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Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects

The Paradox of Nature: Merleau-Ponty's Semi-Naturalistic Critique of HusserlianPhenomenologyShazad AkhtarMarquette University

Recommended CitationAkhtar, Shazad, "The Paradox of Nature: Merleau-Ponty's Semi-Naturalistic Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology" (2010).Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 65.http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/65

THEPARADOXOFNATURE:MERLEAU‐PONTY’SSEMI‐NATURALISTICCRITIQUE

OFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY

by

ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A.

ADissertationsubmittedtotheFacultyoftheGraduateSchool,MarquetteUniversity,inPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementsfortheDegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy

Milwaukee,Wisconsin

December2010

ABSTRACT

THEPARADOXOFNATURE:MERLEAU‐PONTY’SSEMI‐NATURALISTICCRITIQUEOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY

ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A.

MarquetteUniversity,2010ThisdissertationdealswithMerleau‐Ponty’scriticaltransformationofHusserl’sphenomenologythrougharethinkingoftheconceptof“nature,”whichHusserl,Merleau‐Pontyargues,failstointegrateorexplainsuccessfullyinhisphilosophicalsystem.ThefirstchapterreconstructsHusserl’s“transcendental‐phenomenological”projectinIdeasI,whilethesecondwidenstheinvestigationtocovertheontologically‐centeredIdeasIIandIII.Inmythirdchapter,IchartwhatIcallMerleau‐Ponty’s“organicappropriation”ofHusserlandtheuniquehermeneuticalchallengesitposes.HeretheambiguityofIdeasII,whichbothgroundssubjectivityinthelivedbodyandseparatesnaturefrom“spirit”(Geist),playsacrucialrole.ThefourthchapterconcentratesontheMerleau‐Ponty’slatermeditationsontheontologyofnatureandsubjectivity,particularlyinhisrecentlytranslatedNaturelecturesof1959‐61.Finally,thefifthchaptercomparesandcontrastsHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty,intermsofbothsubstanceandmethod,throughadetailedexaminationoftheirdifferentnotionsof(andwaystoaddress)“paradox.”IshowhowMerleau‐Ponty’s“paradoxical”thinkingstemsnotfromchanceormeretemperamentbutafundamental,systematiccommitmenttotheself‐contradictory(or“dialectical,”butinamodifiedsense)natureofbeingandtruththemselves.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A. Iowetheconceptionandfruitionofthisprojectabovealltomydirector,Pol

Vandevelde.ItisinhisclassesthatIfirstawakenedtotheimportanceof

phenomenologyandthepowerofitsmethod.Hehastaughtmethetextsandstyles

ofHusserl,Heidegger,Merleau‐Ponty,andmanyotherfigureswhohaveinfluenced

myphilosophicalthinkingandresearchdecisively.Ihavelearnedtremendously

fromlengthydiscussionsoverbothhisownandotherauthors’originalworks.Ifthis

dissertationissuccessfulinanysmallmeasure,thisisowingsubstantiallytothe

guidanceandinfluenceofDr.Vandevelde.

Ihavealsomysecondreader,Dr.SebastianLuft,tothankprofuselyforhis

energeticandgenerousaidtomeovertheyearsandinthecompletionofthe

presentproject.Ihavebenefittedgreatlyfrommyyears‐longconversationswithDr.

LuftonmanytopicsrangingfromphenomenologytoHegelianidealismandmuch

more.Hisfriendship,availability,andcutting‐edgescholarshiphavebeenvery

valuabletomeinmyacademicdevelopment.

Inaddition,IwouldalsoliketotaketheopportunitytosincerelythankDr.

AndyTallonandDr.StephenWatsonofNotreDamefortheirencouragementand

suggestionsduringmywritingprocess.

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ImustaddthatIwasgreatlyaidedincompletingthisdissertationinatimely

mannerbytheMarquetteGraduateSchoolanditsgenerousfinancialsupport,

throughtheRaynorFellowship,throughthe2009‐2010academicyear.Iamalso

deeplygratefultotheMarquettePhilosophydepartmentforhavingnominatedme

fortheawardand,moregenerally,forhavinggivenmeafirst‐classphilosophical

educationthatIwilltakewithmeandbuildupon,Iamsure,fortherestofmylife.

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TABLEOFCONTENTSACKNOWLEDGMENTS………..................................................................................................................iINTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………..1I.PresentStatusoftheProblem

A.Merleau‐Ponty’sInterpretationofHusserlandHusserl’sConception

ofNature………………………………………………………………………………………..4B.Merleau‐Ponty’sLaterOntologyandConceptofNature…………………………..6C.IdeasIandII………………………………………………………………………………………………7

II.SummaryoftheDissertation

A.ChaptersOneandTwo…………………………………………………………………………...8B.ChaptersThreeandFour……………………………………………………………………...11C.ChapterFive………………………………………………………………………………………...15

III.Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………….17CHAPTERONE:HUSSERL’STRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGYINIDEASI:THEBASICPOSITION………………………………………………………………………………………………...19I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology…………...19II.EpochéandPhenomenologicalReduction

A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..24B.TheNaturalandtheTranscendentalAttitudes………………………………………26

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C.PhenomenologicalEpoché……………………………………………………………………….32D.Phenomenological‐TranscendentalReduction(s)…………………………………34E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction………………………………….38

III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction………………………………………………………………..40

A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence………………………….43B.TheEideticDistinctionbetweenMentalandPhysical……………………………49C.TheChargeofDualism…………………………………………………………………………52D.AbsoluteandRelativeExistenceandthe“World‐Annihilation”Experiment……………………………………………………………………………………………..55E.Husserl’sFinalPosition:“TranscendentalIdealism”………………………………60

IV.ConcludingReflections…………………………………………………………………………………..65CHAPTERTWO:THECONSTITUTIONOFNATURE,BODY,ANDSPIRITINHUSSERL’SIDEASII……………………………………………………………………………………………73I.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………79II.TheOntologicalMatrixofIdeasII/III

A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..79B.TheConstitutionofWorldlyReality

1.MaterialNature…………………………………………………………………………822.AnimalNature,ortheBody‐and‐Soul…………………………………………853.Ego…………………………………………………………………………………………...914.Spirit………………………………………………………………………………………...93

III.Analysis:PhilosophicalDifficultiesofIdeasII/III

A.Introduction:PhenomenologicalMonism,OntologicalDualism……………..99

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B.Husserl’sNaturalism………………………………………………………………………….102C.ThePriorityThesis…………………………………………………………………………….108D.SpiritandConsciousness……………………………………………………………………110E.TheQuestionoftheBody……………………………………………………………………114

IV.Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………..118CHAPTERTHREE:MERLEAU‐PONTY’SORGANICAPPROPRIATIONOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGYI.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………….122II.Merleau‐Ponty’sRelationshiptoHusserl:AnDoxographicalOverviewandCritique

A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………127B.The“StrongView”:Zahavi,Smith,andBarbaras………………………………….129C.“Weak”and“Mixed”Views:Lefort,Richir,Madison,etal.……………………130D.FourWeakReadings:Embree,Behnke,Seebohm,Bergo……………………...133E.ConcludingThoughts………………………………………………………………………….140

III.Merleau‐Ponty’sHusserlianPhenomenology:ByText

A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………141B.HusserlinPP……………………………………………………………………………………..143C.HusserlinMerleau‐Ponty’sLaterWork………………………………………………146

IV.Merleau‐Ponty’sHusserlianPhenomenology:ByTheme

A.ThePhenomenologicalReduction………………………………………………………152B.EssencesandtheEideticReduction…………………………………………………….158

V.ConcludingReflections………………………………………………………………………………….161

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CHAPTERFOUR:MERLEAU‐PONTY’SMATUREONTOLOGYOFNATUREI.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………….166II.NatureandtheOntologyoftheNatureLectures

A.Introduction:TheNatureLectures,TheVisibleandtheInvisible,andtheProjectof“Ontology”……………………………………………………………………………..168B.Defining“Nature”………………………………………………………………………………174C.NatureandtheSciencesofLife…………………………………………………………...181

III.TheNatureLecturesandTheVisibleandtheInvisible:TowardsaNewDialecticalOnto‐Phenomenology

A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………190B.Reversibility………………………………………………………………………………………191C.Flesh………………………………………………………………………………………………….196D.IdentityandDifference,theOneandtheMany:DimensionsofMerleau‐Ponty’sDialectic…………………………………………………………………………………….200

IV.Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………..205CHAPTERFIVE:MERLEAU‐PONTYANDHUSSERLONTHEQUESTIONOFTHEPARADOXOFSUBJECTIVITYANDNATUREI.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………….....207II.Merleau‐Ponty’sPhilosophyofParadox

A.OverviewofMereau‐Ponty’sReferencestoParadox…………………………....211B.Paradoxandthe“PerceptualFaith”…………………………………………………….217C.ParadoxandPhilosophy……………………………………………………………………..220

III.HusserlandParadox……………………………………………………………………………………221IV.TheParadoxofReflection

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A.TheReflectiveAttitude………………………………………………………………………225B.“Hyper‐Reflection”…………………………………………………………………………….229

V.Merleau‐Ponty’sParadoxicalThinkingInRelationtoOtherStylesofThinking:Dialectic,Skepticism/Quietism,andMysticism

A.Merleau‐PontyandHegelianDialectic………………………………………………...234B.Merleau‐PontyandSkepticism/Quietism……………………………………………237C.Merleau‐PontyandMysticism…………………………………………………………….240

VI.Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………….244CONCLUSION

I.Merleau‐Pontyvis‐à‐visHusserl……………………………………………………….....247

II.Merleau‐PontyandSomeOtherPhilosophers……………………………………..251

III.The“PersonalisticAttitude”andtheLimitsofReflection……………………253

IV.PhenomenologyasParadox………………………………………………………………254

V.Naturalism………………………………………………………………………………………...255BIBLIOGRAPHYI.PrimaryLiterature(HusserlandMerleau‐Ponty)

A.Husserl……………………………………………………………………………………………...257B.Merleau‐Ponty…………………………………………………………………………………...258

II.SecondaryLiteratureandOtherWorks

A.BooksandMonographs……………………………………………………………………...259

B.Articles,BookChapters,andVolumeIntroductions……………………………..262

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C.Miscellaneous…………………………………………………………………………………….268

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Introduction

Thecentraldynamicofthisdissertationisthecreativeencounterbetween

MauriceMerleau‐Ponty(1908‐1961)andEdmundHusserl(1859‐1938),twoofthe

mostimportantphilosophersofthetwentiethcentury.Iexplorethisencounter—an

“encounter”betweentwophilosophiesasopposedtotwophilosophers,asthetwo

thinkershadneverformallymetandareseparatedbymorethanageneration—

withrespectprincipallytotheontologicalissuessurroundingtheclassicaldivision

of“nature”and“spirit.”Butinthecaseofphenomenology,ontologicaland

epistemologicalissuescannotbecleanlyseparated.Thusmajorquestionsof

epistemologicalsignificance,suchasthoseofidealismandthenatureofreflection,

arealsoaddressedandrelatedtothequestionofwhatitmeanstodo

phenomenology—andevenphilosophy—itself.Phenomenology,ontology,

epistemology—allofthesetermsarenegotiatedandre‐negotiatedinthecourseof

Merleau‐Ponty’ssustainedhermeneuticsofHusserl’swork,ahermeneuticsthat

opensupontoahiddenworldofpossibilitieslatentinthe(ostensibly)simple

phenomenaofsensing,seeing,speaking,andreflecting.

Merleau‐Ponty’sinterpretationofHusserlhasbeencommentedonbefore.

However,oneoftheuniquecontributionsofthepresentresearch,Ibelieve,isitsuse

oftheconceptof“nature,”afundamentalconcernofboththinkersbutinvery

differentways,togototheheartofthequestionsofphenomenologicalmethodand

therelationshipofhumansubjectivitytotheworld.Thischoiceallowsusto

appreciatethemotivationsofMerleau‐Ponty’srethinkingofphenomenology,

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puttingasideitschallengetoclassicalmetaphysicalbinariessuchas“human‐

animal”and“nature‐spirit,”inthecontextofawiderphilosophical‐ontological

tradition(thoughstillverymucha“modern”one,forthemostpart).Merleau‐

Ponty’scritiqueofsomeelementsofHusserlianphilosophyclearlybelongstohis

generalcritiqueofmodernismand,inturn,blendharmoniouslywithhispositive

appropriationofHusserlianphenomenologyasakindofunified‐fieldtheoryof

Being,oncecleansedofitsCartesianpresuppositions.1

InHusserl,“nature”appearsprimarilyinthreeguises:asthe“natural

attitude”;astheregionaldomainofthe“naturalsciences”;andastheontic‐noematic

correlateof“spirit”intherealmofworldly(non‐transcendental)reality.For

Merleau‐Ponty,ontheotherhand,“nature”comestoemergeasacomplexand

nuanced“otherness”attheheartofsubjectivity,manifestingitselfmostdirectlyin

therealmof“life,”especiallyanimality,andyetalsohauntingconsciousness,or

spirit,withits“presencebyabsence,”itsimpenetrable“origin”‐ality.Itis,as

Schellingsays,a“wildBeing”untamedbythought,yetalsountamable,forthere

couldbenothoughtwithoutahorizon,andthathorizonalityisthedepththat

cannotbeknownwithoutmyvanishingfromtheworldaltogetherandsomehow

“seeingitfromabove”—animpossibilityevenforaGod,however,since,asboth

HusserlandMerleau‐Pontyremindus,visionisacorporealact.

Inmyinterpretation,“Nature”—andthen“Being,”andstillagain,the

“flesh”—come,inMerleau‐Ponty’streatment,toquietlydisplacethe“transcendental

ego”ofHusserl,itselfahold‐overoftheCartesian‐epistemologicalprioritizationof 1 Itisinthislight,too,thatwecanappreciateMerleau‐Ponty’sendorsementoftheworkofLeibniz,Hegel,andBergson,ontheonehand,andhisrejectionof(muchof)KantandSartreontheother.

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the“inner”overthe“outer.”Natureisambiguouslybothinnerandouter—an

interiorityquaexteriority,likethelivingorganism,whose“outwardbehavior”can

onlybeunderstoodasliving‐outwithinthe“internal”horizonofanUmwelt.The

organism,mostevidentlyinthesimpler(butnottheverysimplest)forms,likecrabs

orworms,isradicallyself‐centered(“initsownworld”)atthesametimethatit

lacksacenter,an“ego”thatcandifferentiateitself“absolutely”froma“world”apart

fromitsinteriority.Theanimalisitsworld.Thelivingbeinginitsunitywithits

worldservesasareminderofthepre‐reflectivelifeofconsciousnessthat

underlies—andchallengesfromwithin—thedualismsofreflectivethought,

includingthatofthe“natural”and“spiritual,”thecentraldivisionofHusserl’sIdeas

II.2

Whileremainingaphenomenologisttotheend,Merleau‐Pontyrejectedboth

Husserl’s“transcendentalidealism”3aswellasthelatter’simplicit(andironical)

collusionwithnaturalscienceoveritsdefinitionofthe“essence”ofnature.Itisnot

onlyinresponsetoHusserlorIdeasII,ofcourse,thatMerleau‐Pontydevelopedhis

ideasofnature;afterall,hehadbeenatworkontheontologicalimplicationsof

animalityevenbeforehebecameacquaintedwithHusserl’sworksinaseriousway,

startingwithhisfirstmajorworkTheStructureofBehavior(1942).4Nonetheless,in

IdeasIIheseesHusserlstrugglingwiththeconsequencesofdividingtheworldfrom

consciousnessandnatureandanimalityfromspirit,andhisarticulationofan 2 Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution.Trs.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989 3Itcanbedebatedtowhatdegree,ofcourse;seeToadvine,Ted.“LeavingHusserl’sCave?ThePhilosopher’sShadowRevisited.”InMerleau­Ponty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.71‐94).4Merleau‐Ponty,TheStructureofBehavior.Trans.A.L.Fisher.Boston:BeaconPress,1963.

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alternativecannotbefullyappreciatedwithoutthisworkasahermeneutical

backdrop.

Theremainderofthisintroductionoffersanoverviewofthepresentstatusin

therelevantsecondaryliteratureofthetheme(s)ofthiswork,aswellasapreview

ofthecontentsofthedissertationchapterbychapter,culminatinginasummaryof

theconclusionsIdrawfromalloftheforegoingstudies.

I.PresentStatusoftheProblem

A.Merleau­Ponty’sInterpretationofHusserlandHusserl’sConceptionofNature

WhilethereareanumberofgoodarticlesonMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingof

Husserl,severalofwhicharecollectedinthe2002essaycollectionentitledMerleau­

Ponty’sReadingofHusserl,5thereisverylittlematerialwrittenspecificallyon

Merleau‐Ponty’scritiqueofHusserl’sconceptionofnature,6letaloneasustained

assessmentoftheirrespectivephilosophiesthroughthelensofthisidea.Thedearth

ofmaterialonthequestionofnatureisprobablyduetothefactthatMerleau‐ 5 Merleau­Ponty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002.OthergoodarticlesincludethosebyTaylorCarmanandAnthonySteinbockforinstance,whichbothcompareHusserlianandMerleau‐Pontianphenomenologiesofthebody,amajorthemeofIdeasII;CarmanevenexplicitlydiscussesMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofIdeasII,thoughonlyinpassing.Thismaterialis,however,onlypartiallyrelevantforourpresentpurposes.See:Carman,Taylor.“TheBodyinHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999(pp.205‐225);Steinbock,Anthony.“SaturatedIntentionality.”InTheBody.Ed.DonnWelton,Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,1999(pp.178‐199). 6 AnexceptionisStephenCrowell’sessay“TheMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.”PrintedinIssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996.(pp.81‐106)Thisessayalsocontainsmuchextraneousmaterial,forourpurposes,onthephilosophyofmythology.

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Ponty’smostpointedcriticismsonthisissuearedirectlytobefoundinhislecture

coursesonnature,whichwerehoweverpublishedonlyrelativelyrecently.7The

presentdissertationclosessomeofthisgapinthescholarship.

MuchofthediscussionofMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofandphilosophical

relationtoHusserlispolemicalandinsomewaysparalleltothemorestandard

“HusserlversusHeidegger”debate.TaylorCarmanexpressesacharacteristic“pro‐

Merleau‐Pontian”view:

“UnlikeHusserl,butlikeHeidegger,Merleau‐Pontylooksbeyondthesubject‐objectdividetotrytogaininsightintotheconcretestructuresofworldlyexperience…Indeed,takingtheproblemofembodimentseriously,asMerleau‐Pontydoes,entailsaradicalreassessmentoftheveryconceptualdistinctionsonwhichHusserl’senterpriserests.”8

CarmanfurtherclaimsthatgoingbeyondHusserl“wouldmeanrelinquishingthe

conceptualdualismonwhich[his]projectrests.”9ManyHusserlianswoulddispute

thischaracterizationofHusserl,thoughIpersonallybelieveitislargelyaccurate,10

thoughthereareactuallyseveral“conceptualdualisms,”notjustone,thatmustbe

contendedwithandsortedthroughontheirownterms,notallofwhichequatetoa

“substancedualism”ofasortonefindsinDescartes(andisatleastoutwardly

refutedinHusserl).IaddressthisissueinChapter2.

7 Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Trans.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003. 8 Carman,Taylor.“TheBodyinHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999,p206. 9 Ibid.,p.208 10 FrançoiseDastur,acarefulandrelativelynon‐polemicalreaderofbothHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty,agreeswiththelatterthatHusserlisbasicallydualistic.SeeDastur,Françoise.“HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.65‐77).Merleau‐Pontyisroutinelyreadasazealousanti‐dualist,aclaimIwillpartiallychallengeinchapters4and5.

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Husserlhasplentyofdefenders,ofcourse,someofwhom,likePanos

Theodorou,takeissuewiththewidespreadreadingofIdeasIIthatunderstandsitas

validating,essentially,thenatural‐scientificviewofnature.11J.ClaudeEvansagrees

thatthisreadingismisleading,andgoesevenfurther,arguingforthesuperiorityof

Husserl’saccountofnatureandscienceinIdeasIIoverhislaterreflectionsonthe

life‐world,definitelyaminoritypositionforthoseconcernedwiththisproblem.12

WithinHusserlianscholarship,atleastasevidencedbyMerleau­Ponty’s

ReadingofHusserl,achiefquestionliesinjusthowfarMerleau‐Pontydivergesfrom

Husserl.Fordiametricalpositionsonthisquestion,seeforexampleSeebohm’sand

Zahavi’sarticlesinsaidvolume.13

B.Merleau­Ponty’sLaterOntologyandConceptofNature

InrecentyearstherehasbeenaspateofliteratureonMerleau‐Ponty’slater

philosophyandhisgeneral“ontology.”Theseincludeseveralbook‐length

treatments,forexamplebyDillon(1998)andBarbaras(2004)14—twoofthebest

available—aswellasmanyarticles,interestinglylargelyinEnglish.(Merleau‐Ponty

hasproventobepopularinAmericaespecially,thoughoneshouldnotfailto

11 Theodorou,Panos.“PerceptualandScientificThing:OnHusserl’sAnalysisof“Nature‐Thing”inIdeasII.”InTheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophyVolume5,2005.Eds.BurtHopkinsandStevenCrowell,165‐187.Seattle:NoesisPress,2005. 12 Evans,J.Claude.“WhereistheLife‐World?”PrintedinIssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996. 13 Seebohm,ThomasM.“ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InMerleau­Ponty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.51‐70);Zahavi,Dan.“Merleau‐PontyonHusserl:AReappraisal.”InMerleau­Ponty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.3‐29). 14 Barbaras,Renaud.TheBeingofthePhenomenon.Trans.TedToadvineandLeonardLawlor.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004;Dillon,M.C.Merleau­Ponty’sOntology.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988

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mentionthatthereisalsoaJapaneseMerleau‐PontyCircle).Oneofthesearticles,by

Geraets,dealswiththethemeofnatureexplicitly,15whileothersdealmorewith“the

flesh”andotherrelatedtopicsfromthelaterphilosophy.16Acomprehensive

treatmentofMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyofnature,onelongoverdue,hasbeen

recentlyauthoredbyTedToadvine.17

C.IdeasIandII

RegardingHusserl,thereareinnumerableworksdealingwiththecentral

conceptsoftranscendentalidealismandwithIdeasI18,asatext,inparticular—

indeed,virtuallyeveryintroductorytextorstatementonHusserlhastotakethis

seminalworkintoaccount.Myrelianceonsecondaryliteratureforthesectionon

IdeasIisminimal,however,fortworeasons.First,Iexpoundonlythework’smost

basicthemes—epochéandreduction,noesisandnoema,thetranscendentalego,etc.

Second,althoughthesenotionsthemselvesareallcontroversialandcontested

throughouttheHusserlliterature,myaimisnottogiveadefinitiveinterpretationof

them,onlytofacilitatethroughmytreatmentofthemacomprehensiblediscussion

ofMerleau‐Ponty’sgeneralappropriationsandcriticismsofHusserlian

phenomenology.

15 Geraets,ThéodoreF.“Merleau‐Ponty’sConceptionofNature.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.301‐312). 16 SeeforexampleDastur,Françoise.“World,Flesh,Vision.”InChiasms:Merleau­Ponty’sNotionofFlesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Albany:2000(pp.23‐50). 17 Toadvine,Ted.Merleau­Ponty’sPhilosophyofNature.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2009 18 Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,FirstBook:GeneralIntroductiontoaPurePhenomenology.Trans.F.Kersten.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1983

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WorkonIdeasIIisfarlessextensivethanthatonIdeasI,buttherehasbeen

somenoteworthysecondaryscholarshipinthelastdecadeonIdeasII,someofit

includedinthevolumeIssuesinIdeasII19,whichdrawstogetheranumberofessays

onvariousaspectsofthework.Otherpenetratingreadingsincludethoseof

Rockstad20andthealready‐mentionedEvansandTheodorou.IdeasIIhasofcourse

beenwrittenaboutbymajorphenomenologists,includingRicoeur21,Landgrebe22,

and(obviously)Merleau‐Pontyhimself.Ihavefoundthatthese,alongobviously

withtheprimarytext,arestillthemostvaluableelementsinIdeasIIscholarshipat

thepresenttime.

II.SummaryoftheDissertation

A.ChaptersOneandTwo

InChaptersOneandTwo,IsketchapictureofHusserlofIdeasIandII,the

“idealist”Husserlwho,inthelatterofthesetwoworks,neverthelesslaysthe

foundationsofmostofwhatMerleau‐Pontywillforgeintoanewvisionof 19 IssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII,eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996. 20 Rokstad,Konrad.“TheHistoricityofBodyandSoul.”InPhenomenologyofLife­­FromtheAnimalSoultotheHumanMind:BookI:InSearchofExperience,ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.(pp.127‐159).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,2007;also,Rokstad,Konrad.“Nature,SubjectivityandtheLife‐World.”InAnalectaHusserliana:TheYearbookofPhenomenologicalResearchVolLXXVII,ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.(pp.41‐59).Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishing,2002. 21 Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisofHisPhenomenology.Trans.EdwardG.BallardandLesterEmbree.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1967(Thirdchapter:“Husserl’sIdeasII:AnalysesandProblems,”pp.35‐81). 22 Landgrebe,Ludwig.ThePhenomenologyofEdmundHusserl.Ed.DonnWelton.Ithaca,NewYork:CornellUniversityPress,1981.

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phenomenologyandthenature‐spiritrelation.Asjustalludedto,thefirstchapteris

adetailedoverviewofHusserl’stranscendentalphenomenology—theeideticand

transcendental‐phenomenologicalreductions,thenaturalandtranscendental

attitudes,noesisandnoema,intentionality,thetranscendentalego,constitution,and

thelike.23Thepurposeofthischapterismostlyexpository(someinterpretationis

involved,ofcourse—asanygenuineexpositioninfactrequiresanyway);the

demandsofexplainingHusserl’sphilosophicalsystem,however,alsohappento

makeitthelongestchapterinthiswork.

ThesecondchapterisadetailedexpositionandreadingofIdeasII24,witha

focusonitsonto‐phenomenologicalmeditationsontherealmsof“materialnature,”

“bodyandsoul”,and“spirit,”alongwiththequestionoftheenigmaticrelationof

these“constitutedrealities”andthetranscendentalsubjectivity(orsimply

“consciousness”)ofthetranscendentalreductionformallyexpoundedinIdeasI.

23 ANoteontheChoiceofText:Husserlwasconstantlyintheprocessofreinventinghimself;IdeasIisonlyoneofmanypossible“introductory”textstousetopresentHusserl’s“transcendental”versionofphenomenology(CartesianMeditationsandtheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciencescomemostquicklytomind,buttherehasevenbeenabook‐lengthintroductiontoHusserl,byKockelmanns,basedonhisEncyclopediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenology—see:Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserl’sPhenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994).WhychooseIdeasI?AsidefromthereasonthatIdeasIandIIbelongtogetherbytheirtitles(IdeasIIhadbeeninitiallyplannedasasequelandfurtherexplicationofthethesismaintainedinIdeasI),itisalsotruethatIdeasIissufficienttointroducemostofthefundamentalplanksofHusserlianphenomenology.WhetherornotHusserleventually,inthe1930s,shiftedhisbasicpositiontoamore“existential”and“detranscendentalized”formofphenomenology,orwhetherthelater“genetic”phenomenologyisnotmerelyanextensionofthephenomenologyoftheIdeasbutratherafar‐reachingradicalrethinkingofit,arequestionsIwillnotandneednotdealwithhere.ForitwouldsuitmypurposesiftheHusserl/sofIdeasIandIIareregardedasjustone(ortwo)ofmanyactualorpossible“Husserls,”onlybecausethepointsIwillbetryingtomakearebasicallysystematicones,whichthetextsathandbringoutsufficientlyontheirown. 24 Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution.Trans.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989.TheyearofpublicationoftheoriginalGerman‐languageeditionwas1952.

10

InIdeasII,Husserlpresentsapictureofnatureasathelifeless,meaningless

(Sinnlos)substrateofreality,abare“physicalthinghood”thatdistinguishesitself

fromlife(soul,Seele),ontheonehand,andmind(spirit,Geist),ontheother.The

lived‐body,aspresentedbyHusserl,isthe“unity”ofmindandmatter,but,

importantly,itisdistinguishablefromthe“pure”formsofeither.Whatshields

Husserlfrombald‐faced“Cartesian”dualismishisclaim,announcedalreadyinIdeas

I,thatpureortranscendentalsubjectivity—andherehefollows(roughly)Kant,

whose“Copernicanturn”hebroadlyendorses—cannotbereducedto“thinghood”

or“objectivity”ofanykind.Puresubjectivityismorefundamentalthananyobject,

sinceitistheveryconditionforthepossibilityofobjectivityinthefirstplace.

Husserl’sprioritizationoftranscendentalsubjectivityoverempiricalsubjectivity

radicalizesthisdifferencebyplacingempiricalsubjectivitysocompletelyinthegrip

ofthe“objective”andeven“lifeless”worldof“physicalnature,”thatweareforcedto

seethatsubjectivitystrictly(orpurely)speakingcannotbeoftheworld,literally.

Thisisnottosaythatitcanexistwithoutit,butitcertainlycanbeconceivedtodo

so—asdemonstratedinafamous,and,tosome,infamous,passageinIdeasIthatis

echoedinlaterwritingsaswell.ThatHusserlwasinterestedinmakingsuchan

underlyingpointisclearfromIdeasIIanditsother,complementaryarguments

againstmind‐bodyreductionisminthattext.25

25 Foragoodtreatmentofthis,seeMarcelle,Daniel.“TheOntologicalPriorityofSpiritOverNature:Husserl’sRefutationofPsychophysicalParallelisminIdeasII.”InPhilosophyToday,vol.50(suppl.),2006(pp.75‐82).Whetherconsciouslyornot,Husserlpresentsakindof“ontologicalgambit”directedagainstthenaturalisticorphysicalisticphilosopher.Inthislanguage,Merleau‐Ponty’sconcernmightbethatHusserl’sgambitfails,intheprocessconcedingfartoomuchtonaturalscience.Accordingtothisview,then,thetranscendentalego,thatis,istoothinareedtoputtheburdenon,sothatinthewakeofthefailureoftranscendentalphenomenology,therewouldbeonly

11

IdeasIIwasunpublishedinHusserl’slife‐timebutreadandstudiedclosely

byMerleau‐Ponty,whosepositiveappropriationofthatworkliesmostlyinthearea

ofthephenomenologyofthebody(thelived‐body,orLeib).26Merleau‐Ponty’s

reservationsregardingtheworkasawhole,however,andinparticularonwhathe

regardedasitsunderlyingconceptualconfusions,wereconsiderable.Andthe

questionofnature—whatitis,andhowhumanbeingsaretobeunderstoodin

relationtoit—occupied(aswehaveseen)greatdealofMerleau‐Ponty’smature

thought,whosegeneralthrustgoesagainstthegrainofHusserl’sfindingsinIdeasII.

HusserldoesnotseemeithertorecognizethetensionsinIdeasIIasfundamental

onesorrealizethatnatureposesaradicalproblemforthetranscendental‐

phenomenologicalmethoditself.Wemightputitthisway:whereasforHusserl

naturehastobeexplainedintermsofits“constitution”intranscendental

consciousness,forMerleau‐Ponty,itisthisveryconsciousnesswhichwouldneed

explaining,inlightofitsobviousoriginationintheprimordialexperiencesofthe

lived‐body,whichisitselfanemblemofnature.

B.ChaptersThreeandFour

ChapterThreeaddressesMerleau‐Ponty’sspecificformofphenomenologyin

relationtoHusserl’sown.Itessentiallyrepresentsmytakeonthedecades‐old

questionofhowbesttounderstandMerleau‐Ponty’softencontroversialreadingof

Husserl.Theissueiscomplex,butafterthoroughlydocumentingMerleau‐Ponty’s

thenaturalistic‐physicalisticoptionleft,adisastrousoption.Hencethereistheneedtorethinkphenomenologyinawhollynewlight(thoughstillrootedinperception,asHusserlhadit). 26 SeeforexampleMerleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.”InSigns.Trans.RichardM.McCleary.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964

12

re‐envisioningofclassicphenomenologicalmotifssuchasthephenomenological

andeideticreductionsfromthePhenomenologyofPerceptionthroughTheVisible

andtheInvisible,IarguefinallythattheFrenchphilosopher’smannerof

appropriationofHusserlispersuasivebutalso,moreinterestingly,highly“organic.”

IusethistermnotonlyinthesensethatitdrawsonHusserlinanaturalmanner,so

tospeak,butmoreparticularlyinthesensethatitembodiesorinstantiates

Merleau‐Ponty’sstyleofphilosophyandevenhisownontology.Forexample,

Merleau‐Ponty’sownnotionsofambiguity,reflection,andparadox,amongothers,

actuallyprovetobethekeytounlockingthesecretofhisHusserl‐reading.Butthis

alsomeansthattheextenttowhichoneagreeswithMerleau‐Ponty’sreading

correlatessomewhattothedegreetowhichoneacceptshisoverallphilosophical

vision,somethingthatmayaccountforatleastsomeofthedoggedoppositionto

himfromcertainmembersofthe“strongHusserlian”camp,atleast.(Merleau‐

Ponty’sreadingofhisownreadingofHusserl—hisviewofthedegreeofhisown

faithfulnessorunfaithfulnesstothesource,forexample—isalsoherelargely

confirmedthroughtheprismofhisowndialecticalviewsandhermeneutics.)

ThefourthchapterplumbsMerleau‐Ponty’swritings,mostparticularlythe

Naturelectures,toconnecthisreadingofHusserland“existentialization”of

phenomenologytohisnewlydevelopingconceptionsofnatureand,accordingly,the

natureofhumanityaswell.TheNaturelectureseriesisanexcitinglydetailedand

densetractoforiginalresearchandtextualandscientificinterpretationthat

Merleau‐PontygaveastheheadoftheCollègedeFranceoveraperiodofseveral

years,between1958and1961,shortlybeforehisuntimelydeath.Hedelivered

13

thematthesametimehewascomposinghisunfinishedmasterpieceTheVisibleand

theInvisible,alsoatextIwillalsoheavilyrelyoninbothChapters4and5(itis

effectivelyMerleau‐Ponty’smostsignificantworksincethePhenomenologyof

Perception).

Merleau‐Ponty’sexpressaiminthelecturesistoinitiateaprojectof

“ontology”startingfromtheideaof“nature”asitappearsinthehistoryofWestern

philosophyandscience,particularlyinthemodernperioddowntohisownpresent

day.Thisisasurprisingchoiceforaself‐identifiedphenomenologist,butitis

consistentwithMerleau‐Ponty’sownfamousassertionthatthephenomenological

method,includingthephenomenologicalandeideticreductions,areradically

“incomplete”andthus,oneissafetoconclude,unabletosealconsciousnessofffrom

theempiricalrealminthewayHusserl,theprogenitorofthemethod,hadintended.

(Thisisnottosaythat“natural”means“empirical,”onlythatthereisa“family

resemblance”betweendoingexistentialphenomenologyandanarchaeologyof

nature,therootofourliving“existence.”)

WhereasinTheStructureofBehaviorandPhenomenologyofPerceptionthe

focushadbeenonanimalityandthelived‐body—thesignificanceofwhichremains

inthelaterphilosophy(whichIdonot,asdosomeothers,readintermsofa“break”

withtheold,ratheronlyadeepeningthatoccasionallypromptsacorrection),

Merleau‐PontynowbroadenshisinquirytoBeingasawhole,therebyfinding

himselfinquiringintonatureasafieldoflifepriortothedivisionof“subject”and

“object.”Natureturnsouttobenothinglikeeitherthe“objectiveNature”of

scientistsorthe“noematicpole”ofHusserliantranscendentalconsciousness,since

14

itis,inaprofoundsense,foreverbeyondanypowersof“constitution.”Remarkably

andimportantly,Merleau‐Pontydoesnotabandonthephenomenologicalattitudeor

stand‐pointofreflectivethoughtinfavorofaholisticimmersioninpre‐reflective

life.Hisvisionisoneofthehumanbeing’sinevitablebelongingnessandalienation

fromnature—thatis,fromhimself/herself.Humanexistenceisthereforeself‐

interrupting,thoughnottothepointofrealizingaSartreandisconnectionfromthe

wholespectacleofBeing,inwhoseinternal“fold”humanconsciousnesstakesits

rightfulplace.Itis,however,aconditionedconsciousness,justasfreedomfor

Merleau‐Pontyisaconditionedfreedom.Ineithercase,onecanputtheemphasison

eitherthefirstorthesecondtermandfind,ineachcase,animportantnuancethat

illuminesauniquesideofexistence.

MuchofthemostinterestingmaterialintheNaturelecturespresentsthese

ideasindirectlythroughMerleau‐Ponty’soriginalinterpretationsofsuch

philosophicalfiguresasDescartes,Spinoza,Kant,Schelling,andBergson,aswellthe

findingsofcontemporaneousscientists.Merleau‐Ponty’slaterconceptionofnature,

andanewontologicalvocabularytogowithit,hadbeengestatingforalongtime,

sincehisfirstworksinfact.Nature,aswehavealreadyseen,comestotakeonthe

meaningofwhatSchellingcalledthe“barbarousprinciple”ofthereal,oragain“wild

Being,”whichcannotbebroughtinatransparentwaywithintheorbitofreflection.

Merleau‐Ponty’scritiqueoftranscendentalphenomenologyisapparenthere(much

asSchellingcriticizedthe“reflexivity”ofHegelandidealismgenerally).Itseemsas

thoughMerleau‐Ponty’s“nature”isonewhichsomehow,fromwithinitself,gives

risetosubjectivityandreflection—andthereby“transcendsitself”whileremaining

15

opaquetoitselfatthesametime.(Thisopacityisreflectedinthemotto“weare

giventoourselves.”)TheparalleltoSchelling’sownNaturphilosophieis

unmistakable,asaretheromanticresonancesofhisunderstandingofnature

generally.27Butwhatisgoneis“intellectualintuition”ortheclaimtoaninsightinto

a“higherorder”ofbeing.

C.ChapterFive

Thefinalchapterisasystematicexplorationofonefundamentaldifference

betweenHusserl(andperhapsthevastmajorityoftraditionalphilosophy)and

Merleau‐Ponty,anditpertainstotheirapproachtophilosophy—andthought—

itself.Isphilosophybestappreciatedasaproblem‐solvingenterprise,asHusserl

believes,orratherasameditationonparadoxes,themselvesbeyondanysimple

“solution”?Merleau‐Pontyfindstheultimatetruthofthehumanconditiontoconsist

inacertain“dialectical”contradictionwhich,however,unlikeHegel’sversion,does

notfindaresolutioninsomething“higher,”suchasanabsolutestand‐point.

Merleau‐Pontyisultimatelyaphilosopherofparadox,whichiswhatexplainsthe

titleofthepresentdissertation,“TheParadoxofNature...”Itisregardingthe

problemofnature—atoncethehomeofhumanspirit,aswellasitspermanent

other—thatMerleau‐Pontyfindsoneofhismostfruitfulapplicationsofwhathe

callsinTheVisibleandtheInvisiblethemethodof“interrogation.”

27 WatsonmentionsNovalisinthisconnection.(Watson,StephenH.“Merleau‐Ponty’sPhenomenologicalItineraryFromBodySchematoSituatedKnowledge:OnHowWeAreandHowWeAreNotto‘SingtheWorld.’”JanusHead,Winter/SpringIssue,9.2,2007.Amherst,NY:TriviumPublications,p.534‐549.)RobertVallierhaswrittenhisdissertation,notpublishedunfortunately,onthetopicofSchellingandMerleau‐Ponty.(“Institution:OfNature,Life,andMeaninginMerleau‐PontyandSchelling.”DePaulUniversity,2001)

16

Ofcourse,Husserlhimselfmakes“paradox”acentralpartofthediscourseof

phenomenology—inthenarrowsensethatheneverceasesfirstofalltoemphasize

theuttercounter‐intuitivenessofthe“revolutionary”perspectiveoftranscendental

phenomenology,oftheenormouseffortittakestooverturn(para‐)thecommon

view(doxa)thatplacessubjectivityatthemercyofthespatio‐temporal‐causal

world,ratherthanvice‐versa.YethealsospeakseloquentlyintheCrisisaboutwhat

hecallsthe“paradoxofsubjectivity”—“paradox”heremoreinthemoreMerleau‐

Pontiansenseof“antinomy”—namelytheparadoxthatsubjectivityisatonceapart

oftheworld(initsembodiedform,inindividualconsciousnesses),evenasitisthe

transcendentalconditionfortheverypossibilityoftheworld(whatHusserl

controversiallycalls“absolute”existenceasopposedtothe“relative”existenceof

theworld).Inanimportantway,this,too,isaparadoxofnature:fortheworld—

nature—isboththeconditionofthepossibilityofconsciousness,evenas

consciousnessistheconditionforthepossibilityoftheworld.ButHusserloffersa

“solution”totheparadoxbymakingadistinctionbetweentwotypesofsubjectivity,

andofferingonepriorityovertheother.Aswehavealreadyseen,suchasolution

willnotdoforMerleau‐Ponty.Andintheend,Husserlisnolesssympatheticto

antinomiesthanmostofthecanonicalthinkersoftheWesternphilosophical

tradition,fromAristotle(Metaphysics,BookIII)onward.

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III.Conclusion

InHusserl,thethematicofnatureinitiallyassertsitselfinthatphilosopher’s

famous(thoughclearlyambiguous)rejectionofthe“naturalattitude”andhisstrong

distinctionbetween“world”and“consciousness,”anditextendsinMerleau‐Ponty’s

worktothelatter’sfine‐grainedattempts,throughhislife‐longstudiesofbiology

andpsychology,tonegotiatebetweenthissortofdualismandtheequaldanger,in

hiseyes,ofapurelyscientific“naturalism.”Merleau‐Pontyeventuallysettlesonan

interpretationofthe“phenomenologicalreduction”asadeepeningofthe“natural”

attituderatherthanaflighttopureconsciousness—or,asMerleau‐Ponty

paradoxicallystatesit(inHegelianterms),itisonlyadeparturebywayofreturning

toourselves.Inthisway,Merleau‐Ponty’slecturecourseonnature—afocaltextof

thisdissertation,alongwithIdeasIandIIandTheVisibleandtheInvisible—canbe

seentobetheculminationofanon‐goingcritiqueofHusserlian“transcendental”

phenomenologyinfavorofamore“existential‐naturalistic”—atonce

phenomenologicallythickandscientificallyinformed—variety,whichplaceshuman

subjectivityattheheartofnature,orBeing,ratherthanoutsideoraboveit.The

consequenceisthatforMerleau‐Ponty,phenomenologyisnotanewscienceora

magickeytounlockphilosophicalpuzzlesonceandforall;rather,itisthe

witnessingofthemiraculouscoherenceofcontradictorytruthsinthespectacleof

existence.

Fromthebeginning,Merleau‐Pontyrefusestoadoptamethodthatwould

allowfortheworld’sthorough‐goingconstitutioninthemind.Atthesametime,he

18

explicitlyprioritizedwhatwemightcallthe“first‐personality”ofthe

phenomenologicalmethodoverthenaïve‐realistmethodofmostso‐called

“naturalists.”The“naturalistic”methodMerleau‐PontyandHusserl(nottomention

Heidegger)opposeisthatoftakingtheworldassomethingfirstself‐constituted,so

tospeak,andthenlaterexperiencedornotexperienced,dependingoncausal

conditionsthatobtainbetween“subjects”andtheworldas“object.”InMerleau‐

Ponty’swayofthinking,humansubjectivity,or“spirit”broadlyspeaking,bearsan

intrinsicrelationwiththeworlditlives‐through,perceives,andunderstands,butat

thesametime,itisalienatedfromthisworldatalevelwhichsuggestsatwistingor

breaking‐apart(dehiscence)attherootlevelofbeingitself.Merleau‐Ponty’sanalysis

of“nature”andphenomenologymarksaturntowardswhatIcallMerleau‐Ponty’s

“semi‐naturalistic”versionofthephenomenologicalproject;“naturalistic”because

itsituateshumansubjectivityorspiritintermsthatinscribeitinalargermatrixof

being,butonly“semi‐”naturalisticbecauseitisnotthefull‐blownor“reductive”

naturalismofakindthat,onceagain,bothHusserlandMerleau‐Pontyvigorously

opposed.

19

ChapterOne:Husserl’sTranscendentalPhenomenologyinIdeasI28:TheBasicPosition

I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology

IdeasIdemandsourattentionbothfortheboldnessandoriginalityofits

ideasandforbeinganundeniablemilestoneinHusserl’scareeraswellasa

watershedmomentinthehistoryofthephenomenologicalmovement.Itisthefirst

textinwhichHusserl,theeffectivefounderofthemovementasweknowittoday,29

formallyintroducessomeofhismostfamousanddistinctivetheories,includingthe

phenomenological‐transcendentalepochéandthephenomenological‐transcendental

reduction.30Italsocontainspreliminaryattemptsatarigorousdefinitionof

28ThefulltitleoftheworkisIdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy(FirstBook).IwillrefertoitthroughoutthistextasIdeasIforshort,asiscommonpractice.29Brentano,Husserl’steacher,revivedthemedievalnotionofintentionalityandpracticedarudimentary(andarguably“psychological”)formofwhathetermed“phenomenology,”butHusserl’sLogicalInvestigationsandIdeasIaregenerallycreditedforinitiatingtheschoolknowntodayas“phenomenology,”thoughHeidegger’s1927workBeingandTimealsocontributedstronglytothewaytheideaof“phenomenology”eventuallycametobereceivedandinterpreted.30Husserlsometimesmakesastrongdistinctionbetweenthe“phenomenological”andthe“transcendental”reductions,whichissomethingIwillbringupagainbelow(IID)withrespecttoHusserl’sfamousEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenology.ButinIdeasI,hetreatsthemashavingthesameextension,onlyreferringtodifferentaspectsofasingleprocess.Thushedistinguishesthemasfollows:“...weshall,onmostoccasions,speakofphenomenologicalreductions(butalso,withreferencetotheircollectiveunity,weshallspeakofthephenomenologicalreduction)and,accordingly,fromanepistemologicalpointofview[myitalicshere],weshallrefertotranscendentalreductions.”(IdeasI,66)Inotherwords,thedistinctionasgivenhereismerelyoneofperspective,andaccordinglyIwilloftenusethetwoterms—”phenomenologicalreduction”and“transcendentalreduction”—interchangeably,exceptwhentheexpositiondemandsthattheytemporarilybeunderstoodasdistinct.(Whatgoesforthereductioninthiscasegoesfortheepochéaswell,fortheyarecompanionconcepts.)

20

phenomenologyasdistinctfromothersciences(“natural”and“human”)andthe

introductionoftheterminology(noesisandnoema,naturalandtranscendental

attitudes,constitution)socharacteristicofHusserl’ssubsequenttechnical

phenomenologicaldiscussions.Itis,then,easilyonparinimportancewithHusserl’s

earlierandsimilarlypath‐breakingLogicalInvestigations.31

YetevenincomparisontootherpublishedtextsbyHusserl,IdeasIisnota

particularlyeasytexttounderstandorunpack.Itishighlyabstractandrarely

pausestoexplainthesignificanceorphilosophicalcontextofitsanalyses,takingthis

backgroundmoreorlessforgranted.AsPaulRicoeurpointsout,themotivationsof

thework,rootedinaconfrontationwithskepticism,arebestdiscernedthrough

unpublishedtextsandlecturesfromtheperiodbetween1905and1913,aswellas

withthehelpofthewritingsofHusserl’sremarkableassistantEugenFink.32Indeed,

theactualtextofIdeasIreadsattimeslikeastarter’strainingmanual,inthiscase

forthepracticeofanewphenomenologicalmethodofthinkingandanalysis.Yetthe

“manual”isalsoarecordofself‐discoveryandhasthefeelofaworkinprogress,as

Husserlwashimselfworkingthroughmanyofitsideasandtheirimplications,not

allofwhich,asisclearfromhislaterintroductorytexts,arefullyworkedoutinits

pages.

31Husserl,Edmund.LogicalInvestigations.Trans.J.N.Findlay.London:Routledge,1900/01(2nd,revisededition1913)(HereafterLI)32InRicoeur’swords:“Finally,itmustbesaidthatIdeasIisabookwhosemeaningremainsconcealedandthatoneisinevitablyinclinedtolookforitsmeaningelsewhere.”See:Ricoeur,Paul.AKeytoEdmundHusserl’sIdeasI.Trans.BondHarrisandJacquelineBouchardSpurlock.(Trans.revisedbyPolVandevelde,ed.)Milwaukee:MarquetteUniversityPress,1996(pp.36‐7)HereafterKey.RicoeurreliesheavilyontheHusserl‐approvedessaybyFink,“DiephänomenologischePhilosophieEdmundHusserlsindergegenwärtigenKritik”(1933),tofillinsomeofthegapsleftbyHusserlhimself.Merleau‐Pontywastodothesamelateron.

21

ItwouldbeimpossibletocondenseallofIdeasIinthespaceofonechapter,

letalonetoshowhowitbuildsonHusserl’sconsiderableoutputbeforeits

publication,orforthatmatterhowhisstilllaterthinkingrelatestoIdeasI.Indeed,

IdeasIiswrittenwithreadershipoftheLIlargelybeingpresumed.Certainofthe

latter’sideasarerevisitedanew—intentionality,forexample—whileothersare

enfoldedimplicitlyintothesubstanceofnewerreflections.33Itisnecessaryforthe

purposesofthepresentworkforustosketchoutIdeasI’smainargument(ifthisis

therightword)anditsbasicorientationtowardssomeofthefundamentalquestions

itposestoitself,concerningespecially:thenatureofconsciousnessandthe

relationshipofconsciousnesstotheworld;thedefinitionofphenomenologyasa

“transcendental”(aswellaseidetic)sciencethateschewsthe“naturalattitude”

whileseekingtoexplainitscontents;theideasof“transcendence”and

“immanence”;andthequestionofthescopeandmeaningofthephenomenological

epochéandreduction,thelatterquestionbearingofcourseonthecentralissueof

thephenomenologicalmethod.Theseareallinterrelatedquestions;indeed,one

mightevengosofarastosay(inHeideggerianstyleperhaps)thattheyare“the

same”question.Forroughly,theyallconcerntheunderlyingrelationshipof

consciousnesstoworld—or,putinanotherway,subjectivityandnature.Wecannot

33Forexample,inIdeasIHusserltakesforgrantedthenotionthatphenomenologydealswith“acts”ofconsciousness,whose“meaning‐intentions”areeither“empty”or“fulfilled.”ThisprincipleisofcoursefoundationaltoHusserl’sideasonperception.Forexample,whileIcanseeor“intend”onesideofadie,Igenerallyalso“intend”itshiddensidesaswell.Theformerintentionisfulfilledbyintuitiveevidence—thegivennessofthedieinitscolor,shape,etc.,asitshowsitselftomevisually.Thelatter“signitive”intentionsarenotfulfilledandarethus“empty”—unlessoruntilothersidesofthedieareseenbyme.ThedistinctionisimportantforitallowsHusserltoexplainhowitisthatweperceivethedieandnotmerely“thissideof”thedie.Weperceiveobjects,inotherwords,notmerelyprofiles.ThisisoneofHusserl’sstrategies,sotosay,forovercomingthe“appearance‐reality”dividethathashamperedprevioustheoriesofperception.

22

hopetodofulljusticetothemanyanglesonemightusetoapproachandaddress

Husserl’smultifacetedanswertothesequestions.Totakeoneexample,wewillhave

toglossoverthesignificantcontroversiessurroundingHusserl’sconceptofthe

“noema”34orofitsrelationto“fulfilment.”35Nonetheless,manyofthesortsof

fundamentalproblemsthatariseinsuchdebateswillbetouchedoninother

sectionsoftheoverviewprovidedbelow.Thisoverview,alongwithsome

independentcommentaryandbriefreferencestosomeofthesecondaryliterature

onIdeasI,willconstitutethebulkofthischapter.

Yetgiventherelatively“intermediary”statusofIdeasIinthecourseof

Husserl’sownlifelongtask(fromIdeasIonward)ofexplainingtranscendental

phenomenology,itmightstillbewonderedwhyweareconcentratinginthischapter

onthisparticulartext.Merleau‐Ponty,forexample,regardedIdeasIasabelonging

toa“middle”or“transition”periodbetweenHusserl’s“logicism,”presumably

culminatingintheLogicalInvestigations,andthelatersupposed“existentialism”of

34Thisquestionhasbeenwrittenaboutendlessly,especiallyincontextofthedebatebetweenthosewhointerpretthenoemaas“percept”(Gurwitsch,Cairns,etal.)andthose,leadchieflybyFøllesdal,whointerpretitasavariantofFrege’sSinn.Foranicerecapofthedebate,see:Solomon,RobertC.“Husserl’sConceptoftheNoema.”InHusserl:ExpositionsandAppraisals,FrederickA.EllistonandPeterMcCormack,eds.NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1977(pp.54‐69).Solomonbeginshisessaybynoting:“Itisgenerallyagreedthattheconceptofthenoemaisoneofthethemes,ifnotthecentraltheme,ofHusserl’sphenomenologicalphilosophy.”J.N.Mohantyisseeminglyinperfectagreementwhenhemakesapassingreferenceto“theall‐importantideaofnoemaandnoetic‐noematicstructure,regardedbymanyasconstitutingthemostimportantandoriginalpartof[IdeasI].”(Mohanty,J.N.ThePhilosophyofEdmundHusserl:AHistoricalDevelopment.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008,p.372)Anothertopicwewillhavetoleaveout,thoughinthiscasebecauseitisalmostwhollyabsentfromtheIdeasitself,isthetopicoftime‐constitution,whichlaterfiguresdeeplyinallofHusserl’smostadvancedanalyses.35Foranexcellentsummaryofthedebate,seePolVandevelde’sintroductiontoKey(pp.16‐20).AlsoofnoteisRicoeur’sremark,inspiredalsobythedifficultiessurroundingthenoema,andquotedbyVandeveldeintheintroduction,that‘thus,realityalwaysseemstoescapetranscendentalconstitution.”

