The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 12 | Issue 2 | Number 3 | Article ID 4061 | Jan 12, 2014

1

The Origins of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute between China,Taiwan and Japan 中・台・日における尖閣・魚釣問題の起源

Yabuki Susumu, Mark Selden

This article introduces Foreign Relations of theUnited States (FRUS) documents and OkinawaReversion Treaty Hearings on the Senkakudispute to clarify Japanese, Chinese and UnitedStates positions on the historical origins andcontemporary trajectory of the Senkaku/Diaoyu(hereafter, Senkaku) dispute.

Introduction by Mark Selden

Yabuki Susumu, in a series of articles and talks,has rigorously mined the historical record ofChina (PRC/ROC)-Japan-US relations toilluminate the background to the dangerousconflict that presently threatens to bring war tothe Western Pacific in the wake of Japanesenationalization of three of the Senkaku islandsin September 2012. While other importantissues add to the gravity of the conflict,including enlarged territorial claims by China,Japan and Korea in the form of advancing anddefending competing claims to ADIZ in the EastChina and South China Seas, Yabuki shows thelong trajectory of competing claims over theSenkaku dispute and the evolving policies ofChina, Japan and the United States in shapingit. Since so much of the international discussionof the issues has focused on China-Japanconflict, a particularly important contributionof the present paper is its clear presentation ofUS recognition at the highest levels of thesignificance of the competing territorial claims,and its maneuvering in negotiations withTaipei, Tokyo, and Beijing to shape theoutcome.

The story can, of course, be traced back toearlier claims to the islands, includinghistorical interactions involving Taiwan andOkinawan fishermen and Chinese tributarymissions, to Japanese claims to the islands, andto their disposition by the US in framing andimplementing the San Francisco Peace Treaty.The treaty set the stage for the transfer of theSenkaku to Japan in 1972 at the time of thereversion of administrative rights to Okinawa.But the story told here pivots on the detailednegotiations between Washington and Taipei in1971 in the context of the US-China opening.What it shows is keen awareness of theSenkaku question by the ROC as early as 1970in the context of US preparation for thereversion of Okinawa, and preoccupation withthe issue by both Kissinger and Nixon as theyprepare the 1971 US-China opening at the timeof Ping Pong Diplomacy and discussions of PRCresumption of the UN Security Council Seat. AnROC Note Verbale to the State Department ofMarch 15, 1971 made the historical andcontemporary case for Chinese possession ofthe Senkaku islands. Following close attentionto its content, in the shadow of demonstrationsover the islands on Taiwan, Kissingerhandwrote in the margin, "But that is nonsensesince it gives islands to Japan. How can we geta more neutral position?" The authoritativelegal position of the US was given at the time ofthe Fulbright Hearings on reversion in the formof a memorandum of October 20, 1971 byRobert I Starr, Acting Assistant Legal Adviserfor East Asian and Pacific affairs. Noting thedispute over the Senkaku between China andJapan, it noted that "The United States believesthat a return of administrative rights over thoseislands to Japan, from which the rights were

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

2

received, can in no way prejudice anyunderlying claims (of ROC and/or PRC)." Itwould remain for China and Japan to negotiatetheir disposition. At no time thereafter has theUS legal position changed. MS

On September 11, 2013, the Japanesegovernment decided to nationalize three isletsof the Senkaku's eight island group.

Table 1 Name of Senkaku/ Tiao-yu/Diao-Yu islandsOwnership1 Japanese Name1 Chinese Name2,

TaiwanSquare kilo-meters1

MaximumElevation3

metersState 2012.9.11 Uotsuri-jima(魚釣島) Tiao-yu-t'ai(釣魚台)

Hoapin-san(和平山)3.6 383

State 2012.9.11 Minami-kojima(南小島) Nan-hsiao(南小島) 0.32 149State 2012.9.11 Kita-kojima(北小島) Pei-hsiao(北小島) 0.26 135Private, Kobi ShoGunnery Range 1972

Kuba-jima(久場島) Huang-wei-yu(黄尾嶼) 0.87 117

State, Sekibi ShoGunnery Range 1972

Taisho-jima(大正島) Ch'ih-wei-yu(赤尾嶼) 0.04 84

State Okino-kitaiwa(沖北岩) Pei-hsiao(北礁) 0.05 28State Okino-minamiiwa(沖南岩) Nan-hsiao(南礁) 0.01 17State Tobi-se(飛瀬) no name 0.02 n. a.Source: 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Japan's Basic Position on the Senkaku Islands andFacts, October 2012.2. Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Okinawa Reversion Treaty, Annex toHearings, October 27, 28 and 29, 1971. p. 5.3. Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations, University HawaiiPress, 2000.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Japan, Japan's Basic Position on theSenkaku Islands and Facts, October 2012.

The Chinese government strongly protested thenationalization of the islets to the Japanesegovernment, and on September 15 published awhite paper on the "Diaoyutai Issue."1 OnSeptember 18, on the anniversary of Japan'sseizure of Manchuria in 1931, Chinese in anumber of cities demonstrated in a so-called"one million demonstration." Some of thedemonstrators destroyed shops and factories.Thus Japan-China relations deteriorated to thelowest point since normalization in September1972.

On September 25, the United States publishedSenkaku (Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai) Islands Dispute:U.S. Treaty Obligations.2 On September 28, theTaiwan Government published a white papertitled, Riben Zhanju Diaoyu de Lishi Zhengju(Historical Evidence of Japanese Occupation of

Tiaoyu).3 In October, the Foreign Ministry ofJapan announced Senkaku-shotō no Ryōyūkenni tsuite no Kihon- Kenkai (English version:Basic Position on the Senkaku Islands andFacts), and asserted that 'the Senkaku Islandsare indisputably an inherent part of theterritory of Japan in light of historical facts andbased upon international law'.4

One year after the dispute erupted, the BeijingOlympic Committee voted in favor of Tokyohosting the 2020 Olympics, and non-government level exchanges between bothcountries began to normalize. However,political relations remain frozen and show nosigns of thawing.

Why did Japanese-China relations fall into thissnare?

To answer this question, we must reconsiderthe Okinawa Reversion Treaty of some 40 yearsago.

SCENE One:

WHITE HOUSE MEETING of NIXON ANDCHOW

On April 12, 1971, Ambassador Chow who wasleaving his position to return to Taipei asForeign Minister visited the White House.Because of the visit of the U.S. Ping Pong Teamto China, what was originally a courtesy calltook on added significance. Shortly beforeChow entered the room, Nixon and Kissingerdiscussed the visit of the U.S. ping pong teamto the PRC. Nixon observed, "One interestingthing that we're saying goodbye to him on theday that the ping pong team, waited, you know,ping pong team makes the front page of TheNew York Times." Responded Kissinger, "Theyare very subtle though, these Chinese." Nixonreplied, "You think it means something."Kissinger stated, "No question."5

Ambassador Chow began the meeting bythanking the President for his many courtesies

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

3

and saying he wanted the President to knowthat he always understood that the Presidentand I [Kissinger] were the best friends of Chinain this Administration. The President said, "Iwant you to convey my warmest greetings toGeneralissimo and Madam Chiang. We willstick by our treaty commitments to Taiwan; wewill honor them. I said so in my State of theWorld Report.6

The Presidentcontinued, "On the UNmembership issue, some of our friends havedeserted us. We are prepared to fight for youbut we want to do it in an effective way. I havemany proposals on various schemes such asdual representation. I will make this decision,not the State Department. Some people say,let's find a clever way of doing it, but there isno clever way of being defeated. There is nochange in our basic position, but there mayhave to be some adaptation of our strategy. We,however, before we make a decision want totalk to you.

I am sending Ambassador Murphy to Taiwan;he is going there on business anyway, and theGeneralissimo should talk to him as he talks tome. Taiwan and the UN is a fact of life for usand we will do nothing to give it up, but wehave to be intelligent and we want to hear yourviews."

Chow said, "We appreciate your specialattention; above all , don't spread theimpression that all is lost." The President thenasked me to explain the choices on Chinarepresentation, and I summed up thememorandum that I had written to him on thesubject (copy attached).7

The President asked Chow for his analysis.Chow said, "We could stick them out forUniversality plus the Important Question." I[Kissinger] said, "Will the IQ carry andUniversality lose?"

