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Donagh Bradley 09488626

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History 42060

Agency, Intelligence and Statecraft:

The origins of Modern Diplomacy and International Law

Dr. Declan M. Downey

Truman’s Diplomacy and the Retreat from Isolationism, April-August 1945.

What were the influences which shaped American foreign policy during Truman’s

first five months in office?

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“History hints that what is done during the first few months after a great war ends is

likely to determine the fate of the next generation. Since prophets were not usable as

diplomats, this was a time that called diplomats to be prophets”.1

Throughout his presidency Franklin D. Roosevelt had retreated from the traditional

American form of diplomacy known as ‘exceptionalism’. Alexis de Tocqueville first

coined this term in his classic work, Democracy in America 1835–1840. The term

relates to the belief that the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role

to play in human history, a nation that is not only unique but also superior.2

According to George Keenan an urge to make the rest of the world adhere to the

American image can be traced to the deep strains of Puritanism running through

American culture.3 American foreign relations under Roosevelt moved away from

these urges and concentrated on the ideals of ‘isolationism’. This ideology centres on

the avoidance of political and military commitments to, or alliances with, foreign

powers particularly those of Europe. Its origins can be traced back to the teachings of

John Quincy Adams in the 19th century.4 In his first inaugural address on March 4th

1933 Roosevelt launched a revival of these ideals stating, ‘In the field of world policy

I dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor, the neighbor who resolutely

respects himself and because he does so, respects the rights of others, the neighbor

who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of agreements in and with a

world of neighbors’.5 This approach to foreign relations not only encroached on the

traditional ideals of exceptionalism but also went against the internationalist

movement which was growing amongst Americans during the 1940’s.6

Internationalism has been described as the antithesis of isolationism. It stems from the

belief in external contact with the world and international relationships which become

more extensive and political with the passage of time. Internationalism encourages

political commitments or entanglements through multinational treaties as well as

1 Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace the Potsdam Conference (London, 1967),p.25. 2 http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/EN/Exceptionalism.html, accesed on

15/04/2013. 3 Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S Diplomacy since 1900 (New York, 2002), p.10. 4 http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Isolationism.html, accesed on 15/04/2013. 5 Jeffrey Steinberg, ‘American Exceptionalism in the 20th century’, EIR Volume 25,

Number 40, 1998, p.3. 6 Schulzinger, U.S Diplomacy since 1900, p.9.

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military commitments abroad.7Upon taking the presidency Truman had to decide

whether Roosevelt’s isolationism or traditional American exceptionalism entwined

with the growing ideals of internationalism was the best form of diplomacy to carry

the U.S into the post war international system.

Immediately after his swearing-in ceremony, the new president addressed a hastily

convened cabinet. ‘It is my intention,’ Truman announced, ‘to continue both the

foreign and domestic policies of the Roosevelt Administration’.8 It was clear five

months after Truman’s inauguration, by the 6th of August 1945, that America under

Truman had retreated from Roosevelt’s isolationism and turned to an

exceptionalist/internationalist approach to international diplomacy. Historians have

argued over the last number of decades as to why this transition in foreign policy

came about.9 These debates have led to many diverging opinions. This essay will

engage with the arguments put forward by historians in recent decades surrounding

this topic and attempt to offer a conclusive answer as to why American foreign policy

changed remarkably during the first five-months of Truman’s presidency. In

particular this essay will look at how Truman handled relations with the Soviet Union

as this was the major factor which shaped American diplomacy for the following fifty

years.

The President

On the afternoon of the 12th of April 1945, Harry Truman sat dwarfed by the Senate

chamber’s Levanto marble pillars as he presided over a water treaty debate. The vice

president was content in his familiar surroundings. He had the perfect evening

planned. Confident in the knowledge that there was little official business to worry

about Truman planned to attend a poker game in a hotel room of an old friend from

his World War I field artillery battery who was visiting town.10 Ever since his

appointment as vice president, Truman had had little involvement in any diplomatic

7 http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Internationalism.html, accesed on 15/04/2013. 8 Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, Memoirs Vol 1 (New York, 1955) ,p.19. 9 Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the

Cold War (Indiana,2007), p.2. 10 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men(New York, 1986), p.254.

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missions or decisions during the first half of 1945. During his eighty-three days as

vice president he had not been invited to the negotiations at Yalta, been briefed about

the growing tensions surrounding U.S relations with the Soviet Union or been trusted

with information regarding the development of the Atomic Bomb. Not once during

President Roosevelt’s tenure did Truman enter the ‘Map Room’, the critical nerve

centre in the West Wing of the White House where Roosevelt went each day to

monitor military and diplomatic messages. Truman never got to attend the poker

game that evening but would instead embark on a journey which would see him

playing diplomatic poker with some of the 20th centuries most gifted diplomats. The

news of Roosevelt’s death on that faithful April evening rippled through Washington

like a shock wave. Describing the scenes outside his State Department office, Dean

Acheson noted that crowds began to gather, ‘merely standing in a lost sort of way’. 11

This sense of loss and confusion resonated deeply with Truman, who was perhaps the

least prepared man in American history to assume the title of President. The day after

been sworn in as thirty-third president of the United States, as he left his office of the

Secretary of Senate for the last time, Truman was greeted by a gang of reporters.