23

the“life‐world”philosophy,bestknownthroughtheCrisis.36Givensuchviews,why

notreviewHusserl’slaterreformulationsofmuchofthismaterial?Moreover,as

mentionedabove,Husserlhimselflateradmitstothedisadvantages—thoughnot

necessarilyinadequacies—ofthe“Cartesian”waytothereductionpresentedherein.

Healsodevelopedanewformofphenomenology,“genetic”or“dynamic”

phenomenology,whichsupplements(andsomesaysupplants)the“static”

phenomenologyofIdeasI.

Thefactremains,however,thatHusserlhimselfnevertotallyabandoned

eitherthestaticorthe“Cartesian”phenomenologicalmethod.Regardingthelatter,

forexample,nolessthantheauthoroftheheterodoxtextTheOtherHusserl,Donn

Weltonnotesthat“[t]heexistenceoftheCartesianMeditations,andthefactthat

[Husserl]recommendeditsFrenchtranslationtoreadersaslateas1933evenashe

begandevelopingthetextoftheCrisis…convincesusthat[theCartesianwaytothe

reduction]wasneveroverthrown.”37Furthermore,Husserlneverabandonedthe

basicframeworkof“transcendentalsubjectivity”anditswhollynon‐naturalistic

essence.IdeasIpresentsabroadlyfaithfulpictureofthebasicthrustof

transcendentalphenomenology,andthisfact,combinedwithitshistorical

importanceandthefactthatitisthe“prequel”toIdeasII,atextequallyifnotmore

vitalforourtask,are,Ibelieve,enoughtorecommenditfordetailedinvestigationat

thepresenttime.

36SeeMerleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962(p.320n).CrisisreferstoHusserl’stextTheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenologicalPhilosophy.Trans.DavidCarr.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1970.37Welton,Donn.TheOtherHusserl:TheHorizonsofTranscendentalPhenomenology.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2000(p.118).Hereafter“Welton.”

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II.EpochéandPhenomenologicalReduction

A.Introduction

TheheartofIdeasI,andprobablythesignatureofphenomenologyitselfasit

ispopularlyknown,isthephenomenologicalreduction.Itisallbutimpossibleto

giveabriefdefinitionofit,butanyaccountmustbeginwiththeconceptof“epoché”

orthe“suspension”or“bracketing”ofallone’sbeliefsregardingexternalexistence

oftheobjectsofperception(andofcourseofanyothermentalact).Throughthisall‐

importantsuspension,oneeffectsaradicallynew“attitude,”thephenomenological

attitude,accordingtowhichtheworldisseentobeasitisfortheconsciousness,or

subjectivity,thatbeholdsit.Inthisway,all“objectivereality”is“reduced”toits

significanceforconsciousness—or,alternately,toitsmeaningfulnessasa

“noematic”correlatetothe“noetic”actsofaconsciousnessinwhichtheworldis

“constituted.”38

Thejargon‐ladendefinitiongivenabovemust,however,becarefully

explained.Furthermore,manypossiblemisinterpretationsmustbeobviated—at

leastregardingHusserl’sownintentions—suchastheinterpretationofthe

reductionasbeingameanstoexposetheillusorinessoftheexternalreality.Thisis

notatallHusserl’sintentionorreflectiveofhisactualview.Atthesametime,it

38Thislanguagewillbeexplainedbelow(IVA).Notethattheterm“reduction”doesnothavethemodernmeaningof“reductiveness”forHusserl;thereisnoquestionhereofconvertingobjectiverealityintoasubjectivesubstratum.“Reduce”means,etymologically,“tobringorleadback,”andthisisHusserl’sintendedmeaning.Thereductionleadsbackaconsciousnessthatlosesitselfinitsworld—backtoitsownachievementsasasense‐bestowingandworld‐constitutingbeing.

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cannotbedeniedthatHusserldidinsomesenseprioritizesubjectivityoverobjective

“reality.”Husserldidnotdenytheexistenceofsuchareality,butaswewillsee,

underthereductionitacquiresawhollynewsense—namely,thatofbeingthesense

“mind‐independentreality”(alongwithinnumerableothersenseswhichgivethe

worldits“intelligibility”).Toputitanother(un‐Husserlian)way,whilewecansay

thatthereisaworldthattranscendsthemind,itonlydoessoforthemind,39

acquiringitsmeaningfulnessassuchatranscendentbeinginthiswayalone.Thus,it

caninacertainwaybecalledindependent(initsexistence,or“thatness”)fromthe

mindinonewayandyetwhollydependentonit(foritsmeaning,or“whatness”)in

another.Consciousnessitself—inits“purified”and“transcendental”form—is,by

contrast,dependentonnothing.Anditissolelybecauseofthisasymmetry,andnot

becauseofsomesupposed“non‐existence”ofexternalreality,thatHusserlcalls

consciousness(asopposedtothetranscendentworldassuch)“absolute.”Allof

thesenotionswillbefurtherexploredindividually,however,inPartIVbelow.

Inthesectionsthatfollow,Iwillproceedtodescribethereductionasitis

outlinedinIdeasI.Alongtheway,Iwillbeflaggingsomeofthemostsignificantand

controversialissuesofinterpretation,aswellaspossibleinconsistencies,mysteries,

orambiguitiesinHusserl’saccount,whichcanbe(andusuallyalreadyhavebeen)

raised.Indoingso,itisinevitablethatsomecommentarybemixedwith“pure”

description(contrarytothespiritofHusserl’sownmethodology!)evenbeforethe

39Iwillattimesusetheword“mind”for“consciousness,”despitethepotentialhazardsthatcometherewith.“Mind”caneasilybereified,whereasby“consciousness”(Bewusststein)Husserlmeansanythingbutan“object”or‘substance”intheclassicalCartesiansense.Nonetheless,itiscumbersometousetheword“consciousness”solelytotranslate“Bewusststein,”andhencesynonymswilloccasionally,thoughcautiouslybeused.

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finalsection,whichisprimarilycommentary.Butmyunderlyinggoalistopresent

Husserl’sconceptionofthereductionasaccuratelyasIcan,andfurthermorewith

minimalrecoursetojargon(thoughHusserlis,afterall,coiningmanynewterms

here),andinawaythatisatleastplausibleasaninterpretationofjustwhatHusserl

wasafter.Nonetheless,extendedquotationsareoccasionallycalledfor,asmuchis

tobegained(andclarified)throughadirectexaminationofHusserl’sprecise

phraseologyofhisownmainideas.

B.TheNaturalandtheTranscendentalAttitudes

Thestoryofthereduction,sotospeak,beginswithadescriptionofthe

“naturalattitude.”40Sowhat,then,isthenaturalattitude?Itwouldhelptobeginby

contrastingitwithwhatHusserlalternativelycallsthe“philosophical,”

“phenomenological,”and“transcendental”attitudes(allofthesebeingequivalentin

thecurrentcontext).41Thenaturalattitudeisthedefault,“normal”attitudeinwhich

wetacitlyornon‐tacitlyframeour(mostlyperceptual)experiences;thealternative

attitudeisoneinwhichwehavedisengagedfromthepresuppositionsofthenatural

attitude,particularlyregardingobjectiveexistenceandnon‐existence,andhave

takenupanewappreciationoftheoriginsofmeaningfulexperienceinthedepthsof

40Ofcourse,whatispossiblymostcontroversialaboutthereductionishowitcanbe“begun”atall,butwewillcometothatlater(PartV).41Thispictureof“attitudes”willbecomeimportantlyexpandedandenrichedinIdeasII,inwhichthenaturalattitudeisdividedinto“personalistic”and“naturalistic”forms.Thesewillbediscussedcloselyinthenextchapter.

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subjectivity—inourselves:“Imustlosetheworldbyepoché,inordertoregainitby

auniversalself‐examination.”42

ButwhatdoesHusserlmeanbyattitude(Einstellung)?Amazingly,Husserl

nowheredefineshistechnicalusageoftheterminthetextoftheIdeas(or

anywhere,asfarasIcantell),perhapsowingtoitsstatusasbasictounderstanding

thereductionitself.Fornow,wewillseehowHusserlusestheterm;wewillreturn

tothequestionofhowitmightbestbedefinedattheendofthissection.

Todescribethenaturalattitude,Husserlpresentsaseriesofobservationsof

whatexperienceinthisattitudeconsistsin:

“Iamconsciousofaworldendlesslyspreadoutinspace,endlesslybecomingandhavingendlesslybecomeintime.Iamconsciousofit:thatsignifies,aboveall,thatintuitivelyIfinditimmediately,thatIexperienceit.Bymyseeing,touching,hearing,andsoforth,andinthedifferentmodesofsensuousperception,corporealphysicalthings…aresimplythereforme,“onhand”intheliteralandfigurativesense…”43

Inthenaturalattitude,hecontinues,“we…[are]humanbeingswhoareliving

naturally,objectivating,judging,feeling,willing.”44Butanimatebeingsandpeople

arethereformealso:“Ilookup;Iseethem…Igrasptheirhands…”45

Thenaturalattitudeis“natural”firstofallinthesenseofitseveryday

pervasivenessaswellasitsdefaultcharacter.Itcomestous“naturally.”Roughly,

then,wecancharacterizethisasaconditioninwhichweasnormal,adulthuman

beingsfindourselvesroutinelyandasitwereautomatically,justinsofarasweare

42Husserl,Edmund.CartesianMeditations:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenology.Trans.DorionCairns.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1999(p.157).HereafterCM.43IdeasI,p.5144Ibid.,p.5145Ibid.,p.51

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aliveandawake(andmaybeasleepanddreamingaswell),inwhichweperceive

theretobeobjects,aswellaspeopleandvalue‐characteristicsofthings,toexist

outsideusand“onhand.”Husserlstressesthattheworldasweknowitinthe

naturalattitudeisnotsimplytheworldofscienceora“materialworld”;thuswe

“naturally”perceivea“worldofobjectswithvalues,aworldofgoods,apractical

world…”46Intermsof“material”objects,weperceivenotsimply(orvirtuallyever,

unlesswearescientistsina“scientificattitude”)“matter,”butthingslike“tables”

and“pianos”—objectswithculturalmeaning‐accretions.Thenaturalattitudeisalso

oneinwhichwethinkandcogitate,atleastintheeveryday(non‐

phenomenological!)way.47Butmostpertinentlywithregardtothe

phenomenologicalepoché,inthenaturalattitudeweaccepttheworldasa“factually

existentactualityandalsoacceptitasitpresentsitselfto[us]asfactuallyexisting.”48

Empiricalscienceanditsmodeofcognitionpertaintothisworld,preciselytakenas

existentinthesenseoutlined.Hencescience(asanactivityandaformofthought)

itselfbelongstothe“naturalattitude,”afactHusserlnevertiresofexploitingtothe

advantageofphilosophyasheconceivesit.

Husserlregardshisdescriptionofthenaturalattitudeaspre‐theoretical;that

is,itisnotaconstruct,butsimplywhatisdirectlyintuitedtobethecaseabout

natural,non‐transcendentalexperience:

46Ibid.,p.53(Husserl’sitalics)47Ibid.,p.5348Ibid,p.57(Husserl’sitalics)

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“Whatwepresentedasacharacterizationofthegivennessbelongingtothenaturalattitude,andthereforeasacharacterizationoftheattitudeitself,wasapieceofpuredescriptionpriortoany“theory”.”49

Hethennotesthatby“theories”hemeans“preconceivedopinionsofeverysort.”

Husserlclaimsto“keeptheseatadistance”strictly,astancehemaintains

throughouthiscareer,inkeepingwithhiscommitmenttogoto“thethings

themselves”andby‐passthecorruptinginfluenceof“presuppositions”ofanykind.

(Hencehisfamous—andfamouslyimperiled—dreamofdevelopinga

“presuppositionlessscience.”)ButwhileHusserl’sdescriptionofthenaturalattitude

maybepre‐theoretical,itismorethanapparentfromitthatwe,insofaraswedwell

inthenaturalattitude,areallatypeof“naïverealist,”tousethemodernparlance.

Thus,Husserl’sunderstandingofthenaturalattitudemaybestbeunderstood

throughasimpleconsiderationofwhatsomebodyunbiasedby,say,“fancy”

metaphysicaltheoriesunderstandshimselftobeexperiencingeveryday,inthemost

thoroughlyordinarysenseimaginable,asalivinghumanbeing.Itisthis

thoroughgoingaverageness,thebasicmediocrityofexistence,thatHusserl

continuallycontrastswiththedisconcertingandvertiginousheightsofthe

transcendentalattitude.ItisnotasthoughHusserldismissesnaturalexperience;to

thecontrary,thewholepurposeofphenomenologyistounderstandit.Itisjustthis

embraceoftheordinarythatdistinguishesphenomenologyfrommore“speculative”

sortsofphilosophicalendeavors.Andyetthereisatranscendental,“noetic‐

noematic”dimensionofmeaning‐constitution,arealminwhichordinaryexperience

becomesclarifiedintermsofitssourceandtruemeaning.Itisthrough

49Ibid.,p.56

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transcendentalinvestigationthatnaturalconsciousnesscomestoknowthe

foundationsoftheexperientialityittakesnaïvelyforgranted.(Iwillexplorethe

transcendentallevelinsubsequentsections.)SebastianLufthelpfullyframesthe

natural/transcendentaldistinctionintermsoftheclassicaldivisionbetweendoxa

andepisteme:

“WhenHusserlconceivesofthe‘natural’inoppositiontothe‘philosophicalattitude’,thisechoesthedistinctionbetweenpre‐transcendentalandtranscendentalstandpointsasamodern‘version’ofthedoxa/epistemedistinction.ThetranscendentalturnanticipatedbyDescartes,andtakenbyKant,appliestherealizationofthesubject‐relativityoftheworld.Theturntothesubject,the‘reduction’totheego(cogito),becomesthefoundationofscience.Theworldisnotan‘absolutebeing,’butisrelativetotheexperiencingsubject.”(Luft203‐4)

Hefurtherexplains:

“Thedistinctionofdoxaandepisteme‘translated’intothisconceptionmeans:Philosophythatbelievesitcanoperateona‘realistic’levelisboundtothenaturalattitudeanditcannotbecriticalinthetranscendentalsense.ThisisnotonlyHusserl’scritiqueofpre‐transcendentalphilosophybutespeciallyofhispupilswhoneglectedtopursuethetranscendentalpaththathehadtakenupwithIdeasI(1913).50

Luft’sexplanationisuseful,butitmustbekeptinmind,afactIwillcomebackto

lateron,thatinadditiontobeing“doxic”asopposedto“epistemic,”thenatural

attitudeforHusserlisafalsedoxa,a“wrongview.”Thisisimportantbecausethe

naturalattitude’snaïverealismisnotonly“naïve”but,preciselyinshowinga

“blind[ness]tothecorrelativityofworldandexperience,”(Luft,208)itwrongly

pronouncesagainstjustthiscorrelativity,falsely(thoughtacitly)affirming,asLuft

pointsout,theworld’sabsoluteexistence.

50Luft,Sebastian.“Husserl’sTheoryofthePhenomenologicalReduction:BetweenLife‐WorldandCartesianism.”InResearchinPhenomenology34,2004(p.204)Hereafter,“Luft.”

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Letusfirstreturntotheinitialquestionofwhatan“attitude”issupposedto

beinthefirstplace.IfwetakeHusserlforhisword,an“attitude”cannotbe

explainedmerelyasapsychologicalstate,astheword(inEnglish)isroutinelytaken

todenote.Afterall,onlythenaturalattitudeproperlydeservestobecalled

“psychological,”asHusserlhimselfonoccasiondoescallit.51Anattitude,then,I

propose,mightbestbedefinedastheorientationinwhichtheparametersof

experiencearedelimitedanddefined.Inthenaturalattitude,theseparametersare

defined,sotospeak,bytheinternalandexternalhorizonsoftranscendentthings

(andthe“halos”thatformthebackgroundinwhichweperceivethem),bypeople

andlivingbeings,byvariousactsoffantasyandmemory,andtoanextentbyour

self‐perception(andhenceourownegos).Butinthetranscendentalattitude,these

parametersshifttosomethingnew,afieldofconstitution,aswellastothe

transcendentalegoor“pureconsciousness”inwhichallworldlybeings,including

theempiricalego,arethemselvesconstituted(inwhichtheycometobeing).52A

shiftinattitudeisthusashiftoftheentirematrixofintelligibilityofthings—a

prefiguring,perhaps,ofHeidegger’slaterconceptof“world.”53

51Ibid.,p.126:“Inourcasewehave,accordingly,ontheonehand,thepsychologicalattitudeinwhichournaturallyfocusedregardisdirectedtomentalprocesses—e.g.toamentalprocessofrejoicing—asasequenceofmentalstatesofhumanorbeast.Ontheotherhand,wehavethephenomenologicalattitude…”(Husserl’sitalics)Seealsop.172forfurtherclarificationofwhatthepsychologicalattitudeinvolves.52ItistruethatHusserldoesnotrestricttheterm“attitude”tothecontrastofnaturalandtranscendentalattitudes:healsospeaksofthe“eidetic”attitude,thenatural‐scientificattitude,etc..Onemaystillapplyourdefinition,however:forexample,intheeideticattitudetheparametersofexperienceareessences,ratherthanfacts.(Itneedstobeunderstood,ofcourse—asIwilldiscussbelow—thatthetranscendentalattitudepresupposestheeidetic,whilethenaturalmayormaynotoverlapwitheideticattitude.)53IamindebtedtoDr.PolVandeveldeforthislanguageof“parameters”and“intelligibility,”aswellastohisunderstandingofHeidegger’sconceptionofa“world,”thoughIwouldnotpresumetosayhewouldendorsemyapplicationoftheseconceptsunderthesecircumstances.

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C.PhenomenologicalEpoché

Husserlbeginshisshiftintothenewattitudebynoticingthat,contrarytoits

spiritoftotalself‐confidence,thenaturalattitudehassomeansweringtodo.For

thereare“presuppositions”toits“psychologicalexperience”54thatremainsofar

unexploredandunknown(tonaturalconsciousnessitself).Husserlwantsto

investigatethese.Herenowa“radicalalteration”iscalledfor:“anewstyleof

attitudeisneededwhichisentirelyalteredincontrasttothenaturalattitudein

experiencingandthenaturalattitudeinthinking.”55Inordertodemonstratethis

transformation,HusserlcallsfatefullyupontheexampleofDescartesandthelatter’s

MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.Subsequently,thewaytothereductionoutlinedin

IdeasIistypicallycalledthe“Cartesian”way.Husserlcertainlybelievedthat

Descarteshadopenedthewaytoawhollynewfieldofbeing,whichHusserlhimself

calls“transcendentalsubjectivity,”buthealsobelievedthatDescartesdidnot

properlyunderstandhisownachievementandhencefellawayfromthenewperch

almostassoonashereachedit,aswewillseebelow.

HusserlexploitstheCartesian“methodofdoubt”inanewandoriginalway.

Throughhisownconfrontationwithskepticism,Descartesenactedthisfamous

methodinordertoreachthefoundationofknowledge,theself‐certain“Ithink,I

am”(cogito).Husserlnowpracticesavariationofthismethodinordertoreacha

similarlyself‐evidentsphere,somethingheisabouttocallasphereofpure

consciousnessorimmanence.ButHusserldoesnotwanttoactuallydoubtanything,

certainlynottheindubitableexistenceoftheworld(whichisalwayspresupposedin 54IdeasI,xix55Ibid.,xix

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consciousnessasitsultimatehorizon).Whatheisinterestedinisthe“attempt”at

doubt.Forwhilewecannotdoubtcertainthings,“wecanattempttodoubtanything

whatever,nomatterhowfirmlyconvincedofit,evenassuredofitinanadequate

evidence,wemaybe.”56Thenatureofsuchanact,theattemptatdoubt,isto

hypotheticallyplacetheexistenceofthatwhichisdoubtedintometaphorical

“brackets”or“parentheses.”It“effectsacertainannulmentofpositingandprecisely

thisinterestsus.”Thereisnoquestionofnegatingthatwhichexists,i.e.denyingits

existence.Butthereisasuddenneutralitywithregardtothisentirequestion—

something“whollypeculiar.”57Thequestionoftheexistenceofthingsissuddenly

“putoutofaction,”andinmywords,intoakindofpurgatorial“maybe”that

neverthelessallowsonetofocusonsomethingelse—inthiscase,onthemannersof

givennessofthings.Thisnewfocus58automaticallyimplicatesthemasexperienced

bysomeone,i.e.,showsthemintheir“self‐givenness.”

Aswehavesaid,the“parenthesizing”of“positings”ofexistenceiswhatis

calledthe“epoché.”Morespecifically,thereareseveraltypesofepoché.Whatisat

issuenow,however,isnot,forexample,thekindofepochéonespeaksofinregards

tothe“bracketing”offeaturesunrelatedtothestudyathand(forexample,a

scientistbracketsallvalue‐predicatesof“physical”objectsandfocusesontheir

spatiotemporaldeterminationssolely,aphenomenologicalpsychologistbracketsall

materialorbiochemicalaspectsofanlivingorganism,etc.),butratherthefulland

56Ibid.,p.5857Ibid.,p.5858Itmightbenotedthatthissortoflanguage—”changingfocus”—wouldnotreallybesufficientforHusserltocapturetheradicalityofthenewattitude,sinceitisitselfborrowedfromexperiencewithinthenaturalattitude.

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totalbracketingofthequestionofexistence(ornon‐existence)oftheentireworld

(includingevenoneselfinsofarasoneispartoftheworld,thoughthiscomes

later)—the“thesisoftheworld”(Weltthesis).Butcanweeffectaglobalepochéof

thissort?Canweputthewholeofrealityinbrackets?Thisisaquestionwewill

comebacktoattheendofthischapter.

D.Phenomenological­TranscendentalReduction(s)

ThebracketingoftranscendentthingsisnotforHusserlsufficient,however,

toreachthetranscendentalego.59Itonlygoesasfarassealingthepsycheofffrom

whatmightbecalled(fromanatural‐attitudinalstand‐point,anyway)the“external

world.”ItisherethatHusserlmakesanotherinterestingdeparturefromDescartes.

Theego,too“[is]arealObjectlikeothersinthenaturalworld.”60Thisisnottrue

onlyinthesensethatIhaveaphysicalbody,butalsointhesensethat“Ieffect

cogitationes,actsofconsciousnessinboththebroaderandthenarrowersenseand

theseacts,asbelongingtothehumansubject,areoccurrenceswithinthesame

naturalactuality.”61(Thisprincipleofthenaturalityof“psychic”—asopposedto

transcendental—consciousnesswillonceagainbecomeacentralthemeinIdeasII.)

Inlaterwritings,Husserldistinguishesbetweenthe“phenomenologicalreduction”

andthe“transcendentalreduction,”characterizingthelatterasafurtherstep

beyondtheformer,preciselyintermsofthefurtherbracketingoftheego.The

phenomenologicalreductiononthisunderstandingeffectsauniversalepochéonthe

59Moreissaidaboutthisconceptinthissectionbelow.60IdeasI,p.6461Ibid.

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naturalworld,butnotupontheegoitself.Henceitisareductiontowhatmightbe

called“phenomenologicalpsychology”ortheintentionallifeofconsciousness,but

withoutanexplicitrecognition—onlytobesuppliedthroughthefinal,

transcendentalreduction—oftheultimatesourceofmeaning,thetranscendental

ego:

“Ifthetranscendentalrelativityofeverypossibleworlddemandsanall‐embracingbracketing,italsopostulatesthebracketingofpurepsychesandthepurephenomenologicalpsychologyrelatedtothem.”

Andso,

“Accordingly,theconsistentreflectiononconsciousnessyieldshimtimeaftertimetranscendentallypuredata,andmoreparticularlyitisintuitiveinthemodeofnewkindofexperience,transcendental“inner”experience.”62

InIdeasI,Husserllatercomestounderstandthesetwodistinctstepstohavebeen

conflated.63Onceitiskeptinmind,however,itissufficientforourpurposestokeep

thembothascomprisingwhatHusserltreatsinIdeasIasasingle

“phenomenologicalreduction”—areductiontophenomenologicalconsciousness

and,therewith,thetranscendentalego.

Husserl’sbracketingofthe(empirical)egoisamajordevelopmentthat,in

Husserl’sunderstanding,distinguisheshisownmethod,atthispoint,from

62ThesequotesarefromHusserl’sEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleof1928(trans.RichardE.Palmer),reproducedinfullin:Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserl’sPhenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994(p.209)Kockelmann’ssourceforthetranslationisHusserl:ShorterWorks.McCormackandElliston,eds.NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1981(pp.21‐35).63Seefn.3,above.

36

Descartes.’64Forthereductiondoesnotretreatintoaprivate“cogito”oritstheater

ofconsciousness;neitherdoesitmerelyseizeontheessenceofconsciousness,when

takeninthemundanesense(thisisstillthetaskof“psychology”).

“Evenmoreinaccessibletohim[Descartes],andnaturallyso,wastheconsiderationthattheegoasitisdisclosedwithintheepoché,existingforitself,isasyetnotatall“an”egowhichcanhaveotherormanyfellowegosoutsideitself.ItremainedhiddenfromDescartesthatallsuchdistinctionsas“I”and“you,”“inside”and“outside,”first“constitute”themselvesintheabsoluteego.”65

HusserlunderstandsDescartestohavecorrectlydiscoveredthe“absolute

ego”asthe“indubitable”ultimatumoftranscendentalinquiry,onlytohavethen

misinterpretedhisowndiscoveryinanimportantway.Inparticular,hefailedto

properlygraspthenatureofthe“I”oftheself‐certain“Ithink,Iam.”66The“I”in

questionisnotme,Descartesorevensomepossibleindividualempiricalego,atleast

notquapsychophysicalbeing,butrathertranscendentalsubjectivity—nota

thinkingsubjectbutthethinkerassuch,transcendentallyconsidered,forwhomand

inwhomanentireworldisconstitutedand,hence,availableinfull“self‐evidence”

formyknowingregard.Furthermore,whileHusserlendorsesDescartes’thesisthat

the“I”isinsomewaymorecertainthantheveryquestionoftheexistenceofthe

world,helamentsthelatter’sfailuretoseethattheworldisstillpreservedasa

phenomenoninthereduction.WhatDescartesfundamentallymisunderstoodisthat

theindubitableselfisnotthemere“ego‐pole”ofconsciousnessorevenpsychic

empiricalconsciousnessitself.Itistranscendentalsubjectivity.67

64IdeasI,p.6865Ibid.,p.8266MyitalicsontheCartesianquote67Crisis,p.81.OnecanalsoseeherethelanguageofDescartes’“self‐misinterpretation.”

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Yetwhatremainsafterthereductionisnonethelessa“stream”ofmentallife.

Isthisthenotorious“transcendentalego”?JustwhatHusserlmeansbythe

“transcendentalego”isoneoftheverydifficultproblemstosolveinHusserl

scholarship.AccordingtoDavidBell,“…thetranscendentalegoisnothingbutthe

ordinary,common‐or‐gardenmind,albeitviewedfromwithinaphilosophicalor

transcendentalperspective.”Insupportofthisthesishecitesthefollowingpassage

fromtheCrisis:“Astranscendentalego,afterall,Iamthesameegothatinthe

worldlysphereisahumanego.WhatwasconcealedfrommeinthehumansphereI

revealthroughtranscendentalenquiry.”68Inthisspirit,wewouldperhapsnotdo

badlytounderstandthetranscendentalegoofIdeasIastheselfquatranscendental

sphereofnoetic­noematicconsciousness,withallofitsactsandintentionalobjects

included,andunderstoodtoconstituteitselfthroughthelawsoftemporality

(thoughHusserlelaboratesonthislastpartlater).Ofcourse,thisdefinitionmight

seemtoconflictwithHusserl’senigmaticpost‐IdeasIclaimthatthemeaningof

transcendentalsubjectivityistranscendentalintersubjectivity.69Butwewillhaveto

presentlyleavethatcomplexissueaside.

68Bell,David.Husserl.NewYork:Routlege,1990(p.207),hereafter“Bell”;theHusserlquotecanbefoundinCrisis,p.26469ThesubtitleoftheFifthMeditationoftheCM(p.89)statesthepointdirectly:“UncoveringoftheSphereofTranscendentalBeingasMonadologicalIntersubjectivity.”TherecanbenoquestionbutthatHusserlviews“intersubjectivity”here(andfortherestofhiscareer)astheauthenticmeaningoftranscendentalsubjectivity.Thetranscendentalegoisnotayouorme,butneitherisitanempiricalcommunity(asthiscouldleadtorelativism,oneofHusserl’savowedenemies),butsomehowan“I”thatisa“we”inatranscendentalregister.WecannothererehearsethestepsofHusserl’selaboratedescriptionofthemannerinwhichthebeingofotheregosis“evincedandverifiedintherealmofthetranscendentalego.”(p.90)ForadetailedexpositionandinterpretationofHusserl’sviewsee:Zahavi,Dan.HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity:AResponsetotheLinguistic­PragmaticCritique.TranslatedbyElizabethA.Behnke.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,2001.(Seeespeciallypp.159‐66).

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E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction

Beforefurtherexploringthephilosophicalandontologicalimplicationsofthe

reduction(seePartIVbelow),wemightatthisstageaskwhatactuallymotivatesit

inthefirstplace.Sofar,wehavepresentedthereductionlargelyasHusserl(inIdeas

I)himselfdoes,namelyasaprocedureforgettingatthetruthofexperienceandthe

world.ButwhatmakesHusserlthinkthisparticularmethodisnecessary,asopposed

toothers?HereitisimportanttounderstandthatHusserlfitsintoaveryold

traditioninphilosophy,namelythequestforwhatmightbecalledrealandsecure

knowledge.Alongtheselines,thephilosopherspeaksoftheelementalquestfor

freedom—inthiscasethe“epistemicfreedom”thatcanalsobedescribedasthe

freedomfromerrorandbias,illusionandemptyabstraction.Foritisthepursuitof

certainty,clarity,andfreedomfromprejudicethatconspiretoproducetheprecisely

HusserlianversionofphenomenologythatburstsforthoutofIdeasI.See,for

example,Husserl’sreferenceto“genuinefreedomfromprejudice”70inthefirstpart,

orHusserl’sowndeclarationthatthegoalofthephenomenologicalreductionsisto

reach“thefreevistaof‘transcendentally’purifiedphenomenaand,therewith,the

fieldofphenomenologyinourpeculiarsense.”71

Whatwecangather,then,isthat(transcendental)phenomenologyis

motivatedbyathirstforacertainfreedom,inparticularafreedomfrom

presuppositions.Butiffreedomfrompresuppositionsmotivatesthereduction,what

isthissupposedtobeafreedomto?Inshort,Husserlwasinsearchofthe

foundationofknowledge.Wemustbefreefrombiasinordertogainaccesstoa 70IdeasI,p.36(myitalics)71Ibid.,xix

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securezoneofknowing,adirectaccesstoreality.Logic,science,andmathematics

makethemostvigorousclaimstoknowledgeinourandHusserl’sera,butHusserl

becameconvincedthateventheyneededsecuringonamorefundamentalbasis.But

Husserlwasnotsimplya“meta‐scientist.”Insteadofbeingmerelyfixatedongiving

thesesciencesafoundation,hecamealsotobefascinatedforitsownsakewiththe

realmofmeaningsinwhichconsciousnessrevealedallthingsintheiressence.He

cametoregardphilosophy—understoodinanewandnon‐dogmaticway—asthe

indispensablescienceandthefoundationofallknowledge.Italonebearsthe

customaryrole—andtheresponsibility—ofansweringtheskepticwhodeniesthe

possibilityofknowledge,andhedoesthisbyshowingthewaytoanindubitable,

undeniablesourceofapodicticevidence.Husserl’sstrivingforknowledgeissodeep

andthoroughthatheiswillingtorevisehimselfruthlessly.Husserldidnotthink

philosophywasascienceamongsciences—i.e.,asjustanother“formal”or

“material”ontologythatmakesclaimsandargumentsaboutacertainregionof

reality.Sounlikepreviousphilosophers,Husserl—inlargeagreementwithKant,his

“transcendentalist”ancestor—placedallhistrustnotinsomerealmofmetaphysical

truths,intuitedorlearnedthroughrevelation(suchasPlatonicForms,God,

AbsoluteSpirit),fromwhichtoderiveandsecureothers,butsimplyinexperience.

Philosophy’sroleistodrawitsevidencefromthewellofexperience—actsof

consciousnessandthethingsofwhichitisconscious(egocogitocogitatum)—

throughamethodinwhicheverythingbutthispurifiedexperientialityissuspended

indefinitely,and“putoutofaction”forthetranscendentalgaze.

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InthiswayHusserl’sphilosophicalorientation,broadlyconstrued,is

radically“epistemological.”ButthisdoesnotmeanHusserlwasconcernedwith

“epistemology”inthenarrowsenseinusetoday—Husserlwasnotoverlyconcerned

withdefining“knowledge”as“justifiedtruebelief”orsomethingelse,forexample.

Andheisnot,onceagain,obsessedwiththe“subjective”sideof“knowing”(“noetic

phenomenology”)inthewaytraditionalepistemologyis(exceptingthe“causal”and

“externalist”models,ofcourse),ashegivesampleattentiontothevariousobjects

thatareknown(“noematicphenomenology”).Itdoesmean,however,thatfor

Husserl,todiscoverhowknowledgetakesplaceisbothanecessaryandasufficient

taskforphilosophyassuch,regardedinitspurestessence.

III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction

Besidesthephenomenologicalreduction,thereisanother,nolessimportant

typeofreductionwhoseperformanceisalsonecessaryforphenomenologyas

Husserlconceivesit:theeideticreduction.HusserlbeginstheversionofIdeasI

eventuallypublishedwithatacked‐onbut(tohismind)crucialdiscussionofthe

“eidetic”natureofphenomenology,tryingtoclassifyphenomenologyamongandas

againstother“sciences.”Thismaterialisveryinteresting,butwecanonlytouchon

itbrieflyhere,insofarasitisrelevanttoourtask.

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Thereis,forHusserl,afundamentaldividebetween“mattersoffact”(in

muchthe“Humean”sense)ontheonehandand“essences”(oreidē)ontheother.72

Overlappingwiththisdistinctionisthatbetween“reality”(thereal,whichistosay

factical)or“theempirical”ontheonehand,and“essentiality,”ontheother.What

exactlyisaHusserlianessence,oreidos?Isit,forexample,a“universal”?Sucha

questionmaynotbeterriblyhelpful,giventhecontestednessofthequestionof

universalsitself,butHusserlianessencesare“universal‐like”inthattheyare

multiplyinstantiableand“non‐particular.”Thatis,theyarenot“singular”intheway

“existent”particularsare.However,itisnottechnicallytruetosaythattheyare

outsideofspaceandtime;theydonotsubsistlikePlatonicFormsinasupra‐

spatiotemporalorder,asHusserlforcefullyunderscores.73Essencesarealso

ontologicalinastrongsense—thatis,theyarenotpurely“linguistic”or

“conventional.”Wedonotdecide“asacommunity”whatisorisnotanessence,at

leastaspertainstothenaturalandspiritualfurnitureoftheworld;wediscoversuch

essences.

Thecleargraspofessencesisachievedthroughamethodknownas

“imaginativevariation.”Intheeideticreduction—whichistobeperformedbefore

thephenomenologicalreduction—oneistobracketoutallparticular,factical,and

contingentfeaturesofthingsperceived(orremembered,imagined,etc.)andtoseize

onlythosefeaturesthatbelongtotheobjectnecessarily—i.e.,thatmaketheobject

whatitis.Inotherwords,theeideticreductiondistillsthosecategorialformsthat

weintuitinthings.Yethowdoesoneclearlydistinguishbetweentheessentialand 72Ibid.,pp.7‐873Ibid.,pp.40‐42

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inessentialaspectsofthings?Thisiswhereimaginativevariationasamultiply‐

repeatableexercisebecomescrucial:wearetoimaginethethingsinmanydifferent

circumstancesandundergoingmanychanges.Ineachchangeofcircumstance,some

featureorpropertyofthethingisaltered.Doestheobjectsurviveasjusttheobject

thatitisevenafterthisalteration?Thenthepropertyalteredmusthavebeen

inessential.Aftervaryingtheobjectenough,itistobecomeapparentwhatthe

essentialfeaturesoftheobjectare.

Hence,inkeepingwithatraditioninauguratedbytheGreeksandsustained

bythescholastics,essencesrevealthewhatofthings(andpeople),theessential

“nature”ofthings,and,tothisextent,theirbeing.Allthesame,therearetwodistinct

sensesoftheword“being”—essenceandexistence.74Itwouldseemthattheessence

ofathingcannotexistwithoutthereexistingthingsthatinstantiatethatessence.75

Thereare,then,atleastthesetwooptionsforthetheoreticalregardofan

objector“real”(athingorstateofaffairs,forexample):toviewitasfactualand

spatiotemporallylocated,ortoviewitinitsessentiality,i.e.intermsoftheessences

itinstantiates.Thedistinctiondoesnot,however,correspondtothatbetweenthe

naturalandtranscendentalattitudes;fortranscendentalreflectionisnottheonly

sciencedoneinthe“eideticattitude.”Essencesarenottheprovinceonlyof

phenomenology.Phenomenologyisaneideticscience,butnotalleideticsciences—

e.g.,logicandmathematics—arepersephenomenological.Phenomenology,in

Husserl’sconception,isthereforeoneofmanyeideticsciences.(Tobemoreprecise

74Ibid.,p.1275Attimes,itdoesseemasthoughHusserlgoesevenfurther:“Positingof…essencesimpliesnottheslightestpositingofanyindividualfactualexistences;pureeidetictruthscontainnottheslightestassertionaboutmattersoffact.”(IdeasI,p.11;Husserl’sitalics)

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still,onemightsaythatthereisnothingphenomenologicalinthe“eidos”ofthe

“eidetic,”butverymuchsomething“eidetic”inthe“eidos”ofthe

“phenomenological.”)

Husserlmakesmuchdependnotonlyontheeideticreduction,butalsoon

thestrictandabsolutedifferencebetweenfactsandessences,theempiricalandthe

eidetic.EssentialismalsobecomesextremelyimportantforHusserl’spurposesin

termsofhisdistinguishingbetweentheessencesof“mentalprocesses”ontheone

handand“physicalthings”ontheother.76ThusitwillbecentraltoHusserl’s

delineationsoftheessencesofconsciousnessandreality,aswewillseebelow.

IV.ConsciousnessandWorld

A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence

ForHusserl,asforhisteacherBrentano,themostfundamentalfactabout

consciousnessisthatitisintentional—itisintrinsically“about”or“of”something.77

Fromtheperspectiveofthetraditionalissuesinmodern“philosophyofmind”and

epistemology,thephenomenologicalnotionofintentionality,alreadyanticipatedby

Kant78,couldbyitselfbeseentosolve,asitwere,theoldquestionofhowsomething

like“consciousness,”whichis“inner,”can‘transcend”itselfandreachouttoaworld

76Ibid.,p.9877Ibid.,pp.73‐578See,forexample:Russell,Matheson.Husserl:AGuideforthePerplexed.ContinuumBooks.NewYork:2006(p.47).Hereafter“Russell.”Theconceptisalsopresentinmedievalwriters.

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thatisoutsideofit—“outer.”Forintentionalityrevealsanintimate,indeed

unbreakablebondbetweenanactofconsciousness(“noesis”)ontheonehand,and

an“intentionalobject”(“noema,”vaguelyakintoKant’s“phenomenological

object”—Gegenstand)ontheother.Onemightatfirstbetemptedtosaythatsucha

relationshiptakesplacewithinconsciousnessitself,but“consciousness”shouldnow

beseenasanequivocalterm.Consciousnessasintentionalityhousesbotha

“subjective”poleaswellasan“objective”one;consciousnessinthissenseisnot

“mere”subjectivity.Whilethisisnotsomucha“proof”thatthereexistsan“outside

world,”sincethisisbuiltintotheverydefinitionofexperience(atleastforHusserl),

itisafundamentalproblematizationofthevery“inner/outer”distinction

philosophyhadbeentakingforgrantedpre‐phenomenologically(orpre‐”critically”

intheKantiansense).Thereissimplynosenseintheideaofaconsciousness

essentiallyunrelatedtoanintendedworld,horizon,orobject.

Mostcommentatorshavegenerallyfoundthereferentoftheterm“noesis”to

beunproblematictograsp,butnotso“noema.”Asmentioned,theterm“noesis”

referstointentionalactsofconsciousnessand“noema”totheobjectssointended

(andquaintended).InHusserl’swords:

“CorrespondingineverycasetothemultiplicityofDatapertainingtothereallyinherentnoeticcontent,thereisamultiplicityofData,demonstrableinactualpureintuition,inacorrelative“noematiccontent”or,inshort,inthe“noema”—termswhichweshallcontinuetousefromnowon.”79

Husserlgivesanexample,pertainingtotheexperienceofseeingatree:

“thetreesimpliciter,thephysicalthingbelongingtoNature,isnothinglessthanthisperceivedtreeasperceivedwhich,asperceptualsense,inseparablybelongstotheperception.Thetreecanburnup,be

79Ibid.,p.214

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resolvedintoitschemicalelements,etc.Butthesense—thesenseofthisperception,somethingbelongingnecessarilytoitsessence—cannotburnup;ithasnochemicalelements,noforces,norealproperties.”80

However,thenoemaisnotforHusserla“reallyinherent”partofconsciousness.The

noema“tree,”saysHusserl,is“nomorecontainedinherentlythanisthetreewhich

belongstoactuality.”81

Hencethe“noema”ofaperceptionissimplytheperceivedasperceived.This

wouldapplyacrosstheboardtoallthevarioustypesofact:thenoemaofa

recollectionistherecollectedasrecollected,thenoemaofafantasyisthefantasied

thingasfantasied,etc.Husserlalsocallsthenoemaor“noematiccorrelate”the

“sense”ofanact.Howthisdefinitionofitmatchesupwiththefirstisadeepsource

ofdebate,butitcannotbefurtheredaddressedhere.82

Ashintedatalready,thenoetic‐noematicbifurcationallowsHusserltoclaim

thatphenomenologyisnotmerelyaboutconsciousnessinthenarrowsenseof

“subjective”consciousness—sincethisisonlythe“noetic”poleofexperience—but

alsoabouttheobjectsexperienced(asexperienced)—the“noematic”pole.Every

consciousexperience,withoutfail,hasbothanoeticandanoematicside.Itmakes

nosensetoisolatethe“consciousness‐of”fromthatofwhichthereis

consciousness—apointMohantymakeseloquentlyinspeakingoftheirreducibility

ofthephrase“consciousnessofsomething”:

80Ibid.,p.21681Ibid.,p.23782Onceagain,Bell’swayofcharacterizingtheissueishelpfulforourpresentnarrowpurposes:“…somethingisnoematicinsofarasitisanimmanent,butnon‐realcontributoryfactorinthepossessionbyanactofsignificanceormeaning.”(Bell,p.180)

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“Consciousnessis…acorrelationbetweennoeticactsandnoematicmeanings.Theworldisastructureandinterconnectednessofsuchmeanings,andisthecorrelateofconsciousness.Thetwo,consciousnessandworld,together,intheircorrelation,constitutetranscendentalsubjectivity…Thetruetranscendentalfoundationis:consciousness­of­the­world.Realismdeletesthehyphens…butitcannotinfactdoso.Iwanttokeepthemtiedtogether.”83

Ifconsciousnessitselfhasan“inner”and“outer”,a“here”and“there,”a

subjectandobject,thenitisalready,inasense,self‐transcending;andso

immediatelyonecanseehow“transcendence”becomesafundamentalthemeinthe

structureofconsciousness.Husserlgenerallyspeaksof“transcendence”inthe

contextofthetranscendentintentionalobject,including,mostimportantly,the

“necessarytranscendence”thatbelongstotheessence“physicalthing.”Butitis

importanttoseethatbecausetranscendenceisfirstpredicatedonintentionality,

andintentionalityisastructuralfeatureof(noetic‐noematic)consciousnessassuch,

thetranscendenceoftheworld,whateverformitwilltake,willbesuchasnotto

leaveconsciousnesstrappedinaskepticalimpasseorlockedintothe“private

theater”ofthemind.Onceagain,Husserl’stheorycouldbeseenasanadvanceover

lesssophisticated“modern”theoriesofmindandworld.

ButwhatexactlyisHusserl’sconceptionof“transcendence”?Itisimportant

heretotracetheexactsenseinwhichHusserlemploystheterm,forthiswillhave

enormousconsequencesforthegeneralphilosophicalimplicationsofHusserl’sfinal

“transcendental‐phenomenological”position.Tobeginwith,Husserldeniesthe

83Mohanty,J.N.“MyPhilosophicalPosition/Response.”InTheTranscendentalandtheEmpirical.Ed.BinaGupta.Oxford,England:RowmanandLittlefieldPublishers,Inc.,2000pp.261‐2(myitalics).Inthisway,thenoetic‐noematicstructureofconsciousness(inthewidesense)canbeseentofollowfromtheoriginalthesisofintentionalityitself.YetitalsoconfirmsHusserl’sinterestinthe“appearingasappearing”ofthings(inthewidesense).Itisnotthingsintheir“real”existence,butthings“astheyappear,”thatconcernuswithinthephenomenologicalreduction.Wedonotworryaboutwhetherornotthere“reallyis”anappletreebeforeus;weareconcernedwiththenoemaof“theappletree.”Realityquarealexistenceisnotdenied,justputoutofplay.

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Kantiandistinctionbetweenthephenomenonandthenoumenon.84Thething‐in‐

itselfisnotunknowable—preciselytheopposite.Buthowcanitbeknowable,ifitis

alsotranscendent?Itisknowableindegreesor“adumbrations”—theprofilesof

thingsasseenfromdifferentangles;henceitisknown,inHusserl’sterminology,

“inadequately”—andnotjustforfiniteobserversbutforanyobserverwhatsoever,

includingGod.(Thisreflectstheintrinsicnatureofperception,understoodasa

generalrelationshipofconsciousnesstoextra‐consciousreality).Hencethethingis

“transcendent”onlyafterapeculiarway—notwhollyotherthanoraliento

consciousness,butinawaythatbelongstoitnoetically‐noematically,through

adumbrations,yetnotwithrespecttothewholeoftheobjectallatonce.Thingsare

encounteredastranscendent—theyhavethis“meaning”—butsuch“transcendence”

amountsonly,ultimately,toakindofregulativeIdea(roughlyintheKantiansense)

of“adequate”objectivity—theinfinitelimitoffull,adequategivennessoftheobject

inallofitsprofilesatonce.Transcendenceisthusnotapropertyofthingsbutthe

ideaofacompleteunityofadumbrations,thesumofprofilesofathing.Warnsand

clarifiesHusserl:

“…onemustnotletoneselfbedeceivedbyspeakingofthephysicalthingastranscendingconsciousnessoras‘existinginitself.’Thegenuineconceptofthetranscendenceofsomethingphysicalwhichisthemeasureoftherationalityofanystatementsabouttranscendence,canitselfbederivedonlyfromtheproperessentialcontentsofperceptionorfromthoseconcatenationsofdefinitekindswhichwecalldemonstrativeexperience.Theideaofsuchtranscendenceisthereforetheeideticcorrelateofthepureideaofthisdemonstrativeexperience.”85

84See,forexample:Husserl,Edmund.“Kantandtheideaoftranscendentalphenomenology,”trans.TedE.Klein,Jr.andWilliamE.Pohl.TheSouthwesternJournalofPhilosophy,5.3(1974),p.11(citationfoundinRussell,p.91)85Ibid.,p.106(myitalics)

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Fundamentaltothispictureisthenotionofgivenness.Inthewordsofone

commentator,“thegiven...includesnotonlythatwhichisimmanentinarealsense

butalsothetranscendent,providedthatitisgiven.”86ThisalsoallowsHusserlto

convertalltranscendenceintowhathecalls“immanenttranscendency.”With

respecttophysicalthingsthistermdenotesthat“...thetranscendencybelongingto

thephysicalthingasdeterminedbyphysicsisthetranscendencybelongingtoa

beingwhichbecomesconstitutedin,andtiedto,consciousness...”87

Yetinthiscase,onemightsuspectthatHusserlhassecuredaccesstothe

“things”atabitofanunfairprice.Suchacriticismmightrunasfollows:Either

thingsarenottrulytranscendent,ortheyarenotnecessarilyknown—unliketheir

phenomenalappearance,whichmay,afterall,withKant,beconditionedbyourown

cognitiveapparatus.ButHusserldespisesbothsubjectivismandconstructivismas

equallyunbearableconcessionstotheskeptic(orthestrictKantian),sothese

optionsareclosedbyhim.Husserlwantsapuretransparencyofbeing—apure

knowing—aswellastheotherness,sotospeak,ofthisbeing,ortheobject.Butcan

hehavethis?

Husserlwouldprobablyarguethatthecounter‐argumentsketchedabove

restsonafalsedilemmathattranscendentalphenomenologymovesbeyond.The

criticdoesnotseeathirdpossibilitybetweentranscendentalrealismand

skepticism,namelythepossibilityofatranscendentallevelatwhichtheworldis

revealedtobeintegrallyunifiedwithconsciousness.Thisisbutabriefpre‐sketchof

86DeBoer,Theodore.TheDevelopmentofHusserl’sThought.Trans.TheodorePlantinga.TheHague,theNetherlands:MartinusNijhoff,1978,p.31487IdeasI,p.123

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onewayHusserlcouldrespondtotheobjection.Iwillsaymuchmoreaboutthis

waytoapproachthe“consciousness/world”relationanditspotentialforsuccess,

however,intheconcludingthoughtsofthischapter.

B.TheEideticDistinctionbetweenMentalandPhysical

Husserl’squasi‐”Cartesianism”doesnotendwiththe“Cartesianway”tothe

reduction.Itisalsoevidentinhisefforttodistinguishtheessencesofthe“mental”

andthe“physical”onseveralgrounds.Forinstance,itbelongstotheessenceof

mentalphenomenathattheyareindubitable,ofphysicalphenomenathattheyare

not.“Everyperceptionofsomethingimmanent[i.e.,inthesphereofconsciousness]

necessarilyguaranteestheexistenceofitsobject.”88However,“[a]ccordingto

eideticlawitisthecasethatphysicalexistenceisneverrequiredasnecessarybythe

givennessofsomethingphysical,butisalwaysinacertainmannercontingent.”89

WhatHusserlisindicating,ofcourse,isthatIcannotbewrongaboutthe

existenceofsomething’sappearingtomeassuch‐and‐suchthing.Forexample,

whileIcanbewrongthatamonsterisstandinginfrontofme,Icannotbewrong

thatitappearsasthoughonedoes.EventhePyrrhonianskepticswereindeed

comfortablewiththismuch.Butdoesthisrevealsomethingaboutthe“mental”and

the“physical,”ormerelyourcognitiverelationtoourselvesontheonehandand

transcendentrealitiesontheother?Thisquestionreachesbacktothequestionof

whetherDescartes’own“realdistinction”isinvalidonthegroundsthatheconfused

theepistemologicalpropertiesofthemindwithrealpropertiesofmindsand 88Ibid.,p.10089Ibid.,p.103

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extendedthings.ButinHusserl,asopposedtoDescartes,thisquestioncannotarise,

becauseafterthephenomenologicalreductionandovercomingofthenatural

attitude,itmakesnosensetospeakofanythingbutmeanings.Tospeakofthingsas

beingtotallydisconnectedfromconsciousnessis,aswehaveseen,meaningless;so

wehavetotakethemannerofgivennessofobjectsinperceptionasrevealing

somethingessentialabouttheseobjectsthemselves,andnotonlyastellingusabout

“ourselves”asperceivers.90

Physicalthings,bycontrasttomentalprocessesandappearances,are,aswe

havealreadyseen,transcendent.Thatis,themeaning“physicalthing”containsthis

transcendence.Astranscendent,physicalthingssomehowdonotpossessthesealof

self‐evidentnessofimmanentmentalphenomena.Forthisissomethingthatbelongs

essentiallytothenatureof“thephysical.”Insum(noticethecontinuousemphasis):

“Overagainstthepositingoftheworld,whichisa“contingent”positing,therestandsthenthepositingofmypureEgoandEgo­lifewhichisa“necessary,”absolutelyindubitablepositing.Anythingphysicalwhichisgiven“inperson”canbenon­existent;nomentalprocesswhichisgiven“inperson”canbenon­existent.Thisistheeideticlawdefiningthisnecessityandthatcontingency.”91

The“real”(Descartes’term)or“eidetic”(Husserl’s)distinctionbetween

physicalandmentalisestablishedinotherwaysaswell.Letusreturntotheissueof

perception.Aswehavesaid,transcendentthings—“theworld,”collectively

regarded—presentthemselvestoconsciousnessinprofilesor“adumbrations.”We

seeonlythesidesofthings,andcannever—noteveninprinciple—viewallsidesof

athingatonce,forperceptionisirreduciblyperspectival.Therefore,wecansaythis 90Ibid.,p.9291Ibid.,Husserl’sitalics.Husserl’squotationmarksherearenotmeanttobeironic,theyaresimplydesignatingessentialtypes.

