every other species of creature came to be out of the seed-form latent in itsnative element, are we not thereby given to understand that the lights of heaven came forthfrom theirs, just as plants came from the earth? For the propriety of such a mode of

generation, cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods (Trans. C. D. Yonge asThe Nature of the Gods and Divination [H.G. Bohn, 1853]), Book II. XV:

XV. … As, then, some animals are generated in the earth, some in the water, and some in the

air, Aristotle thinks it ridiculous to imagine that no animal is formed in that part of the

universe which is the most capable to produce them. But the stars are situated in the

ethereal space; and as this is an element the most subtle, whose motion is continual,

and whose force does not decay, it follows, of necessity, that every animated being

which is produced in it must be endowed with the quickest sense and the swiftest

motion. The stars, therefore, being there generated, it is a natural inference to suppose them

endued with such a degree of sense and understanding as places them in the rank of Gods.

1 The passage of Aristotle, to which Cicero refers, is lost. (emphasis added)

N.B. It must be noted here that, although the works of Aristotle as we possess them containno such passage, the foregoing witness is sufficient to establish the point at issue as com-ing under the purview of respectable ancient natural philosophy; such a supposition being

neither more nor less problematic than the opinion that all things came to be from Night , or

that in the beginning all things were mixed together in a sort of Chaos , or that the seed of all things is moist , and similar doctrines, and therefore not to be rejected out of hand.

Having seen, then, reason to infer that the lights of heaven were created in seminal

form, and recognizing that the heavens are but one of two material principles brought forthat the outset of the Work of the Six Days, the foregoing conclusion inevitably suggests the

following:

6. That the terrestrial elements, earth and water , also came forth from a unitary seminal

principle.

58 “For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the causeof the generation of all men….” (Ia, q. 5. art. 5, ad 1). For “…man is generated from matter and by man, as

by a proper agent, and by the sun, as by a universal agent with respect to the generable” (Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Bk. II, lect. 4, n. 175) (emphases added). On universal causality in this order, see also the

texts excerpted above regarding “the influence of the stars” in the generation of all things.

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INTRODUCTION TO GENESIS 1

This chapter contains an account of the creation of the universe, and all things in it; assertsthe creation of the heaven and earth in general, and describes the state and condition of theearth in its first production, Ge 1:1…. <…>

Ver. 1. In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. By the heaven some

understand the supreme heaven, the heaven of heavens, the habitation of God, and of the

holy angels; and this being made perfect at once, no mention is after made of it, as of the

earth; and it is supposed that the angels were at this time created, since they were present atthe laying of the foundation of the earth, Job 38:6 but rather the lower and visible heavens

are meant, at least are not excluded, that is, the substance of them; as yet being imperfect

and unadorned; the expanse not yet made, or the ether and air not yet stretched out; nor

any light placed in them, or adorned with the sun, moon, and stars: so the earth is to be

understood, not of that properly so called, as separated from the waters, that is, the dry

land afterwards made to appear; but the whole mass of earth and water before their

separation, and when in their unformed and unadorned state, described in the next verse:

in short, these words represent the visible heavens and the terraqueous globe, in their

chaotic state, as they were first brought into being by almighty power.

The h prefixed to both words is, as Aben Ezra observes, expressive of notification or

demonstration, as pointing at “those” heavens, and “this” earth; and shows that thingsvisible are here spoken of, whatever is above us, or below us to be seen: for in the Arabic

language, as he also observes, the word for “heaven”, comes from one which signifies

high or above {a}; as that for “earth” from one that signifies low and beneath, or under

{b}. Now it was the matter or substance of these that was first created; for the word ta set

before them signifies substance, as both Aben Ezra and {c} Kimchi affirm. Maimonides

{d} observes, that this particle, according to their wise men, is the same as “with”; and then

the sense is, God created with the heavens whatsoever are in the heavens, and with the earth

whatsoever are in the earth; that is, the substance of all things in them; or all things in

them were seminally together: for so he illustrates it by an husbandman sowing seeds of

divers kinds in the earth, at one and the same time; some of which come up after one day,

and some after two days, and some after three days, though all sown together.

{a} “altus fuit, eminuit”, Golius, col. 1219. {b} “quicquid humile, inferum et depressum” ib. col. 70.

Hottinger. Smegma Orient. c. 5. p. 70. & Thesaur. Philolog. l. 1. c. 2. p. 234. {c} Sepher Shorash. rad.

ta. {d} Moreh Nevochim, par. 2. c. 30. p. 275, 276. {e} Ut supra. (Sepher Shorash.) rad. arb

(emphasis added)

Cf. Adam Clarke, The Holy Bible: Containing the Old and the New Testaments (NewYork, 1811), on Gen 1:1:

[Hebrew omitted]ta eth hashshamayim. The word ta eth, which is generally considered

as a particle, simply denoting that the word following is in the accusative or oblique case, is

often understood by the rabbins in a much more extensive sense. “The particle ta,” says

Aben Ezra, “signifies the substance of the thing.” The like definition is given by Kimchiin his Book of Roots. “This particle,” says Mr. Ainsworth, “having the first and last

letters of the Hebrew alphabet in it, is supposed to comprise the sum and substance of

all things.” “The particle ta eth (says Buxtorf, Talmudic Lexicon, sub voce) with the

cabalists is often mystically put for the beginning and the end, as α alpha and ω omega are in

the Apocalypse.” On this ground these words should be translated, “God in the begin-

ning created the substance of the heavens and the substance of the earth,” i.e. the prima

materia, or first elements, out of which the heavens and the earth were successively

formed . The Syriac translator understood the word in this sense, and to express this meaning

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has used the word yoth, which has this signification, and is very properly translated in

Walton’s Polyglot, ESSE, caeli et ESSE terrae, “the being or substance of the heaven,

and the being or substance of the earth.” St. Ephraim Syrus, in his comment on this place,

uses the same Syriac word, and appears to understand it precisely in the same way. Though

the Hebrew words are certainly no more than the notation of a case in most places, yet

understood here in the sense above, they argue a wonderful philosophic accuracy in the

statement of Moses, which brings before us, not a finished heaven and earth, as every

other translation appears to do, though afterwards the process of their formation is given

in detail, but merely the materials out of which God built the whole system in the six following days. (emphasis added)

The initial state of the terrestrial creation, then—earth being without form and void, and

darkness on the face of the deep—is to be understood as a sort of chaos where the pri-mordial elements are not yet distinct, but rather mixed together; being the substance of

what is to be made out of them, as what is called ‘earth’ is the principle of ‘earth’ properly

so called; the same being the case with ‘water’; understanding by ‘substance’ here, not “thesupreme genus condivided with the other genera, but…that likeness to substance which is

found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains the others virtuallyand is said to be the substance thereof ” (cf. Ia, q. 4, art. 1, ad 1) (emphasis added). But

earth and water, as they first came from the hand of the Creator, stand to the earth andwater that derive from them (viz. “dry land” and ”seas”) in just this way. Hence, the sub-

lunary principle, comprising earth and water, being antistrophic to the ethereal or heavenly,

is also seen to have existed in seminal form at the outset of the first day.

7. The placement of the preceding understanding in the philosophy of nature.

With regard to the first material principles of things understood as their ‘substance’, let us

consider the teaching of the following text: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae(On the Principles of Nature) (tr. B.A.M.), c. II, nn. 14, 16 (in my numbering):

n. 14. And it must be understood that a certain matter has composition with form, just asbronze, when it is matter with respect to an image. Nevertheless the bronze itself is acomposite of matter and form. And therefore bronze is not called first matter, since it has form. However, that matter which is understood without any form whatsoever and pri-

vation, but is subjected to form and privation, is called first matter, because there is no

other matter before it . And this also is called hule, [that is, “chaos” or “confusion”, in

Greek].60 <…>

60 Actually, hule means ‘timber’, as the following text explains: Cf. Charles De Koninck, “Abstraction from

Matter”, Part I. IV, Laval théologique et philosophique, Volume 13, numéro 2 (novembre 1957) (p. 133-

196):

Both the Greek word u(/lh and the Latin materia originally meant ‘timber,’ and then what we call‘lumber’; they were further extended to mean ‘any building material,’ including stone as well aslumber, bricks, cement, etc.; finally they were extended to mean ‘that of which’ anything is

composed, even though this might be as various as the vapor of a cloud, the sides of a triangle, or theterms of the syllogism.

LIDDELL and SCOTT (Greek-English Lexicon) list the following meanings: I. forest, woodland; forest-trees. II. wood cut down; firewood, fuel; brushwood; timber . III. the stuff of which a thing is

made, material ; generally, materials; in philosophy, matter , first in Aristotle, etc.

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n. 16. Also, something may be called first matter with respect to something in a genus, just

as water with respect to liquids. Nevertheless, it is not first simply, since it is a composite

of matter and form, and so it has prior matter. (emphasis added)

Hence, just “as water [is first] with respect to liquids”, so also is earth with respect to drythings, and so with the other elements. So understood, the material principles of creation

are seen to stand as first matter not as what is first simpliciter , but secundum quid , inas-

much as they name what comes first in a certain genus. Hence the first sublunary principleout of which dry land and the seas came to be may be correctly understood as the first

matter in this genus of things, and therefore as ‘substance’ in the way determined.

For the foundation of this doctrine in natural philosophy, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Com-mentary on Aristotle’s Physics. Books I-II translated by Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J.

Spath & W. Edmund Thirlkel (New Haven, 1963), 1963, Bk. I, lect. 2:

LECTURE 2 (193.a 9-b 21)

NATURE IS BOTH MATTER AND FORM, BUT PRIMARILY FORM

149. Having shown what nature is, the Philosopher here points out the number of ways in

which the name ‘nature’ is used. He shows first that nature is predicated of matter, secondlythat it is predicated of form, where he says, ‘Another account ...’ (193 a 30 #151). Con-

cerning the first point we must note that the ancient natural philosophers, being unable to

arrive at primary matter, as was said above [I, L12 #108], held that some sensible body,

such as fire or air or water, is the first matter of all things. 61 And so it followed that all

forms come to matter as to something existing in act, as happens in artificial things. For

the form of knife comes to iron already existing in act. And so they adopted an opinion about

natural forms similar to that which is true of artificial forms. He says, therefore, first that it

seems to some that that which is primarily in each thing and which considered in itself is

unformed is the substance and nature of natural things, as if we would say that the nature

of a bed is wood, and the nature of a statue is bronze. For wood is in the bed and is, when

considered in itself, not formed . And Antiphon said that the following is a sign of this: if

one should bury a bed in the earth and if the wood by rotting should acquire the potency togerminate something, that which is generated will not be a bed, but wood. Now since the

substance is that which remains permanent, and since it belongs to nature to generate what is

like itself, he concluded that every disposition in respect to any law of reason [ratio] or art is

an accident. And that which remains permanent is substance, which continually undergoes

change of dispositions of this sort.

Having supposed, therefore, that the forms of artificial things are accidents, and that

matter is substance, Antiphon assumed the other proposition, namely, that just as the

bed and statue are related to bronze and wood, so also each natural thing is related to

some other thing which is its matter. Thus bronze and gold are related to water (because

the matter of all liquefiable things seems to be water), and bone and wood are related to

earth, and it is the same with all other natural things. Hence he concluded that the material

things which subsist under natural forms are their nature and substance. And because of thissome have said that earth is the nature and substance of all things, for example, the first

theological poets; whereas the later philosophers chose fire or air or water, or some of

these or all of them, as is clear from what was said above [I, L2 #13; L8 #54].

Hence, hule comes to mean “that of which anything is composed”; having never meant “chaos”, as the

bracketed words, which are found in Marietti’s text, state.61 Cf. also St. Thomas’ Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book V, Lesson 5, Commentary, n. 818,

found below as part of a Supplement dealing with this subject at greater length.

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For they said that there are as many substances of things as there are material principles. And

they said that all other things are accidents of these material principles, either as passions, or

as habits, or as dispositions, or as anything else which is reduced to the genus of accident.

Thus one difference which they posited between material and formal principles is that

they said that they differed as substance and accident. There is, however, another

difference, for they also said that these principles differ as the permanent and the corruptible.

Since they held that each of the aforementioned simple bodies is a material principle, they

said it was permanent, for they did not say that they were changed into each other. But they

said that all other things come to be and are corrupted infinitely. For example, if water is thematerial principle, they said that water is never corrupted, but remains water in all things as

their sub-stance. But they said that bronze and gold and other things of this sort are corruptedand generated infinitely.

150. This position is in part true and in part false. With reference to the point that matter is

the substance and the nature of natural things, it is true . For matter enters into the consti-tution of the substance of each natural thing. But insofar as they said that all forms are acci-

dents, this position is false. Whence from this opinion and from his argument, Aristotle con-

cludes to that which is true, namely, that nature in one way is called matter, which underlies

each natural thing which has in itself a principle of motion or of some sort of mutation. For

motion is a species of mutation, as will be said in Book V [L2 #649ff]. (emphasis added)

Hence, just as the heaven informed by light on the first day is a single principle out

of which the lights of the fourth day arise, so, too, the the waters of the deep are the first principle out of which the earthly elements and the bodies composed of them came to be.

Again, the seeds of all living things are understood to have existed at first in their respec-

tive elements, as the power productive of plants in the earth and of fishes in water; but all such things also pre-existed seminally in the lights of heaven, inasmuch as the latter areuniversal causes of the generation of all things. Hence every component of corporeal

creation, both celestial and terrestrial, is seen to have existed at first in seminal form:

1. the light of the first day with respect to the lights of the fourth

2. the waters of the deep with respect to the dry land and the several seas on the third3. The first forms of the remaining species of living things; but these had a twofold

existence:

(a) in their respective elements, as plants in the earth and fishes in the sea

(b) in their the lights of heaven, as in their universal causes

N.B. Inasmuch as I have here supposed the matter of the first day to have existed under

some common form, a position resembling that of ancients such as Antiphon, weighty ob-

jections St. Thomas brings against this position must be addressed.

