The Origins and Evolution of Conflict in Portland's Neighborhood Association System: A Case Study of North Portland's District Coalition Board

The Origins and Evolution of Conflict in Portland's Neighborhood Association System: A CaseStudy of North Portland's District Coalition BoardAuthor(s): Matthew WittSource: Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 62-75Published by: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25611328 .

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THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN PORTLAND'S NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF NORTH PORTLAND'S DISTRICT COALITION BOARD1

Matthew Witt_

Portland State University

ABSTRACT

Neighborhood

associations represent a possible vehicle for brokering private interests and public welfare within a diverse social context. In order to function at the level hoped for by normative

political theory, neighborhood associations must be able to host vigorous dialogue within varied social interest group settings. Yet, because of the limited resources they typically command, and the

disparate interests and agendas they are often confronted with, neighborhood associations are

particularly vulnerable to destructive levels of conflict and an array of collective action problems. As such, a central interest for neighborhood association research is to identify the constraints that

impede citizens of different cultural and class backgrounds from working together to forge consensus around community wide concerns and agendas. A related interest is to see that this activity can occur with as little interference from central administrative agencies as possible. Portland, Oregon's neighborhood association system offers a unique laboratory for exploring these research interests because it hosts a system of nominally autonomous neighborhood associations which receive ongoing subsidy from local tax revenue. This paper examines preliminary interview and archival data collected for dissertation research which suggests that Portland's system may foster conflict more than it supports consensus formation. The implications of these findings are examined against research claims made elsewhere that Portland's neighborhood association system is exemplary.

INTRODUCTION

If we are looking for returns on investment in social

capital, then structured neighborhood associations of the kind we find in Portland appear, prima facie, to

be strong stock: trust, civic engagement, social net

works, and norms of reciprocity could all be well served

through an ongoing subsidy tailored to sustaining basic

organizational capacity for citizen groups at the neigh borhood level. Moreover, the place-based aspect of

neighborhood associations offers a rich context for

citizens to seek creative solutions to conflicts between

private property and public welfare. In terms of the value for research, this amalgamation of private inter

ests and public good, brought to immediacy at the

neighborhood level and brokered through neighborhood associations of the kind we see in Portland, makes the

understanding of these systems vital to ongoing inquiry into the potential yields of social capital formation.

There are in fact only a handful of American cities similar in size to Portland-less than 1,000,000 popula tion-which currently host neighborhood association

activity with ongoing subsidy drawn from tax dollars

(Berry, et al., 1993). Though most cities of any size have experienced neighborhood mobilization of some kind or another over the past 30 years, very few support this activity through ongoing subsidy or the formal

designation and standing which would enable neighbor hood activists regular access to resources necessary to mount any number of "livability" campaigns on city hall. These facets-ongoing subsidy and formal recogni tion-are the central characteristics we refer to when

speaking of "structured" neighborhood associations. By extension, the imposition of structure upon citizen

activity has profound implications for understanding the

ways in which public administration functions in the

space between downtown and neighborhood, between "citizen and city."2

62 Administrative Theory & Praxis March 1999, Vol 21, No. 1



But why should we hesitate to structure neighbor hood association systems like Portland's in other Amer ican cities?3 Besides the costs, what factors need to be in place to assure these systems work? According to recent research, there are several, all of which make the

proposition of structured neighborhood associations

(NAs) rather complicated: more risky, we might say, than municipal bond investments. But there are other

risks incurred through implementing such systems: risks not fully accounted for by scholarship thus far.

These risks drive to the heart of questions seeking answers about what preconditions are vital to sustain a

steady yield of social capital.

This paper presents an argument, supported by preliminary data analysis, to explain in what ways

neighborhood politics in North Portland-representing approximately one seventh of all neighborhood associa tion activity in the city-spiraled out of control over a

five year period between 1987 and 1992.1 shall contend

that, beginning with trust, key elements of social capital formation-including norm formation around reciprocity and social networking-have, despite recent research claims to the contrary, in fact been casualties of neigh borhood association activity in Portland. If structured

systems like Portland's are to be touted as potential vehicles for social capital formation (Portney & Berry, 1997), it is important that a full measure be taken of these systems assets and liabilities.

MOTIVATIONS FOR RESEARCHING PORTLAND

The prospect for neighborhood associations to serve

vital civic functions has been investigated extensively through empirical inquiry and scholarly analysis, most

notably by the urban studies and public administration literatures. Much of this work has been framed in terms of the viability of "citizen involvement" in policy formation and planning (Clay & Holister, 1983; Rohe &

Gates, 1985; Checkoway, 1985; Rich, 1986; Thomas, 1986). Other inquiry has examined neighborhood-based

mobilization within historic contexts of resistance and

change (Fisher, 1994). These research efforts fall,

generally, under the rubric "citizen involvement," and seek to examine the promise and viability of the demo cratic imagination for a "strong democracy" (Barber, 1984).

The most recent and certainly most ambitious examination of citizen involvement in local planning to date was carried out by a Tufts University team of

political scientists between 1985 and 1993 (Berry et al.,

1993). Entitled "The Rebirth of Urban Democracy," this

study-funded and published by the Brookings Institu tion-examined how structured systems of neighborhood based planning operate within medium sized American cities. Portland was among five core cities examined by this study, drawing attention because of its then eleven

year-old, tax subsidized and geographically organized system of neighborhood-based citizen involvement.

Along with more than 3,000 interviews, more than

11,000 surveys were analyzed in this effort across a

frame of 15 cities (5 core plus 10 matched) drawn from a sampling pool of all American cities between 100,000 and 1,000,000 in population. Besides its sheer scope, the central strength of this study lay in the breadth and

depth of its critical scholarship: it greatly helped clarify and situate the importance of previous empirical efforts, as well as to rein in over-weaning theory.