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muchabouttranscendentobjects:theyarealwaysgiveninadequately.Wenever

haveatotalisticperceptionofanobject,butjustastruly,objectsdonotgive

themselvesinfulladequacy.92Bycontrastwithphysicalobjects,purecogitataand

mentalappearancesaregivenadequately.Forexample,Idonotconceiveofa

triangleinitsadumbrations,butadequatelyandallatonce.Husserlgeneralizesthe

pointtoincludeall“mentalprocesses,”93concerningwhichheremarks,“Where

thereisnospatialbeingitissenselesstospeakofaseeingfromdifferentstand‐

pointswithachangingorientationinaccordancewithdifferentperappearances,

adumbrations.”94

HerewithHusserlonceagainestablishesthatthereisanessential

difference—withechoeshereagainofDescartes’“realdistinction”—between

consciousnessandreality.Consciousnessisasphereofimmanence,inwhichthe

objectsofthoughtaregivenadequately,whereas(physical)realityisasphereof

transcendence—unqualifiedtranscendence,tobeprecise—whoseobjectsaregiven

toconsciousnessinadequately.Husserlactuallymakestwoimportantrelevant

essentialdistinctions:betweenthatofperceptionandnon‐perceptualmental

processesontheonehand,andbetweenperceptionand“depictive­symbolic

objectivation,”or,moresimply,“sign‐consciousness,”ontheother.95Inthisway,

Husserltriestosetphenomenologyapartfromthefollowingalternatives,long

familiarfromtraditionalormodern“epistemology”:pureidealism(whichwould

92Thisdoesnot,bytheway,meanthatweonlyperceive“parts”ofobjectswhenweseethem—wegenerallyperceivethewholeobject,throughitsprofilesoradumbrations.Hencethe“adequacy/inadequacy”relationcannotbecorrelatedwiththepart‐wholerelation.93IdeasI,p.9194Ibid.,p.9195Ibid.,p.93

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denythefirstdistinction),representationalismofaLockeanvariety(whichwould

denythesecond),andnaïverealism(whichdoesnotconsiderconsciousnesstohave

itsownessenceinthefirstplace).Tothiswemustaddthedistinctionbetween

phenomenologyandKantianism.Foraswehavepointedout,Husserldeniesthe

phenomenon‐noumenondistinction.Thushestressesthat:

“…inimmediatelyintuitiveactsweintuitan‘initself’,andthatinperceptionthe‘ititself’isfurthercharacterizedinitspeculiarityas‘inperson’incontrasttoitsmodifiedcharacteristicas‘floatingbeforeus,’as‘presentiated’inmemoryorinfreephantasy.”96

Owingtohismaintenanceofanessentialdistinctionofconsciousnessandreality,

nottomentionhisowninvocationofDescartes,Husserlcouldeasilybesuspectedof

espousingatthispointaCartesiandualismaswell.Wewilllookatthischarge

below.Toseefullyhowhewoulddistinguishphenomenologyfromthatdeadend,

wewilleventuallyhavetoturntohisargumentsabouttheprimacyofconsciousness

overreality,inthesubsequentsections.Suchanasymmetry,ifsuccessful,would

definitivelyrendertheimpossibilityofCartesiandualism.Inthemeanwhile,Iwill

trytodispelthespecterofstraightforwardCartesiandualismbelow.

C.TheChargeofDualism

Thechargeof“dualism”couldsuperficiallybeleveledatHusserl,butifwhat

ismeantbythisisCartesian“substance”dualism,itisclearlyunfair.Husserl

decisivelyrejectsthissortofdualism,anditisalreadyclearfromhisownanalysis

thatheneverregards“externalreality”astrulyandabsolutely“external.”How

96Ibid.,p.93

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couldweknowitinthefirstplace,orperceivetheworld—“ititself”—inactsof

perception,ifthiswerethecase?ThissortofcomparisontoDescarteswouldbe

especiallyirresponsiblegivenHusserl’strenchantcritiqueofthatphilosopher’s

view,alreadypartiallylaidoutabove(IIB).

WhateverHusserl’spositionwithrespecttohisargumentfortranscendental

phenomenology,itshouldbeclearbynowthathehasrejectednaïverealism,

Kantiandualism,representationalism,andCartesiandualismalike.Indeed,itis

bettertostartonhisownterms—thatis,intermsof“transcendentalidealism.”

Consciousnessistranscendentalinthatitmakesbothexperience—“natural”

experience—andtheworldsoexperienced,possible.Transcendentalityisnot,

however,asufficientconditionfortheexistenceoftranscendentobjects.Husserl

doesnotdenytherealityofnature—ofarealmofpurelytranscendentbeing(albeit

definedunderconditionsinwhichsuchtranscendenceobtainsinnecessarilyco‐

subjectiveterms).

Noneofthisistodeny,however,thatHusserlcansoundlikeadualistmuch

ofthetime.Withthetranscendentalreduction,Husserlfreestranscendental

consciousnessfromthe“realworld.”Thushespeaksofthe“essential

detachablenessofthewholenaturalworldfromthedomainofconsciousness”97and

proclaimsthata“veritableabyssyawnsbetweenconsciousnessandreality.”98His

wordshereadmittedlyconcernnot“natural”consciousness—orthehumanor

animalpsyche—but“pure”consciousness.Yetevenso,theyraiseconcernsabout

thepossibilitythatHusserlhasdescendedintoaCartesian‐styledualism.Husserl 97Ibid.,p.10498Ibid.,p.111

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himselfseemstorelishemphasizingtheabsolutedistinctnessoftranscendental

subjectivityand“Nature”:

“Everythingwhichispurelyimmanentandreducedinthewaypeculiartothementalprocess,everythingwhichcannotbeconceivedapartfromitjustasitisinitself,andwhicheoipsopassesoverintotheEidosintheeideticattitude,isseparatedbyanabyssfromallofNatureandphysicsandnolessfromallpsychology—andeventhisimage,asnaturalistic,isnotenoughtoindicatethedifference.”99

Buthow,wemightwonder,wouldanon‐dualisticviewlikethisreallywork?

Andhow,asHusserlclaims,cantherebeanyformofconsciousnessessentially

disconnectedfromthehumanego,thelatterofwhichnowrelegatedtothe“real”or

“natural”world?Ifthispossibilityisdenied,Cartesianismmightbeseentobethe

inevitableresult.ButHusserlisnotonetohedgehisbets;everythingrestsonthe

possibilityoftranscendentalsubjectivityinthestrict,“irreal”100senseinwhichhe

understandsit.Husserl’senterpriseinitsradicalityofpurposewouldbecompletely

misunderstood,inmyview,byonewhosoftensorblursthisemphasisonthis

radicalseparabilityofconsciousnessandworld.Foritispreciselytheinversionof

thenaturalisticprioritizationofthe“real”oversubjectivitythatneedstobeeffected,

inHusserl’sview,beforephenomenologyisevertocomeintoitsownandappearas

itself,andhesaysthisrepeatedlythroughouthiswork.101Aphilosophythatdoes

notcrossthethresholdoftranscendentalconsciousness,makingacleanbreakonce

andforallfromnaturalism,issimplyaformof“psychology.”Itdoesnotrecognize

99Ibid.,217(myemphasis)100Ibid.,p.4101Totakeoneexample,seeCrisis,p.200:“thecompleteinversionofthenaturalattitude,thusintoan‘unnatural’one,placesthegreatestconceivabledemandsuponphilosophicalresolveandconsistency.”Thissoundsexactlylikea“conversion”experience.

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theautonomyofthesubject,andhenceitisdestinedtoremainenthralledby

“science”and“scientism.”102

D.AbsoluteandRelativeExistenceandthe“World­Annihilation”Experiment

Husserl’sultimatecontentionwithrespecttotherelationshipof

consciousnessandrealityisthatthebeingofconsciousnessis“absolute”whereas

thebeingoftheworldismerely“relative”(namely,toconsciousness).ThusHusserl

isnotcontentwithmerelymakinganeideticdistinctionbetweenthe“mental”and

the“physical.”Healsoexplicitlyassignspriority(inasenseyettobedetermined)to

theformeroverthelatter,atleastwhenitcomestotranscendentalconsciousnessin

itsrelationtothematerialworld(andthose“strata”—psychical,forexample,that

arefoundeduponit).Wehavealreadyseenthatfromthepointofviewof

experience—and,importantly,thereisnootherpointofview!—theworld’s

existenceisnot,strictlyspeaking,necessary,buttheexistenceofconsciousnessis.

Yes,perceptualconsciousness,inwhichwearecontinuallyenmesheddirectlyor

indirectly,isconsciousnessoftheworld;butperceptionsmaybemerelyfantasies.

102Howeveraccurateormisguidedthispositionmaybe,itispowerfulenoughtoexertconsiderablepressureoveralater,“post‐transcendental”phenomenologistlikeMerleau‐Ponty.Forhispart,Merleau‐Pontywasequallyopposedtoscientificnaturalism,butnotonthegroundsthatitwascorrectinitsowndomain,yetoverlypresumptuousintakingthe“natural”worldasthedomainofallbeing.Husserlwidensthenet,preservingsciencewholesaleinitsmostbasicobjectivistassumptions,whileMerleau‐Pontyattackstranscendentalism(inbothitsKantianandHusserlianforms)andscientificnaturalismalike,insearchforaholisticalternative,onemightsay.Yetallthesame,Merleau‐Pontywouldhavetostrugglewiththeproblemofdistinguishingphilosophy’staskcompellinglyfromthoseofthesciences;hewastosettlefinallyonanotionofreciprocity,contrarytoHusserl’suncompromising,buttosome,moreappealingabsolutism.

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Forwithanygivencaseof(possible)perception,“thepossibilityofthenon‐beingof

theworldisneverexcluded.”103Oragain:

“Whathoversbeforeonemaybeamerefigment;thehoveringitself,theinventiveconsciousness,isnotitselfinventedandtherebelongstoitsessence,astoanyothermentalprocess,thepossibilityofaperceivingreflectionwhichseizesuponabsolutefactualbeing.”104

Besides,theexistenceofexternalobjectsisestablishedonlyonthebasisofcoherent

patternsofexperienceoverextendedperiodsoftime—butwhatifthesewereto

dissolveintofull‐blownincoherence,i.e.“chaos”?“Theworld”wouldnotnow

“exist”,butconsciousness(ofarealorimaginedworld)nonethelesswould.

Thislatternotion—featuredinHusserl’s“world‐annihilation”experiment—

isperhapsthemostradicalthoughtinalloftheIdeasI,aswellasperhapsitsmost

contested,evenbymanyHusserlians.Thethoughtexperimentisdesignedtoshow

theultimateasymmetryofconsciousnessandworld—andsubsequentlytolend

furtherproofoftheindependenceoftranscendentalphenomenologyfromthe

empiricalsciencesofthe“naturalattitude.”Husserlobservesthatthemeaning

“world”isestablishedasacertainharmonyofappearances.Thatis,physicalthings

canbydefinitionneverbecomecompletelyimmanent,andhencewecannotknow

themabsolutelyanddirectly.Sotheonlywaywecometounderstandthemtoexist

transcendentlyisthroughtheregularwaysinwhichtheyappeartous.Itisonthe

basisofappearancesorpresentationsofthingstoconsciousnessthatweposit(asit

were)theexistenceofatranscendentworld—onlythendoesits“meaning”as

103IdeasI,p.103104Ibid.,p.101

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“transcendent”(Kant’s“transcendentalobject=X”105)becomeconstituted.The

appearancesmusthaveacertainregularity,andtheymust“appear”inawaythat

satisfiedaminimallevelofexpectationonourpart.Forexample,wewouldnotat

firsttakeaflashing“object,”whichpoppedintoandoutofexistencerandomlyand

rapidly,asanexternalobject,evenifitwereone;wewouldlikelytakeittobean

hallucination.106Butsupposethisregularityweretobreakdownatafundamental

level,suchthat,effectively,thereceasestobeaworld.107Doesthisautomatically

entailtheabolishmentofconsciousness?Husserlthinksnot:

“…whilethebeingofconsciousness,ofanystreamofmentalprocesseswhatever,wouldindeedbenecessarilymodifiedbyanannihilationoftheworldofphysicalthingsitsownexistencewouldnotbetouched.”108

Mentalprocessescouldstilloccur—whynot?Afterall,accordingtothemethodof

epochéandreductionthemselves,wehavenorighttoassumethatconsciousnessis

causallydependenton,orinterdependentwith,theworld.Allsuchpresuppositions,

aswellasnotionsofcausality,havebynowbeenexposedforexactlywhattheyare,

andtheyhavebeenbracketedaccordingly.WhatremainsiswhatHusserlcallsthe

“phenomenologicalresiduum,”109oracertain“stream”ofconsciouslife.

Allthesame,itisveryimportanttonotethatwearenotintheBerkeleyan

campwiththisargument.FornowheredoesHusserlsuggestthatphysicalthings

themselves,intheirtranscendentbeing,dependontheexistenceofconsciousness 105Ibid.,pp.342‐3106Ifothersreportedseeingitaswell,thiswouldbegintochangeourview.Butthenagain,theywouldnotreportit,either,unlessthereweresomereason—aharmonyofappearanceandsatisfiedexpectationsovertime—todoso.107IdeasI,p.109108Ibid.,p.109109Ibid.,p.65

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orperception(“esseestpercipi”).Hispointisthatwewouldhavenoreasontoposit

theexistenceoftranscendentthingsinthefirstplace,wereitnotforthe

deliverancesofconsciousnessintheformofadumbratedappearance‐perceptions.

Yetinitsreflexivemomentofself‐perception,thesamecannotbesaidof

consciousnessitself:itcanbesureofitsexistence,anexistencethatistherefore,in

thissense,“absolute.”Anditcanseeself‐evidentlythatitexists,evenifthereisno

maturelyformed“ego”theretobeabletoarticulatethis.ThismuchoftheCartesian

legacysurvivesinIdeasI.110ForHusserl,consciousness’knowledgeofitself,atsome

deeplevel,isabsolute.Thisisenoughtogroundtranscendentalphenomenology—

namelyona“pure”levelofexperienceinwhichallobjects,onthenoematicside,as

wellasallperceivingsandthinkings,onthenoetic,areconstituted.

Todenythatthissortofasymmetryexistsmightbetempting,butonwhat

groundscouldwedosoaftertheepoché?Certainlytherearenogroundstospeakof

acausallynecessaryrelationshipofworldtoconsciousness,foritispreciselyany

possiblecausalrelationbetweenthetwothatHusserlpurposefullybracketsand

110ItistruethattherefollowsfromHusserl’sviewthedistinctpossibilityofsolipsism,atleastofa“transcendentalsort”:“OnlyforanEgo,orastreamofmentalprocesses,inrelationtoitself,doesthisdistinctivestateofaffairsexist;herealonethereis,andheretheremustbe,suchathingasperceptionofsomethingimmanent.”(italicsadded)TheproblemofsolipsismisoneHusserltacklesmemorablyinlaterworks,particularlytheCartesianMeditations,thoughtoquestionablesuccess.Theproblemisroughlythis:Doesthereductionrevealthenecessitysolelyofmyselfastranscendentalego,inthesensethattheworldisthe“transcendentalphenomenon”(Husserl’sterm)formytranscendentalego?Thiswouldindeedbeadisastrousconsequenceforthetranscendentalreduction,ifitweretrue.ItisintheFifthMeditationoftheCartesianMeditationsthatHusserlfinallyrevealsthattranscendentalsubjectivityresolvesintotranscendentalintersubjectivity,whichalreadypresupposesamultiplicityofego’sand,subsequently,theworldof“ObjectiveNature”asdecisivelysharedbytheseegosinacommonspaceandtime.(CM,p.130)Itisonlywiththeintroductionoftranscendentalintersubjectivitythatonecananswerinafullandpositivewaythechargethattranscendentalphenomenologyisaformof“transcendentalsolipsism”thatcollapsesthebeingoftheworldandofotherpeopletoakindofabsolutetranscendental“intra‐subjectivity.”Nonetheless,Husserl’ssolutionisstrictly“transcendental”andneverpresupposestheactualexistenceofanyoneatall.Comparewithhisremarksonthetreethatneednotexistinbeingperceived(IVAabove)andtheworldthatneednotexistformetohaveconsciousexperience(presentsection).

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ignores.Buthowarewetoavoidtheconsequenceofacompletecollapseinto

idealism—toanembraceofthepossibilityofaself‐sufficientEgo,inwhichthe

“worldassuch”findsitstruehome?Hereitmightseem,inotherwords,thatthereis

nowaytoprove—ortodiscoverinthefirstplace—justwhat“theworld”islike,asa

transcendentworld,apartfromitsmannersofgivennesstoconsciousness,sothat,if

wearetorejectsubjectiveidealism,weseeminglymustgranttheexistenceofa

transcendentworldonlyasamatterofprejudice.Butthisisnotacceptable,

certainlynotforHusserl.Thissortofprejudiceor“blindassumption”isexactly

whatHusserlwantstoavoid,anditiswhyworldlyexistencemustproveitself

throughexperience,andnotvice‐versa.

Husserl’sexperimenthasnotbeenconvincingtomanypeople,butitshould

probablybeviewedasaperfectlyreasonableillustrationofthemorebasic

Husserlianprinciple—namelythepossibilityofaglobalepochéandtranscendental

reduction.Thatis,ifwewishtoquestiontheworld‐annihilationexperiment,

perhapsweneedfirsttoquestionthispossibilityofaglobalepoché.Itisprecisely

overthispointthatthephenomenologistJanPatǒcka,totakeoneprominent

example,takesHusserltotask,arguingthatabracketingoftheveryexistenceofthe

worlditselfisimpossible,forwecanonlydothisforasubsetoftheworld.Moreover,

Patǒckaarguesthattheexistenceoftheworldissomethingwecouldnevereven

attempttodoubt.InhisbookonHusserl,hebeginsbypointingoutthat“…theworld

asawholeisever‐present,presentasahorizon;thishorizonalgivennessis

somethingoriginal.Forthehorizonisneitheraparticularperspectivenoran

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anticipation.Perspectivesandanticipationsarepossibleonlyonthebasisofit.”111

HethengoesontodisputeHusserl’sequationofa“chaos”withtheabsenceofa

“world”:“Achaos,though,issomethingdifferentthannoworldatall;itisprecisely

anun­orderedworld.Anun‐orderedworlddoesnotmeanthenon‐existenceofthe

whole,onlythenonexistenceofawholeofacertaintype.”112InthiswayPatǒcka

correctlyconnectstheworld‐annihilationexperimentdirectlywiththenotionofa

globaltranscendentalepoché,regardingtherejectionoftheoneasentailingthe

rejectionoftheother.113

E.Husserl’sFinalPosition:“TranscendentalIdealism”

IfHusserlisnotasimpleCartesiandualist,thenwhatishe?Firstofall,he

takeshimselftobestartingasuigenerisenterprisethatiswhollyincomparableto

anypriorphilosophicalsystem.Healsotakeshimselftohavegonebeyondtheone‐

sideddebatesofrealismandidealismandtakenahigherroute,likeKant.However,

infact,hecallshisownview“transcendentalidealism”(myemphasis).Inthisway

heinvitestheviewthatheissomehow“anti‐realist,”tousethemodernturnof

phrase.

ManyofHusserl’scritics,bothonandofftheContinent,contemporaneously

aswellasmorerecently,haveregardedhimsuspiciouslybecauseofthisself‐

declared“idealism.”Inthislabeltheyhaveseenthevestigesofanoldmistake, 111Patocka,Jan.AnIntroductiontoHusserl’sPhenomenology.Trans.ErazimKohák.Chicago:OpenCourtPublishingCompany,1996.(p.105)Hereafter“Patocka.”112Ibid.,p.105113Patocka’sconclusionisthatthe“thesis”oftheworld“asawhole”“doesnotinprinciplereducetoanygivennessofaparticular,sothatitsthesiscanneverbeexcludedbysuspendingthethesesofsuchparticulars.”(Patocka,p.105)Andunderthisview,thereductionhastopresupposetheworld,fortranscendentalreflectionitselfrequiresit.

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namelytoconflateexperiencewiththatwhichisexperienced.Indeedthe

philosopherJ.N.Findlay,EnglishtranslatoroftheLogicalInvestigations,rejected

Husserl’slaterphilosophyinpartbecauseofjustthisturntowards“idealism.”114

Andthisiscomingfromanself‐avowed“rationalmystic”!Butthesamewastrueofa

verydifferentgroupofthinkers,Husserl’sownsometimefollowers—including

AlexanderPfänder,AdolfReinach,andJohannesDaubert—oftheso‐called“Münich”

schoolof“realist”phenomenology.Dauberthadwrittenadetailedcommentaryon

IdeasIinshorthand,onlyrecentlytranslated,againtakingissuewithitsidealism.115

(Daubertarguesforthe“primacyofthereal”andforconsciousnessasamere

“function”ofreality.)Husserlhimselfrarelyusestheterm“idealism”inIdeasI,but

thereisnodoubtthatthetextembracesakindofidealism,whichwewillinvestigate

below,inhisefforttosecureforphenomenologythepositionof“first

philosophy.”116

InHusserl’saccount,consciousnessisnotclosed,butopen‐to‐the‐world.The

meaning“theworld”verymuchbelongstoconsciousexperienceasanintegraland

necessarypartofit—andcertainlyinactsofsense‐perception,inwhichthe

intentionalobjectsarethingslike“chairs”and“cats,”encounteredphysically‐

transcendently—butalso,lessdirectly,inallotheracts.Husserlwasthusnota 114See,forexample:Findlay,J.N.TheDisciplineoftheCave.NewYork:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1966,p.162:“ThisiswhyadeeplyreflectivethinkerlikeHusserl,whosewholetraininginthethoughtofBrentanomadehimwaryofallthemorefacilesnaresofidealism,nonethelessveeredtowardsidealisminhislaterphenomenology.”(myitalics)SeealsotheinterestingarticlebyDavidCarrentitled“Findlay,Husserl,andtheEpoché”(Ch.5ofStudiesinthePhilosophyofJ.N.Findlay,eds.Cohen,Martin,andWestphal,Albany:SUNYPress,1985),esp.pp.154‐5115The“code‐breaker”wasKarlSchuhmann.SeetheessaybySchuhmannandBarrySmithentitled“AgainstIdealism:JohannesDaubertvs.Husserl’sIdeasI.”ReviewofMetaphysics38(1985),pp.763‐793.116Ofcourse,therearescholarswhowoulddisputeeventhisclaim.DallasWillardinsiststhatHusserlisinfacta“realist,”forexample.ButsinceHusserlcalledhimselfatranscendentalidealist,itseemstobehooveusatleasttounderstandinwhatsensehemighthavetakenhimselftobeone.

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subjectiveidealist,certainlynotbydesign.117Forhim,theworldexistsverymuch

independentlyofparticularactsofconsciousness.Theaprioricorrelativity(ashe

wastolatertermit)ofworldandconsciousnessisamatteroftheworld’sgiving

itselftoconsciousnessincertainfixedanduniformmanners,whicharethemselves

anchoredincertainessentialtypesofsubjectivityand“subjective

accomplishment.”118Inotherwords,itistosaythatwecannotmakesenseofa

worldthathasnointrinsicconnectiontoapotentialoractualsubjective

experiencingofthatworld,justasthereisnowaytounderstandsuchan

experiencingwithoutaconcomitantprincipleofanobjectiveornoematicpole

throughwhichtheworldbecomesmanifestandgiveninitsactualityinperceptual

experience.

ButoneoftheconsequencesofHusserl’sidealismisthedenialthatthereis

anymeaningfulsortofreality,suchasphysicalreality,thatcanbecomede‐coupled

fromthemindatalllevels.Husserl’swayofputtingthepointisasfollows:

“…thewholespatiotemporalworld...hasthemerelysecondarysenseofabeingforaconsciousness....Itisabeing...determinedandintuitedonlyassomethingidenticalbelongingtomotivatedmultiplicitiesofexperience:beyondthatitisnothing.”119

Fromthepointofviewofthephenomenologicalattitude(asopposedtothenatural

one),whatthingsareissimplywhattheyareforconsciousness.Butsincethe

phenomenologicalattitudeisphilosophicallytruerandsuperior120tothenatural

117HeexplicitlyrejectsthelabelinIdeasI,129118Crisis159‐60119IdeasI,p.112120Cf.:“Fromthetranscendentalstandpointoneunderstandsthenaturalattitudeasa‘lower’stance,orwhichsaysthesame,thenaturalattitudeisalreadytranscendental,yetwithoutknowingit.The

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(becauseitisfreerof“presuppositions”),itfollowsthatweshouldobeyitsauthority

whenitrevealsthattheessenceofworldlybeingistobedependentonanother,ina

waythatdoesnotapplysymmetricallytoconsciousnessitself.Wearestillnot

talkingaboutexistential‐causaldependence,however.Wearenotclaimingthatthe

worldisafictiongeneratedbytheimagination,orthatitismerelyavariantof

consciousnessitself.Afterall,becauseconsciousnessisinherentlyintentional,itis

alwaysalreadyaconsciousness“of”things,ofits“surroundingworld”—which

Husserlalsomakesclearisaconstantgroundinawaythatimaginedand

rememberedworldsarenot.Sotheworldcannotbedismissedorsubjectivized;but

itcanberevealedasabeingdependentforitsmeaningonanother,andthisis

consciousness.

Yetcanwenotturnthisargumentback,andarguethatconsciousnessis

similarlydependentforitsmeaning—asconsciousness—ontheworld?Notfor

Husserl,crucially.Thereasonisremarkablysimple:acertainsortofprimordial

subjectivityremains,asaresidue,afterallotherthings—allexistentialclaims—have

beenbracketed.Actsofconsciousnessremain,andtheyremainintuitively

accessibleasjustwhattheyare,withouttheinterferenceofany“presuppositions.”

Theexistenceofconsciousnessisnotsomethingweclaim;it—the“transcendental

ego”—isthebasisforthemakingofanyvalidclaimswhatsoever.Itistheultimate,

timeless,andprimordialsourceofmeaning.Husserldoesnotclaimforitthestatus

naturalattitudeis‘implicate’inthetranscendentalperspective.”(Luft,225)Only,wemightwishtomakeadistinctionbetweenrawnaturalexperienceandsuchexperienceasladenwithrealistic“assumptions,”thelatterbeingthefull“naturalattitude”asHusserldescribesit.

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ofagodhead,however.Strictly,itisneither“human”nor“divine.”(!)Yetitcertainly

isself‐contained:

“[C]onsciousnessconsideredinitspuritymustbeheldtobeaself‐containedcomplexofbeing,acomplexofabsolutebeingintowhichnothingcanpenetrateandoutofwhichnothingcanslip,towhichnothingisspatiotemporallyexternalandwhichcannotbeaffectedbyanyphysicalthing...”121

Nowironically,thissortofremarkhaspreciselytheeffectofcircumventingthe

possibilityofdualism.ForwhatHusserlistellingusisthat(pure)consciousnessis

notsomethingonthesamelevelaseither“physical”thingsor“mental”ones(non‐

”purified”subjectivethingslikeparticularhumanegosandtheir“real”

components),andthatitisnotindeedathingatall,butthebasisonwhichallthings

becomeknownanddefined.Whetherweagreewithhimornot,wemusttake

seriouslyhisownclaimtoberevealinganundiscoveredcountry,asitwere,whose

terrainhasneverbeforebeenseen.ItisasiftosaythatHusserlclaimstohavefound

(orrediscovered,afterDescartesandothers)theaccesspoint,itselfneitherpartof

theworldnorotherthanit,tothecomprehensibilityofthatworld(anditself).This

structureistheultimateconcernof“philosophy,”nowunderstoodas

“transcendentalphenomenology”—thestudyoftheunderlyingstructures,oragain

theoriginsof,122experienceandexperienceablereality.

WemightendthissectionwithanextendedquotefromHusserl,inwhichhe

himselfneatlysummarizesthebulkofhispositioninIdeasI.Hopefully,bynowthe

readerwillbefamiliarwiththeconceptsdiscussedherein:

121Ibid.,p112122Ibid.,p.131

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“Therealmoftranscendentalconsciousnessastherealmofwhatis,inadeterminedsense,‘absolutebeing,’hasbeenprovidedusbythephenomenologicalreduction.Itisprimalcategoryofallbeing(or,inourterminology,theprimalregion),theoneinwhichallotherregionsofbeingarerooted,towhich,accordingtotheiressence,theyarerelativeandonwhichtheyarethereforeallessentiallydependent.Thetheoryofcategoriesmuststartentirelyfromthismostradicalofallontologicaldistinctions—beingasconsciousnessandbeingassomethingwhichbecomes‘manifested’inconsciousness,‘transcendent’being—which,aswesee,canbeattainedinitspurityandbeappreciatedonlybythemethodofthephenomenologicalreduction.Intheessentialrelationshipbetweentranscendentalandtranscendentbeingarerootedalltherelationshipsalreadytouchedonbyusrepeatedlybutlatertobeexploredmoreprofoundly,betweenphenomenologyandallothersciences—relationshipsinthesenseofwhichitisimplicitthatthedominionofphenomenologyincludeinacertainremarkablemannerallothersciences.”123

Ofparticularnotehere,forourpurposes,istherepeateddeploymentofvariantsof

“being”and“ontological,”aswellasthenotionofa“realm”of“transcendental

consciousness.”Transcendentalphenomenologyisbothanepistemologyaswellas

akindofhigher‐orderontology—ascience,tomodifyAristotle,of“beingqua

known.”

IV.ConcludingReflections

PartofthedeepappealofHusserl’sphenomenologyisitsappealtointuition,

toexperience,andtoevidence.This“evidentialism”(myword)givesphilosophya

mandatetobe“responsible”tothefacts,sotospeak,andaccordinglytothe“things

themselves.”ItiswhyHusserlcouldspeakofphenomenologyasthe“genuine”

123Ibid.,p.172

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positivism.124Ontheotherhand,Husserl’sdefinitionofexperienceandintuitionare

broadenoughtoappealtonon‐empiricists(andevenKantians),forwhomsensory

experienceistheonlytrueformofintuition.Husserlincludessuchactsascategorial

intuitionandideation.Weareableto“experience”logicalentitiesandmathematical

ones,and,throughactsofimaginationandmemory,non‐existentones.Thereisonly

oneultimateprincipleofevidencetowhichonemuststrictlyadhere—theso‐called

“principleofprinciples”:

“Noconceivabletheorycanmakeuserrwithrespecttotheprincipleofallprinciples:thateveryoriginativepresentiveintuitionisalegitimizingsourceofcognition,thateverythingoriginarily…offeredtousin‘intuition’istobeacceptedsimplyaswhatispresentedasbeing,butalsoonlywithinthelimitsinwhichitispresentedthere.”125

Husserlmakesknowledgeamuchmore“democratic”enterprisethanwasever

beforeconceived—allintuitiveevidenceofanykindcantakeoncognitivevalidity.

Atthesametime,Husserlforcesthephenomenologisttobedisciplinedby

remainingtruetothisevidenceandonlythisevidenceinmakingknowledgeclaims.

Butifthisisallthatphenomenologyconsistsin—evidentiaryrigoranda

widescopeforcognition—thenitisunlikelyHusserlwouldhaveattractedsomuch

oppositionbylater(andcontemporary)phenomenologiststhemselves.To

understandthisreactiononemustturntotheboldandchallengingformof

intentional“idealism”thatIdeasIerects.Itis,essentially,anexplanatoryframework

forthepossibilityofknowledgeinlightoftheseeminggulfbetween,asMcDowell

124Ibid.,p.39125Ibid.;Husserl’sitalics

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hasmemorablyputit,“mindandworld.”126Husserlshowsusthatinfact,thetwo

areintertwinedatalllevels,eventhougheideticallydistinct.Buthowisthis

possible?Howcantherebeaworldthatgivesitselftousevenwhilethisgivennessis

subjecttostrictrulesgovernedbythelifeofanessentiallyun‐worldlyEgo?Howis

thisnottobethoughtofasanythingmorethananarbitrarypositingofaquasi‐

Leibnizian“pre‐establishedharmony”?Whatistheessential,innerlawthatwould

makethefusionoftherealandtheidealanactuality,andnotablindhope?

ItwouldseemthatHusserl’s“transcendentalego”doesnotsomuchoffera

solutionasitliterallygivesanametojustthishope—itisapromise,anearnest,

ratherthanasolution.ItdoesnotimproveonHegel’s“AbsoluteSpirit”andinfact

lacksthelatter’sunivocal(inthiscase,ideal)nature.Husserl’stheoryasksfora

separationofessencefromfact,realfromideal,transcendentalfromnatural—all

thewhileinsistingthatnosuchcleavagescompromisehisvisionofpureanddirect

cognitionofthe“thingsthemselves.”Thisisatoughsell.Foristherenotan

unavoidabletensionbetweenanyformoftranscendentalidealismandthenotionof

“transcendentthings”?Solongasthesearemerely“immanenttranscendencies,”

doesnotHusserl’spositionveerprecipitouslytowardssubjectiveorabsolute

idealism,albeitclearlyagainsthisownintentions?Itisinfactthelatterhidden

possibility—thepossibilityofan“absolute”idealism—thathoversconstantlyover

hisworkintheidealistphase.Yetthereareevendeeperreasons—reasonsthatthe

structureofHusserl’sownsystemprovidesuswith—tobelievethatHusserl’s

“transcendentalidealism”isintrinsicallyorientedtowardsabsoluteidealism,by

126McDowell,John.MindandWorld.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity,1994

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tendencythatis.Thiscanbeseenthroughtheinevitablelogicof“attitudes”that

Husserlleavesforthemostpartinexplicit.

Husserliantranscendentalidealism,aswehaveseen,dependsonthecrucial

distinctionofthenaturalandtranscendentalattitudes,andhenceonthepossibility

ofatranscendentalreduction.Inthisrespectitisexceedinglyimportanttoregard

thetwoattitudes—naturalandtranscendental—asbeingatdifferentlevels.Thatis,

thenaturalattitudeisnotmerelyreplacedbythetranscendental;fromthenatural

attitude,wetradeuptothetranscendentalattitude.Onitsown,thenaturalattitude

isfalse,sinceitmakesassumptionsabouttheindifferenceofmindandworldthat

arethemselvesfalse.Thenaturalattitudehastobeovercomeandreplacedbythe

transcendentalifwearetodorealphilosophyandhence“know”theworldaround

us.Somuchismerelyreview.Thetranscendentalattitudeistheoneinwhichreality

isknownasitreallyis;thenaturalattitudeisbutaprelude.Yet,doweeverstop

being“naïverealists”?Istherenotan“everydayness”thatpervadeseventhe

transcendentalphilosopher’sexistence?ItisimpossibleinHusserl’ssystemtohave

bothattitudesatonce,however,sincethenaturalattitudecontainscommitments

thathavetobegivenupinthetranscendentalattitude;theyaremutuallyexclusive.

Yetiftheyweremerelyincommensurable,onecouldnotbecalledsuperiorto

another,andtheresultwouldbeaformofrelativism.Butsincethetranscendental

attitudeisclearlysuperiorforHusserl,whowasstronglyanti‐relativistwemight

add,itwouldseemtomethatitisonlylogicaltoconcludethefollowing:thatthe

transcendentalattitudeisatahigherlevelthanthenatural,butalsocontainsallthe

truthandlegitimacy(basically,therawintuitivity,withoutforexamplethemistaken

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theoreticalassumptionsregardingtherealexistenceofintuitedobjects)ofthe

former,andinsuchawayastosublateit.Thuswecanstillexperiencethenatural

attitudelegitimately,solongaswesubordinateittothetranscendentalassoonas

weareinapositiontobegintotrulyunderstandwhatweexperience“naturally.”

Thetranscendentalattitudeisthusanimprovementoverthenaturalattitude;itisa

clear‐eyedviewofthebilateralconstitutivenexusofexperienceandthat‐which‐is‐

experienced,groundedinintuitiveevidencewhichcomestous“naturally.”Andso

thenaturalattitudeisthusovercomebythe(phenomenological)philosopher,who

goesbeyonditwhileretainingthefirst‐orderexperientialdata,morphicandhyletic,

disclosedinitsdomain.

Whatdoesthispicturetellus,finally?ItexplainsexactlyHusserl’sown

convictionthatthetranscendentalattitude,whichisitselftheattitudeof

transcendentalconsciousness,disclosesaself‐standingrealmofbeingthatincludes

butovercomesthebeingofNature,whichismerelydependentonthe“pure”Being

ofConsciousness.Externalexistenceinthe“naïve‐realist”sense,sotospeak,is

revealedtobeafictionnativetothenaturalattitude.Itisnottobetakenseriously

bythosethatknowbetter,namelythat“externalexistence”isitselfonlya“meaning”

generatedinandthroughconsciousness—namelyperceivingconsciousness.Icall

this“absoluteidealism”notsimplytoechoHegelortheGermanIdealistsbutto

drawonHusserl’sownlanguage—hehimselfuses“absolute”todescribethebeing

ofconsciousness(quaphenomenologicalresiduum).Thephenomenological

reductionisthusakintheopeningofaneye,adeliveryfromdarkness.Itisnomere

modificationofthepsyche—indeed,itleavesthepsycheitselfbehind!

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Thereisapressinggeneralquestion,therefore,regardingthe“bracketing”

procedure,oratleastthewayHusserlemploysitinIdeasI,namelywhetherit

necessarilyentailsasortofsubjectivismfromwhichthereis,properly,noreturn.

Husserl’stranscendentworldispreservednominallyafterthereduction,butonlyas

a“meaning.”Husserl’sunderstandingoftranscendenceiscomplex,anditmay

legitimatelybewonderedwhetherhehastrulyrepelledtheghostofsubjectivism

fromenteringhissystem.Thishasbeenperceivedasalackofappreciationofthe

depthofthe“alterity”ofthings,muchinthewayHusserlhasbeensimilarly

criticizedfornotsufficientlyexplainingtheothernessofotherpeople.

AnotherquestionthatarisesinreadingHusserlregardstheverypossibility

oftranscendentalphenomenologyinthefirstplace.Thisisthesourceofoneofthe

greatpuzzlesandchallengesoftranscendentalphenomenology.Thatis,howcanwe

overcomethenaturalattitude,asHusserlinsiststhatwemustinordertoenterinto

knowledge,ifitisalreadysosuccessful,byitsverynature,inbindingustoitsdoxic

spell?Husserlframesthetaskofbreakingfreeasamatterofbeingdisciplinedand

rigorous,butthequestionreallyhasmoretodowithprinciplethanwithdegree.For

justhowisitthatitisevenpossibletoknowone’sexperientiallifeasitislived

withoutremainingsomehowinthatveryexperientiality—thatis,inthe“natural

attitude”?Thisisnotmerelyaquestionofthepossibilityof“reflexivity.”For

reflexiveconsciousnesscanstillbeexplainedwithinthenaturalattitude:Icanthink

aboutmythinking,treatingitasanobjectlikeanythingelse.Thetranscendental

attitudeinvolvesmorethanthis;itinvolvesareflexivityblendedtogetherwitha

thoroughgoing“bracketing”ofthewholeworldItakeforgrantedineverydaylife.It

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involvestherejectionofnaïverealisminthemostcategoricalofterms.Sohowis

transcendentalphenomenologyitselfpossible?

Itisinconnectionwiththisquestionthatwecometoacharacteristic

hermeneuticdifficultyinIdeasIandtranscendentalphenomenologygenerally.127To

beabletoseethenaturalattitudeassuch,tobeabletoformtheessentialconceptof

itandmakeitathemeofreflection,istohavetopresupposetheself‐transcendence

ofthenaturalattitude.Oneisalreadyinthetranscendentalattitude,inotherwords,

fromtheverybeginningofthetextofIdeasI—oratleast,onehastobethereto

properlygraspitscontents.Yethowarewetogetthere,withoutfirstusingthe

phenomenologicalmethod,thatis,withoutfirstbracketingourownassumptions,

etc.?

Thephenomenologicalreductionhasadistinct“doublemeaning.”Thereisan

obviousandimportantsenseinwhichtheepochéinvolvesakindof“withdrawal”

fromtheworld.Itisanexclusion,or“bracketing,”ofthenatural“factual”world,a

flighttoalevelof“pure”insight.Buttranscendentalphenomenologyisalsoamove

awayfromthe“theories”developedinthe“naturalattitude”andhenceareturntoa

moreprimordialandauthenticlayerofexperience—ofthenatural,factualworld!To

over‐emphasizetheformeraspectisofcoursetopushHusserlintomysticism,while

thelatterpresseshimtoodeeply,potentially,intothebowelsofnature,thedreaded

zoneofopaque“fact.”Yetunlessweacceptastoryofsublation,inwhichHusserl

comesdangerously(tohismind)closetoabsoluteidealism,therewouldseemtobe

anunresolvedtensionbetweentranscendentalsubjectivityandthe“naturalorder”

127ThiswasalreadypointedoutastutelybyRicoeur.SeeKey,p42&pp.48‐9

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attheheartofHusserl’ssystem.128Itismyconsideredview,then,thatHusserlmust

beanabsoluteorunmitigatedidealist—onewhodeniesanyco‐ultimacyof“natural”

realitywithtranscendentalconsciousness/subjectivity—onpainofthepotentialfor

hissystemtodissolveintoincoherenceandpermanentvacillationbetween

transcendenceandtranscendentality.

128SomecontemporaryHusserlcommentators,forexampleDonnWelton,havearguedthatitwouldbeashametobaseone’sentireunderstandingonHusserl’stranscendentalprojectonIdeasI.InWelton’swords,the“Cartesian”approachofthistextis“trappedintranscendentalpsychologism,”andshouldbecontrastedwiththemuchmorepromising“Kantian”approachHusserllater(insufficiently)developed.(Welton,p.287)Thismaybeso,butaswehaveseenalready,evenWeltonrecognizesthattherearemultipleandparallelpathsinHusserl’sownthinking.WhetherHusserlevertrulyresolvedthetensionsIspeakofisanopenquestion.

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ChapterTwo:TheConstitutionofNature,Body,andSpiritinHusserl’sIdeasII129

“Ifphilosophybeginswiththenaturalattitude,williteverleaveitbehind,andifitcould,whywouldit?SucharethequestionsthatbotherHusserl,andwhichexplainthecontradictorypositionsthathetookontheconstitutionofNature.” ‐‐MauriceMerleau‐Ponty130

I.Introduction

IfIdeasIaimsthroughtheepochéandreductiontointroduceHusserl’s

transcendental‐phenomenologicalmethod,thenIdeasIIaimstoshowusthebeing

oftheworldasrevealedbythismethod.Thelattertextisthus,onemightsay,the

ontologicalcomplementtoitsmoreepistemological‐methodologicalpredecessor,

whilethebriefIdeasIII131,thefinalpieceinthetriad,isakindofhybridofboth.The

129IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution.Trs.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989.(HereafterIdeasII.)ThepresentchaptercoversbothIdeasIIandIdeasIII.(IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,ThirdBook:PhenomenologyandtheFoundationsoftheSciences.Trans.TedKleinandWilliamE.Pohl.TheHague:MartinusNijhoffPublishers,1980.HereafterIdeasIII.)ButIwilltalklessfrequentlyofthelatter,owingtoitsbrevityandrelativelackofsubstance,ascomparedtoeitherofthefirsttwovolumes.Itdoes,however,containsomeusefulmaterialforourpurposes.BriefattentionwillalsobegiventooneofHusserl’slecturesfrom1919.(Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaMaterialienbände,BandIV.NaturundGeist:VorlesungenSommersemester1919.Ed.MichaelWeiler.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002.HereafterHusserl1919.)130Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003(p.79)131Itisofcoursethemiddle,muchlongeranddensertextthatistheprimarysubjectofthischapter.

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lattertwovolumespresupposeapriorperformanceoftheepochéandreduction,

alongwiththetranscendental‐idealisticturnthatgowiththem.ThisallowsHusserl

todiveintotheburningquestion,leftwideopenafterIdeasI,astojustwhatthe

worldissupposedtolooklikeoncethereductionhastakenplace—notonlythe

world,ofcourse,buttheworld‐occupyingselfwho,initstranscendentalguise,has

madethesenewvistaspossible.

IdeasIIisthusbothanextensionaswellasadeepeningofitsnominal

predecessor,thoughit’struethatthetwotextshardlyhaveacomparablehistoryof

development.Althoughmuchofitwaswrittenaroundthesametime(1912‐1915)

asIdeasI,IdeasIIwasbeingrevisedthroughoutHusserl’slife,andhewasnever

satisfiedtohaveitpublished.132IdeasIIIalsoremainedunpublishedinHusserl’s

life‐time,butitwasrevisedhardlyatallbetweenthetimeitwasfirstdraftedand

Husserl’sdeath.133Thepublishedandauthor‐endorsedIdeasIwashugely

influential,bothpositivelyandnegatively,butamazingly,sowasthelong‐

undergroundIdeasII.NolessthanHeideggerandMerleau‐Pontywereshaped

decisivelybythework,whilemanyothers—AlfredSchütz,PaulRicoeur,etc.—felt

compelledtocommentontheworkandrespondtoitsremarkablecontents.134As

132SomemakemuchofthefactthatEdithSteingaveagooddealoftheshape(andoveralltitle)totheworkinher1918redaction.Iwilladdressoneparticularscholar’s(ElizabethBehnke’s)thoughtsonthematterinthenextchapter.133FordetailedinformationonthepublicationhistoryofIdeasII,seetheTranslator’sIntroductiontotheEnglisheditionofthework(IdeasII,xii‐xvi).134ThecaseofMerleau‐Pontyisclearandobviousfromhisownwritings,aswewillseeinthisandsubsequentchapters.AsforHeidegger,NenonmakesaconvincingcasethatHeideggerwas“directlyandimmediately”influencedbyHusserl’snotionsofthe“personalisticattitude”and“Umwelt.”(See:IssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996,p.x.VolumehereafterreferredtoasIssues.)Luckily,alengthysynopticstudyhasbeendonebyPaulRicoeur,whosenumerousjudiciousobservationswewillhavemultipleoccasionstoconsultandinterpretinthecourseofthepresentstudy.See:Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisofHisPhenomenology.Trans.EdwardG.BallardandLesterE.Embree.Evanston:Northwestern

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fortherelativedearthofliteratureonthebookanditsringsofinfluence,inthe

wordsoftheeditorsofarecentcollectionofessaysonthework,“thereisanalmost

inverseproportionbetweentheinfluencethatHusserl’sIdeasIIexercisedon

importantphilosophicaldevelopmentsinthiscenturyandtheattentionithas

receivedinsecondaryliterature.”135

ThefactisthatIdeasIIisanamazing,aswellasfearsomelycomplex,foray

intoalargearrayofproblems,amongthemthemind‐bodyproblem,theso‐called

problemofthehumansciences(whattheyareandhowtheydiffermethodologically

andregionallyfromnaturalsciences),theproblemofpersonalidentityand

motivation,andmanyothers,allunitedintenuouswaysunderthebanner“studies

inconstitution.”IdeasIIcomplementsIdeasIbutalsogoeswellbeyonditinmany

regards.Itcanfruitfullybereadasasupplementtoorforeshadowerofallphasesof

Husserl’slaterthought.Forexample,itanticipatesandevenpartiallydevelopssome

ofthemainthemesoftheCartesianMeditations(intersubjectivity,empathy,

“monadology”)aswellastheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciences(thelife‐world,or,asit

were,the“surroundingworld”—Umwelt),andwhilemostly“static”(likeIdeasI),it

beginstoincorporateelementsofgeneticphenomenologyaswell,atleastinits

thirdpart.Itstandsonitsown,however,aswell.Itfeaturesthemostdetailed

examinationofthebodyHusserleverproduced—thisbeingtheprobablerootofits

singularimpactonsubsequentContinentalthought.Itisalsothesourceof

UniversityPress,2007.(pp.35‐81)Hereafter“Ricoeur.”ThereisalsoashorterbutimportantearlyessayonIdeasIIwrittenaroundthesametimebyAlfredSchütz,whichIwillunfortunatelynothavetimetoaddressinthischapter.See:Schütz,Alfred.“EdmundHusserl’sIdeas,VolumeII.”InPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,13:(pp.394‐413)135TheeditorsareThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.(Issues,p.ix)

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numerousinsightfuldistinctionsbetweennature,soul,spirit,Ego,andperson—

thoughtheseareoftenimpossibletoreconcilewithoneanotherharmoniously,as

wewillsee.Forultimately,IdeasIIissimplytoostuffedwithgoodideastomakea

singleconsistentargument(or,phenomenologicallyspeaking,aconsistentsetof

eideticdescriptions),whichmaybeoneofthereasonsHusserlwasneverfully

satisfiedwithit.Indeed,muchthatisintroducedandpartlydevelopedinIdeasIIis

notdevelopedalltheway,evenbyHusserl’sstandards.Thehistoryofthetextand

itseditingbymultiplehands(Husserl,Stein,Landgrebe)alsomeansthatitishighly

unevenanddisorganizedinplaces,andcanhardlybesaidtohaveaconventionalor

evenlogicallysoundstructure.

Itiswisethen,ontheonehand,nottotreatIdeasIIasaunifiedwholeso

muchasacollectionofinvestigatorystrains.Ontheotherhand,theskeletonofIdeas

IIasatextistheclosestwewillcometoaglimpseofwhatmightbecalleda

complete“Husserlian(regional)ontology.”136Husserl’sconstitutionalanalyses,

takenattheirfacevalueasgroundedintuitively,aremeanttorevealtousthebeing

ofthewholeworldofpositivebeing,of“whatis”(pantataonta),fromthelowestor

mostfoundationalstratum,thatof“physicalistic”nature,tothehighest,the

reflectingpersonal(or“spiritual”)Ego,alongwithitscollectiveculturalformations

(“personalitiesofahigherorder”).Andallofthishasintrinsicphilosophicalinterest

foramyriadofquestionsusuallyunderstoodas“metaphysical”—materialismand

136Husserldistinguishesbetweenformalontologyandregionalontology.Inthischapterweareconcernedwiththelatter,thatis,withthekindsofbeingsthatmakeuptheworld,specificallythe“ontologicalregions”ofmaterialnature,animalnature,andspirit.(See:Drummond,JohnJ.HistoricalDictionaryofHusserl’sPhilosophy.Lanham,Maryland:ScarecrowPress,2008,pp.78‐9,151,180.Hereafter“Dictionary.”)

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themind‐bodyproblem,forexample—inthesameway,perhaps,thatthe

phenomenologicaltheoriesofintentionalityorperceptionaddressclassical

questionsof“epistemology.”AsIwillargueinthischapter,Ireadthetexttobea

continualbalancing‐act—whichresemblesmoresoasee‐saw—betweennaturalistic

andanti‐naturalisticstrainsinHusserl’sphilosophy,bothofwhicharestronglyon

displayinthetext.ThecontradictionsofthetextareusefulforthestudyofHusserl

generallybecausetheyarereflectiveofthedeepestunderlyingtensionsofhis

phenomenologicalsystem.Theygototheveryissues—thenatureofidealismand

thetranscendentalego,thenature‐spiritdivideandthedivisionofnaturaland

humansciencesintheirrelationtophenomenology—thatoccupiedHusserl,and

remainedunresolved,untiltheendofhislife.

Ofcourse,thesearealsotheveryissuesthatconcernusinourstudyof

HusserlandMerleau‐Pontyonthequestionofthemeaningofnatureanditsrelation

to“spirit”andconsciousness.IdeasII(andIII)teachaconfusingdoublelesson—on

theonehand,the“spiritualityofnature”(asHusserlputsitinanothertext137),

particularlyintheformoftheliving,feelingorganismasliving;andontheother

hand(andthisiswhatdominatesHusserl’saccount,allthingsconsidered),thestrict

bifurcationofnatureandspirit,notnecessarilyintermsofdistinguishingthe

transcendentalego(consciousnessinits“irreal”iridescence)fromreality,butin

termsofcarvingouttwoseparateontologicalorderswithintherealmofthe“real”

itself(andwithinwhichthe“body”figuresverydifferentlyineachrespective

sphere).Combinedwiththesedifficultiesistheequallycentralconfusionbetween

137Husserl1919,186

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thenatureof“spirit”vis‐à‐visthatof“consciousness”or“transcendental

subjectivity,”thelatterofwhichofcoursefiguressoubiquitouslyintheschemeof

Husserl’sprojectasawhole.Thisparticularissuegoestotheheartoftheambiguity

betweenHusserl’sdistinctionbetweenontologyandphenomenology,therealand

thetranscendental,and,inadditiontothepriorambiguitiesaboutnatureandthe

body,makeitpossibletoseewhereHusserl’stranscendental‐phenomenological

projectstartstounravelsomewhatfromwithin.Ormorecharitablyspeaking,these

problemsseemtocallforatransformationofHusserlianphenomenologicalproject

inamoreunifieddirection,oneofwhichhappenstoinvolveamoreimmanentized

andembodiedconceptionoftheego(whichoughtnotbeentirelyalooffrom

ontology)andamoreecstatic,“enworlded”conceptionofthebody(whichoughtnot

tobeentirelyalooffromtheego).ThisisthedirectionultimatelytakenbyMerleau‐

Ponty,forwhomthetranscendentalegomustsituateitselfsomehow(andnever

whollycomfortably)innatureitself,namelyasapoweroffinitereflection,capable

ofacertain“eideticseeing”butincapableofabsolutetransparencyorafinalvictory

overitsall‐too‐naturalGrund.Thus,Merleau‐Ponty’sentireoriginalproject,one

mightsay,isfirstmadepossiblebythevolatilerupturesofIdeasII.138Butwewill

havetowaitbeforeweexaminethis“secondhalf”ofthestoryinmoredetail,in

Chapter3(andbriefly,intheconclusionofthepresentchapter).

InpartIIofthischapterIwillprovideadetailedoutlineofthegeneral

ontologicalmatrixsketchedoutbyHusserlinIdeasII(andcontinuedinIII),

138Ofcourse,hereitiswelltokeepinmindVoltaire’shighlyappropriatemaximaboutthemistakesof“truegenius”:“C’estleprivilègeduvraigénieetsurtoutdugéniequiouvreunecarrière,defaireimpunémentdegrandesfautes.”(SiècledeLouisXIV,ch.32)

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accompaniedbysomecriticalcommentary.Then,inpartIII,Iwillproduceatextual

analysisinwhichIbothlayoutwhatItaketobethemostinterestingproblems—in

boththeneutralandpejorativesensesoftheterms—ofHusserl’spresentation.Iwill

concludewithsomereflectionsonIdeasIIand,asmentionedabove,somethoughts

onhowMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophycanbeunderstoodasaresponsetoand

developmentofthethemes(andtensions)oftext.UltimatelyIwillarguethatwhat

emergesfromHusserl’sontologicalmatrix(incombinationwiththeposition

alreadystatedinIdeasI)isacomplex,andfinallyself‐inconsistent,combinationof

ontologicaldualismandphenomenologicalmonism,inspiteofanotherwise

promisingforayintothehybridityofthelivingbody.