Chow said, "No, this depends on how it isformulated." He then raised this issue of the

Senkaku Islands.8

It has to do with the protection of the ChineseNationalist interests. If Taiwan can do that,then intellectuals and overseas Chinese willfeel they must go to the other side. The StateDepartment statement insisting that this is partof Okinawa has had violent repercussions. Thiswill get a movement of overseas Chinese.9

The President said, "I want you to know thatthe relaxation of trade that we are planning ismostly symbolic; the important issue is the UN.We will be very much influenced by what theGeneralissimo will think. As long as I am here,you have a friend in the White House and youshould do nothing to embarrass him. TheChinese should look at the subtleties. You helpus and we will help you. I want Murphy to bringhis report personally to me. We will stand firmas long as we can, but we must have an armybehind us.10

**********************************************************************

Because Ambassador Chow Shu-kai raised veryimportant questions, Kissinger decided to meethim once more on the same day at 3:31–3:47p.m.11

Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to seeAmbassador Chow briefly to express hispersonal sentiments on how much he hadenjoyed having Ambassador Chow inWashington. He wanted, too, to repeat thesentiments which had been expressed earlierby the President on this same score.

Dr. Kissinger then referred to what thePresident had said concerning moves which theU.S. might possibly make toward CommunistChina, indicating that some steps might betaken this week. However, this had nothing todo with U.S. relations with the GRC, and quitefrankly, were undertaken in order to preventRussia from being the dominant country indealing with Communist China. Ambassador

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

4

Chow noted that he could understand this.12

Continuing, Dr. Kissinger saidthat we hadpicked a few steps which might be taken now,such as travel. While we could let a fewChinese Communists in, it was doubtful theywould be breaking down our doors asking forvisas. Ambassador Chow again noted that hecould see our point-the new steps might makethe Russians more amenable.

Nevertheless, he didn't know if the Russianswould respond to this approach, and Pekingwould be put in the middle between China, theU.S. and Moscow. Dr. Kissinger agreed thatthere were limits to what the Russians coulddo. This was a very complicated game.

Ambassador Chow described the U.S. approachas a highly sophisticated one, which couldn't beexplained very easily to the people on Taiwan.He would need to report to his President onthis matter in generalized terms.

Dr. Kissinger pointed out that no one inWashington outside of a very few knew whatwas to be undertaken. In fact, a long list hadbeen presented, of which we were taking but afew items. Ambassador Chow said that in themeasures the U.S. was taking which affectedhis country, the understanding if not thesupport of the Chinese people was needed.

He described the strong sentiments whichvarious Chinese groups had with regard to anumber of issues, particularly the question ofthe status of Senkaku Islets. The demonstrationwhich had taken place in Washington on April10 was a case in point-those demonstrating hadbeen scientists, engineers, and professionalpeople and not just students.

The demonstration had come on all of a suddenbecause these people had become excited, andwas symbolic of what they and the countrywould stand for. Ambassador Chow declaredthat he had been asked by President Chiang totake up the Senkaku question with the

President and Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger stated that he was looking intothe Senkaku matter, and asked Mr. Holdridgeto forward a report to him on the issuesinvolved by April 13. Ambassador Chow, incommenting further on the Senkakus,remarked that even when the Japanese hadoccupied Taiwan and the Ryukyus, legalmatters involving the Senkakus had beenhandled by courts on Taiwan, and the fishingboats which went to the Senkakus had beenfrom Taiwan.

From the Japanese point of view, they didn'tcare how the Senkakus were administered. Forthe Chinese though, the issue of nationalismwas deeply involved.

Ambassador Chow referred to the fact thatthere would be some decisions required withrespect to the General Assembly next year andhe hoped that the "other side" (i.e., the ChineseCommunists) could be kept out.

Whatever formula was advocated, the Chineseposition had to be made tenable in the eyes ofthe people. Moreover, regardless of what wasproposed, it would be hard to sell. AmbassadorChow went on to discuss the desirability oflikeminded nations in East Asia working moreclosely together.

He described ASPAC13 as something of a socialclub of the foreign ministers, who put forwarddiffering views on various subjects. TheKoreans and the Japanese, for example, werequite far apart on many issues. His idea was forcountries such as the ROC, Korea, Thailand andVietnam to have more and closer consultations.This would not be like a "minor club," butwould have a real purpose in such things asmilitary matters.

Such a grouping, having more or less of a jointstand, would make it easier for the U.S. tomake military moves. The group could come tothe U.S. and say that it would back the U.S. up.

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

5

If the four governments could be gottentogether, more planning could be undertakenon issues such as the UN, and a parallelapproach maintained instead of eachgovernment going its separate way.

The U.S. would be expected to be a benevolentfriend. It wouldn't necessarily be expected toact, and the other nations would have to dothings for themselves, but the tacit backing ofthe U.S. was needed. Rivalries had to beavoided, since there were already enoughadversaries in the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that in these days,anyone who stands up to the Communistscomes under attack; this was not from theCommunists but from fellow citizens.Ambassador Chowreferred to the existence ofrumors that the U.S. was giving up, and of theneed to arrest the trend of assuming that suchwas the case.

Dr. Kissinger said that he agreed. We did notbelieve that we had to demonstrate our wisdomand political sagacity by destroying our friends.

This was very much in the President's mind. Onthe UN issue, we would send someone to theROC to explain our position, and would needsome support from the ROC side. Dr. Kissingerasked Ambassador Chowto explain to hisPresident that our President was a true friend,and that there had to be understandingbetween the two.

AmbassadorChow stated that he would lookupon his role in Taiwan as Foreign Minister asbeing one of support for the U.S. position. Heconsidered himself very proud to have knownDr. Kissinger, whom he regarded as a friend.

He asked that Dr. Kissinger allow him theprivilege of communicating directly with him.Dr. Kissinger replied that he definitely wantedAmbassador Chow to do so. If AmbassadorChow should write and let Dr. Kissinger know

his private reactions, this would be atremendous help. He wanted AmbassadorChow to know that in his opinion, he,Ambassador Chow, had always conducted hisaffairs here with dignity, and when in Taiwanshould feel he had two friends in the WhiteHouse.

If we were obliged to do things which causedthem pain, this would be to the minimum extentpossible. He assured Ambassador Chow that wewould do nothing without checking with theROC. As far as our moves toward the ChineseCommunists were concerned, they were mainlyof significance with respect to the USSR and inresponse to our own domestic situation.

Ambassador Chow said that he could see theU.S. point of view in both cases, although therewere of course questions raised with respect tomainland China.

**********************************************************************

The following day Kissinger asked Mr. John H.Holdridge of the National Security Council

Staff to check ROC's Note Verbale.14

John H. Holdridge's memorandum reads asfollows:

You asked for information on the Chinese claimto the Senkaku Islets. The most recentsummary of this was contained in a NoteVerbale sent the State Department by theChinese Embassy on March 15.

Its main points are as follows:

-As early as the 15th century Chinese historicalrecords considered the Senkakus as theboundary separating Taiwan from theindependent kingdom of the Ryukyus.

-The geological structure of the Senkaku Isletsis similar to that of other islets associated withTaiwan. The Senkakus are closer to Taiwan

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

6

than to the Ryukyus and are separated from theRyukyus by the Okinawa Trough at the end ofthe Continental Shelf, which is 2,000 meters indepth.

-Taiwanese fisherman have traditionally fishedin the area of the Senkakus and called at theseislets.

-The Japanese Government did not include theSenkakus in Okinawa Prefecture until afterChina's cession of Taiwan and the Pescadoresto Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war in1895.

-For regional security considerations the GRChas hitherto not challenged the U.S. militaryoccupation of the Senkakus under Article 3 ofthe San Francisco Peace Treaty. However,according to international law temporarymilitary occupation of an area does not affectthe ultimate determination of its sovereignty.

-In view of the expected termination of the U.S.occupation of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, theU.S. is requested to respect the GRC'ssovereign rights over the Senkaku Islets andrestore them to the GRC when this terminationtakes place.

John H. Holdridge's Comment reads as follows:

As you can imagine, the Japanese Governmenthas a comparable list of apparently offsettingarguments and maintains simply that theSenkakus remain Japanese. State's position isthat in occupying the Ryukyus and theSenkakus in 1945, and in proposing to returnthem to Japan in 1972, the U.S. passes nojudgment as to conflicting claims over anyportion of them, which should be settleddirectly by the parties concerned.

After reading this memorandum, Kissingerimmediately handwrote the following commentin the margin: "But that is nonsense since itgives islands to Japan. How can we get a moreneutral position?"

In the writers' view, this is a very importantconversation which decided the fate of theSenkaku/Diaoyutai problem. President Nixonand his aide Kissinger realized the complexnature of this dispute.