Many of them knew him as their poker-playing friend Harry. He shook hands with

every one of them, his eyes filling with tears. ‘Boys’ he told them, ‘if you ever pray,

pray for me now. I don’t know whether you fellows ever had a load of hay fall on

you, but when they told me yesterday what had happened, I felt like the moon, the

stars and all the planets had fallen on me’. ‘Good luck Mr. President’, shouted one of

the reporters. Bewildered, Truman responded ‘I wish you didn’t have to call me

that’.12

Truman’s reluctance to take over as President of the U.S was understandable when we

consider the almost impossible situation which he inherited. Upon entering the White

House Truman became the leader of an emerging superpower at the climax of a

global cataclysm.13 International diplomacy was undergoing a seismic change. The

end of an international system defined by European alliances was about to be replaced

by a great struggle between two superpowers. As Truman took office Soviet and

11 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p.255 12 Michael Dobbs, Six Months in 1945-Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and Truman from

World War to Cold War (London, 2012), p. 161 13 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p.161

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American troops were concluding the greatest feat of military cooperation in history.

But behind the scenes in the shadow of glorious victory an alliance unified by war

was beginning to dissolve into one polarized by peace.14 The following sections shall

consider the influences on Truman’s diplomacy during this period.

The Advisors.

“I may not have much in the way of brains, but I do have enough brains to get hold of

people who are able and give them a chance to carry out responsibility”.15

- Harry Truman

Truman was by no means a diplomatic expert upon entering the White House. His

diary entry on the 12th of April makes this clear, ‘I knew the president had a great

many meetings with Churchill and Stalin. I was not familiar with any of these things

and it was really something to think about’.16 His foreign affairs philosophy leading

up to this point was, at best, nebulous. Just after Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union,

Senator Truman had casually commented to a New York Times reporter, ‘If we see

that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought

to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible’.17 Due to this lack of

diplomatic experience a school of thought emerged in the 1960’s which argued that

Truman’s hard line advisors in the State Department influenced his policies towards

Russia and therefore forced this change in American diplomacy.18 Many have pointed

to the fact that without sufficient knowledge and experience to form his own

independent judgment, Truman was influenced by whoever walked in the door.19

The State Department had enjoyed a limited role in Roosevelt’s foreign diplomacy.

The president would often consult with his advisors but their warnings were often

blithely ignored. Frustrations had been growing among certain State advisors as to

14 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p.257. 15 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p.257. 16 http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/correspondence/truman-harry/corr_diary_truman.htm, accesed on 15/04/2013. 17 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), p.426. 18 Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, p.5. 19 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p.215.

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Roosevelt’s isolationist views and their effect upon America’s relationship with

Russia. Roosevelt’s preferred method for dealing with Stalin was to procrastinate, to

hope that difficulties would eventually go away and to avoid conflict with his

neighbours. Eleanor Roosevelt was once quoted as saying ‘he always thought that if

you ignored a thing long enough it would settle itself’.20 Hardliners such as Averell

Harriman believed the Soviet Union was one problem which could not be ignored. In

this respect Truman’s advisors were desperate to grab the new president and shake

him. This section of the essay will look in detail at Truman’s relationship with his

advisors in order to discern the extent to which his foreign policy between April and

August 1945 was shaped by them.

On the evening of April 12th 1945 Averell Harriman hosted an informal party in the

Spaso House.21 A close nit group had gathered in the U.S Ambassadors home to toast

a departing embassy staffer. Many had left early that evening but a respectable crowd

was still gathered at 1. a.m. when the duty officer at the consulate called for

Harriman. Upon learning of Roosevelt’s death the party quickly turned to a somber

affair. The Soviets, on learning of the passing of the American President, sent

Molotov, Stalin’s most trusted diplomat and right hand man, directly to meet with

Harriman to offer his condolences. After taking care of the formalities and consulting

with his advisors Harriman soon realised that the passing of Roosevelt was an

opportunity to finally have his voice heard in the White House. Harriman’s request to

return to the U.S. to consult with Truman had been rejected by Secretary of State

Stettinius, ‘Now of all times it is essential that we have you in Moscow’. 22 Harriman

not one to be left on the sidelines hit on a plan. One of Roosevelt’s final desires was

to have Molotov attend the grand opening of the United Nations, scheduled for San

Francisco at the end of April. Originally Stalin had rejected this idea, but Harriman

knew that if he could convince Stalin to reverse his refusal as a potent gesture of

Soviet good will then as a by-product of Molotov’s journey to America he would be

20 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p. 156. 21 Originally inhabited in the 17th century by the Tsar's dog-keepers and falconers

standing one mile west of the Kremlin, Spaso House became the residence of American ambassadors in Moscow with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Soviet Union in 1933.

(http://moscow.usembassy.gov/spaso.html, accessed on 17/04/13) 22 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p.258.

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presented with the perfect opportunity to return home. This is precisely what

happened. At his meeting with Stalin the next evening Harriman used all his

diplomatic skill and experience with the Russians to bring about this objective. It was

an unlikely situation for humour, this meeting between the sad faced diplomat and the

steely dictator, but Harriman made an atypical attempt. He joked that if Stalin agreed

to send his foreign minister, the U.S. would paint a red star on the side of the plain.23

His plan worked and on the 19th of April, after his arrival the night before, Harriman

was ushered into the Oval Office of the White House to meet with Truman.