The principal flaw in the Tufts study, when consid

ering Portland, was the omission of any systematic examination of how the primary administrative units in this system, the district coalition boards, work on a day to-day basis. These boards constitute the main adminis trative apparatus supporting neighborhood association

(NA) activity in the city. Based on a delegate and

representative structure, these boards-of which there were seven total in Portland until 1994-draw their

membership from member NA boards. The key function of the district coalition boards (DCBs) is to provide organizational capacity to geographically contiguous neighborhood associations. Although receiving the bulk of their operational subsidy from the city's general fund

budget, these boards are sovereign, non-profit entities,

responsible for setting their own agendas, establishing administrative policies, hiring and firing staff, budgeting for resource allocation, etc. In addition, the DCBs

regularly establish policy agendas on issues such as

public safety and traffic management which cut across individual NA boundaries.

How important are these organizations to the overall functioning of the NA system? City administra tors often attend DCB meetings in lieu of individual NAs to gain some sense of broad-based community concerns. It is here where norms for discourse among member NAs are set, and where staff are most dominant in establishing the tone of relations between member

NAs and in adjudicating differences between district coalition and downtown perspectives. In sum, this level is integral to the overall working of the NA system, yet

WITT/ The Origins and Evolution of Conflict in Portland's Neighborhood Association System 63



it received virtually no scrutiny from the Tufts study. Portland's "tiered" system-NAs organized into districts and represented at DCBs-is unique among the five core cities Tufts studied.4 The autonomy these organizations enjoy with respect to staff hiring and firing impressed the Tufts team, and was one factor leading them to

group Portland with St. Paul, Minnesota, as representa tive of the most progressive efforts in structured citizen

participation among the five core cities they studied.

NORTH PORTLAND POLITICS

The importance of the district coalition element in the overall structure of citizen participation in Portland

was identified clearly in a study by Adler and Blake

(1990). This work served to challenge the "standard socioeconomic model" of citizen participation, with an

emphasis on the role played by Portland's structured

system of neighborhood associations and how this structure serves to mitigate disparity in access to local

decision making across race and class.5 These scholars

chose to study Portland following the same logic guiding the Tufts effort: because Portland's system is supported by elements identified in the scholarly literature as key to the overall success and democratic appeal of citizen

participation. This aspect enabled Adler and Blake to

advance the research about the merits of structured

systems past theoretic speculation. Using response rates

among neighborhood association participants to the land use zoning change requests of development interests as

a key dependent variable, Adler and Blake found that

Portland's system did not discriminate based on class, race, educational background or home ownership status

of neighborhood participants. Sorting their analysis by district coalitions, however, the researchers did find that

the North Portland Coalition response rate was signifi

cantly lower than the other six coalitions in the city. Adler and Blake speculated that the cause of this was the

historic weakness of North Portland neighborhoods and

the reluctance of district coalition staff situated there to

take on a leadership function in organizing the area:

The bottom ranking of North Portland, espe

cially given the relative frequency of chal

lenges to the area, represents the limits of the

Portland system in the face of weakness at the

neighborhood association level. While the

district organization in North Portland emerged

prior to the city's formal participation system, the neighborhood associations in North Port

land have historically been weak. This finding

supports [recent scholarship] regarding the

importance of pre-existing neighborhood identi ties in stimulating participation. Since the dominant conception of the relationship be tween neighborhood and district has been one that restricts the autonomy of the district of

fice, the district has been unable to take the initiative to compensate for the lack of activity in the neighborhoods. It appears that the neigh borhood participation system (in Portland) has been unable to overcome the political culture of isolation that has historically characterized

North Portland. (Adler & Blake, 1990, p. 43)

As if prophesied by Adler and Blake, troubles in North Portland politics became apparent in the Spring of 1989 when the Office of Neighborhood Associations

(ONA) threatened to withhold general fund contract

money to the North Portland DCB.6 The ONA alleged the coalition was out of compliance with work plan items it was under contract to provide the North Port

land community. This gesture was to be the first official

volley in what was to become a battleground of commu

nity politics spanning the next several years. Although many issues would surface during this time, a central

place of conflict and contention was among neighbor hood association delegates to the district coalition review

board.

A primary feature of the conflict hinged on the

accusation by the delegates of two NAs that a clique of

leaders from within the district had obtained informal

influence over district coalition office staff (and re

sources) in a manner which undermined open challenge and prevented the incorporation of all concerns and interests in the coalition. Primary among these concerns

was the claim made by these challenger delegates that

several NA delegates south of North Lombard Street-a

major geographic feature running east-west which

bisects North Portland-were seeking to curtail broad

based citizen participation in coalition affairs. The

challenged NAs (henceforth called the "dissidents") rebutted that the real issue was one of power: the two

challengers could not obtain the influence they desired

except through insurrection. The challengers countered

that suggestions of power-mongering merely revealed a

renegade leadership cadre determined not to share

influence. The area south of North Lombard Street is,

overall, significantly more affluent than the area north

of North Lombard.




The role of the ONA during this time eventually took on a pattern of formal threat followed by informal efforts at conciliation. By February, 1992-in spite of concerted efforts at conciliation by the then ONA Director-the six NAs south of North Lombard Street elected to leave the Coalition. The ONA was now

caught in a political bind: how could it support all the area neighborhood associations without a nominal structure through which to process a contract? The ONA cobbled what appeared at the time as a tentative

compromise: it would continue to offer services to the six dissident NAs in the hope of sustaining some lever

age over them to reconsider rejoining the two challenger NAs. Meanwhile, the challengers seized on the appear ance of inconsistency, accusing the ONA of exacerbat

ing the rift by providing incentive (ongoing service

support) for the dissident NAs to avoid resolving the conflict. It was at this point that the issue of class bias was made public by one of the two dissident coalition

delegates.7

The denouement of this saga came in early 1997 with action by the Oregon Supreme Court. The Court

upheld a lower court ruling in favor of summary judg ment for defendant in a lawsuit waged by the challenger delegates against the City of Portland, the DCB Execu tive Director, and a host of the dissident NA leadership. The lawsuit alleged there existed a conspiracy between the dissident faction and City of Portland officials to defraud the North Portland DCB of its funding and contract status with the City of Portland. In effect, it

alleged that the mass exodus by the dissident NAs was

orchestrated, and contingent upon city support to create a shadow coalition which would eventually supersede the beleaguered DCB.