SECOND SCENE:

TEXTILE NEGOTIATION AT TAIPEI BY D.KENNEDY

Three months after the Chow-Kissingermeeting, President Nixon dispatched TreasurySecretary David Kennedy to Taiwan tonegotiate the textile issue.15 Receiving a reportfrom Taipei, Assistant to the President forInternational Economic Affairs Peter G.Peterson explained to Nixon the negotiationprocess based on Kennedy's report.

1. Ambassador Kennedy reported that the U.S.and Taiwan had reached some preliminaryunderstanding on several major portions of afive-year voluntary restraint program fortextiles, including a nine percent averagegrowth rate for synthetic textiles and onepercent for wool.16 However, several veryserious points of contention remain (base yearfigure and trigger mechanism for imports incategories not specifically covered in theagreement). Until they are resolved, thenegotiations are at an impasse.

2. Ambassador Kennedy believes there is nogive whatsoever in the U.S. industry's positionon these issues and there is some strongpressure for the industry representatives tocome home. The Taiwan government also hascompelling reasons to be adamant. They see noreason why they should not hold out for termsat least as good as those that Japan is nowgiving us unilaterally. They are also concernedabout being the first of the three Asiancountries to voluntarily settle with us unlessthe terms are advantageous. The TaiwanGovernment feels it has taken a heavy beatingfrom the U.S. in recent months (oil moratorium,Two-China developments) and that it would

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

7

lose a great deal more international face if itwere to settle for a disadvantageous bargain.

3. Ambassador Kennedy believes we have threealternatives:

(a) Go to Hong Kong and Korea with theagreement as it now stands and with anunderstanding with Taiwan (which they haveagreed to) that they will accept a base yearfigure and consultation mechanism that thosetwo countr ies are wi l l ing to accept .Ambassador Kennedy rejects this approachsince Hong Kong and Korea would realize theproblem we face with Taiwan and be in aposition to exert leverage on us to give in onother matters to get what we need on the baseyear and the consultation mechanism.

(b) Return home now and admit failure.Ambassador Kennedy believes your prestige ison the line in the textile and footwear issuesand that to fail could have very seriousdomestic and foreign ramifications (he believesthe footwear negotiations would collapse if thetextile negotiations were called off). While theindustry indicates it would rather go home thangive any further, he doubts that would be theirfeeling a few months down the road in the faceof totally unrestrained textile imports.

(c) Offer certain concessions to Taiwan.Ambassador Kennedy feels the impasse can bebroken without disastrous side effects foreither our industry or the Taiwan Government.While the GRC stressed the importance ofcertain military items (F–4s for example)Ambassador Kennedy is convinced that the"only" way to resolve the issues is to withholdturning the Senkaku Islands over to Japaneseadministrative control under the OkinawaReversion Agreement.

4. Ambassador Kennedy's argument on theSenkakus was as follows:

"This is a major issue in Taiwan with bothdomestic and international implications. If the

U.S. were to maintain administrative control, itwould give the GRC a tremendous public boostsince they have expressed themselves soforcefully on the issues.

Further, it would be a very direct indication ofour continued interest in and support for theGRC-and it would be done at Japan's expense, apoint that is vital to our ability to proceedeffectively with textile negotiations in HongKong and Korea and subsequently in Japan.Announcement of such a decision allows theGRC to save face both at home (it takes theVice Premier off the hook) and abroad.

Taiwan could accept the current textilepackage in face of Hong Kong and Koreanpressure. "In addition, such an act would, in myopinion, provide a very badly needed shockeffect on the Japanese. It would indicate thatU.S. acquiescence in all matters requested bythe Japanese could no longer be taken forgranted.

"I can fully appreciate the opposition whichsuch a proposal will generate in certainquarters of our government. But I feel that thiscan and must be done . We acceptedstewardship of these Islands after World WarII. Neither historically nor geographically arethey a part of the Ryukyus Chain containingOkinawa.

Consequently, the GRC suffers a great loss offace if we allow Japan to gain administrativecontrol of them. Since possession of the Islandsis still in dispute, there is every reason for theUnited States to maintain administrativecontrol until such time as the dispute is settled.

Taiwan feels very strongly that once Japan hadadministrative control there is absolutely nopossibility of their ever relinquishing thatcontrol. By no means am I suggesting that wehand the islands over to Taiwan. Rather, I amstrongly recommending the wisdom ofpreserving the status quo rather than allowingJapan to assume administrative control with the

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

8

great loss of face this entails for Taiwan.

"I know of no other action sufficientlyimportant or sufficiently dramatic to resolveour textile problems specifically as well as topave the way for resolution of several generalinternational trade difficulties. The stakesinvolved are very high which I fully realize. Irealize, too, that only the President can makesuch a decision. Therefore, I urge you in thestrongest possible terms to present to him allthe potential benefits and ramifications of myrecommendations."

5. Henry Kissinger is looking into thebackground of the Senkaku Islands dispute andwill be able to report to you at our meeting thisafternoon on what would be involved in notturning over the Senkaku Islands to Japan atthis point.

**********************************************************************

Hearing Ambassador Kennedy's proposal,Nixon, Kissinger and Peterson gathered atCamp David to make a final decision. The resultwas delivered to Ambassador Kennedyimmediately.

FRUS document 134. Backchannel MessageFrom the President's Assistant for InternationalEconomic Affairs (Peterson) to AmbassadorKennedy, in Taipei17 shows the process howNixon's decision was delivered to Governmentof Taiwan.

―Washington, June 8, 1971, 1229Z. Eyes Onlyfor Amb Kennedy, Taipei from Peter Peterson.

After lengthy discussion, the President'sdecision on the Islands is that the deal hasgone too far and too many commitments madeto back off now.18 I (Peterson) showed yourwire (Kennedy) on this and even reread portiondealing with its importance.19

The President was deeply regretful that he

could not help on this, but he felt that thedecision was simply not possible. The Presidenthas instructed me to tell you that he will send asenior military representative in August toreview with GRC in "a favorable andforthcoming way" important defensepossibil it ies. 2 0

I've explained that this makes final negotiationsnow very difficult but decision is August visitbecause of need to do this while Congress isout in August. Not to complicate your lifefurther but I just talked with Roger Millikenwho says that industry here was about todecide to ask everyone to come back becausedeal now being talked about comes up to 2.7billion over the term, which is half billion upfrom 2.2 billion or 7-1/2 percent increaseworked out here on the 1970 base that Millikensays was the ceiling.

Also, Milliken reports Mills will say that he canget deal from other countries similar toJapanese which will work out considerablybetter than deal you have offered.21

Harry Dent and I suspect that Mills may havesuggested he will support quota bill as part ofhis own political objectives. Bryce Harlowconfirms from high sources that Mills has madesome kind of commitment to support quota billnext spring. Apparently, the 2.7 billion thatindustry representatives there agreed to strikesthem as too much here in this country and that2.2 billion was the ceiling.

I have just called Milliken to say that thePresident would certainly appreciate theirstaying with us in this effort and if it breaks upnow it would be hard to reconstitute the effort.He said they felt that likelihood is good enoughfor quota legislation that they would probablytake their chances and come home now.

My recommendation is that you tell GRC thatdeal must be at a volume level that you can getindustry to really accept and that this isimportant enough to us that we will have to

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

9

review defense and other carrots and sticks inorder to achieve it.

Then I would go on and start in other twocountries and let GRC stew about potential U.S.actions. If industry says they want to comeback to U.S., I'd be inclined to go on anywayand see what it takes in other two countries toget deal industry would accept.

I think it would be better if industry would staybut it's not essential. My reasoning is that ifyou can get deal that sounds reasonable notonly to some of the industry but also the public,then I think we are far better off than havingappeared to have failed and only Presidentialalternative would be to support what could be adisastrous, wide-ranging quota bill on manycategories or veto and still lose textile support.

If we don't make any deal, it certainly wouldseem to hurt the President a lot and helppolitical opponents equally. I've explored thiswith top advisers and all agree that the bestdeal we can make is a lot better than none atall. Do your best on this basis.22

The President deeply appreciates what you aredoing.23

THIRD SCENE:

PARIS MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARYOF STATE ROGERS AND FOREIGNM I N I S T E R A I C H I O N O K I N A W AREVERSION TREATY

On June 9, 1971, Secretary Rogers and ForeignMinister Aichi hold final meeting at Paris U.S.Embassy. Rogers "strongly urging GOJ todiscuss issue with GRC prior to signature ofOkinawa Agreement on June 17. AmbassadorNakayama sent an extremely secret telegram toTokyo.