Molotov was not expected to arrive in Washington for another two days. The

intervening period allowed Truman to seek opinions on how to handle the Russians

from his top advisors. When given this chance Harriman wasted no time. He now had

the opportunity to broadcast his views which had been silently frustrated during the

long winter months spent in Spaso House. This frustration was vented in a

presentation to the president which drew on all the information he had gathered

during his time as ambassador. Harriman made it clear that he wanted Truman to

understand some unpleasant facts about the Russians. ‘We are faced with a Barbarian

invasion of Europe’, Harriman exclaimed. According to him Stalin was retreating

from the agreements made at the Yalta conference which stated that free elections

would be held in Poland. Harriman argued that the Soviet Union was extending its

system in Europe through the use of secret police, extinction of freedom of the press

and other forms of social control.24 According to this line of thinking Stalin had

misinterpreted Roosevelt’s isolationist approach and was taking advantage of

America’s non-intervention policy in countries like Poland. It was time to get firm in

protecting U.S. interests. It must be noted here that during this oration Harriman did

suggest that it was not too late to reach a workable compromise with Stalin provided

the U.S. abandoned its idealistic illusions. Truman reacted enthusiastically to this

advice. He replied that he intended to be firm but fair in his approach to the Polish

question. He commented that he understood it was ‘impossible to get 100 percent of

what we want but that we should be able to get 85 percent’. Other State Department

advisors offered similar advice to Truman. Navy secretary James Forrestal argued that

the dispute over Poland was not an isolated incident; according to Forrestal there was

23 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p.259. 24 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p.165.

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clear evidence of Soviet desire to dominate other neighbouring countries.25 Among all

of Truman’s top advisors only the acknowledged ‘Wise Man’ of Roosevelt’s cabinet,

Henry Stimson, dissented from this view. Stimson defended the Russians and made

the case that the Americans had misinterpreted the guarantees for Poland set out in the

Yalta Agreement and that in signing these agreements Roosevelt had focused too

much on ‘altruism and idealism instead of stark realities’. The seventy seven year old

Secretary of War cautioned against a head on collision with Russia over Poland. He

reminded the president that virtually all of Poland had been Russian prior to World

War I and argued that the U.S. should continue its ‘Good Neighbor’ policy and not

intervene in a country’s affairs which clearly lay within the Soviet sphere of

influence.26 Truman ignored this advice to the dismay of the ‘Wise Man’, and

followed the advice of his hard-line advisors.

The meeting which took place between Molotov and Truman on the 23rd of April

1945 has become in itself a major part of Cold War mythology. Some historians have

argued that Truman’s conduct at this diplomatic meeting can be identified as the point

at which Roosevelt’s isolationism was abandoned. The pair had met the previous day

to begin talks about the Polish question. This meeting had an amicable but wary

atmosphere and only resulted in a deadlock between differing interpretations of the

Yalta agreement. Molotov arrived at the White House at 5:31 pm on the 23rd having

traveled the fifty yard journey across the Pennsylvania Avenue from Blair House in a

convoy of two large limousines escorted by a dozen police motorcycles. The man

who emerged from the limousine was stone faced and somber. Molotov had earned

the nickname ‘Stone Ass’ because of his ability to sit in his chair for hours without

yielding an inch.27 Molotov was an alias, derived from the word molot, or hammer,

which he adopted during his days as an underground activist. It captured the essence

of his relationship with Stalin perfectly: the ‘Hammer’ for the ‘Man of Steel’.

Churchill summed up Molotov’s character thus, ‘A human being who more perfectly

represented the modern concept of a robot…yet underlying this there was an

apparently reasonable and keenly polished diplomatist’.28 The meeting began with

25 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p.165. 26 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p.167. 27 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p.168. 28 Churchill, Gathering Storm (New York, 1985), p.330.

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both men rigidly sticking to the line that their governments were correctly interpreting

the meaning of the Yalta agreement with regards to Poland. Truman, accompanied by

Harriman, Stettinus and Charles Bohlen (a Russian expert and translator), eventually

cut the unproductive dialogue short and suggested that if Stalin allowed three or four

non-communist Poles to join the discussions surrounding the formation of the post-

war Polish government then cooperation on the matter could continue. Molotov

protested that some of those who Truman had suggested join the talks were working

against the Red Army. With this Truman interrupted the ‘Hammer’ and said he

wanted friendly relations with the Soviet Union but not on a one way street basis.

With that he ended the meeting after just twenty four minutes.29 It has been

documented that upon hearing this Molotov replied ‘I have never been talked to like

that in my life’. Truman’s response was sharp, ‘Carry out your agreements and you

won’t get talked to like that’.30

Daniel Yergin in his influential Shattered Peace, published in 1977, argued that what

was said at this meeting signified a major shift in American attitudes towards the

Russians and that the exchange symbolised the beginning of the postwar divergence

that led to the cold war.31 But recent research has cast doubts over this theory.

Michael Dobbs in his work published in 2012, carried out an examination of

Truman’s personal records from this meeting and has established that the malevolent

comments made by the parties at the end of the meeting were almost certainly never

uttered. In a memorandum written by Truman in 1951 he recalls telling a ‘rather

truculent’ Molotov that he expected Russia to live up to its assurances under the Yalta

agreement. Referring to a later conversation at which he was not present, he then

added ‘Molotov told Bohlen that he’d never been talked to like that by any foreign

power’. It seems that throughout the cold war years certain writers used this

memorandum to spice up their accounts of the conference which took place between

Truman and the ‘Hammer’. Dobbs shows that Truman’s own tape recorded

reminiscences make no reference to the heated exchange. In fact Bohlen, who took

contemporaneous notes of the meeting, denied that the final angry exchange ever took

29 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p.169. 30 Truman, Year of Decisions ,p. 82. 31 Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, p.8.