The leadership of the North Portland NAs has since

largely turned over, and the eight NAs currently meet on a "confederated" basis once monthly. No North Portland NAs indicate any interest in restoring the old coalition structure-with complete control over office staff and administrative prerogative. The current admin istrative structure cedes administrative control to the

city: that is to say, staff are now hired by the city. For the time being there is no concerted clamor calling for a return to the DCB organizational form, status quo ante. For now, current North Portland leadership seems content to leave the administrative headaches up to the ONA. What the district has lost in sovereignty it has

perhaps gained through peaceful co-existence and

interpersonal equanimity.

These events in North Portland provide sufficient cause to re-examine Tufts' sanguine portrayal of Port land's system, and, with this, Tufts' larger claims about the potential for structured approaches to citizen in volvement:

We believe this book provides some important corrections to current skepticism about citizen

participation in the United States. It suggests that these concerns, raised mostly in empirical analyses about democratic participation, are overstated. And it suggests that the expecta tions for practical democracy that grow out of normative theory are too high. Nevertheless, face-to-face forms of political participation can achieve much of what theorists suggest is worthwhile and can do so without producing significant negative consequences. (Berry et

al., 1993, p. v.)

Perhaps most significant is the fact that North Portland appears to have had its fill of the privileges and

responsibilities attendant to the sovereign status of

DCBs, the facets of Portland's system Tufts found so laudable. How could this have happened? What does this

signify about the capacity for citizens here to sort out

organizational imperatives-including necessary social

capital investments in trust and norms of reciprocity? Was it the case, as inferred by Adler and Blake (1990), that Portland's system may be unable to overcome the historic weakness of North Portland's neighborhood associations? Or should we ask whether or not (and if so, in what ways) Portland's formal citizen participation structure served to exacerbate these weaknesses? Adler and Blake found the level of education to be low in North Portland relative to the rest of the city. What role did this factor play, if any, in the conflict apparent there over the last several years? Can we find evidence of similar forces operating in the ongoing conflicts in Portland's East Coalition, which dissolved recently following dynamics similar to North Portland?

CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY8

The methodology for examining North Portland has thus far included in depth interviewing of central

participants to the conflict, North Portland DCB staff, the ONA Director during the period of conflict, attorney for the challenger NAs, and several onlookers, including those who were integral to forming the system in the

early 1970s (ten interviewees in all). Legal documents from both sides filed in the case of the challenger NAs




suit against the dissidents and City of Portland officials have been extensively reviewed, as well as news ac counts of the conflict spanning several years. In addi

tion, archival documents-including meeting minutes, agendas, and correspondence-over the 1987-92 period of North Portland politics have also been reviewed. The author's past personal experience as a neighborhood association board member in Portland's West/Northwest district has also been drawn from for this research.

THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE

Six propositions emerge from analysis of data collected thus far examining what happened in North Portland. This section will present these propositions followed by discussion in sequence. These propositions are presented here provisionally. More participants will be interviewed who may further validate, challenge, or

qualify these research claims. These propositions are offered here, with substantiation, by way of suggesting the merit of further research. That said, it is a matter of historic record that Portland's NA system, highly praised by recent scholarship, has been significantly affected by the events in North Portland. These events, and others like them which will be incorporated into

ongoing research, warrant further examination in light of Tufts' recent appraisal.9

1) Substantial distrust among NA participants at the coalition level existed in North Portland during an unknown length of time prior to 1989, followed by open hostility through about 1993. This claim was

supported by all interview participants thus far. Imputa tions about the causes of this distrust varied along a continuum from psychological to sociological factors. Some participants stressed the nature of "intense person ality clashes" which flared up around 1991 among DCB

participants. Other participants downplayed this dimen

sion, speculating that sociological factors, including the

disparate class and race backgrounds of participants, tindered the conflict. It was only after this initial

spark-disagreement over the bylaws-that personality clashes were foregrounded. Onlooker interviewees were

incredulous at the degree to which the conflict became heated.

According to the 1990 decennial census, North Portland ranks 6th out of Portland's seven district coalitions in median household income. Interestingly, the distribution of household median income levels by neighborhood within North Portland is not significantly different from most of the other district coalitions.10

Measures for poverty and education level in North Portland array as expected based on median income levels, with distinctive differences between northern and southern portions of the district.11 Although socioeco nomic status (SES) differences within the district are

significant, it is important not to assume a too mono tonic relationship between SES differences and conflict in North Portland politics. Indeed, conflict in North Portland was triggered in part because its poorer neigh borhoods did not feel helpless. The Kenton neighbor hood, located in the north-eastern portion of the district, is hosted by one of the oldest recognized NAs in the

city. Although it is a lower-income neighborhood within the coalition, Kenton has had strong leadership; this factor played a key role in bringing to a head the conflict with the dissident NAs in the district.

2) Efforts to exit the DCB by the dissident NA

delegation appear to have been orchestrated, and

signaled the complete breakdown of trust between

warring factions at the DCB. The Tufts research stated

unequivocally that the neighborhood associations they investigated could only claim to be participatory. That is to say: though recognized as an important voice

within a specified geographic boundary, NAs could never claim the mantle of being "representative" of

neighborhood interests. Why, then, did the challenger NAs dig in their heels on the matter of what constituted

legitimate participation and involvement in district coalition board affairs? Why did the dissident NAs view exit as the only viable option around the impasse of distrust on the DCB?

Until the mid-1980s, the North Portland DCB had a kind of hybridized, bi-cameral makeup. One wing of the DCB, nominally the umbrella organization, was

comprised of community service, industry, and business

leadership, and was in charge of an office staff. The other wing was comprised of neighborhood association

delegates. Staff allegiance at the time was to the first

wing, and the ethos of community organizing took the form of "brokering" across disparate interests. By the

mid-1980s, new directives from the ONA trimmed the scale of DCB prerogative, emphasizing residential interests and "livability" initiatives. Since local indus tries and other service organizations were no longer hosted by the DCB, the new residential livability ethos

likely had the effect of thinning social networks in the

community. Norms of reciprocity, once the glue to

community organizing in the area, may have also been diluted.




