Third Edition 2013

The organisational accident

The importanceof calibration

Angle of attack indicator:Panacea for safe handling

and performance

Air crash survivability

Hello Summerroadshows concluded

FAA Workshop hosted

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Message from the Director

In this edition

Dear readers

The year is quickly drawing to a close, and the aviationcommunity is as busy as ever.

The 7th National Aviation Safety Seminar which took place inOctober included the Industry Day and gave aviationenthusiasts much food for thought regarding aviation safety.Some of the views included that of a single point ofaccountability for SMS; the importance in aviation training to

inculcate safe thinking behaviour in every student from DayOne; and the need for pilots to understand the weather codesas introduced in the new Weather Book SA.

Airspace infringements have increased, and the possibility ofconsidering plotting airspace infringement hotspots and givingquestionnaires to those involved in infringements, wasmentioned. The discussion on loss of control in flight addressedthe need for simulators to duplicate situations where loss ofcontrol could occur. The role of accountability in a just culturewas also debated. The information gathered at this valuableseminar will be used towards enhancing oversight andstrategizing aviation safety and security.

In South Africa, the International Civil Aviation Day (ICAD istaking place on 6 December at the New Tempe Airport inBloemfontein this year. The theme for this year’s globalobservance is “Evolving to Meet the Challenges of the 21stCentury Air Transport”. The event promises to once againhighlight the importance of international civil aviation in thesocia l and economic development of S tates .

While we are observing ICAD, let usnot forget that accidentsand incidents rob the industry and community of lives andresources, and therefore safety continues to be our focus. Inthis edition, The Organisational Accident examines whathappens when stakeholders at all levels of the systemcontribute towards the fateful decision-making of the crew.The importance of the end user’s access to calibrationcertificates in maintenance is discussed and air crashsurvivability is deliberated.

Are affordable Angle of Attack instruments some the most-wanted safety improvements? The article on page 7 mayprovide some answers.

The festive season is upon us, and I wish you a time ofrecuperation and peace.

Until next time, have a safe holiday and many happy flyinghours.

P3FAA Resolution of Safety Concerns Workshop

P4The Organisational Accident

P6The Importance of calibration

P7Angle of Attack Indicator: Panacea for Safe

Handling and Performance

P9Hello Summer Workshops Feedback

P11Air Crash Survivability

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During the week of 9 - 13 September 2013, the Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) Academy delivered Resolution of SafetyConcerns (RSC) training in South Africa. This highly engagingand much needed training was organised by the SACAAICAO Compliance Section as part of the ICAO COSCAP-SADC Project for SADC Member State Civil Aviation Authorities.A total of 20 delegates attended the course, representingSouth Afr ica, Botswana, Swazi land and Angola.

The course objective is to train those personnel with directenforcement duties in the policies, regulations, documentation

and requirements to satisfy the State CAA compliance andenforcement responsibilities. The course covered theconcepts, tools, and processes for a compliance andenforcement programme in a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).

It introduced a newly developed ‘Model EnforcementManual’ for government decision-makers that can be usedas the basis for supporting the CAA's commitment to AviationSafety. The course also addressed the International CivilAviation Organisation (ICAO) Safety Oversight Critical Elementobligation towards the Resolution of Safety Concerns.

This course provided the essential means by which the safetyand security of the individual State CAA is investigated andenforced. The course materials and instruction to utillise weremade available to attendees within their respective CAAsfor developing a new enforcement manual or to improveexisting guidance materials.

Feedback from all attendees indicated that they found thecourse extremely valuable. Not only did the course contentgreatly contribute towards awareness and knowledge of theResolution of Safety Concerns, but some very valuableinternational networking was achieved towards the successfulregional efforts in addressing safety.

FAA Resolution of Safety Concerns WorkshopBy Adel Groenewald and Ishmael Sebogodi

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Afriqiyah Airways Flight 771 was a scheduled internationalpassenger flight that crashed on the twelfth of May 2010 atabout 06:10 local time on approach to Tripoli InternationalAirport. The sole survivor was 9-year-old Dutch boy namedRuben Van Assouw, from a total of 104 passengers and crewon board.