8. Preliminaries: Water as the principle of all things: The Deep (Tehom).

For the Hebrew conception of tehom, cf. “Deep, The”, Theodor H. Gaster, Encyclopedia Judaica (New York, 1970):

DEEP, THE. The ancient Hebrews believed that the earth lay across an all-encompassing

ocean, which they called tehom. The term is used in the Bible either for the primordial

waters in toto (Gen. 1:2) or for the upper or lower portion alone (cf. Ps. 42:8). Most fre-

quently it denotes the latter, and it is then conventionally rendered “the deep”….

(emphasis added)

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Cf. also A Reconstructionist Dvar Torah for Bereyshit. Parashat Bereyshit Genesis 1:1 -

6:8. Not “How” but “Why”. Rabbi Lewis Eron. Added October 2, 2002:

Descriptions of God establishing the earth after subduing the chaotic energy of the

primordial waters (Psalm 74:12-17; Psalm 89:10-11; Psalm 93:3-4) seem to draw on the

image and vocabulary of Ancient Near Eastern legends. (emphasis added)

For the primordial waters in the conception of the first philosopher among the Greeks, cf.Sir Thomas L. Heath, Greek Astronomy (London, 1931), Introduction, pp. xx-xxi:

Thales’ theory of the universe was this. According to him, the one “first principle” (as

Aristotle calls it) or material cause of all things is water; earth is the result of conden-

sation of water, air is produced from water by rarefaction, and air again when heated

becomes fire. We may assume therefore that, in Thales’ view, there was in the beginning

only the primordial mass of water and from this other things were gradually differe-

ntiated …. Simplicius, the commentator on Aristotle, conjectures that Thales derived his

ideas from myths current in Egypt. Paul Tannery pointed out the similarity between Thales’

view of the world and that contained in ancient Egyptian papyri. According to these, there

existed in the beginning the Nu, a primordial liquid mass in the limitless depths of which

floated the germ of all things. When the sun began to shine, the earth was flattened out,

and the waters separated into two masses. The one gave rise to the rivers and the ocean;

the other, suspended above, formed the vault of heaven, the waters above, on which the

stars and the gods, borne by an eternal current, began to float. The sun, standing upright

in his sacred bark which had endured for millions of years, glides slowly, conducted by an

army of secondary gods, the planets, and the stars. We may compare also the first chapter

of Genesis, verses 6 to 10: “And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the

waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God made the firmament, and

divided the waters [xx-xxi] which were under the firmament from the waters which were

above the firmament; and it was so. And God called the firmament Heaven. And God said,

Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land

appear; and it was so. And God called the dry land Earth; and the gathering together of the

waters called he Seas.” The Babylonian account of creation contains apparently the same

idea of the primordial watery chaos being cleft into two parts, the chaos, however, being

personified as a monster which Marduk, the supreme God of Babylon, cleaves in twain

with his scimitar …. (emphasis added)

Cf. also G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cam- bridge, 1960, Second Edition), pp. 92-95:

The near-eastern origin of part of Thales’ cosmology is indicated by his conception that

the earth floats or rests on water. In Egypt the earth was commonly conceived as a flat,

rimmed dish resting upon water, which also filled the sky; the sun sailed each day across

the sky in a boat, and also sailed under the earth each night (not round it, as in the Greek

legend, e.g. 7). In the Babylonian creation-epic Apsu and Tiamat represent the primeval waters, and Apsu remains as the waters under the earth after Marduk has split the body of

Tiamat to form sky (with its waters) and earth. In the story of Eridu (seventh century B.C.

in its youngest extant version), in the beginning ‘all land was sea’; then Marduk built a

raft on the surface of the water, and on the raft a reed-hut which became the earth. An

analogous view is implied in the Psalms (where the Leviathan is an analogue of Tiamat),

where Jahweh ‘stretched out the earth above the waters’ (136, 6), ‘founded it upon the

seas, and established it upon the floods’ (24, 2). Similarly Tehom is ‘the deep that lieth

under’ (Gen, xlix. 25), ‘the deep that coucheth beneath’ (Deut. xxxiii.13).1

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Against this profusion of parallel material from the east and south-east for the waters under

the earth, there is no comparable Greek evidence apart from Thales. The naive Greek

conception of a river Okeanos surrounding the earth (ch. 1 §2) is not strictly comparable (for

it is clear that there is no Okeanos under the earth), although it was probably a much earlier

development, in a different direction, of the widely-diffused near-eastern generic concept

of the earth rising in the midst of the primeval waters – a concept almost certainly not

native to the Greek-speaking peoples, whose home before the migrations into the Greek

peninsula lay far from the [92-93] sea. Similarly, although the isolated references in Iliad

book xiv (8 and 9) to Okeanos as origin of all things were also probably based upon thesame near-eastern concept, from a slightly different aspect, they contain no implication of

the special idea that the earth floats on water, and so are unlikely to have been the origin of Thales’ assertion of this idea. For any more general contention that the earth came from, or

is maintained by, water, Thales would no doubt be encouraged and gratified to have the

apparently native Homeric precedents. Thus Thales’ view that the earth floats on water

seems to have been most probably based upon direct contact with near-eastern mytho-

logical cosmology. We have already seen that he had associations both with Babylonia

and with Egypt. The idea that the earth actually floats upon water was more clearly and

more widely held in the latter of these countries; and the conjecture might hazarded that

Thales was indebted to Egypt for this element of his world-picture.2

1

These instances are cited by U. Holscher in his convincing discussion of Thales, Hermes 81(1953), 385-91. Some of the material is treated in ch. 1, especially pp. 11ff. For the idea of

Nun, the Egyptian primeval ocean, supporting the earth, see also the remarks of J. A.

Wilson, Before Philosophy 59ff., and H. Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion (N.Y., 1948),

114.2 Thales evidently used the floating-earth idea to explain earthquakes.... The cosmological

scope of the idea is, however, limited; and it seems reasonable to conclude from Aris-

totle’s information in 85 that Thales also thought that the world originated in water,

since this is implicit in the near-eastern mythologies and is stated in the Homeric Oke-

anos-passages which are thought to be based on those mythologies. Thales may have

rationalized the idea from a Greek mythological form like the Homeric one; he may

also have been directly influenced (as he seems to have been for the special detail that

the earth floats on water) by foreign, perhaps Egytian versions…. (emphasis added)

Cf. Prof. Barry D. Smith, Thales. 3.1. Water as the First Material Principle (Atlantic Bap-

tist University):62

Aristotle explains Thales’s philosophical views as follows:

Of the first philosophers, then, most thought the principles (tas archas) which were

of the nature of matter (tas en hulês) were the only principles of all things (archas

pantôn).... Yet they do not all agree as to the number and the nature of these principles.

Thales, the founder of this type of philosophy, says the principle is water (for which

reason he declared that the earth rests on water), getting the notion perhaps from

seeing that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat itself is generated fromthe moist and kept alive by it (and that from which they come to be is a principle of

all things). He got his notion from this fact, and from the fact that the seeds of all

things have a moist nature, and that water is the origin of the nature of moist things.

Some think that even the ancients who lived long before the present generation, and first

framed accounts of the gods, had a similar view of nature; for they made Ocean and

Tethys the parents of creation, and described the oath of the gods as being by water, to

62 (http://www.abu.nb.ca/Courses/GrPhil/Thales.htm [7/8/03])

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I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for instance (Gen. ad lit .i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only

in origin or the order of nature, whereas others, as Basil ( Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose ( In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom ( Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that formlessness of matter preceded in

time its formation. And although these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they

differ but little; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from

the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we thus understand it wecannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to its formation or

to its distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For if formless matter preceded induration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being

in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to saythat being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms.

Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened

the different forms that distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient

natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in

act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed that to be made

means merely to be changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial

being, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the supervening form would

not simply make an actual being, but ‘this’ actual being; which is the proper effect of an

accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying notgeneration, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created

altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if

the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which

in itself is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction,

but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior

to act, and the part to the whole. (emphasis added)

For the basis of the Angelic Doctor’s denial here, cf. Commentary on Aristotle’s Gener-ation and Corruption by Thomas Aquinas, tr. by Pierre Conway & R. F. Larcher (Colum- bus, 1964), Bk. I, lect. 10, nn. 79-80:

Lecture 10

The difference between generation and alteration

<…>

79. Then [76] he shows, from the side of the subject, how generation differs from alteration

and from other changes.

First, he shows how all of them are related to the subject which is a being in act;

Secondly, how related to the subject which is a being in potency, at 81.

He says therefore first [76] that, as was said, alteration is according to the passions of

something that remains. And this same thing occurs in other changes, which take place with

respect to accidents which occur to a subject existing in act. When, therefore, a change is

from contrary to contrary according to quantity—for example, from large to small, or vice

versa—we have “growth” or “decrease” of the same permanent subject, since quantity

occurs to a subject existing in act. But when the change is with respect to contrariety of place

—for example, up or down—it is “latio,” i.e., local motion, of the same remaining body,

since “where” accrues to a body existing in act. When the change is with respect to a

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contrariety in passions (i.e., primarily in passible qualities, and in other qualities as a

consequence), we have “alteration” of the same permanent being, because quality too

accrues to a subject existing in act. But when nothing remains existing in act, of which that

which is changed might be a passion or some accident, it is universally “generation and

corruption,” since the substantial form, with respect to which generation and corruption

occur, does not accrue to a subject existing in act .63

80. Hence it is evident that the opinion is false which Avicebron handed down in the

book Font of Life, namely, that in matter there is an order of forms, in the sense thatfirst matter acquires a form making it a substance, and then another that makes it a

body, and then another which makes it living body, and so on. For since it is one andthe same thing to constitute a substance and to make a “this something,” which per-

tains to particular substance, it would follow that the first form, which constitutes the

substance, would also make it a “this something”, which is a subject existing in act.

Consequently, the subsequent forms would accrue to a permanent subject, and with

respect to them there would be alteration rather than generation, according to the

doctrine which Aristotle here transmits. Therefore one should say, as was said above,

that substantial forms differ according to more and less perfect. But the more perfect

can do all that the less perfect can do, and more; hence the more perfect form that

makes a thing “living” can also make it “body,” as does the more imperfect form of

non-living body. Consequently, no substantial form accrues to a subject existing in act,nor does it presuppose some other common form really distinct from it, which would be

the object of Natural Philosophy, but only one distinct according to reason, and which

pertains to the consideration of Logic. (emphasis added)

For an elaboration of Avicebron’s view, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questionson Spiritual Creatures, translated by Mary C. Fitzpatrick and John J. Wellmuth (Mil-waukee, 1949), art. 3, reply (excerpt):

ANSWER.

…But some, starting out along the same road, asserted on the contrary that the more uni-

versal a form is, the more material it is. And this is the position of Avicebron in his book

Fons Vitae: he asserted a prime matter without any form which he called universal matter;

and he said that it is common to spiritual and corporeal substances, and to it, he said, there is

added a universal form which is the form of substance. Now, matter thus existing under the

form of substance, he said, receives in a part of itself the form of corporeity, while another

part of it which pertains to spiritual substances remains without a form of this sort. And so

he proceeded to assert in matter one form under another according to the order of genera and

species, down to the ultimate specific species. And this position, although it seems to dis-

agree with the first, nevertheless in actual truth agrees with it and is a consequence of it. For

the Platonists asserted that the more universal and the more formal a cause is, the more

remote is its perfection in a given individual: and hence as an effect of the first abstract, that

is, of the good, they put down prime matter, in order to have a primary subject corresponding

to the supreme agent; and so following, according to the order of abstract causes and formsthat have a share in matter, just as a more universal abstract is more formal, so a more

universal participated form is more material.

63 As the foregoing review indicates, in order to preserve the reality of substantial change, one must recog-

nize some first subject underlying the form which makes a thing to be what it is—that is, some first matter

which is not a being in act but only in potency. To suppose otherwise would commit one to the view that

every kind of change is a re-arrangement of unchangeable and unchanging principles.

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But this position, according to the true principles of philosophy which Aristotle considered,

is an impossible one. In the first place, because no individual instance of substance would be

“one” in an unqualified sense. For a thing that is one in an unqualified sense does not come

into being from two acts, but from potency and act inasmuch as that which is in potency

comes into being actually. And on this account “white man” is not one in an unqualified

sense, but “two-footed animal” is one in an unqualified sense, because the very thing which

is animal is two-footed. But if “animal” were something in isolation, and if “two-footed”

were something in isolation, “man” would not be one but several, as the Philosopher argues

in III and in VIII Metaphysica [4, 999b 25; 6, 1045a 16]. It is obvious, therefore, that if therewere a manifold of many substantial forms in one individual instance of substance, the

individual in-stance of substance would not be one in an unqualified sense, but in a qualifiedsense, like “white man.”

Secondly, because the essential character of an accident consists in the fact that it is in a

subject, yet in this sense, that by a subject is meant an actual being and not one merely in potency, and in this sense a substantial form is not in a subject but in matter. Whenever there

is a form, therefore, of which some actual being is a substrate in any sense, that form is an

accident.