II.TheOntologicalMatrixofIdeasII/III

A.Introduction

Aswehavealreadyindicated,IdeasII/IIIconcernsthe“constitution”of

reality.Inthewordsofonecommentator,“IdeasIIcanberegardedastheattemptto

regain[afterIdeasI]realitybycatchingitupinthesamenetwithpure

consciousness.”139Thatis,whereasthesubject(inthesenseof“topic”)ofIdeasIis

consciousnessanditsgeneralintentionalstructure,thatofIdeasIIisthereality

139Tymieniecka,Anna‐Teresa.“FromHusserl’sFormulationoftheSoul‐BodyIssuetoaNewDifferentiationofHumanFaculties.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983(p.4)

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constitutedinconsciousness,arealitywhichhasitsownvariouskinds,strata,and

typesofgivennesstobedistinguishedandrelated.Inthisway,reductionand

constitutioneventuallyemergeastwocomplementarypolesofphenomenological

method140,andtheyhaveremainedsoeversince.

Butwhat,precisely,is“constitution”?Definingitisabittricky.AsDermot

Moranexplains,itismoreofan“operative”asopposedto“thematic”conceptin

Husserl,andthusittypicallyremainsundefinedbyhim.141Onecould,however,

defineitroughlyintermsofthespontaneousproduction(inthesenseof“making

available,”not“creation”)ofobjects.Onespeaks,forexample,ofconsciousness’

constitution“ofthematerialworld,”forexample,oragainof“otherpeople”(inthe

senseofintersubjectivity)—inthesensethatconsciousnessmakessuchbeings

available.Thus,thenotionofconstitutionemphasizesthe“objective”aspectofthe

“correlationalapriori”ofconsciousnessandobject,whilereduction,bycontrast,

emphasizesthesubjective,or“constituting”aspect.Nowtheprincipleof

constitutioniswhatallowsustospeakofHusserl’s“ontology,”thatis,ofthe“being”

ofthings“inthemselves,”intermsofwhattheyfundamentally(essentially)are,so

longasweremember,inthewordsofCobb‐Stevens,that“transcendental

philosophyrefusestobeabsorbedeitherbyasociologyofpersonalreciprocityora

philosophyofobjectivespirit.”142Thatis,wecanspeakofHusserl’sunderstanding

ofthe“being”ofthings(broadlyspeaking)butonlyintermsoftheirnoematic

140Dictionary,54‐5141Moran,Dermot.IntroductiontoPhenomenology.NewYork:Routledge,2000(p.164)142Cobb‐Stevens,Richard.“Body,Spirit,andEgoinHusserl’sIdeasII.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.(p.252)Hereafter“Cobb‐Stevens.”

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“sense,”itselfrevealedviathephenomenological(andobviouslyeidetic)reductions.

Husserl’sontologyisthereforethestudyofreality‐as‐constituted‐in‐transcendental‐

consciousness.143Thisisnoematic,asopposedtonoetic,phenomenology.144(Atany

rate,thedisciplinesofphenomenologyandontologyareparallelforHusserl,

differingonlythrough“shiftinview”—thatis,thephenomenologicalreduction.145)

IdeasIIpresentsanexhaustiveorderingofthevarioussense‐layersof

objectivity—materiality,animality,humanity,sociality,etc.,plusmanyintermediate

layers—thatareconstitutedbyconsciousness.146BothIdeasIIandIIIhavethesame

orderofpresentation,intermsofstartingfirstwiththe“lowest”(andself‐

independent,inpurelymaterial“things”147)stratumofmaterialnature,andmoving

“upwards”topurespirit.Thisorderingiscuriouslytheexactinverseofthe

“ontologicalpriority”Husserlgivestospiritandthe“spiritualattitude”inwhich

thingsarefirstconstitutednotaspurelymaterialatall.Butthisisjustoneofthe

143Thuswhile“naïverealism”isdestroyedthroughthereductionandthetransitiontothetranscendentalattitude,itisimportanttokeepinmindthatphenomenologyisnotphenomenalism;itdoesnotreducerealitytoappearance,itstudiesrealityinitsappearing(aswellasthesubjectivitytowhichrealityappears,whichcaninturnbestudiedforitsownsakeaswell).144Amoretechnicaldefinitionof“constitution”isofferedbyRicoeur:“Toconstitutesignifiesonlytointerrogateasensebyexplicatingthesignificationalintentionstowhichthesensecorrelates.Hence,thejobofconstitutionremainsbelowthelevelofinterpretation.”(Ricoeur65)Overgaardoffersperhapsthesimplestwaytounderstandtherelationbetweenreductionandconstitution:“…theactualrelationbetweenconstitutionandtranscendentalphenomenologicalreductioncanbedescribedasonebetweenwhatwewanttounderstandandthemethodbywhichweareabletounderstandwhatwewanttounderstand.”See:Overgaard,Søren.HusserlandHeideggeronBeingintheWorld.Dordrecht:Springer,2004(pp.59‐60)Hereafter“Overgaard.”Gadameroffersthis:““Constitution”isnothingbutthe“movementofreconstruction”[Wiederaufbaubewegung]thatfollowsafterthereductionhasbeenperformed.”(CitedbywayofOvergaard,59.)145“Butallclarifyingontologicalinsightexecutedintheframeworkofaxiomaticclaritythatisnotdirectlyphenomenologicalbecomessuchbyamereshiftofview,asconverselyinthewholeofphenomenologicalinsightstheremustbethosewhichbecomeontologicalthroughamereshiftofview.”(IdeasIII,90)146Althoughthisisnotdiscussedinasmuchdetail,consciousnessalsoconstitutesitself,insofarasitmakesitselfanobjectofobservationand(self‐)perception.147Seefn27,below.

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manyparadoxesofthetext.148Itisalsoimportanttonotethatfromthevery

beginningofthetext,Husserl’sexaminationofontologicalregionsiscorrelatedwith

atypeofscientificortheoreticalactivity—forexample,purenaturewithphysics,

thesoulwithpsychology,thelivingbodywiththe(seeminglyinvented)scienceof

somatology,etc.—aswellas,inmostcases,anattitude,anothercentralbut

operativeHusserlianconceptordevice,alreadydiscussedinourchapter1(pp.8‐

11.)Theontologicalregionofspirit,studiedbythe“humansciences,”iscorrelated

withthe“personalistic”or“spiritual”attitude,andtheregionsofmaterialand

animalnaturewiththe“naturalistic”attitude.AsHusserlnowputsitinIdeasII,“A

changeinattitudemeansnothingelsebutathematictransitionfromonedirection

ofapprehensiontoanother,towhichcorrespond,correlatively,different

objectivities.”149

B.TheConstitutionofWorldlyReality

1.MaterialNature

RicoeurremarksthatHusserl’sgestureinthereductionofIdeasIisto“reject

natureas‘alien,’as‘anotherbeing.’”150Itdoesthis,ofcourse,tomakewayfora

senseof“consciousness”notreducibletothatof“nature”—toeffectaKantian

“Copernican”turn,sotospeak.InIdeasII,Husserlsoftensthe“otherness”ofnature

bygivingbotha“material”aswellas“animal”dimension.Thustherearethesethree

148Itcanactuallybeexplained,however,intermsofwhatIwilllatercallHusserl’s“naturalism”—hisimplicitacceptanceandadoptionofthemodern‐scientificconceptionofnature.149IdeasII,221150Ricoeur,57

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divisionsofthetext:“materialnature,”“animalnature,”and“spirit.”151Alreadyfrom

thisitisclear,however,thattheunderlyingdichotomyinHusserl’sconstitutional

analysisinIdeasIIisthatof“nature”and“spirit.”Husserlhimselfconfirmsthe

impressionwhenheannounces:“…wehavetwopoles:physicalnatureandspirit

and,inbetweenthem,Bodyandsoul.”152

ButwhatdoesHusserlmeanbytheterm“nature”or“natural”153?Husserl

speaksof“nature”inadoublesense,154itsreferringontheonehandonlytothe

“physical,”andontheotherhandtoboththephysicalandpsychicasasinglereality

(thepsychophysical,living‐ensouled,etc.).Theformeris“natureinthefirstand

originalsense.”155Inthelattercase,thepsychic“stratum”is“founded”onthemore

basicmaterialsub‐stratum.ThispointiscentraltoHusserl’sontologyandis

stressedbyhiminthefollowingquote(fromIdeasIII):

151Husserladdressedthe“nature/spirit”dividerepeatedlyinhiswork,fromhislecture“LogikalsTheoriederErkenntnis”(1910/11)tohislastfullwork,theCrisis(1936),usuallyinthecontextofthequestionoftherelationsbetweenthenaturalandhumansciences,andbetweenallsuchsciencesandphenomenology.ForanoverviewofhistreatmentsofthesetopicsseeMichaelWeiler’sextensiveEditor’sIntroductionto:HusserlianaXXXII,GesammelteWerke:NaturundGeist:VorlesungenSommersemester1927.Ed.MichaelWeiler.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2001,pp.XVI‐L.(Volumereferredtohereafteras“Husserl1927.”)152IdeasII,298153Atthispoint,afurtherterminologicalnoteisinorder.Severalterms(andtheircognates)mustbedistinguishedfromeachother,namely“nature/natural,”“physical”or“material,”and“real.”Husserlassignsthesetermsmoreorlesstechnicalmeanings.Wemaythusregardtherelationshipbetweennature,reality,andphysical(ormaterial)inthefollowingway:natureinthe“first”senseisthepurelyphysicalormaterial;natureinthesecondsenseistherealmofanimalityor“embodiedness”and“ensouledness”;nature,takeninitstwosensestogether,isstillnotallof“reality,”forrealityencompassesnatureandspirit,which,takenbyitself,isstrictlynon­naturalinHusserl’ssense.ThusforHusserlthereisadistinctionbetween“allthereis”—thetotalityof“worldly”(or“intramundane,”byanotherlocution)reality—andnatureas“thefieldoftranscendent—specifically,spatio­temporal—realities”thatis“nature.”(IdeasII,3).Allofthesedistinctionswillcomeintoplayabundantlyasweproceed.154Husserl’sexpression:Ibid.,145155Ibid.,171.Compare:“thesoul,too,isofcourseapersistentbeing.Butthispersistentbeingisno‘nature.’”(IdeasII,355)SeealsoHusserl’sremarkthat“reality”istobespokenof“inthefirstplaceasnature”(IdeasII,420)…Healsoreferstotheformersenseof“nature”asthe“strict”sense.(SeeHusserl1919,pp.136‐7)Unlessotherwisespecified,Itoowillusetheterm“nature,”inreferencespecificallytoHusserl’sviewsthereof,inthisstrictsense.

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“…psychicrealityisfoundedintheorganismalmatter,butthisisnotconverselyfoundinthepsyche.Moregenerallywecansay:thematerialworldis,withinthetotalObjectiveworldthatwecallnature,aclosedworldofitsownneedingnohelpfromotherrealities.Ontheotherhand,theexistenceofmentalrealities,ofarealmentalworld,isboundtotheexistenceofanatureinthefirstsense,namelythatofmaterialnature,andthisisnotforaccidentalbutforfundamentalreasons.Whiletheresextensa,ifweinquireofitsessence,containsnothingofmentalnessandnothingthatwoulddemandbeyonditselfaconnectionwithrealmentalness,wefindconverselythatrealmentalnessessentiallycanbeonlyinconnectiontomaterialityasrealmindofananimateorganism.”156

Husserlalsoregardsnaturetobe(asisstatedalreadyinthefirstlineofthework!)

the“objectofthenaturalsciences.”157Suchanearlyandexplicitinvocationofnatural

science,perhapsseeminglyinnocuoustosome,infactrepresentsahugeandfateful

concessiontothemodernphysicalisticworld‐view,whichHusserlwillbeatpainsto

reverseinwaysthatcompoundthelatentdualistictendenciesofhisthinking.Allof

thiswillhopefullybecomeclearerasweproceed,especiallyinpartIII.158

Husserl’snotionofnatureisthusatoncescientific,inthesenseof“Galilean‐

Newtonian,”aswellasbroadly“Kantian.”Natureisbyitsessence“extended,”hasa

definitespatiotemporallocation,isgovernedbythelawofcausality,is“initself”

devoidofsecondaryqualities,etc.159Thoughaspeciesofthenaturalattitude,the

natural‐scientificornaturalisticattitudeinvolvesakindofepochéandreductionof

itsown,abracketinginthiscaseofallaxiologicalandpracticalpredicates.160Inthis

156IdeasIII,104157IdeasII,3158Itisnotthepurposeofthecurrentchaptertoofferanalternativeconceptionofnature,butthiswillcomeinchapter4,whichisdevotedtothistopicasitisdevelopedbyMerleau‐PontyinhisNaturelecturesandotherlaterworks.159IdeasII,80‐2.Itshouldbeaddedthatthefullsenseof“nature”isutterlyintersubjective.Thatis,asolipsisticsubjectcannotconceiveofthatbasicnaturalentity,the“thing,”asopposedtowhatHusserldescribesatlength(andforthefirsttimeinIdeasII)asthe“phantom.”160Thoughitisnotmerelyamatterofbracketingbutofsubordinatingthem:“Fromthestandpointofnature,everythingpersonalissubordinate.”(IdeasII,194)Husserldoesnotgiveanyindicationthatthenaturalisticattitudeis—asitappearstosomemodernreaderstobe—thoroughlyhistoricaland

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way,“nature”purelyspeakingdoesnothaveanyhumansignificance,value,or

utility;itsimply“is.”161Thiswilleventuallyleadtotheneedtoplace“spirit”above

“nature”in“ontologicalpriority,”butthisdoesnotsomuchasdignifynatureas

swallowitupinhumanculturalactivity.162

2.AnimalNature,ortheBody‐and‐Soul

WhenHusserlspeaksofthebody,hesometimesdescribesitintermsofa

“plus”thatisappresentedinsomephysical“things,”towhichbelongsthenewsense

of“livingbeings”(orbodies),somethingmorethanmeremateriality,though

somethingthatis,again,alsodependentonmaterialityasits“substratum.”163

HusserlgenerallytreatstheBody164(Leib)inconjunctionwiththesoul(Seele,

Psyche).However,itisimportantforustodistinguishthis“psychophysical”

composite,i.e.,theliving“ensouled”organism,fromthe“body”regardedasadouble

reality165—i.e.,asthatwhichiseither“body”(Körper,body‐thing,Ding)or“Body”

(Leib,livingbody).Infact,therelevantdistinctionstomakeareatleastthefollowing

five:

a)ThebodyasaJanus‐faced“doublereality,”towhichpertaintwolinesofrealcircumstances,”materialandpsychic.(Iwillrefertothisassimply“thebody.”)

conditionedbythevagariesoftheepoch.Instead,hepresentsitasa“timeless”attitude,whicheventheancients,forexample,mayhaveperformed,butsimplydidnothavetherightinformationtodo.161PerhapsintheSartreansenseofabsurdlybeing“there,”detrop?ThiswouldhelpexplainSartre’sowndualisticappropriation(“initself”and“foritself”)ofHusserlian(bywayofHegelian)phenomenology.162Seefn106,below,andalsofn107.163IdeasII,97‐99164IamfollowingtheusefulconventionoftheEnglishtranslatorsofIdeasIIofsignifyingLeibwith“Body”andotherreferencestothebodywiththelower‐case“body.”(IdeasII,XIV‐XV)165Ibid.,297

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b)Thebodyasbody‐thing,orslabofmatterinspaceandtime,subjecttoforcesofnaturalcausality.(“body”whenthecontextisclear,otherwise“Körper”or“body‐thing”)c)Thebodyasa“thing”“inserted”betweentherestofthematerialworldandthe“subjective”sphere;166also“ownbody”d)ThebodyasLeib,thelivinganimateorganism,oranimal,whichpossessesapsychicalorsoulishstratum,appresentedwithitsmaterialsubstantiality.e)Thesoulorpsycheitself,whichformstheupperstratumoftheLeib,thelowerstratumofwhichismaterialNature.

Ofcoursethepictureisstillmorenuanced.Forexample,thereisatthelevelofthe

Bodythelevelofsensations,includingkinaestheticsensations,whichisthe

“aesthesiologicalbody,”whileatahigherlevelthereisthe“volitionalbody,”which

isresponsiblefor“acting”inthesenseof“willing”andactingonthe“Ican.”167

Husserl’streatmentofthebody‐soulrelationisveryinteresting.Thesouland

theBodyareintertwined.Thusinthisrespect,HusserlsideswithAristotle,soto

speak,ratherthanPlato:“thesoulisindeedeveronewiththeBody.”168Therecan

indeedneverbeaseparationofsoulandBody,apointHusserlmakesdramatically

throughadetaileddiscussionoftheapriorieideticnecessityforevenaghostto

haveaBody.Withoutabodyofanysort,noghost,herebydefinitiona“phantom”in

Husserl’suniquesense,couldbeperceivedorapperceived(orforthatmatter

hallucinated);appresentationofthepsychealwaysoccursthroughperceptionof

certainkindsofbodies.169Thissortofdiscussioninfactraisestheinteresting

counter‐imagetothatofthemindasa“ghostinthemachine.”Forinthecaseof

166Ibid.,169167Husserlspeaksofthe“Ican”asapracticalto‐be‐able‐tothatispriortodoing(e.g.,Ibid.,273),an“originalconsciousnessofabilities”thathelpsustoconstitutetheworldwithwhichImayinteract.“WhatIcando,whatisinmypower,whatIknowmyselfcapableofandamconsciousofassuch,thatiswhatapracticalpossibilityis.”(Ibid.,270)Itisonlythisthat“canbeathemeofmywill.”168Ibid.,176169Ibid.,100‐2

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Husserl,theimagecouldn’twork:fortheghost,beingalreadyembodied,couldnot

besaidtoneedyetanotherbody(“machine”)tobe“in.”Inthiswayitbecomes

obviousthatHusserl’sconceptionofthe“leibisch­seelisch”being,thepsychophysical

organism,cannotbeidentifiedwith,say,Plato’sorDescartes’explicitremarkson

theseparabilityofmentalandphysicalsubstances,ifwemeanbythiswhatHusserl

calls“soul”and“Body.”170

ButdoesHusserlactuallygotoofarinthedirectionofanti‐dualismofBody

andsoul?Thereisasense,forexample,inwhichHusserl’sviewis

epiphenomenalistic.171Remarkingforexamplethat“thethingandthewholeof

naturearesealedoff,”hegoesontoargue:“Psychicalconsequencesarejoinedto

naturalprocesses,justaspsychicalcauseshaveconsequencesinnature,butthey

aresuchthatintruththeyhavenoinfluenceonnature.”172Husserlseemstosealthe

dealashedescribesthenatureofcausalityitself:“Itisclearthatcausalityof

physicalnaturehasinfactapre‐eminentsense.Thiscausalityisaconstitutiveidea

fortheideaofnature,fortheideaofaphysicalthing…Forreasonsofprinciple,the

psychicisoutsidethisnexus.”173

170WehavealreadyseeninthepreviouschapterhowHusserldepartsfromDescartesinthisrespect;aswewillsee,however,Husserl’sissueswithontologicaldualismremain,nowwithrespecttoanalternatedichotomyof“nature”and‘spirit.”ThusHusserlclosesonedoortodualismonlytoopenanother.Ricoeurputsitwell:“thepsycheanimatingthebodyisnotequivalenttotheculturalandcommunalrealizationsofman.InreintroducingthedimensionofpersonandthatofcommunityHusserlcompletestheego‐psychepolaritywithanewschemawherespirit(Geist)isnottheempiricalcounterpartofthepuresubjectofphenomenologybutisratherasortofculturalequivalentmuchmoreawkwardtosituateinthephenomenologicalstructure.”(Ricoeur,68‐9)171Cf.Ricoeur,67172IdeasII,355173Ibid.,353.Seealso:“thesoulisabeingthatisrelatedconditionallytoBodilycircumstances,relatedinaregulatedwaytocircumstancesinphysicalnature.”(IdeasII,356)Nonetheless,“epiphenomenalism”isnottheonlypossibilityforwhatHusserlisdescribing,whichisalso,forexample,consistentwithakindofLeibnizianparallelism.

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ButbeforewefurtherinvestigateHusserl’snotionofthesoul,letuscome

backtothebodyas(a),asdoublereality.Alreadyatthelevelofitsmaterial

thinghood(b),thebodyisspecial.Thatis,ithasaparticularlyhighvalueandcentral

importancefortheanimalorhumansubject.Itis,firstofall,centraltoperception.It

governsthesystemofunfoldingofadumbrations,forexample,dependingonits

positioninspaceandtime,thepositionoftheeyesandlimbs,andsoon.Asathing

perceived,theown‐bodyiscertainlyathingofaunique“type”—forexample,as

beingthecenter,ortheNullpunkt,oforientation,inreferencetowhichallother

“things”areconstitutedintermsoftheirnearnessorfarness,abovenessor

belowness,rightnessorleftnesstomy“absolutehere.”The‘subjectoftheBody”is

ofcoursealways“here”and“inthecenter,”evenasthebodyasmaterialthingis

constantlyinmovement.174Furthermore,because“Idonothavethepossibilityof

distancingmyselffrommyBody,ormyBodyfromme,”subsequently,thebodyisfor

me,perceptuallyspeaking,a“remarkablyimperfectlyconstitutedthing.”175There

arepartsofthebodythatIcannotsee,some(suchasmyeyes,ormyback)evenin

principle.Thereisnootherpossiblematerialobjectofwhichthismaybesaid.As

“my”Körper,then,theownbodyishighlyunique.Andthisisofcoursetosay

nothingofitsaxiologicalandpracticalimportancetous,matterswhichare

bracketedinthenaturalisticattitude.Itisnotathingjustlikeotherthings,even

insofarasitismerelya“thing.”

Asliving‐body(d),however,thebodyisnota“thing”atall—itsessenceis

whollyotherthanthis.Becausethelivingbodyandthesoulareintertwined,itis 174Ibid.,166175Ibid.,167

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possibleandevenpropertospeakof“myself”asalivingbody.(“Iamhurt”—not

“thislegisimpaired,butIamokay.”)Aswehaveseen,whatdistinguishestheliving

bodyfromthesenseofmaterialthingistheelement,orstratum,ofsoul.Howissoul

firstconstituted?Essentially,itisfirstconstitutedbythesolipsisticsubjectwith

respecttothe“own”bodyand,onlylater,extendedthroughempathytoother

Bodies.Thequestionoftheconstitutionofthesoulsofothersisessentiallythesame

questionasthatofintersubjectivity,whichwastobedealtwithmorememorably

andextensivelyintheCartesianMeditations(andtheIntersubjektivitätHusserliana

volumes).176

Thewayweexperiencetheownbodyinitspsychicalaspect(indeedasone’s

own)isthroughthebody’sbeingthe“localizedbearerofsensations.”177Thisis

essentiallytheexperienceoftactility.Thusitisonmyhand,hereinthisspotthatI

canfeelthewarmthofaglowinglight‐bulb,orbackthereinthemiddleofmyback

thatIcanfeelthistwingeofpain.Inthisway,Icometoknowmybodyasafeelerof

sensations,andthroughthesesensations—includingkinaestheticsensations—Ican

infactexperiencemyselfasbeinginspace,occupyingthisorthatregion,myfingers

beinginsuchandsuchposition,etc.Inthisway,theBodyis,inthefirstplace,

“medium”or“organ”ofperception.”178Equally,however,mybodyisthe“oneand

onlyObjectwhich,forthewillofmypureEgo,ismoveableimmediatelyand

spontaneouslyandisameansforproducingamediatespontaneousmovementin

176Ofcourse,Husserl’snotionsofempathyvary.ButinIdeasII,theemphasisonmethodologicalsolipsismseemstobestrong.Thusatthelevelofintersubjectiveapprehension,Iseethat“…myappearancesbelongtome,histohim.”Andthusweeachbelongto“subjectiveworlds”ofourown.Andsoon.(IdeasII,166‐7)177Ibid.,152‐5178Ibid.,61

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otherthings…”HenceHusserl’sdefinitionoftheBodyas“freelymovedtotalityof

sense‐organs.”179Inanycase,allofthesedefinitionsareultimatelytobe(ineffect)

subordinatedtohowtheBodyisconstitutedforconsciousnessinthespiritual

attitude,specificallyasthe“expression”ofspirit.

SincesomuchinthedistinctionofKörperandLeibturnsonthesoul,wemust

ask,whatexactlyisthesoul?Asaregionofrealityorobjectivity,wehavealready

seenthatitisinseparablefromtheBody.Butitisalso,Husserlsays,astratum

foundedonmaterialnature,and—intheclassicalGreeksense—itiswhat

“animates”thismatterandinvitesustoapperceivea“motivatingagent”behindit.

Husserlhimselfdefinesitformally(butcircularly)as“…thebearerofapsychiclife

togetherwiththesubjectivepossessionsofthatlife,andassuchitisaunity

extendingthroughtime(thesametimeinwhichtheBodyendures).”180Ricoeur

crypticallydescribesHusserl’spsycheas“aconstitutedrealitywovenintothe

surroundingworldofthepureego,”181whichistosay,thatitisnottobeconfused

withtheegoorthepersonalspirit.Afterall,eventhelowestofanimals(Husserl

saysremarkablylittleaboutplants)hasasoulbutnoegoorGeistigheit.182Yetapart

fromitsinterrelatednesswiththeBody,thestatusofHusserl’s“soul,”atleastin

IdeasII,ismorethanalittlemurky.183

179Ibid.,61180Ibid.,134(myemphasis)181Ricoeur,52182“Thepersonasspirit,asperson,hasself‐consciousnessoranEgo(whichisthesame);asouldoesnotneedtohaveself‐consciousness.”(Ibid.,361)183Ricoeur,too,seesabasicambiguityinthesoul(myletter‐designationsofdifferentmeaningsofthebodyareinbrackets):“Thusweareledtotheambiguityofthepsyche.Itparticipatesinsubjectivitysinceitisthesoul[e,intermsofthemenuofbody‐meaningsabove]thathasitsbody[d],andalsoinobjectivity,sinceitisthebody‐thing[b]thathassensations[c].Thisbodyisapartofthings,andyetthepsychewhichinhabitsitisthecenteraroundwhichtherestoftheworldis

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3.Ego

Thequestionofthepsycheisinseparablefromthatofthe“ego,”especiallyin

humansubjects.184AsweknowfromtheturntowardstheegoaftertheLogical

Investigations,theegohasbeencentraltoHusserl’sphenomenologicalconcerns.In

IdeasII,Husserlarguesthattheego“cannotbethoughtofassomethingseparated

from…livedexperiences,fromits‘life,’justas,conversely,thelivedexperiencesare

notthinkableexceptasthemediumofthelifeoftheEgo.”185Husserl’segoisalso

describedasa“rulingpart”ofthesoul.186Itwouldseem,then,thattheEgobeing

discussednowisthemundaneone,the“empiricalego”asopposedtothe

“transcendental”one.Thisiscertainlytrueofthefollowing:“Wecanalso

understandthatinconstitutednature,theBodyandtheBody‐soulunityare

constitutedandthattheempiricalEgoistheEgoofBodily‐psychicnature.TheEgo

isnotitselftheBodily‐psychicunitybutlivesinit.ItistheEgoofthesoul…”187

ButtheentirediscussioninIdeasIIoftheegoassuchis,infact,framed

aroundwhatHusserlcallsthe“pureego.”Andthepureegois,Husserlexplains,

“immutable,”188beingclearlyunlikeeitherthesoulortheBody.Muchofwhat

HusserlsaysaboutintheegointhisveinisfamiliarfromIdeasI,exceptthathere,in

IdeasII,itis,again,the“pureego”ratherthanthe“transcendentalego”thatisunder

grouped.”(Ibid.,64).Husserlseemstobeawareoftheambiguityinsofarasheassignsthebodya“quasi‐nature”and“quasi‐causality.”(IdeasII,145,356)184“…theexplorationofthepsychicapperceptiveEgoisonlyonelevelofthegeneralinvestigationofthepsyche.”(IdeasIII,17)185IdeasII,105186The“personalEgo…functionsso‐to‐sayastherulerofthesoul.”(Ibid.,150)187Ibid.,350188“…initselfthepureEgoisimmutable.”(Ibid.,110)The“immutability”oftheegohasnothingofcoursetodowithimmortality,butmeansratherthat“…insteadofgeneratioandcorruptio,tothepureEgotherepertainsonlytheessentialpropertythathasitssteppingforthanditsreceding,thatisbeginstofunctionandholdswayactivelyandthatitceasestodoso.”(Ibid.,110)

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discussion.Buttheyare,finally,probablythesame.Ricoeurtacitlyacknowledges

thishimself:“Thedistinctionbetweenthepureego,productofthephenomenological

reduction,andthehumanego,arealityofthisworld,isaconstantinHusserl’s

thought;itseparatesphenomenologyfrompsychology.”189Thatthediscussionof

thepureegoseemstobehardtodistinguishfromthatofthetranscendental,is

evidentfrompassageslikethese:

“Infact,thepureEgoisindeednothingotherthanwhatDescartes,inhismarvelousMeditations,graspedwiththeinsightofgeniusandestablishedassuchonceandforall,thebeingofwhichitisnotpossibletodoubtandwhichinanydoubtwoulditselfnecessarilybefoundagainasthesubjectofdoubt.”190

“ThereforeitisnottobeconfusedwiththeEgoastherealperson,withtherealsubjectoftherealhumanbeing.Ithasnoinnateoracquiredtraitsofcharacter,nocapacities,nodispositions,etc.”191

“TheEgo…doesnotappear…isgiveninabsoluteselfhood…AspureEgoitdoesnotharboranyhiddeninnerrichness;itisabsolutelysimpleanditliesthereabsolutelyclear.”192

Husserldoesnotmakethingsmoreclearwhenheidentifiesspiritwiththeego

cogito(evidentlythendistancingspiritfromperson193),aligningitnowwiththe

Cartesian“Ithink.”194Inthatcase,the“pureego”wouldencompassbothempirical

(spiritual)andtranscendentalpoles.Butwewillleavethematterhereuntilwetake

189Ricoeur,52(myemphasis)190IdeasII,109191Ibid.,110192Ibid.,111193Cobb‐Stevensdefinesthepersonasthe“fullconcreteunityofsoulandbody.”(Cobb‐Stevens,250)TosaythisofthetranscendentalegowouldbetomundanizeitinawayunacceptabletoHusserl.Onthedistinctionofpersonandtranscendentalego,Cobb‐Stevenswrites:“thepersonistooinvolvedintheUmweltbyreasonofpragmaticmotivationstobecompletelyidentifiedwiththephilosophicalvoicethatdescribesthestratumofspirit.”(Cobb‐Stevens,253)194Seeforexample,IdeasII,109.

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upinpartIIIthequestionoftherelationofthetranscendentalego(consciousness)

withournextconcept‐theme,“spirit.”

4.Spirit

SuddenlyinIdeasIIHusserl(or,ifwelike,the“narrator”)signalsaradical

shiftinperspectivethatwillusherinthethirdsectionofalreadyexhaustingly

demandingwork:“theanalysisof[materialandanimal]natureinourconsideration

ofnaturethusprovestobeinneedofsupplementation.Itharborspresuppositions

andconsequentlypointsbeyondtoanotherrealmofbeingandofresearch,i.e.,the

fieldofsubjectivity,whichnolongerisnature.”195Thus,weenterintotherealmof

spirit,homeofthehumansciences,culture,personhood,andeverythingthat,inthe

classicalhumanist‐philosophicaltradition,makeshumanbeingssupposedlystand

outfromnaturequanature,materialoranimal.AccordinglyHusserlsaysofthe

distinctionofsoulandspiritthatit“isthefundamentaloneinthisentiregroup.”196

Thisatfirstsurprisingremark(isnotthedistinctionof“nature”and“spirit”infact

themostimportant?)ismotivatedbythefactthatthesoul,whilecertainlynota

“thing”inthenarrowestsense,isstillenvelopedintheclosedcircuitofthenatural

order.Thesoulisstillanaturalbeing.

Relatedtothisisthe“personalistic”attitudeasavariation,orrathera

privilegedtype,of“naturalattitude.”InIdeasI,weweremadeawareonlyofa

divisionbetweennaturalandtranscendentalattitudes,andnotofanyinternal

divisionorhierarchywithinthenaturalattitudeitself.Butnow,inIdeasII,welearn 195Ibid.,180(myemphasis)196Ibid.,181

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thatthenaturalattitudeisdividedintoatleastthesetwo:the“naturalistic,”which

takesitscuesfromnaturalscience,andthe“personalistic,”whichisclosertothe

everydaylifeandeverydayworldinwhichwenaively,butmeaningfully,exist.Thus

Husserlannounces:

“[The]‘naturalistically’consideredworldisofcoursenottheworld.Rather,givenprioristheworldastheeverydayworld,andwithinthisariseman’stheoreticalinterestandthesciencesrelatedtotheworld,amongwhichisnaturalscienceundertheidealoftruthsinthemselves.”197

Husserladdsimmediatelythat“thispregivenworldisinvestigatedfirst[myitalics]

withrespecttonature.Thenanimaliahavetheirturn,humanbeingsbeforeall

others.”Bethatasitmay,thescientific‐theoreticworldofblosseSachenisitself

“reduced”outoftherawmaterialoflived,personalandinterpersonal,functionally

andaxiologicallymeaningfullife,alifelivedinwhatHusserlnowcallstheUmwelt

(“surroundingworld”).198

Itisevidentfromvarioussupplementalsections199thatinIdeasII,Husserlis

developinghisnotionof“spirit”throughathinking‐throughofthedistinctionof

naturalandhuman—thatis,cultural—sciences.Husserl’ssotosayconcessionto

naturalscience,grantingitfreereignoverthehumansoulintheformsofbiology

andpsychology,hasseeminglytriggeredacertainneedtoregainforhumanitya

dignityandsingularity.Afterall,itiswewhodophenomenology—or,itisinusthat

197Ibid.,219.GivenHusserl’spositionthatboththenaturalandhumansciencesaretheoretical,andthatthenaturalisticandpersonalisticattitudesarecorrelatedtothemrespectively,theclaimthatthelatterispriorto“theory”isconfusing,butperhapsjustmoreevidenceofHusserl’sconflationofthetranscendentalandspiritualattitudes.(SeePartIIIbelow.)198Cf.Dictionary,234‐4199SupplementXII,II,forexample,makesitverycleartheextenttowhichHusserl’sconceptionsof“spirit”and“theperson”aredevelopedinthecontextofdistinguishingnaturalfromhumansciences.(IdeasII,351‐82)

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phenomenologyoccurs.Inasmuchasitisregardedasafoundedstratumofthe

Body,itselfa“doublereality”whoseaspectas“materialthing”placesitsquarely

withinthe“causalnexus”of“nature,”thehumanbeingisanobjectofnatural

science.ButHusserlwantstoaddtothispicturebyarguingthatthereisanother

sensetothe“humanbeing,”anon‐naturalisticsense,thatregardshim/heras

“subject”ofaction,feeling,valuation,andsoon,ratherthanas,say,thingoranimal.

Butonceagain,Husserlprobablygoestoofarintheprocessofcompensation(ifthat

iswhatheisdoing).Forfromtheperspectiveofthehumansciences,naturalscience

isitself,asawhole,nothingbutaculturalachievement,anaccomplishmentof

personsactinginconcert.Husserlnowcompletelysupplantstheindependent

integrityofthenaturalsciences,whichheelsewhereseeminglystrugglesto

maintain,and,aswewillseebelow,fallsintoapuresubjectiveidealism.

Aswehavealreadyseen,Bodyandsoul,andhenceanimality,areexcluded

fromtherealmofthestrictlyspiritual.Admittedly,“…Bodyandsoulare“naturein

thesecondsense”properlyspeakingonlyaccordingtothesideturnedtoward

physicalnature.”200Ontheside“turnedtowardspirit,”Bodyisinfactthe

“expression”ofspirit,likethemeaningofawordthatisexpressedbytheletterson

apage.Butjustasidealityisnotsimplylocatedinthewords,neitherisspirit

located,asisthepsyche,inthelivingbody.Itiskeytorealizethatwhenwediscuss

spirit,wearealreadyinthepersonalisticattitude.Thisiswhy,asCobb‐Stevensputs

it,spiritisnotsimplygraftedonsoul,likesoulonbody.201Spiritisnotsimply

anotherfounded“strata”onmaterialandpsychicnature,inthesensethatto 200Ibid.,298201Cobb‐Stevens,252‐3

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constituteitisalreadytohaveshiftedoutof(sotospeak)thenaturalistic,andinto

the“personalistic,”attitude,forwhichthepsycho‐physicalcompositestudiedin

sciencesimplydoesnotappearinthisform.Itisperhapsforthisreasonthat

Husserlsays(relatively)littleabouttheinterrelationoftheregionsof“spirit”and

“soul,”butoddly,thisiscertainlynottrueabouttherelationofspirittoBody.

Indeed,Husserl’sremarksonthisparticularrelationaresomeofthemost

provocativebutalsoconfusingandcontradictoryinallofhisontological

investigations.Ontheonehand,itmightseemasthoughHusserlwantstoclaimthat

spiritandBodyaretobedistinguishedinthestrongestofterms:

“WhatwefindthenisourselvesasthespiritualEgorelatedtothestreamofexperiences—‘spiritual’hereisusedinameregeneralsense,referringtotheEgothathasitsplacepreciselynotinCorporeality;e.g.,I‘think’(cogito),i.e.,Iperceive,Irepresentinwhatevermode,Ijudge,Ifeel,Iwill,etc.,andfindmyselftherebyasthatwhichisoneandthesameinthechangingoftheselivedexperiences,as‘subject’oftheactsandstates.”202

Butuponscrutiny,itappearslikelythatthe“spiritualEgo”beingreferredtohereis

actuallynothumanspiritatall,butthetranscendentalego.Still,themixingofthe

languageof“spirituality”withthe“Ithink”initsnon‐Corporealityisaclueof

difficultiesinherentinHusserl’sconceptionofa“non‐natural”realitythatis

nonethelessdifferentthantranscendentalsubjectivity.

Atanyrate,HusserlrepeatedlystatestheviewthatBodyhasadistinctroleto

playintherealmofspiritand(whatamountstothesame)culture.“For

phenomenology…theBodyplaysanexpansiveroleintherealmofspirit.”203Forone,

itisthe“expression”ofspiritinamostprovocativesense.Itisthatbywhichone 202IdeasII,103203Ibid.,295

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graspsthehumanityofahumanbeing,the“personthere,whodances,laughswhen

amused,andchatters…”Anditisnotthe“apprehensionofaspiritfastenedtoa

Body,”buttheapprehensionofthepersonthroughhisbody.204ThusIcansayof

man,inthisattitude,thathe“hasaCorporeality,[he]hasabodywhichisaphysical

thingwithsuchandsuchqualities…”SometimesitisnotclearwhetherHusserlis

speakingofsoulorspirit,asinanearbysectionhespeaksofthefactthat“each

movementoftheBodyis,asBody,filledwiththesoulthroughandthrough…Bodyis

fullofsoul.”Husserl’spointisthatapersonalityemergesthrough,say,aparticular

Body’smovements.Husserlpointsoutthatthisistruenotonlyofthecorporeal

Bodybutofany“body”or“materialthing,”suchastexts,whicharecultural

expressionsofauniquelysignificantkind.205Thisisausefulcluethattherelationof

BodyandspiritthatHusserlisoutlininghereisinfactarelationofspiritandbody

as(a),namelyasbothKörperandLeib.Thatis,spiritisrelatedtothematerialityof

thebodyaswellastoitssoulishaspect,asLeib.Thebodyascomplexduality‐in‐

unityistransformedfroma“natural”complextoa“spiritual”onethroughachange

inattitude,butineithercase,itretainsitsJanus‐facednature.206

204Ibid.,252205Ibid.,248‐50.Onemayspeakofart‐worksorreligiousartifactsaswellpresumably.206Inallofthiswearefocusingonindividualspirits.Husserlhimselfrecognizeswhathecalls“personalitiesofahigherorder”or,whatamountstothesamething,collective“spirits,”suchasnations,clubs,churches,families,andthelike.(Seeforexample:IdeasII,377;or,forparalleltalkofindividualandcollectivesubjects,seesHusserl1919,135.)ThisresemblestheHegeliannotionof“objectivespirit,”butforHusserl,communalsubjectivityisfoundedontheinteractionsofindividualsubjects.Outoftheseinteractions,emergentlyperhaps,higher“wholes”ororganicunitiesthatdeservethenameof“persons”appear.Husserlseemstobasethisonthefactthatwecommonlyspeakofthewill,desires,attitudes,etc.,ofgroupsofpeopleorganizedincoherentwholes,notonlyofindividuals.Thisisnotmerelyanalogousorfigurativelanguageforhim.Nowiftrue,itwouldradicallyalterourconceptionofwhatcountsasa“person”andcouldhavereallegalramifications.ThiswouldberelevanttothecurrentdebateovertheU.S.SupremeCourt’srecentrulingonthelegalrightsof“corporations”undertheU.S.Constitution.(See:CitizensUnitedv.FEC)

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Relatedtoitssenseasspiritualexpression,theBodyisthemeansbywhich

spirit“…initsfreedommovestheBodyandtherebycanperformaworkinthe

spiritualworld.”207AsRicoeurnotes,everythingnowisa“performance”ofspirit.208

ButthisactuallypointstooneofthemorePlatonistaspectsofHusserl’s

understandingoftheBodyinthepersonalattitude,alreadyhintedatabove.The

Bodyisformeto“use”as“organonofmywill.”AndtheBodyinthespiritual

attitudeismerely“mine”;IamnotoftheBody:

“ItisabsolutelyoutofthequestionthatIamhereencounteringorintendingmyselfassomethingintheBody,asfoundedinit…theBodyismyBody,anditismineinthefirstplaceasmy‘overandagainst,’myob­ject,justasthehouseismyobject,somethingIseeorcansee,somethingItouchorcantouch,etc.Thesethingsaremine,butnotascomponentpiecesoftheEgo…”209

Admittedly,thiskindofdescriptionthenbecomeshardtosquarewithwhatHusserl

callsthe“unityofBodyandspirit.”210ButtheunityofBodyandspiritinparticularis

complex,inmultiplesenses(i.e.complicated,compounded)ofthatword:

“[Thebody]isatthesametimeapartofnature,insertedintothenexusofcausality,andthespirituallife,whichwegraspthroughtheBodilyexpressionandunderstandinitsnexusofmotivation,appears,invirtueofitsconnectionwiththeBody,tobeconditioneditselfbynaturalprocessesandtobeapperceivedassomethingofnature.TheunityofBodyandspiritisatwo‐foldone,and,correlatively,atwo‐foldapprehension(thepersonalisticandthenaturalistic)isincludedintheunitaryapperceptionofthehuman.”211

Whatthisindicates,perhaps,isthatBodyandspiritare“one”onlytotheextentthat

thelatterisapperceivedthroughtheformer,namelyviatheBody’sappearingasan

207IdeasII,295208Ricoeur,75209IdeasII,223.Thislanguageisalreadyintheearlypartofthetext:see“mymaterialBody,”p.111.210Forexample,Ibid.,259211Ibid.,259

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expressionofSpirit.Thisitselfoccursinthepersonalisticattitude,butitiswiththe

naturalisticadditionthatwecomefullytograspspirituallifeasbelongingtothe

naturalcausalorder—which,withoutnaturalisticinterference,isnotinfactthe

case.Forspiritisdefinedbymotivationandfreedom,notnaturalcausality.The

bodyinthiswayisthe“pointofconversionfromspiritualcausalitytonatural

causality.”212

III.Analysis:PhilosophicalDifficultiesofIdeasII/III

A.Introduction:PhenomenologicalMonism,OntologicalDualism

ThroughouttheIdeasvolumes,andhisphilosophygenerally,Husserlmakes

afirmdistinctionbetweenphenomenologyandontology.213Sciencesof(regionsof)

“beings”presupposea“transcendentalsense.”214Thusphenomenologyisfirstin

methodologicalpriority,beingthe“maternal‐groundofallphilosophicalmethod:to

thisgroundandtotheworkinit,everythingleadsback.”215Becauseofthisclear

prioritizationandtalkofa“ground,”elsewheredescribedasthetranscendentalego,

itbecomespossibletothinkofHusserlasakindof“monist,”namelya

phenomenological(ortranscendental)monist.Atthesametime,Husserl’s“ground”

212Ibid.,299213Cf.IdeasIII,117:“Forinitself…ontologyisnotphenomenology.”214Ibid.,66‐7215Ibid.,69.Husserlgoesontoindicatethatphenomenologyallows“ontologicallyfoundedinvestigation”to“unfolditsfullpower”and“receiveitsfullcertainty.”Butphenomenologyismorefundamental,and“owesnothing”toontologies!

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isnota“part”ofthe“world”—a“tag‐end”likeDescartes”non‐transcendental

“cogito”—andthereforecannotbeunderstoodintermsofanontologicalmonism.

Therealmofworld‐ontologyremainsrelativelyunder‐thoughtinHusserl,and

thoughnosingleconsistentpositioncanbeteasedoutofIdeasII,inmyviewthetext

comesclosertoaformofontologicaldualismthanHusserlwouldhavewantedto

admit.Someoftheevidenceforthisviewhasalreadybeenfurnishedabove,but

morewillbeprovidedbelow.Muchoftheremainderofthischapterisdevotedto

discussingsomeoftheunderlyingphilosophicalissuesandpressureswhichleadto

thedualisticposition,aswellassomeofthewaysinwhichHusserl’stextseemsto

veerawayfromsucharesult,generallywithoutsuccess.

Thechargeof“dualism”isanoldoneasappliedtoHusserl,anditshouldnot

bebandiedaboutcarelessly.Foronething,thereisacertainnebulousnessinthe

questionofHusserl’sdualismbecauseofthequestionofwhich“dualism”oneis

referringto.Inmyview,thekindofdualisminHusserl,atleastinIdeasI­III,isthat

specificallyofnatureandspirit,not(forinstance)ofbodyandsoul,orof

consciousnessandreality.WehavealreadyseenhowinseparableBodyandsoulare

fromoneanother;indeed,Husserlstressesthepointwhenheclaimsthat“whatwe

havetoopposetomaterialnatureasasecondkindofrealityisnotthe‘soul’butthe

concreteunityofBodyandsoul,thehuman(oranimal)subject.”216Noweventhis

dichotomy,thatbetween“thing”and“animal”—includinghumanbeingas

216IdeasII,146.Thiswouldseemtoruleoutaseparable‘soul‐substance,”butHusserldoesnotallowthistopreventhimfromspeaking,inthemodeofimaginativevariation,ofthe“departure”ofthe“soul”(Ibid.,100),whichleavesonly“deadmatter”behind.HereHusserl’spointisthatitisthesoulishorpsychicdimensionofthehumanoranimalbeingthatmakesitsuch,asopposedtosimply“materialnature.”

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psychophysicalcomposite—isnottechnicallyadualism,because“thing”and

“animal”bothgounderthegenus,sotospeak,of“nature.”Finally,consciousness

andrealitydonotcompriseadualismforthereasonsalreadyindicated;thefirstis

thegroundofthesecond,andthustheyhavenoparity.Thereisnorealityorworld

withoutconsciousness;butthereisatleastconceivablyconsciousnesswithout

realityorworld(cf.theworld‐annihilationexperiment,whichHusserlupholdsinno

uncertaintermsinbothIdeasIIandtheEpiloguetotheIdeasvolumes).217

Rather,natureandspiritaredualisticbecauseneithercanbeexhaustively

explainedthroughtheother,andtheydonotoverlap.Theyareboth“absolutes,”

correlatedtoalternativeversionsofthenaturalattitude,eachretainingprideof

placeinitsrespectiveattitude.218Thisisnottosayonecannotfindtalkofanoverlap

betweennatureandspiritinHusserl;butwhenHusserlspeaksofthis,ofa

“spiritualityinnature”forexample,heistypicallyreferringto“animalnature”and

doesnotlosesightofthefactthatsuchanimalityisafoundedstratumonmaterial

nature,or,moreimportantly,thatsuch“spirituality”isfundamentallyoutsideofthe

realmof“culture”orthepersonalisticattitude,inwhichthebodybecomesmere

217IdeasII,303.FromtheEpilogue(writtenaslateas1930/31):“thenon‐existenceoftheworldeverremainsthinkable…”(IdeasII,420)Husserlheredrawsthefamiliarlessonfromthis:“…thebeingoftranscendentalsubjectivityhasthesenseofabsolutebeing,thatonlyitis‘irrelative’…whereastherealworldindeedisbuthasanessentialrelativitytotranscendentalsubjectivity,due,namely,tothefactthatitcanonlyhaveitssenseasbeingonlyasanintentionalsense‐formationoftranscendentalsubjectivity.”218ToclaimthatHusserlisaphenomenologicalmonistissimplytoaffirmthefactthatHusserlwasneverunclearabouthisprioritizationof“transcendental”or“phenomenological”or“pure”consciousnessover“reality,”which,taken“onitsown”sotospeak,lacksallsenseand“being”inthefullestsense,andishenceconsciousness‐dependent.Husserl’scommitmenttotranscendentalsubjectivity,whichwasfirstformallyintroduced(inprint)inIdeasI,neverwavered.ButforHusserl,ithadalwaysbeensomehowpre‐ortrans‐ontological;“ontology”comestohavearestrictedsenseinHusserl,alreadyprefiguringHeidegger’sdistinctionbetweenthe“ontic”(beings)and“ontological”(forHusserl,somethinglike“transcendentalconsciousness,”thesourceofallmeaning—thoughfallingshortof“Being”inHeidegger’ssense).

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organofspirit.Theforegoingremarksarenonethelessnotwithoutcounter‐

examplesinthecourseofIdeasIIandIII.Butwewillexamineallofthesethingsin

moredetailinthesectionsbelow.

B.Husserl’sNaturalism

Husserl’soppositiontoscientificnaturalismislegendary—sohowcanone

speakofhisviewsas“naturalistic”?Theanswerhastodoultimatelywiththe

parallelismofphenomenologyandontology;allthatdifferentiatesthemisthe“shift

ofview”thatisbroughtaboutthroughtheepochéandphenomenologicalreduction.

ThusitisentirelypossibleinHusserl’sframeworktoacceptthemeaningscience

givesto“nature,”its“objectofstudy,”whilealsoclaimingtofindthesourceofthis

meaningintranscendentalsubjectivity,whichisrevealedthroughthe

phenomenologicalreduction.AndthisisjustwhatHusserldoes,asIwillnowtryto

show.

AsmentionedinpartIIofthischapter,oneoftheimportantfeaturesof

Husserl’sconceptofnatureisitstacitacceptanceofthedefinitionofnaturegivenby

thosewhocouldbedescribedasscientific“naturalists.”InDastur’swords,“[In]

IdeasII…scienceisconsideredasadefinitivethoughindirectcontinuationof

perception.”219AsOvergaardnotes,moreover,Husserlclaimselsewhere220thatthe

219Dastur,Françoise.“HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.(p.72)Hereafter“Dastur.”DasturclaimsinthissamequotethattheCrisisdoesthesamething,butthisisacontroversialpoint.Therelevantmaterialtointerpretincludesthistellinglinefromthelatterwork:“thecontrastbetweenthesubjectivityofthelife‐worldandthe‘objective,’the‘true’world,liesinthefactthatthelatterisatheoretical‐logicalsubstruction,thesubstructionofsomethingthatisinprinciplenotperceivable,inprinciplenotexperienceablein

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naturalconceptionoftheworldisinnoneedofcorrection,aremarkwhich

Overgaardrightlynotesshouldbetaken“veryseriously.”221Thissortofaffirmation

ofthescientificconceptionisindeedmanifestthroughoutHusserl’s“eidetics”of

natureinIdeasI­III,sincehedefinesnature’sessencepreciselyintermsofthat

whichisthesubjectof“naturalscience”;inotherwords,natureisanontological

regionwithastrictlyprescribedessence,knownbythesciencesalreadyattheir

ownlevel:

“…whatunderliesnaturalscienceisalwaysanideaoftheessenceofnature,ifonlyanimplicitone.Correlatively,theconsciousnesswhichfunctionsasnatural‐scientificexperience,andthusalsoasthethinkingpertainingtonatural‐scientificexperience,hasitsessentialphenomenologicalunity,andthisconsciousnesshasitsessentialcorrelateinnature.”222

Husserlgoesontosayinthequotedpassagethatthetaskofphenomenologyis

merelyto“bring…toclarity”the“natural‐scientificsense”alreadysoimplicitin

naturalscientificconsciousnessitself.Andlateronhestates:

“Tomakeallthesethingsclearandtooutlineaprioritheformofapossibledeterminationofwhatisinitselftrueofnature,adeterminationwhichisrelativelytrueandrelativelynecessaryforeverystageofexperience—thisisthetheoryofnaturalscience;asmethod:thetheoryofnatural‐scientificmethod.”223

Yetinperhapsanevenstrongerstatementthanalloftheabove,Husserl’sdeclares:

“Butitmustbeunderstoodfromwithin,fromphenomenologicalsources,thatthisabstractionfrompredicatesbelongingtothespheresofvalueandpracticeisnotamatterofanarbitraryabstraction, itsownproperbeing,whereasthesubjective,inthelife‐world,isdistinguishedinallrespectspreciselybyitsbeingactuallyexperienceable.”(Crisis,127)220Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaXIV,GesammelteWerke:ZurPhänomenologiederIntersubjektivität.TexteausdemNachlass.ZweiterTeil.1921‐28.Ed.IsoKern.TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1973(p.278)221Overgaard,Søren.HusserlandHeideggeronBeingintheWorld.Dordrecht:Springer,2004222IdeasII,3‐4223Ibid.,305

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lefttoone’sowndiscretion,forassuch,itwouldinfactproducenoradicallyself‐enclosedideaofascientificdomainandthusalsonoideaofascienceself‐containedapriori.Yetwedogainsuchanaprioriclosedideaofnature—astheideaofaworldofmerethings…”224

Theargumentthata“worldofmerethings”isan“abstraction”forHusserland

thereforecanbedownplayeddoesnotcarrymuchwater,becauseanabstractionis

notnecessarilydistortiveorarbitrary,andinthecaseofnatureHusserlmakesit

clearthatsuchan“abstraction”isinfactgroundedintheessenceofnatureitself.225

Thereasonforemphasizingallofthishereistoestablishwhatwehavebeen

seeinginchoatelyallalong,namelytheimplicitly“naturalistic”bentinHusserl

himself.Indeed,considertheall‐encompassingextensionassignedbyHusserltothe

conceptofmaterialnature:“Nature…initsformsofspaceandtime,encompassesall

factualrealitiesbutalsoincludes,obviouslyonessentialgrounds,allaprioripossible

realitiesaswell.”226Andagain:“Whatwehavehereistheone“Objective”world,

withtheonespaceandtheonetime,inwhich“everything”isordered—personsas

well,who,inunionwiththeirBodies,leadtheirpersonallives.”227Becauseall

realitiesareconstitutedashigher“strata”ofmateriality,whosebasiccausal

commercedefinesthenaturalandanimalworlds,natureinthepure,physicalistic

sensehasthesenseofbeingthesubstrateofanyothertypeofbeingwhatsoever.