There are two reasons why this accident perks one’s interest.Firstly, it was a flight that originated from FAOR (O.R. TamboInternational, South Africa), and secondly it involved probablyone of the most technologically advanced and commerciallysuccessful wide-body aircraft, namely, the Airbus A330. Thecrash of Flight 771 was the second hull-loss of an Airbus A330in less than a year and the third hull-loss of an Airbus A330 intotal.

At first glance this appears to be one of many accidentspopularly attributed to so-called “pilot error”. However, oncloser inspection, one is drawn into the fine art ofunderstanding these consequences from a root causeperspective, and specifically within the context of the ICAOSafety Management Manual (SMM) Doc 9859. This documentprovides a comprehensive root-cause methodology anddelves into what is termed “the organisational accident”.Briefly, the intention of this manual is to provide States (in thiscase South Africa) with guidance on the development andimplementation of a State Safety Programme (SSP), inaccordance with the International Standards andRecommended Practices (SARPs) contained in Annex 1 —Personnel Licensing; Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft; Annex8 — Airworthiness of Aircraft; Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services;Annex 13 (which each pilot should be familiar with) — AircraftAccident and Incident Investigation; Annex 14 — Aerodromesand Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations. Theeffective use of SMS can begenerally interpreted asa p p l y i n g a q u a l i t ymanagement approach tocontrol safety risks.

he American Managementscholar, Peter FerdinandDrucker, famously pointedout that, “If you can’tmeasure it, you can’tmanage it.” SMS thenattempts to accomplish thismeasurement, from a safetyp a r a d i g m , b yunderstanding hazards, itssubsequent componentsand risks impacting anygiven organisation engagedin aviation-related activities.S i m i l a r l y t o o t h e rmanagement functions,s a f e t y m a n a g e m e n tr e q u i r e s p l a n n i n g ,organising, communicatingand providing direction top-down.

Although the pilots of Afriqiyah

Airways Flight 771 did indeed have the dubious honour ofbeing the first at the scene of this fatal accident, they weremost certainly not solitary cogs in this orange clockwork. It isa well-known fact that nothing can replace a well-trained,knowledgeable and experienced flight-deck crew, however,even the best and most competent crew cannot compensatefor the inherent (latent) faults in a complex system such asair transportation. From the concluding remarks of the Dutchair crash investigators, it was clear that the flight crew did notfulfil their role as the last line of defence in this system.Nonetheless, almost all stakeholders at all levels of the system,through their actions or lack of action, contributed to denyingthe crew the means to mitigate the consequences of theirown actions.

According to a well-structured Safety Management System,three lines of defence are available within the complexity ofthe organisational aviation system. The notion of a systemicdefence system are contained in a building block approach,these parts are Training (for example, updated, appropriatesimulator experiences, quality learning from line-orientedtraining pertaining to the nuances of operations and non-punitive operator recurrent training, are all important factorsinstilled within an error-tolerant system); Technology (investingin modern aircraft, improved navigational performance suchas Performance Based Navigation PBN, Required NavigationPerformance RNP-AR, etc.), and Regulations (SOPs, legislation,a respected pool of check and standards pilots, etc.).

In the aftermath of this accident, it was discovered that thiscrew (although having the privilege to operate possibly themost advanced piece of machinery known to human-kind)were unfortunately ill-equipped from a training perspective,to carry out non-precision approaches in an Airbus A330. The

The Organisational AccidentBy Dr Preven Naidoo

Police and rescue workers stand among the mangled remains of AfriqiyahAirways Flight 8U771, which crashed on landing at Tripoli airport

5

latent threat existed and herein was the land mine, onlyrevealing itself when stepped on. During a low-visibility NPapproach into Tripoli, the co-pilot had invariably downgradedthe automation to a selected vertical profile (manuallymanipulating the flight path angle). The co-pilot’s intervention(due to a fundamental lack of knowledge of these aircraftautomation systems) had resulted in the aircraft descendingdangerously below the nominal glide profile, resulting in anundesired aircraft state (UAS). In the context of Threat andError management (this is 6th generation Crew ResourceManagement), a UAS is a position in space where the aircraftis presented one step prior to an incident or accident.Mitigation of the UAS was attempted; however, due to anumber of factors such as poor CRM skill, lack ofknowledge/training, fatigue, coupled with the impact ofphysiological interference from a somatogravic illusion, hadultimately resulted in high-speed impact with relatively flatterrain, in a completely serviceable aircraft.