Now it is obvious that any substantial form, whatever it may be, makes a being actual and is

a constituent thereof; and hence it follows that only the first form which comes to matter issubstantial, whereas all those that come later are accidental. And this is not ruled out by what

some say, that the first form is in potency to the second form; because every subject is

related to its own accident as potency is to act. Besides, a form of a body which would

bestow capacity for life would be more complete than one which did not: and hence, if the

form of a non-living body makes that body to be an actual subject, much more does the form

of a body that has life in potency make that body to be an actual subject; and thus the soul

would be a form in a subject, which is the essential characteristic of an accident.

Thirdly, because it would follow that in the acquiring of the last form, there would be

generation not in an unqualified sense but in a qualified sense only. For since gener-

ation is a changing over from non-being into actual being, a thing is generated in an

unqualified sense when it becomes a being, unqualifiedly speaking, from non-being inan unqualified sense. Now a thing which is already in existence as an actual being

cannot become a being in an unqualified sense, but it can become “this particular

being”, as, for instance, “white being” or “large being”, and this is becoming in a

qualified sense. Since, then, it is the preceding form in matter which produces actual

being, a subse-quent form will not produce actual being in an unqualified sense, but

“being this par-ticular thing”, as, for instance, “being man” or “being ass” or “being

plant”; and so there will not be generation in an unqualified sense. And on this account,

all the ancients who asserted that prime matter is actually something, such as fire or air or

water or something in between, said that becoming was nothing but change;64 and

Aristotle solves their difficulty by asserting that matter exists only in potency, and he says

that it is the subject of generation and corruption in an unqualified sense. And because

matter is never denuded of all form, on this account whenever it receives one form itloses another, and vice versa. (emphasis added)

64 …quod fieri nihil erat nisi alterari; literally, “that to become (or “becoming”) was nothing but to be altered

(or “altering”/“alteration”)”. Cf. his Commentary on Aristotle’s Generation and Corruption, n. 14, excerpted

more fully below: “For they did not posit such elements as composed of matter and form, so that out of the

corruption of one, another could be generated. Rather they posited them as first matters that would not be

resolved into some first subject . But whatever is to be converted into something else must be resolved into

some first subject.” (emphasis added)

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Cf. also Commentary, op.cit., lect. 2, nn. 11-16:

Lecture 2

The basic reason for these differing opinions on generation and alteration.

11. In the preceding lecture Aristotle stated that the reason some ancient philosophers posited generation as differing from alteration, and others did not, was that some postulated

one material principle and others more than one. He clarified above the root of this reason,showing how some posited many principles—for in the case of those proposing one

principle, the exposition is more unqualified. Now he intends to elucidate this reason in

itself. Concerning this he does two things:

First, he manifests the reason;

Secondly, he objects to it, at 14.

About the first he does two things:

First, he elucidates the aforesaid reason as to those who posit one principle;

Secondly, as to those who posit several principles, at 13.

12. He says therefore first [11] that all the philosophers who assert that all things are

produced from one material principle are forced to say that generation and corruption

are the same as alteration. For they posited their one material principle to be some actual

being, such as fire or air or water; they also posited it to be the substance of all things

generated from it. And just as the matter always persists in things made from matter, so

they said, that this subject remains one and the same. Now we say that a thing is altered

when, with the substance of the thing in act remaining, some variation occurs with respect

to the form. Hence it follows that there can be no change called simple generation and

corruption, but only alteration. We, on the other hand, declare that there is of all gen-

erable and corruptible things one first subject, which, however, is not a being in act but in

potency. Therefore when its first subject acquires a form through which it becomes a

being in act, this is called simple generation. But it is said to be altered when, afterbeing made a being in act, it acquires any additional form .

13. Then [12], he elucidates the aforesaid reason as to those who posited several principles.

And he says that those, mentioned above, who assign many kinds of material princi-

ples, must say that generation differs from alteration. For according to those philo-

sophers generation comes about when those material principles combine into one;

when they are separated, corruption occurs. Hence Empedocles asserts that the

“nature,” i.e., the form, of a body composed of elements is none of the elements (for it isnot of the nature of fire or of water or of the other elements), but it is solely a

“mixture,” i.e., it consists solely in a certain “mixed” nature, and the opposite privation

consists in the separation of what was mixed. And since something is said to be

generated when it acquires its appropriate nature, they posited that generation resulted from aggregation, and corruption from separation. But alteration, they said, takes place

only through transmutation, as will be explained later. Therefore, since this explanation

fits their supposition, and they do indeed speak thus, it is plain that they so speak of the

difference between generation and alteration, as has been said.

14. Then [13] he disproves what has been stated, with respect to those who posit several

principles, for those who posit but one principle reach the conclusion with necessity once its

root is supposed. Concerning this he does two things:

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First, he proposes what he intends, and says that those who posit many principles must admit

that generation is different from alteration, as has been said. Nevertheless, this is impossible

to maintain in consistency with what they say, as will easily be seen from what follows.

Secondly [14], he elucidates his proposition with two arguments. In regard to the first, he presents an analogy and says that, just as, while the substance “rests,” i.e., remains, we

see a change occur in it as to size, called “growth” and “decrease,” so too with alter-

ation, which is a motion according to quality. For just as quantity is based on sub-

stance, so too is quality. But according to what is posited by those philosophers who

assume many principles, it is impossible for alteration to occur in this manner. For theysay that the “passions,” i.e., the passible qualities, with respect to which we state this,

namely, alteration to occur, are the proper differences of the elements, namely, hot and

cold, white and black, dry and moist, soft and hard, and so on. For example, Empedocles

stated that the “sun,” i.e., fire, since he posited the sun to be of the nature of fire, is seen as

white and hot; “rain,” i.e., water, is seen always as dark, cold and cloudy, as is evident from

the darkening of the air when it rains. He explained the other passions in a similar way,

attributing them to the elements. They said that it was not possible for water to be

produced from fire, or earth from water, or for any one of the elements to be converted

into another in any way whatsoever. For they did not posit such elements as composedof matter and form, so that out of the corruption of one, another could be generated.

Rather they posited them as first matters that would not be resolved into some first subject.

But whatever is to be converted into something else must be resolved into some firstsubject. Now it is impossible for the proper accidents of a thing to be anywhere but in

their proper subject. Hence, if “hot” is the proper accident of fire, and “cold” of

water,65 “hot” can be found only in fire and “cold” only in water, and so on for the

others. If, therefore, fire cannot come to be from water, nor one element from another,

then black cannot come to be from white or hard from soft. And the same goes for all

other such qualities. Consequently, since alteration occurs only when one or another of

these qualities varies in one and the same subject, there is no such thing as alteration.

Therefore they have no grounds to posit a difference between generation and alteration.

15. He presents the second argument [15] and says that it is necessary in any motion to

suppose one nature for the contraries which are the termini of the motion, namely, whether

something is being transmuted with respect to place, or growth and decrease. Likewise, thismust be so in alteration, namely, that if there is alteration, there be one subject and one

matter for all the things having such a mutual change, and that if those have one sub-

ject when alteration is looked for, it follows that there be alteration. But since the

aforesaid thinkers do not posit one subject for all the qualities involved in alteration, but

several, they cannot posit alteration. Consequently, they groundlessly say alteration to be

different from generation. his argument differs from the first in that it states the universal

cause of the middle term used in the first one.

16. Then [16] he disputes against Empedocles in particular, with two arguments. In the first

of these he declares that Empedocles seems to be at odds not only with what our senses

reveal, namely, the fact that we see that air comes to be from water and fire from air, but

he seems to contradict himself also. For, on the one hand, he says that no element isgenerated from another, but all other “elemented” bodies are composed of them; and, on the

other hand, he says that before this present world was generated, all the nature of things was

assembled by Friendship into one, minus Strife, and that each of the elements and also each

of the other bodies came to be out of that one through the influence of Strife, separating

things.

65 Rather than in some underlying subject which is neither fire nor water, etc.

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From this it is plain that through certain differences and passions of the various ele-

ments it was brought about by Strife out of that one that one thing be water and

another fire. And he gives an example of the “differences and passions”—thus he

[Empedocles] says that the “sun,” i.e., fire, is white and hot and light, but earth is heavy

and hard. From this, it is evident that such differences are newly acquired by the elements.

Now whatever is newly acquired can be removed. Therefore, since these differences are

removable inasmuch as they are newly engendered, it is plain that, once removed, it isnecessary that water be made from earth, and earth from water, and, in general, each

element from some other—and this not only “then,” i.e., in the beginning of the world,but also now, coming about through the change of the passions. (emphasis added)

Cf. Aristotle, Metaphys., I. 3 (983b 7-18) (tr. W. D. Ross):

Of the first philosophers, then, most thought the principles which were of the nature of

matter were the only principles of all things. That of which all things that are consist, the

first from which they come to be, the last into which they are resolved (the substance [10]

remaining, but changing in its modifications), this they say is the element and this the

principle of things, and therefore they think nothing is either generated or destroyed, since

this sort of entity is always conserved, as we say Socrates neither comes to be absolutely

when he comes to be beautiful or musical, nor ceases to be when he [15] loses these

characteristics, because the substratum, Socrates himself remains, just so they say nothingelse comes to be or ceases to be; for there must be some entity—either one or more than one

—from which all other things come to be, it being conserved. (emphasis added)


Rowan (Chicago, 1961), Book I, lect. 4, n. 74:

74. Accordingly he says, first (36), that most of those who first philosophized about the

natural world held that the principles of all things are merely those which are referred to the

[genus] of material cause. In regard to this it must be said that they took the four

conditions of matter which seem to belong to the notion of a principle.

For, (1) that of which a thing is composed seems to be a principle of that thing. But

matter is such a thing; for we say that a thing that has matter is of its matter, as a knife

is of iron. (2) That from which a thing comes to be, being also a principle of the process

of generation of that thing, seems to be one of its causes, because a thing comes into

being by way of generation. But a thing first comes to be from matter, because the

matter of things precedes their production. And a thing does not come from matter in

an accidental way; for a thing is generated in an accidental way from its contrary orprivation, as when we say that white comes from black. (3) Third, that into which all

things are ultimately dissolved by corruption seems to be a principle of things. For just

as principles are first in the process of generation, in a similar way they are last in the

process of dissolution; and obviously this too pertains to matter. (4) Fourth, since a

principle must remain in existence, then that which remains throughout the process of

generation and corruption seems to be a principle. Now the matter which they said is the

substance of a thing remains throughout every transmutation, although its attributes,

such as its form and everything that accrues to it over and above its material substance,

are changed . From all these considerations they concluded that matter is the element

and principle of all beings. (emphasis added)

Finally, let us consider one additional text touching on the foregoing matters:

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Sentences 2.2, d. 12. In Thomas Aquinas,Selected Writings. Edited and translated with an introduction and notes by Ralph McInerny(slightly rev. B.A.M.) (Penguin, 1998), art. 4:

Article 4: Was prime matter unformed?

It seems that it was.

1. For matter was common to all the elements, because from it all were made. But theelements agree only in unformed matter. Therefore prime matter was wholly unformed.

2. Moreover, Augustine says in the Confessions, speaking to God, ‘Lord you have taught

your servant that before you did these things it was not anything, neither form, nor colour,

etc.’ But it was not wholly nothing, because it was something unformed. Therefore prime

matter wholly lacked form.

3. Moreover, if that matter had some form, it would be either the form of a mixed body or

of a simple body; but not of a mixed body, because then the mixed would be prior to

simple bodies, which would be consonant with the position of Anaxagoras. Therefore it

would have had the form of a simple body and then we would return to the position of the

an-cient naturalists who posited one element of everything, whether fire, or water, or air.

4. If it be said that it had none of these forms but another, on the contrary: everything that is

generated is generated out of its contrary. But the elements were made from prime matter

existing under a bodily form. Therefore it is necessary that it have contrariety with theelements which are made from it. But the contrariety of the first bodies cannot extend

beyond the number of four, as is proved in On Generation and Corruption z ?. Therefore,

matter had to be under the form of one of the four elements, if it was under some bodily

form; and thus it would be only one of the first elements. But the Philosopher disproves this.Therefore it must be that that matter was in every way unformed.

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. All existence is from form. Therefore if prime matter existed before the distinction of

things, it is necessary that it had some form.

2. Moreover, as natural body is to the different shapes, so prime matter is to substantial

forms. But it is impossible for there to be a body without any shape. Therefore it is

impossible for matter to be without any form.

RESPONSE:

It should be said that prime matter is said in two ways: either such that indicates the

first order of nature, or such that it implies the order of time. Insofar as it indicates the

order of nature, prime matter is that into which all natural bodies are ultimately reduced andmust be without any form. Every subject that has a form is analysable into form and the

subject of form. Therefore, because all knowledge is through form, prime matter is know-able, as the Philosopher says in Physics 1, according to analogy alone, insofar as we say that

prime matter is that which is to all bodies as wood is to bed. And although prime matter so

taken does not have any form as part of its essence, it is never separated from all form, as

Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics. Indeed when it loses one form, it acquires another,

insofar as the corruption of one is the generation of the other. Therefore prime matter so

taken cannot be for any duration prior to the bodies formed from it.

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In another way, the understanding of prime implies the order of time,66 namely that which

in duration preceded the ordered disposition of the parts of the world as we now see it,

according to those who hold that the world did not always exist and that all things were

not distinct from the beginning of creation. Understanding prime matter in this way, it has

to have some form.

On this point the ancient philosophers were divided,67 for some held that the whole of it

was under [one] form, saying that there is one prime matter of all the elements, or

something between them and from this all are generated by density and rareness. Othersheld that it was under many forms, not ordered among themselves but mixed in a kind of

confusion which was reduced to order and distinction by the act of creation which they

explained differently, as the Philosopher tells us. But this is not relevant here. All these

positions are sufficiently refuted by Aristotle.