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place.32 In light of this recent research it is clear that the arguments put forward by

historians such as Daniel Yergin may be based on falsified information which became

part of historical record by virtue of endless repetition throughout the cold-war years.

While this meeting cannot be viewed as the seminal point at which Truman

abandoned Roosevelt’s line of diplomacy it certainly did show just how influential the

president’s hardline advisors were at the beginning of his term in office. But just as

Yergin’s theory can be disproved by looking in detail at the president’s actions during

this period so can that of the historians who argue that hardliners such as Harriman

forced the change in American diplomacy which took place in 1945. Following the

stalemate on issues such as Poland, and the rising tensions which surrounded

Molotov’s attendance at the first United Nations meeting in San Francisco, the public

image of Russia as a great American ally was gradually being eroded. It was in the

midst of this turning tide of public opinion that the hardliners made a fatal mistake in

their attempts at controlling Truman’s foreign policy and turned the president away

from their influence.

The issue of lend-lease aid which had been given to Britain and Russia during the war

in order to sustain their fighting reared its head when the war finally came to an end

with the signing of the Act of Surrender. Harriman along with supporters such as

General Deane believed that curtailing the supply of aid under the Lend-Lease

Agreement was one way of counteracting the worrying conduct of the Soviet Union in

the months following the Yalta agreement. These advisors had encouraged the

administration to become strict in its responses to Soviet requests for products and

machinery, and in return argued that the government should begin to ask for definite

return favours of some sort. These requests had been resisted by Roosevelt’s

government in order to keep on proving American friendship towards Russia in the

hope of evoking a like disposition in Moscow. The ink had barely dried on the Act of

Surrender, when on the 7th of May Truman was approached by Leo Crowley, the

Foreign Economic Administrator in general charge of the Lend-Lease program.

Crowley, believing that he was obligated by the intent of Congress to terminate any

32 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p.170.

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foreign aid at the stroke of victory, asked Truman to sign the Lend-Lease Act.33

Truman still lacking in experience did not fully understand the effect which such an

act could have. In his own words he believed, ‘What they told made good sense, with

Germany out of the war, lend-lease should be reduced. They asked me to sign it. I

reached for my pen, and without reading the document I signed it’.34 The order given

to stop aid was carried out with zeal by subordinate officials. They ordered that even

ships sailing towards Soviet ports be immediately turned around. When the supply of

aid was abruptly stopped howls of protest erupted from both the British and the

Soviets. Stalin interpreted this act as a political bludgeon designed to intimidate the

Soviets. Rather embarrassingly the act was amended on the 11th of May and orders

were given to carry on with aid but this aid was now limited to that which was

directed towards fulfilling war efforts. While almost everyone including Harriman

and Truman blamed the overzealous bureaucrats for their heavy-handed execution of

the Land-Lease Act, the event created a gulf between Truman and his hardline

advisors which turned Truman away from their ideals.35

Two days after the land-lease embarrassment Truman turned to an old friend from his

poker playing days, Joseph Davies. Davies was renowned as the dean of the soft

liners, his memoirs of his mission as ambassador to the Soviet Union during the

1930’s originally named ‘Mission to Moscow’ had been re-named ‘Submission to

Moscow’ by those in hardliner circles. Davies was invited for a glass of Bourbon and

Sunday supper on the 13th of May. At this informal meeting Truman unloaded his

worries, laying blame on the ‘get tough’ advice of those in the State Department.

Davies listened to these complaints and advocated a different approach. He outlined

his view that when approached with generosity and friendliness, the Soviets respond

with even greater generosity. This conversation with Davies did not prompt a

complete reversal of policy, but Truman certainly did become more skeptical of what

had become known as the Harriman hard line approach.36 In the weeks that followed

Truman’s anxieties over the growing tensions with the Soviet Union resulted in a

diplomatic mission headed by experienced foreign adviser Henry Hopkins. Beginning

33 Feis, Between War and Peace the Potsdam Conference, p.27. 34 Truman, Year of Decisions, p.228. 35 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p.279. 36 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p.279.

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on the 25th of May this mission aimed at smoothing over relations with Stalin in

preparation for the Potsdam Conference.37 By the time the Potsdam conference began

on July 17th it was clear that the State Department advisors had been pushed aside by

the man who replaced Stettinius as Secretary of State in June of that year, James F.

Byrnes. Years after the conference Harriman recalled how Byrnes had taken over as

Truman’s top adviser and limited the hardliners influence, ‘I didn’t like Truman’s

relationship with Byrnes…. Byrne’s threw me out, it was rather pathetic’.38

In summary, the idea put forward by historians like Gar Alperovitz, Diane Clemens

and Denna Fleming that Truman’s hardline advisors were behind the change in

American diplomacy during this period is not one which conclusively satisfies the

question outlined at the beginning of this essay. While it is clear that hardline advisors

such as Harriman certainly influenced Truman’s foreign policy at the beginning of his

tenure this influence has been overestimated by the historical school addressed above.

It is clear from the points made above that Truman lost confidence in the hardline

approach to diplomacy before the Potsdam conference. As Truman once remarked to

a young junior professor in Harvard named Henry Kissinger, ‘If the President knows

what he wants, no bureaucrat can stop him. A President has to know when to stop

taking advice’.39 While it is true that Truman’s diplomacy did bring about a souring of

relations with the Soviet Union and saw America turn to exceptionalism this change

in foreign relations cannot be completely attributed to the influence of the hardline

advisors in the State Department.

A Difference in Ideologies.