It reads as follows:

Regarding Senkaku (Sovereignty) Problems

GOC is quite anxious about people's reaction,and pressured Washington not to revert toJapan. Washington wishes Japan to help them,and negotiate with GOC without diminishingJapan's own legal rights. They would requestJapan to begin talks as early as possible.

Minister Aichi replied to Rogers that Japan willdo it after signing the treaty, as in the case ofthe explanation of Joint Statement of Sato-Nixon in 1969. We have ample confidence todeal with GOC, Washington need not worryabout it. (尖閣諸島問題につき、国府は、本件に関する一般国民の反応に対し、非常に憂慮しており、米国政府に対しても、国府から圧力をかけてきているが、本件について日本政府がその法的立場を害することなく、何らかの方法で、われわれを助けていただければありがたいと述べ、例えば、本件につきなるべく速やかに話合を行うというような意志表示を国府に対して行っていただけないかと述べた。これに対し、本大臣より、基本的には米国に迷惑をかけずに処理する自信がある。国府に必要とあらば話をすることは差支えないが、その時期は返還協定調印前ということではなく、69年の佐藤・ニクソン共同声明の例にならい事後的に説明をすることとなろうと答えた)

Judging from Aichi's words to Rogers, Japan'sForeign Ministry did not pay much attention tothis problem. Mofa seems to have regardedlightly GOC's strong demand and thenegotiation process between GOC andWashington.

On the contrary, Rogers accompaniedspokesman McCloskey to Paris after 'Chiangasked that the U.S. Government categoricallystate at the time of the signing of the Okinawareversion agreement that the final status of theislands had not been determined and should besettled by all parties involved.'

The writer believes that Nixon and Kissingerfully recognized that the Senkaku sovereigntyissue was related with the Taiwan problem andcould complicate upcoming talks with PremierZhou Enlai.

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

10

In the event, the Okinawa Treaty was signedwithout any contact with GOC.

Copy of the Original Material No.877, FromAmbassador Nakayama to Foreign Ministry,Tokyo

パリ日本大使館発 愛知・ロジャース会談に関する極秘電報

(1971年6月9日) 1971年6月9日パリ日本大使館発、極秘、大至急。

本大臣[愛知]とロジャース長官との会談は、9日午前9時半より、約2時間にわたり、当地、米大使館の大使執務室で行われたが、会談中沖縄返還協定関係についての要旨以下の通り。(出席者は、わが方、赤谷[源一、国連]大使、吉野[文六、米国]局長、栗山[尚一、条約局法規]課長。米側、ペダソン[Richard F. Pederson, 国連]大使、エリクソン[Richard A. Ericson、国務省東アジア太平洋局日本]部長、マクロスキー[Robert J .McCloskey 国務省報道官])。

(1)冒頭、ロジャース長官より、大部分の問題は既に解決を見ているが、若干の点についてお話したいとして、まず尖閣諸島問題につき、国府は、本件に関する一般国民の反応に対し、非常に憂慮しており、米国政府に対しても、国府から圧力をかけてきているが、本件について日本政府がその法的立場を害することなく、何らかの方法で、

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

11

われわれを助けていただければありがたいと述べ、例えば、本件につきなるべく速やかに話合を行うというような意志表示を国府に対して行っていただけないかと述べた。

これに対し、本大臣より、基本的には米国に迷惑をかけずに処理する自信がある。国府に必要とあらば話をすることは差支えないが、その時期は返還協定調印前ということではなく、69年の佐藤・ニクソン共同声明の例にならい事後的に説明をすることとなろうと答えた。

(2)次にロジャース長官より、六五の使途につき日本政府のリベラルな解釈を期待するとの発言があり、これに対し、本大臣よりできる限りのリベラルな解釈をassure[保証]すると述べた。

(3)請求権問題に関連してロジャース長官は、本大臣の書簡を必要とする旨述べたので、本大臣より、本書簡は公表されざるものと了解してよろしきやと、と念を押したところ、ロジャース長官は、「行政府としては、できるだけ不公表にしておくよう努力する所存なるも、議会との

関係で、これを発表せざるをえない場合も、絶無ではない」と答えた。よって

本大臣より、本件書簡の表現ぶりについては、既に東京において一応合意に達した旨連絡を受けているが、これが公表される可能性があるというのであれば、表現も、より慎重に考えたいと述べた。ロジャース長官は、 日本政府の立場も理解できるので、米側の法的な要件をみたしつつ、日本側の立場をも配慮した表現を発見することは可能と思うと述べた。

(4)本大臣より、本日長官の返事をいただく必要はないが、返還協定の発効日を4月1日とすることを沖縄県民が一致して強く要求しており、日本政府としても、その事実に大きな関心を有するものであることをお伝えしたい旨述べた。これに対し、ロジャース長官は、それは全く不可能ではないにしても、極めて困難であり、過早に協定発効日を論ずることは議会の反発を招くということも考慮しなくてはならない。しかしながら、沖縄県民および日本政府の意のあると

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

12

ころを考慮したいと答えた。

(5)次いで、本大臣より、調印日につき、わが方の国内事情を考慮し、一昨日もお話しした通り、ぜひとも17日

に決めていただきたいと述べたところ、ロジャース長官は、本件については議会との関係上、われわれとしては慎重にならざるをえず、かかる観点からすれば、17日は決して最適の日とは思わない。しかし、日本側の事情を考慮し、17日調印にふみ切ることとした。

本日右を発表することおよび、署名字観は、ワトン時間午前4時、東京時間午後9時とすることに異論はないと答えた。よって、本台紙ンより、本件は、今回の会談において自分が最も重要視していた問題であり、17日調印にふみきられたことについて感謝する旨述べた。(了)

FOURTH SCENE:

MEETING BETWEEN KISSINGER ANDROC AMBASSADOR CHOW.

After half a year since signing the OkinawaReversion treaty the Republic of China (GOC)Foreign Minister visited the U.S. and held ayear-end meeting with Dr. Kissinger. FRUSdocument 180. Memorandum of Conversationis the record of their conversation.24 Theconversation was held at Key Biscayne, Florida,December 30, 1971, 10:30 a.m. Participants areDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Chow Shu-kai, ForeignMinister, Republic of China Director Cheng,Republic of China His Excellency, James Shen,Republic of China Ambassador to the UnitedStates and Coleman S. Hicks, notetaker.

The conversation began with light banteramong the participants.

Chow: It is very nice of you to take the time tosee us here in Key Biscayne. I have just comefrom Japan and you, of course, will be meetingthe Japanese in San Clemente. I have threequestions that I would like to ask you. First,how secure is Taiwan from Communist attack?Second, will you press us to negotiate withPeking? And number three, I would like to raisematters regarding confiscation of property. TheJapanese are very excited about theseconcerns.

Kissinger: Well, I won't tell you anything untilthe Ambassador promises to invite me toanother Chinese dinner. (Laughter)

Chow: What we are seeking is reassurancefrom you about these matters. We areconcerned that the Communists can gaincontrol of the air.

Kissinger: Let's settle the defense questionfirst. At my press conference in November Icommented that our defense commitment wasunimpaired.25 I have also said that to Chou En-lai, and our defense commitment has not been

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

13

affected by our dealings with Peking. If you areattacked, we will come to your defense.Personally, I don't think China can maintaincontrol of the air.

Chow: But we are in a situation where thequantity and quality of the Communist militarycapacity is going up and our impression is thatthe military assistance program is standingstill. This results in a change of the militarybalance.

Kissinger: There has been no stoppage of ourmilitary assistance program to the Republic ofChina.

Chow: This is encouraging but there is concernabout it.26

Kissinger: Can you give me particular items? Iwill check into it.

Chow: We are interested in excess equipment,F–104s, tanks and so forth. We do not seekoffensive weapons.

Kissinger: I can reassure you that no stepshave been taken to limit the military assistanceprogram to the Republic of China.

Chow: There are rumbles in the lower levels atthe State Department about tie-ups in theprogram.

Kissinger: Look, the lower levels of the StateDepartment are prone, as you have probablyseen, to take credit whenever it is due someoneelse but at the same time to undermine supportfor Presidential policies. The President has awarm personal feeling for the Republic ofChina. The steps we have taken with theCommunists have been necessary. They arecold-blooded, calculated diplomatic moves.They have nothing to do with sympathy.

Chow: Well, I hope you can stir things up onthis military assistance program.

Kissinger: I thought everything was in normalchannels. What did Rogers say when you talkedto him this morning?