Moderns too are divided according to these two paths. For some hold the whole of prime

matter is created under one form, but lest they seem to fall into the error of the ancients

they say that the one form is not one of the four elements, but something which is in

process towards them, as imperfect to perfect, just as the form of the embryo is related to

the complete animal.68 But this cannot be said of the elements because, according to the

Commentator, the first thing had by matter is the form of the element. Hence there is no

form intermediate between prime matter and the form of the element although thereare many intermediates between prime matter and the form of animal, one succeeding the

other by intermediate generations and corruptions until it comes to ultimate perfection, as

Avicenna says.

Moreover, once natural principles are instituted, it would be necessary then to recog-

nize another form before the form of the element in the natural generation of elements,

which is nonsense. Unless perhaps it were said according to the sense of The Fountain

of Life that there is one first form, and that first a common bodily form would be pro-

duced in prime matter and afterwards the special distinct forms. But Avicenna dis-

proves this position because every substantial form gives an existence complete in the

genus of substance. But whatever comes after things had been actually constituted is an

accident, for it is in a subject which is called a being complete in itself. Hence it wouldbe necessary that all natural forms are accidents and thus would be revived the ancient

error that generation is the same as alteration. That is why he holds that it is by essen-

tially one form that fire is fire and a body and a substance.

Therefore, taking the path of the other saints who held there to be a succession in the

works of the six days, it seems to me that we must say that prime matter was created under

several substantial forms and that all the substantial forms of the essential parts of the

world were produced at the beginning of creation. And Sacred Scripture shows this by

mentioning the heaven and earth and water in the beginning.

The Master says the same, holding that in unformed matter this earthly element con-

sists in a mean, and that rarer waters were in the form of clouds over the deep.

66 As the reader will recall, in his work on the principles of nature St. Thomas teaches another division of

prime matter even more germane to the present discussion than the one he puts forward here.67 Unlike the moderns presently under discussion, the ancients, of course, believed the world always to have

existed, inasmuch as nothing comes from nothing, as St. Thomas elsewhere explains.68 Note that the position I defend is somewhat similar to this one, but with crucial differences, as I have

explained above.

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But I say that the active and passive powers were not yet in the beginning conferred on

the parts of the world, thanks to which they are said afterwards to be distinguished and

ordered. That this is possible is clear, if we wish to hold the position of Avicenna who

taught that the elements remained in the mixed body according to their substantial

forms with respect to their primary existence, but transmuted with respect to their

secondary, namely with respect to active and passive qualities: for there a mixture is

the union of mixable alternates. Hence it is possible that matter be under one sub-stantial form without having active and passive qualities in its perfection, and thus

since first existence naturally preceded second, the order of nature was expressed as anorder of time, since things first came to be in first existence before they were perfected

in second.

Ad 1. It should be said that the prime matter which is numerically one in all elements as a

part of their essences is in every way unformed as considered in its essence, but cannot

precede the elements in duration. Hence the matter which precedes in duration was bodily,not one with the unity of essence, but by the likeness of formlessness with respect to

secondary forms.

Ad 2. It should be said that since Augustine is not giving the order of duration but of nature

alone, it must be said according to him that prime matter is wholly unformed; which cannot

be according to the position of the other saints.

Ad 3. It should be said that it did not have one form but several, not indeed the forms of

mixed bodies, because these follow on the active and passive powers of the principles of the

world, of which they are essentially composed.

Ad 4. The reply is evident from the foregoing. (emphasis added)

The ancient natural philosophers, then, inasmuch as they failed to recognize the difference

between first matter simply speaking, and the element (or elements) of bodies consideredas what comes first in a genus, and hence as first matter secundum quid , ended up treating

the latter as if it (or they) were the former; for “they did not posit such elements as com-

posed of matter and form, so that out of the corruption of one, another could be generated.Rather they posited them as first matters that would not be resolved into some first subject.

But whatever is to be converted into something else must be resolved into some first sub-

ject.” (Commentary on Aristotle’s Generation and Corruption, lect. 2, n. 14). They there-

fore took some sensible body as the element and principle of all things in a way that pre-cluded the existence of proto hule as Aristotle afterwards came to understand it. But with

respect to the Work of the Six Days, the supposition that the subject out of which all things

came to be was a body such as water remains a possibility so long as it in no way involvesthe denial of a prior composition out of first matter and substantial form . But as I have

endeavored to demonstrate above, it is quite natural to take the mass of waters without

order which stands as one first subject out of which every terrestrial substance emerges as

first matter in a certain respect, and hence as ‘substance’ in the sense of the first beginningor inception of a thing containing virtually everything that follows from it; the same being

true of the unitary light of the first day, as I have also argued above. Hence, the objection

to our position found in the texts of St. Thomas cited above is obviated at its root; thereason being that, as the Angelic Doctor himself teaches, matter understood as existing under a common form need not be understood as first matter simply speaking . Conse-

quently, the supposition that Genesis 1 posits some one first matter out of which all bodilythings arose appears to be sound.

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We therefore conclude that all such things ultimately derive from two originary

material principles, each of which comes before us in the first verse of Genesis, the oneunder the name “the heavens”, the other, under the name “the earth”, each in its own way

standing at the outset as something unformed before it is formed, as common before being

made determinate, existing in seminal form before being perfected by the workings of Pro-vidence. And note here that our conclusion closely resembles the position of St. Augustine,

albeit the latter supposes the word “heaven” to name an unformed spiritual nature, and

“earth” its bodily counterpart, whereas I take both to name bodily matter, but the one in its“higher” and “more noble” form (“the heavens)”, and hence celestial or etherial , and theother in its “lower” and “less noble” form (“the earth”), and hence terrestrial or sublunary.

In this regard, consider the following text:

Cf. Cory’s Ancient Fragments of Phoenician, Carthaginian, Babylonian, Egyptian and Other Writers. By I.P. Cory (London, 1832), Introductory Dissertation:

By comparing all the varied legends of the west and east in conjunction, we may obtain

the following outline of the theology of the ancients.

It recognizes, as the primary elements of all things, two independent principles, of the

nature of male and female. And these, in mystic union as the soul and body, constitute thegreat Hermaphroditic deity, the One, the Universe itself, consisting still of the two separate

elements of its composition, modified, though combined in one individual, of which all

things were regarded but as parts.

<…>

It has been often remarked, that the Theogonies and Cosmogonies of the heathens

were the same. In addition to those naturally constituting a part of the work, I have

given the most remarkable of the Hermetic, Orphic, and Pythagorean accounts; which

will be found, with the celebrated collection from Damascius, under a separate head.

By comparing these with the Cosmogonies of Sanchoniatho, Berossus, and the rest, we

may, without much difficulty, arrive at the following conclusion: that the Ether and Chaos, or, in the language of the Philosophers, Mind and Matter, were the two primeval,

eternal, and independent principles of the universe; the one regarded as a vivifying and

intellectual principle, the other as a watery Chaos, boundless, and without form: both

which continued for a time without motion, and in darkness. By a mystic union of the two

was formed the great Hermaphroditic deity, the One, the universal World; of which the

Chaotic matter presently became the body, and the Etherial Intellectual principle the

soul. As soon as the union had commenced, from the Ether sprung forth the triad, Phanes or

Eros, a triple divinity, the most prominent character of which was Light. He was the same

with the Soul of the World, and the Intelligible triad so largely insisted upon by the

Platonists.69 The gross chaotic elements of Earth and Water were formed into the terr-

aqueous globe, while the disposing Ether, in the character of Phanes, under some three of

the conditions of Light, Air, Heat, Fire, Ether, Flame, or Spirit, composed a physical trinity concentred in the Sun, the soul and ruler of the world. Or, according to the more

refined speculations, it consisted of a trinity of mental powers, in which the Understanding,

Reason or Intellect, the Soul, Passions, Feelings or Affections, Power, Counsel or Will, are

variously combined. Viewed, therefore, either under a physical or metaphysical aspect, it isstill a triad subordinate to, and emanating from the more ancient Intellectual Ether, and into

which each person of the triad is again resolvable.

69 Of course the corresponding principles in Genesis do not have this character. Cf. our remarks following.

102



…From the widely dispersed traditions upon the subject, it is manifest that the cir-

cumstances of the creation and the deluge were well known to all mankind previously

to the dispersion. And the writings of Moses give to the chosen people, not so much a

new revelation as a correct, authenticated and inspired account of circumstances,

which had then become partially obscured by time and abused by superstition.

The formless watery Chaos and the Etherial substance of the heavens, enfolding and

passing over its surface as a mighty wind, are the first principles both of the sacred and

profane cosmogonies; but they are reclaimed by Moses as the materials, created by theimmediate agency of an Almighty power . The subsequent process of formation so

completely corresponds in both systems, that if they were not borrowed the one from theother, (a position which cannot be maintained,) they must each have been ultimately derived

from the common source of revelation. Similar considerations upon the traditions of a

Trinity, so universal among the nations, and an examination of what that Trinity was

composed, forces upon me the conviction, that the trinitarian doctrine, as it is now

believed, was one of the original and fundamental tenets of the Patriarchal religion; that

the analogy between the Microcosm, as pointed out, and the then current accounts of the

creation, became the stumbling block, which set mankind to refine upon the truth; that

hence they fell into the errors of attributing eternity to matter, of placing a Monad above

the Trinity, with the Pantheistic opinion that the Deity was no other than the universe

itself . (emphasis added)

As we intimated above, the corresponding principles in Genesis, while agreeing in certainrespects with those of the foregoing account, differ from them in marked ways. To begin

with, with respect to the “Etherial” principle, one must distinguish the Spirit of God

moving over the waters, understood as the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity, from thematerial “wind” (itself a movement of “air”) implied by its agency with respect to the

waters of the deep, as well as from the “matter” of the heavens. For, inasmuch as the light

of the first day had to have been received in some subject, there must have been a material

principle which was capable of receiving it. But such a subject is implied by the name of “darkness”, as St. Thomas explains:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Sentences 2.2, d. 12. In Thomas Aquinas, Selec-ted Writings. Edited and translated with an introduction and notes by Ralph McInerny

(Penguin, 1998), art. 5, Explanation of the Text:

Article 5: Are the four coevals properly assigned?

<…>

THOMAS’S EXPLANATION OF THE TEXT OF PETER LOMBARD

<…>

‘Or of air obscured by quality.’

It should be known that every privation, with respect to that which is signified by the word,

is non-being; but something must be presupposed, because privation is a negation in a

subject apt to have it, as is said in Metaphysics 4 — hence the subject is presupposed and

its potentiality to the reception of the form of which it is deprived—therefore since

darkness is opposed to light by way of privation, it can be understood in three ways[:]

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It can be understood as the very deprived subject [itself], which is obscure air , and thus it

is clear that darkness is something and a creature. Second, it can be taken for the very

power of air by which it is receptive of light, which is diaphaneity, insofar as it is not per-

fected by light , and thus darkness can be called an obscure quality of air, which is some-

thing created. In a third way, it is taken properly for that which is signified by the word,

and thus privation is non-being , and in this way, speaking per se, it cannot be said to be

created by God, but only incidentally, insofar as he makes the opaque nature, darkness

arising from its blocking the luminous body. So one who closes the window is said to cause

darkness in the house. (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 68, art. 3, c. (in part) (tr. English Domi-

nican Fathers):

Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no express mention of

air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge. In

order, however, to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, 70 he implies in the

words: “Darkness was upon the face of the deep,” the existence of air as attendant, so

to say, upon the water. For it may be understood from these words that over the face of

the water a transparent body was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in

fact, is the air . (emphasis added)

But that air is not the sole subject of light is clear from a passage excerpted above: Cf.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 68, art. 4, sc., c. (tr. English DominicanFathers):

In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that

Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper

and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or

potentially, and incorruptible by nature.… In the second place, the name heaven is

applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and

luminosity, actual or potential . [remaining sense omitted] (emphasis added)

Hence, at the outset of the first day, in addition to the waters of the deep, one must recog-nize the existence of “that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially”, which

is called “heaven”, as well as “a body that participates in any property” of such a nature,

which is called “air”, both of which taken together are named “the heavens”, and which

themselves are often described in Scripture under the figure of waters (cf. Ps. 104:3). Withrespect to what has been called “the Etherial substance of the heavens”, then, we must dis-

tinguish its matter from its moving cause, which, considered in one way, was Mind (this is

the Word of God considered as analogous to the active power in the seed of the male; cf.our treatment above), but in another, Spirit. Those heavenly waters, then, comprise one

first principle of bodily creation, the waters of the deep, another; both deriving by way of

creation from the one first principle of all things, God the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all that is, seen and unseen, and so neither independent nor eternal.

Our conclusion may be taken as confirmed by the following Scriptural con-

siderations:

70 “For air is only slightly perceptible, both because it is so rarified and because it has no excelling active

quality, but only a passive one, namely, moistness….” (Commentary on Aristotle’s Generation and Corrup-tion by Thomas Aquinas, tr. by Pierre Conway & R. F. Larcher [Columbus, 1964], Bk. I, lect. 10, n. 76)

104



Cf. Psalm 101 [102]: 26 (Douay-Rheims):

26 In the beginning [AV: “Of old”], O Lord, thou foundedst the earth: and the heavens are

the works of thy hands.

Cf. 2 Peter 3:5 (Douay-Rheims):

5 For this they are wilfully ignorant of, that the heavens were before [or “of old”, AV], and

the earth out of water, and through water, consisting by the word of God.

Cf. Psalm 32 [33]:6 (Douay-Rheims):

[For] 6 By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; and all the power of them

[AV: “all the host of them”] by the spirit of his mouth.