Systemically, this accident can be described accuratelywithin the framework of Professor James Reason’s Swiss CheeseModel (all the holes eventually lined up). Similarly, from anSMS perspective (Figure 1), latent hazards within the

Organisation (flaws in managerialdecisions and processes) wereblatantly apparent after theaccident investigation. Forinstance, it was discovered thatthe very same crew, operatingthe same aircraft had made thesame mistakes two weeks prior,and had closely approacheddisaster, only to recover theaircraft at a very low altitude.

A sub-standard f l ight datamanagement department andlack of feedback from crew(possibly due to a low trustenvironment) resulted in this first,very telling, incident slippingthrough the organisational cracks.

Within the Workplace latentthreats from fatigue due tocreative crew planning decisions

and a somewhat bizarre in-flight rest regime on the accidentflight, low morale and a steep cockpit gradient, led to hidden,yet significant fractures within the fabric of safety. WithinPeople, gross errors were committed by the crew, who shouldhave been the last line of defence operating at the coal-face, during both the approach and go-around. Normalisationof deviance due to a home-base complacency and pooraircraft knowledge provided the holes in this part of thesystem.

A well-run and effective airline SMS would therefore identifydormant hazards deep within the organisation andsystematically aim to manage and measure safety with properpractices, policies and initiatives within a “just culture”.

The discussion is a testament to what can go wrong whenthe “why” is not adequately addressed. Root-cause analysisis probably the most comprehensive and scientific methodavailable in accident and incident prevention. In summary,the importance of a trust or just culture, pro-active andpredictive safety tools and scientific management of safetyis highlighted in the organisational accident of Flight 771.

Ramp Inspections, a clarification

Following the article on Ramp Inspections in the previous edition of Safety Link, a reader pointed out that aCertificate of Registration may not be carried in the aircraft, but that it must be kept in a safe place and acertified copy must be carried. Further investigation revealed that the article referred to CAR91.03.1. Theregulation advises that one should carry the original OR certified copy of the document. You may thus carryeither.

We appreciate and welcome any comments and thank the reader for his contribution.

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The Importance of CalibrationBy S imon Segwabe

You may ask yourself, why should I read the tool’s calibrationcertificate? One could ask this question as it relates to variousbrochures, certificates and manuals, and there generally is agood reason as to why one needs to be informed.Various types of instruments and equipment are used to inspect,measure, and test products and components. This providesvaluable information to assess the conformance of a productto a particular standard or a specification and assists in the“fitness-for-use” and other safety-related decisions. Theconsistency and accuracy of these inspections, requiring theuse of measuring, and testing equipment, assures improvedquality and increased safety and confidence in the end result.

CARING FOR A TOOL AND EQUIPMENT

m Selection and acquisition of the right equipment appropriate to the specific needm Validation of equipment (hardware, software, and procedures), accuracy, and precision prior to first usem Suitable environmental conditions for calibration, inspection, testing, and measurementm Traceability to a reference standard of known accuracy and stabilitym Frequency of calibrationm Handling, preserving, and storagem A recall system for periodic maintenance, repairs, adjustments, and recalibrationm Establishment of procedures for periodic recalibrationsm Preservation of documentary records.

CALIBRATION

Calibration is a process used to compare the inspection,measuring, and testing of instruments to a recognized referencestandard of known certified accuracy and precision, noting thedifference and adjusting the instrument, where possible.Fundamental to a systematic programme of instrumentcalibration and periodic recalibration is not to assume that theinstruments are at a constant; extensive use, wear, design,environment, and time are some of the factors that degradethe performance and accuracy of equipment. A calibrationsystem is therefore implemented to ensure and verify theaccuracy and precision before use when maintenance isperformed.

The selection of appropriate inspection, measuring, and testequipment is an integral part of inspection planning, and successdepends on such factors as measurements to be made andaccuracy requirements. Included are hardware items, such asinstruments, fixtures, gauges, and templates, software forcomputer-aided inspections, and process instrumentation. Alsoincluded is all testing equipment used in the development,manufacture, installation, and servicing of a product.