This transition to a neighborhood-dominated DCB was a watershed event. Cultural and class divisions that were eclipsed during the pre-1980s, consortium ethos,

emerged once the DCB came to be dominated by residential property concerns. This history suggests that the DCB structure, including the support it received from the City of Portland, was incapable of withstand

ing cultural divisions in that district, indeed; it may have exacerbated class and cultural tensions.

Confronted with this divide, the dissident NAs elected to exit. Some participants indicate that the

breakup was a precipitous event, occurring because "unbalanced personalities" (from the challenger NAs)

made compromise impossible, forcing many participants to exit. Others stress that the final breakup was long in

coming, and that the cantankerous and belligerent behavior of the challengers (lower-income activists) was

provoked by the dissidents' stratagems to dissolve the

organization. Depositions taken by the challenger's attorney suggest that members of the dissident NAs felt that exit from the coalition was the only viable way around the impasse of mistrust. There is also some evidence that some of the dissident NA members may have intended to hasten the coalition's demise through dissolving its assets and resigning en masse, with the intent of forming a new coalition-to be called "River

City North." Whether such action had been previously orchestrated or not, the dissidents did in fact resign en masse at a coalition meeting, February 18, 1992. This

gesture followed a momentous vote by the dissident faction: to expend the organization's uncommitted funds on projects which, the challengers alleged, had not been authorized by the board membership. This action followed a declaration a week earlier by one of the NA

delegates that her neighborhood association intended to leave the coalition because of constant in-fighting. Together, these events sent the coalition into a tailspin, ultimately leading to its dissolution. (Fitzgibbon, 1992)

In fact, threats of exit were not new to the coalition. A delegate from one of the challenger NAs had threat ened exit from the coalition in the fall of 1991. It is

important to note that this delegate and his wife (also an

activist), were probably perceived by some within their own NA membership to be "loose cannons," bent on

pushing a vendetta which had little to do with how their

neighborhood felt about the DCB, much less with

important substantive issues. How strong the dissent within this NA was from these members remains

problematic. Nonetheless, these members retained their

influence at the DCB throughout the 1989-92 period of contention and conflict.

3) The City of Portland was unable to control the spiral of distrust between NA delegates to the DCB in North Portland. As mentioned previously, City of Portland officials-including the ONA Director and the Commissioner in charge of this bureau-made concerted efforts to mend relations in North Portland

beginning around the spring of 1991. At this time the coalition became immobilized by the in-fighting spurred by disputes about bylaw language regarding general membership participation, staff roles, and related administrative issues. The Office of Neighborhood Association's effort followed the withholding of contract dollars from the coalition by the ONA director in 1989 because the DCB did not adequately satisfy ONA

stipulations that a formalized workplan be in place for the DCB. (The workplan was something the coalition board was responsible for preparing among its member

delegates.)

The ONA Director, having just begun her tenure under then Mayor Bud Clark, was loathe to intervene in the 1989 incident. Throughout the ONA's existence its various Directors have had to contend with a certain

degree of suspicion from neighborhood association activists. Interventions into coalition affairs was, there

fore, the least favored course of action for ONA Direc tors confronted with coalition problems. Moreover, this was not only a problem for agency directors: the commissioner in charge of the ONA risks political fallout if she/he appears to violate NA and district coalition board sovereignty. The North Portland DCB had been rebuked by the ONA in 1987 for inadequate record keeping by the previous ONA Director, serving under a different commissioner. In fact, the issues

leading to the 1987 intervention resurfaced in 1989, and the ONA had little choice but to become involved yet again.

4) Community activism in North Portland has been marked by key transition points, and the conflicts occurring over the past ten years coincide with a period where conditions-heavily influenced by the ONA-for organizational maintenance of the

DCB, tended to displace collective action. This

proposition is mostly speculative at this time. But there is evidence from the interview data that the fervor and

spirit of activism in the 1974-84 period was marked by a creed of problem solving quite distinct from the form




of activism evolving over the last fifteen years. Fueled

by broad participation of community interests and

significant federal subsidy for "bricks and mortar"

initiatives, activism in North Portland achieved major successes in its first decade, leaving a legacy difficult to

match for succeeding generations of activists.

Following the work of planning theorist Paul

Niebanck, these two periods might aptly be distin

guished in terms of their "place making" and "rule

making" modalities (Niebanck, 1993).12 By "place making" we mean a mode of planning enterprise which is highly situated in terms of time and place, and where the planning agenda originates in terms of the unique geographic, environmental, social, political, and eco

nomic features and history of a locale. Planning in this mode is a generative enterprise-not merely "advocacy" based-and originates at the intersection of need and

opportunity. Place-making, in Niebanck's construction, is constituted of four elements: identification, apprecia tion, concern, and action. These elements emerge as

central to the planning mode apparent in North Portland 25 years ago. By 1974, North Portland, like many

inner-city neighborhood districts across the country, was

in significant decline. Besides a historic dip in housing values due in part to suburbanization, North Portland

suffered unique stigmas, including its close proximity to

heavy industry as well as the metro area's principal landfill. Historically home to a broad mix of socio

economic backgrounds, the district had distinctive

boundaries. These factors, along with a renaissance in

local leadership, compelled a tremendous ferment of

activism in the mid-1970s. Fueled by a zeal for "tar

geted action"-an ethos Niebanck describes as planning in the "energetic and entreprenuerial" mode-this period

marked a turning point for the North Portland commu

nity, especially within the St. Johns neighborhood.