Hence, in addition to the heavens as one first principle of things, there is water as the principle of earth. Now inasmuch as in the beginning God created the heavens and the

earth—the heavens being made by His Word, as well as all their “host” (or “power”); and

again, the earth—but the earth at that time was covered by the waters of the deep, for

which reason it was without form and void—we may understand the words of the Apostleas follows: For with the separation of the waters above from the waters below, followed by

the withdrawal of the earthly waters allowing the dry land to appear—all being accom- plished by God’s Word through the agency of his Spirit moving over the waters, which

Spirit is itself understood to be a compound of pneuma and hudor , ‘spirit’ and ‘water’71 —

we have “the earth out of water, and through water, consisting by the word of God”. But itis also by the word of God that the heavens were “of old” or “before”—that is to say, that

they came to be at the beginning of the world, and so did not always exist; “consisting by

the word of God”—that is, produced in being by Him, with the earth being produced out of

water and through water by “rarefaction” and “condensation” and “heating” etc.; water being the principle not only of earth, but also of heaven in a way, inasmuch as the firma-

ment was made in the midst of the waters, and so of all such things; whereas the “body onhigh” was a separate principle, also of the nature of water. And all things were madethrough water inasmuch as the Spirit of God moving over the waters corresponds to the

seed of the male in the way in which we have explained above. Hence, in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, two first principles of all bodily things, both of which were first established in seminal form and afterwards perfected in the process of

time by the Providence of God.

§

N.B. Let us next consider an additional case where a primordial component of creation was

brought forth in seminal form, which is the heavens informed by light as the result of the first work of distinction. To that end, let us take up certain witnesses which establish that

the heart is understood to be the first principal part of a blooded animal, and so is like a seed .

71 Cf. Aristotle, De gen. anim., II. 2 (736a 1-3) (tr. Arthur Platt): “ Semen, then, is a compound of spirit

(pneuma) and water ( u/(dwr ) , and the former is hot air (aerh); hence semen is liquid in its nature

because it is made of water”. (emphasis added) For the Spirit of God as corresponding to the seed of the

male, see my discussion above.

105



10. The heart as the first principal part and hence as a kind of “seed”.

Cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, II. 4 (739b 20—740a 24) (tr. Arthur Platt):

[20] When the material secreted by the female in the uterus has been fixed by the semen of

the male (this acts in the same way as rennet acts upon milk, for rennet is a kind of milk

containing vital heat, which brings into one mass and fixes the similar material, and the

relation of the semen to the catamenia is the same, milk and the [25] catamenia being of the

same nature)— when, I say, the more solid part comes together, the liquid is separated off from it, and as the earthy parts solidify membranes form all round it ; this is both a neces-

sary result and for a final cause, the former because the surface of a mass must solidify onheating as well as on cooling, the latter because the foetus must not be in a liquid but be

separated [30] from it. Some of these are called membranes and others choria, the

difference being one of more or less, and they exist in ovipara and vivipara alike.

When the embryo is once formed, it acts like the seeds of plants. For seeds also [35]

contain the first principle of growth in themselves, and when this (which previously existsin them only potentially) has been differentiated, the shoot and the root are [740a] sent off from it, and it is by the root that the plant gets nourishment; for it needs growth.72 So also inthe embryo all the parts exist potentially in a way at the same time, but the first principle is

furthest on the road to realization. Therefore the heart is first differentiated in [5] act-

uality. This is clear not only to the senses (for it is so) but also on theoretical grounds. For whenever the young animal has been separated from both parents it must be able to manage

itself, like a son who has set up house away from his father. Hence it must have a first

principle from which comes the ordering of the body at a later stage also, for if it is to

come in from outside at later period to dwell in it, not [10] only may the question be asked atwhat time it is to do so, but also we may object that, when each of the parts is separating

from the rest, it is necessary that this principle should exist first from which comes growth

and movement to the other parts. (Wherefore all who say, as did Democritus, that the

external parts of animals are first differentiated and the internal later, are much mistaken; itis as if [15] they were talking of animals of stone or wood. For such as these have no

principle of growth at all, but all animals have, and have it within themselves.) Therefore it

is that the heart appears first distinctly marked off in all the sanguinea, for this is the first

principle or origin of both homogeneous and heterogeneous parts, since from the [20] moment that the animal or organism needs nourishment, from that moment does this

deserve to be called its principle or origin. For the animal grows, and the nutriment, in its final stage, of an animal is the blood or its analogue, and of this the blood-vessels are thereceptacle, wherefore the heart is the principle or origin of these also . (This is clear from the

Histories8 and the Anatomies.)

8 See History of Animals III 3.

72 For the basis of the comparison with seed, cf. Aristotle, Meteor., IV. 3 (380a 12-17) (tr. E. W. Webster):

“ Ripening is a sort of concoction; for we call it ripening when there is a concoction of the nutriment in

fruit. And since concoction is a sort of perfecting, the process of ripening is perfect when the seeds in fruit

are able to reproduce the fruit [15] in which they are found; for in all other cases as well this is what wemean by ‘perfect’. This is what ‘ripening’ means when the word is applied to fruit. However, many other

things that have undergone concoction are said to be ‘ripe’, the general character of the process being thesame, though the word is applied by an extension of meaning.” (emphasis added) Insofar as an animal

resembles a plant, with regard to the production of the catamenia (menses) or of an egg, an analogous process

will be understood to take place: cf. De Gen. Animal., I. 20 (728a 25-30): “Thus it is clear that it is reason-

able to suppose that generation comes from this. For the catamenia are semen not in a pure state but in need

of working up, as in the formation of fruits the nutriment is present, when it is not yet sifted thoroughly, but

needs working up to purify it. Thus the catamenia cause generation by mixture with the semen, as this impure

nutriment in plants is [30] nutritious when mixed with pure nutriment.”

106



Cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals II. 5 (741b 16-23) (tr. Arthur Platt):

And what comes into being first is the first principle; this is the heart in the sanguinea

and its analogue in the rest, as has been often said already. This is plain not only to thesenses (that it is first to come into being), but also in view of its end; for life fails in the heart

last of all, and it happens in all cases that what comes into being last fails first, and the first

last, Nature [20] running a double course, so to say, and turning back to the point from

whence she started. For the process of becoming is from the non-existent to the existent, and

that of perishing is back again from the existent to the non-existent. (emphasis added)


Rowan (Chicago, 1961), Book V, lect. 1, n. 755:

755. In the first way, then, a principle means that part of a thing which is first generated

and from which the generation of the thing begins; for example, in the case of a ship the

first thing to come into being is the base or keel, which is in a certain sense the foundation

on which the whole superstructure of the ship is raised. And, similarly, in the case of a

house the first thing that comes into being is the foundation. And in the case of an animal

the first thing that comes into being, according to some, is the heart, and according to

others, the brain or some such member of the body. For an animal is distinguished from a

non-animal by reason of sensation and motion.

Now the principle of motion appears to be in the heart, and sensory operations are most

evident in the brain. Hence those who considered an animal from the viewpoint of motion

held that the heart is the principle in the generation of an animal. But those who considered

an animal only from the viewpoint of the senses held that the brain is this principle; yet the

first principle of sensation is also in the heart even though the operations of the senses are

completed in the brain. And those who considered an animal from the viewpoint of

operation, or according to some of its activities, held that the organ which is naturally

disposed for that operation, as the liver or some other such part is the first part which isgenerated in an animal. But according to the view of the Philosopher the first part is the

heart because all of the soul’s powers are diffused throughout the body by means of the

heart. (emphasis added)

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas,translated by the English Dominican Fathers (1952), q. 3, art. 18, obj. 10; ad 10:

10: Man is described as being a lesser world [minor mundus] by reason of his likeness to the

greater world. Now man’s more noble part, his heart to wit, is formed before the other parts,

according to the Philosopher ( De Gen. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore seemingly the angels, who

are the more noble part of the greater world, were created before visible creatures

<…>

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the heart is formed before the other members,there is but one continual generation of the animal’s body, the heart is not formed by a

separate generation, and the other members afterwards by a succession of generations at

various intervals. This does not apply to the creation of the angels and corporeal crea-

tures, as though they were produced by one formative act, the spiritual creature first

and the whole universe by a continuous production: because successive production

applies to things produced from matter, in which one part is nearer than another to the

final completion. Consequently there was no place for succession in the first creation of

things, although it may obtain in the formation of things from created matter .

107



Wherefore the doctors who held that the angels were created before the world, main-

tained that the creation of the former was entirely distinct from the creation of bodies,

and that there was a long interval between. Moreover there is need for the heart in an

animal to be formed first, because its activity conduces to the formation of the other mem-

bers: whereas no spiritual creature co-operates in the creation of corporeal creatures

since God alone can create. Hence the Commentator ( Metaph. xi, com. 44) finds fault with

Plato for asserting that God after treating the angels committed to them the creation of

corporeal creatures. (emphasis added)

Cf. also William Harvey, On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals, Ch. IV, trans-

lated by Robert Willis (London, 1628):

Besides this, however, I have occasionally observed, after the heart and even its right

auricle had ceased pulsating, – when it was in articulo mortis in short, – that an obscure

motion, an undulation or palpitation, remained in the blood itself, which was contained in the

right auricle, this being apparent so long as it was imbued with heat and spirit. And, indeed,

a circumstance of the same kind is extremely manifest in the course of the generation of

animals, as may be seen in the course of the first seven days of the incubation of the

chick: A drop of blood makes its appearance which palpitates, as Aristotle had already

observed; from this, when the growth is further advanced and the chick is fashioned, the

auricles of the heart are formed, which pulsating henceforth give constant signs of life.When at length, and after the lapse of a few days, the outline of the body begins to be dis-

tinguished, then is the ventricular part of the heart also produced, but it continues for a

time white and apparently bloodless, like the rest of the animal; neither does it pulsate or

give signs of motion. I have seen a similar condition of the heart in the human foetus

about the beginning of the third month, the heart then being whitish and bloodless, al-

though its auricles contained a considerable quantity of purple blood. In the same way in

the egg, when the chick was formed and had increased in size, the heart too increased and

acquired ventricles, which then began to receive and to transmit blood.

And this leads me to remark that he who inquires very particularly into this matter will not

conclude that the heart, as a whole, is the primum vivens, ultimum moriens, – the first part to

live, the last to die, – but rather its auricles, or the part which corresponds to the auricles in

serpents, fishes, etc., which both lives before the heart and dies after it. (emphasis added)

11. The first principal part as “nucleus and origin” of subsequent development.

Cf. William Harvey, Anatomical Exercitations Concerning the Generation of Animals,translated by Robert Willis (London, 1651):

EXERCISE THE FORTY-FIFTH. (excerpt)

Some, out of a material previously concocted, and that has already attained its bulk, receive

their forms and transfigurations; and all their parts are fashioned simultaneously, each with

its distinctive characteristic, by the process called metamorphosis, and in this way a perfect

animal is at once born; on the other hand, there are some in which one part is made beforeanother, and then from the same material, afterwards receive at once nutrition, bulk, and form: that is to say, they have some parts made before, some after others, and these are at the same time increased in size and altered in form. The structure of these animals

commences from some one part as its nucleus and origin, by the instrumentality of which

the rest of the limbs are joined on, and this we say takes place by the method of epigenesis,

namely, by degrees, part after part; and this is, in preference to the other mode,

generation properly so called . (emphasis added)

108



As we have seen from the texts excerpted above, for Aristotle, the “nucleus and origin” of

the entire organism, which is its first principal part, is the heart. But with the advance of embryology, a very different view has arisen: Cf. P. Ide, XIIth General Assembly. Inter-

national Congress, “Is the Human Embryo a Person?” Status Questionis and Determination

(The Vatican, 2007):

Every cell contains a genome that brings the building program of the whole organism andthe ordering of the agents to carry it out. Therefore, we know that however little it may be,

the zygote contains in its heart, that is, in the nucleus, the whole of what it will become.

(emphasis added)

Cf. Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. and Kevin D. O’Rourke, O.P., Health Care Ethics 4th ed.(Washington, DC, 1997), p. 229:

Aristotle’s view still has philosophical supporters because of the philosophical cogency of

his principle that human ensoulment cannot take place until the body it substantially unifies

is proximately organized for it. But he did not know that all the essential information

needed to construct the human body is already present at conception in the zygote’s

nucleus. We now know that the sperm is haploid (has only half the human set of

chromosomes) and ceases to exist once it has initiated fertilization by contributing its half of the genetic information. We know too that the ovum is already highly structured andcontributes the other half of the genome, the bulk of the cytoplasm, and certain additional

genetic factors in the cytoplasmic mitochondria. Since the zygote is thus already highly

organized, the Aristotelian requirement for human ensoulment seems satisfied at conception.

(emphasis added)

12. On the meaning of “nucleus”.

Cf. The Free Dictionary, s.v. “Nucleus” (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the Eng-lish Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000):

1. A central or essential part around which other parts are gathered or grouped; a core….; 2.Something regarded as a basis for future development and growth; a kernel….; 3.

Biology A large, membrane-bound, usually spherical protoplasmic structure within a living

cell, con-taining the cell’s hereditary material and controlling its metabolism, growth, and

repro-duction. …[Latin nuculeus, nucleus, kernel , from nucula, little nut , diminutive

of nux, nuc-, nut .] (emphasis added)

Cf. ibid .:

2. An organelle in the cytoplasm of eukaryotic cells (all cells except prokaryotes) thatcontains nearly all the cell’s DNA and controls its metabolism, growth, and reproduction.