FREQUENCY OF CALIBRATION

The next important factor is the frequency of calibration orintervals between recalibrations. Most recalibration programmesare based on some function of time or calendar period. Intervalsbetween recalibration may also be based on other factors suchas the instrument’s purpose, stability of measurement (overdifferent conditions), observation of drift (slow variation overtime) and the degree of usage. The interval between calibrationsmust be shortened to ensure continued required accuracy,based on the historical calibration evidence. It may be possible

to lengthen the interval of calibration if historical calibrationdata indicate little or no deviation from the original accuracyover a period of time.

SUMMARY

Contributory factors such as continued use, wear, environmentalconditions, and time further degrade the performance ofinstruments/equipment and adversely affect the accuracy andprecision. With this in mind, there might still be a commondenominator with regard to equipment that may be overlookedby all South African maintenance organisations and invariablyleads to unsafe practices. Records of the control and use ofcalibration are required to be kept for a period of at least fiveyears in terms of the regulations, and most organisations complyas required. It is the place where these records are kept thatmay lead to the unsafe situation. In most cases records are keptat the Quality division with limited or no access by the engineersthat use the equipment. Should there be any variation recordedon the calibration certificates the end user, in this case themaintenance engineer, would not know about these variations.This practice requires immediate change.

WHY IS THIS A CHALLENGE?

Documentation provides evidence of compliance with theprogramme requirements in case of an internal or an externalquality assurance audit. In addition to the documentation ofthe overall programme requirements, one also needs to establish,document, and maintain calibration procedures for all of theequipment covered by the programme requirements. This alsoincludes documentation for the recall protocol and priorcalibration history of each instrument for frequency ofrecalibration decisions. Documentation should also include theprocedures and precautions for handling, preservation, andprotection of the equipment to ensure its accuracy and precisionunder varying environmental conditions during storage,transportation, handling and use.

WHAT IS CONTAINED IN A CALIBRATION CERTIFICATE?Other than basic information regarding the tool, the followingdata form the basis of a calibration certificate:Deviation and Uncertainty of measurement.

m Deviation: deviation from a specified value; may be expressed in measurement units, percentage of span, or percentage of reading.m Uncertainty: Analysis is performed to evaluate and identify factors associated with the calibration of equipment and process instruments that affect the calibration accuracy.

These two factors should be taken into consideration whenreading a calibration certificate, and it is proposed that eachtime before the equipment is used, copies of the calibrationcertificates, including the deviations, should be reviewed by theengineer. Controlled copies of the calibration certificates shouldbe kept with each tool or calibrated equipment. It serves littlepurpose when bolts are tightened to an incorrect torque,assumed to be correct, and then released to service in an unsafemanner. In all cases the end user should have access to thecalibration certificates, consider the deviations and calculatethe differences so that each time when maintenance isperformed, the aircraft or component is released as safely aspossible.

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“You will write out 1000 times by tomorrow morning: “the AoAindicator is not only a stall warning indicator”; these were theorders of the ground instructor to a student pilot during anaerodynamics lecture at Flight School.

Origins of the AoA Indicator

Historically, angle of attack indicators were regarded as thesole domain of flight testing and then in third generation fightersas an aid to pilots in managing the aircraft’s energy duringcombat manoeuvring. In the world of flight testing, angle ofattack has always been one of the most critical measurementparameters; in fact, the Wright brothers had only one instrumenton their first aircraft, a protrusion from the nose of their aircraftwith a piece of yarn attached to it from which they couldestimate the AoA.

The century series fighters such as the F-100 to F-106 types withrelatively low aspect ratios and also those with delta wingplatforms such as the Mirage III, generated drag curves in whichminimum drag speeds were typically 300 KIAS and managingthe aircraft’s energy was the single biggest contributor to pilotworkload. What is surprising is that one hundred years later itis still not a common instrument on general aviation aircraft,despite the FAA requiring stall warning devices on certificatedaircraft.

FAA Push

Based on the number of loss-of-control accidents that haveoccurred in general aviation, both the NTSB and the FAA haverecommended an increased use of AOA indicators - the latestpush has centred on bringing this technology to general aviationaircraft. The FAA’s Advisory Circular AC23.1309-1C: “To improvethe safety of the aircraft fleet by fostering the incorporation ofboth new technologies that address pilot-error and weather-related accidents and those technologies that can be certifiedaffordably. “Embry-Riddle Installs Angle of Attack Indicators inEntire Cessna Training Fleet to Enhance Quality of FlightEducation”, Daytona Beach, FL/Prescott, AZ (PRWEB) July 29,2013.