224Ibid.,27225Husserl1919,132.Thereis,admittedly,somedissentonthequestionofhowcloselyHusserladherestothescientificnotionofnature.ThusTheodorou,inarecentarticlearguesthat“…inIdeasII,nature‐thingsaredescribedfromaphenomenologicallylegitimatetheoreticalattitudethatdoesnotnecessarilyadopttheverdictsofnaturalscientifictheoriesaboutwhatis‘merenature.’”See:Theodorou,Panos.“PerceptualandScientificThing:OnHusserl’sAnalysisof“Nature‐Thing”inIdeasII.”InTheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,Volume5,eds.BurtHopkinsandStevenCrowell.Seattle:NoesisPress,2005(p.169)Astheauthorfullyadmits,however,Husserlisunclearfromthebeginningaboutthisquestion,andpresentlythisisthemoreimportantfact.226IdeasII,30;emphasisadded227Ibid.,219;emphasisadded

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“Nature”hasthesenseofbeingthegroundof“allthatis”becauseofthefactthat

anythingelsethatisperceived,co‐perceived,orapperceivedmustbeahigher

stratumofarealitythatmustbe,atitsmostbasiclevel,“natural”inthesenseof

“material.”Andagain,whatiskeyhereisasymmetry.Therecannotbeapurely

spiritualbeing,withnomaterialsubstrate,buttherecanbeandofcourseare

materialthingswithnohigherstratum.Allofthiswillmakeitveryhardto

understandHusserl’ssuddendeclarationofthe“ontologicalpriorityofspiritover

nature”(the“PriorityThesis”asIwillbecallingitforshort).

YetHusserlwouldsurelyrespondthatallofthisissupposedtobepredicated

onthenaturalisticattitudesolely,notthepersonalistic.Thedangerthenbecomes

thatofdualism.ItisherethattheactualroleofthePriorityThesiscanbeproperly

ascertained—namelytoavoidjustsuchadualism.Forunderthespiritualattitude,

thenatural‐scientificviewanditsimplicitnaturalisticbias(whichissomehowvalid)

canbeassignedadecisivelysubordinatestatus228:

“Itisthecharacterofthehumansciencestopositsubjectivityasabsolute,toacknowledgenatureonlyastheintuitivelyexistingsurroundingworld,orasrepresented,thought,andintendedsurroundingworldofpersons,andtotakemathematicalObjectivenature,whichpreviouslywasthe‘truereality,’onlyas(whatinfactitmerelyis)atheoreticalthoughrationalconstructiononthepartofmanasthesubjectofscientificactivities…”229

Andagain:

“Itisnotthenaturalsciencesbutthehumansciencesthatleadintothe‘philosophical’depths;forthephilosophicaldepthsarethedepthsofultimatebeing.”230

228SeealsoHusserl1927,192‐5229IdeasII,374230Ibid.,376

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Ironically,itisalongtheselinesthatcommentatorslikeUlrichMelleandSteven

CrowellinfactdevelopfavorablyhumanisticinterpretationsofHusserl’sontology.

Nature“matters,”forHusserl,becauseithassignificance—utility,beauty,

goodness—forhumanbeings.Fromthispointofview,arespectforhumanspirit

emergesindirectlyasthelasthopeforarescueoftheenvironment.ThusMelle

remarks:

“…itisclearthatnatureplaysonlyasubordinateroleforHusserl.Husserl’sidealisticconceptionoftherelationshipbetweennatureandspiritisradicallyspirit‐centered.Natureinitselfandindependentofspiritanditsmeaning‐givingactsisfirstofallonlyanabstractionandsecondlyameresubstrateforthemeaning‐givingactsandgoal‐directedactivitiesofspiritualbeings….Protectionofnaturefornature’ssakewouldthereforenotmakeanysensetoHusserl,andanynaturalisticaxiologyandethicsisnonsensicalforhim.”231

Inaninterestingbook‐lengthstudyofHusserlandthebodyDoddcomestoasimilar

conclusion,comparingHusserl’sview(favorably,onemightadd)tothatofPlato

fromthePhaedo:“For,Iwouldliketosuggest,thereismuchinthispassage[Phaedo

66b‐67b3]thatshouldremindusofHusserl,andthereismuchinHusserl’sanalysis

ofthebodythatshouldremindusofPlato,oratleastofatraditionthatsoughtto

putsomesortofdistance(ofwhatevertype)betweenbodyandwhatevercanbe

identifiedasthatwhichwemosttrulyare.”232

Forhispart,CrowellcelebratesHusserl’s“disenchantment”ofnatureasa

triumphofethicalthinking.StatesCrowell:“CriticsofHusserl(e.g.Merleau‐Ponty)

havesuggestedthatthemeaninglessnatureofthenaturalisticattitudeisan

231Melle,Ullrich.“NatureandSpirit.”InIssues,p.34232Dodd,James.IdealismandCorporeity:AnEssayontheProblemoftheBodyinHusserl’sPhenomenology.Dordrecht:Kluwer,1997(p.119)

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abstraction,thatgenuinenatureistheprimordialrealmofanoriginarylogos,the

originofmeaning.Tothissensibility,Husserl’srathertraditionalgnosticismseems

outofplace.ButperhapsHusserlisright…Husserl’scriticsseektoreviveamythical

conceptionofnature…”233CrowellcriticizesMerleau‐Pontyforsuppressingthe

“absolutismofreality”andheopposeshimunfavorablytoLevinas,whothankfully

“vindicatesthedisenchantmentofnature”foundinHusserl!234Crowellinterprets

Merleau‐Pontytobearguingforaviewofnaturesuchthat“naturealreadyharbors

acertainsensuousmeaningfulness,acertainmythical‘fulness’thatenrapturesand

fascinatesandisnotatalla‘mere’thingexperience…”235Hethenobservesthat

Merleau‐Ponty’sviewisincompatiblewithHusserl’s“phenomenologicalaccountof

nature”inmostofIdeasII,whichitselfsignifiesa“break”withthemythicalfulness

ofmeaning“adumbratedinthesensuous.”Again,forCrowell,thisbreakis

necessitatedbythediscoveryofthe“ethical,”whichitisLevinas’greatachievement

tohaveremindedusof:“ForHusserl[asforLevinas]itisthedestinyofthis

separationtoleavenaturebehindaltogether,andsoitisimportanttoaskwhether

whatliesatitsorigin—thereversibilityoftouch—issufficienttoaccountforthe

233Crowell,StevenGalt.“theMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.”InIssues,p.82.Articlehereafterreferredtoas“Crowell.”Crowellmeanssomethingspecificby“mythical.”Themythicalisborneoutofadesiretosuppressthe“absolutismofreality”thatforcesitselfuponusashumanbeings.(Crowell,84)234Ibid.,85.Crowellgoeson:“Merleau‐Pontysoughttotracetheoriginofmeaningtotheelement.Hiselementalnature—as“wildmeaning,”an“idealitythatisnotalien”totheflesh—evincesamythicalimagination.”(Crowell,94)ItisinterestingtonotethatRicoeur,whodisagreedwithMerleau‐Ponty’s“existential”appropriationofIdeasII(seeRicoeur41,69),wouldnot,withhischaracteristicsenseofmoderation,gothisfar.IncontrastingIdeasIandII,Ricoeurstates,“thestyleofIdeasIrequiressubordinatingtheunionofconsciousnesswithrealitythroughincarnation[whichiswhatisdoneinIdeasII]toitsunionwithrealitythroughperception.”(Ricoeur,55)Ofcourse,the“union”thatRicoeurspeaksofmayjustbebetterspokenofasa“disjunction”—thatis,IdeasIprovidesuswiththedisjunctionofsubjectiveimmanenceandobjectivetranscendence,IdeasIIandIIIwiththatofnatureandspirit.ButthepointisthatRicoeurseesanattemptatafusionthatisclosertowhatMerleau‐PontyhasinmindthanwhatCrowelldoes.235Crowell,94‐5

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radicalityofthebreak.”Merleau‐Pontymakesmuchofsuch“reversibility,”aswe

willseeinsubsequentchapters.Healsowilltrytoaccountforthe“radicalbreak”in

termsthatcannonethelessexplainhowitispossibleinthefirstplacetohave

identifiedwithnature;onecannotbreakfromthattowhichoneisnotalready

attached.Merleau‐Ponty’suseof“paradoxicalthinking”willultimatelybeemployed

intheserviceofthisdifficultproblem.

C.ThePriorityThesis

ThePriorityThesisisoneofthemostproblematicpositionsadvancedby

Husserlinthetext.Thepriorityofspiritovernaturefollowsfromtheprivilegingof

the“personalisticattitude,”andwhileitcertainlycircumventsdualism(bydintofits

verytitle),itraisesotherperplexities.Foronething,itsquaresbadlywiththenotion

thatspiritissomehowitselfdependenton“reality”asdeterminedprimarilyby

materiality.HusserlcanmaintainthispositionorthePriorityThesis,butnot,Ithink,

both.Considerthefollowingclaim:“Initsspiritualacts,thespiritisdependenton

thesoul…ThespiritualEgoisdependentonthesoul,andthesoulontheBody….

Consequentlythespiritisconditionedbynature…”236Husserlevengoessofarasto

stateoutrightthatspirit“belongstonature,”thoughwhathemeanshereisnot

clear,ashealsoreferstonatureandspiritas“tworealities.”237

AsecondreasonanddeeperreasontosuspectthePriorityThesisisthatit

wouldappeartocommitHusserltoanontologicalmonismofahighlysubjectivistic

sort.Husserl’sownwordsmakethedangersimmediatelyevident: 236IdeasII,295237Ibid.,296

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“Therealmofnatureistherealmofthe‘phenomenal’;thatmeansheretherealmoftherealunitiesconstitutedinorbymeansof‘presentation.’Therealmofspirit,however,istherealmoftherealitiesgiveninabsolutemanifestation(self‐manifestationandmanifestationthroughcomprehension),realitieshavingbehindthemselvesonlythepureEgoastheirreal,absolutesubstrateofallmanifestationsofreality.”238

Itisverypossiblethat,assomewritershavecommented,Husserlhasinmind

somethinglikeamodified(transcendentallypurified)monadologicalidealismalong

thelinesofaLeibniz,whoseveryideaofthemonadheadopts,atleastinpart,not

onlyinIdeasIIbutmostmemorablyintheCartesianMeditations.Butthepassage

justquoteddoesnotpresentuswithatranscendentalidealism,insofarasitstresses

therealmofspirit;here,weareonlyatthelevelofthenaturalattitudeand,

correlatively,reality.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthe“dogmatic”idealismofthe

Leibnizianvarietyandthe“transcendental”idealismHusserlisaimingaretwo

radicallydifferentthings,atleastfromHusserl’sstatedperspective.Thefinal

referencetothe“pureEgo”isitselfunclear,duetotheambiguitiesinthisvery

concept,discussedalreadyabove.

ArelatedconfusionarisesoverhowHusserlinterpretsthesuperiorityof

spiritinthefollowingquote:

“Natureisafieldofrelativitiesthroughout,anditcanbesobecausethesearealwaysinfactrelativetoanabsolute,thespirit,whichconsequentlyiswhatsustainsalltherelativities.…Thatistosay,ifwecouldeliminateallthespiritsfromtheworld,thenthatistheendofnature.Butifweeliminatenature…therealwaysstillremainssomething:thespiritasindividualspirit.”239

238Ibid.,337239Ibid.,311

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Heissayingnowof“spirit”—asectorofconstitutedreality—whathenormallysays

onlyoftranscendentalsubjectivity,forexampleintheworld‐annihilation

experiment.Iwillfurtheraddresstheseunsettlingconflationsbelow(sectionD).

AsidefromtheotherproblemswithHusserl’sargument,thebasicmysteryat

theheartofhisviewasstatedinthePriorityThesisisthis:howareweto

understandhowscientistscouldhavearrived,simplyfromthespiritualattitude,at

naturalisticconceptionsofnatureandmatteranditsabsolutestatus—unlessthey

weresimplywrongaboutthis,sayoutofacertainarrogance?Bydefiningthe

essenceofnatureaspurelymaterial,andnatureasthebasisofreality,Husserl

himselfhasensuredthatthescientificconceptionofnaturecouldnottrulybe

supplantedbyanother,exceptbyrecoursetotheseeminginventionofa“new”and

“different”“naturalattitude”—abifurcationthatreinforcesratherthansoftenshis

dualisticstand.

D.SpiritandConsciousness

ThePriorityThesisissoflawed,infact,thatitsveryexistencepresentsa

profoundhermeneuticalmystery.WhatisitdoinginHusserl’sphilosophyatall?I

thinkthereasonbecomesclearuponsomereflectionofwhatthesupposed

advantageofspiritovernatureissupposedtoliein,namelysubjectivity.The

personalisticattitudeissubject‐centered,integratingmeaningandsubject‐relative

values,feelings,andsoon,intothematrixofperceptionandaction.Inthisway,it

beginstoturninthedirectionofphenomenologyitself,especiallywhenone

considersthatphenomenologyisahuman,cultural,andhence“spiritual”activity.It

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iseasy,infact,toseeHusserl’sIdeasIIconceptsofthepersonalisticattitudeand

Umwelt240ascrucialanticipationsofthelife‐worldandlife‐world

phenomenology.241Thetrouble,however,isthatinHusserl’sownview,ahugegulf

separatesphenomenologyfromothersciences,i.e.,fromreality.Strugglingwiththis

problem,Ricoeuroffershisbestattempttoreconcilespiritandtranscendental

consciousness:“…Geistis[perhaps]nothingotherthantheegoofphenomenology,

butwithoutthelightofthephenomenologicalreduction.”242Butiftrue,thiswould

haveseriousconsequences.Firstofall,Husserlinfacttakespainstodistinguishthe

humansciencesfrom(transcendental)phenomenologythroughouthiswritings.If

spiritandtranscendentalegoareroughlyequivalent,thenthenaturalattitude

wouldnothavetwosub‐species—naturalisticandpersonalistic—butwouldbe

univocal.Atleast,thepersonalisticattitudewouldhavetobesub‐dividedinto

“natural”and“transcendental”aspects.Butasthingsstand,theformeroptionwould

concedethenaturalattitudeentirelytothenaturalsciences,giventheauthority

Husserlcedesthemoverthe“natural”world,whilethelatter,moreplausibleoption

wouldnonethelessmakethetheneedforthereductionhardtounderstand.Doesn’t

thepersonalisticattitudealreadyinterprettheworldasaworldofsense,rather

240ThomasNenonconcurs:“theIdeasIIshows[sic]thattheconceptofUmwelt,whichwouldbereplacedbythatofthelife­worldinthe20’sand30’s…”(Issues,x;emphasisadded)241Theword“Lebenswelt”can,surprisingly,befoundinIdeasII.See,forexample:IdeasII,187.Inthe“Translator’sIntroduction”totheEnglish‐languageversionofIdeasIII,TedKleinandWilliamPohlclaimthat,intheirunderstanding,thelife‐worldispresentfromthebeginningofthattextaswell.(IdeasIII,viii‐ix)242Ricoeur,80.Ricoeuridentifiesthe“spirit/consciousness”ambiguityasacentralmysteryofIdeasII—orinhismorebluntwords:“Aswearegoingtosee,thispre‐eminenceitself[referringtothePriorityThesis]iswhatposesthemostembarrassingquestionofIdeasII:thatofsituatingwhatinthisworkHusserlcallsspirit(Geist)inrelationtothatwhichhisworksgenerallycall‘consciousness,’thesubjectivelifeofconsciousnessreachedbythephenomenologicalreduction.”(Ricoeur,76)

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thanofmere“things”?Ultimately,thenaturalattitudeitselfisinneedofaradical

rethinking.243

Thefundamentalandwell‐knownambiguitiesofthe“life‐world”arerooted

intheambiguitiesofthespiritualattitudeandthenotionof“spirit”itself.Spiritisa

realmofreality,therealmofpersons,culture,andsocietiesorsocialstructures—as

wellastheirhistorical(diachronic)dimension;consciousnessinthe

“transcendental”and“phenomenological”senseisnoneofthese.The“pureEgo”of

IdeasIInowappearstobealmostpurposefullyambiguous:atoncehavingafootin

“personhood”andanotheroutsideit.Wehavealreadyaskedwhetherthe“pureEgo”

isthesameasthe“transcendentalEgo,”asconstitutingconsciousnessitself,and

decidedthatitprobablyhastobe.Ontheonehand,onewantstoinferthatwhenthe

phenomenologistcomesuponthepureEgo,he/shecomesuponhimself/herself,as

transcendentalego,intheactofself‐constitutionandself‐reflection.Thiswould

essentiallycompriseaperformanceofthereduction.(Husserldoesafterallcallthe

pureEgothe“irreal,absolutesubstrateofallmanifestationofreality.”244)Butaswe

haveseen,HusserldescribestheEgointermsofspirit,andasthe“rulerofthesoul,”

forexample,soitsroleasa“real”componentoftheobjectiveworldsitsuneasily(or

tooeasily)alongsideits“transcendentality.”

243IsuspectthatthisiswhyDavidCarr,inhis“Translator’sIntroduction”totheCrisis,distinguishessharplybetweenthe“naturalattitude”ofIdeasI(andtherefore,Iwouldsay,IdeasIIandIIIaswell),whichisstill“theoretical,”andwhathetermsthe“primordialnaturalattitude”ofthelife‐world.See:Crisis,xxxix.Betweenthenaturalisticnaturalattitudeandthepersonalistic(itselfbeingvaguelytranscendental)attitude,thereseemstobenotruenaturalattitudeintheIdeasvolumes.Thetaskofphenomenologyasaphenomenologypreciselyofthenaturalattitudebecomesmuchmoresubtleandelusivethanbefore,sinceitbecomesataskofelucidatingthepre‐theoreticalworld,whatMerleau‐Pontywillforhispartcallthe“tacitlogos”ofnature.Wewillsaymoreaboutthisinsubsequentchapters.244IdeasII,337

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Alife‐worldconnectiondoes,however,allowustore‐interpretHusserl’s

Priority‐Thesis‐engendered“spiritualmonism”inthesafer(ormorefamiliar)

directionoftranscendentalmonism,thestandardHusserlianpositionthatallreality

isconstitutedinandbytranscendentalconsciousness,thesourceofallmeaningand

being.Underthisinterpretation,then,inelevatingthe“humansciences”abovethe

naturalsciences,whatHusserlisinfactdoingisimpreciselyexpressinghis

convictioninthesuperiorityofphenomenology,asthestudyofconsciousness,tothe

studyofreality,which,Husserlseemstofeel,hasbeenmonopolizedbythenatural

sciences.Theelevationofthehumansciencescanbeseenasaprotestagainstthis

naturalisticbias,buttothatextentitoverstatesthecaseandultimatelymakesallof

perceivedmaterialrealitytheprovinceofsubjectiveUmwelten,whichcannothave

beenHusserl’sintention.Itbecomesincreasinglyapparentthatthe“problemofthe

naturalandhumansciences”wasonethatbecamegraftedontophenomenology

afteritbecameknowntoHusserlthroughcontactwiththeworksofDilthey.Itturns

outtobehardtosynthesizetheseverydifferenttypesofdiscourseinasingle

framework.245

Thusinlightoftheforegoing,theCrisis’investigationsintothelife‐world

maynowappearinanewlight,namelyasanattempt(itselfadmittedlygroping)ata

finalsolutiontotheambiguityofspiritandconsciousness.Thetranscendental

245Whatisatstakeinallofthisismorethanjustthe“paradoxofsubjectivity,”thatis,whatHusserllatercallsthephenomenonof“real”egoitycombinedwith‘transcendental”egoity.Forthatproblem,addressedatlengthintheCrisis(Crisis,178‐85),concernsthedualityofempiricalandtranscendentalegos,notthespecificproblemoftheambiguousontologicalstatusofthetranscendentalegoitself,atranscendentalegobothworldlyandnon‐worldly,sotospeak,atthesametime.InIdeasII,consciousnessbelongstoEgos,andtheseEgosarepartofthe“real”orderoftheworld,namelythesummitofits“spiritual”.Thustranscendentalsubjectivitycanbesaidtobothbelongtotheworldandconstituteit“fromoutside,”sotospeak.

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reductiontothelife‐worldpreserveswhatwascrucialinIdeasII’sdiscussionofthe

Umweltandthepersonalisticattitude,namelyitsinvolvementintheaxiologicaland

practicalspheresofmeaning—eveninassigningthempriorityoveraconceptionofa

purely“meaningless”nature.246

E.TheQuestionoftheBody

Husserl’sdepictsthelivingbodyoranimalorganismasitsownontological

region,distinctfrompure“materiality”ontheonehandandpure“spirituality”on

theother.Husserlelsewherecallsthebodya“connectingbridge”inthisrespect.247

However,thesecouldactuallybeseentorepresenttwoverydifferentclaims,which

cannonethelessbeeasilyconflated.Thisisexactlywhatoccursinarecent

(schematic)attempttodeveloparecentunifiedinterpretation,byLuisRabanaque,

ofHusserl’sideaofthelivingbody.RabanaquedrawsonbothIdeasIIandHusserl

1919248toarguethatthebodyinHusserlcanbeunderstoodasa“thirdnoematic

region”betweennatureandspirit(orculture).Onitsownthisisnotcontroversial

(depending,crucially,onhowoneunderstandstheinterrelationsofthe“regions,”as

Iwilladdressbelow),butthepaperequallydrawsonthe“connectingbridge”

metaphorbetweensubjectivityandphysicalthinghood.ThefullquotefromHusserl,

inwhichthismetaphorisused,goesasfollows:

246Butwhereexactly,then,doesthelife‐worldleavetheroleofthehumansciencesandthe“spirit”specificallyassuch?Thisquestionisbeyondthescopeofthischapterordissertation,butitmayhavetodowiththe“ontologyofthelife‐world”thatHusserlhintsatbutneverfullydevelopsintheCrisis.(Crisis,173)247Seefn127.248Rabanaque,Luis.“TheBodyasNoematicBridgeBetweenNatureandCulture?”In:Epistemology,Archaeology,Ethics:CurrentInvestigationsofHusserl’sCorpus(Eds.PolVandeveldeandSebastianLuft).NewYork:Continuum,2010

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“Weseetherebyalreadythat,phenomenologicallyconsidered,subjectivity(soulishspirit)intheworldandphysicalthinghoodintheworldarenottwoseparateandexternallyrelatedgroupsofrealoccurrences,butratherthatthereisproducedintheformofCorporeality,whichinitselfhasitsowndeepestlayerofbeinginsensibilityandfreemobility,aconnectingbridge,which,throughthesingularspiritualityinnature,canhaveapositionintherealmofphysis.”249

Themetaphorofabridgeinthiscontextisapowerfulonebecauseitseemstooffer

apossibilityofresolvingoratleastsofteningtheotherwisestarkdisparitybetween

physicalthinghoodandhumanspirit.ItisnotsurprisingthatHusserlshouldlookto

animalitytofilltheroleof“missingrung”intheGreatChainofBeing‐likeladderhe

hasbuilt.ButinRabanaque’sreading,the“bodyquabody”isa“thirdnoematic

region”that“cannotbeassimilatedtoeithernatureorspirit.”Inotherwords,the

bodyissomehowdifferent,inanirreduciblemanner,fromegoicconsciousnessas

suchandphysicalthinglinessassuch.Firstofall,Husserlhimselfstatesquitetothe

contrarythatthebodyisapartofnature(“animalnature,”natureinthe“second

sense,”etc.).Andsecondly,Rabanaqueseemstohavetacitlycombinedthenotions

ofapluralityofnoematicregionsontheonehandandan“integrated”(hisword)

totality—withthebodyas“midpoint”betweenextensioandcogito,sharingin

“featurescommontoboththelowerandupperregions”—ontheother.Indoingso

heprovesofcoursethedictumthatitispossibletobetoofaithfultoatext.Forthe

ideaofthebodyasa“bridge”betweennatureandspirit,anditsbeinganirreducible

“thirdnoematicregion”inadditiontothenaturalandthespiritual,areobviously

twoverydifferent,andmutuallyincompatible,claims.Inthefirstcase,wemight

haveacaseofontologicalmonism—aslidingscaleofbeing,perhapsfromthemost

249Husserl1919,p.186(mytranslation)

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inerttothemost“enspirit‐ed.”ThiswouldbereminiscentoftheNeoplatonism‐

tingedontologyofsomeGermanRomantics,orperhapsdistantlyofSpinozism.But

ifspiritualityandphysicalityfuseorblendinthemiddle—inthebodyas“midpoint”

ofextensionandthought,inRabanaque’simage—thenitwouldseemthatthenotion

of“noematicregions”inthepluralmustbedispensedwithaltogether.Forinthat

casematerialthinghoodandpsychicegoitywouldnotbetwodistinctnoematic

regionsatallinthefirstplace,letaloneleavingroomforathird,thebody.

Thefirst,monisticviewsuggestsakindofvitalism,orpanpsychism,that

HusserlexpresslyrejectswithrespecttoLeibniz(andBruno).250Furthermore,this

wouldbeacaseinwhichLeiblichkeitwoulddefinethewholecontinuumofwhich

extensionandthoughtaremerelypolesoneitherend.Yetthiswouldclearlybe

unacceptabletoHusserl,asitwouldcallintoquestionthefounding‐founded

relationshipofthephysicalandpsychical,thelatterofwhichbeingfoundedonthe

former,aswellasremovetheprivilegedperchoftheCartesian“Ithink.”Thefactis

thatHusserldidpositmultipleirreducible(thePriorityThesisaside)“ontological

regions”—twoinparticular,natureandspirit.Thebodyfallsintheformercolumn.

Ofcourse,thereisonemoreprovocativethoughtexperimenttoconsider.Intalking

abouttherelationbetweenthepsycheandthebody,Husserlinvokesthefollowing

image:

“Letusimagineaconsciousness…whichwouldstandinrelationtoalocomotive,sothatifthelocomotivewerefedwaterthisconsciousnesswouldhavethepleasantfeelingthatwecallsatiety;ifthelocomotivewereheated,itwouldhavethefeelingofwarmth,etc.Obviously,thelocomotivewouldnot,becauseofthemake‐upofsuchrelationships,become‘animateorganism’forthisconsciousness.If,insteadofthethingthatIatthetimecallmyanimateorganism,thelocomotive 250Ibid.,132

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stoodinmyconsciousnessasthefieldofmypureEgo,thenIcouldnotcallitanimateorganismalso,foritsimplywouldnotbeananimateorganism.”

Theimagehasintuitiveappeal,butwhy?Husserlimmediatelygoesontoexplainthe

reasonthelocomotiveandmyconsciousnesswouldnotmakeupananimate

organismatthispoint:

“…aconsiderablepartofthelargecontent‐classbelongingtothesphereofconsciousnessunderthetitle‘materialofconsciousness’issointimatelyatonewiththematerialanimateorganismthatintheintuitivegivennessnotmerelyconnectionbutpreciselyunityisshown.”251

Notmerelyconnectionbutunity.Thisseemsaverystrongstatementindeed.An

animateorganismisalreadymorethanamaterialthinginitsessence.Ithasa

“stratum”ofthepsychic,belongingtothewholeoftheorganism“fromtheoutset.”

Butreally,allthismeansisthattheanimateorganismissuchthatinit,itsBodyand

soulareone.Wehavegonethroughallofthisalready.Inspiteofthis“unity,”there

isalso,still,afounded‐foundingrelationbetweenthefirstandsecond(“psychic”)

stratum;they’renotequal,inthissense.ThisiswhatallowsHusserltospeakofthe

bodyasa“sensingphysicalthing”thatis“coveredorfilledwithfeelings.”252Its

materialityisprimary,itspsychicdimensionanadd‐on,albeitonewovenintothe

essenceofsomebeings,the“animate”ones.Sounfortunately,theunityofBodyand

soulfailstoprovidetheneededevidenceofeitheraradicalunionofora“middle

region”betweennatureandspirit.253Indeed,itisarguablethatHusserl’streatment

251IdeasIII,104252IdeasII,105253Further(indirect)evidenceofthisistheunconvincingtreatmentof“somatology”asitsowndisciplineinIdeasIII,forexample.

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ofthebodyisitselfdualistic,havingthetwosides,materialandpsychical,butin

truth,thiswouldprobablybetousetheterm“dualistic”tooloosely.254

IV.Conclusion

IhopetohaveshownthatHusserl’sacceptanceofthenatural‐scientificsense

ofmaterialnatureastheabsolutebasisofreality,thesubstrateuponwhichhigher

strataofrealityare“founded”inaunidirectionalway,hassevereconsequencesthat

reverberatethroughouttheIdeasseriesandmaybeHusserl’sphilosophyasawhole.

Itpushesthebodyandlivingnatureintothepurviewoftheinherentlyreductive

“naturalsciences,”allthewhileprecipitatingacrisiswhereby“spirit”mustbe

rescuedfromtheclutchesofbrutematerialism—andhencemustbedualistically

sealedofffrom“nature”itself.Husserl’sworldisbifurcatedinsuchawaythatthe

unityoftheworldcannotbefoundinit,butonlyinthefactthatbothsetsofrealities

areconstitutedincommonthroughthetranscendentalego,i.e.,phenomenologically.

Ifthetranscendentalegoandphenomenologicalmonismfail,theworlddoesnot

havetheresourcestomaintaininternalcohesion.ThisviewishighlyPlatonicina

certainveryspecificsense,thatis,inreferencetoasplituniversewhoseunityis

254TaylorCarmanarguesthattheKörper/Leibdistinctionisdualistic.(See:Carman,Taylor.“theBodyinHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999,p.206.Hereafter“Carman.”)IdoagreewithbothCarmanandDasturthatHusserl’soverallpositionisdualisticinsomeimportantsense.(Carman,208andDastur,73)

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providedbysomethingfrom“above,”“participating”inwhatis“below.”InHusserl’s

case,thetranscendentalegoisnota“thing”liketheForms,itisratheranattitude,a

kindofconsciousness.ButtocallHusserl’sview“transcendentalPlatonism,”while

beingmoreaccurate,doesnotdrainthecomparisonofitspresentrelevance.

ButifIdeasIIpromisesmorethanHusserlhimselfdelivers,thatisalso

becauseitpromisessoverymuch.Itharborsthesortsoffertileambiguitiesthat

haveledquitenaturallytotheontologicalshiftinphenomenologythattookplace

throughHeidegger,Sartre,andMerleau‐Ponty,amongothers.AndovertheCrisis

andotherlater(atleastamongpublished)writings,geneticorstaticorboth,ithas

theadvantage,ironically,ofgreaterinconsistencyandthusagreatersenseof

possibility.MuchofthispossibilityarisesoutofHusserl’sjustlyinfluentialtreatment

ofthebody.ThebodyhadalreadybeenamajorconcernofContinentalphilosophers

likeBergson,Marcel,andScheler(whowasinfluencedbyHusserl,albeit),but

throughthevehicleofIdeasIIitsplaceinthehorizonoffoundationalphilosophical

problems,atleastintheContinentaltradition,waspermanentlyestablished.

Inallofthis,Husserlofcoursedoesnotseemeithertorecognizethetensions

inIdeasIIasfundamentalonesortorealizethatthequestionofnatureposesa

radicalproblemforthetranscendental‐phenomenologicalmethoditself.Aswehave

seen,hepresentsakindof“ontologicalgambit”directedagainstthenaturalisticor

physicalisticphilosopher.IfHusserl’sgambitfails,itwillhaveintheprocess

concededsomuchtonaturalscienceand,inthewakeofthefailureof

transcendentalphenomenology,therewouldbeonlythenaturalistic‐physicalistic

optionleft.Somethinghasclearlygonewrong.Atitsbest,theexaminationofthe

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bodyinIdeasIIraisesthepossibilityofarethinkingofphenomenologyandthe

naturalattitude,anuncoveringofevidencethatshowspowerfullythatthereisa

kindofdeepinter‐connectivityandoverlapofnatureandspirit.Thereisacertain

volatilityinHusserl’shandlingoftheseconcepts,avolatilitythatreappearsin

intermittentburststhroughoutIdeasII.Thus,likeintentionalconsciousnessitself,

IdeasIIasatextpointsnecessarilybeyonditself.

Forhispart,Merleau‐PontyadoptsmanyofHusserl’sinsightsashisownbut

goeswiththeminadifferentdirection.Wemightputitthisway:whereasfor

Husserlnaturehastobeexplainedintermsofits“constitution”intranscendental

consciousness,forMerleau‐Ponty,itisthisveryconsciousnesswhichneeds

explaining,inlightofitsobviousoriginationintheprimordialexperiencesofthe

naturallived‐body.Thebodybecomesthesiteofaparadoxthatwillneverbe

“resolved,”becauseitisdefinitiveofthehumancondition.Ontologically,thebodyas

Leibblursthelineofsubjectivityandobjectivityinawayevenmoredecisivethan

(theoretical)intentionality,sinceithasno“directionality,”anditisnotsimplythe

“body‐subject”(asMerleau‐Pontyhimselfcametorecognize)butsomethinglikethe

criss‐crossingorintertwiningofbeingwithitself—aknotattheheartofthe

universe.Theintimacyofnatureandspiritallowsphilosophy,andnotjustnatural

science,tohaveasayindefiningwhatitis,evenwhileitselfbeingsusceptibleto

havingtoreviseitsownbeliefsinlightoftheseexplanations.InMerleau‐Ponty,

“naturalism”isdefeated,paradoxically,bybecomingtransformedthroughamuch

morerobustdefinitionof“nature”thanscientistshavetraditionallypermitted.This

isnovictoryofahigheridealismorspiritualism.Contrarytowhatsomehave

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claimed,Merleau‐Ponty’sphilosophydoesnot“re‐enchant”naturesomuchas

removeanyhard,essentialistbarriersbetweenthevarious—real—divisionswithin

“being.”Itisinthissensepreciselyaphilosophyof“promiscuity,”touseMerleau‐

Ponty’sword,ratherthanofromanticalunity.

LetusnowturntoMerleau‐Ponty’sownmulti‐facetedappropriationof

Husserl’sthought,IdeasIIincluded.

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ChapterThree:Merleau­Ponty’sOrganicAppropriationofHusserlianPhenomenology

“WeknowthatHusserlnevermadehimselftooclearonthesequestions.” ‐‐MauriceMerleau‐Ponty255

I.Introduction

Thequestionofwhatphenomenologyis—andwhatitsultimatetasksare—

hasneverceasedtobeposedeversinceitsinception.Naturally,peoplehavelooked

toHusserl,theeffectivefounderandpioneerofthisphilosophy,foranswerstosuch

questions—butwhilesomefindthemhere,othersseeonlymorequestions.

Merleau‐Pontywasunique,inthisregard:hefoundananswer,butithappenstobe

onethatcontinuestosurpriseusbecauseofitscounter‐intuitivity.OnMerleau‐

Ponty’sreading,Husserl’squestionsareultimatelythoseofhumanexistence,the

paradoxesofincarnatesubjectivity,thefinitudeofhumanknowledge—noneof

whichthe“textbooks”atfirstsuggesttobecentraltotheGermanphilosopher’s

agenda.Nevertheless,itisundeniablethateversinceMerleau‐Pontyintroducedhis

Husserltotheworld,phenomenologyhasnotbeenabletostopwonderingoverthe

enigmathatistheMerleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationship. 255Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.”(Hereafter“PS.”)InSigns.Tr.RichardM.McCleary.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(p.165)

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Thestakesareashighasever,asevidentfroma(relatively)recentaccount

likethisonebyLesterEmbree:

“ItisdauntingtorecallthehistoricalerainAmericanphenomenologyofouryouththatisbestcalled‘PhenomenologyandExistentialism’ifonlybecause,inthatgreatupsurgeofenergy,Husserlwas,incredibly,readbysomanyasthefatherofexistentialphenomenology,apaternitythatstillneedschallenging.”256

Therearemany,particularlyonthe“Husserlian”side(hopefullythissortoflabel

willmeanlessbytheendofthischapter),whoshareEmbree’sdisenchantmentwith

whattheyperceivetobeMerleau‐Ponty’smisappropriationofHusserlian

phenomenology.257Therearealsothosefromthe“Merleau‐Pontyside”ofthings

wholamenttheFrenchphilosopher’sconstantreferencestoHusserl,findingthem

unnecessaryandmisleadinggiventheultimatelytrans‐phenomenologicalnature,

theyclaim,ofMerleau‐Ponty’sundertaking.Others,ofcourse,stresstheindissoluble

linkbetweenthetwophilosophers.

Itiscertainlyhardtodenythatasignificantlinkexists,buttheprecise

relationbetweenMerleau‐PontyandHusserlisanuncannilydifficultcodetocrack.

“DoesMerleau‐PontygetHusserlright?”isjustthefirstofmanyquestionsthatarise.

Othersinclude:Istherea“right”Husserl—a“true”Husserl,atall?ShouldMerleau‐

Ponty’sself‐describedfidelitytoHusserl’sideasbetrusted?ShouldweseeMerleau­

PontyasakindofHusserlian,finally,andevenHusserl(oroneofpossiblyseveral

“Husserls”)asaproto­Merleau­Pontian?

256Quotedin:Bernet,Rudolf;IsoKern;andEduardMarbach.AnIntroductiontoHusserlianPhenomenology.Evanston,Ill.:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1993(p.xi)Ireproduceandrespondtoafullerversionofthesamequotebelow.257Forexample,ElizabethBehnke,asdiscussedfurtherbelow.

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Tostartattheendandworkbackwards,sotospeak,myquickanswersto

thesequestions,respectively,wouldbe:yes,Merleau‐Pontygetssomething

profoundlyrightaboutHusserl,thatisaparticularstrainofhimthatmustbe

separatedcarefullyfromtherest;no,thereisno“true”Husserl,sincemanylive

possibilitiesremainopeninhiscavernousthought;yes,Merleau‐Ponty’sself‐

understandingasaphenomenologistofaHusserlianveinisgroundedintruth;and

finally,yes,thereisasenseinwhichHusserlandMerleau‐Pontyarereciprocally

intertwined,suchthat,tousethelatter’swordswhenspeakingofhimselfand

Husserl,“itisnotpossibleeveninprincipletodecideatanygivenmomentjustwhat

belongstoeach.”(PS159)

Thisisalottoshow,however,inadissertationchapter,soIhavelimitedmy

goalspresentlytothesefour:First,tobrieflysketchthehistoricalbackgroundofthe

relationship;Second,toprovideanoverviewandcriticalassessmentofavarietyof

positionstakenonthisrelationshipintherecentsecondaryliterature;Third,to

show,throughastudyoftherelevanttexts,howIunderstandMerleau‐Pontytoread

andappropriateHusserl;andFourth,tosuggestwaysinwhichhisrelationship258to

HusserlexemplifiesandembodiescertainMerleau‐Pontian(butalso,implicitly,

Husserlian)“figuresofthought.”Thatis,Iwillwantultimatelytoshow—andhereis

atleastoneclueastowhysomereadersdon’tacceptMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingof

Husserl—thatMerleau‐Ponty’sinterpretationofHusserlfollowsthesamepatternas

258HusserlandMerleau‐Pontydidnothaveapersonalacquaintance,soby“relationship”Ihaveofcoursebeenreferring(andwillcontinuetorefer)throughoutthischaptertotherelationshipbetweentheirphilosophies.

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hisgeneralphilosophy,suchthattoacceptoneis,toalargedegree,toacceptthe

other—oratleasttobepreparedtodosomorereadily.259

Merleau‐Pontydidnotbeginhisphilosophicalcareerstrictlyasa

“phenomenologist,”buthegraduallygrewintotherole.Hewasinterestedin

Husserlasearlyas1934,butevenaslateashisfirstbook,TheStructureofBehavior,

hisprimaryfocusseeminglylieselsewhere.However,readingHusserl(orabout

him,asthroughEugenFink’simportantKantstudienarticleof1933260)evidently

hadagreatcumulativeimpactonhim,suchthat,asonechroniclernotes,“[his]

attentiontoHusserlincreasesratherthandiminishesoverthecourse”261ofthe

progressionfromThePhenomenologyofPerception(PP),hiswell‐known1945

masterpiece,toTheVisibleandtheInvisible(VI),whichwasleftunfinishedatthe

timeoftheauthor’suntimelydeath.UnlikeEugenFink,MartinHeidegger,Aron

Gurwitsch,andotherstudentsofHusserl’s,Merleau‐Pontydidnothaveapersonal

relationshipwithHusserl,althoughhemayhaveattendedatleastoneofhis

lectures.262Complicatingmattersfurther,Husserlwasclearlyonlyoneofmany

influencesonthesponge‐likeFrenchthinker.ThisisbecauseHusserl’s

259Animportantbutdeliberateomissionfromthisdiscussionisanyextendeddiscussionofhermeneuticsforitsownsake.Forexample,Itouchonlyindirectlytheperennialquestionofwhetherthereisinfactsuchathingasa“correct”interpretationofawork,orevenwhetherthereissucha“work”tobeginwith.(Besides,Merleau‐Ponty’sisacaseinwhichitisnotthemeaningofindividualtextsthatareusuallyatstakebutthetendenciesand“innerlogic”ofthethinker’scorpusasawhole,anevenmoreelusiveanimal.)Thesearesurelyquestionsthatdeserverepliesandwouldhavesignificantbearingonthepresentinquiry,buttheyalsoliejustoutsideitsnecessarilyrestrictedscope.260See:Fink,Eugen.“DiephänomenologischePhilosophieEdmundHusserlsindergegenwärtigenKritik.”In:Fink,Eugen.StudienzurPhänomenologie1930­1939.TheHague,Netherlands:MartinusNijhoff,1966261ThechroniclerisTedToadvine.See“Merleau‐Ponty’sReadingofHusserl:AChronologicalOverview.”In:Merleau­Ponty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(p.228).Hereafter“Toadvine.”(Theessaycollectionasawholeisreferredtohereafteras“Reading.”)Toadvine’schroniclehasbeenextremelyusefulforthissection.262Ibid.,pp.227‐33

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phenomenology,largelythroughtheinfluenceofSartre,wasonlyoneofmany

dominantphilosophicaloptionsin1940sFrance,whenMerleau‐Pontyforgedthe

coreofhisphilosophicalvision.263

Nevertheless,Husserl’sinfluenceturnedouttobethemostdecisiveinthe

end.Inthe“Preface”ofPP,Merleau‐PontyadoptedthefundamentalHusserlian

insightsandconcepts,workingthemintohisownbrandof“existential”

phenomenology,andhewasthefirstso‐called“outsider”tobegrantedprivateand

in‐depthaccesstoHusserl’sarchivesinLouvain,whichwereatthattimefilledwith

reamsofunpublishedmaterialthatMerleau‐Pontyhappilydevouredand

communicated,fragmentarily,toawidercircleofscholarsandintellectuals.264

Merleau‐Ponty’sreadingofHusserliscriticalofsomeofHusserl’stendencies,

particularlywhathavebeenvariouslylabeledandidentifiedashisrationalism,

idealism,essentialism,andfoundationalism.Merleau‐Pontydislikedeachofthese

“styles”ofthinking,butheclearlyregardedHusserlas“morethanthesum”ofthese

philosophicalparts.Itisalsotrue,however,thateachoftheabovelabelscanbe

challengedasoverlysimplisticstereotypeswhenappliedtoHusserl,astheyall

applychiefly(thoughbynomeansexclusively)totheearlypublishedworksof

Husserlduringhis,primarily,“staticphenomenology”period—mostespecially, 263Forexample,AlexandreKojèvehadmemorablyre‐introducedHegeltoFrenchstudents,includingMerleau‐Ponty.HeideggerandSchelerandtheircriticismsofHusserlwerealsoinfluentialtoMerleau‐Ponty,aswereSartre’sexistentialism,Bergsonianism,(eventually)Marxism,andotherphilosophies—tosaynothingofthecentralimpactofGestaltPsychologyontheyoungthinker.Onthe(mostly)negativeside,theinfluenceofFrenchNeo‐Kantianismshouldbementioned.IwillfurtheraddressMerleau‐Ponty’sconsistentoppositiontoKantianisminlatersections.264AccordingtoDanZahavi,itwasinfactIdeasII,thethen‐unpublishedsequeltoIdeasI,thathadhadthegreatestimpactonMerleau‐Ponty.(Zahavi,Dan.“Merleau‐PontyonHusserl:AReappraisal.”InMerleau­Ponty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002.(p.6—hereafter“Zahavi.”)ThisideaissupportedindirectlybythewayMerleau‐Pontyessentiallyreconstructshisownphilosophyonthebasisof“somelines”ofIdeasIIinPS.

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Husserl’sIdeasI,whichwehaveexaminedinthefirstchapter.Merleau‐Ponty

recognizedinHusserl’sthoughtovertimeadistinctphilosophicalmaturation,as

wellasamovementawayfromthestyleofIdeasI.Merleau‐Pontythusdivides

Husserl’sthoughtintothreedistinctperiods:logicist,idealist(orsimply“middle”),

andexistentialistphases.265Merleau‐Pontysideswiththethird,“existentialist”

phaseinHusserl’sthought,butthefactisthatheneverdeniedthecomplexityand

evencontradictorinessofHusserl’sphilosophyevenattheend—thoughgivenhis

temperamentandpenchantforl’ambiguité,healmostcertainlyadmiredHusserlall

themoreforthisthannot.

II.Merleau­Ponty’sRelationshiptoHusserl:AnDoxographicalOverviewand

Critique

A.Introduction

ToraisethequestionofMerleau‐Ponty’srelationshiptoorreadingofHusserl

istodosoagainstthebackdropofalivelyandvigorousdebate,onethatbegins

early266andcontinuestothisday.HereIwillexaminetheparametersofthisdebate,

265TwodistinctplacesinwhichheadvancestheideashowhowenduringitwasinMerleau‐Ponty’smind:PP,p.317,fn274;and,muchlater,PSM46and48.Seealsofn46,below.266Asof1964,EdiereportsaccusationsagainstMerleau‐Ponty,forexamplebyMauriceNatanson,thathadalreadybeguntoariseovertheaccuracyorreliabilityofMerleau‐Ponty’scitationsofHusserl’sTheCrisisofEuropeanSciences(particularlyquotestotheeffectthatforHusserl“transcendentalsubjectivityisanintersubjectivity”).SurelyJamesEdiewasprescientlycorrectinmusing:“ThatMerleau‐Ponty’sinterpretationofHusserlhasbeenandwillcontinuetobecontestedisbeyonddoubt.”SeethePrefaceof:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.xvii‐xviii,fn10)Thenamesakeessay(actuallyalectureandadiscussion)fromthisvolumeisreferredtohereafteras“Primacy.”

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beginningalso,throughacritiqueofsomeoftheextantliterature,tooffermyown

interpretation.ThepositionsIwilladdresscannotnecessarilybeplacedonasingle

spectrum,sincethereisnosinglequestionthattheyalladdressinthesameway.

Someauthors,forexample,discusstheextentoftheinfluenceofHusserlover

Merleau‐Ponty,whileothersconcentrateonthefidelityofMerleau‐PontytoHusserl

ongivenissues(orasawhole).Butmygoalisnottoanalyzethisdiscussioninto

theirindividualcomponentsbuttoprovideamoreorlessholisticoverviewofthe

discussionitself,forallaspectsofitarerelevanttoanygeneralassessmentof

Merleau‐Ponty’srelationshiptoHusserl.

Ihavedividedvariousviewsaseither“strong”or“weak.”Weakviews,on

thisdefinition,tendtodownplaythephilosophicalassociationbetweenthetwo

thinkers,whilestrongviewstendtoemphasizeandattachgreatimportancetoit.

Somereaders,ofcourse,likeStephenWatson,combinebothaspectsintheir

consideredview.Asageneralrule,weakreadingsaremorecommonthanstrong

ones,foravarietyofreasons.Itouchonsomeofthenotableexceptionsfirst—

relativelybriefly,sinceIgenerallyagreewiththestrongorientationmyselfandseek

tobeofferingoneofmyownasIproceed.Thatis,insteadofrehearsingpositive

strongaccountsalreadymade,Ihavedeemeditmoreimportantfinallytoanswer

weakreadingsinstead.267

267Myplacementofatreatmentofthesecondaryliteraturefirst,beforeadirectanalysisoftheprimarytexts,ismotivatedbymyhopethatitwillbeusefultohavethecontextinwhichthesignficanceofsuchananalysiscanbedulymeasured.Thereviewisrestrictedmostlytorecentliterature,bothforreasonsoflimitedspaceaswellastomakeitascurrentaspossible.

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B.The“StrongView”:Zahavi,Smith,andBarbaras

DanZahavi,whileacknowledgingdifferencesbetweenthetwothinkers,

surprisingly(givenhisstrong“Husserlian”credentials)stressesthecontinuity

betweenthemandarguesthatMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofHusserlisinmanyways

prescientandaheadofitstimes.268Forhispart,A.D.SmitharguesthatMerleau‐

Ponty’sideasinPParefundamentallyHusserlian,thoughstatedwithadifferent

emphasisandthroughdifferentrhetoric.HealsoarguesthatHusserlhasthe

resourcestoaccountforthespecialsignficanceaccordedbyMerleau‐Pontytothe

“bodilyschema,”againsttheviewofShaunGallagher,forexample.269BothZahavi

andSmithhaveincommonavastcommandovertheHusserlianaarchives,and

hencecalluponmaterialthatcannotbeexpectedtobeknownbyevensome

advancedphenomenologists.ThepivotalIdeasIIhascometobeincreasinglywell‐

known,ofcourse,butthereareonthisfrontdetractorsoftheStein‐andLandgrebe‐

editedvolumewehavebeforeustoday.270

InadditiontoZahaviandSmith,whowriteprimarilyonHusserl,thereisalso

thecaseofaMerleau‐Pontianwhofullyacknowledgestheprofundityofthelink

betweenthetwophilosophers,namelyRenaudBarbaras.Thusintheconclusionof

hisbookDel’êtreduphénomène,Barbarasstates:“…Merleau‐Ponty’sontologydoes

268Textcitedaboveas“Zahavi.”ForaninstanceofhisspiriteddefenseoftranscendentalsubjectivityinHusserl,seeforexample,Zahavi,Dan.HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity:AResponsetotheLinguistic­PragmaticCritique.Tr.ElizabethA.Behnke.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,2001269Smith,A.D.“TheFleshofPerception:Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InReadingMerleau­Ponty:OnthePhenomenologyofPerception.Ed.ThomasBaldwin.NewYork:Routledge,2007(pp.1‐22)Noteinparticularthesummaryremark,“…IhavesuggestedthatthereisnothingradicallynewinMerleau‐Ponty,ascomparedwithHusserl.Theyoccupythesameterraininphilosophicalspace.”(p.20)270Seeforexample:Behnke,Elizabeth.“Merleau‐Ponty’sOntologicalReadingofConstitutioninPhénoménologiedelaperception.”InMR,p.34;hereafterBehnke.BehnkearguesthatSteinhadalready“steered”IdeasIIinarealisticdirection,onemorecongenialtoMerleau‐Ponty’sintentionsthantoHusserl’sown.

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notbreakwithphenomenology;itisratherphenomenology’smostsignificant

achievement…”271Ofcourse,LeonardLawlorandTedToadvine,inthe

“Introduction”totheirEnglishtranslationofthebookdescribeitashavingasoneits

mainaimsto“confrontHusserl’sphenomenology”andthatitconcernsthe

“transformationofMerleau‐Ponty’sphenomenologyintoontology.”Importantly,

however,theseremarkspertaintoBarbarashimself,ratherthantoMerleau‐Ponty.

ForBarbarastacitlyadmitsthatMerleau‐Pontydidnotfullyeffectthedesired

“transformation”himself,andhasbenefitedfromhisowneffortstofinallydoso.272

C.“Weak”and“Mixed”Views:Lefort,Richir,Madison,etal.

Notwithstandingthepositionsofthethreeeminentscholarsjustmentioned,

theoppositeviewisrathermucheasiertofind.ThisistrueofMerleau‐Ponty’sone‐

timestudentClaudeLefort,forexample,aswellasMarchRichir,bothofwhom

speakofMerleau‐Ponty’sultimate“break”withphenomenology.273Stillonthe

271TheBeingofthePhenomenon.Trs.TedToadvineandLeonardLawlor.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004(p.312)Barbaras’fullquotebearsalmostexactresemblancetosomethingMerleau‐Pontyhadwrittenbefore.Barbaras:“Also,Merleau‐Ponty’sontologydoesnotbreakwithphenomenology;itisratherphenomenology’smostsignificantachievement.ItaimstorecognizewhatHusserlhadforeseen,namely,‘atypeofbeingwhichcontainseverything’;itaimstomakeareturnfromanobjectiveworldtoaLebensweltinwhosecontinualfluxareborneNatureandtheobjectsofperception,aswellasconstructions…”Merleau‐Ponty,fromalectureonthe“life‐world”:“…thereturnfromanobjectiveworldtoaLebsenweltinwhosecontinualfluxareborneNatureandtheobjectsofperception,aswellastheconstructionsthroughwhichwegraspthemwithCartesianexactness.”(Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollègedeFrance1952­1960.Tr.JohnO”Neill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970,p.108.Hereafter“Themes.”)272Ibid.,ix273See:Lefort,Claude,Surunecolonneabsente:EcritsautourdeMerleau­Ponty(Paris:Gallimard,1978)andRichir,Marc,“LesensedelaphénoménologiedansLevisibleetl”invisible,”inEsprit,no.66(June1982),p.125.IgetthesecitationsbywayofBettinaBergo’s“PhilosophyasPerspectivaArtificialis:Merleau‐Ponty’sCritiqueofHusserlianConstructivism.”Printedasthe“Afterword”of:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.HusserlattheLimitsofPhenomenology.Ed.LeonardLawlorwithBettinaBergo.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2002,p.178.Thisarticleisreferredtohereafteras“Bergo.”