Chow: (unintelligible)

Kissinger: I, of course, don't know the exactdetails about the military balance between youand the Communists, but personally I don'tbelieve that the Communists have the capacityto use their military force outside their borders.But if so . . .27 Coleman, get Colonel Kennedy tolook into this matter.

Chow: Another issue relates to the submarines.

Kissinger: I approved that two months ago.

Chow: All the key matters relate to training.Secretary Rogers appears to be apprehensiveabout this.

Kissinger: We have approved this. Why wouldit be in our interest not to go ahead and do it?Of course we will do it.28

Chow: The next issue I would like to raise withyou is the handling of the Senkaku Islands.When you talk to the Japanese in SanClemente, may I encourage you to consider ourposition? The Japanese watch very carefully theU.S. role in the Pacific and seek consultationwith you. We have a difficult domestic politicalsituation regarding the Islands. Peking wantsto develop an anti-American campaign onTaiwan. We need help from our friends. TheIslands don't make any difference to Japan butthey do to the people of Taiwan. Perhaps youcould discuss these withered pieces of rock-there is no oil there-with the Japanese.

Kissinger: We will raise it with the Japanese.

Chow: We hope to keep them quiet about it.

Kissinger: You don't want the Islands back;you just want to avoid a big fuss about them, isthat right?

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

14

Chow: Yes, that's right. It is like OuterMongolia. The Japanese have an interest inOuter Mongolia. If we were on the Mainland,we might be over-sensitive about OuterMongolia and Tibet. The important thing is thatthey remain politically autonomous.

Kissinger: You are interested in Tibet.(Laughter)

Chow: In our bilateral relations we willcontinue to play it cool. We have told theJapanese that, for instance, we will trade witheveryone. We will even trade with the socialistcountries like East Germany. We would rathertrade, of course, with our friends, but . . .

Kissinger: Will you negotiate with theMainland?

Chow: No.

Kissinger: People have asked me often aboutmy comments on this in my press conference atthe end of October. To be honest, I thought thatmy comments would be helpful to you. I wastrying to remove that item from the agenda inPeking during the President's visit. What Iindicated was a policy of allowing the Mainlandand Taiwan to settle the problem politicallythemselves, without the use of force. You willget no pressure from us to settle this matter aslong as President Nixon remains in office. Ithink this is the best possible formula from yourperspective. If we were to say that we wouldnot accept a political solution, the result wouldbe a big international incident-problems at theUnited Nations; in short, a big issue. As long asno pressure is put on you for a politicalsettlement, why isn't this formula the bestpossible policy?

Shen: When you say that it is an internalChinese affair that gives the impression thoughthat you are washing your hands of it.

Kissinger: I didn't say that we were washingour hands of it. I said merely that we would put

no pressure on you to make a politicalsettlement and that we would tolerate no forceon the part of either side in resolution of thedispute. It seems to me to be a very practicalsolution. Regardless, I don't think that ZhouEn-lai will renounce force. He isn't about readyto ask us to act as an intermediary in thismatter.

Shen: The last thing anybody would beinterested in would be having you act as anintermediary.

Kissinger: It is important to do a little Chinesethinking here, to look at the matter in acomplicated light. This issue will come up atthe UN year after year. We will continually saythat our policy is to tolerate no use of force insettling the political matter. What can gowrong?

Shen: But we need desperately to maintain ourdefense capacities. If they lag, it might lead theCommunists to a miscalculation.

Kissinger: We have already talked about thedefense matters. Personally, I don't see amilitary capacity by the Mainland Chinesewhich would be effective against you. They arenot about ready to use their air force againstyou. They are too scared of the Russians; whywould they bother to take you on? You know, ahundred miles of water to cross is quitedifficult.

Chow: But they might use tricks. They mightlink this issue to the prisoners of war or theVietnam problem. Of course, we know that youare smart enough not to be taken in.

Shen: People on Taiwan are concerned. Whatwe are confront ing here is largely apsychological question.

Kissinger: Whatever materials are in themilitary pipeline on our systems program, wewill deliver on. To be frank, I don't know thedetails of exactly what is, but, Mr. Foreign

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

15

Minister, when you were Ambassador inWashington, we did what you wanted, didn'twe? What you needed, we gave you. Youappear to think that the Communists are quiteflexible. I don't. I believe that their domesticproblems are very serious, that they will notrenounce the use of force in the Taiwan issue,and also that they will not use Vietnam topressure us on a political settlement.

Chow: There are many rumors about . . .

Kissinger: Yes, of course, I hear all theserumors. There is one that I made a deal withChou in China that we would withdraw troopsfrom Taiwan before his visits. Have we? Let meask you this: Have we withdrawn any troops? Icertainly don't think so, to the best of myknowledge. There may have been somerotations, but no withdrawals.

Chow: (The Foreign Minister made somecomments about General Barnes29which werenot intelligible.)

Kissinger: You get all the stories that aren'ttrue.

Chow: (The Foreign Minister discussed someaspect of dealing with the Japanese-more wasnot understandable.)

Kissinger: We will talk toSato and Fukuda inSan Clemente and attempt to restrain theiractivities in the Islands. You stick to your gunsand be sure to keep us informed on all yourdealings with the Communists.

Shen: We have certainly learned our lesson.We have talked to the President three times, tothe Vice President once.

Kissinger: You have showed great dignity andcharacter. Of all the sons-of-bitches in theworld, you are the last of all who deserve whathas happened this year.

Chou: Thank you very much for taking the time

to meet with us today.

Kissinger: You must understand that what wedo, we do with a heavy heart. We don't do it tobetray our friends. We take actions visà-vis theCommunists only because those actions arerequired.I assure you again that you will get nopressure from us on any political deal with theMainland.

At this point the party retired from Dr.Kissinger's villa and began to walk back to thehotel, where the Chinese boarded their vehicle.During the walk, Dr. Kissinger spoke with theForeign Minister about several problems. Dr.Kissinger emphasized again his impression thatthe formula of no-military action, but anopenness to political accommodations, was thebest possible formula for the ChineseN a t i o n a l i s t s . O n t h e U N i s s u e , h eacknowledged that the United States hadengaged in what turned out to be a badstrategy vis-à-vis the timing of the secondreturn from China. He indicated that hethought a two-week delay would have beenpossible had the matter been handled moreproperly. General comments were made aboutthe Japanese vis-à-vis the United States; theirtouchiness on the China trip, their trading rolewith Taiwan, etc.30

FIFTH SCENE:

OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY ,HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ONFOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATESSENATE

On October 27, 1971, the U.S. SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations opened at10.15 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate OfficeBuilding. Senator J. W. Fulbright chaired,saying: The treaty comes before us against abackdrop of strained United States-Japaneserelations, stemming primarily from many longsuppressed economic tensions and aggravatedby the developments of the past few monthsregarding China. The United States has now

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

16

stated that it seeks to normalize relations withthe People's Republic of China, a change inpolicy apparently taken without consultationwith Japan. And the People's Republic has nowbeen seated as the representative of China inthe United Nations. These important stepsnaturally have a substantial impact affectingU.S. security interests throughout Asia,including Okinawa. In considering thereversion treaty, the committee will beinterested in examining the general effect ofthe treaty on United-States-Japanese relationsas well as its implications for U.S. treatycommitments and security interests in Asia."

As Fulbright said, as the United States has nowstated that it seeks to normalize relations withthe People's Republic of China, the Japanesegovernment opposed the People's Republic ofChina being seated as the representative ofChina in the United Nations in the last minutes.

Opening Statement by J. W. Fulbrightreads:

Today the committee opens its public hearingson the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. The treatyrepresents the end of an era in United States-Japan relations. It settles the last remainingmajor issues between the two countries arisingout of World War II, returning to Japan theremaining occupied territory which has beenpromised it. Ratification of this treaty wouldremove the last vestige of occupying powerstatus now held by the United States and wouldformalize a relationship of equality between thetwo states. In his letter transmitting the treatyto the Senate, the President has urged that thereturn of Okinawa "is essential to thecontinuation of friendly and productiverelations between the United States andJapan."

The treaty comes before us against a backdropof strained United States-Japanese relations,stemming primarily from many long suppressedeconomic tensions and aggravated by thedevelopments of the past few months regarding

China. The United States has now stated that itseeks to normalize relations with the People'sRepublic of China, a change in policyapparently taken without consultation withJapan. And the People's Republic has now beenseated as the representative of China in theUnited Nations. These important stepsnaturally have a substantial impact affectingU.S. security interests throughout Asia,including Okinawa. In considering thereversion treaty, the committee will beinterested in examining the general effect ofthe treaty on United States-Japanese relationsas well as its implications for U.S. commitmentsand security interests in Asia.