‘Did you ever sit and listen to an orchestra play a fine overture and imagine that

things were as they ought to be and not as they are?’40

- Truman to his wife Bess in November 1911.

Russian apologists have argued that the reason American diplomacy changed

37 Feis, Between War and Peace the Potsdam Conference, p.97. 38 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p.300. 39 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), p.425. 40http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/personal/large/folder2/nov11911.htm, Accessed on 21/04/2013

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direction during the first six months of Truman’s presidency was directly related to

the difference between Roosevelt’s and Truman’s personalities. Thomas G. Paterson

has outlined this view in an article entitled ‘Harry Truman, the Polish Question, and

the Significance of FDR’s Death for American Diplomacy’.41 Here Paterson argues

that while some sort of postwar conflict between the emerging superpowers was

unavoidable, it was the change in tone of diplomacy which occurred during this

period which provoked a hostile environment. He argues that Roosevelt was more

patient with the Russians, more willing to settle issues at the conference table, tamer

and less abusive in his language, less abrupt in his decisions, and more solicitous of

Soviet opinion and fears than Truman. This belief has become known as the ‘Myth of

the Empty Chair’. Accordingly this school of historical thought believes that if

Roosevelt had not come to an untimely end he would have been able to cooperate

with the Kremlin and resolve the many issues which arose at the end of the Second

World War.42 Others, who believe that this change in American diplomacy was

brought about by a realisation that American democracy fundamentally clashed with

Communist beliefs and that the two could not work together in harmony, have

vehemently denied ‘the empty chair’ argument. Kissinger outlines his view that

‘Coming to grips with the reality that the tensions between the Soviet Union and the

United States had not been caused by some misunderstanding but were in fact

generic, was the story of the beginning of the Cold War’.43 This section of the essay

will show that those who argue in favour of the ‘Myth of the Empty Chair’ have

ignored the diplomatic realities which underlined U.S.-Soviet relations at the time of

Roosevelt’s death.

In reality the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1945 was one

underlined by deeply rooted historical antagonisms, fiercely competing economic

systems and sharply conflicting political philosophies.44 Stalin’s paranoia towards the

west was palpable as the Second World War came to a close. The Marshal was

41 Paterson, Thomas G, ‘Harry Truman, the Polish Question, and the Significance of

FDR’s Death for American Diplomacy’, Maryland Historian, 23 (Fall/ Winter, 1992),p.29. 42 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New Jersey, 1980), p.778. 43 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), p.426. 44 Richard W Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (Toronto, 1964), p.640.

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petrified by the prospect of winning the war but loosing the peace. This fear was

compounded by the rate at which German divisions were surrendering to the Western

allies compared to the last ditch stand which was been conducted by the Nazis on the

Russian front. In Stalin’s mind Roosevelt and Churchill had a clear motivation to

betray the Marshal. If they made an alliance with the Nazis the western armies could

move freely across Europe and meet the Red Army much further east than originally

envisaged. The fact that Stalin himself had concluded a pact with Hitler in 1939 could

be used as justification for such a maneuver. Evidence of motivation was evidence of

guilt in Stalin’s view, just as had been the case with the victims of the Moscow show

trials, and the Marshal began to form a negative view of his ‘allies’ as the war drew to

a close.45 In reality Germans surrendered more willingly to the Western allies as they

knew their captors would treat them humanely. Stalin’s hostility towards the west did

not end upon German surrender. After the Nazi forces retreated from the Red Army,

thousands of British and American troops were found in East Prussia and Poland. The

U.S. and British embassies in Moscow repeatedly requested the cooperation with the

west in launching missions to facilitate their return. These requests fell on deaf ears.

Eventually Roosevelt wrote to Stalin complaining of the lack of cooperation, ‘This

Government has done everything to meet each of your requests. I now request you to

meet mine in this particular manner’.46 Stalin’s response was abusive in tone, ‘Soviet

commanders have better things to do than host American officers. Those freed by the

Red Army are enjoying better conditions than those afforded to Soviet ex-prisoners of

war in U.S. camps, where some of them are lodged with German war prisoners and

subjected to unfair treatment, including beating’.47 This aggression was a clear

indication of Stalin’s post war intent, but his aggressive policies had been emerging

months before the war had ended.

The Yalta agreement, signed in February 1945, had been lauded by Roosevelt as one

which ‘ended the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances, spheres of influence,

and balances of power and all other expedients which have been tried for centuries

45 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945, p.146. 46 Stalin’s Correspondence with Churchill, Atlee, Roosevelt and Truman 1941-1945, Published by Lawrence and Wishart London. p. 196.

47 Stalin’s Correspondence with Churchill , Atlee, Roosevelt and Truman 1941-1945, p.197.

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and have always failed.’48 Roosevelt believed the promises made by Stalin at Yalta.

Under the ‘declaration of liberated Europe’ the countries of Europe previously

occupied by the Nazi’s were guaranteed their chance to choose what form of

government they would employ. But Roosevelt’s faith in Stalin’s promises was

shown to be unfounded. Soon after the Yalta agreement had been signed Stalin began

to exert influence on the governments of Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. Soviets

began working hard to infiltrate the state institutions and applied a policy of anti-

government agitation by promoting communist rallies. On the 24th of February the

Communists organised demonstrations in Bucharest demanding the resignation of the

coalition cabinet recently elected by King Michael.49 As Bailey has shown, the naked

truth is that by mid March 1945, the Soviets were clearly taking over states such as

Poland and Romania as satellites in violation of their solemn pledges at Yalta. Bailey

argues that Roosevelt died knowing, or strongly suspecting, that he had failed in his

gigantic gamble to wean Stalin away from dangerous ideals by kind words and lend-

lease largesse. The Russians, he contests, never dropped communist world revolution

ideals; they just cleverly deceived the Americans, who were in the mood to deceive

themselves.50 This realisation may have become clear to Roosevelt as he spent his last

days reflecting in Warm Springs, but it did not occur to Truman until his first meeting

with Stalin in Potsdam where he could see for himself the fundamental differences

which separated the U.S. and Russia.