”The Advisory Circular emphasised that AoA gauges allow pilots

to quickly assess their stall margin and went on to declareaffordable AoA instruments as one of its most-wanted safetyimprovements. AOPA’s Air Safety Institute also enthusiasticallysupported the cause.

In a final report issued in September 2012, angle of attackindicators were listed as the top of 23 safety enhancementsthat could help cut the problematic general aviation fatalaccident rate. According to the General Aviation Joint SteeringCommittee, “The GA community should embrace to the fullestextent the stall margin awareness benefits of these systems.”

The traditional method of teaching stalls based on airspeedalone, deserves some consideration. The fundamentaldifference is that whereas airspeed is an indirect andapproximate measure of the wing’s lifting capability, the AoAindicator provides a direct measure of lifting capability andmargin with respect to the critical angles of attack; the angleat which the wing will stall regardless of the weight, configurationor air density.

Weight as a Performance Parameter

Every pilot worth his wings knows that a wing will stall at aspecific angle and that the stall airspeed is a direct functionof aircraft weight. Since aircraft efficiency is an indirect functionof weight, by logical deduction, to maximise efficiency, onewould need to fly the aircraft at a specific optimal angle ofattack for specific flight/weight profiles to produce maximumefficiency.

In fighter combat missions, large weight differentials of 50%between take-off and landing, depend on maximising criticalperformance parameters for successful mission accomplishment,viz:

m maximising range and endurance,m maximising turn performance during air combat (a survival tool), andm optimising speed control on approach for landing at airspeeds of up to 200 KIAS and stopping the aircraft in the available runway length (dragchutes required to stop).

Optimising energy was, and still is, a primary control parameterfor fighter pilots and the single most important indicator of

Angle of Attack Indicator: Panacea forSafe Handling and Performance

By Des Barker

Low aspect ratio, high lift dependent drag aircraft requireangle of attack indicators to reduce pilot workload and improve

energy management. (Anton Dyason)

Typical Graph of Dragvs Airspeed for generalaviation type aircraft.(http://www.mountainflying.com/Pages/articles/images/drag_curve.jpg

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aircraft efficiency is angle of attack. But, the collateral benefitsof angle of attack indication are more than just maximisingefficiency; the safety benefits exceed the performance benefits.In 1957 the U.S. Navy and Marines reportedly cut their fatalityrate in half in one year after they perfected using AoA as theprimary management of energy in carrier landings.

Times Have Changed

The cost of fuel has been one of the most critical factorsmilitating against aviation and the requirement for maximisingperformance has become equally critical for general aviationpilots in their efforts to afford flying.

Additionally, general aviation accidents worldwide haveremained in about the same proportion statistically for eachphase of flight, year after year. The majority of accidents occurduring the takeoff or landing phase of flight, followed closelyby manoeuvring flight. An angle-of-attack indicator could goa long way in preventing these types of accidents.

According to the FAA, the final ‘killing event’ is uncontrolledflight into the ground due to stalls and spins while AOPA’s AirSafety Foundation (ASF) states that “stall/spin accidents tendto be more deadly than other types of GA accidents,accounting for 10% of all accidents, but 13.7% of fatalaccidents.”

The ASF study also found that stalls/spins are most likely to occurin manoeuvring flight such as aerobatics, ‘shoot ups’ with steepvertical pull-ups, agricultural flight steep turns to reversedirections, engine failures after take-off with the pilot trying toreturn to the runway and steep turns to final approach(‘hammerhead’) when trying to correct an overshoot frombase to finals. A NASA study in the late 1970s found that GAaircraft typically require about 1200 feet to fully recover froma spin, so recovery from a spin on final approach in most GAaircraft would be most unlikely.

Most airliners have AoA sensors installed, but the output is oftenonly fed through to the aircraft’s flight management systemsand such information is not readily visible to the pilot. Corporateaircraft have had AoA indications available for years and nowgeneral aviation has an affordable indicator. No longer canthe general aviation pilots sit back and say: “I don’t need anAoA indicator, I have an audio stall warning which I scan inconjunction with the airspeed indicator.” There’s a lot morebenefits available than just a stall warning indication.