We are very pleased this morning to welcomethe Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, whowi l l in i t iate the presentat ion of theadministration's position. If I may add, Mr.Secretary, speaking personally, although therehas been much criticism of the action of theUnited Nations and I regret that our positionwas not fully supported, nevertheless Ipersonally feel that this action over a longperiod may prove to be beneficial to thepolicies of this administration. And I am not abit discouraged as to the future of your effortsto bring about much better relations with Chinaand the rest of the world.

Statement of Hon. William P. Rogers,Secretary of State; Accompanied by U. AlexisJohnson, Under Secretary of State for PoliticalAffairs reads as follows:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; Iappreciate those remarks. Mr. Chairman andmembers of the committee, I am here today toexplain why this administration considers itvery important that the Senate should adviseand consent to the ratification of the agreementbetween the United States and Japan. Theagreement, signed on June 17, 1971, providesfor the return of the Ryukyu Islands to theadministrative control of Japan. This agreementcan, I believe, truly be called an historic

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

17

document. It would resolve the last major U.S.-Japanese issue arising from World War II. Theagreement provides for the return to Japaneseadministration of an area which has beenhistorically associated with Japan and whosepopulation strongly desires to be united onceagain with its native land. The Ryukyus are alsoan area of significant strategic importance tothe United States. The agreement takes fullaccount of this agreement and its relatedarrangements would protect and promote theU.S. security interests in the Far East. DeputySecretary Packard will discuss its securityaspects in greater detail in his testimony.

Among 61 points which Rogers raised andanswered to Senates questions, I will introducethree points; No.4 Japan's Retention ofResidual Authority, No.5 Recognizing ofJapan's Residual Authority, and No. 17Sovereignty of Senkaku Islands.

No. 4 Japan's Retention of ResidualAuthority

On September 5, 1951, in presenting the draftof the peace treaty to the Peace Conference,Ambassador John Foster Dulles noted thatsome of the allied powers had urged that thetreaty require Japan to renounce i tssovereignty. Others had proposed that theislands be restored completely to Japan. "In theface of this division of allied opinion,"Ambassador Dulles said, "the United States feltthat the best formula would be to permit Japanto retain residual sovereignty, while making itpossible for these islands to be brought into theUnited Nations trusteeship system, with theUnited States as administering authority." Itwas decided at that time that although theUnited States had long-term security interestsin the Ryukyus, the "peace of reconciliation,"which we and most of our allies sought withJapan, would be vitiated by the islands'enforced, permanent detachment from Japan.The "residual sovereignty" formula was clearlydesigned to convey the thought to Japan and to

the world that although the United States wasobliged to retain control of the Ryukyustemporarily for security reasons, what hadbeen Japanese territory was not beingpermanently detached from Japan and theprinciple of no U.S. territorial acquisitions as aresult of war was being observed.

No.5 Recognizing of Japan's ResidualAuthority

In December 1953, the United States returnedthe northern portion of the Okinawa Islandchain, the Amami Islands, to Japanesejurisdiction. In June 1957 President Eisenhowerand Prime Minister Kishi reaffirmed "Japaneseresidual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus. In June1961, President Kennedy and Prime MinisterIkeda did l ikewise. In March 1962, inconnection with an executive order concerningthe administration of the islands issued on thebasis of a U.S. Government task force study ofthe Ryukyus policies and programs, PresidentKennedy recognized the Ryukyus "to be a partof the Japanese homeland." He added that he"looked forward to the day when the securityinterests of the free world will permit theirrestoration to full Japanese sovereignty." InNovember 1967, President Johnson and PrimeMinister Sato met in Washington and agreed onthe establishment of an advisory Committee tothe High Commissioner "to promote theintegration of the Ryukyus with Japan and thushelp to minimize the stresses that wouldaccompany reversion." President Johnson alsostated at the time that he "fully understood thedesire of the Japanese people for the reversionof the islands." The President and the PrimeMinister agreed to conduct joint andcontinuous review of the status of the RyukyuIslands, "guided by the aim of returningadministrative rights over these islands toJapan. This left Okinawa, the Daito Islands, andthe more southerly islands in the RyukyuArchipelago as the only territories listed underArticle III of the peace treaty, which were stillunder U.S. administration. Finally, President

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

18

Nixon and Prime Minister Sato, in theircommuniqué of November 1969, announcedthat "The two Governments would immediatelyenter into consultations regarding specificarrangements for accomplishing the earlyreversion of these islands without detriment tothe security of the Far East, including Japan."The President and the Prime Minister," thecommuniqué continued, "agreed to expeditethe consultations with a view of accomplishingthe reversion during 1972, subject to theconclusion these specific arrangements withthe necessary legislative support."

Thus Japan's "residual sovereignty" overOkinawa has been recognized by everyAmer ican Pres ident and every U.S .administration since the end of the occupation.The agreement before you, Mr. Chairman andmembers of the committee, the agreementbefore you and its related arrangements arethe logical and timely culmination of an historicprogression set in motion over 20 years ago.

―Thus, the author considers that the reversionof Okinawa is widely recognized by the Alliesand by the world opinion. The problem is thesovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. Regardingthis problem point No. 17 of Rogers 'explanation reads:

No.17 Sovereignty of Island Senkaku

Fulbright said: There is this troublesomequestion that I have seen in the paper and Iwondered if you wanted to comment on it. Ibelieve it concerns the island of Senkaku. Isthat left as is without an attempt to determineits sovereignty? There was a piece in the paperthe other day indicating that there may besome difficulty over the sovereignty of thatisland.

Secretary Rogers replied, Mr. Chairman I amglad you asked that question because we havemade it clear that this treaty does not affect thelegal status of those islands at all. Whatever thelegal situation was prior to the treaty is going

to be the legal situation after the treaty comesinto effect.

The Chairman. In any case, that is not areason to object to this treaty, whatever onemay think about it. Is that correct?

Secretary Rogers. That is right. That iscorrect.

The Chairman. It does not affect it.

Regarding Japan's Retention of ResidualAuthority there were several questions. Whatis the concept of Residual Authority? Is it alegal concept or just political maneuvering?

After all, the following letter by Robert I Starr,Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asianand Pacific affairs is the legal position of theU.S. Government.

******************************************************************

Department of State,

Washington, D.C., October 20, 1971.

Robert Morris, Esq.,

Rice & Rice,

Mercantille Dallas Building, Dallas, Tex.

Dear Mr. Morris: Secretary Rogers has askedme to reply to your letter [Robert Morris] ofSeptember 28, 1971, concerning the claim ofGrace Hsu to ownership of the Tiaoyutai,Huang Wei Yu, and Chih Yu islands. We assumethat you that by "Huang Wei Yu"and "Chih Yu",you refer to Huang-wei-chiao and Chih-wei-chiao, two islets in the Tiao-yu-tai group. TheJapanese names for these two islands arerespectively Kobi-sho and Sekibi-sho, and theentire group is known in Japanese as theSenkaku Islands. Under Article of the 1951Treaty of Peace with Japan, the United Statesacquired administrative rights over "Nansei

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

19

Shoto" south of 29 degrees north latitude. Thisterm was understood by the United States andJapan to include the Senkaku Islands, whichwere under Japanese administration at the endof the Second World War and which are nototherwise specifically referred to in the PeaceTreaty. In accordance with understandingsreached by President Nixon and Prime MinisterSato of Japan in 1969, the United States isexpected to return to Japan in 1972 theadministrative rights to Nansei Shoto which theUnited States continues to exercise under thePeace Treaty. A detailed agreement to thiseffect, on the terms and conditions for thereversion of the Ryukyu Islands, including theSenkakus, was signed on June 17, 1971, andhas been transmitted to the Senate for itsadvice and consent to ratification.

The Government of the Republic of China andJapan are in disagreement as to sovereigntyover the Senkaku Islands. You should know aswell that the People's Republic of China hasalso claimed sovereignty over the islands. TheUnited States believes that a return ofadministrative rights over those islands toJapan, from which the rights were received,can in no way prejudice any underlying claims(of ROC and/or PRC). The United States cannotadd to the legal rights Japan possessed beforeit transferred administration of the islands tous, nor can the United States, by giving backwhat it received, diminish the rights of otherclaimants. The United States has made noclaim to the Senkaku Islands and considers thatany conflicting claims to the islands are amatter for resolution by the parties concerned.I hope that this information is helpful to you. IfI can be of any further assistance, please do nothesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

Robert I Starr,

Acting Assistant Legal Adviser

for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

**********************************************************************

This is the most important legal statement ofthe U.S. Government on the sovereignty of theSenkaku islands. The United States hascontinued to maintain this position since theratification of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty,typical examples being China's MaritimeTerritorial Claims: Implications for U.S.Interests, November 12, 2001 andSenkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: U.S.Treaty Obligations, September 25, 2012.