Truman arrived in Potsdam on the outskirts of Berlin on the 16th of July, briefed and

ready for the conference which was scheduled to take place in the Cecilienhof Palace

on the 17th of July. It was at this meeting that Stalin’s true colours came to the fore.

Many issues were discussed at this meeting between Truman, Churchill and Stalin but

this section of the essay will focus on the negotiations which considered the fate of

the former satellite states of Germany. During the opening proceedings of the

conference on the 17th Truman laid out the items which he wanted included on the

agenda. Number three on this list of four was the implementation of the declaration of

liberated Europe. Outlining his views on this issue, Truman called for the

48 Pierre de Senarclens, From Yalta to the Iron Curtain: The Great Powers and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford, 1995), p.14. 49 Senarclens, From Yalta to the Iron Curtain, p.16. 50 Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p.778.

16

reorganisation of the Romanian and Bulgarian governments along democratic lines.

He urged for ‘free and unfettered elections’ in Romania and Bulgaria.51 In a private

meeting with Churchill the following evening Stalin showed his anger at the

American position. He told the prime minister that ‘he had been hurt by the American

demand for change in Government in Romania and Bulgaria. It was unjust for them to

want to make changes in an area of Soviet interest’.52 Tensions surrounding this issue

came to a head on the 24th of July. During these discussions Truman brought forward

the notion of inviting Italy into the United Nations. This motion was backed by the

British delegation, but Stalin mounted a protest. According to the Marshal an artificial

distinction was been made between Italy (A former Satellite under Western control)

and states like Romania and Bulgaria which were in the Soviet sphere of influence.

Stalin could not believe that post war Italy was any more democratic than the Balkan

states. In this way Stalin attempted to barter acceptance of Italy to the United Nations

with recognition of the Balkan States under communist influence.53

The debate which ensued was one of the most heated exchanges of the whole

conference. From the western viewpoint one could not recognise a regime that was

neither responsible nor democratic, and that would not permit freedom of action or

speech within its borders. Following an exchange between Truman and Churchill

which led to a deadlock in negotiations, Churchill added to the obstruction by

insisting that Italy had met all democratic criteria, whereas the Soviet occupied states

did not. The Prime Minister praised the growth of democracy in Italy stating that there

was no political censorship or censorship of the media, the Italian press he stated even

attacked him frequently. Churchill then noted that there was little news coming from

either Romania or Bulgaria and contested that British envoys in these countries had

been placed in conditions of isolation resembling internment. ‘Fiction!’ replied Stalin.

‘Of course, you are free to call our statement fiction’ Churchill retorted, ‘but I have

full confidence in our political representatives’.54 The bickering continued for a

51 Foreign relations of the United States: diplomatic papers: the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 17th /July/ 1945, p.53-55. 52 James L. Gormly, From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy 1945-1947 (Delaware, 1990), p.46. 53Foreign relations of the United States: diplomatic papers: the Conference of Berlin

(the Potsdam Conference), 24th /July/ 1945, 324- 327. 54 Gormly, From Potsdam to the Cold War, p.47.

17

number of minutes. All the while Truman sat on the sidelines observing the ferocity

with which Stalin was willing to defend his actions, actions which had clearly

violated the promises made at Yalta. Until now any disagreements between the three

heads of States had been ‘confrontations conducted by both sides with considerable

politeness’, but this conflict showed their manners up to that point as an embarrassing

sham. Under the cloak of diplomatic niceties it became abundantly clear to Truman

that the Soviets were not willing to allow the growth of democracy in Europe, as had

been originally set out in the ‘Declaration of liberated Europe’.

Upon leaving the Potsdam conference Truman wrote in his diary, ‘As I left for home I

felt that we had achieved several important agreements. But more important were

some of the conclusions I had reached in my own mind and a realisation of what I had

to do in shaping future foreign policy’.55 The conference at Potsdam should have been

a time of exaltation. The enemy was prostrate. The suffering and separation was over.

Great vows had been kept and greater valour shown. The United Nations had the

chance and the means to bring the world closer to the visions of freedom, justice,

peace, and well bring. But while populaces rejoiced, Truman came to understand that

the prospect of a peaceful coexistence with the Soviets was doubtful.56 As indicated

above the growing rift which separated the U.S. and Soviet Union during the first half

of 1945 was one which could not have been mended had Roosevelt stayed in office.

Although the president had a lighter touch in dealing with Stalin, the fundamental

differences in ideology could not have been resolved. The realisation which came to

Truman at Potsdam, that the Soviets wanted to spread their communists belief in

Europe and that Roosevelt’s ‘Good neighbor policy’ had played into Stalin’s hands,

was undoubtedly one of the main factors which saw American diplomacy revert back

to its exceptionalist roots. It would have been a mistake for Truman to carry on

believing in the isolationist ideals of Roosevelt. Communism was growing in Europe

and without U.S. political and military commitments to and alliances with foreign

powers in Europe the Soviets would have had a free region.