The post-1984 period notably lacked many of these

characteristics. Facing a dearth of any significant outside subsidy available for the types of projects which

triggered earlier community spiritedness and excitement, this period may have fostered a perceived need to

consolidate the organizational capacity of the NA

system. As noted, there is evidence that this period

compelled the privileging of domestic private property concerns in North Portland. Did such emphasis exacer

bate class and culture backgrounds there (e.g., between

renters and homeowners)? There is evidence from the

interview data that increasing demands by the Office of

Neighborhood Associations that all district coalition

boards meet specified contract criteria may have fos tered an unhealthy dynamic of control and counter control played out between the ONA and DCBs through out the city.13 It may also be that this fostered changing terms for defining the role, power, and influence for DCB office coordinators (eventually entitled Executive

Directors): attention by district coalition office coordina tors may have then drifted to shoring up the power of their nominal bosses, the DCB directors. What had been an ethos of parlaying broad community involvement would transform to an ethos of parsing selective benefits for a few stalwart supporters of office staff, whose

powers to initiate projects had been curtailed over the

years.14 Such a dynamic may have fostered a "siege" mentality within the North Portland coalition, where dissent within the board would be taken as quite threat

ening and where an inclination for scapegoating might emerge.

Gradually, a "rule-making" ethos may have taken

hold across Portland's neighborhood planning activity

during the post-1984 period. Niebanck defines rule

making as the mode most indicative of planning's command and control legacy, and as the most dominant mode in environmental planning today. In the case of

North Portland neighborhood politics, this modality was, to some degree, cross-bred with a hybridized version of Niebank's fourth mode of planning: princi

pled action. Niebanck speaks of principled action as

that mode of planning where "values are primary and up front." Here the tough questions are asked: "What

ethical argument justifies a particular planning action? What sense of justice or fairness, or wholeness, or

beauty supports a particular planning system?" (p. 513). Portland's neighborhood association system is incapable of maintaining this level of soul-searching on a sustained

basis; hence the impulse to truncate this mode of

planning, and a tendency to assert certain norms stress

ing conformity and consensus in order to efface divi

sions within the DCBs.

Why and how does this happen, and by whose

initiative? Portland's DCB structure aspires, in large

degree, to a consensus-making mode of operation. That

is to say: the system has been conditioned over the years

by a "make nice" norm which, in effect, if not by

design, puts a premium on "getting along." This norm

makes sense at three levels that might be described as

apparent, shadow and political.

68 Administrative Theory & Praxis March 1999, Vol. 21, No. 1



The apparent reason for getting along at the coali tion is that all DCBs are responsible for drafting annual

workplans in order that they may obtain operating contracts and funding from the city. Collaboration and consensus are essential features of any workplan pro cess. Ideally, this is also an opportunity to establish norms of reciprocity around contended issues, whereby an ethos of trading support across time can evolve. The

principle agents who have a stake in getting along at this level are the NA delegates to the DCB and the neighbor hood interests they represent.

The shadow reason for getting along is revealed when considering that DCBs consist of delegations made

up of neighborhoods with disparate socioeconomic

backgrounds, agendas, political styles, etc. Under such

circumstances, dissent threatens to exacerbate tensions

lying near the surface. In lieu of a clear and definable external threat that would galvanize an otherwise

patchworked community, or resources in sufficient abundance which might aid in overcoming collective action problems, internal rifts pose a potential threat to the entire neighborhood association system. While the NA delegates are clearly stakeholders at this level of norm setting, it must be noted that the DCB staff, and

particularly the office coordinators/executive directors are also major stakeholders at this level of interest. The ONA's agenda is also discernable at this level. This is

why North Portland's woes were so momentous: they forced the system and its key players to contend in a serious way with dissent for the first time. Shortly after the North Portland fracas, a task force was convened by an in-coming city commissioner inheriting the ONA

portfolio. The ostensible mandate established for this commission was to assess the viability of the NA system city wide. The political purpose was multifaceted: to

protect the new commissioner while signaling neighbor hood association participants of his good faith. This was also a clear gesture by the political center to retrieve control over its periphery, the DCB structure.15

This episode points to the political forces compel ling a "get along" norm for the coalitions. Under Portland's municipal governmental structure, each city commissioner is responsible for administering a set, or

"portfolio," of bureaus (the assignment of which is determined by the Mayor). Lacking a city manager's office, Portland's elected commissioners must serve

simultaneously as politicians and demi-city managers. Good management is thus inextricably linked with good politics. The ONA is, arguably, the most "public"

bureau within Portland's city government; conflict

surrounding its operation is therefore both highly exposed and difficult to control. Correspondence during the North Portland conflict between the ONA Director, the Commissioner then assigned the ONA, and the

leadership of the dissident faction suggests that an ONA

"agenda," supported if not guided by the Commissioner, may have exacerbated the DCB conflict. Moreover, interview data support the conclusion that ONA's ethos

was significantly determined by administrative fears about the prospect for coalition politics to spiral out of control.

5) Portland's NA system and its coalition struc ture have fostered tension between competing styles of activism in North Portland. There is substantial evidence from archival and interview data suggesting that the schism in North Portland evolved in part as the result of a clash between leadership cadres who ap proached neighborhood mobilization and activism in

distinctly different ways. The leadership cadre that

emerged from the wealthier neighborhoods south of North Lombard Street manifested what might be called a "weak social tie, network approach" to community politics. The leadership north of North Lombard oper ated more from a "strong social tie, social clique" approach.

In the parlance of social network analysis, "weak social ties" are those ties which serve time-limited, instrumental ends. Weak ties are the kind citizen activ ists may seek to bank on when forming a coalition of

groups to combat the proposed siting of a perceived noxious use in their neighborhood (e.g., a homeless shelter, work release or other prison extension service), or in order to compel local authorities to site a preferred use (e.g., light rail alignment or a new community center). While tending to serve limited range, specified purposes deemed mutually beneficial by two or more

parties (made up of groups or individuals), weak ties enable reputation and trust to be built among parties who otherwise have little opportunity or compulsion to maintain and deepen their relationships (Rogers &

Kincaid, 1981). The network logic of weak social ties is a logical extension of their teleological basis: they are

ramifying in nature.