Unfortunately, most Japanese people, includingso-called experts on international problems,know nothing about these U.S.-Taiwannegotiations and their results. The resultingmisunderstandings of the conditions ofReversion Treaty sustain Japanese nationalism.

***********************************

Appendix: The Lessons of Japan-Taiwanagreement on fishing rights around theSenkaku/Diaoyu Islands

The Asahi reported 'Japan, Taiwan agree onfishing rights around Senkakus', on April 10,2013 as follows;

Japan made concessions to reach a basicagreement with Taiwan over fishing rightsaround the disputed Senkaku Islands, a dealthat will likely rile China. Under the agreement,which could be announced as early as April 10,Taiwanese fishing boats are prohibited fromentering Japan's territorial waters within 12nautical miles of the Senkaku Islands in theEast China Sea, according to sources.However, they can operate in the rich fishinggrounds outside the territorial waters.

Tokyo and Taipei plan to set up a joint controlcommittee to arrange the fishing fleet sizes ofboth sides, the sources said. Most of the areathat will be under joint control lies south of 27

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

20

degrees north latitude, east of the Japan-Chinamedian line and northwest of the boundaryclaimed by Taiwan. The area also includes partof the waters north of the Yaeyama Islands andsoutheast of the boundary claimed by Taiwan, arich fishing ground that Taipei is eager toharvest. The Senkakus, a group of fiveuninhabited islets and reefs, are administeredby Japan but also claimed by both China andTaiwan, which call them Diaoyu and Diaoyutai,respectively. Taiwan also lays claim to fishingrights in waters around the Senkaku Islands.China has called on Taiwan to form a unifiedfront against Japan over the Senkakus issue."Compatriots on both sides of the strait mustjointly preserve sovereignty over the DiaoyuIslands," a spokesman for the State Council ofChina's Taiwan Affairs Office said.

However, Japan's concessions on fishing rightsto Taiwan have driven a wedge between Chinaand Taiwan and prevented a possible unifiedfront over the territorial dispute. "Sovereigntycannot be divided, but resources can beshared," Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou said.Neither Tokyo nor Taipei plans to mention thesovereignty issue in the agreement. The watersaround the Senkaku Islands are consideredtraditional operating areas for Taiwanesefishermen. With the bluefin tuna fishing seasonbeginning in April, a delay in the agreementwith Japan could have caused an uproar amongTaiwanese fishermen. The part of the EastChina Sea close to the Senkaku and Yaeyamaislands in Okinawa Prefecture is a prolificfishing ground that has attracted many fishingboats from Japan, Taiwan and China. That isalso an area where exclusive economic zonesclaimed by the three sides overlap. The lack ofa f isheries pact has meant that manyTaiwanese fishing boats have been seized byJapan Coast Guard cutters. The fisheries talksbetween Tokyo and Taipei started in 1996,were halted in 2009, and resumed in 2012.THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

In the writer's view one of the most importantfacts is that the PRC did not strongly opposethe Japan-Taiwan fishing agreement. This is abackground fact that is easily forgotten, but itis very important for future arrangements withthe PRC.

A concept that provided the basis for Japan-Taiwan negotiation is Dr. Ma Ying-jeou's thesisthat "Sovereignty cannot be divided, butresources can be shared." Dr. Ma Ying-jeou'sHarvard Law School dissertation is titled,Trouble over Oily Waters: Legal Problems ofSeabed Boundaries and Foreign Investments inthe East China Sea, December 1980. Thereason why this agreement has beensuccessfully concluded is that neither Tokyonor Taipei plans to mention the sovereigntyissue in the agreement.

Applying Ma Ying-jeou's thesis to the Japan-China Senkaku Conflict, Japan's effectivecontrol over the Senkaku Islands should berespected, while, at the same time, the ROC'sand the PRC's underlying claims of thesovereignty of Diaoyutai should also berespected. Japan should not reject ROC andP R C c l a i m s o n s o v e r e i g n t y o f t h eSenkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. We need a new

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

21

formula for peace in the East China Sea.

This is a revised version of an article preparedfor the inaugural meeting of the East AsianMaritime Cooperation Forum (EAMCF) atBEXCO Convention Center on December 19,2013, sponsored by Sea Power League of theRepublic of Korea (SPLRK) and Seoul NationalUniversity Asia Center (SNUAC).

Yabuki Susumu, Professor emeritus atYokohama University, is one of Japan's leadingspecialists on Mao Zedong, on China-JapanRelat ions, and on Chinese economicdevelopment and geopolitics. His two mostrecent books are ﾁャｲﾒﾘｶ―米中結託と日本の進路 (Chimerica: US-China Co-dependence andJapan's Way Forward) and 尖閣問題の核心. 日中関係はどうなる(The Core of the SenkakuProblem: What is to Become of Japan-ChinaRelations.)

See also his interview with the Asahi"INTERVIEW: China-watcher Yabuki saysSenkakus are a diplomatic mistake by Japan,"Dec 12, 2012

And three interviews with Yabuki by StephenHarmer at Forbes: Interview with ProfessorYabuki on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis and U.S.-China-Japan Relations, Oct 3, 2012; and Japanand U.S. Ignored Chinese Signals and History,Blundering into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis,February 20, 2013; and Mark Selden at theA s i a - P a c i f i c J o u r n a lhttp://japanfocus.org/-Yabuki-Susumu/3906 .

Mark Selden is Senior Research Associate,Cornell University and an Asia-Pacific JournalCoordinator.

Recommended Citation: Yabuki Susumu andM a r k S e l d e n , " T h e O r i g i n s o f t h eSenkaku/Diaoyu Dispute between China,Taiwan and Japan," The Asia-Pacific Journal,Vol. 12, Issue 2, No. 3, January 13, 2014.

Notes

1 Diaoyutai shi zhongguo guyou de lingtu,Guowuyuan baodao-bangongshi.

2 Congressional Research Service Report,Report for Congress, CRS 7-5700, by Mark E.Manyin

3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China.

4 http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/senkaku/

5 Memorandum of Conversation, Source:National Archives, Nixon PresidentialMaterials, NSC Files, Box 1025, President/HAKMemcons, Memcon-the President, Kissinger,and Amb. Chow Apr. 12, 1971. Top Secret;Sensitive; Eyes Only. The President's DailyDiary indicates that Chow met with thePresident from 11:31 a.m. to 12:05 p.m. andthat Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol for theDepartment of State, was also present. (Ibid.,White House Central Files) The conversationwas recorded by the White House tapingsystem. The statements in quotation marks areactually paraphrases. (Ibid., White HouseTapes, Recording of conversation betweenNixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, 11:28a.m.–12:41 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No.477–3)

6 Apparent reference to the "Second AnnualReport to Congress on United States ForeignRelations," February 25, 1971, in PublicPapers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 219–345.

7 Probable reference to an April 9 memorandumfrom Kissinger to Nixon; see Foreign Relations,1969–1976, vol. V, Document 344. See alsoDocument 167 in this volume.

8 Japanese-American negotiations over Okinawasparked renewed Chinese interest in theSenkaku Islands (Tiaoyutai or Diaoyutai inChinese). Chow gave a 4-page aide mémoire toGreen on September 16, 1970, outlining ROCobjections to Japanese sovereignty over theislands. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROCF i l e s : L o t 7 5 D 6 1 , S u b j e c t F i l e s ,

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

22

Petroleum–Senkakus, January–September1970). Shoesmith summarized reports ofstudent demonstrations in Taipei againstJapanese control of the Senkaku Islands andnoted: "The Embassy believes that the initiativefor the demonstrations has come from thestudents rather than the government. But thelatter probably has given tacit approval out ofreluctance to oppose the fruits of youthfulpatriotism and its own dissatisfaction over ourChina policy and oil exploration moratorium."(Memorandum from Shoesmith to Green, April17; ibid., Lot 75 D 76, Petroleum–Senkakus,January–March 1971) There were also studentprotests in the United States and Hong Kong.The White House tape of the April 12 meetingindicates that Chow emphasized that the finaldisposition of the Senkakus should be keptopen, and that this issue was a measure of theROC's ability to protect itself. He emphasizedthe symbolic importance of the islands. (Ibid.,Nixon Presidential Materials, White HouseTapes, Recording of conversation betweenNixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, OvalOffice, Conversation No. 477–3)

9 After Chow left the Oval Office, the Presidentremarked that Chow was correct on the need toconsider the political views of overseasChinese. (Ibid.)