Atomic Diplomacy

‘It certainly is a good thing that Hitler’s crowd or Stalin’s did not discover this

55 Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 411. 56 Feis, Between War and Peace the Potsdam Conference, p.323.

18

atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be

made the most useful ’. 57

-Harry Truman, July 1945.

Throughout Truman’s first six months in office the development of the Atomic Bomb

and its use in the war against Japan was a topic which heeded much attention from

those within the upper echelons of American politics. In the build up to Potsdam it

was clear that the president regarded the bomb as an important development. He

wrote in his memoirs of the voyage to Potsdam, ‘Preparations were being rushed for

the test atomic explosion in Alamogordo, New Mexico, at the time I had to leave for

Europe and on the voyage over I had been anxiously awaiting word on the results.’ 58

It was undeniable that the successful testing of the bomb would give Truman a

political ace over Stalin in the negotiations at Potsdam, but it was how Truman should

play this ace which caused a heated debate amongst American diplomats. These

debates centred around the question of whether the Soviets should be informed of this

new technology and given a say in proceedings or if the U.S. should use the bomb of

its own accord in the war against the Japanese, thus creating a monopoly on nuclear

weapons which would allow the U.S. to exert its influence more freely in Europe.

Truman, under the influence of Byrnes, chose the latter. As Messer shows, the

diplomatic power gained by the American monopoly on atomic weapons played a big

part in the failure of post war peace agreements between the U.S. and Soviet Russia.59

The dropping of the Atomic Bomb created a gulf in American- Soviet relations and

ended any perception amongst the international community that Truman was adhering

to Roosevelt’s ‘Good neighbor’ policy. It shall be shown below that despite the many

justifications given by Truman for the dropping of the bomb, such as avoiding the loss

of American lives in a Japanese ground invasion, the real driving force behind the use

of the bomb was the pursuit of an exceptionalist goal. This goal was to force

American ideals on the newly freed countries of Europe. By dropping the bomb this

showed the Soviets the power the American’s possessed.

57 Robert L. Messer, The end of an Alliance: James F.Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (North Carolina, 1982), p.180. 58Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 415. 59 Messer, The end of an Alliance, p.94.

19

On becoming president Truman knew little of the Manhattan Project. Before he took

his seat in the Oval office he had questioned the validity of the enormous amount of

resources been pumped into this mysterious engineering development. When his

investigation committee indicated an interest in finding out the aim of this project, he

was told by Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, to confine his inquiries to less sensitive

areas of the war effort. On the night of his inauguration a considerably more

deferential Stimson stayed after all the other cabinet officers had left. Stimson

explained that the project was aiming to create ‘a new explosive of almost

unbelievable destructive power’.60 When in early May of that year Truman was asked

to appoint a representative to the interim committee, which was charged with advising

the president on the wartime use and postwar implications of the A-Bomb, Truman

immediately asked Byrnes to take on the assignment. From this point until the

conference at Potsdam it was Byrnes who influenced most of the key decisions with

regard to the use of the Bomb.

Byrnes had known about the existence of the project since 1943 and like Truman he

too had questioned the resources which were being pumped into the scheme. As late

as March 1945, Byrnes had warned Roosevelt of the political repercussions after the

war if the weapon did not provide a return on the government’s already huge

investment. Byrnes advised the president to appoint an independent scientific

investigation team to look into the project. After the phenomenal success of the bomb

Byrnes used his earlier skepticism as a joke, by observing that the president had

ignored his proposals because no scientists who were not already working on some

phase of the project were available to act as independent investigators. 61 Jokes aside,

when Byrnes’ skepticism subsided upon his entering the interim committee it became

clear that the man from South Carolina viewed the bomb as a tool which could be

used against the Russians in the post war struggle for Europe. During the interim

committee meeting on the 19th of May, Byrnes outlined his view that ‘the bomb might

make the Russians more manageable in Eastern and Central Europe’.62 One atomic

scientist on the committee, Leo Szilard, later recalled his dismay at this approach to

the bomb, ‘I was completely flabbergasted by the assumption that rattling the bomb

60 Messer, The end of an Alliance, p.84. 61 Messer, The end of an Alliance, p.86. 62 Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy 1941-1949 (Chicago, 1970), p.88.

20

might make Russia more manageable’. Byrnes was a child of internationalism, and

naturally considered the development in terms of its use on the international stage.

Three days after the aforementioned meeting the committee approached the question

of how and when to inform the Soviet Union about the bomb. Army Chief of Staff,

George Marshall, proposed that Soviet observers be invited to witness the tests

detonation scheduled for mid-July. Byrnes intervened. Using his prerogative as the

president’s personal representative, Byrnes outlined his dismay at the thought of

telling the Russians of the new weapon. He vetoed any proposal that the Russians be

told of the bomb’s existence before it was used against Japan. He also made the point

that disclosing even general information on the bomb would prompt a Soviet request

to enter into full atomic partnership with the U.S. Byrnes’s opposition to discloser of

the bomb succeeded in reversing the entire tenor of the committee’s discussion. After

he had completed his statement, all members agreed that the Soviet Union should not

be approached before a public demonstration of the bomb against Japan. Stimson later

officially reported this recommendation to Truman as the committee’s considered

judgment, but in reality the decision had been Byrnes’s.63

In the month that followed these discussions some influential policymakers began to

consider an alternative approach to ending the war with Japan. Up until this point U.S.