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Merleau‐Pontyside(sotospeak),therearethecasesofGaryMadisonandM.C.

Dillon,bothofwhomunderplaytheroleofthephenomenologicalreductionin

Merleau‐Ponty.274ForDillon,eventheearlyMerleau‐Ponty“uncritically

appropriated”Husserlianterminologyfordifferentpurposes.275Suchsentiments

arecommonamongMerleau‐Pontyscholars.InhisbookonMerleau‐Ponty,for

example,LawrenceHassarguesthatMerleau‐PontygoesbeyondHusserldefinitely

fromphenomenologyto“expression”276,whileHubertDreyfuscommentsthat

Merleau‐Ponty’santi‐dualismconflictsdirectlywithwhatmakesthetranscendental

reductioninHusserlpossible277.TaylorCarmanandFrançoiseDastur,bothfrom

verydifferentperspectives,bothagreeonacertain“dualism”inHusserlwhich

clasheswithMerleau‐Ponty’santi‐dualistagenda.ArguesCarman,forexample:

“UnlikeHusserl,butlikeHeidegger,Merleau‐Pontylooksbeyondthesubject‐objectdividetotrytogaininsightintotheconcretestructuresofworldlyexperience…Indeed,takingtheproblemofembodimentseriously,asMerleau‐Pontydoes,entailsaradicalreassessmentoftheveryconceptualdistinctionsonwhichHusserl’senterpriserests.”278

Forhispart,XavierTilliettereinforcesthisdividewhenheremarksthat

“…HusserlwasnotaninstructorofMerleau‐Pontyasmuchasaninitiatoranda 274GaryMadison,ThePhenomenologyofMerleau­Ponty:TheSearchfortheLimitsofConsciousness(Athens:OhioUniversityPress,1981),194‐5and332‐3,andMartinDillon,Merleau­Ponty’sOntology(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988),71‐2,120(hereafter“Dillon”).Citedbywayof:SaraHeinämaa,“FromDecisionstoPassions:Merleau‐Ponty’sInterpretationofHusserl’sReduction.”(Hereafter“Heinämaa.”)In“Reading”(pp.127‐148)275Dillon,p.83.Dillondoeshowevernoteonp.87the“usual”wayinwhich,almostasakindofmodusoperandi,Merleau‐Pontypicksupanddevelopsa“seminalthought”ofHusserl’s.276Hass,Lawrence.Merleau­Ponty’sPhilosophy.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2008(pp.198‐9)277Dreyfus,Hubert.“Merleau‐Ponty’sCritiqueofHusserl’s(andSearle’s)ConceptofIntentionality.”InRereadingMerleau­Ponty.Amherst,NewYork:HumanityBooks,2000(p.37)278Carman,Taylor.“TheBodyinHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999,p206.ForDastur’ssimilarbutslightlymorenuancedposition,see:“HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983(pp.65‐77).

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revealer,”goingontoaddthat“Merleau‐Pontyhastracedoutnewfurrows,

concernedtofreeuptheimplicitHusserlwhoresembledhimlikeabrother,”279an

interestingtwistofcourseinwhichHusserlissaidtoresembleMerleau­Ponty,as

opposedtheotherwayaround!280Tillietteisambiguous,however,abouttheissue

ofMerleau‐Ponty’soriginality,aswhenhewrites,“Inreality,[Merleau‐Ponty]did

notcarryoutdetailedpioneerwork,butratherpickedoutpassagesandformulas

thatelectrifiedhisownmeditation.Hewasnotanddidnotwanttobeascholiast

norevenanhistorianofphilosophy.”Didhecarryoutpioneeringworkordidn’the?

Inarecentessay,StephenWatsonofferssomethinglikeanintermediary

position,a“mixture”ofthestrongandtheweakingredients.281Ontheweakerside,

heemphasizesthecriticalaspectofMereau‐Ponty’sengagementwithHusserl:

“Merleau‐Pontyhasgivenuponphenomenologyasastrictlyfoundationalsciencein

ordertoarticulatephenomenologyaspartofourconceptualhistoryandcoherence,

asituatedknowingandasituatedknowledge.”282Watsonseemstosuggestthat

Merleau‐Ponty’sradicalrethinkingoftheroleofhistory,factuality,andgenerally

the“relationofstructureandsense,”283whilestillperhaps“phenomenological”ina

loosesense,issufficientlyradicaltoindicateaprofounddisengagementfromthe 279Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TextsandDialogues.Ed.HughSilvermanandJamesBarry,Jr.Tr.MichaelSmithetal.NewJersey:HumanitiesPress,1992(p.162)280Wealsomustbecarefulinfollowinghimashecontinuesthispassage,however:“HeapproachedHusserlwithulteriormotives,knowingbydivinationwhathewouldfindthere…”(CitedbywayofLesterEmbree’sPrefaceto“Reading,”p.xiii)Tillietteadmitstohaveacquiredthislatterinsightsecond‐handfromaformercolleagueofMerleau‐Ponty,whoknewhimasof1938.HisbeliefthatMerleau‐Pontychieflybroughtoutthehidden“implications”ofothers”thoughtsisnotincorrect,butifonedoesthisatamasterlyenoughlevel,itbecomesunclearwhoismoreresponsibleforthefullydevelopedthought—theoriginalauthororthecommentator.281Watson,StephenH.“Merleau‐Ponty’sPhenomenologicalItineraryFromBodySchematoSituatedKnowledge:OnHowWeAreandHowWeAreNotto‘singtheWorld.””JanusHead,Winter/SpringIssue,9.2,2007.Amherst,NY:TriviumPublications.(pp.535‐549)282Ibid.,544283Ibid.,545

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original,morepositivisticversionofphenomenologythatHusserlhadlaidout.“We

mustconcludethatonitsownphenomenologyisnotexplanatory[intheway

Husserlhadclaimed].Itattainsnoexplanatory‘role’—certainlynotthatof

determiningourconcepts—withoutbeingbroughttogetherwiththefactsandtheir

history.”284Watson’srichargument,whichitselfcombineshistoricalfactand

systematicanalysisintracingMerleau‐Ponty’scriticalbreakfromelementsofboth

Husserl’sandhisownearlierphenomenology,neverthelessmakesacompelling

indirect(and,forlackofabetterword,performative)casefortheinextricabilityofa

comprehensionofMerleau‐Ponty’staskwithoutreferencetoHusserlasakindof

permanenthorizon—muchinthesamewayperhapsthatMerleau‐Ponty(citedby

Watson)arguesforthedialectical‐relationalimportanceofscienceto

phenomenology.285Itisthisthatcanbesaidtocomprisethe“strong”elementin

Watson’sreadingoftheMerleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationship.

D.FourWeakReadings:Embree,Behnke,Seebohm,Bergo

IntherestofthissectionIwilldealatgreaterlengthwiththe“weak”viewsof

threephenomenologistsofhighrepute:LesterEmbree,ElizabethBehnke,and

ThomasSeebohm.Iquotetheseauthorsatlengthinordertodealwiththeirclaims

inclosedetail.

284Ibid.,545285Ibid.,540.TheoriginalcitationisfromPrimacy,29.WatsonalsocitesGurwitsch’swell‐knownremarktotheeffectthatthe“life‐world”inHusserlcannotbeunderstoodapartfromitspolemicalrelationtothescientificattitude.

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ForEmbree’sview,Iwillsimplyreproduceanexpandedversionofthequote

providedattheoutsetofthischapter:

“ItisdauntingtorecallthehistoricalerainAmericanphenomenologyofouryouththatisbestcalled‘PhenomenologyandExistentialism’ifonlybecause,inthatgreatupsurgeofenergy,Husserlwas,incredibly,readbysomanyasthefatherofexistentialphenomenology,apaternitythatstillneedschallenging.ThatwaschallengedchieflyonthebasisofwhatMerleau‐PontyconfectedinreferencetoabookwhoseEnglishtitleactuallyisTheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciences.Nocompetentreadercanstudythepresentwork[anintroductiontoHusserl’sphenomenology]andfailtocomprehend(a)thatHusserl’swasfromabout1905throughtotheendofhislifeatranscendentalphilosophyand(b)thatHusserl’sfocuswasinthephilosophyofscience.Existentialphenomenologyisnottranscendentaland,althoughnotlackingininterestinsciencetheory,ismoreconcernedwithhumanexistence.”286

Severalthingscanbesaidtochallengethesesentiments,thoughnonedefinitive.For

example,ononereading,Merleau‐Pontydoesnotrenouncethetranscendental

attitude,andattimesinfactembracesitexplicitly.287Onthisview,itisthe

“absoluteness”or“priority”ofitthathechallenges,notitsrightfulplacein

phenomenologicalpraxis.Also,itisarguablethatMerleau‐Ponty’sintensive

engagementwiththesciences—atleastatthefirst‐orderlevel(meaning,the

creativeinterpretationofits“results”)—notonlymatchesbutsurpassesthatof

Husserlhimself.288Finally,toarguethatHusserlwasconcernedwith“science”as

opposedto“humanexistence”mightbeafalsedilemma,especiallyinMerleau‐

286Quotedin:Bernet,Rudolf;IsoKern;andEduardMarbach.AnIntroductiontoHusserlianPhenomenology.Evanston,Ill.:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1993(p.xi)287Seeforexamplethefollowingpassageonp.63ofPP:“Butnowthatthephenomenalfieldhasbeensufficientlycircumscribed,letusenterintothisambiguousdomainandletusmakesureofourfirststepsasfarasthepsychologistisconcerned,untilthepsychologist’sself‐scrutinyleadsus,bywayofsecond‐orderreflection,tothephenomenaofthephenomenon,anddecisivelytransformsthephenomenalfieldintoatranscendentalone.”(italicsadded)ReferenceprovidedbyHeinämaa(p.129)SeealsoTedToadvine’sarticle,alsoinMR(pp.71‐94),entitled“LeavingHusserl’sCave?ThePhilosopher’sShadowRevisited.”ToadvinearguesthatthePSisanexampleofMerleau‐Ponty’s“reformulatingtherelationbetweenthetranscendentalandthemundane.”(p.71)288Andheisnostrangertothe“philosophyofscience”assuch,either.SeeforexamplewhatMerleau‐PontysaysaboutscienceinhisEyeandMind(InThePrimacyofPerception,tr.CarletonDallery.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964)pp.159‐61.

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Ponty’scase,butalso,arguably,inHusserl’s.Embree,oneofthemosteminent

scholarsofphenomenologytoday,isobviouslyawareofallofthis,sothisismore

thanamatterofliningupcitationstoproveonesideortheother.AsIwilltryto

arguelater,howonereadstheMerleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationshipispartlya

functionofone’sreceptivitytothekindof“ambiguity”—agoodambiguity,mind

you289—thatMerleau‐Pontywantstointroducetophilosophyandhermeneutics

alike.

Behnkebeginsarecentessaybyarguingthat“Merleau‐Ponty’s‘reading’of

Husserlissimultaneouslya‘writing’ofHusserl—awritingthatappropriatesand

develops,butalsodeformsandoccludes.”290ItisinterestingtonotethatMerleau‐

Pontyhimselfendorsesthenotionthatitisafalsedilemmatosaythat

“interpretationisrestrictedtoinevitabledistortionorliteralreproduction.”(PS

159)Yetonewishestoaskhowitispossibletodevelopsomeone’sideasby

deformingthem?Doesnotthenotionof“development”presupposeacertainlackof

completedform,andhenceamalleabilityor“potentiality”thatmakesithardto

defineinthefirstplace?Withthisominousphrasing,Behnkegoesontoexplainwhy

shefaultsMerleau‐Ponty’sapproachandmannerofappropriation,asinthistelling

quote:

“Onthewhole,then,Merleau‐Ponty’sHusserl‐readingischaracterizedbyaninterpretiveengagementwiththecontentofHusserliantextsratherthanaconcernforadoptingaphenomenologicalattitude,consultingexperientialevidenceforourselves,andcarryingHusserl’sresearchtraditionfurther.…AndsinceMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofHusserlhashadaprofoundinfluenceonthewayHusserl’sworkhasbeenreceivedingeneral,theoveralleffecthasbeento

289Fortheexpression“goodambiguity,”seePrimacy,11.290“Merleau‐Ponty’sOntologicalReadingofConstitutioninPhénoménologiedelaperception.”InMR,p.31

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perpetuateaclimateofinterpretationinwhichHusserlianthemesandtermsaretypicallyapproachedinlightofreceivedphilosophicalproblemsandreceivedwaysofposingthem,allattheexpenseofthepossibilityofappropriatingphenomenologyasalivingresearchhorizon.”(Behnke,49‐50)

Readclosely,thisemergesasaparticularlystingingcritiqueofMerleau‐

Ponty,atleastqua“phenomenologist.”Bynotconsulting“experientialevidencefor

ourselves”or,whatBehnkementionsjustbefore,cleavingto“description”rather

than“explanation”(Behnke,49),Merleau‐Pontyisperhapsnotsomucha

“phenomenologist”atall,butclosertoasimpledogmatist,thatisametaphysician

whoengagesin“receivedphilosophicalproblemsandreceivedwaysofposing

them.”Behnke’sstickingpointisMerleau‐Ponty’sabandonmentofHusserl’sstrict

methodologicaldirectives,somethingneitherhenorIwouldentirelydispute.

Behnkeaddsyetanotherdarktwist,however,bysuggesting,likeEmbree,thatthe

receptionofMerleau‐Pontyasarepresentativephenomenologisthasdamaged

Husserl’slegacy.ObviouslyBehnkeisnottryingtocastaspersionsonMerleau‐

Pontyhimself,butsimplytodescribewhatsheseesasacaseofall‐too‐successful

appropriation(herword)ofHusserl’sprogram.ButMerleau‐Pontyhas,inBehnke’s

words,performeda“disservice”toHusserl’swork.291Thereisperhapsacertain

assumptionherethatHusserl’sownself‐definedproject—withoutinterventionby

Merleau‐Ponty—isvitalonitsown,apowerfulphilosophicalsystemor

methodologythathasbeenovershadowedbyaninferiorproduct.However,itisnot

clearinthiscasethatMerleau‐Pontywouldhavemarkedoutanysortof

291Behnkesinglesoutthat“majorelementofHusserl’sworkasawhole”thatis“constitution.”(Behnke,48)Behnke’sremarksherearesomewhatsurprisinggivenherintensiveengagementwithMerleau‐Ponty,particularlyovertheissuesofembodimentandnature,inrecentyears.Seeforexample:“FromMerleau‐Ponty’sConceptofNaturetoanInterspeciesPracticeofPeace.”InAnimalOthers:OnEthics,Ontology,andAnimalLife.Albany:StateUniversityPress,1999(pp.93‐116)

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“development”ofHusserl’sthought,somuchaswrong‐headedlymisconstruedwhat

Husserlwasfinallyupto.

Thesesortsofsentimentsstandofcourseinsignificantcontrastwith

Merleau‐Ponty’sunderstandingofhisownrelationshiptoHusserl’sthought,which,

aswewillseeinthenextsectionofthischapter,isclosertothestrongviewsbriefly

coveredabove.Itisinlightofthisself‐interpretationofMerleau‐Ponty’sthat

ThomasSeebohmdevelopsaninterestingpsychologicalhypothesis,suggestingthat

Merleau‐Pontyknewofthedistanceatsomelevelinhismind,buttriedinanycase

to“coverup”thisdistance.Whywouldhedothis?Again,alongbutrichquote:

“AsinthecaseofFichteandKant,thetoposservesasacover‐upofacritique,andthiscritiquehasthecharacterofdeconstruction.FichteshowedwithrespecttoKant,andMerleau‐PontywithrespecttoHusserl,thatwhattheybelievedtobethelastwordinphilosophyisbuilton‘unthought’suppositions.Theselurkbehindthehiddencontradictionsofthecriticizedposition…Thenewtaskistherecognitionandexplicationofthesepresuppositions,thusaskingforthepossibilityofthecriticizedpositions.Adeconstructivecritiquehas,takenforitself,thecharacterofamoreorlesscompleteruptureandradicalrejectionofthepositionsinquestion.Butthegoalisalsotoclaimsomekindofcontinuity.”292

Andheaddselsewhere,

“Merleau‐Pontyisineveryrespecthonestinhisattemptsto‘savetheface’ofhishonoredmasterinthelightofthenewdevelopmentsintroducedbyhimandothers.”293

ThusMerleau‐PontyoverplayedtheconnectionbetweenhimselfandHusserlinat

leastoneway:forthe(ironically)benevolentpurposesofdisguisingcertainjarring

discrepanciesbetweenthetwo.(Merleau‐PontyevidentlywantedtosaveHusserl’s

292Seebohm,ThomasM.“ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InMR(p.59)293Ibid.,p.55

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facebygivinghimakindof“face‐lift”!)Ifitisbeingimpliedthatthiskindofface‐

saving,well‐intentionedasitmaybe,isnonethelesscounter‐productive,becausefor

exampleittendstomisleadreadersastowhatHusserlreallymeant,thenwecome

fullcirclebacktoBehnke’scriticismaboutlegacyandocclusion.The“face‐saving”

hypothesisistempting,givenMerleau‐Ponty’sgenerallynon‐confrontationalstyleof

engagingfriendsandenemiesalike,butitfacesarealdifficulty:whyshould

Merleau‐PontyhavefeltobligedtodiscussHusserlinthefirstplace,andtothe

extentthathedoes?OutofsomestrangeemotionalattachmenttoHusserl,amanhe

hadnevermet,andwhoseworkhehadeveryreasontodownplaywithrespectto

figureslikeHeidegger,Hegel,andothers?294Thisdoesnotseemwhollyconvincing.

IfthereisanypersonalresponsibilityMerleau‐Pontywouldfeeltowards

Husserl,itwouldprobablybeasagratefulstudenttoa(virtual)teacher.Having

benefittedfromreadingHusserl’sprivatemeditationsintheHusserlarchives,

concealedtomostofthepublic,andwhichoftenconflictedwiththetendenciesof

thepublishedworks,Merleau‐Pontyprobablyfeltincreasinglyresponsibleto

revivifyHusserlintheeyesofapublicthatremembershiminaone‐sidedway.This

isthedistinctimpressionthatIgetasIreadtheopeningofthePS.Hedidnothaveto

citeHusserlasoftenashedoes,butnottohavedonesowouldhaveeventually

appeared,tomany,asabitdishonest,giventheroleHusserlplaysinhisown

thinking.AndifitistruethatMerleau‐Ponty’sthoughtisakindof“deconstruction”

ofHusserl,Merleau‐Pontyhimselfdoesnotreallygivethisindication.Evenwhenhe

294Thereferenceto“deconstruction”shouldnotbeignored,asitgoestotheissueofMerleau‐Ponty’smannerofinterpretingphilosophers,butwewillcometothisinthenextsectionwhenweexaminePSindetail.

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claimstoexposeacontradictioninHusserlhimself,295forexample,hequicklyadds

thatHusserlwasatleastsemi‐awareofitandmovingtowardsasatisfactory

resolutionofit,namelyinthelastphaseofhisphilosophy.Merleau‐Pontyisnot

deconstructingsomuchasreconstructingHusserl—fromoutofHusserl’sown

writings,noless.

BettinaBergo’sinterpretationoftheMerleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationbuilds

onsomethingMerleau‐Pontyhimselfcommentson,namelyacertaintensionin

Husserl’sthought,which,says,Bergo,“liesbetweenthesearchforaground,a

unifyingprinciple...and,ontheotherhand,theconvictionthattheground…is

ultimatelyneverwhollyreducibleandsocannotserveasanepistemicfoundation.”

(Bergo,159)OnBergo’sview,Merleau‐Pontyeffectivelychosesides(mywords)by

takingthe“an‐archicphenomenologicaloption.”(Bergo,160)ThetensionBergo

citesisreal,yes—butshe,unlikeMerleau‐Ponty,expressesithereinsolely“static”

or“synchronic”terms.Merleau‐Ponty,instead,providesamorediachronicaccount,

accordingtowhichHusserl’stextswereemergingintoacertain“an‐archism”quite

ontheirown.296Ifthisistrue,thenMerleau‐Ponty’sautonomyasa“chooser”is

diminished;heisfollowingHusserl’sleadeveninthinkingagainstHusserl.That,

indeed,isafittingwaytocharacterizethedepthofHusserl’sinfluenceover

Merleau‐Ponty,ifbyacircuitousroute.Bergointerestinglycallsthisinfluenceinto

questionovertheissueofHusserl’slatetextErfahrungundUrteil,atextthathas 295Seeforexample:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RoberVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003(p.79)296OneinstanceofMerleau‐Ponty’spositioncomesattheconclusionofalongassessmentofHusserl’sthinkinginPS:“Originallyaprojecttogainintellectualpossessionoftheworld,constitutionbecomesincreasingly,asHusserl’sthoughtmatures,themeansofunveilingabacksideofthingsthatwehavenotyetconstituted.”(PS180)

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beenshowntohavemanyparallelswith(oranticipationsof)Merleau‐Ponty’s

writings.ButbecauseMerleau‐Pontywasnotawareofthetext’sexistence,Bergo

concludesthatthecoincidencesaysmoreaboutMerleau‐Ponty’sindependenttrain

ofthoughtthanHusserl’sinfluenceonMerleau‐Ponty.However,athirdoption

seemstobethatMerleau‐Pontywasatsomepoint“keyedin”toacertainlogicof

Husserl’sthoughts,andsocouldanticipatemanyofthethingsHusserlmighthave

said,withouthavingactuallyhadacquaintancewiththem.IamnotsureBergohas

convincinglyforeclosedthispossibility.

E.ConcludingThoughts

Notwithstandingitsmanytwistsandfolds,theMerleau‐Ponty/Husserl

debate’sdominantundercurrentissomethinglikewhetherMerleau‐Pontyshould

beunderstoodasa“thingapart”fromHusserlorsomehowacontinuation,evena

mereecho,ofthelatter.OneofBergo’sintriguingideas,drawnfromsomeaccounts

ofLefort,isthatMerleau‐Pontyisapeculiarsortofreaderofphilosophersgenerally,

onewhoseappropriationofothersondistinctlyMerleau‐Pontiantermsisso

seamlessastomakeonebelievethatthesourceauthor“reallymeant,”allalong,

whatMerleau‐Pontysaystheymeant.(Bergo,158‐9)Ofcoursethismightbesaidof

manyphilosophers;Iamsure,forexample,thatAristotle’sstudentswereconvinced

byhistendentioustreatmentofthepre‐socratics.ButIthinktheclaimisthat

Merleau‐Pontyisparticularlyeffectiveineffacinghimselffromtheequation,almost

intermsofasortof“appropriationbystealth”—asopposedtoanovertAristotelian‐

Hegelianteleologism(“allofthisleadstomytheory.”)Animagethatisbroughtto

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mindisoneofaplanet(Merleau‐Ponty)whosepullbringsphilosophers(Hegel,

Heidegger,Bergson,Schelling,Scheler,Marx,etc.)andnon‐philosophers(Uexküll,

Proust,Freud,Cézanne,Valéry,etc.)alikeintoitsorbit,revealingthemtobe(or

bendingthemtobecome)justsomanycompliantmoons.Allofthismaybetruein

thecaseofthefiguresjustlisted,butitisnottrue,Iwouldinsist,withrespectto

Husserl.ItwouldgotoofartosayHusserlistoMerleau‐Pontywhatastaristothis

planet,soperhapsamorefittingimageisthatofthetwinstarsofthebinarySirius

starsystem,workingintandemtoproduceapotentluminosityinthenightsky.

III.Merleau­Ponty’sHusserlianPhenomenology:ByText

A.Introduction

Iwouldliketobeginthissectionwitha(second)epigraphofsorts,anearly

(1947)quotationfromMerleau‐Pontywhichsetsthestagefortherestofhis

(prematurelycurtailed)philosophicalcareer.

“Whenphilosopherswishtoplacereasonabovethevicissitudesofhistorytheycannotpurelyandsimplyforgetwhatpsychology,sociology,ethnography,history,andpsychiatryhavetaughtusabouttheconditioningofhumanbehavior.Itwouldbeaveryromanticwayofshowingone’sloveforreasontobaseitsreignonthedisavowalofacquiredknowledge.Whatcanbevalidlydemandedisthatmanneverbesubmittedtothefateofanexternalnatureorhistoryandstrippedofhisconsciousness.”297

297See:“ThePrimacyofPerceptionandItsPhilosophicalConsequences.”(Tr.JamesEdie)In“Perception,”p.24.Thiswasatalk(andensuingdiscussion)originallyrecordedin1947,shortlyafterthepublicationofPP.Hereafter“Primacy.”

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Inacertainway,thispassageconveystheessenceofMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyof

man298:theenigmaticnexusoftheinnerlifeofconsciousnessandtheouterbeingof

Nature,theambiguousmiddle‐spaceinwhichhumanexistenceunfoldsand

(partially)findsitself.InMerleau‐Ponty’sview,Husserlsawthesameenigma,and

increasinglycametoseethatitcouldnotbesolvedthroughanappealto“absolute

consciousness,”areflective‐constitutive“possession”oftheworld,299anymorethan

itcouldbesolvedbyscientificnaturalismanditsdeterministiclaws.Hencethe

“existential”thrustofMerleau‐PontianphenomenologyandthepersistentMerleau‐

PontianclaimthatHusserlhimselfenters“existentialism”inthethird,“life‐world”‐

themedphaseofhisphilosophy.ButhowdoesMerleau‐Pontygetallofthisfrom

Husserl,andhowdoesheparlayitintoanewvisionof“humanreality”?

ThecurrentsectionisoneoftwothatreconstructMerleau‐Ponty’s

philosophyasa“Husserlian”phenomenology.BecauseMerleau‐Pontygenerally

writespiecesandnotpiecemeal(areflectionofhislargelybecominganessayist

betweenPPandVI),itisimportanttoexaminethismaterialtextbytext;butatthe

sametime,thisapproachtendstooccludethegenuinelysystematicwayheengages

withtheprincipalthemesofHusserl’sphenomenology,suchasthetworeductions.I

havethustriedtocombinebothapproaches—textual‐historicalandthematic‐

systematic—byorganizingthesecondsectionaroundthesamematerialdiscussed

298Hereaselsewhere,Iuse“man”insteadof“humanity”onlyinordertoreflectthestyleofthesourceauthor.IdoofcourseusethelattertermwhereverIamrepresentingmyownviewsalone.299“Originallyaprojecttogainintellectualpossessionoftheworld,constitutionbecomesincreasingly,asHusserl’sthoughtmatures,themeansofunveilingabacksideofthingsthatwehavenotyetconstituted.”(PS180)SeealsoMerleau‐Ponty’swarninginthesameessay:“Tothinkisnottopossesstheobjectsofthought;itistousethemtomarkoutarealmtothinkaboutwhichwethereforearenotyetthinkingabout.”(PS160)

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inthefirst,onlynowbytheme.Differentthingsbecomeapparentthrougheach

approach.300

B.HusserlinPP

PPisdominatedbythepreoccupationsandmethodologicalinnovationsof

phenomenology.AndMerleau‐Pontymakesitclearinhisfamous“Preface”thatitis

Husserl’sversionofphenomenologythathehaschieflyinview.301Mostifnotallof

themajorissuesintheHusserl/Merleau‐Pontynexus,andMerleau‐Ponty’smanner

ofinterpretingHusserl,arepresentinatleastgerminalformintheshortbut

pregnant“Preface.”Merleau‐Pontyenumeratesthethreemajorthemesof

Husserlianphenomenology—thephenomenologicalreduction,eideticreduction,

intentionality—and,onebyone,endorsesandrepackagesthemin“existential”

terms.Thuswelearnthatthephenomenologicalreductioninfact“belongsto

existentialistphilosophy.”302

300Intermsoftexts,Iwilldrawprimarilyonthe“Preface”toPP,theessaysPSand“PhenomenologyandtheHumanSciences”(InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964;hereafter“PSM”),andVI.(Note:IwillbecitingfromthepaperbackeditionoftheSmithtranslationofPP;amazingly,pagenumbersofthehardcoverandpaperbackeditionsforthemostpartdonotalign.)301Afterall,heexplicitlyrelegatesBeingandTime(HeideggerbeingtheothermajorphenomenologicalalternativetoHusserl,exceptingSartre,whohimselfappropriatesHusserlandHeidegger)tothestatusofadetaileddevelopmentofHusserl’sownphilosophy.ThisstatedpreferenceforHusserloverHeidegger(andScheler)isrepeatedelsewhere,forexample,inPSM:“Husserl,whodefinedphilosophyasthesuspensionofouraffirmationoftheworld,recognizedtheactualbeingofthephilosopherintheworldmuchmoreclearlythanHeidegger,whodevotedhimselftothestudyofbeingintheworld.”(PSM,94)Merleau‐PontycallsHeidegger“dogmatic”inthesamepassage.ThisattitudetowardsHeideggersuggeststhatMerleau‐Pontyis,inaway,“takingHeideggerback”forHusserl.ThuswhenMerleau‐Pontyusesatermlike“being‐in‐the‐world”or“facticity”inthe“Preface,”itisalways,ironically,tothebenefitofHusserl.AgainstthosewhowouldargueforanequalHusserlandHeidegger(atleasttheHeideggerofBeingandTime)influenceonthethinker,Ithinktheseindicationshelpdispelthatimpression,thoughthereisadmittedlymuchroomfordebateonthematter.302LestweimaginethistobeaveiledattackonHusserl,weneedonlyconsultalaterfootnotelaterinwhichMerleau‐PontydefinesHusserlhimselfas“existentialist”—inhislastor“third”periodof

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OnwhatbasisdoesMerleau‐Pontyargueforaspecificallyexistentialist

understandingofphenomenology?Inafootnote(oneofmanywithrevealing

remarksaboutHusserl)laterinthebook,Merleau‐Pontyexplainsthelinkas

follows:

“Husserl’soriginalityliesbeyondhisnotionofintentionality;itistobefoundintheelaborationofthisnotionandthediscovery,beneaththeintentionalityofrepresentations,ofadeeperintentionality,whichothershavecalledexistence.”(PP141n)

This“deeperintentionality”isofcoursewhatMerleau‐Pontyvariouslycalls“motor

intentionality”or“operativeintentionality,”thespontaneous,pre‐conscious(or

“anonymous”—anotherHusserlianword)intentionalityofthebodyoriented

towardsitsenvironment.Husserlhimselfhadagreatdealtosayaboutsuch

“operativeintentionality”—itisinfacthisidea.ThusMerleau‐Pontyis—underthis

meaningof“existence”—merelyemphasizingacertainlineofHusserlian

investigation.

OneoftheconsistentthemesofMerleau‐Ponty’sthinking—itis,infact,one

ofthefundamentalpremisesofhisgeneralphilosophicaloutlook—ishisopposition

to“idealism.”Thereason—oroneofthem—isthatofthe“opacity”oftheworldto

consciousness.Idealisms(speakingnowespeciallyofthe“transcendental”rather

than“phenomenalist”sort)managetorenderconsciousness“transparent”tothe

philosophizing,thatis.Indeed,this“tripartite”divisionofHusserl’sthoughtbecomes,aswehavealreadyseen,aregularmotifinMerleau‐Ponty’sHusserl‐interpretation.ForasinPP,inPSMMerleau‐PontysinglesoutfortheirimportanceHusserl’s“lasttenyears”(PSM46),thoughhealsoclaimsthat“fromthebeginningtotheendofhiscareer,Husserltriedtodiscoverawaybetweenlogicismandpsychologism”(PSM48)—thatis,betweenstrictlogicalnecessityandthepurecontingencyoffacts.Thusitisusefultonotethatalreadyinthe“Preface”Merleau‐PontymakesreferencetoHusserlasacontradictoryphilosopher.(PPviii)

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world.303Merleau‐Ponty’soppositionto“idealism”isthereforeclear,butwhose

“idealism”heisreferringto—Kant’sorHusserl’s,forexample—isnot.Thereare

somewhotakeittobemotivatedagainstHusserl304,butA.D.Smith,totakean

excellentrecentexample,showsconvincinglythatitisonlyaKantian(orNeo‐

Kantian)kindofidealism—whichMerleau‐PontytargetsrepeatedlythroughoutPP

asthequintessentialformof“intellectualism”—thatthreatenstoimplythiskindof

transparency,namelybybuildingitintoperceptionasaconditionofanysortof

experienceatall.305Husserl’soppositiontoKantian“humanist”constructivismin

factpavesthewayforMerleau‐Ponty’sownappreciationofperceptionasan

“openness”totheworld.(PPxix)Weareopentotheworld,butitisnotenclosed

withinusorpre‐fittedtoourcategorialthought.Thisisexactlywhythe

determinationoftheworldthroughessencesisalwaysfraughtwithperilandshot

throughwithcontingency.306ButitisalsowhyHusserl’sreturntothe“things

themselves”issoimportantandrevolutionary.

303“…alogicallyconsistenttranscendentalidealismridstheworldofitsopacityanditstranscendence.”(PPxiii)304See,forexample,Bergo,162:“ItseemsfairtoconcludethatMerleau‐PontysetabouttoclearanyidealistresiduefromthepathofthelaterHusserl,and,insodoing,pushednumerousconceptsofhisown.”Isthissortofcharacterizationright?I,atleast,certainlydon”treadMerleau‐Pontyashaving‘setabout’tore‐interpretHusserl;onmyreading,hesimplysetabouttophilosophize,andHusserlgavethisphilosophizingitsshapeandtexture.305Smith,A.D.“TheFleshofPerception:Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InReadingMerleau­Ponty:OnPhenomenologyofPerception.Ed.ThomasBaldwin.NewYork:Routledge,2007(pp.10‐11)306Merleau‐Ponty’sstrongemphasison“opacity”and“contingency”does,ofcourse,exposehimtothedangersofskepticismandrelativism,bothofwhichheconfrontsasnecessarythreatstoface.HesideswiththeskepticslikeHumeandMontaigneuptoapoint—arguingthattheyarenevertheless“tootimidinthereturntothepositiveaspectaftertheirskepticalcriticisms.”(Primacy,29)HeaddressesthechallengeofrelativismandthethreatofscientismexhaustivelyinPSM,whichwewillcometobelow.(Wemightwishtokeepinmindthatthesame“softrelativism”thatemergesinMerleau‐PontymayhavebeguntocreepintoHusserlalreadyinthelatter’sinvestigationintothemultiplicityofhistoricalandcultural“life‐worlds”—theZulu,etc.)

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Asageneralrule,mostofMerleau‐Ponty’sdeclarationsinthe“Preface”can

beseentobeinconflictwithmanyfeaturesof,say,theHusserlofIdeasI,though

muchlesssowiththe“geneticphenomenology”ofHusserl’slaterperiod.Take,for

example,Merleau‐Ponty’sstatementthatphenomenologyisa“phenomenologyof

origins,”orthatitcapturesmeaning“asitcomesintobeing.”(PPxxiv)Thisis

nothingbutHusserl’s“Sinngenesis,”asMerleau‐Pontyhimselfackowledges.(PPxxi)

AndwhileitishardtoseeHusserlsaying“theworldisnotwhatIthink,itiswhatI

livethrough”(PPxix)usingjustthesewords,whatdoescometomindisHusserl’s

intensivelaterinvestigationsinto“passivesynthesis”—thepre‐theticconstitutionof

theworld.Thatis,I“livethrough”theworldevenasIconstituteitbecauseI

constituteit“anonymously,”muchinthewayIsoorientmyselftotheworld

through“bodilyintentionality.”

C.HusserlinMerleau­Ponty’sLaterWork

ItisonlyappropriatetobeginherewithPS,whichchroniclesthelasting

philosophicalsignificanceofHusserl(andhis“shadow”).Byitselfitdemonstrates

muchofwhatIamtryingtoshowinthischapter,namelytheinseparabilityof

Merleau‐Ponty’sphilosophicalcontributionandhisreading/appropriationof

Husserl.

ThepiecebeginswithsomecrucialremarksonMerleau‐Ponty’sown

hermeneuticalapproachtopastphilosopherslikeHusserl,someofwhichhavebeen

citedalreadyabove.Merleau‐Pontywarnsagainstourbeingseducedinto“reducing”

aphilosopherstrictlytowhathesaid—towhatis“objectivelycertified”ofhim.

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Merleau‐Ponty’s“middleway”inthisparticularcaseisbetween“objectivism,”on

theonehand,andpurearbitrariness,ontheother.Thus:an“objective”historyof

philosophywould“rob”greatphilosophersof“whattheyhavegivenotherstothink

about.”Yetneithershouldweengagein“meditationdisguisedasadialogue.”He

pointsout(asweindicatedabove)thatitisafalsedilemmatoclaimthat

interpretationsofothers’workleadseitherto“inevitabledistortion”or“literal

reproduction.”307

Merleau‐PontythenquotesfavorablyfromHeideggeronthe“unthought‐of”

elementsinphilosophers’works;inHusserlthereisan“unthought‐ofelementinhis

workswhichiswhollyhisandyetopensupontosomethingelse.”(PS160,myitalics)

Notetheparadoxical“iswhollyhis”and“ontosomethingelse.”Merleau‐Pontyis

tracingoutHusserl’sownprocessofself‐transcendence—andtherebymaking

manifestwhatislatent,butofcoursethefull“manifestation”turnsouttobe(more

immanentin)thetextsofMerleau­Ponty.Theboundariesof“self”and“other”are

porousindeed.The“unthought‐of”inHusserlistherebygivenvoiceinMerleau‐

Ponty,butitisimportanttorealizethatthereisnocleardividinglinebetween

“unthought‐of”and“thought‐of”inthis,orperhapsinanyother,case.Thusin

Husserl,existentialphenomenologyishalf‐thought,orsomewhat‐thought,whilein

Merleau‐Pontyitismore‐fully‐thoughtorre‐thought.308

307PS159‐161.Bothofthesepositionshavethecommonpremiseof“positivism”—here,anotherwordfor“objectivism”—accordingtowhich,Itakehimtomean,thereissomefullydeterminateandfinishedtextbeforeus,whichwemayeitherduplicateordistort,butnothinginbetween.308ReadingMerleau‐Pontyonthe“unthought,”Bergoechoesthecommonviewwhenshestatesthat“thequestionofMerleau‐Ponty’sreading…isaquestionoffindingthelatenciesinthetextanddevelopingthemsuchthattheyappeartobringtolightanunthoughtdimension.”(Bergo158‐9)Takenonitsown,thisistoosimplistic.Thisbecomesevidentwhenoneobservesthesheervolumeof

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Aswehaveseenalready,Merleau‐Pontyconsistentlymaintainedthebelief

thatHusserlevolvedovertimeintothe“existential”Husserlofthe“life‐world”

philosophy.InreferencetoHusserl’sideaofthelife‐worldMerleau‐Pontyurges:

“Theselateanalysesareneitherscandalousnorevendisturbingifweremembereverythingwhichforetoldthemfromthestart.Theymakeexplicitthat‘world’sthesis’priortoeverythesisandtheory,thissideofunderstanding’sobjectifications,whichHusserlhasalwaysspokenof,andwhichhassimplybecomeinhiseyesoursolerecourseintheimpasseintowhichtheseobjectificationshaveledWesternknowledge.”(PS180)

HeknowsthatHusserlwouldprotest.Hence,lateron,weencounterthisrevealing

phraseology:“Willy‐nilly,againsthisplansandaccordingtohisessentialaudacity,

Husserlawakensawild‐floweringworldandmind.”(PS188‐9,myitalics)Husserl’s

laterthought—verymuchbuildingontheearlier—suggestsanewdirectionwithout

necessarilyfullytakingit.Merleau‐Pontyrevelsinshowingthroughliberal

quotationsthatinIdeasII,Husserlfreelygrantsontologicalprioritytomaterial

NatureoverSpiritinonebreath,evenasheprioritizestranscendental

consciousnessinanother.(PS164‐5,171)Fromtheseandotherhintsheconcludes

that:“Husserl’sthoughtisasmuchattractedbythehaecceityofNatureasbythe

vortexofabsoluteconsciousness.”(PS165)Merleau‐Pontythenstressesthemutual

“encroachment”(PS176)andreciprocalFundierung(PS173,176‐7)ofdifferent

ordersofbeing,sensibleandideal,309citingHusserl’sownwordsagaintosealthe

case.(PS177)

quotationsMerleau‐Pontyusesinawaythatemploystheirliteralandovertmeaning.OneistemptedtosaythatsomanyofHusserl’s“latencies”manifestthemselvesquitewell!309ItwouldofcoursetakeadetailedstudyofIdeasII(asundertakeninChapter2)toconfirmMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofit;butevenanotedHusserlscholarlikeStevenGaltCrowellconcedesthatthereisatleasttheappearanceofthissortofparadoxinthetext:“Inthecourseofhisattemptto

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PSM,anessayfrom1961,offersamoreprosaicbutalsothoroughly

revelatoryassessmentofHusserlianthoughtandhisownself‐circumscription

withinitsberth.Itrepresentsthethinker’smatureconclusionsononeofthemajor

themesofphenomenologysinceitsinception,namelyitspreciserelation(ornon‐

relation,asthecasemaybe)tothesciences—bothnaturaland“human.”310Itis

primarilypsychologythatMerleau‐Pontyisconcernedwith,notsurprisingly(given

hislongengagementwithGestaltpsychologyinparticular).Thecentralproblematic

hereisthe“paradox”ofessenceandfact.Theessayisparticularlyilluminating

becauseofthewayitdemonstratesMerleau‐Ponty’sstrategyofstrikinga“middle

way”—through,andnotdespiteHusserl—betweenhistoricismandrelativism,on

theonehand,andessentialism(and,implicitly,determinism),ontheother.What

Merleau‐Pontywantstomaintain,andclaimsthatHusserlhimselfachievesevenif

belatedly,istruthinthemidstofindeterminacy,essencewithinexistence,and,

strikingly,“eternity”alongwith“contingency.”(PSM92)Inallofthis,heviewsthe

humansciencessympathetically(andinfactallsciences—thereisnoclear

separationmadeherebetweennaturalandhumansciencesontologicallyspeaking,

eveniftheirmethodologiesdiffer).Thereasonforthissympatheticviewisthat determinetheideaofnatureinIdeasII,Husserlencountersanapparent“viciouscircle”…Arepersons“componentsofnature,”then,“subordinated”toit,ordoestheveryconstitutionofnaturepresupposethenon‐naturalrealmofspirit?”See:Crowell,StevenGalt.“TheMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.”InIssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996(p.81).310Bythe“sciencesofman”Merleau‐Pontyhasprimarilypsychologyand,toalesserdegree,sociologyandethologyinmind.Anotherlecturecourseentitled“PhenomenologyandSociology”focusesonsomeotheraspectsofthesameproblem,thistimeemphasizingthenamesakescience,thoughitusesmuchofthesamelanguageasPSM,andismuchshorter.Ofcourse,whatisarguablymostimportantofallforMerleau‐Pontyistherelationofphilosophytohistory.Butalthoughwecallhistoryoneofthe“humanities”asopposedto“socialsciences,”itispreciselytheempirical,contingentfactorofhistoricalitythatmakesitakintothehumansciencesinMerleau‐Ponty’ssense.Thisisalsowhyhetreatsthethreatof“historicism”alongwiththatof“relativism”asheopenstheessay.

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humansciences,intheirownway,aredoingpreciselythesamebalancingact,albeit

withouttheself‐reflectiveanxietythatphilosophybringswithit.Itisinthissense

thatMerleau‐Pontydeclaresthatthereisnocleardividinglinebetweenthetwo.

(PSM72)OnceagainheseemstobeatoddswithHusserl,whoinsistsonthe

separatenessoftranscendentalphenomenologyfromallsciences,butMerleau‐

Pontytellsadifferentstorythatrelies,asusual,heavilyon“evolutionary

developments”withinHusserlhimself.Merleau‐Pontyseesaburgeoning

recognitioninHusserlofthe“reciprocalenvelopment”ofpsychologyand

phenomenologybutalso,morebroadly,factandessence.Thushemakesseveral

detourstochroniclethestoryofHusserl’s“profounddevelopment”awayfrom

absoluteessentialism,forexamplewiththecaseoflanguage311.(PSM80)

InPSM,whatiskeytonoteinallofthisisnotjustwhatMerleau‐Pontysays

butwhyheissayingit:hedrawsHusserlintohisownfightagainstthenaturalismof

psychologyandtheempiricalsciences,invokeshimtomakehisowncase—indeed,

todefendhisownphenomenologicalapproachtothequestionsathand.Itisinthis

lightthatwecanappreciateMerleau‐Ponty’sdescriptionofphenomenologyitselfas

anegotiatedmeanbetweenskepticismandabsolutism.Merleau‐Pontydoesnotso

muchwanttomodifythephenomenologicalmethodasbringitintolivingcontact

withtherestoftheintellectualconversation:

“Husserlisseekingtoreaffirmrationalityatthelevelofexperience,withoutsacrificingthevastvarietythatitincludesandacceptingalltheprocessesofconditioningwhichpsychology,sociology,andhistoryreveal.Itisaquestionoffindingamethodthatwillenableustothinkatthesametimeof 311ThusforthelaterHusserl,arguesMerleau‐Ponty,“Thereisnoquestionanymoreofconstructingalogicoflanguage,auniversalgrammar,butratheroffindingalogicalreadyincorporatedintheworld.”(PSM82)

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theexternalitywhichistheprincipleofthesciencesofmanandoftheinternalitywhichistheconditionofphilosophy…”(PSM52)

Husserltherebyfindsthe“rootsofreasoninourexperience”(PSM52)—justas

Merleau‐Ponty,wemightadd,findshisownrootsinHusserl.

VIisthehardestofMerleau‐Ponty’sworkstoassessintermsofits

relationshiptoHusserl.Partlythisisbecausetheworkisunfinished,withexplicit

referencestoHusserllyinginalargenumberof“WorkingNotes”whoseproper

interpretationisanythingbutclear312;butalsobecauseitsreferencesorallusionsto

HusserlarebynowsointerwoveninMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophicalimagination

thattheycomeandgoveiledorunannounced.Thisisnotthecaseentirely:thelast

pageofthefinalfamouschapter“TheIntertwining—theChiasm,”forexample,has

fulsomepraisefortheGermanfounder.313

Nonetheless,atleasttwoofthechapters,thefirstandthird—“Reflectionand

Interrogation”and“InterrogationandIntuition”—canbereadfruitfullyascritical

meditationsonHusserl.JustasonecouldeasilysaythatPSdealsprimarilywiththe

phenomenologicalreductionandPSMwiththeeidetic,thesame,Ithink,canbesaid

forchapters1and3oftheVI,respectively.Onceagainitbecomesclear,whenone

seesitthisway,justhowsystematicMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingandre‐readingsof

Husserltrulyare.ThesubstanceoftheVIchapterswillbebroughtoutthroughout

thefollowingsection.

312Ihavetriedpresentlytoavoidtheuseofthefragmentary“WorkingNotes”thataccompanythesechaptersduetotheirindeterminatenature.Ihavealsostayedawayfromtheimportantbutslightlyover‐exposed(nopunintended)notionof“theflesh.”Thereisluckilyplentyofremainingrelevantmaterialforthepresenttaskfromtherestofthetext.313“Inasensethewholeofphilosophy,asHusserlsays,consistsinrestoringthepowertosignify,abirthofmeaning,orawildmeaning,anexpressionofexperiencebyexperience…”(VI155)

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IV.Merleau­Ponty’sHusserlianPhenomenology:ByTheme

A.ThePhenomenologicalReduction

ItisabromidebynowthatthereisnoissuemoreimportantinHusserl’s

thoughtthanthephenomenologicalreduction(andepoché).314Sosuspicionshave

arisenoverMerleau‐Ponty’shavingsupposedlycurtailedorcompromisedthepurity

ofthereduction,chieflyandmostfamouslyinthe“Preface”ofPP:

“…wemustbreakwithourfamiliaracceptanceofit[theworld],andalso,fromthefactthatfromthisbreakwecanlearnnothingbuttheunmotivatedupsurgeoftheworld.Themostimportantlessonwhichthereductionteachesusistheimpossibilityofacompletereduction.”(PPxv)

Butthesefamousorinfamoussentencesdonot,inMerleau‐Ponty’seyes,indicatea

breakfromHusserl.Theymerelystressconsciousness’“…dependenceonan

unreflectivelifewhichisitsinitialsituation…”(PPxvi)AccordingtoMerleau‐Ponty,

again,Husserlalreadythematizedthislifeastheproblemofthe“life‐world,”having

stressedtheprimacyoffacticityandexistenceovertheonce‐ortwice‐removed

approachesof,say,scientificempiricism,ontheonehand,andKantianidealism,on

theother.Thepointofthepassageistorevealtheparadoxicalityofthereduction,

namely,thefactthatitisonlythroughanactoftotalcommitmenttoreflectivelife

thattheimpossibilityofsuchacommitmentisrevealed.Inthisway,thereduction

314Againforthischapter,asfortherestofthisdissertation,Iamnotmakingadistinction,asMerleau‐Pontydidnot,betweenthe“phenomenological”andthe“transcendental”reductions,butratheramtreatingthemasone.

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givesusovertoourexistentialselfhood.Andthisiswhythephenomenological

reduction“belongstoexistentialistphilosophy.”

Idon’tthinkweshouldundervaluethefactthatMerleau‐Pontyendorsesthe

phenomenologicalreduction.Indeed,heregardsitascentraltohisphilosophy.Itis,

afterall,thereductionthatbringsustothe“naturalattitude”before“naturalism”

anditsblosseSachen.(PS163)Itiswhatallowsusto“slackentheintentional

threadswhichattachustotheworld”evertootightlytoseeourselves.(PPxv)He

laterdescribesthereductioninsimilartermsas“thelink,whichisindeeda

schism[,]establishedbylifebetweenourthoughtandourphysicalandsocial

situation,”addingthatitnevertheless“neverleadsusinanywaytonegatetimeor

passbeyonditintoarealmofpurelogicorpurethought.”(PSM49)Inotherwords,

then,Merleau‐Pontyacceptseventhe“schismatic”aspectofthereduction315,so

longasitisnottakentomarkatotaldeparturefromthefinitudeoflivedhorizons.

Merleau‐Ponty’sreductionconsistsintwomovements:themovement“out

of”nature—thatis,themomentinwhichonebreaksoutofone’s“natural”

condition,thepassiveslumberofeverydaylife;andthemovementbackintoit,that

is,toarecognitionofone’sfinitude.316Initially,throughbracketingandtheshift

fromthenaturalattitudetothetranscendentalattitude,I“see”or“gainpossession

ofmyself”;reflectionsharpensmyconsciousnessandbringsitintoself‐

315Indeed,Merleau‐Pontyinsistselsewherethat“thesensibleorderisbeingatadistance”(PS167‐8)inordertostressthefutilityofteleologicalaccountsoftheworldthatbindthe“inner”andthe“outer”byasecret“aim.”316Onemightcallthisa“circleoffinitude”which,moreover,bearsobviousandopenaffinitieswithaspectsofHegelianthought.

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consciousness.Buttheselfisnotapartfromnature;insomewayitcannotaccount

foritself,itbelongstonatureevenasit(apparently)transcendsit.

ThesecondpartofthismovementiswhatMerleau‐Pontythinksmustbe

reassertedagainstcertaintrends—andnotjustthoseof“transcendentalHusserl”:

“…theessentialdifferencebetweenmypointofviewandthatofaphilosophyofunderstandingisthat,inmyview,eventhoughconsciousnessisabletodetachitselffromthingstoseeitself,humanconsciousnessneverpossessesitselfincompletedetachmentanddoesnotrecoveritselfatthelevelofcultureexceptbyrecapitulatingtheexpressive,discrete,andcontingentoperationsbymeansofwhichphilosophicalquestioningitselfhasbecomepossible.”(Primacy40)

Closelytiedupwiththephenomenologicalreductionisthedialecticofthe

“naturalattitude”andthe“transcendentalattitude.”Merleau‐Ponty’sunderstanding

oftheseattitudespreserveselementsofbothcontinuityanddiscontinuitybetween

them,inkeepingwiththeparadoxicalnatureofthereduction.317Ontheonehand,

thereductiontakesusbeyondnaturalattitude,butthisisonly“halfthetruth.”(PS

162)Merleau‐Ponty’sconsideredjudgmentisthat“Itisthenaturalattitudewhich,

byreiteratingitsownprocedures,seesawsinphenomenology.Itisthenatural

attitudeitselfwhichgoesbeyonditselfinphenomenology—andsoitdoesnotgo

beyonditself.”(PS164)Thetranscendentalattitudeisnotabandonedordeclared

nonsense;butoneattitudedoesnotrelatetotheotheras“false”to“true.”318Inthe

317Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollègedeFrance1952­1960.Tr.JohnO”Neill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970.(p.108)Hereafter“Themes.”Merleau‐Pontyapprovinglyspeaksofthemomentwhen“philosophybecomestheenterpriseofdescribinglivingparadoxes.”318ItisinterestinginthisregardtonotethatHusserlhadalreadybeenwriting—privately—of“Der“transzendentaleIdealismus”alsSynthesisvonnatürlicherundtranszendentalerEinstellung.”(Husserl’semphasis)See:Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaXXXIV:ZurPhänomenologischenReduktion(TexteausdemNachlass1926­1935).Ed.SebastianLuft.Dordrecht:Kluwer,2002,p.15(Hereafter“Husserl”)

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end,wemustembracethe“contradictorycharacteristics”—which,saysMerleau‐

Ponty,Husserlhimselfpurposefullyassignsit—ofthereduction.(PS161)

ItistruethatMerleau‐PontycannotacceptsomeofwhatHusserlregardsto

betheconsequencesofthereduction,suchastheprivilegedperchof“absolute”

(reflective)consciousness.319Afterall,the“incompleteness”ofthereductionalso

meansthelimitedness,inthatsense,ofreflectivethought.Butinreadingthelater

Merleau‐Pontyinparticular,itbecomesincreasinglycleartoonethathehas

essentiallyfoldedthetranscendentalattitude,thestand‐pointofphenomenological

consciousness,ontothatofself‐consciousnessor“reflection”assuch.Thisisneither

meresemanticsloppinessnoranobvioustransgressionagainstHusserlhimself.Itis

aconsequenceofhisrejectionofthestrongdivisionbetweenpsychologyand

philosophy,manifestthroughoutPSM,forexample;reflectionisnotmerelya

“naturalistic”psychicact,tobesharplydelineatedfromtheheroicheightsofthe

transcendentalreduction.Giventhisre‐orientation,Merleau‐Ponty’sattacksinVIon

the“philosophyofreflection,”ashecallsit(VI43),appeartobedirectednotat

HusserlassuchbutatakindofidealismthatHusserlsometimesaffirms,butwhich

stemsmoreoriginallyfromKant.