ASI vs AoA Indicator

AoA sensors in general aviation aircraft are rare, so airspeedis used as a proxy to get the approximate angles for variousflight profiles, but the ASI has its own unique inherentinadequacies such as lag and sideslip over/underread errorsdue to asymmetric input to the static vents. Unfortunately pitotstatic errors increase with airspeed decrease and provides verylittle information about the lift conditions of the wing; that is

what an AoA indicator does.

Then, of course, the idiosyncrasy in that pilots generally onlyknow the correct approach airspeed for gross weight at sealevel on a standard day has the result that if the aircraft is light,they tend to come in fast and curse the ‘floating’ landing, thebounce or the excessive braking required to stop on the shorterrunways. At the other end of the scale, the problem is gettingtoo slow, resulting in a ‘hard landing’.

Benefits of AoA Indications

An AoA indication can provide the pilot with information toincrease the safety and eff icacy of the aircraft:

m the indications are valid under any flight conditions, at any airspeed, altitude wing loading and density altitude.m the indicator is sensitive at any airspeed and changes in AoA are immediately apparent.m there is a specific AoA that provides maximum range and endurance and even the minimum sink speed.m Vx and Vy are all functions of AoA and occur at the given AoA. Using the same pitch attitude for low and high density take-offs may place the aircraft in the “region of reverse command” but by flying the proper AoA on rotation, will ensure a proper attitude regardless of density altitude or gross weight.m Also, all approaches should be flown using a specific AoA regardless of gross weight, bank angle, turbulence or density altitude.m provides a stall indication/number that is correct whether straight and level or in a turn.

Real World Applications

Some AoA advocates point to the recent Asiana 214 in SanFrancisco as an example of the type of accident that couldhave been prevented with such an instrument but, in fact, italso demonstrated exactly why AoA is not the panacea forcontrol woes. Obviously pilots have to look at the instrumentfor it to be of any use; in the Asiana case, the crew managedto ignore the airspeed indicator eventually getting almost 30knots slow on final approach. Another instrument would nothave prevented this disaster!

Besides looking at the instrument, pilots have to know how toreact to its indications. For the GA pilot struggling to log 25hours in a year, the physical stick and rudder skills will be moreimportant than the recognition skills. Furthermore, an AoAindicator won’t help the idiot who does a ‘shoot-up’ at 20 feet,neither will it prevent the over-gross weight take-off on a hotday that eventually results in a stall; scenarios depressinglycommon which get grouped under the “loss of control” heading.

Fighter pilots readily sing the plaudits of an AoA system becauseit’s a religion in the military and most are surprised that generalaviation pilots are still flying solely on airspeed. However, acounter-argument from general aviation pilots is that an AoAindicator is most probably required when landing on the pitchingdeck of an aircraft carrier at night, but for the average GApilot landing on a 5000 ft. runway, the situation is quite different- airspeed control on final approach matters a lot more thana new instrument in the panel.

The simple fact is that airspeed is a great proxy for AoA mostof the time and general aviation pilots fly in a very small envelopeof +/-10º in pitch and 30º of bank in most cases. Within thoseboundaries, monitoring airspeed is a perfectly good way tokeep from stalling.

Most of the base-to-final stall/spin scenarios happen becausethe pilot got too slow, plain and simple, which suggests thatgood airspeed control would improve safety more than a newinstrument in the cockpit. However, accuracy of speed control

Typical AoA Gauge for GAaircraft (ICON A5)

Typical high-performanceNumeric AoA display

(Gulfstream))

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on final approach remains a challenge to the general aviationcommunity at large; naysayers will claim that: “We don’t havean instrument problem, we have a stick and rudder skills problem.Instead of spending a lot of money on new instruments, let’steach pilots how to maintain the proper airspeed on final.Now, that would be revolutionary!”

Tangible Benefits

Is the system worth the expense? There's more to consider thanjust some extra protection against becoming a stall-spin statisticor floating a bit on landing, although that may be enough formany pilots. Every landing at the right speed is that much lesswear and tear on brakes, tires and undercarriage. Increasedefficiencies are achieved by flying at the correct angles forbest rate, best angle of climb, maximum range, etcetera, allfor an investment of under $1500 for most light aircraft. Stallwarning, increased precision of flight, improved stall/spinsituational awareness, fuel conservation and buildingconfidence in pilot’s handling, are just some of the benefits.