Strong social ties are not time- or circumstance

specific, and do not feature the conditional, quid pro quo dimension weak ties depend upon. Strong social ties form part of the normative infrastructure of traditional,




kinship groups. Since strong ties evolve within the context of shared experience and tradition, they tend to

depend upon a strong normative structure dictating what is spurned and what is valued, making the understanding of motive and purpose more tacit than explicit. Commu nities who draw from a strong social tie tradition view themselves as outside of the broader society in ways

which can reify a sense of isolation.

North Portland has a long history of feeling outside

of, or apart from, metropolitan Portland. Located along a peninsula formed by the confluence of the Willamette and Columbia Rivers, North Portland was recognized early in this century as a strategic location for port facilities development. The cultural heart of the area for

many years was the St. Johns community, located at the northwestern edge of the urbanized portion of the

peninsula, downstream from Portland. Prior to 1915, St. Johns was an independent jurisdiction. Beginning in

1910, the City of Portland began to aggressively pursue annexation of St. Johns, succeeding by 1915 (Abbott, 1983). To this day the St. Johns community has retained a strong sense of cultural separation from Portland. This

separatist sentiment has been encouraged in large part by two factors: the continued industrial development of the area, and the decision earlier this century (1940) to

site Portland's principal landfill (only recently closed) over marshland located at the edge of St. Johns. As

such, the St. Johns community has long felt as if it was

the "dumping ground" of the region, and as a result

many residents there continue to perceive any political initiatives emanating from downtown Portland as

suspect.1617

St. Johns and the Portsmouth and Kenton neighbor hoods east of it, are all situated north of North Lombard Street. All three neighborhoods host a predominantly working class population with generational ties to the

area, and border (or include within their NA bound

aries) heavy industrial activity. The neighborhoods south

of North Lombard, situated for the most part east of the

St. Johns Bridge and therefore away from heavy indus

trial traffic heading to port facilities and, in the past, to

the landfill, have attracted substantial redevelopment over the last 15 years. Anchored by a private university campus to the west and an interstate highway to the east, three of the four NA boundaries south of North Lom

bard form a crescent of neighborhoods-featuring a

significant stock of vintage Victorian architecture-which

sweeps southeasterly along a bluff carved by the Willa mette River. This location offers excellent views of

downtown Portland to the east, and, directly to the

south, the north slope of the Forest Park ridge-a five thousand acre parcel of undeveloped forest land stretch

ing nearly four miles along the west bank of the Willa mette River. The fourth neighborhood south of North

Lombard, although lying northwesterly of the university campus and therefore abutting heavy industrial activity, nonetheless features the same excellent views with the added advantage of a sloped topography.

These geographic and historic features of North Portland conditioned politics in this area for many years. But with the coming in the mid-1970s of a city wide

system of neighborhood associations and its district coalition form of administration, North Portland was fated to confront internal divisions which, if they existed

previously, were probably eclipsed by the more fervent animus shared by St. Johns and its sister neighborhoods (Portsmouth and Kenton) towards downtown Portland. This sense of "being done wrong" by downtown politics and being deprived over the years of decision-making autonomy appears to have fostered strong social ties within the interior of the area north of North Lombard. But the coalition form of the NA administration was

built upon a weak social tie, network logic. This logic has effaced cultural and class differences in political style and organizing approaches between the northern and southern portions of the district. During the heady days of "place making" between 1974-84, these differ ences had not yet fully taken shape-a factor owing in

part to the small number of formally organized NAs in the district (those who had acquired their own corporate, non-profit status). But the tensions which would ulti

mately unravel the North Portland DCB originated about the same time as the NA "rule making" ethos began taking effect in North Portland in the mid-1980's. This

period was marked by increasing pressure on the DCB to organize neighborhoods within its province. This

pressure came from two fronts: the ONA, as well as the

newly arriving migrants to neighborhoods south of

North Lombard Street.1819

6) Portland's NA system may highlight an

incommensurability between trust building and social

network building. Like all voluntary organizations, NAs face collective action problems which originate in

part from the broad array of motives which attract

people to donate their time and energy. Some people show up to volunteer with their NA for a limited range commitment in order to lobby for a cause they perceive bears on their immediate sense of security and place,




and then terminate their involvement after achieving (or not achieving) the goals they entered with. Some

entering with such motives stay involved for any variety of reasons. Others become involved in order to gain a sense of place, and delight in grappling with the set of broader issues affecting their community. In between these reasons for involvement are an array of motives

which make neat categorization problematic.20 Likewise, the activities people involve themselves with through these organizations differ in the degree to which they center on community concerns. Some volunteers are

attracted to NAs by the prospect of acquiring skills in

activism, inter-personal communication, knowledge about planning principles, or the opportunity to get to

know other people. Others join in order to build com

munity awareness, consolidate community assets, and

lobby downtown for support on any number of livability initiatives. Similarly, participants in the NA system differ in the breadth and depth of skills they bring with them to their activities. These collective action factors

stack up at the DCB level, where participants face another round of collective action imperatives.

There is a clear parallel between this array of interests and talents, and the teleological differences of human capital versus social capital. The neighborhood associations south of North Lombard enjoy relatively greater human capital resources by virtue of the higher socioeconomic status of residents there, compared with the NAs north of North Lombard; friction related to this situation was a partial catalyst to hostilities at the DCB.

Furthermore, the interview data thus far collected indicate that the more cosmopolitan approach to organiz ing characteristic of the higher SES North Portland NAs came at the expense of trust building with their lower SES partners at the district coalition board. This data further reveal that interaction among NA delegates at the DCB caused the higher income delegates to adopt a

clique form of interaction which ostracized the lower income delegates. Did the lower income participants in the North Portland NA coalition feel the need to gain control over the DCB because of a perception that, taken individually, their NAs were too weak to lobby successfully for their needs? There is evidence from archival data that conflicting assumptions between DCB

delegates about the appropriate role and allegiance of the coalition office staff kindled tensions between member

NAs, and may indicate a jockeying for control and influence at the DCB. The fact of frequent office staff turnover pursuant to internal tensions at the DCB over the 1987-92 period supports such a claim.