Atfirst,thisisadmittedlynotobvious.Takethefollowingpassages:

“Aphilosophyofreflection,asmethodicdoubtandasreductionoftheopennessupontheworldto‘spiritualacts,’tointrinsicrelationsbetweentheideaanditsideate,isthriceuntruetowhatitmeanstoelucidate:untruetothevisibleworld,tohimwhoseesit,andtohisrelationswiththeother‘visionaries.’”(VI39)

andagain: 319Merleau‐Pontycritiquestheannihilationoftheworldexperiment(see,forexample,PS173‐4)butotherwisegiveseventhedescriptionofthereductioninIdeasIawarmreception.(SeePSM56)

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“…letusrepeatthatwereproachthephilosophyofreflectionnotonlyfortransformingtheworldintoanoema,butalsofordistortingthebeingofthereflecting‘subject’byconceivingitas‘thought’—andfinallyforrenderingunthinkableitsrelationswithother‘subjects’intheworldthatiscommontothem.”(VI43)

ItmayseemnowthatMerleau‐Ponty,afteryearsof“face‐saving”acrobatics,isnow

“finally”jettisoningHusserlforgood.ButthefactisthatnoneofMerleau‐Ponty’s

criticismsherearenew.Merleau‐Pontyhasalreadyrejectedtranscendental

idealisminPP,withitsassumptionsofthe“transparency”oftheworldtoreflective

thought.320Indeed,theghostofthe“Preface”hauntsthischapteroftheVIinmore

waysthanthis:“Itisessentialtothereflectiveanalysisthatitstartfromadefacto

situation”(VI44)and“Thesearchfortheconditionsofpossibilityisinprinciple

posteriortoactualexperience…”(VI45)arenothingmorethanrestatementsofthe

“existential”turntakeninPPandalreadydiscussedabove.

ButacarefulreadingofthischapterrevealsthatMerleau‐Ponty’srealtarget

isKantianconstructivism,whichhegivescredittoHusserlforpiercingthrough:

“ThisiswhatHusserlbroughtfranklyintotheopen…thatis:everyefforttocomprehendthespectacleoftheworldfromwithinandfromthesourcesdemandsthatwedetachourselvesfromtheeffectiveunfoldingofourperceptionsandfromourperceptionoftheworld,thatweceasebeingonewiththeconcretefluxofourlifeinordertoretracethetotalbearingandprincipalarticulationsoftheworlduponwhichitopens.”(VI45)

Indeed,Merleau‐Pontyisnotsomuchagainst“reflection”(orthetranscendental

attitude)asheisagainstacertainphilosophyofreflectionwhicheffectivelyexcises

allconsiderationfortheroleofthe“pre‐reflective”inepistemologicallife.Thisisthe

320“Alogicallyconsistenttranscendentalidealismridstheworldofitsopacityanditstranscendence.”(PPxiii)

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heartofhisoppositiontoKantand,indeed,theKantianinflectionsofHusserl’sown

self‐styled“transcendental”phenomenology.321Aphilosophyofreflectionbyitself

“…leavesuntouchedthetwofoldproblemofthegenesisoftheexistentworldandofthegenesisoftheidealizationperformedbyreflectionandfinallyevokesandrequiresasitsfoundationahyper­reflectionwheretheultimateproblemswouldbetakenseriously.”(VI46)

This,ineffect,isMerleau‐Ponty’sidentificationofthe“limitsofphenomenology”—

andafulfilmentofhispromisetomakeofphenomenologya“phenomenologyof

phenomenology.”322Butbecausethe“foundation”Merleau‐Pontyreferstoisinfact

lessdeterminatethanreflection,andmoreofanexplorationofitsnever‐fully‐

recoverableunder‐side,itisnotareplacementofwhatisprovidedbythe

“existentialHusserl”butisinfactmerelyafurtherdevelopmentofit.Merleau‐

Ponty’sdisagreementiswith“purecorrelation”of“subjectandobject,”atleastinan

idealisticorquasi‐idealisticconstruction(VI47),andagainwiththenotionofa

“universalmind”(VI49).ButheseesHusserlasonthepathofquestioningthese:“In

recognizingthateveryreflectioniseideticand,assuch,leavesuntouchedthe

problemofourunreflectedbeingandthatoftheworld,Husserl…agreestotakeup

theproblemwhichthereflectiveattitude323ordinarilyavoids—thediscordance

betweenitsinitialsituationanditsends.”(VI46;compare:PS163and179)

321Merleau‐Pontyannounceshispositionclearlyalreadyinthe“Preface”ofPP:“DescartesandparticularlyKantdetachedthesubject,orconsciousness,byshowingthatIcouldnotpossiblyapprehendanythingasexistingunlessIfirstofallexperiencedmyselfasexistingintheactofapprehendingit.”(PPx)Merleau‐Pontycallsthisthe“idealistreturntoconsciousness”whichheexpresslydisavows.Seealso:“Husserl’stranscendentalisnotKant’s…”(PPxv)ItisofcoursetheKantofthefirst“Critique”thatMerleau‐Pontyhasinmindinsuchremarks.Heisfarmoresympatheticandevenindebtedtothethird“Critique.”322Husserl’sphrase,infact.SeeHusserl,p.176323Notetheterminology—”reflective”for“transcendental.”

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Merleau‐Pontyfinallycomestotheidea—bywayofSchelling,itwould

seem324—thatphilosophyas“reflection”mustultimatelygivewaytoathinkingof

therichmiddlebetweentheknowableandtheunknowable,theidealworldof

thoughtandtherealworldof“wildbeing.”Forthisisthespringofhumanspirit,the

soiloftheself.RemarksToadvine,“Thisstateofcontinualbeginning,oftheneedfor

continualreexaminationoftheparadoxicalfoundationsofareflectionthatattempts

tograspitsownunreflectiveorigins,couldbeconsideredtheorientingthemeof

Merleau‐Ponty’sownphenomenologicalmethod.”(Toadvine240)Itcanscarcelybe

missedthatthissortofmethodconvergeswithMerleau‐Ponty’sown“re‐

examination”ofHusserl,theoriginofphenomenologyitself,andthe(atleast

hitherto)“un‐reflected.”

B.EssencesandtheEideticReduction

CommentatorsaredividedoverwhetherMerleau‐Pontyacceptstheeidetic

reduction,buttheevidenceisplainthathewasdeeplypreoccupiedbythe

Husserliannotionof“essences”fromfirsttolast.Itistruethathehaslittlepatience

fortheintuitionistresonancesofHusserl’sWesenschau,whichheherecallsa“myth”

(VI115‐6)andthereredescribesasthe“emergenceoftruthinandthroughthe

psychologicalevent.”(PSM53)WhatbecomesclearisthatMerleau‐Pontyisseeking

amiddlewaybetweenessentialismandnominalism,andhethinksHusserl,inthe

324SchellingisdiscussedindetailinMerleau‐Ponty’slectureson“Nature.”(Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003,esp.pp.36‐52)ForanexcellenttreatmentofSchelling’sroleinMerleau‐Ponty’slaterphilosophysee:PatrickBurke,“CreativityandtheUnconsciousinMerleau‐PontyandSchelling.”InSchellingNow:ContemporaryReadings,ed.JasonM.Wirth.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2005

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end,wasdoingexactlythesame.ThisiswhyhecitestheHusserliandistinction

between“exact”and“morphological”essences(PSM67),theunlikenessof

mathematicstophenomenology(PSM67),Husserl’sownstrictparallelismbetween

therealmsoftheeideticandtheempiricalandarandompassagetothiseffectin

“DiePhilosophiealsstrengeWissenschaft,”(PSM72)andsoon.Furthermore:

“[Husserl’s]notionofanexperiencedessence,oraneideticexperience,containsin

germtheconsequencesIhavejustdrawnfromit.”(PSM72)

WhatMerleau‐PontyiscommunicatingisashiftheseesinHusserlfroma

purephilosophyofreflection—anorientationtowardsthelogical,theoretical,

transcendental,eidetic—toaphilosophyofexistenceinwhich,wefindout,

reflectionplaysacrucialbutnon‐foundational325role.ItisinthislightthatMerleau‐

Pontyunderstandsboththephenomenologicalandeideticreductions.Totakethe

latterfirst,Merleau‐Pontyexplainsthatphenomenologyisaboutnotonly“essences”

butalso“facticity.”Thisfollowsfromphenomenology’sbeingabout“achieving

directandprimitivecontactwiththeworld.”(PPvii)Idealityisnowcharacterizedin

purelyinstrumentalterms:theeideticreduction“prevail[s]overfacticity”through

ideality,thoughthe“prevailing”isforthesakenotofidealitybutratherfora

graspingofthethingsthemselves—the“fish”thatarecaughtinthe“fisherman’s

net.”SurelyMerleau‐Pontyisrightthatwedonotreachthethingsbydwellingonly

inessences.Wemaynotreachthethingsascompletelyaswewish,butthereis

somethingbetweenabsoluteknowledgeandtotalignorance.Inthisrespectitis

325Inastrictlyontologicalsense,thatis—reflectionisstillforMerleau‐Pontythefoundationoftheactivityofphilosophy,since“unreflectiveexperienceisknowntousonlythroughreflection…”(PP49)Itisthissortofinsightthatsetsthestageforthelaternotionof“hyper‐reflection.”

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helpfultorememberthatHusserlhimselfembracedaversionoftheterm

“empiricist,”whichmusthavemeantthatheprivilegesfactsoveressences,butwas

vaguelyawareofthefactthatreflectioncanonlyknowessences—hence

engenderingthemostenduringepistemologicalparadoxofMerleau‐Ponty’s

meditations.326

Justwhatareessences?Essencesarethemannerandstyleofbeingonly:the

SoseinandnottheSein.Andjustasthereisanessential“incompleteness”with

respecttothephenomenologicalreduction,sothereisalimitalsoonimaginative

variation—thusthereisnopureeidos,no“totalvariation.”Furthermore,eidetic

variationisnotjustdoneinphenomenology,butinallsciences.Inoneplace

Merleau‐Pontyadmits:“InpresentingthematterasIhave,IampushingHusserl

furtherthanhewishedtogohimself.”(PSM72)Merleau‐Pontywantstoadmitofa

“fundamentalhomogeneity”ofthe“inductiveandessential”modesofknowledge,

whichHusserlalwaysmaintainedwasimpossible.ButHusserl’sownthinking,

includinghisfocusontheconcreteandlivedstreamoflife,forcesonusan

“inevitabledialecticoftheconceptofessence.”

AllofthisallowsMerleau‐Pontyfinallytosay:

“…wecansaythattheproblemwithwhichwewereconcernedatthebeginning[ofPSM]—mustwebeforfactorforessence,fortimeoreternity,forthepositivescienceofmanorphilosophy?—wasbypassedinthelaterthoughtofHusserl.Herehenolongerconsidersessenceasseparatedfromfact,eternityfromtime,orphilosophicthoughtfromhistory.”(PSM93)

326SeePP57fn44

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V.ConcludingReflections

IbeganthischapterbysuggestinganintegralrelationshipbetweenMerleau‐

Ponty’sphilosophyandhisreadingofHusserl.Ihopetohaveshownthisthrough

thecourseofmyrecapitulationofandcommentaryonthisreading,butthesemay

nowbesupplementedandreinforcedwithsomeanalogies.Thus,Merleau‐Ponty

standstoHusserl,Iwanttosay,muchashumanity,inMerleau‐Ponty’sHusserlian

philosophy,standstothe“world,”thatis“the…pre‐existentLogos”(PPxxiii)or“that

jointingandframingofBeingwhichisbeingrealizedthroughman”(PS181).Or

again,Merleau‐PontyistoHusserlaslanguage(orlogos—the“themeof

philosophy”)istothe“pre‐languageofthemuteworld”(VI126),orfinally,asSpirit

istoNature,thefirstfindingavoiceinthesecond,thesecondfindingitsdepthinthe

first.Theholisticvisionthatemergeshere—ofmanandworld,spiritandnature—is

onlyprefiguredorsketchedinoutlineinMerleau‐Ponty’swritings,butitis

determinateenoughtoshowhowMerleau‐Pontycouldhaveascribedsomuchofhis

philosophy327—inmyviewvalidly—toanotherphilosopher,Husserl,whoforhis

partneverthelesswentsomuchofthetimeinacontrarydirection.Merleau‐Ponty’s

viewsofreciprocityandreversibility,identityanddifference,paradoxandthe

“between”—theyareallrelevanttoandimplicitinhisdevelopmental—and

organic—appropriationofHusserlianthought.

327ObviouslyIdonotmakeasharpdistinctionbetweenthephilosophiesofthe“earlier”and“later”Merleau‐Ponty.Thematerialpresentedinthepresentchapteraloneafford,Ithink,ample(thoughperhapsnotsufficient)evidencethatthisisso.

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IsMerleau‐Pontyfinally,intheend,justamere“reader”or“commentator”of

Husserl?Thisisthewrongquestiontoask.ShouldPlotinusberelegatedtobeinga

commentatorofPlatoandAristotle?ShouldAverroësbedismissedasa

commentatorofAristotle?Surelygreatphilosophycanbedonethrough

commenting,bringingasitwere“newtruthsintobeing,”asMerleau‐Pontyhimself

putsit.Thecommentatorisnotlikelytobecelebratedasatrailblazer,butwithout

goodcommentators,itisunlikelythatanycoherent“trails”couldbediscernedfrom

thedense,sometimescontradictoryoutpouringofathinkerlikeHusserl.Allthe

same,Merleau‐Pontydoesnotmerelycomment—hehasthetalenttodevelop,to

takefurtherandradicalizeandseethehiddenimplicationsof,thetextsheanalyzes.

Thetextsspeaktohim,andhespeaksback.

Merleau‐Ponty’s“version”ofphenomenologyhasbeendisavowedbycertain

Husserlians,butitmustbesaidthattheir“Husserl,”whileconsistentforthemost

partwithHusserl’sownself‐declarationsofthenatureandconsciouslystated

intentionsofhisownphilosophizing,isnotalwayseasytodefendphilosophically.A

narrowinterpretationofHusserl,Merleau‐Pontywouldargue,wouldfatefullyturn

itsbackonHusserl’sownunderlyingsensitivitytotheinadequaciesofhisown

earlierconceptions,ashehimselfsurgedforward.Inotherwords,the“strict

Husserlian”wouldfallwellshortofHusserl’sownlevel,tosaynothingofexpanding

onhim!SomeHusserlianshaveofcourseembracedMerleau‐Ponty,butselectively,

ifonlytodemonstratethatHusserleitheranticipatedorfullyexplicatedthesame

thingsMerleau‐Pontydiscusses,andperhapsinanevenbetterway.Merleau‐Ponty

wouldofcoursehavebeenhappytoacknowledgehisdebt(egotismisnotoneofhis

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vices),buthewouldalsoinsistthatHusserlhimselfremainstooinconsistentforus

totrytorelyonhimexclusivelyasthe“voiceofphenomenology.”Therearetoo

manystrainsinhim,anditisnecessarytoeditorialize,toeditandtobringtolight

whatistrueandfalse,necessaryanddispensableinhisthinking.

Thereareobviousbutfatefulconsequencestothissortofreadingofthe

Merleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationship.IfweacceptMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingof

Husserl,weimplicitlyrejectmuchofHusserl’sself‐interpretation—hisstated

intentions,andhisframingofthetranscendental‐phenomenologicalproject.Butis

thisnotfamiliarhermeneuticalterritory?Itisindeedaninvokingofthe

hermeneutictoposof“knowingthephilosopherbetterthanhe/sheknew

himself/herself.”Buteventhisisnotsosimple,since,onMerleau‐Ponty’saccount,

HusserlalreadyknewwhatMerleau‐Ponty“knows”aboutHusserl,justnotwiththe

sameclarityorunivocity.ItistoMerleau‐Ponty’slastingcreditthat,decadesbefore

DonnWelton’sTheOtherHusserl328,theFrenchthinkerhadalreadypaintedavivid

portraitoftheinnerconflictednessofHusserl’sthought.Hehadalreadyidentified

andembraced“theotherHusserl,”whoheknewalreadyasthe“pre‐jection”(my

word,butMerleau‐Pontianinspirit)ofhimself.ItistruethatMerleau‐Pontydoes

notfeelhimselfconstrainedbythehistoryof“traditional”interpretationof

Husserl’sworks,orbywhatHusserlmayhavebelievedhehimselfwas

accomplishingthroughhisownphilosophizing.ButinthiswayMerleau‐Ponty’s

attitudetowardsHusserlismuchlikethatofahealthychildtowardsitsparent:

328See:Welton,Donn.TheOtherHusserl:TheHorizonsofTranscendentalPhenomenology.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2000.

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adulationisbalancedbycriticaljudgment,emulationbycreativeinitiative.Would

wewantanythingelse?

InoneplaceMerleau‐Pontynicelysummarizeshisunderstandingofthe

meaningandprogressofHusserl’sphilosophy:

“Thus,aphilosophy[Husserl’s]whichseemed,morethananyother,bentuponunderstandingnaturalbeingastheobjectandpurecorrelateofconsciousnessrediscoversthroughtheveryexerciseofreflexiverigoranaturalstratuminwhichthespiritisvirtuallyburiedintheconcordantfunctioningofbodieswithinbrutebeing.”329

Traditionally,theplausibilityofMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofHusserlhasbeen

thoughttoturnonthis:whetheroneseesHusserlasaself‐divided,Janus‐faced

figure,workingprogressivelytoanadequatelytranscendental‐existential

conceptionofphenomenology,orwhetheroneseeshimratherasamoreorless

consistentOlympianthinkerofabsoluteconsciousness.ButwhatIhavetriedtodo,

inmysmallway,istosayratherthatwhatmakesMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingplausible

isanacceptanceofMerleau‐Ponty’sownstyleandsubstanceofthought.Butthis

bringsoutakindofspecialparadox,wherebythelinebetweenthetwothinkers

becomeswhollyblurred,exactlyasifwewereenteringthe“intermonde”Merleau‐

Pontywritesaboutinthelaterworks.330ForifMerleau‐Pontyisrightthatheis(in

somanywords)aHusserlianthinker—atleast,athinkerofHusserl’sinner

thoughts—thenitturnsoutthattoacceptMerleau‐Ponty’s“Husserl”underthe

bannerofacceptinghim(Merleau‐Ponty)istohavealreadyacceptedHusserl.This

329Themes,p.83330HeusestheterminVI(48,84)ThetermismentionedalreadyatthetimeofPP,butinaslightlydifferentsense.Seealsothereferenceto“intercorporeality”inPS(168)

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mightforsomebehardtobelieve,butthenagain,perhaps,initsownway,itmay

onlybetheradicalfulfilmentoftheideaofa“hermeneuticcircle”!

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ChapterFour:Merleau­Ponty’sMatureOntologyofNature“WewillshowhowtheconceptofNatureisalwaystheexpressionofanontology—anditsprivilegedexpression.” ‐‐MauriceMerleau‐Ponty331

I.Introduction

SomeofMerleau‐Ponty’smostimportantfinalwritings,Iwouldargue,are

foundinTheVisibleandtheInvisible332,whichMerleau‐Pontyhadbeenworkingon

asamajorstatementofhisphilosophyatthetimeofhissuddendeath.Thegoalof

thepresentchapteristoconveysomeoftheessentialfeaturesofMerleau‐Ponty’s

ontology,asdevelopedintheaforementionedwork,aswellashisincreasingly

“dialectical”understandingofnatureandspirit,allthewhileemphasizingthe

“(semi‐)naturalistic”elementtherein.Accordinglyitwillundertakeadetailed

examinationoftheNaturelecturesof1956‐1960(astheycomedowntous,mostly

intheformofmeticulousstudentnotes),inconjunctionwithVI,exploringtheways

inwhichMerleau‐Pontythinksthroughthequestionsofbeing,consciousness,and

theirreciprocalrelationshipwiththehelpofanintensiveinvestigationof“Nature,”

particularlyinthebiologicalsciencesandthehistoryofphilosophy.

Merleau‐Ponty’streatmentof“nature”istothisdaylittleknown,despitethe

factthattheNaturelecturescollectivelycompriseavolumeofroughlyequallength

331Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RoberVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003.(p.204)Hereafterdesignatedas“N”inallcitations,and“theNaturelectures”insidethebody.332Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheVisibleandtheInvisible.Tr.AlphonsoLingis.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1969.Hereafter“VI.”

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toVI.Itistruethatthelectureswerenotintendedtobepublishedasabook

preciselyintheformwehavethem,butitisalsotruethatMerleau‐Pontyintended

tousemuchofthematerialfromthemaspartsofhispublishedwritings,including

sectionsofVIitself.333FromadetailedexaminationofbothtextsIconcludethat

Merleau‐Ponty’softencommented‐uponrejectionofdualism—whichofcourse

hardlydistinguisheshiminthehistoryofphilosophybothbeforeandafter

Descartes—isinfactmostproperlycharacterizedasaphilosophyof

complementarity,onethatseekstounderstandtheprinciplesofidentityand

difference,bothinthebroadestofontologicalcontextsaswellasnarrowerones

(suchastheontologyofthebody),inawaythatdoesjusticetotherolethateachof

themplaysinthestructurationofBeing,thatis,thestructureofthe

“visible/invisible”world.Thisdiscussionwillalsotakeuswellintothefifthchapter

anddissertationconclusion,whichascertainthe“upshot”ofMerleau‐Ponty’s

dialecticforthephenomenologicalmethod.

ItismyviewthatMerleau‐Ponty’sphenomenologyis“dialectical”butina

whollynewsense,onethatisdrivenbytheexigenciesofthinkingthe“natural”

originsofsubjectivity(inthesenseofspirit,orhumanconsciousness)fromwithin,

andoftherebyrecastingthephenomenologicalprojectasonethatinheresin

“ontology”inabroadersense.FromthecourseandprogressionoftheNature

lectures,onecanseeMerleau‐Ponty’sthoughtgrowmoreorganicist—concerned 333Seeforexample:N,xvi(fromthe“Translator’sIntroduction”byRobertVallier).Someofthematerialdoesinfactmakeitintovariousessays,suchas“BergsonIntheMaking”andthealreadyexamined“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow,”andcertainconcepts—the“flesh,”forexample—arediscussedinbothtextsinsomedetail,aswewillseebelow.See:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“BergsonintheMaking.”Tr.RichardC.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.(pp.182‐191);Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.”Tr.RichardM.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.159‐181)

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withtheprincipleof“wholeness”anditsrealizationinthe“organicforms”of“life.”

Ofcoursethe“naturalism”Merleau‐Pontyespousesisnotthe“naturalism”

embracedbyscientifically‐mindedmodernwriters,whoseformwealsofindin

Husserl’swritings,butanother,moreatoncephenomenologically‐rootedand

romantically‐inspiredkind,whichdevelopsthroughouttheNaturelectures

explicitlyandintherestofMerleau‐Ponty’sotherworkimplicitly.Ontologywill,itis

true,“takeprecedence,”inacertainway,butnotbecauseitisthe“foundation”of

phenomenology,inthewayHusserlconceivedphenomenologytobethefoundation

ofontology.Merleau‐Ponty’sintentionisnottoinvertthisorderofdependence,but

rathertomakephenomenologyanswertoitsexistentialsituation,whichnowcomes

tomean,tobeartheshadowofitsnatural,wild,andpre‐reflectiveorigins.

II.NatureandtheOntologyoftheNatureLectures

A.Introduction:TheNatureLectures,TheVisibleandtheInvisible,andtheProjectof“Ontology”

IntheNaturelectures,Merleau‐Pontydeclares,“Theontologicalproblemis

thedominantproblem,towhichallotherproblemsaresubordinated.”(N134)What

exactlyistheontologicalproblem?Merleau‐Pontydoesnotanswerthisquestion

directly,butwehavesometellingclues.WhatMerleau‐Pontywantstoavoid,he

indicates,areatleastthree“isms”:“Naturalism,humanism,theism…Thesethree

wordshavelostallclearmeaninginourculture,andtheyceaselesslypassintoone

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another.”(N135)Wehaveanevenbetterspecificationoftheprobleminaroughly

contemporaneousworkingnote,inwhichMerleau‐Pontywrites:

“Necessityofareturntoontology—Theontologicalquestionanditsramifications:thesubject‐objectquestion,thequestionofinter‐subjectivity,thequestionofNature.OutlineofontologyprojectedasanontologyofbruteBeing—andoflogos.DrawupthepictureofwildBeing,prolongingmyarticleonHusserl.Butthedisclosureofthisworld,ofthisBeing,remainsadeadletteraslongaswedonotuproot‘objectivephilosophy’(Husserl).AnUrsprungklärungisneeded.”(WN165,myitalics)

ThereferencetoHusserlisclearlypositive.Whatisneededisanalternative

ontology—clearlyinspiredbyHusserlianphenomenology,particularlythe“genetic”

variety—tothatofobjectivism.The“questionofNature”issupposedtofitrightinto

thisproject.Theproblem,inshort,ishowtoforgethisnewontology,howto

overcomethe“strabism”ofWesternontologysinceDescartes(N165),butalso,to

someextent,ofphenomenologyitself(N72),whichinits“idealist”(i.e.,Husserlian)

formisstillsomewhathaunted,wemightsay,byDescartes’ghost.

VIhasproventobeastumblingblockforsome,asitcancomeacrossasa

curiousamalgamofphilosophyandpoetry.Attimeshighlyesoteric(especially

whenthe“workingnotes”arefactoredin,someofwhicharebrilliantlyclear,others

allbutinscrutable),itleavesreaderswithacertainsenseofpuzzlement,even

bewitchment,throughitsextensiveuseofmetaphorandnewterminology.Agood

waytoappreciateMerleau‐Ponty’sincreasinglynuancedandtechnicalexplorations,

hisnewphenomenologicalontology,isinfacttoconsulthisinvestigationsofnature.

Ofcourse,thesearenotatallsufficientinthemselvestoexposeMerleau‐Ponty’s

ontologicalproject,sincetheyareintendedexplicitlytobepreparatory334to

334ExplainsMerleau‐Ponty:“…theontologyofNatureasthewaytowardontology—thewaywepreferbecausetheevolutionoftheconceptofNatureisamoreconvincingpropaedeutic,[sinceit]

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somethingelse,namelyafullerengagementwithsomeofthethemesMerleau‐Ponty

ismorewellknownfor,includingperceptionandembodiment.Merleau‐Ponty’s

treatmentofthesetopicsintheNaturelecturesisindirect,forexamplethroughthe

studyofanimal“Umwelten”orthestudyoftheontologicalimplicationsoftheir

physiology.

Thereareotherinterestingdifferencesbetweenthetwotexts,when

comparedside‐by‐side.ThuswhileVIemphasizesdiscontinuitybetweenpastand

presentphilosophyandspeaksofradicalrenewal(VI83,165),etc.,thelectures

reflecttheflip‐side,offeringacriticalcommentarythatestablisheslinkstothepast

andseeksto“rectify”it.(N186)Throughacriticalengagementwiththe

philosophicaltraditionandexaminationofthescienceofhisday,Merleau‐Pontyin

thelattertextstrivesforabalancingofoppositesand,ineffect,anewequilibrium,

betweentheoreticalpoleslike“finalism”(teleology)and“mechanism.”

Themulti‐disciplinaryNatureseminarscoveravastamountofterrain,

exploringnolessthanthescientific,theological,andphilosophicalunderpinningsof

Westernnotionsofnature,animality,God,andthehumanmind.Throughanearly

rejectionoftheviewsofLaplace—akindof“stand‐in”formodern‐scientificviews

analogoustoAugustine’sroleatthestartofWittgenstein’sPhilosophical

Investigations—Merleau‐PontyrevealshimselfintheNaturelecturestobea

championoftemporality,becoming,andholicity,asagainstan(exclusiveorlop‐

sided)emphasisonspatiality,being,andanalyticity.335Inthiswayheisworkingin

moreclearlyshowsthenecessityoftheontologicalmutation.”(N204)(Itisnotclearfromthispartofthetextwhattheauthorisreferringtoasthe“ontologicalmutation.”)335Take,forexample,N,89;inhisstatingofLaplace’sviews,heisnegativelyalsogivinghisown.

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obviousconcertwith“lifephilosophy”aswellasfiguressuchasBergsonand

Whitehead,onlynowinamoredeeplyphenomenologicalregisterthat,onceagain,

comesmoresignificantlytotheforeinVI—notwithstandingthosereadingsofthe

textthat,ratherunjustifiablyinmyopinion,downplayitsphenomenological

character.ThecontentsofVIinfactbearcontinuityinsubstance,ifnotalwaysin

style,toThePhenomenologyofPerception336anditsquestionsofmindandbody,

perceptionandreflection,language,andthenatureofphenomenologyandHusserl’s

thought.However,thelattertextismoreintentthanever,itseems,todescribethe

ultimatenatureofrealityitself—oratleast,todescribethetaskof“interrogation”

thatcirclesaroundthisontologicalultimacy.Thequestionsof“Being”and“Nature”

cometotheforefrontinthelaterphilosophy;theissuesofperception,embodiment,

intersubjectivity,etc.,aretreatedasillustrativeordisclosiveofthedepthsofBeing

andhumaninvolvementinit.TheinfluenceofHeideggerisunmistakable,butfor

themostpartunspoken;thisisprobablybecauseitismoresoHeideggerianthemes

(manyofwhichareanchoredinHusserl)thatMerleau‐Pontyappropriates,andless

soHeideggerianconclusions.ItisalsoimportanttorealizethatMerleau‐Pontyhas

beeninterestedinontology,particularlythenature‐spiritquestion,fromthefirst;

TheStructureofBehaviorisakindof(evidentlyinadequate)phenomenological

ontologyinitsownright.337

336Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962(Hereafter“PP.”)337Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheStructureofBehavior.Tr.A.L.Fisher.Boston:BeaconPress,1963.ForagooddiscussionofthattextwithrespecttoMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyofnature,see:Toadvine,Ted.Merleau­Ponty’sPhilosophyofNature.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2009

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Afterthatearlierwork,however,Merleau‐Pontytookhispointofdeparture

moreexplicitlyfromHusserlandthephenomenologicalreduction,aswehave

alreadyseen.PPisessentiallymotivatedbytheparadoxofperceptionwherebythe

world—thethings—becomereally(andnotmerely“subjectively,”asthrougha

representation)availabletome,despitethefactthattheyaretranscendenttome.

Thisspecificallyphenomenologicalparadoxmadeitnecessarytorethinkthereal

natureofthe“I‐think”oregowhoperceives—farfrombeingadisembodiedcogito,

the“I”mustbeabody,the“body‐subject,”whoseverybeingisworldlyinthesame

sensethattheworld’sis.Bodyandworldformacircuit,asystemofreciprocity,

which,aswewillsee,Merleau‐Pontycontinuesinthelaterwritingstomeditateon

intensively,thoughwithreferencetowhathetermsanessential“fold”or“hollow”

inBeing.338

However,onitsown,PPis,inacertainrespect,lockedinitsownformof

Husserl‐inheritedsubjectivism,permittingtheworldtoariseinconsciousness,

albeitpre‐intentionally(orthroughadeeper“motor”or“operative”intentionality),

butnotexplainingatallhowitisthatthisworld,ortranscendentBeing,couldand

doesgiverisetoconsciousness—and,morebasically,toorganiclife.That

phenomenologyinstructsitselfexplicitlytoavoidthiskindofquestiondoesnot

preventMerleau‐Pontyfrombroachingitfulsomelyanyway.Duponddescribes

338HerearetwoofthemanyinstancesinwhichMerleau‐Pontymakesuseofthisidea,bothtakenfromworkingnotes:“Itisnottheeyethatsees(theeyething).Butitisnotthesoul.Thereisa‘bodyofthemind’(Valéry),somethingthatisgatheredintheapparatusofvisionandhollowsouttheplacetherefromwhichonesees.…”(VI222);“—Andwhatreplacestheantagonisticandsolidaryreflectivemovement(theimmanenceofthe‘idealists’)isthefoldorhollowofBeinghavingbyprincipleanoutside,thearchitectonicsoftheconfiguration….Therearefieldsinintersection…”(VI227)

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thuslythedifferenceinapproachtonaturethatwefindbetweenMerleau‐Ponty’s

earlierandlaterphilosophy:

“InthePhenomenologyofPerception,therelationbetweennatureandspirit[esprit],asthereciprocalfoundation(Fundierung)andthegatewaytotheenigmaoftheworld,wasdealtwithbywayofspirit(incarnatedinnature)ratherthannature—aposturewhichreiteratesthedualityofsubjectandobject).Inthe[Nature]coursesattheCollègedeFrance,therelationbetweennatureandspiritisoneofreciprocalenvelopment,andthegatewaytothisenigmaisnatureratherthanspirit.”339

Ifitistruethatphenomenologyabstainsonprincipledgroundsfromquestions

aboutlifeorbeing“before”consciousness—andgoingagainstthis,tosomeextent,is

thesignificanceofaninquiryinto“Nature”fromMerleau‐Ponty’sphenomenological

vantage‐point—thisdoesnotmeanitcannotcontemplatetheparadoxicaldistance

(unknowability,opacity,“depth”)ofNatureasthesourceoflifeandthoughtandyet

alsothecontinuityofconsciousnesswithNatureitself—or,putdifferently,the

“prolongation”ofconsciousnessin“thethings”thatMerleau‐Pontyclaimsto

characterizevision,forexample.(VI271)Merleau‐Pontyspendsagooddealoftime

thinkingaboutboththeactivityor“autoproduction”ofsenseinandbyNatureitself,

ontheonehand(thisismostevidentthroughtheactivitiesoforganiclife,whose

seemingly“miraculous”developmentalprocessesdefycausalexplanation),andthe

naturalityofhumanexistence,asrevealedthroughthe“intertwining”ofbodyand

worldalreadylaidoutforus;hefurtherconsiderstheimplicationsofthisunityfor

thereconceptualizationofthequestionsofsubject/objectandintersubjectivity(the

latterofwhichwewillbeabletosaylittle,unfortunately,inthepresentchapter).

339Dupond,Pascal.DictionnaireMerleau­Ponty.Paris:Ellipses,2008.(p.153;mytranslation)Hereafter“Dupond.”

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B.Defining“Nature”

Aswehavealreadyseen,Merleau‐Pontyisthoroughlyopposedtoconceiving

Natureas“object,”includinglifeless“massofmatter,”andsoon.Whatitis,initself,

isnotthe“in‐itself”ofthetradition,strictlyopposedtoa“for‐itself,”butratherwhat

Merleau‐Pontycalls(afterSchelling)“wildBeing,”orthe“barbaricprinciple,”which

ismorebasicthanthesubject‐objectdistinction(similarlytothe“flesh,”arelated

notion,aswewillseebelow).(VI200)The“wildness”ofnatureisnotsuchthatitis

somethingthatmustbe“molded”or“informed”inaKantianwayinordertobe

madesenseoutof,butratherthatitcontainsallpotentialities,itisallthings,but

withouthavingbecome,quaNatureitself,anyofthem.(N212)Attheoutsetofthe

lectures,Merleau‐Pontyoffersseveralimportantindicationspertainingtohis

developingconceptofnature.HereIwillquotetheminfullandthencommenton

subsequently:

“Thereisnaturewhereverthereisalifethathasmeaning,butwhere,however,thereisnotathought;hencethekinshipwiththevegetative.”(N3)

“Natureiswhathasameaning,withoutthismeaningbeingpositedbythought:itistheautoproductionofmeaning.”(N3)

“[Nature]hasaninterior,itisdeterminedfromwithin;hencetheoppositionof‘natural’to‘accidental.’Yetnatureisdifferentfromman:itisnotinstitutedbyhimandisopposedtocustom,todiscourse.”(N3)

“Natureistheprimordial—thatis,thenonconstructed,thenoninstituted;hencetheideaofaneternityofnature(theeternalreturn),ofasolidity.…Itisoursoil[sol]—notwhatisinfrontofus,facingus,butrather,thatwhichcarriesus.”(N3)

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Thesentimentsexpressedinthesefourquotationsareclearlymeanttosetthe

directionoftheinvestigationsthataretofollow.Torecapitulate,theydescribe

Natureinthefollowingpositiveandnegativeterms:1)possessingorembodyinga

meaning,2)producingameaninginoroutofitself,3)nothavingtodowithorbeing

positedbythought,4)possessinganinteriority,5)beingdistinguishablefromthe

artificial,conventional,orman‐made,6)beingeternalandprimordial,and7)lying

not“before”usbutrather“beneath”us—and,asMerleau‐Pontywillalsosay,within

us.(N212‐3)Theseareadmittedlyschematicproperties,anditisnotyetclearhow

oriftheyinterlock,butalreadytheyrevealquiteabit.Merleau‐Ponty’sconception

ofNatureisthatofanontologicalground(ofsorts)thatisnon‐objective(cf.its

“interiority”)andradicallyprimordial—andthuspre‐reflective:“…atypeof

englobingbeinginwhichwediscoverourselvesalreadyinvestedpriortoall

reflection.”(N84)Thatis,itisboth“non‐instituted”(areferencetoHusserl’snotion

ofStiftung,institutionorestablishment)andessentiallyso(itisnon‐institutable).

Butevenmoreimportant,itispresupposedineveryinstitution,ineveryhuman

project,indeed,inembodimentandperceptionthemselves.Attimes,Merleau‐Ponty

singlesoutthispropertyofNaturemost,namelyitshaunting“presencebyabsence,”

or,temporallyspeaking,itsbeinga“permanentpast,”alwaysbehindus.

WhatMerleau‐Pontyistryingtogetathereisperhapsbestseenthroughhis

critiqueofBergson,whoheclearlyadmiresbutalsofaultsforhavingmissedthisall‐

importantfeatureofthenatural.Merleau‐Pontyattributesthisblindnessof

Bergson’stoacertain“positivism.”Merleau‐Pontybeginshiscritiqueby

acknowledgingfavorablythat“Bergson…positsconsciouslyaparadoxinherentto

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perception:Beingisanteriortoperception,andthisprimordialBeingisconceivable

onlyinrelationtoperception.”(N55)ButhegoesontocriticizeBergsonfor

“makingofthisprehumanabeingwithwhichwecoexist.”(N58)Therecanbeno

simultaneityofreflection(or“intuition”)withNature—amajorpointthatMerleau‐

Pontywillstressagainandagain,comingfromtheepistemologicalsideofthe

questionofNature.Merleau‐Ponty’sverdict:“InBergson,theofficialpositionof

positivismalsoruinstheideaofNature.”(N70)

Husserl,Merleau‐Pontyclaims,improvesonBergsoninthisregard,ina

passagethatcallstomindwhatwehavealreadysaidaboutthecontinuityofworld

andconsciousness:

“HusserlrehabilitatedtheideaofNaturebythisideaofjointuretoacommontruththatsubjectswouldcontinuebutofwhichtheywouldnotbetheinitiators.Allthathappensisnotexplainedbyinteriority,orbyexteriority,butbyachancethatistheconcordancebetweenthesetwogivensandisassuredbyNature.”(N78)

Thatchanceplaysapartinthe“explanation”oftheinner/outerstructureofBeing

onceagainunderscoresthatthereisnocomplete“logos,”nocompleteexplanation,

ofBeing,orNature,initself—not,however,becauseitisjustoutofour“finite”

humangrasp,suchthatGodcouldunderstanditwhereas“we”cannot,butbecause

thereisa“savage”principleofbeingthatunderliestheessentialpolarities

encounteredinreflexivethought,somethingconnectedwith“theflesh,”whichwe

willdiscusslateron.

Merleau‐Pontyisalsointerestedinthe“productivity”ofnature:

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“TheconceptofNaturedoesnotevokeonlytheresidueofwhathadnotbeenconstructedbyme,butalsoaproductivitywhichisnotours,althoughwecanuseit—thatis,anoriginaryproductivitythatcontinues[tooperate]beneaththeartificialcreationsofman.Itbothpartakesofthemostancient,andissomethingalwaysnew.Natureis,asLucienHerrsaidinhisarticlededicatedtoHegelinLagrandeencyclopédie,anuntamedthing:‘Natureistherefromthefirstday.’Natureisnotexhaustedorusedupbytheveryfactthatendures.”(N125)

Thus,partofwhatlendsopacitytonatureisitsnever‐ceasingcapacityforinvention

andself‐renewal.ThisissomethingBergsonofcoursewashighlyimpressedwithas

well(nottomentionWhitehead,whoMerleau‐Pontyfavorablycommentsonandfor

whomtheprincipleof“creativity”isthe“ultimatecategory,”highereventhan

divinity).Asisclearfromthepassagecitedabove,therelationofnatural

productivitytohumancreativityforMerleau‐Pontyresemblesthatassignedby

someoftheGermanRomanticstoart.340Likeartisticcreation,indeed,Nature’s

“autoproduction”ofmeaningisopen,fluid,andalwaysunfinished—apoint

Merleau‐PontymakesthroughareferencetoHeraclitus:“Heraclitussaysthat

natureisachildatplay;itgivesmeaning,butinthemannerofachildwhois

playing,andthismeaningisnevertotal.”(N84)

Finally,Merleau‐Ponty’snotionofNatureshouldbeunderstoodinrelationto

thatof“spirit”—mind,consciousness,language,thought.Towardtheendofthe

Naturecoursesheoffersthefollowingtellingrecap:“Oursubject:RegardingNature,

theconcernwastostudyitasanontologicalleaf—andinparticular,regardinglife,

340ThoughIcannotexplorethisconnectionfullyhere,therearemanyotherindicationsthatMerleau‐PontyisturningtotheGermanRomanticswheretheyleftoffintermsofthephilosophyofnature.Aboveall,hewritesveryglowinglyaboutSchelling’sconceptionofnature,aswewillseebelow.AndliketheGermanRomanticsandGermanIdealists,hecitesKant’sthirdCritiquerepeatedly,andinmuchthesamespiritastheydo:inordertodrawitoutbeyonditself,inordertoattainamoresatisfactoryresultofKant’sinauguralinvestigationsintotherealnatureoflife,theorganism,creativity,andteleology.Also,itisimportantinthisrespecttolookatthewaythatKant’sthirdCritiquesomewhatchallengestheframeworkofhisowntranscendentalidealism,inawaythatSchellinglaterdoesmoredefinitively,andinthewaythatMerleau‐PontytriestodoinrelationtoHusserl.Forsomereferencesalongtheselinessee:N,83,84

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theconcernwastostudytheunfoldingoftheleafofNature—regardingthehuman,

theconcernistotakehimathispointofemergenceinNature.”(N208,myemphasis)

Dupondhelpfullycapturesthesenseinwhichtheconceptof“spirit”(l’esprit)tiesin

withthatofwhatMerleau‐Pontyiscalling“thehuman,”andwhichHusserlhas

identifiedwiththe“personal”:

“Thenotionofspirithabituallydesignatesafigureofbeinginwhichmanrecognizeshisoriginalityorhisownpropermodeofbeing.Itthusformsanetworkwithothernotionswhichalsohavethefunctionofnamingthe‘escape’ofmanfromnature:culture,history,Logos,reason.”(Dupond,70)

DupondfurtherexplainsthesenseinwhichMerleau‐Ponty’sattitudetowards

Naturevis‐à‐visSpiritshouldbeappreciatedhistorically:“[Merleau‐Pontyinverts]

themovementofthehistoryofmodernthought,whichentersphilosophyviaspirit,

[andstartsfrom]nature,inallowinghimselfthepossibilityofcomprehendingthe

emergence,thesurgissementofspirit…”(Dupond70,mytranslation)

Merleau‐Ponty’sprincipalhistoricalinspirationconcerninghisconceptionof

NatureappearstobeSchelling.Indeed,Merleau‐Pontyseemstoidentifyatleast

partiallywith“romanticnaturalism”asopposedto“scientificnaturalism”—a

distinctionhehimselffitfullymakes.(N135)Thushearguesthatwemustpreserve

theideaof“savagenature”fromtheRomantics,savingitforexamplefromKantian‐

humanistdesignsofathinkerlikehisowncontemporaryNeo‐KantianLéon

Brunschwig.(N35)WhatMerleau‐PontyfindsmostimpressiveaboutSchelling’s

notionofNaturearethesamethingshetendstoemphasizeinhisownexplorations

ofit,forexampleitsdescriptionas“wildBeing”thathauntsconsciousnessasan

irrecoverableground,aswellastheideaof“…thesubjective‐objectivethatNature

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willalwaysbe.”(N70)WhatMerleau‐Pontyfindsinthisideaofthe“subjective‐

objective”isillustratedbyhimwithreferencetoakindofreciprocityofthetwo

orders,subjectiveandobjective,inaquotethatalsohelpstoremindusofhowfar

Merleau‐Pontyisfromabandoningaphenomenologicalfirst‐personperspectivefor,

say,third‐person“realism”:

“WearetheparentsofaNatureofwhichwearealsothechildren.Itisinhumanbeingthatthingsbecomeconsciousofthemselves;buttherelationisreciprocal:humanbeingisalsothebecoming‐consciousofthings.”341(N43)

Scientificnaturalism,asthistermiswidelytaken,ofcoursewoulddenybothof

theseconclusions.Itdoesnotseethesenseinwhich“wearetheparentsofNature”

becauseitdeniesanyontologicalorconstitutionalroletoperception(fearing

idealism),anditdoesnotthinkofhumanbeingsastheseatofNature’sown

reflexivitybecauseithastacitlyacceptedtheCartesianprincipleofthepure

exteriority,andhencedeadness,ofnaturalbeing.Thereisno“autoproduction”in

Nature,thereareonlycausal‐mechanisticprocessesgovernedbythe“lawsof

nature,”setinmotionbythemysteriousburstofenergycalledthe“BigBang.”

Ofcourse,thereisalwaysthedangerof“anthropomorphizing”nature,

makingitintoakindofintelligenceofconsciousness,whichMerleau‐Pontyiswell

awareof:“IfNatureisnotanobjectofthought,thatis,asimplecorrelativeofa

thought,itisdecidedlynotasubjecteither,andforthesamereason:itsopacity,its

enveloping.Itisanobscureprinciple.”(N120)Merleau‐Ponty’s“Nature”isnot,

therefore,likeHegel’s“Spirit,”thatis,a“self”thatfindsitselfreflectedbacktoitself 341Compare:“NotonlymustNaturebecomevision,buthumanbeingmustalsobecomeNature…”(N47)Andnoticethephraseologyhere:“Becoming‐natureofmanwhichisthebecoming‐manofnature.”(N185)

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in(oras)nature.Rather,itisan“obscureprinciple”thatunfoldspartiallyin

consciousness,yetalsopartiallyoutsideofit—becauseitismore“ancient”than

consciousnessitselfandstandsinirreducibletensionwithit.

Schelling’sphilosophyofNaturethusteachesMerleau‐Pontykeylessons

aboutthelimitsofobjectivethoughtandofreflection,whichobjectifynaturebut

mustfailtocaptureitsdepths.Thus,invokingSchelling,Merleau‐Pontyobserves:

“Apoeticconsciousnessrecognizesthatitdoesnotpossessitsobjecttotally,thatitcanunderstanditonlybyatruecreation,andthatitcreatesclaritybyanoperationthatisnotdeductivebutcreative.Poeticconsciousness,overcomebyitsobject,mustgetholdofitselfagain,butwithouteverbeingabletoseparateitselffromitshistory.”342(N50)

Thethemeofnon‐coincidenceofreflectionandobject‐of‐reflectionisofcoursea

majoroneinMerleau‐Ponty’slaterontology(andepistemology)generally,lyingat

therootofhisconceptionof“hyper‐reflection”andthemethodof“interrogation.”

WhatMerleau‐Pontyfinds,inotherwords,isthatSchelling’sisa“phenomenologyof

pre‐reflexiveBeing”(N41)thateffectsa“reflectiononwhatisnotreflection.”(N

45)ThusMerleau‐Ponty’sownparticularfascinationwithSchellingdoesnotlie

simplywiththelatter’santi‐Cartesianismbutalso,onemightsay,withhisanti‐

Kantianism(andanti‐idealismgenerally).343Schelling,likeMerleau‐Ponty,denies

thatconsciousnessiscoextensivewithmeaning.(Husserl,withgenetic

phenomenologyandtheconceptofthe“life‐world”lyingbeneaththeconstructions

342TheseideasreappearinreferencetoWhitehead’sphilosophy.“Itisthisstubbornnessthatsubtendsallcreation:‘itbelongstotheessenceoftheuniversetopassintoafuture.’”(N121)Instarkcontrast,thereisthedevastatingassessmentofSartre’sphilosophythatithas“noplaceforaconceptionofNatureorforaconceptionofhistory.”(N70)ThisfollowsfromSartre’sdualismofthein‐itselfandfor‐itself,ofwhichMerleau‐Pontynevertiresincriticizing.343SeeinthisregardMerleau‐Ponty’sinterestingremark:“[Schelling’s]conceptionistheonlypossibleformofrealism.”(N50)

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ofthought,hadsurelybeenheadinginthisdirection,Merleau‐Pontywouldadd,but

theseductionsofanall‐encompassingtranscendentalconsciousnessremained.)

Inmyview,whatiskeytoMerleau‐Ponty’sappreciationofSchellingisthe

factthattheGermanthinkerstoodatthesummitof—andheeffectsacertain

reversalof—amaturetraditionofidealistthinking,beginningatleastwithKantand

culminatinginHegel’s“System.”ThatMerleau‐Pontyunderstandshisownroleto

parallelSchelling’sinthisregardisevidentfromapassagelikethisone:

“Schellingstartedfromtranscendentalidealismaround1800andwonderedhowtorehabilitatetheideaofNatureintheframeworkofreflexivephilosophy.YetthisproblemoftranscendentalidealismisalsoHusserl’s.”(N71;myemphasis)

IntermsofSchelling’sinfamousrelation344toHegelandthelatter’s“dialectical”

system,Merleau‐Ponty’sverdictisaccordinglyfavorabletotheformer:“Schelling

thoughtthisthesisofspeculativephilosophyatahigherlevelofrigorthandidHegel

becauseofhisconceptionoftheempirical;theidentityofthefiniteandtheinfinite

isthoughtbyhiminamoredecisiveway.”345(N47)

C.NatureandtheSciencesofLife

Becauseofitspre‐reflectiveandnon‐objectivecharacter,Natureishardto

investigate“frontally,”sotospeak,whichiswhatallowsMerleau‐Pontytobeginto 344HegeldrewcopiouslyfromtheyoungerSchellingbutfamouslycriticizedthelatterintheprefaceofthePhenomenology,albeitveiledly,callingSchelling’sAbsolute“thenightinwhichallcowsareblack.”SchellingwouldgoontoheavilycriticizeHegelianphilosophy—oratleastitspretensionstocompleteness—throughouthislongcareer,wellafterHegel’sowndeath.345Hegelisofcoursefamousforhavingidentifieda“trueinfinity”whichincorporatesfinitedifferenceintoitsmake‐up,asopposedtothe“badinfinity”thatmerelynegatesthefinite.Schelling’sthinkingdoesnot,however,allowinfinitytohavethe“lastword,”sotospeak,inanysense.Itisinthissensethathethinkstheir“identity”morethoroughly.(Wewillexaminethethemeof“identityanddifference”morecloselybelow.)

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trylateralapproachestoit,includingthestudyoftheworkofthenaturalsciences,

aboveallmodern(inhistime,up‐to‐date)biology.ButhowexactlydoesMerleau‐

Pontyseeasthelinkbetweenbiologyandhisownphilosophicalinvestigationof

nature?Hebeginstoexplainitthroughthenotionof“experience”:

“…Natureisanall‐encompassingsomethingwecannotthinkstartingfromconcepts,letalonedeductions,butwemustratherthinkitstartingfromexperience,andinparticular,experienceinitsmostregulatedform—thatis,science.”(N87)

WhatMerleau‐Pontymeansby“science”isbroadlyencompassesallcontrolled,

observation‐basedproceduraldisciplines,includingpsychology.

Merleau‐Ponty’suseofscienceisextremelysubtleandsophisticated.It

certainlydoesnotconsistofasimpleappropriationofthe“scientificmethod,”butis

insteadaninterrogationofexperience—thedomaincommontophilosophy(atleast

asphenomenology),science,andevenreligion,art,andliterature(Merleau‐Ponty

famouslyturnstopaintersandwritersforinspiration,andtheNaturelecturesare

noexceptioninthisregard,asdemonstratedbyanextendeddiscussionofProust

therein).Thoughheundertakesanoverviewofthephysicalsciences,including

relativitytheoryandquantummechanics,ofwhichwewillsayabitmorelateron,

heprimarilyexaminestheresearchesofscientistswhofocusonanimalityand

behavior,familiaroldthemesinMerleau‐Ponty’swork.

Merleau‐Ponty’smethodisnotinductive.Philosophydoesnotsimply

generalizefromresults,ifthisisindeedwhatscientistsdo;itinterpretsscience

accordingtophilosophicalcategorieswhoselegitimacydependsnotmerelyon

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externalverification‐proceduresbut,wemightsay,alsoonphenomenological

authenticity.Philosophyandsciencearetobeconceivedaspartnersinadialogue.