Conclusion

Having an AoA indicator visible to the pilot is like being able to‘monitor’ the wing’s lifting potential at any stage of flight, whichin turn enhances the safety and efficacy of the flight. It is forthis reason that the FAA/industry panel recommended the use

of AoA-based systems by general aviation as the best methodfor reducing fatal loss-of-control accidents in the approachand landing phase of flight. Bolstering that conclusion, FAAAdministrator Michael Huerta has called on the general aviationcommunity to add AoA systems and other potentially life-savingequipment to their aircraft. “Angle of attack well executed, isa game changer in any aircraft – and it’s long overdue,” (KirkHawkins, former Air Force F-16 pilot). Any air tactics manualshould contain the line, "Speed is Life." Good thinking for fighterpilots, but down here in the more mundane world of generalaviation, it's probably more appropriate to say, "Angle of attackis life." Staff Report, January 4, 2013, Alpha Systems.

References:

Embry-Riddle Installs Angle of Attack Indicators in Entire CessnaTraining Fleet to Enhance Quality of Flight Education,” DaytonaBeach, FL/Prescott, AZ (PRWEB) July 29, 2013.

Aviation Consumer, Staff Report, January 4, 2013, Alpha Systems.

The now one-year old SACAA Part 91 department, supportedfully by industry leaders, embarked on a safety road showin October and November 2013 across seven airports inGauteng and One in Mpumalanga. The road show washeld to help enhance aviators’ decision-making ahead ofthe festive flying season and the turn in the stable winterweather to the challenges of summer weather flying.

The road show also afforded SACAA and industryprofessionals the opportunity to interact with aviators andreceive feedback about services provided on a personallevel.

Presentations included:

m The South African Weather Service (SAWS), highlightingthe seasonal summer forecast for the region; along withassociated weather phenomena expected this summerand a reminder of information available on their websitefor pilot use;

m Simon Gear, climatologist and PPL, discussed the criticalimportance of risk perception and the risks inherent inpersonality and behaviour that pilots should be aware of;

m Chris Kyle, Flying Instructor and subject matter expert,linked into the seasonal weather forecast and used theopportunity to recap the basics prior to flight by consideringdensity altitudes; the effects of overweight flight, amongstmany other important aspects;

m Santjie White, Chief of the Aeronautical Search andRescue (SASAR) explained the role and importance ofsearch and rescue, and options available to pilots to assistthem should things go wrong;

m The Accident and Incident Investigation Division discussed

the consequences of aviators’ poor decision-making andpresented a real-life case study which highlighted an errorin decision-making;

m The SACAA Part 91 team discussed the department’srole as regulator and looked into the role of the generalpublic in terms of complaints;

m Aeroclub SA highlighted accident statistics and promotedtheir Safety First aviator Phase 2 campaign; and

m ATNS, through resident air traffic controllers at the variousairports, shared important information about airspaceinfringements, etcetera.

We were happy to meet over 300 pilots who attendedacross the eight stations, and also enjoyed a coveted radiointerview with 702 Talk Radio.

As this road show was the first of its kind, we used thisopportunity to assess the value that it may contribute toaviators and whether we would roll it out nationally. We arehappy to report that following the many compliments andconstructive suggestions received, combined with numerousinvitations to bring the road show to other parts of thecountry, we will be bringing HELLO SUMMER to the EasternCape; Western Cape and Free State, starting in April 2014.We will also ensure that the content remains exciting,informative and worth your while to attend.

The road show will become part of an annual drive to meetwith fellow aviators, and we welcome any suggestions forcontent going forward.

Have a safe and happy summer, filled with much joy andfestivity.

Hello Summerby Mark Swarts

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Solution to Crossword Puzzle

Across

4 - Condition where critical angle of attack is exceeded5 - Part 617 - Pitch8 - Last stage of thunderstorm10 - Crop-spraying operation12 - Sudden downpour of water lasting a few minutes13 - Upside down17 - High-speed drag18 - RJ Mitchell fighter19 - What type of aircraft was used to first break the sound barrier?