This situation raises important questions about the

social capital building capacity of an NA system like Portland's which imposes a uniform structure over

communities with deep class and cultural divisions. In terms of the discourse on social capital, the teleological tensions between trust building and social network

building should give pause to those eager to replicate Portland's NA system. A related question asks: To what

degree do human capital resources dispose people to

neglect trust building? When poor people and middle class people come together, what norms emerge about how community building work should be done? Human

capital resources are undoubtedly privileged within a

system where logic favors social network building. But does the logic compelling trust building conflict at some

level with a networking logic?

CONCLUSION

As mentioned previously, the Tufts study has made a major contribution to the scholarship on the potential for organized neighborhood associations to participate in local planning efforts. Part of this contribution was its examination of those thinkers who are highly critical of broad-based citizen involvement, including, especially, critics Daniel P. Moynihan and Samuel P. Huntington.

Moynihan, in his critique of the Citizen Action Program during the War on Poverty, argued that broad based involvement tended to foster intractable degrees of

misunderstanding between participants and governmental officials (Moynihan, 1969). Huntington, taking a slightly different tack, argued that invitations by government for broad-based participation are doomed to attract recalci trant citizens who would log-jam the system with infeasible or merely supercilious demands. This dy namic leads, ultimately, to mass exit by lower class

participants whose subsequent inclination for participa tion would be forever dampened by a deep distrust in the "governmental process." For Huntington, as with a

long tradition of thinkers skeptical of populist politics, an "excess of democracy" posed a serious threat to any procedural republic (Huntington, 1981).

The Tufts scholars were rightly critical of these

arguments, and deftly dismantled the cryptic logic and selective evidence that these critiques too often depended upon; however, critiques like those of Huntington's and

Moynihan's still haunt participatory systems. At first

glance, North Portland's woes appear as a bitter re minder especially of Huntington's lament. The behaviors manifest during the North Portland fracas, including allegations of threat and harassment, and the extensive




news reporting of the incident in the major daily news

paper, defied logical deductions. This had the likely effect of convincing many onlookers that the primary problem with North Portland was that an irascible

contingent of troublemakers was able to knit-pick otherwise well-intended volunteers and hold the system

hostage on the basis of a highly reductive, selective, and

self-serving reading of rules and regulations. But a more

in-depth account reveals that the presumed antago nists-with the possible exception of one-were long time

supporters of NA activity, and had worked diligently

and in good faith to support past community efforts. The evidence thus far collected could just as probably suggest that the challengers suffered, to a certain

degree, as scapegoats by a system intolerant of dissent; that the system now in place has a quite different ethos from that which it heralds; and that the promise for collective action-presumed intact by the Tufts study-is more likely a casualty of a system adrift from principles of social capital building than it is the victim of a

recalcitrant citizenry.

ENDNOTES

1 Author's Note: I would like to thank Professors Carl

Abbott, Sy Adler, Charles Heying and Henry Kass for their thoughtful and helpful comments on earlier drafts

of this article.

2 The phrase "between citizen and city," is drawn from

the title of John Clayton Thomas's study of Cincinnati

neighborhood organizations. (Thomas, 1986)

3 We might add, "any" city, for Portland's system has been appraised by delegations from around the globe.

4 Dayton, Ohio, was one of the core cities Tufts studied.

Similar in structure to Portland's two-tiered model, the

Dayton program differs in that a central administrative office (analogous to Portland's Office of Neighborhood Associations) largely controls staffing for their Priority Boards (analogous to Portland's DCBs) (Berry et al.,

1993, p. 69).

5 The standard economic model asserts that opportunities for citizen participation tend to attract people of rela

tively high SES, and that there is a positive correlation

between increasing intensity of citizen participation and

increasing SES (Berry et al., 1993, p. 81).

6 The Office of Neighborhood Associations was renamed

the Office of Neighborhood Involvement in 1993

following a task force's recommendation that business

associations be incorporated into the umbrella of neigh borhood planning. Since this paper examines events

occurring before 1993, the old title will be retained for

present purposes.

7 This conflict may have proved to be formative in the

shaping of local media reporting on community political squabbles. Having covered the North Portland story extensively, Portland's leading daily newspaper, The

Oregonian, became implicated in the appearance of

fomenting tawdry politics. Because of this experience, The Oregonian's editorial policy towards community disputes allegedly became more "hands off." (Personal communication with staff reporter assigned the city Crime Prevention beat, 1994.)

8 The research on North Portland politics is part of a

larger research program for dissertation. Another

coalition, East Portland, will also be examined in order to test the validity of a theoretic framework designed to account for political dissolution in both coalitions. Because the role of office staff is believed to be integral to the shape of organizational dynamics in the DCB

system, an extensive survey of staff will also be in cluded in the research protocol.

9 As mentioned previously, Portland's East Portland DCB has also been rocked recently by intra-organiza tional conflict. As a result, it no longer has a DCB, and

receives services in the same manner as North Port

land-through centralized administration.

10 An F-Test performed for two-sample variances found

median income levels by neighborhood in North Port

land to differ significantly with only one other district, the West Northwest Coalition. All other comparisons were insignificant (p < .05).

11 Median income, percent in poverty (< 1.24 x poverty

level), and education levels (= or > Bachelor's De

72 Administrative Theory & Praxis March 1999, Vol. 21, No. 1



gree) are as follows (northern/southern): $19,895/

$28,576; 30%/18%; 7%/18%. (Note: the figures for the southern portion do not include the Cathedral Park

neighborhood. Beginning in the late 1980s, this neigh borhood began to experience gentrification, a factor not

reflected in the 1990 census.)