10 Nixon remarked that he would not raise theissue of the U.S. position in public, but, ifasked, would say that it had not changed. Healso emphasized that Murphy's visit would beprivate, with no press coverage, and thatMurphy would report to the White House, notthe Department of State. Finally he urgedChow to be "mum" about the United Nationsissue until after Murphy visited Taiwan. (Ibid.)The White House also wanted to l imitspeculation by U.S. officials concerning policytoward China. An April 14 memorandum fromKissinger to the Acting Secretary of State readsin its entirety: "In the wake of recentdevelopments, the President has asked that allsubstantive comments by U.S. officials,

including responses to formal press inquiries,background statements on and off-the-recordremarks and guidance to Posts abroad,concerning U.S. relations with the People'sRepublic of China be cleared with him throughmy office." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 521, CountryFiles, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

11 Memorandum of Conversation, Source:National Archives, Nixon PresidentialMaterials, NSC Files, Country

Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Confidential.Sent for information. Drafted on April 14. Themeeting was held in Kissinger's office. In anApril 14 covering memorandum, Holdridgesuggested that no further distribution be made.Kissinger initialed his approval. (Ibid.)Kissinger and Chow met from 3:31 to 3:47 p.m.(Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,Kissinger Papers, Box 480, Miscellany,1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

12 During April 1971 there were signs that theRepublic of China had accepted the U.S.position. Kearns reported that he spokeprivately with Chiang Ching-kuo after a dinnerat McConaughy's home in Taipei . Heparaphrased Chiang as follows: "It is necessaryfor us to publicly oppose actions taken by theUnited States Government that favor theChinese Communists. However, we wish thePresident to know that we understand thenecessity of taking such actions at this time."Chiang asked that his message be relayed tothe President, and Peterson forwarded it onApril 17. (Memorandum from Kearns toPeterson, April 15, and memorandum fromPeterson to Nixon, April 17; both in NationalArchives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 443 andWilliam P. Rogers' Official and Personal Papers,White House Correspondence)

13 Asian and Pacific Council.

14 Source: National Archives, Nixon PresidentialMaterials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files,Far East, China, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

23

information. A notation on the memorandumindicates Kissinger saw it on April 23, 1971.

15 Memorandum From the President's Assistantfor International Economic Affairs (Peterson) toPresident Nixon. Source: National Archives,Nixon Presidential Materials, White HouseSpecial Files, President's Office Files, Box 12,President's Handwriting Files. Secret. Sent foraction. A notation on the memorandumindicates the President saw it. This trip wasarranged in early May. See Document 121.Overall trade policy toward the nations of EastAsia is documented in Foreign Relations,1969–1976, volume IV.

16Attached but not printed is a message sent viabackchannel by Kennedy to Peterson on June 7.A relatively complete record of the Sino-American textile negotiations is in NationalArchives, Nixon Presidential Materials, WhiteHouse Special Files, Staff Member and OfficeFiles, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, TextileNegotiations (cables).

17 Source: National Archives, Nixon PresidentialMaterials, White House Special Files,President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda forthe President. Secret; Eyes Only.

18 Nixon, Kissinger, and Peterson met at CampDavid from 3:25 to 4:10 p.m. on June 7. (Ibid.,White House Central Files, President's DailyDiary) According to a draft telegram to Rogersby U. Alexis Johnson: "Henry Kissinger steppedinto the breach with material that I suppliedhim, and last night [June 7] obtained thePresident's decision that we would not changeour position on the Senkakus. However, thispoints up the heat that GRC is bringing to bearon us and in turn in some degree probablyreflects the heat that GRC is feeling on asubject which it neglected for so long." (Ibid.,RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695,Nodis Chrono 1971) Kissinger and Johnsondiscussed the Senkaku Island issue bytelephone on the morning of June 7. Johnson

stated: "The principle that we are applying isthat we received the islands from Japan foradministration and are returning them to Japanwithout prejudice to the rights-no positionbetween the two governments on it ."(Memorandum of conversation betweenKissinger and Johnson, June 7, 10:35 a.m.; ibid.,Telcons, May–June 1971)

19 See Document 133 and footnote 2 thereto.

20 In an October 5 memorandum to Haig,Holdridge wrote that Peterson's office hadcontacted him to note that no militaryassistance mission had been dispatched toTaiwan. He noted, "Given AmbassadorKennedy's promise to the GRC, and given thedoubts likely to be raised in their mind by anyconsiderable postponement of the surveymission, we should move ahead reasonablysoon to send a suitable officer to Taiwan."Haig's handwritten comment on the bottom ofthe memorandum reads: "Cripes John-this isdynamite. In any event we should wait till wesee how textiles come out."(National Archives,Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX)

21 Representative Wilbur D. Mills (D–Arkansas)was the ranking member of the House Waysand Means Committee.

22 On June 7 Kennedy told Chiang Ching-kuo ofthe decision on the Senkaku Islands. Chiangasked that the U.S. Government categoricallystate at the time of the signing of the Okinawareversion agreement that the final status of theislands had not been determined and should besettled by all parties involved. (Backchannelmessage from Kennedy to Peterson, June 9;ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Memberand Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971,Textile Negotiations (cables)) In a June 10memorandum to Kissinger, Johnson noted thatRogers had raised this issue with JapaneseForeign Minister Aichi at their meeting in Parison June 9. (Ibid., RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson

APJ | JF 12 | 2 | 3

24

Files: Lot 96 D 695, Kissinger, Henry, 1971) OnJune 12 Peterson informed Kennedy, who wasin Seoul, that Rogers had approached Aichi,"strongly urging GOJ to discuss issue with GRCprior to signature of Okinawa Agreement onJune 17." He also noted that a Department ofState spokesman would announce on June 17that a return of "administrative rights" to Japanof the Senkaku Islands "can in no way prejudicethe underlying claims of the Republic of China."(Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, WhiteHouse Special Files, Staff Member and OfficeFiles, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, TextileNegotiations (cables)) On June 15 Petersoncabled Kennedy, in Seoul, stating that Aichihad met with the ROC Ambassador in Tokyo todiscuss the Senkaku issue. (Ibid.) On July 12Chiang Ching-kuo complained to McConaughythat "the Japanese so far have refused to talk inany meaningful way on the subject." (Telegram3388 from Taipei, July 12; ibid., RG 59,CentralFiles 1970–73, POL CHINAT)

23 An exchange of notes between Rogers andAmbassador Shen on June 29 extended andamended the October 12, 1967, agreement ontrade in cotton textiles. See TIAS 6361 (the1967 agreement), TIAS 7011 (an exchange ofnotes for an interim agreement signed in lateDecember 1970), and TIAS 7135 (the June 1971notes). The agreement was further extendedand amended in August 1971 (TIAS 7177). Anew agreement was reached in December 1971(TIAS 7249, corrected in TIAS 7469). TheUnited States and the Republic of China werealso parties to a multilateral accord on trade inwool and man-made fiber textile products inDecember 1971 (TIAS 7493 and 7498).

24 Source: National Archives, Nixon PresidentialMaterials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files,

Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret; Sensitive; EyesOnly. The meeting was held at Kissinger's villaat the Key Biscayne Hotel. A short attachednote reads: "Coleman: This is ready to go tofile. JHH doesn't think it's necessary to haveHAK read it through. Eileen."25 Kissinger held a short press conference onNovember 29 to announce the date for thePresident's trip to the PRC, where he wasasked about the U.S. defense commitment tothe ROC. (Department of State Bulletin,December 20, 1971, p. 709)

26 In a January 14 memorandum, Holdridgeinformed Kissinger that "Chou's commentprobably represents a form of mild pressure onus to avoid delays or disapprovals rather thandiscontent over an actuality; [less than 1 line ofsource text not declassified] reporting hasindicated considerable anxiety in the ROCDefense Ministry that we might tighten orreduce the flow of military assistance."(National Archives, Nixon PresidentialMaterials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files,Far East, China, Vol. X)

27 All ellipses are in the source text.

28 Holdridge informed Kissinger that theDepartment of Defense had passed to the ROCthe White House's request that no crewmembers arrive in the United States prior toMarch 11, 1972. (National Archives, NixonPresidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523,Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X)

29 Apparent reference to Major General JohnWinthrop Barnes, who became Chief, MAAG, inthe ROC in 1972.

30 Brackets in the source text.