policy demanded an unconditional surrender from the Japanese if war was to be

avoided. At the beginning of June Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy and

former U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, began extensive talks which resulted

in the formulation of an alternative approach to Japan. Grew argued that the U.S.,

‘would have nothing to lose by warning the Japanese of the cataclysmic consequences

of the new weapon…. and indicating that the U.S. would be prepared to allow Japan

to continue as a constitutional monarchy”.64 Gradually this idea began to gather

support. Previously Stimson had been afraid that such a retreat from unconditional

surrender would come across as a sign of weakness, but with the impending victory in

the Battle of Okinawa at the beginning of June these fears were eradicated. A

memorandum sent by former president Herbert Hoover to Truman on the 30th of

May, which was subsequently sent to Stimson, also encouraged Stimson’s support for

63 Messer, The end of an Alliance, p.88. 64 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan (Harvard, 2006), p.97.

21

the ideas forwarded by Grew. In this memorandum Hoover outlined the view that the

Japanese were concerned with preserving both nation and emperor. He stated that ‘if

America could persuade the Japanese they had no intension of eradicating them,

eliminating their system of government, or interfering with their way of life’ a

surrender would ensue.65 On June 12th Stimson, Grew, McCloy and Secretary of the

Navy, James Forrestal, held a meeting to discuss this topic. The result of this meeting

was that Forrestal organised a meeting with Truman the following evening to discuss

the matter. At this meeting Truman listened to the idea of retreating from an

unconditional surrender in order to end the war. He told him that these ideas could be

discussed further at some point before the Potsdam Conference. These sentiments

were again put before Truman at a meeting on the 18th of June. At this meeting

McCloy outlined the option of sending a warning to the Japanese and ensuring respect

for the Japanese political system as an alternative to seeking unconditional surrender.

In response to this idea, Truman expressed interest, but then directed McCloy to take

his idea to Byrnes. Interestingly McCloy noted in a private letter written in 1984, that

at the time he sensed, ‘that the president did not want to meet the opposition of

Byrnes on this issue’.66 Whether it was because of a reluctance to confront Byrnes

over the issue or a matter of indecision the demand for unconditional surrender from

the Japanese had not been reversed upon Truman’s departure for Potsdam on the 6 th

of July.

News of the successful testing of the bomb reached Truman on the second day of the

conference. Its description was like that of nothing ever seen before in history;

‘There was a tremendous blast effect. For brief period there was a lighting effect

within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was

formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height

of over 10,000 feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at

Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180

miles away’.67

65 http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hoover/memorandum, accessed on 17/04/13. 66 Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1996), p.503. 67 Feis, Between War and Peace the Potsdam Conference, p.165.

22

Despite interjection from Stimson at the meetings conducted at Potsdam which

considered the use of the bomb, the more lasting aspects of its consequences were

thrust into the background by thoughts of more immediate advantages which could be

gained by the use of the bomb.68 On the 23rd of July, Truman and Byrnes talked over

lunch about a way to tell Stalin enough about the bomb to invalidate any immediate

reproach that information of military importance had been kept from him, but without

giving away their plans. The following day Truman casually mentioned to Stalin ‘that

we have a new weapon of unusual destructive force’. Stalin responded that he hoped

they could use it well in the war against the Japanese. In Truman’s mind this was a

success. He had mentioned the bomb to the Marshall without inviting further

questions of its nature.69 Following the final warning given to the Japanese on the 26th

of July the first Atomic Bomb was dropped on the 6th of August.

As has been illustrated above Byrnes played a major role in convincing Truman that

the dropping of the Atomic Bomb was the best way off ending the war with Japan.

Truman has offered many justifications for the dropping of the bomb in the years that

followed 1945, one such contention was that it would end the war in Japan saving

American soldiers lives. This of course is a valid reason for ending a war but the fact

that Truman and Byrnes refused to issue an alternative form of surrender to the

Japanese, which could have ended the war sooner than the use of the bomb, shows

that the president had an ulterior motive for the dropping of the bomb. From an early

stage in its development Byrnes realised the bombs potential as a political advantage

in the growing tensions with the Soviets in Europe, and successfully transmitted this

idea to Truman. By sanctioning the dropping of the bomb without Soviet participation

Truman completed the reversal of Roosevelt’s isolationism. By using the weapon as a

way of exerting American influence in European affairs Truman had shown the world

that the U.S. was adopting an internationalist approach to foreign policy and was in

effect backing away from the ‘good neighbour policy’ with the Soviets. The

successful deployment of the bomb confirmed Truman in his judgment that the U.S.

had sufficient power to readopt its traditional exceptionalist diplomacy.70

68 Feis, Between War and Peace the Potsdam Conference, p.174. 69 Feis, Between War and Peace the Potsdam Conference, p.178. 70 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (London, 1985), p.275.

23

Conclusion

This analysis of the first five months of Truman’s presidency shows that isolationism

was replaced by an exceptionalist/ internationalist foreign policy. This research

indicates that while the inexperienced president was at first heavily influenced by a

hardline agenda, following the lend-lease fiasco he turned away from the hardliners to

more moderate influences. However after meeting Stalin face to face at Potsdam and

conducting postwar negotiations, Truman came to believe that the isolationist policies

pursued by Roosevelt were playing into the hands of the Soviets and that a policy of

peaceful coexistence with Stalin was not possible. The atom bomb seemed to Truman

to offer the means of containing Stalin and exerting American influence in Europe

and throughout the world. The cold war and its decades of ideological conflicts

followed.

24

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