Down

1 - Colour of Black Box2 - Heats the plug3 - Lack of carbon dioxide6 - Can be explosive9 - Strong down-slope wind11 - Bus driver14 - Barber’s Pole15 - Start and end flight here16 - Estimated Time of Arrival18 - Sneaky aircraft

11

During practical forced landing training, instructors alwaysplace emphasis on the importance of ‘making the field safely’.During a flight test the student feels the urgency of completingthe perfect landing when the astute instructor retards thethrottle and calls engine failure. Pilots are trained to reactduring an emergency, but how many are briefed andeducated on how to fly the aircraft into a survivable crash,when the conditions of the terrain are adverse?

There are various psychological factors that lead a pilot toattempt the impossible rather than to fly the aircraft as deepinto the crash as possible, thus improving the possibility ofwalking away without injury, or worse.

m Reluctance to accept the emergency situation. Denial, Slow to react.m Desire to save the plane instead of putting life and survivability first.m Undue concern about getting hurt. Overwhelming fear instead of going into survival mode – Flight or Fright syndrome.m Resignation – I can’t do anything about this.

Design consideration

It’s important to note that during the design process of anaircraft, survivability is incorporated into the design. For singleengine light aircraft, the designers’ target is to produce anaircraft that will offer a wide operating envelope in terms ofspeed performance i.e a low stall speed but with efficientcruising performance. Amongst other reasons, theconsideration of a low stall speed is done in order toincorporate crash survival into the design of the aircraft. Mostwell-designed single engine light aircraft have a stall speedof 61 KCAS or less because of crash survival considerations.

Technique

Source: FAA Instructors Handbook

A pilot who is faced with an emergency landing in terrainthat makes extensive aircraft damage inevitable, should keepin mind that to avoid fatal crash injuries, he should try to keepvital aircraft structures relatively intact by using dispensablestructures (wings, landing gear etc.) to absorb the energyand thus to lessen the violence of the ensuing deceleration.It is sudden deceleration and G-forces that hurt people, soif we can manage the dissipation of energy, the better for

us and all occupants of the aircraft.Vegetation, trees and man-made structures may be used asenergy-absorbing mediums. With this in mind, it is vital tounderstand the ai rcraft systems and st ructure.

The lower the deceleration force is, the greater is the chanceof survivability. The process of deceleration is governed byspeed and stopping distance. It is important that a touch-down be made at the lowest controllable speed possible,using all aerodynamic devices available. Little stoppingdistance is required if speed can be dissipated uniformly; thatis deceleration forces spread evenly over the availabledistance.

It is important to make use of the aircraft’s shoulder harnessfor survival. Its purpose is to restrain your upper torso and headfrom hitting the instrument panel. If your head hits the panelat anything more than a few knots, the blow will be fatal.Therefore ensure that your seatbelt and shoulder harness arefastened before landing.

Ability of the human body to resist fatal force

It is also important to understand that the human body’sability to "absorb impact force" varies with the axis. In otherwords, the human body can take a lot more forceperpendicular to the spine than along it. If an attempt wasmade to land with a high vertical speed, compression of thespine and possible death would result.

Second World War aircraft engineers and designers decidedthat humans could survive at a maximum of 18G decelerationforce. Aircraft cockpits then were all designed to withstand18G impact because if the person was already dead, whyinvest in stronger materials and structural support?

The record for peak experimental horizontal G-force toleranceis held by acceleration pioneer John Stapp, in a series ofrocket sled deceleration experiments in which he survivedforces up to 43 times the force of gravity for less than asecond. Stapp suffered lifelong damage to his vision from thistest.

In some fatal accidents it is not the actual impact of thecrash that leads to death, but the post-impact fire that erupts.People may be surprised that they survived the impact, andbecome complacent about other dangers. Peopleunderestimate how quickly a fire can spread and consumean aircraft. The reality is that it takes, on average, just 90seconds for a fire to burn through an aircraft’s aluminumfuselage and consume everything and everyone in it.Understand and know your aircraft well, so that you canselect an aircraft system status and condition that will reducesuch risk.

Make sure doors are unlocked and cracked beforetouchdown - twisted fuselage might make it impossible forjammed doors to be opened!

Survivability is based on a collection of factors at the time ofimpact. Whilst taking the above information into consideration,there may still be unforeseen circumstances that could resultin a different outcome.

Air Crash Survivabilityby Renisha Naidoo & Chris Kyle

You have only 90 Seconds to get out!

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