The nucleus is surrounded by a pair of membranes called the nuclear envelope, which can be continuous in places with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum. The membranes

of the nuclear envelope have interconnected pores that allow the exchange of substanceswith the cell’s cytoplasm. The nuclear DNA is wrapped around proteins (called histones) in

strands of chromatin, which exists in a matrix known as nucleoplasm (analogous to the

cytoplasm outside the nucleus). Just prior to cell division, the chromatin condenses into

individual chromosomes, which contain the cell’s hereditary information. The nucleus also

contains at least one spherical nucleolus, which mainly contains RNA and proteins and

directs the construction of the cell’s ribosomes.

109



Note here that the first principal part is formed prior to the stage of compaction—that is,

prior to the ‘setting’ of the embryonic mass—the former being understood to take place12-22 hours after syngamy (the penetration of the ovum by the sperm); the latter, after 7

days or so. On all these matters, especially the compaction or ‘setting’ of the fetal mass,

see my separate discussion.

N.B. On the preceding understanding of fertilization and conception, cf. Congregation for

the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on theDignity of Procreation Donum Vitae (22 February 1987), sec. I. No. 1: AAS 80:

This Congregation is aware of the current debates concerning the beginning of human life,

concerning the individuality of the human being and concerning the identity of the human

person. The Congregation recalls the teachings found in the Declaration on Procured Abortion:

From the time that the ovum is fertilized, a new life is begun which is neither that of the

father nor of the mother; it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth. It

would never be made human if it were not human already. To this perpetual evidence. . .

modern genetic science brings valuable confirmation. It has demonstrated that, from the

first instant, the program is fixed as to what this living being will be: a man, this indi-vidual man with his characteristic aspects already well determined. Right from fertile-zation is begun the adventure of a human life, and each of its great capacities requires

time...to find its place and to be in a position to act.[25]

This teaching remains valid and is further confirmed, if confirmation were needed, by recent

findings of human biological science which recognize that in the zygote (the zygote is the

cell produced when the nuclei of the two gametes have fused) resulting from fertilization

the biological identity of a new human individual is already constituted.

<…>

Thus the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to sayfrom the moment the zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect that is morally

due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality. The human being is to be

respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that

same moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first place is the

inviolable right of every innocent human being to life.

25. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured Abortion,nos. 12-13: AAS 66 (1974), 738. (emphasis added)

§

N.B. Having seen that the heart of an animal is like a seed , let us next consider the ways in

which the heavens informed by light are like the heart.

110



13. Supplement. The centrality of the heart in comparison with the world.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Motu Cordis (On the Motion of the Heart ), n. 9 (tr. B.A.M.):

9. Again, a perfect animal, which is one that moves itself, most approaches to a likeness of

the whole universe: and so man, who is the most perfect of animals, is by some called a

“microcosm”. Now in the universe the first motion is local motion, which is the cause of

alteration as well as of the other motions, for which reason even in animals the principle of

alteration appears to be local motion. And so the Philosopher in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. 1, 250 b 14-15), pursuing this resemblance, says that motion is “like a kind of

‘life’ existing in all things”.73

Cf. ibid , n. 15 (tr. B.A.M.):

15. Therefore the motion of the heart is natural as following upon the soul, inasmuch as it is

the form of such a body, and principally of the heart. And perhaps in accordance with this

understanding of the matter some have said that “the motion of the heart is caused by an

[angelic] intelligence,” inasmuch as they held the soul to be from an intelligence, just asAristotle says in the eighth book of the Physics (256a1), the motion of heavy and light things

comes from that which generates them, inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle

of motion. For every property and motion follows on some form according to its condition,

just as upon the form of the noblest74 element, fire, for example, follows motion to the

noblest place, which is above. Now the noblest form in lower things is the soul, which most

approaches to a likeness to the principle of the motion of the heavens. And so the motion

following upon it is most similar to the motion of the heavens: for the motion of the heart

in an animal is like the motion of the heavens in the world . (emphasis added)

Hence the heart stands to an animal as the first thing moved stands to the world, but that first thing is the heaven or heavens. But for an additional reason why the heart of an ani-mal is analogous to the heavens so understood, cf. Aristotle, De Caelo (On the Heavens) II.

13 (293a 15- 293b 15) (tr. J. L. Stock):

[15] It remains to speak of the earth, of its position, of the question whether it is at rest or in

motion, and of its shape.

73 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 18, art. 1. obj. 1, ad 1 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso):

Objection 1: In Physics 8 the Philosopher says that motion is, as it were, a sort of life in all things that

exist by nature. But all natural things participate in motion. Therefore, all natural things participate in

life.

<…>

Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first

motion, viz., the movement of the celestial bodies, or to motion in general. And in both senses motion

is said to be like the life of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking.For the motion of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the motion of the

heart by which life is conserved in an animal. Similarly, every natural motion is, as it were, a certain

likeness of a vital operation in natural things. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were a single

animal, so that (as some have claimed) its motion were from an intrinsic mover, then it would follow

that its motion is the life of all natural bodies. [N.B. For St. Thomas, the motion of the heavens comes

from a conjoined mover; cf. Ia, q. 70, art. 3 supra.]

74 “Noblest”, that is, that which has “the highest rank”, so to speak.

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I. As to its position there is some difference of opinion. Most people—all, in fact, who

regard the whole heaven as finite—say it lies at the centre. But the Italian [20] philosophers

known as Pythagoreans take the contrary view. At the centre, they say, is fire, and the earth

is one of the stars, creating night and day by its circular motion about the centre. They

further construct another earth in opposition to ours to which they give the name counter-

earth. In all this they are not seeking for theories [25] and causes to account for observed

facts, but rather forcing their observations and trying to accommodate them to certain

theories and opinions of their own. But there are many others who would agree that it is

wrong to give the earth the central position, looking for confirmation rather to theory than tothe facts of observation. Their [30] view is that the most precious place befits the most

precious thing: but fire, they say, is more precious than earth, and the limit than theintermediate, and the circumference and the centre are limits. Reasoning on this basis they

take the view that it is not earth that lies at the centre of the sphere, but rather fire.

The Pythagoreans have a further reason. They hold that the most important part of the

world, [293b] which is the centre, should be most strictly guarded, and name it, or

rather the fire which occupies that place, the ‘Guardhouse of Zeus’, as if the word

‘centre’ were quite unequivocal, and the centre of the mathematical figure were always

the same with [5] that of the thing or the natural centre.

But it is better to conceive of the case of the whole heaven as analogous to that of animals,in which the centre of the animal and that of the body are different. For this reason they

have no need to be so disturbed about the world, or to call in a guard for its centre: rather

let them look for the [10] centre in the other sense and tell us what it is like and where

nature has set it. That centre will be something primary and precious; but to the mere

position we should give the last place rather than the first. For the middle is what is

defined, and what defines it is the limit, and that which contains or limits is more precious

than that which is limited, seeing that the latter is the matter and the former the essence of

[15] the system. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens, trans. P. Con-

way and F. R Larcher (Ohio, 1964), Book II, lect. 20, n. 485:

485. Then at [343] he refutes the aforesaid reason [argument] and says that in the aforesaid

reason [argument] the Pythagoreans used the word “middle” as though one called

“middle” absolutely, i.e., univocally, both the middle of a magnitude, and the middle of

a thing according to nature, i.e., that through which the nature of a thing is preserved –

as we see in animals that the middle by which the nature of an animal is preserved,

namely, the heart, is not the same as the middle of the body’s size, for that would be the

umbilicus. A similar viewpoint must be taken with respect to the whole heaven, i.e., to the

whole universe. Hence they should not be concerned with the whole universe as though it

needs a guardhouse in such a way that such a prison or guardhouse would have to be

assigned to the center, which is the middle of magnitude. It is necessary, rather, to seek thatwhich is the middle of nature in the universe, as in the case of an animal, and ask what is its

condition according to nature, and which place naturally befits it.

He explains these two things, showing first how the middle of the universe is as corres-

ponding to the heart of an animal. And he says that it is a principle of other bodies, and

most honorable among other bodies: and this is the sphere of the fixed stars. But it is not

the middle place but rather the place of the outermost container that belongs to it, for that

which is the magnitudinal middle among the places of the universe is more like an ultimate

than like a principle.

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The reason is that the middle is contained and determined by all the others, while that which

is the “end,” i.e., the extremity, among bodies according to the order of place, has the nature

of a determinant and container. But it is manifest that the container is more honorable than

the contained, and the end more honorable than the thing ended – since the contained and the

terminated pertain to the notion of matter, but to be a container and that which terminates to

the notion of form, which is the substance of the whole consistency of things. Consequently,

containing bodies are more formal and contained bodies are more material. And therefore, in

the whole universe, just as the earth which is contained by all, being in the middle, is the

most material and ignoble among bodies, so the outermost sphere is most formal and mostnoble, while among the elements fire is above all containing and formal. Finally, he sums up

[344] and concludes that in regard to the place of earth, some have an opinion such as has been described. (emphasis added)

For an additional reason for the likeness, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Exposition of Aristotle’sTreatise On the Heavens, trans. P. Conway and F. R Larcher (Ohio, 1964), Prologue, n. 2:

In like manner, a fourfold order is found in the consideration of speculative reason. First,because there is a process from the general to the less general . And this order corresponds

to the first order which we have called “the order of apprehension,” for universals are

considered according to an absolute form, but particulars by applying form to matter, as the

Philosopher in On the Heavens says, that the word “heaven” signifies a form, and “thisheaven” signifies a form in matter.

The second order is that according to which one goes from the whole to the parts. And this

corresponds to “the order of intention,” inasmuch as, namely, the whole is considered prior to the parts, not just any parts but parts which are according to matter and which are of the

individual – as in the case of a semi-circle, in the definition of which “circle” is used (for it

is “half a circle”) and of an acute angle, in the definition of which “right angle” is used (for

an acute angle is an angle “less than a right angle”). To be divided in that manner isincidental to a circle and to a right angle; hence, neither is a part of the species of a circle or

right angle. For parts of this sort [i.e. parts of the species] are prior in consideration to the

whole and are used in the definition of the whole, as are flesh and bones in the definition of

man, as is said in Metaphysics VII.

The third order is that according to which one goes from the simple to the combined,inasmuch as composites are known in terms of the simple, as through their principles. And

this order is compared to the third order, which is the “order of combining.”

But the fourth order is the one that calls for the principal parts to be considered first, as

are the heart and liver before the arteries and blood . And this corresponds in the prac-

tical order to that order according to which the foundation is laid first.

This fourfold order is also considered in the procedure of natural science. For, first of all, things common to nature are determined in the book of the Physics, in which mobile

being is treated insofar as it is mobile. Hence what remains in the other books of naturalscience is to apply these common things to their proper subjects. The subject of motion,

however, is a magnitude and body, because nothing is moved except what is quantified.

Now it is in bodies that the three other orders are considered: in one way, insofar as the

entire corporeal universe is prior in consideration to its parts; in another way, insofar as

simple bodies are considered before the mixed; thirdly, insofar as, among the simple

bodies, the first must be considered first, i.e., the heavenly body, through which all the

others are sustained. (emphasis added)

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N.B. With the foregoing texts of St. Thomas in hand, we now have three witnesses from

the Angelic Doctor supporting our contention that the heavens informed by light, under-stood as the outermost sphere of the universe, correspond to the heart of animal:

• for just as in the consideration of speculative reason, the heart and liver are con-

sidered before the arteries and blood, inasmuch as they are an animal’s principal parts, so, too, the heavenly body through which the rest are sustained, is considered

before those other bodies, inasmuch as it is the first principal part of the world;such a consideration comprising the order of maintenance, which consists in layingthe foundation (the ‘sustaining’ of the other simple bodies being due to the diurnal

movement of the outermost sphere); hence the heavens stand to the world as the

heart stands to an animal

• again, the motion following upon the soul is most similar to the motion of the

heavens: but this is the motion of the heart; for which reason the motion of the

heart in an animal is like the motion of the heavens in the world (but such motion begins with the aforementioned diurnal movement of the outermost sphere); hence

as the heart is to the animal, so are the heavens to the world

• again, corresponding to the heart of an animal is the ‘middle’ of the universe,

understanding such a ‘middle’, taken with respect to nature and not to magnitude,

to be the outermost sphere, or the sphere of the fixed stars in Aristotle’s system

From the foregoing considerations, then, we conclude that there is an additional reason for

supposing that all things were created in seminal form: for the heavens as informed bylight correspond to the heart of an animal, understood as the first principal part, whichtherefore stands to the animal which develops out of it as the seed-form stands to the fully-developed plant .

14. What was created in the beginning according to seminal reasons in sum.

All bodily beings, then, both celestial and terrestrial , were created in seminal form:

• celestial , as the lights of the fourth day arise from the light of the first

• terrestrial , as the dry land and seas of the third emerge from a chaotic mixture of

earth and water, primordial elements which themselves are observed to have been

present in the waters of the deep, itself created at the beginning of all days

But further, we also see that

• just as the plants at the end of the third day come from seeds in the earth, so, too,

do the other species of living things; for they all arise from seed-forms;

• but all such creatures pre-existed in the heavenly bodies, inasmuch as the latter are

the universal causes of the generation of all things;

• again, the heavens as informed by light correspond to the heart of an animal, which

itself acts like the seed of plants, and so was created in seminal form

Hence, it remains only to consider the immaterial or spiritual creation.

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15. On the creation of the angels in seminal form.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 62, art. 1 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Whether the Angels Were Created in Beatitude?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude. For it is stated ( De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that the angels who continue in the beatitude wherein they were created,do not of their nature possess the excellence they have. Therefore the angels were created in beatitude.

Obj. 2. Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal creature. But the corporeal

creature straightway from its creation was made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of

form take precedence in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says ( Gen. ad lit. i. 15).

Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and incomplete. But its forma-

tion and perfection are derived from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was

created in beatitude.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv. 34; v. 5), the things which weread of as being made in the works of the six days, were made together at one time; and

so all the six days must have existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But,

according to his exposition, in those six days, the morning was the angelic knowledge,

according to which they knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore straightway

from their creation they knew the Word, and things in the Word. But the bliss of the

angels comes of seeing the Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude straight-way

from the very beginning of their creation.

On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in good is of the nature of beatitude. But

the angels were not confirmed in good as soon as they were created; the fall of some of them

shows this. Therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.

I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of rational or

of intellectual nature; and hence it is that it is naturally desired, since everything naturally

desires its ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of

intellectual nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and this is

in a measure called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle ( Ethic. x) says that man’s

ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby in this life he can

behold the best intelligible object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is still

another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby we shall see God as He is. This is

beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above (Q. 12, A. 4).

So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitude, which the angel could

procure by his natural power, he was created already blessed. Because the angel does notacquire such beatitude by any progressive action, as man does, but, as was observed above

(Q. 58, AA. 3, 4), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural dignity. But theangels did not have from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is

beyond the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end; and

consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning.

Reply Obj. 1. Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the

state of innocence.

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Reply Obj. 2. The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could

not have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation; consequently, according

to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v. 4, 23; viii. 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not

take place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the

plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the

beginning of its existence had the perfection of its nature; but it did not have the per-

fection to which it had to come by its operation.75

Reply Obj. 3. The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word; the one which is natural,and the other according to glory. He has a natural knowledge whereby he knows the Word

through a similitude thereof shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory wherebyhe knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the angel knows

things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge, and perfectly by his knowledge of

glory. Therefore the first knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the

outset of his creation; while the second was not, but only when the angels became blessed byturning to the good. And this is properly termed their morning knowledge. (emphasis added)

Cf. ibid ., art 3:

Whether the Angels Were Created in Grace?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were not created in grace. For Augustine says

(Gen. ad lit. ii. 8) that the angelic nature was first made without form, and was called

heaven: but afterwards it received its form, and was then called light. But such formation

comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.

Obj. 2. Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If, therefore, the angel had

been created in grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God.

Obj. 3. Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the angels were not

beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that they were not created in grace; but thatthey were first created in nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were

beatified.

On the contrary, Augustine says ( De Civ. Dei xii. 9), Who wrought the good will of theangels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will, that is, with the pure lovewherewith they cling to Him; at the same time building up their nature and bestowing graceon them?

I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on this point, some holding that the

angels were created only in a natural state, while others maintain that they were created in

grace; yet it seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that

they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in the process of time, being created by the work of Divine Providence, were produced by the operation

of God, were created in the first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as

Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii. 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now it is evident

that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in

nature does to the natural effect; hence (1 John iii. 9) grace is called the seed of God.

75 Cf. our consideration above.

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As, then, in Augustine’s opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural

effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally created, so straightway from

the beginning the angels were created in grace.

Reply Obj. 1. Such absence of form in the angels can be understood either by comparison

with their formation in glory; and so the absence of formation preceded formation by priority

of time. Or else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so it did not

precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as Augustine holds with regard to the

formation of corporeal things (Gen. ad lit. i. 15).

Reply Obj. 2. Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject’s nature. Now itis the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the objects it desires.

Consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can

fail to make use of it, and can sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Although in the order of nature grace comes midway between nature and

glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in created nature, glory is not simultaneous with

nature; because glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands

not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the principle of right operation.

Therefore it was fitting for grace to be given straightway with nature. (emphasis added)

For the Scriptural witness cited, cf. 1 John 3:8-11 (Authorized Version):

8 He that committeth sin is of the devil; for the devil sinneth from the beginning. For this

purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil.

9 Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he

cannot sin, because he is born of God.

10 In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil: whosoever doeth

not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother.

11 For this is the message that ye heard from the beginning, that we should love one

another.

Cf. The Great Commentary of Cornelius À Lapide. Translated by Thomas W. Mossman,B.A. Second Edition (London, 1876), Commentary on the First Epistle of John, 3:9:

Ver. 9. <…> For His seed remaineth in him. Œcumenius by the ‘seed’ understands Christ.See Gal. iii. 29. (2.) S. Augustine and others understand by it the word of God. See Luke

viii. 11; James i. 18; 1 Pet. i. 23. (3.) Lyra, Hugo, Cajetan, and Thomas Anglicus most

fitly understand by it the grace of God. For, 1. All other virtues spring from it. 2. Because

it is the seed of glory. (See D. Thom. par. i. quæst. 62, art. 3.) 3. Because as a seed must

die in order to bear fruit, so does grace suffer death and martyrdom, from whence all

good, both public and private, proceeds. See John xii. 24. (emphasis added)

Even the angels, then, were, in a manner of speaking, created in seminal form. Hence theentire work of creation, both visible and invisible, is seen to have begun in this way; the

geniture of all things being represented according to a likeness it has with the genesis of a

living thing, where the living thing is man, as I elsewhere explain at length.76

§

76 See my paper “The Paradigm of Genesis”.

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16. Supplement. On what comes first: Some primary divisions.

For the case of prime matter, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Sentences 2.2, d. 12.

In Thomas Aquinas, Selected Writings. Edited and translated with an introduction and

notes by Ralph McInerny (slightly rev. B.A.M.) (Penguin, 1998), art. 4, c. (excerpt):

It should be said that prime matter is said in two ways: either such that indicates the first

order of nature, or such that it implies the order of time . Insofar as it indicates the order

of nature, prime matter is that into which all natural bodies are ultimately reduced and

must be without any form. Every subject that has a form is analysable into form and the

subject of form. Therefore, because all knowledge is through form, prime matter is know-

able, as the Philosopher says in Physics 1, according to analogy alone, insofar as we say that

prime matter is that which is to all bodies as wood is to bed. And although prime matter so

taken does not have any form as part of its essence, it is never separated from all form, as

Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics. Indeed when it loses one form, it acquires another,

insofar as the corruption of one is the generation of the other. Therefore prime matter so

taken cannot be for any duration prior to the bodies formed from it. In another way, the

understanding of prime implies the order of time, namely that which in duration preceded

the ordered disposition of the parts of the world as we now see it, according to those whohold that the world did not always exist and that all things were not distinct from thebeginning of creation. Understanding prime matter in this way, it has to have some form.

(emphasis added)

Presupposed to the foregoing division is the following account of ‘first’ or ‘prime’: cf. St.

Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent , dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that ‘first’ (or prime) is said in two ways, namely, first simply,

and first in a genus or in some order . If in the second way, thus according to the many

genera of causes there are many first principles, as the first material (principle) which is first (or prime) matter , and the first formal (principle) which is being , and so on in the other

cases. But finally by descending to the diverse genera of things, diverse first principles of

things are found in diverse things even according to the same genus of causes, as withliquefiable things the first matter is water , but in dry things earth; and in animals semen,

or menstrual blood . (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. Books I-II translated by

Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath & W. Edmund Thirlkel (New Haven, 1963), 1963,Bk. I, lect. 2:

Having supposed, therefore, that the forms of artificial things are accidents, and that matter

is substance, Antiphon assumed the other proposition, namely, that just as the bed and statue

are related to bronze and wood, so also each natural thing is related to some other thingwhich is its matter. Thus bronze and gold are related to water (because the matter of all

liquefiable things seems to be water), and bone and wood are related to earth, and it is thesame with all other natural things. (emphasis added)

Cf. also De Principiis Naturae (On the Principles of Nature) (tr. B.A.M.), c. II, nn. 14, 16:

n. 14. And it must be understood that a certain matter has composition with form, just as

bronze, when it is matter with respect to an image. Nevertheless the bronze itself is a

composite of matter and form. And therefore bronze is not called ‘first matter’, since it has

form.

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However, that matter which is understood without any form whatsoever and privation, but

is subjected to form and privation, is called first matter, because there is no other matter

before it . And this also is called hule….

<…>

n. 16. Also, something may be called first matter with respect to something in a genus, just

as water with respect to liquids. Nevertheless, it is not first simply, since it is a composite

of matter and form, and so it has prior matter. (emphasis added)

On water as the first principle of liquefiable things, cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by John P. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), Book V,Lesson 5, Aristotle’s Text, n. 414, Commentary, nn. 816-818:

414. Again, nature is the primary matter of a thing, and this in two senses: either what

is primary with respect to this particular thing, or primary in general; for example, the

primary matter of bronze articles is bronze, but in general it is perhaps water, if

everything capable of being liquefied is water . And nature is also a thing’s form or substance, i.e., the terminus of the process of generation. But metaphorically speaking every

substance in general is called nature because of form or species, for the nature of a thing is

also a kind of substance.

<…>

816. (4) And from this third meaning of nature there follows a fourth. For if the source of

motion in natural bodies is called their nature, and it seemed to some that the principle of

motion in natural bodies is matter, it was for this reason that matter came to be callednature, which is taken as a principle of a thing both as to its being and as to its becoming.

And it is also considered to be without any form, and is not moved by itself but by some-

thing else. He accordingly says that nature is spoken of as that primary thing of which

any being is composed or from which it comes to be.

817. He says this because matter is a principle both of being and of becoming. Hence he says

that “it is without order,” i.e., form; and for this reason another text says “when it is

unformed”; for in the case of some things their order (or arrangement) is regarded as their

form, as in the case of an army or of a city. And for this reason he says that it is “immutable

by its own power,” i.e., it cannot be moved by its own power but by that of a higher agent.

For matter does not move itself to acquire a form but is moved by a higher and extrinsic

agent. For instance, we might say that “bronze is the nature of a statue or of bronze

vessels” or “wood of wooden,” as if such vessels were natural bodies. The same is true

of everything else that is composed of or comes to be from matter; for each comes to be

from its matter though this is preserved.77 But in the process of generation the dispositions

of a form are not preserved; for when one form is introduced another is cast out. And for this

reason it seemed to some thinkers that forms are accidents and that matter alone is substance

and nature, as he points out in the Physics, Book II

818. They held this view because they considered the matter and form of natural bodies in

the same way as they did the matter and form of things made by art, in which forms are

merely accidents and matter alone is substance. It was in this sense that the philosophers of

nature said that the elements are the matter of things which come to be by nature, i.e., water,

77 So also in the case of water with respect to liquefiable things, as Aristotle says, but which St. Thomas

passes over here.

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air, or fire, or earth, which no philosopher has held to be the element of natural beings all by

itself, although some of those who were not philosophers of nature did hold this, as was

stated in Book I (134). And some philosophers, such as Parmenides, held that some of these

are the elements and natures of things; others, such as Empedocles, held that all four are the

elements of things; and still others, such as Heraclitus, held that something different is the

element of things, for he claimed that vapor plays this role. (emphasis added)

Cf. idem, Lesson 21, Aristotle’s Text, n. 514, Commentary, n. 1085:

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 24-27: 10:23a 26-1024a 28

514. To come from something (esse or fieri ex aliquo) means in one sense to come from

something as matter, and this in two ways: either in reference to the first genus or to

the ultimate species; for example, all liquefiable things come from water, and a statue

comes from bronze….

<…>

Commentary

<…>

1085 …First, a thing is said to come from something as from matter, and this can happen intwo ways: (a) In one way, inasmuch as matter is taken to be “the matter of the first genus,”

i.e., common matter; as water is the matter of all liquids and liquables, all of which are said

to come from water. (b) In another way, “in reference to the ultimate species,” i.e., the

lowest species; as the species statue is said to come from bronze. (emphasis added)

Hence, inasmuch as “‘first’ (or prime) is said in two ways, namely, first simply, and first ina genus or in some order ” ( In II Sent , dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1, c.), with respect to the constitution

of natural things, one understands that there is first matter simply speaking , which is matter

understood apart from every form, but subjected to form and privation ( De Prin. Nat., c. II,n. 14), and first matter in a certain respect , which is first in some genus, as water with

respect to liquids, etc. (ibid., n. 16). But, contrary to the opinion of the Bishop of Hippo,who interpreted “heaven and earth” in Genesis 1 as being unformed spiritual and corporeal

natures respectively—as we have seen, the heavens and the earth at the outset of the first

day are rightly understood as having been created in seminal form, and so as first matter said in the second way.

§

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17. Supplement. On the “plants of the field” in relation to those of the third day.

For arguments against the underlying assumption made by St. Augustine and the Angelic

Doctor to which I have taken exception above, consider the following:

Cf. John Salza, “Evolution” (ScriptureCatholic.com). sec. III:

III. Inconsistencies Between Genesis 1 and 2?

Many people try to undermine the inerrancy of Genesis 1 and 2 by pointing out alleged“inconsistencies” between the two creation accounts. Of course, if Scripture is not inerrant,

then the secularists can advance any theory they wish about creation and the age of the earth.

Following are the most common “inconsistencies” raised by the secularists:

1. Plants created before or after Adam?

Gen. 1:11-12 – God says “Let the earth put forth vegetation, plants yielding seed, and fruit

trees bearing fruit in which is their seed.” In this account, God made plants before He made

man.

Gen. 2:5 – it says “when no plant of the field was yet in the earth and not every herb of thefield had yet sprung up,…God formed man of dust from the ground.” In this account, it

appears that God made plants after He made man. How do we reconcile the two accounts?

Well, none of the early Church Fathers had a problem harmonizing the texts, so 21 st centuryWesterners should have no problem doing so.

In Gen. 1:11-12, it says that God made “herb” and the “tree producing fruit.” This

refers to two kinds of vegetation. Gen. 1:11-12 also says that this vegetation produced

“seed” (in Hebrew, dashah). These types of vegetation evidently served as food for

Adam and Eve.