12 Niebanck depicts four modalities through which

planning is actualized: rule-making, place-making, targeted action, and principled action. Between these

modalities lie two axes in dialectical tension: rule

making/place-making, and targeted action/principled action. It should be noted that Niebanck meant his work to aid in mapping the imperatives facing environmental

planning education today. Although tailored to address

planning instruction, Niebanck's theoretic construction, with some adaptation, offers a potent heuristic means by which to depict historic epochs in Portland's neighbor hood politics. The principal adaptation of his work for

present purposes is to use his heuristic to describe

"place-making" as it happened more than twenty years ago (a time less conscious about the need to account for

ecological systems in the context of planning) and to

apply this heuristic to describe dynamic processes

occurring within a highly urbanized milieu.

13 According to one interview participant-a news

reporter and long time observer of NA activity city wide-1984 marked a clearly distinctive turning point in the ONA ethos. Led that year by a new director, Sarah

Newhall, the ONA emphasized standardization of service delivery to NAs and a stiffening of DCB ac

countability. Additionally, Newhall narrowed lines of communication from the ONA to the neighborhoods by routinizing and formalizing her contact with DCB

Chairs, thereby making lateral access to the ONA much more difficult. It was at this time that the first set of "ONA Goals & Guidelines for Neighborhood Associa tions" was drafted.

14 Interview data suggests a great deal of suspicion by

the challenger NAs that the DCB Executive Director

strongly favored the dissident faction and would rou

tinely snub the challenger NA delegation. Thus far, two interview participants, not party to the conflict, have

suggested there was veracity to this claim by the chal

lenger NAs.

15 The North Portland melee and the subsequent restruc

turing of ONA service delivery to the area made it

imperative that the in-coming commissioner re-establish

norms for DCB politics. The incident also gave the

commissioner the opportunity to initiate reforms to the

city-wide system which he believed would be salutary, including: mandating a base staff make-up for the DCB

offices, and establishing official standing for business associations within the DCB structure.

16 Although one of several municipal landfills serving

the broader metropolitan area until the 1970s, the St. Johns dump was, at 250 acres, by far the largest, receiving all of the City of Portland's municipal garbage until it was closed in 1991. During the 1970s, North Portland's then state representative, Mike Burton,

fought successfully City of Portland plans to expand the landfill's capacity, nonetheless; between 1983-91, the

dump was receiving 90% of all municipal solid waste for the metropolitan area. Burton, a long-time resident of North Portland and one of the co-founders of the North Portland Citizen's Committee-which eventually evolved into the DCB-went on to become Director of the Metropolitan Services District, Portland's regional governmental entity.

17 Correspondence in the archival records indicates that

illegal dumping near the landfill was an ongoing sore

point for the St. Johns community. This was undoubt

edly perceived as the insult to the injury of having to tolerate the St. John's landfill. A community wide forum on illegal dumping was held in June, 1988.

18 Before 1988, only two of the neighborhoods on the North Portland peninsula had officially recognized NAs: one north (Kenton) and one south (Overlook) of North Lombard Street. Although research has not yet deter mined how active the other neighborhoods were at the coalition level prior to gaining official standing with the ONA (which would include legal non-profit status and a set of by-laws abiding Oregon's open public meetings law), key players in the North Portland conflict who came from the Portsmouth neighborhood had a long history of involvement in community activism in the area. It should also be noted that many neighborhoods across the city were not yet formally recognized by ONA even by 1990, yet DCBs recognized these neigh borhoods and granted them voting status on coalition affairs nonetheless. An essential question for further research of North Portland involves determining where the pressure to organize the NAs in the district came from.




19 When the final rift at the DCB occurred in February, 1992, St. Johns initially joined the dissident faction. The reasons for this are not clear from data collected thus far. The St. Johns NA territory was divided at some

point in the late 1980s, just south of the North Lombard axis. The new NA, Cathedral Park, noted above as the fourth of the NAs located to the south of North Lom

bard, includes territory which features scenic vistas

comparable to the NAs located along the crescent to the east. Was St. Johns divided because of residential

redevelopment along its southern slope? Did this divi sion diminish St. John's stature as the cultural center of the area? Was the St. Johns NA then disinclined to

identify too closely with the lower income NAs east of

it, seeing no choice but to align with the DCB majority faction?

20 Political scientist Richard Rich (1980) has done the

yeoman's work in endeavoring to characterize the incentive frameworks which condition voluntary action in neighborhood organizations. Drawing from public choice theory, Rich has depicted neighborhood associa tion voluntarism as being motivated by a reward system,

which he characterizes by a two by two matrix. First,

people participating in neighborhood associations seek either "welfare" or "deference" benefits. Welfare benefits relate to material resources, while deference benefits pertain to the affective rewards people associate

with involvement. Secondly, motivations may be

conditioned by expectations for either collective or selective benefits. According to Rich (italics in origi nal): "The collective/selective distinction directs atten tion to the divisibility of a goodfor control and consump tion, and suggests the calculus confronting individuals with regard to contributions toward its purchase. The

welfare/deference distinction directs attention to the use

to which the good is put (to the nature of benefits received from its consumption), and therefore to the resources involved in its production." (p. 568)

In Rich's account, activists seeking welfare benefits are more likely, in most cases, to come from poor neighborhoods. There is evidence from the archival data that demands for coalition office staff and resource

support from the lower income neighborhoods in North Portland had, in essential cases, a collective welfare

aspect. Moreover, conflicting directives to staff was a

major source of tension at the DCB, and led to efforts to standardize the type of work staff were expected to do. Rich's theoretic framework is parsimonious and

powerful, and has some empirical support; but it is not

yet clear that this heuristic would be able to account for how the incentive calculations of neighborhood activists in North Portland may have interacted over time with a

changing ONA ethos.

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Matthew Witt is a Ph.D. candidate in urban studies at Portland State University, Portland, Oregon. His dissertation examines how intra-organizational conflict influences neighborhood association politics. Between 1990-96 he served as a volunteer for his neighborhood association in Northwest Portland. He served for one year, 1995-96, as a delegate to his neighborhood association's district coalition board. His dissertation research draws from observations he made of neighborhood association activity during his six year involvement. His research interests include public philosophy, urban political economy and organizational studies.




Documents

The Origins and Evolution of Conflict in Portland's Neighborhood Association System: A Case Study of North Portland's District Coalition Board