In Gen. 2:5, it refers to the “shrub,” which is a third type of vegetation, to be

distinguished from that which is described in Genesis 1. This is further demonstratedby the fact that the text says that the “shrub” of Genesis 2 had not yet produced seed

(in Hebrew, tsemach). This is different from the dashah produced by the vegetation in

Genesis 1.

Finally, Gen. 2:5 says “not every herb of the field had yet sprung up.” This indicates

that some vegetation did already spring up, which is the different kind of vegetation

described in Gen. 1:11-12 (the fruit-bearing vegetation versus the vegetation that had

yet to bear fruit). Thus, Gen. 1:11-12 describes vegetation which immediately produced

fruit, and Gen. 2:5 refers to vegetation whose fruit would bud in the next generation. Is

this an inconsistency? No. (emphasis added)

Cf. “Six Day Creation” by Grover Gunn:78

…I wish to comment on one final argument used by those who regard Genesis one as a

poetic account in contrast to an historical narrative. The argument says that the details of the

Genesis one contradict the details of Genesis two. The only possible way to avoid this

conflict is allegedly to interpret Genesis one as poetry and Genesis two as history even

though both use the literary form of an historical narrative.

78 (http://capo.org/cpc/sixdays.htm#fn16 [12/15/06])

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This argument is reminiscent of the controversies over the various accounts of events

found in the Synoptic Gospels. These accounts often contain different terminology and

diverse details. Those who view these as fallible writings often interpret these differences in

ways that cause the differing accounts to contradict. Those who view these as infallibly

inspired writings interpret the same differences in ways that complement each other and thus

harmonize the accounts. Similarly, the details of Genesis two can be interpreted in a way to

complement, not contradict, the details of Genesis one.

The argument for contradiction is based on two passages in Genesis two: Genesis 2:4-6:

This is the history of the heavens and the earth when they were created, in the day that

the LORD God made the earth and the heavens, before any plant of the field was in theearth and before any herb of the field had grown. For the LORD God had not caused it to

rain on the earth, and there was no man to till the ground; but a mist went up from the

earth and watered the whole face of the ground.

and Genesis 2:19-20:

Out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the

air, and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them. And whatever Adam

called each living creature, that was its name. So Adam gave names to all cattle, to the

birds of the air, and to every beast of the field. But for Adam there was not found a helper comparable to him.

It is argued that God created the whole vegetable and animal kingdoms before the creation

of Adam according to Genesis one and after the creation of Adam according to Genesis two.

Such an interpretation, however, is not necessary. These two accounts can be interpreted to

complement each other and not to contradict.

Here, for example, is the interpretation suggested by Cassuto. The herb and plant

mentioned in Genesis 2:5-6 do not refer to the whole vegetable kingdom but to

vegetable species which relate to the state of the earth after the fall into sin and the

initiation of the curse.

Thus the term èsebh of the field comprises wheat and barley and the other kinds of grains from which bread is made; and it is obvious that fields of wheat and barley

and the like did not exist in the world until man began to till the ground . In the

areas, however, that were not tilled, the earth brought forth of its own accord, as a

punishment to man, thorns and thistles – that siah of the field that we see growing

profusely to this day in the Land of Israel after the rains. ... the world of vegetation,

as it was formed on the third day, was composed of those trees and plants and

herbs, that naturally reproduce themselves by seed alone. Those plants that needed

something else, in addition to seed, were excluded: to this category belonged, on the

one hand, all species of corn, which, even though isolated specimens might have

existed here and there from the very beginning, were not found in the form of fieldsof grain until man began to till the ground, and on the other hand, thorns and

thistles, or siah of the field, whose seeds are unable to propagate and grow freshplants until it rains. After man’s fall and expulsion from the garden of Eden, when

he was compelled to till the ground and the rain began to come down, there spread

through the earth thorns and thistles and fields of wheat – the siah of the field and

the èsebh of the field.26

I believe Cassuto’s interpretation of Genesis 2:5 is very plausible. Genesis 2:5-6 explainshow the earth’s original ecology differed from the post-fall ecology, which is the only

ecology the readers of these verses had ever experienced. The pre-fall ecology was not

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dependent on either rainfall or human irrigation (v. 5) because “streams came up from the

earth and watered the whole surface of the ground” (Genesis 2:6 NIV). 27 Genesis 13:10

confirms that Eden was a well watered place like unto the best land in Egypt in the post-fall

world.

The Genesis 2:5 phrase “herb (èsebh) of the field” is found in God’s post-fall curse upon

Adam: “Cursed is the ground for your sake; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life.

Both thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you, and you shall eat the herb of the field . Inthe sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, for out of it you were

taken; for dust you are, and to dust you shall return.” Genesis 3:17b-19 Here “the herb of thefield” refers to the cultivated grains from which bread can be made. Moses later uses this

phrase “èsebh of the field” to refer to the cultivated crops of Egypt which were destroyed bythe plagues of hail (Exodus 9:22-25) and locusts (10:12-15). Specific examples of “èsebh of

the field” are barley, flax, wheat and spelt (9:31-32). Moses also uses the phrase to refer to

pastureland for cattle (Deuteronomy 11:15).

After God created Adam and Eve, He gave them “every herb (èsebh) that yields seed onthe face of the earth, and every tree whose fruit yields seed” for food (Genesis 1:29). Before

the fall, God provided Adam and Eve with fruit from the trees in the garden of Eden for their

food supply (Genesis 2:9). After the fall, Adam and Eve were cast out of Eden and bread

became their staff of life. Adam then had to cultivate the “èsebh of the field” by the sweat

of his brow in order to have adequate food. Genesis 2:5 does appear to be referring to this

contrast between life before and after the fall.

The other contrast is the post-fall existence of “thorns and thistles.” Is this what Genesis

2:5 is referring to when it says “before any plant (siah) of the field was in the earth”? Every

other usage of this word here translated plant refers to a wilderness bush or shrub (Genesis

21:15; Job 30:4,7). In Genesis 21:15, Hagar laid Ishmael under a siah in the harsh wilderness

when their water was gone. In Job 30, the siah is in “the wilderness, desolate and waste”

(NKJ) or “desolate wastelands” (NIV). It is associated in Job 30:4 with the mallow or salt

herb, a plant which grows in salt marshes. In Job 30:7, the siah is associated with nettles.When there is no one to cultivate the land, it naturally becomes a desolation because of the

Genesis 3:18 curse. It is taken over by thorns and thistles, by the siah and nettles. Thus the

Biblical usages of and associations with siah are consistent with Cassuto’s interpretation of

Genesis 2:5.

<…>

16 U. Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis: Part I, From Adam to Noah(Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1961), page 64.23 U. Cassuto, Ibid., page 12.24 U. Cassuto, Ibid., page 94.25 U. Cassuto, Ibid., page 32.26 U. Cassuto, Ibid., page 102-103.27 “The meaning of the Hebrew word 'ed is uncertain. It probably denotes subterranean

waters which rise to the surface and thence as gushing springs or flooding rivers inundate the

land. The watering of the Garden of Eden by a river in the immediate sequel (v.10) may beintended as a specific localized instance of the 'ed phenomena.” Meredith G. Kline,

“Because It Had Not Rained,” The Westminster Theological Journal 20 (1958): footnote 9.(emphasis added)

Cf. J .P. Holding, “The Old Testament. Creation Account, Times Two”, Points of Order:79

79 (http://www.tektonics.org/tekton_05_03_03.html [7/29/04])

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http://capo.org/cpc/sixdays.htm#fn27%23fn27

http://capo.org/cpc/sixdays.htm#fn27%23fn27



Typically, critics find two major points of disagreement between G1 and G2. The first of

these is rather easy to dispose of:

Gen. 1:11 And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth: and it was so.

Gen. 2:4-5 These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth when they werecreated, in the day that the LORD God made the earth and the heavens, And every plant of

the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew: for the LORDGod had not caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was not a man to till the ground.

The allegation is that whereas G1 has plants made before man, G2 has man made be-

fore plants. But it is really rather simple to see that G2 indicates no such thing as is

claimed, for the latter specifies that what did not exist yet were plants and herbs “of the

field” – what field? The Hebrew word here is sadeh, and where it is used of knowngeographic locations, refers to either a quite limited area of land, and/or a flat place suitable

for agriculture, as opposed to the word used in 1:11, “earth”, which is ‘erets – a word which

has much broader geographic connotations. (See for example Gen. 23:12-13: “And he spake

unto Ephron in the audience of the people of the land [‘erets], saying, But if thou wilt give it,

I pray thee, hear me: I will give thee money for the field [sadeh]; take it of me, and I will

bury my dead there.” ; Ex. 9:22 “And the LORD said unto Moses, Stretch forth thine handtoward heaven, that there may be hail in all the land [‘erets] of Egypt, upon man, and upon

beast, and upon every herb of the field [sadeh], throughout the land [‘erets] of Egypt.”; Lev.

25:2-3, “Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, When ye come into the land

[‘erets] which I give you, then shall the land [‘erets] keep a sabbath unto the LORD. Six

years thou shalt sow thy field [sadeh], and six years thou shalt prune thy vineyard, and

gather in the fruit thereof...”) A key to understanding what is being described here is that

verse 2:5 goes on to explain WHY there were no “plants of the field” – because a) there

was no rain upon the earth, and b) there was no man to work the earth – the two key

elements for agriculture according to the ancient mindset. Thus, what this passage

indicates is that there was as yet no organized agriculture, and that makes sense of the

verses following, where God specifically plants the garden of Eden and places man to

tend to it. G2 is not indicating that there were no plants created yet at all, but that aspecial place was set aside for the foundation of agriculture and for plants “of the field”

to be developed. (This idea of Eden as a special place set aside shall come into play as

we progress.) (emphasis added)

Cf. Lee Irons, “The Upper Register. Framework Interpretation: An Exegetical Summary”80

“Because It Had Not Rained” (Gen. 2:5)

Although the above considerations make the framework interpretation a plausible

understanding of the days of creation, we recognize that we have not yet demonstrated the

impossibility of a sequential understanding of the creation days. One might still argue that

day four need not be taken as a recapitulation of day one, proposing instead that God couldhave sustained day and night for the first three days by supernatural means prior to the

creation of the sun, moon and stars. But Gen. 2:5 rules out such an explanation and further

strengthens the link between days one and four in a figurative framework.

80 (http://www.upper-register.com/other_studies/framework_interpretation.html [12/13/06]) [“This article

was originally published in Ordained Servant 9:1 (January, 2000) 7-11. Ordained Servant is a publication of

the Committee on Christian Education of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.”]

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Gen. 2:5a states that “no shrub of the field was yet in the earth, and no plant of the

field had yet sprouted,” and verse 5b provides a very logical and natural explanation

for this situation: “for the LORD God had not sent rain upon the earth, and there was

no man to cultivate the ground” (NASB). Then, in verses 6-7, we are told how God

dealt with these exigencies. In verse 6, the absence of rain is overcome by the divine

provision of a rain cloud (“a rain cloud began to arise from the earth and watered the

whole surface of the ground”); and in verse 7, the absence of a cultivator is overcomeby the creation of man. [7]

Notice that Moses offers his audience (ca. 1400 BC, long after the creation period) a

perfectly natural explanation for the absence of vegetation.

The Israelites would have been familiar with the idea that some form of water supply is

necessary for plant growth – whether God-sent rain or man-made irrigation. So when

Moses states that God didn’t create vegetation until He had established the natural means of sustaining that vegetation, i.e., the rain cloud (verse 6), he is assuming that the Israelites

would recognize the logic of this situation based on their own experience. The very fact that

Moses would venture to give such an explanation indicates the presence of an unargued presupposition, namely, that the mode of providence in operation during the creation period

and that is currently in operation (and which Moses’ audience would have recognized) are

the same. Since the mere giving of a natural explanation presupposes providential continuity between the creation period and the post-creation world, we may infer a general principle,

applicable beyond the case of vegetation, that “God ordered the sequence of creation acts so

that the continuance and development of the earth and its creatures could proceed by natural

means.” [8] In other words, during the creation period, God did not rely on super-natural means to preserve and sustain His creatures once they were created.

With this principle in hand, we now return to the problem of daylight, and evenings and

mornings, prior to the sun. Although the sequential view attempts to explain this problem byhypothesizing that God sustained these natural phenomena by some non-ordinary means for

the first three days, this speculation of human reason is contradicted by the disclosure of

divine revelation that God employed ordinary means during the creation period to sustain

His creatures. Thus, we are cast back upon our original suggestion that the fourth day is aninstance of temporal recapitulation, narrating the creation of the normal physical mechanism

God established to sustain the daylight/night phenomenon throughout the creation period and

beyond. Gen. 2:5 necessitates a non-sequential interpretation of the creation account, and

non-sequentialism in turn demonstrates that the week of days comprises a figurative

framework.

<…>

Endnotes

[7] Futato writes: “The … problem with its two-fold reason will be given a two-fold

solution” (p. 5). Due to space constraints, I must refer the reader to Futato’s article for adefense of the translation “rain cloud.” The Hebrew word mistranslated “mist” (KJV,

NASB) occurs only one other time in the Bible, where it is translated “cloud” in the LXX(Job 36:27). [= Mark Futato, “Because It Had Not Rained: A Study of Gen 2:5-7 with

Implications for Gen 2:4-25 and Gen 1:1-2:3”]

[8] Kline, “Space and Time,” p. 13. [= Meredith G. Kline, “Space and Time in the Genesis

Cosmogony,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 48.1 (April 1996) 2-15](emphasis added)

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The Opening of Genesis Part VIII. And God said: "Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven, to divide the day and the night…."