Indeed,onscienceandscientificconsciousness,therearewaysinwhich

Merleau‐Ponty’spositionhasinfactnotchangedsignificantlyfromHusserl’s(from

thelaterperiodespecially).Take,forexample,thefollowingremark:

“Scienceisnotanunmotivatedinstance.Wehavetopsychoanalyzescience,purifyit.Scientificconsciousnesslivesinthenaturalattitude,asHusserlsaid,anditignoresNaturebecauseitisthere:itisanaïveanduncriticalenjoymentofthenaturalcertitude.”(N85)

Andagain:

“Theconcernofthephilosopheristosee;thatofthescientististofindafoothold.…Thephilosophermustseebehindthebackofthephysicistwhatthephysicisthimselfdoesnotsee.”(N86‐7)

Inotherwords,thewarofphilosophyandscienceisafalseone;even

Husserl’sstrictdivisionbetweeneideticandnon‐eideticdisciplines,aswehave

seen,isbelievedtobeexaggeratedbyMerleau‐Ponty.Scientificevidenceaidsand

instructsthephilosopher,evenasphilosophyputsscientificresearchinto

perspective.Indeedphilosophers,too,canberecklessintheirownway,asMerleau‐

PontymakesclearinhisrebukeofHeidegger’sspuriousetymologies,concluding

fromthisthat“…itisdangeroustoleaveallfreedomtothephilosopher.”346(N86‐7)

ThephilosophyofNatureisthusnotakindofsecretknowledgeor“superscience”to

rivalscience(N204),intheway,perhaps,Heideggerianphilosophy(or“poetry,”

346Thereisalsohereadialecticofthenegativeandthepositivewithrespecttotheproperroleofscience.Forexample,onecanfindMerleau‐Pontyonmorethanoneoccasionstressingthenegativeroleofscienceinhelpingtoeliminatefalseoremptypossibilities.See:N,100,106.

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Dichtung)mightbeasecretknowledgeof(oraccessto)Beingthateludesscientific

andmetaphysicalunderstanding.347Thusitissimplyamatterofhavinga“reading

ofscienceitselfasacertain(reduced)ontologyinthebroadercontextoftherelation

withthemostprimordialbeing,”thatis,withNatureitself.(N206)

Oneofthemorechallengingsections(atleastforphilosophers!)ofthe

Naturelecturesisitslongassessmentofthebiologyofhisday.Agreatdealof

groundiscoveredinashortamountoftime,allthemoreimpressiveasMerleau‐

Pontyishardlystingywithdetails.348Whatisthepointofthisstudyofanimality,

accordingtoMerleau‐Ponty?Thekeylinesinthisrespectarethese:

“Theorganismisnotdefinedbyitspunctualexistence;whatexistsbeyondisatheme,astyle,alltheseexpressionsseekingtoexpressnotaparticipationinatranscendentalexistence,butinastructureofthewhole.Thebodybelongstoadynamicofbehavior.Behaviorissunkintocorporeity.Theorganismdoesnotexistasathingendowedwithabsoluteproperties,asfragmentsofCartesianspace.Anorganismisafluctuationaroundnorms,whichareeventsenframedbyastructurethatwouldnotberealizedinanotherorder,buthasrelationswiththeseevents.”(N183)

Whatiskeyherearethespecificallyontologicalimplicationsoforganiclife.What

theworkofleadingbiologistsshow,hefinds,isthatorganismsexhibitaspecifically

holisticandnon‐localizablestyle:“Therealityoftheorganismsupposesanon‐

347Comparewiththeseremarksfromaworkingnote:“Thesearchfora‘wild’viewoftheworldnowiselimitsitselftoareturntoprecomprehensionortoprescience.…Areturntoprescienceisnotthegoal.–theprescientificisonlyaninvitationtocomprehendthemeta‐scientificandthislastisnotnon‐science.”(VI182)ItistruethatMerleau‐Pontyhimself,atonepoint,identifieshisown“Being”withHeidegger’s.Butthemethodologicaldifferencehasdeeperimplications:byinvolvingnaturalscience,nottomentionmetaphysicalthinkerslikeLeibniz,Schelling,Whitehead,andBergson,Merleau‐PontyisunderminingtheHeideggeriansuspicionofnaturalismthelatterinherited,arguably,fromcertainfeaturesofHusserl’s(andKant’s)transcendentalistframingofphenomenology.348ThoughitwouldrequireacertainamountofbiologicalexpertisetodeterminethecontemporaryvalidityofthescienceMerleau‐Pontydealswith,muchofitconcernssimple(thoughsystematic)observationofanimalbehavior,inwhichinterpretationplaysasignificantrole.

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ParmenideanBeing,aformthatescapesfromthedilemmaofbeingandnonbeing.”

(N183)

Theprincipleofwholenessortotality(whichareequivalentforMerleau‐

Ponty)iscentraltoMerleau‐Ponty’sreflectionsonorganiclifeandindeedontology

generally.Thusheexplains:

“Hencetheorganicistideasupportedby[biologistG.E.]Coghill,accordingtowhich,inasmuchasweanalyzetheorganismspiecemeal,wefindopposedonlyphysiochemicalphenomena,butwhenwerisetotheconsiderationofthewholeoftheorganism,thetotalityisnolongerdescribableinphysiologicalterms;itappearsasemergent.Howarewetounderstandthisrelationoftotalityofpartsasaresult?Whatstatusmustwegivetototality?SuchisthephilosophicalquestionthatCoghill’sexperimentspose,aquestionwhichisatthecenterofthiscourseontheideaofnatureandmaybethewholeofphilosophy.”(N145;myitalics)

Merleau‐Pontyspendsagreatdealofattentionononeparticular1929study

byCoghill,ontheaxolotllizard.349Theaxolotl“…isaverylonglizard,aboutseven

inches,whichasatadpolelivesinthewater,then,onceithasfourlegs,developson

land.”(N140)Whatiscuriousabouttheanimal(whichisreallymoreofa

paradigmaticcasethanananomaly)isthewaythatitsanatomicaldevelopments

mysteriously(andnon‐causally)parallelitsadaptedbehaviors;thereseemstobeno

strictlycausal‐physiologicalexplanationofthecoordination.Thelizard’s

embryology,recountedbyMerleau‐Pontyinpainstakingdetail,reallysuggests,for

CoghillandMerleau‐Ponty,that,“A‘referencetothefuture’…alreadyexistsinthe

embryo.[Thus]Wecannotdefinetheanimalbyitsimmediatefunctioning:herethe

apparatushasmeaningonlyforafuture.”(N144)Forexample,the“orderofthe

nervouscephalo‐causaldevelopmentenvelops[i.e.,anticipates]swimming;thereis

349“Thisbook[AnatomyandtheProblemofBehavior]hasstillnotbeenexceeded,butwehaven’tyetmeasuredallitsweight.”(N140)

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thepossibleintheorganism.”Thisnotionof“thepossible,”a“whatitcando”that“is

realizedatthesametime”asthelizarddevelopsphysiologically,alreadyplacesus,

Merleau‐Pontypointsout,“beyondthephysiologicaldefinitionoftheorganismby

itsrealfunctioning.”(N144)Merleau‐Pontyseesheretheimportanceofasenseof

thetotalityoftheorganism,onethatisimmanentalreadyintheorganism’s

behavioralaswellasanatomicaldevelopment,evenintheearliestphases.Buthe

doesnotwanttosuggestasimpleteleology,forreasonsthatwillbecomecleareras

weproceed.

Itisusefulinallofthistohavebeforeone’smindoneofMerleau‐Ponty’s

favoriteimagesormetaphorsforthekindofwholenessortotalitythathehasin

mind,namelythatofthemelody.Themelodyisametaphorfortheorganism;

indeed,Merleau‐PontyadaptsitfromfamousbiologistandethologistJakobvon

Uexküll,whosaysoftheNaturfaktor—hisownexplanatorynotionfororganic

development—thatitisnotanentelechybuta“melodysingingitself.”(N173)What

iskeyaboutthemelodyisthis:“Atthemomentwhenthemelodybegins,thelast

noteisthere,initsownmanner.”(N174)Thisisclearenough:a“firstnote”ofa

melodyisnotthefirstnotewithoutthecompletemelody’sbeingatleastimplied—

evenifnotyetfullythoughtout,sincethemelodymaybeinthemiddleofbeing

created!350(ThisofcourseisoneofthereasonsthatMerleau‐Pontyopposes

teleologyor“finalism”:thatitpresupposesacompletenessthatdoesnotmake

intelligibletheimperfectionsoftheprocessesofeithernaturalproductivityor

350Thereisaconnectionherewiththe“flesh.”See:“ThenpastandpresentareIneinander,eachenveloping‐enveloped—andthatitselfistheflesh.”(VI268)

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artisticcreativity.)Merleau‐Pontyexplainsanimalbehaviorexactlyintermsofthe

melody,inthefollowingpassage:

“Behaviorcannotbeunderstoodifweunderstanditmomentbymoment.Certainlywestillfindsufficientconditionsfrommomenttomoment,butthenwedonotgrasptherelationofmeaning.Eachpartofthesituationactsonlyaspartofawholesituation;noelementofactionhasaseparateutilityinfact.”(N175)

ItisofcoursecharacteristicofMerleau‐Pontytofuseartandscienceinthis

inimitableway!

Forhisstudentstogainatoeholdinthisnotionofwholeness,Merleau‐Ponty

suggeststhatperceptionishelpful:“Wefindmodelsofthisideaoftotalityinthe

worldofperception.”Forexample,

“Psychologydoeseasilywhatsciencefindsdifficulttodo,namelytoallowforanorganizingprinciplewithintotality.Ineffect,perceptiondoesnotgiveusthethings,butwhatwesee.Inthephenomenalmilieu,nothingimpedesthewholefrombeingotherthanthesumofthepartswithoutbeingforallthatatranscendententity.”(N153)

ItisclearthatMerleau‐PontyisreferringtothethesisofGestaltpsychology,with

whichheregainedinterestatthetimeofhislaterwork.Butwhatiskeyforushere

isthatwecanseewhatsortofconceptionoftotalityinterestsMerleau‐Ponty:one

thatisnon‐transcendentandyetalsonon‐immanent(ifonemeansbythisentirely

engulfedbythesumoftheparts).Thesameideaappliesattheleveloforganiclife.

TheorganismdoesnotembodyatimelessPlatonicForm,orevenanAristotelian

one,butthisdoesnotmeanthatitsdevelopmentoritsbehaviorcanbeexplainedin

reductive,nominalistic,ormechanistic‐causalterms.Thusthereisa“…truthofthe

wholethatdoesnotsignifyatruthofthedetail.”(N31)Butthoughtheanimalhasa

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“why,”asitwere,this“why”isanopen,groping,andincompleteone.Merleau‐Ponty

callsonHegel’simageofthecyclonetoillustratewhathehasinmind:“Hegel

alreadycomparedlifetoacyclone.Thecycloneisnothingotherthanwater,butits

formisnotexplainedbywater.”Wemustnotseekanorganictotality“behindthe

observablephenomena”(N152),anymorethanwewouldseektoreducethewhole

toits“individualcomponents.”ThusMerleau‐Pontyconcludes,“Theorganism

wouldnotbeatranscendenttotality,anymorethanitwouldbeatotalityby

summation.”351

Thefactthatorganictotalityisnotanchoredinapositiveprinciple,suchas

“life”(vitalism)oranentelechy(Aristotelianism),resonatesthroughouttheNature

lecturesinanumberofways.ThusMerleau‐Ponty’sconceptof“life”isessentiallya

reactionagainstvitalistpositivism—again,astypifiedbyBergson—aswellas,as

always,scientificnaturalism.Thushepronouncesthat“…itisnotapositivebeing,

butaninterrogativebeingwhichdefineslife.”(N156)Indeed,Merleau‐Ponty

repeatedlystressesthis“negativeprinciple”withintheorganism.(N155)What

doeshemeanbythis?The“negativeprinciple,”heexplainssomewhatobliquely,“is

lessidentity‐with‐selfthannon‐difference‐with‐self.Thisabsencebecomesafactor

onlybynegationofitsownnegation.”ButunlikewhatisfoundinHegel,the“double

negation”neverbecomesresolvedintoa“concretewhole,”suchasLife,God,Spirit,

orDerBegriff.InthecaseofaHegelianism,Merleau‐Pontyobservescritically,

351Thereareseveralstunning“holistic”metaphorsandimagesinVI,forexamplethatofmirrorsfacingoneanother,inwhichwefind“…acouplemorerealthaneitherof[themirrorsindividually].”(VI139)

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“LifewouldbeSpirit‐in‐itself,andSpiritwouldbelifefor‐itself.ButlifeisnotyetSpiritin‐itself.WefindinHegelthesameretrospectiveillusionasinAristotle.Tograsplifeinthethingsistograspalackinthethingsassuch.”(N157)

WhatMerleau‐Pontyseemstomeanishere1)thattheorganismlacksan“in‐itself,”

andhence(obviously)cannotbethe“in‐itself”ofSpirit,and2)thatthis“lack”

constitutes(orisaconditionof)whatitmeanstobe“alive.”Thisnegativityis

intertwinedwithacertaininteriority;forthereis“…anaturalnegativity,an

interiorityofthelivingorganism…”(N210)Butthisisnottosaythatlifeisa“for‐

itself,”aconsciousness.JustasNaturewassaidtobeneithersubjectnorobject,the

sameholdsfortheorganismassuch.(WemightrecallthatHusserlstruggledwith

thisveryissueinIdeasII,whendiscussinganimalityandthesoul.)Butthis

interiorityhastodowiththesymbolicdepthoflivingbeings,ameaning‐

generativitywhichisreflectedinthestructureofbehavior(andthequasi‐interiority

oftheUmwelt352),notinthepresenceofa(substantial)“consciousness.”Comparing

machinesandanimals(exceptingthelimit‐caseasitwereofthesimplestof

organisms,whichMerleau‐Pontycalls“animal‐machines”),thephilosopher

352Inadditiontoorganicholism,Merleau‐PontyassignsaparticularimportancetotheconceptoftheUmwelt,asdevelopedbylegendaryethologistJakobvonUexküll.(N167)Theuntranslatableterm(whichwe,followingKersten,hadearliertranslatedas“thesurroundingworld”inreferencetoHusserl’snotioninIdeasII),isdefinedbestthroughMerleau‐Ponty’sowndescriptionsofitanditssignificance.Hedescribesitas“[marking]thedifferencebetweentheworldsuchasitexistsinitself,andtheworldastheworldofthelivingbeing.”Thatis,itisbeyondthedistinctionofthe“objective”andthe“subjective.”Essentially,itistheworldofananimal—ananimallife­world,ineffect.“TheUmweltistheworldimpliedbythemovementoftheanimal,andthatregulatestheanimal’smovementsbyitsownstructure.”352(N175)Andagain:“[It]existsforthebehavioroftheanimal,butnotnecessarilyinitsconsciousness;itistheenvironmentofbehavioras‘opposedtothegeographicalenvironment.’”(Uexküllhimselflabelsthe“Umwelt”ofhigheranimalsthe“Gegenwelt.”(N172))TheUmweltiskeytotheexplanationofanimalbehaviorbecause“…betweenthesituationandthemovementoftheanimal,thereisarelationofmeaningwhichiswhattheexpressionUmweltconveys.”(N175)Andfinally:“ThenotionoftheUmweltnolongerallowsustoconsidertheorganisminitsrelationtotheexteriorworld,asaneffectoftheexteriorworld,orasacause.TheUmweltisnotpresentedinfrontoftheanimallikeagoal;itisnotpresentlikeanidea,butasathemethathauntsconsciousness.”(N178)

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concludes:“Thereisnooperatingmeaningwithinthemachine,butonlywithinthe

livingthing.”(N163)Themachineispureexteriorityinrelationtolife,amere

simulacrum,whileonthesideofpureinterioritywouldliepresumablyafully

developedandreflectiveegoicconsciousness.Merleau‐Ponty’sbriefbutfascinating

commentaryonmachinesandlifeculminatesinaperceptiveremarkonartificial

intelligence.Thereisacertain“badfaith,”heargues,inthemodernzestforcreating

artificialorganisms:

“Weareamusedtogivebirthtoaphenomenonoflife,andwedenythatthisphenomenonreferstoanauthenticphenomenon,eventhoughitisinterestingonlytotheextentthatitisanimitationoflife.ItisinthiswaythatMalebranchewouldnothavebeatenastoneashebeathisdog,sayingthatthedogdidn’tsuffer.”(N166)

III.TheNatureLecturesandTheVisibleandtheInvisible:TowardsaNewDialecticalOnto­Phenomenology

A.Introduction

WhatistheplaceofNatureinageneralontology?HowdoeswhatMerleau‐

PontyisdoingintheNaturelecturesinformhisdetailedinvestigationsofthe

“visible”andthe“invisible,”the“sensible”and“sentient,”“touching”and“touched”

thatwefindinVI,themuchbetterknownwork?TheexistenceoftheNature

lecturesposesacertainhermeneuticalchallengeforthoseseekingtopiecetogether

Merleau‐Ponty’smatureontology.Thisisbecausemanyofthetermsthathave

becomefamiliartousfromanacquaintancewithMerleau‐Ponty’slaterwork,such

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as“flesh,”“chiasm,”“reversibility,”andsoon,appearonlysparselyinhislecture

coursesonnature,lectureswhichemployandadopttheworkingterminologyofthe

sciencesand,insomecases,thehistoryofphilosophy.EvenintheNaturelectures,

however,wecanfindthesamesortsofinsightsthatdriveMerleau‐Ponty’s

ontologicalvisioninthemorewell‐knownwork.Thepurposeofthepresentsection

istodiscussthebasicideasofthisontologyinawaythatweavestheNaturelectures

andVItogether,oratleastunderstandsthemaspossessingacommonfront.

ThereareseveralpowerfulideaswhichdominateMerleau‐Ponty’smature

thinking,andalmostallofthemcanbeconsideredaswaystounderstandthe

“identityanddifference”ofthetwoordersofbeing—sensibleandsentient,objective

andsubjective—andofcoursethe“dimensionality”openedupbytheirbeautifulbut

oftenbafflingstyleofcommerce.Iwilltrytoshowinthefollowingseveralsections

howMerleau‐Ponty’skeyconceptsarebasedonthisunderlying“identity‐and‐

difference”themeandacorrespondingtypeofdialecticthatemergestherefrom.

Thiswillopenupadiscussionthatwilleventuallytakeusthroughtotheendofthis

dissertation.

B.Reversibility

ThefoundationofMerleau‐Ponty’sdialecticisthephenomenon,orconcept

(itisinfactboth),of“reversibility.”Inmyownreading,therearetwofundamental

pointsofreferenceforMerleau‐Pontyregardingthisconcept,theonehistoricaland

theothersystematic.Theformeristhemind‐bodyproblemasinheritedby

Descartes,whilethelatteristhephenomenonofself‐sensing,theobservationof

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whichMerleau‐PontyborrowsfromHusserl(butexpandsinwayswewillsee

below).Wewilldealwiththelatterpointofreferencefirst.

Merleau‐Ponty’sclassicphenomenologicalexampleofreversibilityis

Husserl’sownobservationofthereversibilityoftouch,orthephenomenonofthe

“lefthandtouchingtherighthand…”353Merleau‐Pontynotes,likeHusserl,thatto

“touch”something,whenthatsomethinghappenstobeanotherpartofone’sbody,

isalsotobe“touched”bythatsomething.“Subject”herebecomes“object,”andvice‐

versa.Themostdramaticcaseisthatofhandstouchingoneanother;butMerleau‐

Pontyextendsthisphenomenonof“reversibility”beyondthesenseoftouchto

includevision,whichexplainsthetitleofhisprojectedworkandtherepeated

referencesto,forexample,the“strangeadhesionoftheseerandthevisible.”(VI

140)Husserlhadinitiallydistinguishedtouchingfromvisionbynoticingthatwhile

touchisreversible,visionisnot.Thatis,wecannotseeourselvesseeingintheway

wecantouchourselvestouching.ButMerleau‐Pontyquestionsthevalidityofthis

distinctionontwocounts.First,visioncouldnottruly“see”theworldiftheworld

didnot“adhere”toitsglance;andsecond,eveninself‐touching,thereisno

completecoincidenceofsensingandsensed—“non‐coincidence”isinfactoneof

Merleau‐Ponty’sfundamentalideas,anditappliesastrulytothiscaseastoany

other.Asheexplainsinonecharacteristicpassage:

“Tobeginwith,wespokesummarilyofthereversibilityoftheseeingandthevisible,ofthetouchingandthetouched.Itistimetoemphasizethatitisareversibilityalwaysimminentandneverrealizedinfact.Mylefthandisalwaysonthevergeoftouchingmyrighthandtouchingthethings;butInever 353Mereau‐Ponty’sreferencestothistropeandtoreversibilityarefrequent.Someofthemostinterestinginthetextsweareexaminingincludethefollowing:N217;N224;VI272;VI141‐2;VI147,148;VI4154,155;VI223.

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reachcoincidence;thecoincidenceeclipsesatthemomentofrealization,andoneoftwothingsalwaysoccurs:eithermyrighthandreallypassesoverintotheranksofthetouched,oritretainsitsholdontheworld,butthenIdonotreallytouchit—myrighthandtouching,Ipalpatewithmylefthandonlyitsoutercovering.”(VI148)

Thuswhileitistruethatwecannottruly“seeourselvesseeing,”inthattheeye

cannotbenditsvisionbackuponitself,neither,finallycantouch.354Andtothe

extentthateithersenseisreversible,itisreversibleinthiscomplexmanner—that

is,withacombinationofidentityanddifference.Asfortherelationoftouchand

visiontooneanother,Merleau‐Pontynotesthatwhiletheyareinsomesense

incommensurable(wewillseebelowthathemakessimilarremarksconcerningall

ofthesensestakentogether),theyarenonethelessunitedinoneaesthesiological

nexus,renderingbacktousaunifiedworld:“Sincethesamebodyseesandtouches,

visibleandtangiblebelongtothesameworld.”(VI134)

Reversibilityis,ofcourse,aphenomenonwenoticefirstofallwithregardto

thebody,whichforitspartis“…interposed[notas]athing,aninterstitialmatter,a

connectivetissue,butasensibleforitself…”(VI135)Thelivedbodyisthusalways

already“aware”ofitselfandtheworld,which,throughitsUmwelt,is“present”

beforeitimmanentlyandnotmerelyasanexternality.ButMerleau‐Ponty’s

discourseaboutthe“body‐subject,”whilelegitimateinitsownright,hadtendedto

obscurethe“world”sideofthis(literal)equation.Theworld,nature,thesensible—

thesearethecomplementarypolestothebody,themind,andsentience.Therefore

whatwefindaboveallinthelaterwritingsisMerleau‐Ponty’sparlayingtheinsight

354Reversibilityisthus,inthewordsofDastur,“neverfinishedandalwaysinthemaking.”See:Dastur,Françoise.“Merleau‐PontyandThinkingfromWithin,”tr.PaulB.Milan.PrintedinMerleau­PontyinContemporaryPerspective.Eds.PatrickBurkeandJanVanDerVeken.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1993(p.26)Hereafterreferredtoas“Dastur.”

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ofreversibilityandthebodyintoageneralontologicalprinciple,usingittomeditate

onthereflexivedepthsofBeingasawhole,thesubjectivity‐objectivityIneinanderas

such:

“Totouchistotouchoneself.Tobeunderstoodas:thethingsaretheprolongationofmybodyandmybodyistheprolongationoftheworld,throughittheworldsurroundsme…”(VI255)

Thismovetowardsgeneralizationisaccompaniedbyamoreontologicallygeneral

(thoughsomehowstillthicklycarnal)languagethanwefindinhisprior

phenomenologicalanalyses.Thislanguagewhichmayevencomeclosetosounding

likeanew“metaphysics.”Instead,itisintendedtobetakenasawaytoframethe

resultsofphenomenologyinacoherentorsystematicway.AsIwillarguebelow(as

IhavealreadybeguntodoinChapter3),Merleau‐Ponty’sobjectiontohisownprior

researchesisdirectedprincipallytotheirlackofbalance,nottotheirradical

misguidedness.355

AsIreadit,therearebasicallythreefundamentallessonsorthemesMerleau‐

Pontytakesfromreversibility.Thefirstisthatoftheunityor“chiasm”ofsubject

andobject,touchingandtouched,sentientandsensible,etc.;thesecondis,in

apparentoppositiontothefirst,“non‐coincidence”;andthethirdistheinterplayof

identityanddifference,chiasmandnon‐coincidence,thatproducestheparadoxical

“samenesswithoutidentity”(VI261)thatweexperiencewithrespecttotheworld

aswellasotherpeople(forexample,intheparadigmaticcaseofashakingofhands).

355ThecaseofHeideggerisagoodoneforthesakeofcomparison;hisown“Kehre”fromDasein/BeingtoBeing/DaseinisnotentirelyunlikeMerleau‐Ponty’sownturnfromthebody‐subjecttothestructuresofbeingitself,thoughinMerleau‐Ponty’scaseitismoreofamatterofmundaneself‐correctionthanitisinHeidegger’s.

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Afterall,thephenomenonofreversibilitycouldnotbecomeknowntousifitwere

merelyadifferenceormerelyanidentity.Clearlythesensibleandthesentientare

notsimplytwobutratherinsomewayone(orelsehowcouldtheybereversibleand

simply“tradeplaces”?),andyettheyaretwo,sinceiftheyweresimplyone,they

couldnotproduceanexperienceorthe“distance”ofmindandthings.This

intercrossingofidentityanddifferencealsohelpstoexplainwhyMerleau‐Ponty

speaksofthe“indivision”(VI208,255)ofBeinginthesamebreathasits“self‐

splitting.”Further,itisembodiedinMerleau‐Ponty’sreciprocalexpressions

“differencewithoutcontradiction”and“identitywithoutsuperposition.”(VI135)

AsImentionedabove,Merleau‐Pontyalsodevelopshisbasicontological

ideasinexplicitreferencetothehistoryofphilosophy,especiallymodern

philosophyandthemind‐bodyproblemasitemergesinDescartes.Thisbecomes

abundantlyclearintheNaturelectures,whereDescartesemergesashismain

philosophical“rival”—thoughhardlyintheManicheantermsthistermcouldbe

takenin.356Merleau‐PontystatesDescartes’difficulty(whichisalsohisown)inthe

followingterms:

“Thereisanextraordinarydifficultyinthinkingaccordingtoboththefirstandthesecondorder[physicalandmental]atthesametime.Itisdifficulttoconceivethesoulandthebodyasoneandthesamething,whileatthesametimethinkingofthemasdistinct.Unionanddistinctionare,however,bothrequired,yettheyareunthinkablebothatthesametime.”(N17‐8,myemphasis)

ThisquotereferstoMerleau‐Ponty’sideaofnon‐coincidence,aswellasthatof

intertwining—hence,theCartesianproblematicteachesusthesamelessonstaught 356ItisinterestingtonoteinthisregardthatM.C.DillonpresentsMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyasa“criticalassessmentofCartesianism”throughouthiswork,Merleau­Ponty’sOntology.(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988)(Thequotedphraseisfromp.6ofthatwork).

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bythephenomenonofself‐sensing.Cartesiandualismhastobereplacedwith

another,moreflexibleanddialecticalmodel.Accordingly,Dasturassertsthat

Merleau‐Ponty’s“entirephilosophicalundertakingledhimtopromoteakindof

thoughtwhichwouldnolongeropposeinteriorityandexteriority,thesubjectwith

theworld,structureswithlivingexperience.”357(Dastur25)

C.Flesh

Thenotionofthe“flesh”(chair)ismeanttoconveythecommonalityofboth

“ordersofbeing,”subjectiveandobjective,whilerefusingtosynthesizethemintoa

solidorsubstantial“this.”ItisnotacausasuioraSpinozistic“substance,”muchless

aneutral“substrate”ofbeing.Ithas“…nonameintraditionalphilosophy”sinceitis

neithersubjectnorobjectbutsomethingelseentirely,akindof“element”(VI146)

orthesiteofanontologicalexchangethatitselfcomesclosetodefiningwhat

Merleau‐Pontymeansby“wildbeing.”358ThisbecomesclearerwhenMerleau‐Ponty

alignsthefleshwiththeideaof“life”heisdevelopingintheNaturelectures:

357DasturalsousesoneofMerleau‐Ponty’smoreinterestingtropes,thatofnarcissism,throughwhichtounderstand—andsubvertourownpotentialmisunderstandingof—Merleau‐Ponty’sbasicinsightintothewaythe“seerandthevisible”relate.Thuswhileatfirstitseemsasthoughthenarcissistis“egocentric”inthewayheseeshimselfintheobject(thinkofNarcissusstaringintothepond),nonethelessthisisnotthe“second,moreprofoundmeaningofnarcissism,”whichisthe“feeling[thatoneis]lookedatbythings,byaninversionofthelookthattransformssubjectiveactivityintoontologicalpassivity,sothatvisionnolongerhasanidentifiableauthor,sothatvisionbecomesgeneralvisibility.”(Dastur30)ThisnotionthatitisnotonlywethatlookatthingsbutthingsthatlookatusisoneofthemostoriginalandchallengingofMerleau‐Ponty’sthoughts,thoughitcanbeseentofollowlogicallyfromthenotionof“reversibility.”358Thefleshcanbeimaginedasafieldof“assemblage”and“dehiscence”ofsentienceandsensibility,similarperhapstowaterorair(hencethenotionof“element”),inthesenseofpermittingandfacilitatingformsofcreationanddestruction,coming‐togetherandcoming‐apart.

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“Itisnotthatlifeisapowerofbeingoraspirit,butrather,thatweinstallourselvesinperceivedbeing/brutebeing,inthesensible,inthefleshwherethereisnolongerthealternativeofthein­itselfandthefor­itself,whereperceivedbeingiseminentlyinbeing.”359(N210,myemphasis)

Indeed,whatMerleau‐Pontyisgettingatwiththisconceptofthefleshisoftenbest

understoodlaterally,throughother,relatednotions,including“nature”or“wild

Being,”aswecanseefromthefollowing(dense)“workingnote”:

“Solution:recapturethechild,thealterego,theunreflectedwithinmyselfbyalateral,pre‐analyticparticipation,whichisperception,ueberschreitenbydefinition,intentionaltransgression.WhenIperceivethechild,heisgivenpreciselyinacertaindivergence(écart)(originatingpresentationoftheunpresentable)andthesameformyalterego,andthesameforthepre‐analyticthing.Hereisthecommontissueofwhichwearemade.ThewildBeing.”(VI,203)

ThispassagerevealsthatforMerleau‐Pontywearealwaysalready,inperception,

separatedofffromourselves—orfromsomething,asitwere,withwhichwearestill

connected,withwhichweshareatogetherness,andofcoursewhichisalsothevery

siteofourconjunction,sinceitmakespossibletheexperienceofthings—or

“phenomena”—inconsciousness.Thusitseemswhatflesh,wildbeing,the“common

tissue”or“element,”etc.,aretryingtoname,ispreciselythephenomenonof

identity‐and‐differenceofsensibleandsentientorders,aprimordialintertwining

thatexpressesitself,paradoxically,inacertain“separation.”Thefleshturnsoutto

beaninevitablecorollarytoreversibilityitself;itisthefleshthat“is”reversible,

movingbetweenthe“fleshofthebody”andthe“fleshoftheworld.”360Thattheflesh

359InoneplaceheevenequatesthefleshwithNature.Hetellshimself:“DoapsychoanalysisofNature:itistheflesh,themother.”(VI267)Merleau‐PontybroachestheconceptofthefleshtowardstheendofhisthirdNaturelecture,itselfcontemporaneouswiththewritingofthedraftofVI.Indeed,someofhismostrevealingthoughtsonthefleshoccurintheselectures.360FredEvansmakesmuchthesamepointwhenheobserves:“Thefleshholdsseersandthevisibletogether(theyareofthesameflesh),whilestillrespectingtheirdifferenceandkeepingthemapart(asrespectively,thefleshofthebodyandthefleshoftheworld).”Evans,Fred.“ChiasmandFlesh.”

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isattheheartofreversibilityalsoexplainswhyMerleau‐Pontycallsthefleshthe

“miraclethatisthesenseorgan.”(N209)Aswehaveseen,thesenseorgan,for

exampletheskininitstactility,demonstratesthisreversibilityinaparadigmatic

way.

Theidentity,asitwere,ofintertwiningandseparation(ségrégation)is

parallelwiththatofdistanceandproximity,whichdefinesourstrangeintimacy

withthings,evenastheyremainoutsidewhatinHusserlianparlanceiscalledthe

“sphereofimmanence.”Indeed,Merleau‐Pontytakesthenotionofan“immanent

transcendency”ofthingsinconsciousnesstoitslogicalconclusion:

“Bydefinitionperceptionputsusinthepresenceofadefinitivelyopaqueterm.Inotherwords,theNaturethatweperceiveisasdistantandascloseaspossible,andforthesamereasons.ThereisnothingbetweenmeandtheNaturethatIperceive.WhenIperceiveathing,Icannotconceiveofaperceptioninterposedbetweenmeandtheobject.”(N118)

HereiteratesthesameideaintheVI:

“…thisdistanceisnotthecontraryofthisproximity,itisdeeplyconsonantwithit,itissynonymouswithit.”(VI135)

Andinasimilarvein:

Visiondoesnotcompletelyblendintovisible;nonethelessweareclosetoit,palpation,gazeenvelopsthings,clothesthemwithitsownflesh.(VI131)

In:Merleau­Ponty:KeyConcepts.Eds.RosalynDiproseandJackReynolds.Stocksfield:Acumen,2008(p.191)Hereafter“Evans.”

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Itisimportanttorealizethat“distance”isinthissenseacrucialconcept361insofar

asitispreciselysuchdistantiationthatisdenied,overlooked,suppressed,and

“forgotten”bybothflat‐naturalisticandidealisticontologies.ButMerleau‐Ponty’s

innovationistounderstand,inadeeplyHeracliteanway,thisdistanceas

constitutiveofanddefiningofitsseemingopposite,proximity,inthematrixof

perception.Wearewhatwesee,whichalsomeans,onceagain,thatwhatwesee

seesusaswell,inawaythattranscendsmeremetaphor.Perceptionisofcourse

equivalenttothebody,Leib,inthesensethattoperceiveistobecorporeal,and

vice‐versa.ThusMerleau‐Pontyobserves,“…Thethicknessofthebody,farfrom

rivalingthatoftheworld,isonthecontrarythesolemeansIhavetogountothe

heartofthings,bymakingmyselfaworldandbymakingthemflesh.”(VI135)Inthis

waythebodyisnotsimplythe“body‐subject”ofthePhenomenologyofPerception,

butthatpoleofthe“body‐world”circuitnowhavingbeennamedthe“flesh”;indeed,

itisthe“fleshofthebody.”362

InstressingtheentwinementofsensibilityandsentienceoverCartesian‐

styledualism,Merleau‐Pontybecomesacutelyawareoftheneedtostresstheir

differenceaswell,yetofcoursewithoutlapsingbackintodualism.Toexpressthe

complexityofthisrelationship,whatMerleau‐Pontysearchesforisakindof

dialectic—butwhatkindofdialecticemerges?Tobeginwith,itcannotbeadialectic

of“synthesis,”sinceitmustincludenon‐coincidence,somehow,atitscore.Yetnon‐

361Theideaof“distance”hasbeenemphasizedrecentlyinaworkbyRenaudBarbaras:DesireandDistance:IntroductiontoaPhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.PaulB.Milan.StanfordUniversityPress,2006362Compare:“Theworldseenisnot‘in’mybody,andmybodyisnot‘in’theworldultimately:fleshappliedtoaflesh,theworldneithersurroundsitnorissurroundedbyit.”(VI138)

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coincidenceisafunction,ironically,ofacertainidentityofseerandseen.As

Merleau‐Pontyexplainsinaworkingnote:

“Theverypulpofthesensible,whatisindefinableinit,isnothingelsethantheunioninitofthe‘inside’withthe‘outside,’thecontactinthicknessofselfwithself.—Theabsoluteofthe‘sensible’isthisstabilizedexplosioni.e.involvingreturn.”363

Thatsucha“coincidence”isincomplete,never‐finished,always‐in‐the‐making,etc.,

helpstoexplainwhyfacticityalonecannotexplainexistence,thatis,why

transcendenceorself‐distantiation—whicharethetwinbasesofthepossibilityof

reflectionandthe“transcendentalattitude”asareflectivestance—areequally

necessarydeterminantsoftheexistentialsituation.

D.IdentityandDifference,theOneandtheMany:DimensionsofMerleau­Ponty’sDialectic Theunityor“chiasm”ofmindandworld,spiritandnature,generatesasense

ofakindof“pre‐establishedharmony”(VI133)aswellasasenseofprimordial,but

strictlyunthematizable,mutualbelonging,ofthetwononetheless‐distinguishable

orders.Merleau‐Pontytreatsthisharmonyusuallyasabrutefactofsorts,thoughhe

doesattimesunderstanditasexpressingadeeperlogicofreciprocity:“…since

visionisapalpationwiththelook,itmustalsobeinscribedintheorderofbeing

thatitdisclosestous;hewholooksmustnothimselfbeforeigntotheworldthathe

looksat.”(VI134)Merleau‐Pontyexpressesthisideaofharmonyinmanyways—for 363VI268.ElsewhereMerleau‐Pontyreferstothis“explosion”asthe“dehiscence”or“écart”thatmarkstheflightofbeingfromitself—whichisnevertheless,asHegelsays,areturntoitself.Seealso:“Thetruephilosophy[isto]apprehendwhatmakestheleavingofoneselfbearetiringintooneself,andviceversa./Graspthischiasm,thisreversal.Thatisthemind.”(VI199)Relatedly,elsewhereMerleau‐Pontydescribesthefleshasan“anonymityinnatetomyself.”(VI139)

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example,withregardtonaturewithinandwithout:“Bythenatureinus,wecan

knowNature,andreciprocallyitisfromourselvesthatlivingbeingsandevenspace

speaktous…”364(N205)Centraltothisnotionistheultimatecontinuityofthe

visibleandtheinvisible:“Thesuperficialpellicleofthevisibleisonlyformyvision

andformybody.Butthedepthbeneaththissurfacecontainsmybodyandhence

containsmyvision.Mybodyasavisiblethingiscontainedwithinthefullspectacle.”

(VI138)Again,thisisacontinuity“interrupted,”butnotbeforeitmakesitself

knownasacontinuity.ThusIwouldwhollyagreewithFredEvansthat“…the

directionoftruthMerleau‐Pontyspeaksof,evenifitcanneverbefulfilledin

principle,doesseemtoputapremiumonperceptualandepistemological

convergenceratherthandivergence…”(Evans,191)

Ofcourse,thenotionofthefleshhasgeneratedmanycontroversiesand

misunderstandings,oneofthembeingthatMerleau‐Pontyisamonistandthatthe

fleshis,asalreadyalludedtonegativelyabove,akindofontologicalsubstrate.

Merleau‐Pontycertainlyisanon­dualist;hedoesnotusetheword,nowassociated

withstrainsof“Eastern”(especiallyBuddhist)philosophy,butIthinkthismuchcan

beadmitted.Forexample,hemakesclearinoneplace:“Thereisnointelligible

world,thereisthesensibleworld.”365(VI214)Yetfromthisaloneitdoesnotfollow

thatMerleau‐Pontyisamonist.Hispointinthisquote,forexample,isthatthe

“invisible”isofthisworld,itis“thatwhichinhabitsthisworld,sustainsit,and

rendersitvisible,itsownandinteriorpossibility,theBeingofthis[visible,sensible]

364Compare:VI99“…thehomogeneityofthemeasuredandthemeasuringimpliesthatthesubjectmakescommoncausewithspace.”365Insomeplaces,“Nature”isequated(oraligned)withthe“sensible.”See,forexample:“Thesensible,Nature,transcendthepastpresentdistinction…”(VI267)

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being.”(VI151)Orstatedinotherterms:“Meaningisinvisible,buttheinvisibleis

notthecontradictoryofthevisible:thevisibleitselfhasaninvisibleinner

framework(membrure),andthein‐visibleisthesecretcounterpartofthevisible,it

appearsonlywithinit…”(VI215)Whatweseehereisakindofreflexivitythatis

totallyforeignto,say,Spinoza’smonisticsystem,thoughtobefair,Spinoza’s“dual

attribute”theoryisnotwhollyincompatiblewithMerleau‐Ponty’sintentions.The

matterishighlycomplex,chieflybecauseMerleau‐Pontyistryingtore‐drawthe

termsofthisverydistinctionbetween“monism”and“dualism.”

Itisimportant,however,todosomedisambiguationatthisstage.Thereare

actuallytwodifferentkindsofquestionswithrespecttothequestionof“monism.”

Thereismonism(orpluralism)oftypesofbeing—Spinozamaynotfitthiscategory,

butBerkeley,James,orQuinedo—andamonismofjusthowmanybeingsthereare,

thatis,justone(acosmicwhole,substance,etc.)ormany(monads,Aristotelian

substances,etc.).Regardingthislatterquestionofmonismorpluralism,whatis

reallykeyforMerleau‐Pontyistheprincipleofaunityinthemany.Evansputitthis

way:

“What[Merleau‐Ponty]offersis…closertowhatwemightcalla‘unitycomposedofdifference’ratherthanacollectionofseparate,merelyexternallyrelatedentitiesoraunityformedthroughdominationbyoneoftheelementsofthatunity—heeschews,inotherwords,bothpluralismandmonism.”(Evans191)

Merleau‐Pontyillustratestheideaofunity‐in‐manythroughtheexpression“total

part,”thatis,apartofawholewhich,evenasitisapart,capturesthewhole,asit

were,“partially.”AsanexampleofwhatMerleau‐Pontymeansby“totalpart,”letus

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considerwhathesaysaboutthecaseofthesenses(thequoteislongbutvery

importantinillustratingwhatMerleau‐Pontyisgettingat—possiblyatruly

revolutionarynewcontributiontotheancientpuzzleoftheone‐and‐the‐many):

“Each‘sense’isa‘world,’i.e.absolutelyincommunicablefortheothersenses,andyetconstruingasomethingwhich,throughitsstructure,isfromthefirstopenupontheworldoftheothersenses,andwiththemformsonesoleBeing.…The‘World’isthiswholewhereeach‘part,’whenonetakesitforitself,suddenlyopensunlimiteddimensions—becomesatotalpart.Nowthisparticularityofthecolor,oftheyellow,andthisuniversalityarenotacontradiction,aretogethersensorialityitself:itisbythesamevirtuethatthecolor,theyellow,atthesametimegivesitselfasacertainbeingandasadimension,theexpressionofeverypossiblebeing.—Whatispropertothesensible(astolanguage)istoberepresentativeofthewhole,notbyasign‐significationrelation,orbytheimmanenceofthepartsinoneanotherandinthewhole,butbecauseeachpartistornupfromthewhole,comeswithitsroots,encroachesuponthewhole,transgressesthefrontiersoftheothers.”(VI218)

ThesepowerfulstatementsessentiallycomprisetheheartofMerleau‐Ponty’s

answertothequestionoftherelationofthemany—forexample,manysubjects,or

multipleordersofbeing—totheoneorthewhole,andwhathesaysofthesenses,or

ofcolors,appliestomanyotherthings,fromthecoordinatedanatomical/behavioral

developmentoforganisms,alreadylookedat,tothe“becomingofapainting”outof

manystrokesofthebrushandeventosexuality.366Itisimportanttostressallofthis

becauseofMerleau‐Ponty’sownremark,quotedabove,thattheprincipleof

“totality”mightbethecentraloneinallphilosophy.

Thisquasi‐holisticapproachischaracteristicofhowMerleau‐Pontydeals

withissuesofoppositionanddialectic.Foritinfactgoesspecificallytohis

understandingofwhatconstitutesthe“complementarity”ofopposites.“Thereare

366ThereissomethinganalogousinMerleau‐Ponty’sdescriptionofwhatMatisse’smethodofpaintingandthe“bodyofbehavior”intheorganismhaveincommon:“Threadsaretiedup,whichcomefromeverywhere,andwhichconstituteindependentforms,andthesametime,hefindsthatthesethreadsrealizesomethingwhichhasaunity.”(N154)Elsewhere:“Thusthesexualiscoextensivewiththehumannotasauniquecause,butasadimensionoutsideofwhichnothingexists.”(N282)

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two‘sides’ofanexperience,conjugatedandincompossible,butcomplementary.

Theirunityisirrecusable;itissimplyastheinvisiblehingeonwhichtwo

experiencesarearticulated—aselftornapart.[myemphasis]…contradiction,

understoodasinteriortoNature,mustbeassumed.Wemustadmittheideaofan

operatingnegationinNature...”367(N65‐66)Merleau‐Ponty’suseoftheterm

“complementarity,”isnot,Ibelieve,accidental.Ibelieveitisadeliberatereference

toBohr’stheoryofquantummechanicsbythesamename,asubjecttowhichhe

devotesagoodamountofattentionintheNaturelecturesthemselves.(N89‐100)In

asense,heapplieswhatistrueofsub‐atomicparticles,inparticularthesymmetrical

applicabilityofmutuallyincompatiblewave‐theoryandcorpusculartheorytothe

descriptionofelementaryparticles,tobeingitself:“…thetwomapsarecomplete,

andyettheydonotmergeintoone.Thetwopartsaretotalpartsandyetnot

superposable.”(VI134)(Noteagaintheideaofa“totalpart.”)

Inaninterestingkindofconvergence,HusserlscholarSebastianLufthas

expressedtheviewthatHusserl’sphilosophyasawhole,withitstwinpolesofthe

“CartesianWay”tothereductionandthe“Life‐World”method,canitselfbe

summarizedintermsoftwoincommensurableandyetcomplementary“maps”:

“Thus,theinterpretation[Ipresent]attemptstoovercomethecommonassertionthatthereisa‘contradiction’betweenHusserl’sCartesianpositionandhisaccountofthelife‐world.Ihavetriedtoshowthataphilosophicalthematizationofthelife‐worldisnotpossiblewithoutatranscendentalquestionastoitsoriginin(inter‐)subjectivity.InHusserl’seyes,bothagendasarecorrelative.Atthesametime,IwouldliketoinsistthatHusserl’sCartesianaccountofthesubjectandhislife‐worldontologypresenttwodistinctandinthissense,separateprograms.TheyareprojectsHusserlpursueswithdifferentaims:Whereasthe‘CartesianHusserl’pursuesapathofscientificgroundingandfoundationalism,the‘life‐worldHusserl’isinterestedinwhatcanbeencalledahermeneuticsoftheworldofeverydaylife.Bothprojectsaresetsquarelyagainsteachother,notinthesensethat 367ThenotionthatBeingcontainsitsownnegationtiesinwiththesecondofMerleau‐Ponty’slessonslearntfromthereversibilityoftouch—thatis,theimpossibilityofpurecoincidenceorasimple“identityofopposites.”(VI250‐1)

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theycontradictorcanceleachotherout,butinthattheypursuetwodifferentagendas.Theyarelocatedontwodifferent‘maps.’Onecanpursueonewhilecompletelyneglectingtheother.368

Inthisway,adistinctlyMerleau‐Pontianconcept(presumablyindependently

arrivedatbyLuft)ironicallycomesusefullytodefinethecareerarcofHusserl

himself.

IV.Conclusion

Merleau‐PontybeginstheNaturecourses,aswehaveseen,withan

investigationintothehistoryofphilosophy.Helatershiftshisinteresttoan

examinationofcontemporaryscience.Buttheseprimafacieunconnecteddiscourses

are,asiscustomaryinMerleau‐Ponty’ssingularlysyncreticapproach,unitedina

commonpurpose.Theconjunctionisrevealedintellingworkingnote,inwhichthe

philosopherspeaksofwhatistobediscussedinVI:

“ImustthereforeshowintheintroductionthatthebeingofscienceisitselfapartoraspectoftheobjectifiedInfinity[ofDescartes]andthattheOffenheitoftheUmweltisopposedtobothofthese[i.e.,Cartesianontologyandscience].WhencethechaptersonDescartes,Leibniz,Westernontology,whichindicatethehistorico‐intentionalandontologicalimplicationsofthebeingofscience.”369(VI176)

368Luft,Sebastian.“Husserl’sTheoryofthePhenomenologicalReduction:BetweenLife‐WorldandCartesianism.”InResearchinPhenomenology34,2004(p.226)369Relatedly:“IclarifymyphilosophicalprojectbyrecoursetoDescartesandLeibniz.”(VI177)

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Merleau‐Ponty’snotionofNatureis“polymorphous.”Phenomenasuchaslifeand

animality,wholenessandorganicform,growthandcreativity,“natural”originsand

processes—theseareallphenomenathatrevealdifferentcluesaboutthenon‐fully‐

constitutablecoreoftheworldandofourownhumanity.Naturalitydoesnot

exhaustthemeaningofBeing,butitdoesencircleallbeingsinitsberth,and

ultimately,nooneeverfullybreaksawayfromit,justasMerleau‐Pontyalready

observedaboutthe“naturalattitude”ofHusserl.Thusitisfittingtoendwiththe

followingquotation,whichneatlysummarizesMerleau‐Ponty’sattitudetowards

natureanditsplaceinontology:

“Nature…Byexaminingit,wehaveretrievedeverything,notthateverythingisinnature,butbecauseeverythingisorbecomesnaturalforus.TherearenosubstantialdifferencesbetweenphysicalNature,life,andmind.[myemphasis.]Wepassedbetweencausal‐realistthinkingandphilosophicalidealism,becausewefoundinbrute,savage,vertical,presentBeingadimensionthatisnotofrepresentationandnotthatoftheIn‐itself.”(N212)

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ChapterFive:Merleau­PontyandHusserlontheQuestionoftheParadoxofSubjectivityandNature

I.Introduction

Merleau‐Ponty’sembraceof“paradox”isradical,bothinthesensethatit

goestotheheartofhisphilosophicalprojectandinthesensethatitisverythorough

indeed.Itcouldbearguedthatpost‐KantianContinentalphilosophy,especiallyin

thetwentiethcentury,hascometotakeamorefavorableviewofparadoxthandid

itspredecessors;onemaythinkhereofKierkegaard’sfamousembraceofthe

“absoluteparadox”ofChrist,Marcel’s“MysteryofBeing,”Heidegger’s“hermeneutic

circle”andparadoxical“alwaysalready,”evenaspectsofRicoeur’shermeneuticsof

identity(asevidencedinthetitleofoneofhismajorworks,OneselfasAnother).The

differenceisthatMerleau‐Pontymadeofparadoxacentralthematicinitsownright.

Thatthehumanmindisledtoexpressorelucidateitssituationinparadoxical

terms—somethingMerleau‐Pontysteadfastlymaintains—isamomentousfactfor

someonewhoargues,asMerleau‐Pontydoes,fortheintimacyofsubjectivityand

Beingitself.ForitmeansthatBeing,andnotonlyconsciousness,iscontradictoryon

theinside.DoesthismeanMerleau‐Pontyrejectsthelawofnon‐contradiction?

Merleau‐Ponty’sapplicationofthislaw(whichherarelydealswithinjustthose

terms)goesasfarastheintelligibilityofBeingtorationalthoughtgoes;butheis

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willingtoconcede(andinfactinsists)thatBeinginitsprimordialityisineffableand

evennecessarilyso—andthat,accordingly,rationalthinking(“reflection,”“the

transcendentalattitude”)islessthanultimate.

Iftruthisunavailabletousthroughconcepts,however,itisnevertheless

availablyunavailable.Itdoesnotmerelyeludeus,iteludesusbecauseitsurrounds

usandpenetratesustothecore.Moreover,thereisawayinwhichthoughtcan

understanditselfandemployitsconcepts—through“dialectical”and“hyper‐

dialectical”thinking—thatservestobringthe“contradictions”ofunreflectedBeing

intoafruitfulrelationshipwithreflectivity.Theresultofthisexchangearethe

paradoxesofphilosophy,whoserigorousexpressionisnolesschallengingthanany

mannerof“problem‐solving”thatwecouldadopt.

By“Being”Merleau‐Pontydoesnotmeantosayanythingdifferentthan

“experience”asknownin“perceptualfaith.”Being,whichcanbeequatedtoalarge

extentwithwhatwehavebeencalling“Nature”(“wildBeing”),isexperiencedand

“lived‐through,”indeeditmaybe“life”itself(oragain“time,”thesinequanonof

lived‐experienceassuch)whoseprimordialunity‐in‐differenceconcealsatruth,

evena“logos”orlanguage,thatrevealsitself,intheparadoxesofthought,precisely

asconcealed.Thesayabilityandintelligibilityofcoreexperientialityandwhatit

disclosesispreserved,therefore,partiallyandasifintrace‐likeoutline,intheform

oftheparadoxesofbeing,experience,time,mind,freedom,andsoon—andthesein

turngivelifetophilosophicalthought,whichariseandmustreturntothedepths

theyopenup.Paradoxisthus,inMerleau‐Ponty,both“problem”and,asitwere,

“solution.”Itisthequestionandtheanswer,the“mysteryofbeing”aswellasthe

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explanationofthemystery.Inthisway,paradoxisnotintentional—itdoesnot

“pointbeyonditself”toatelos,apurpose,aform,oraplan.Itsfinalityisequallya

functionofitsoriginality—thereisonlytheBeginning,asitwere,thebirththat

eludestimebycreatingit.

Philosophyisthereforemisunderstoodbythose,includingHusserl,whothink

ofitasanessentially“problem‐solving”enterprise.Merleau‐Ponty’sconceptionis

closerinthiscasetothatofthelater(circaPhilosophicalInvestigations)

Wittgenstein,inthathewouldagreethatphilosophyisbetterusedforthepurpose

of“dissolving”philosophicalpuzzlesthansolvingthem.ButMerleau‐Pontywould

notthinkofparadoxesaslinguisticconfusions,ratherasmomentsof“contradiction”

or“crisis”signifyingthebreakdownandlimitsofsignificationbeforethe

unsignifiableverityattheheartofthebeingoftheworld.Merleau‐Pontyand

Wittgensteinareperhapsequallyinsistentonthecentralityoflanguagetothought

andevenhumanexperience.Inthecaseoftheformer,ofcourse,onemustalways

keepinmindhisfamousthesisofthe“primacyofperception,”aprimacythat

ultimatelyexpressesa“faith”inBeingthatisitsownmeaningormeaning‐fount,

fromwhichlanguageandits“ideal”meaningsariseand,overtime,alsodissolve.

ThisisanotherwayofsayingthatforMerleau‐Ponty,thereisstill,afterall,an

“absolute,”a“real”thatcannotbedemarcatedsomuchaslived,anditispromisedin

thesimplestactofperception,which,throughthe“phenomenon,”promises

disclosureoftheworld—thefirstcontradiction(subjectivityandobjectivity)that

theperceptualfaithharmonizesinitseffortlessway.Merleau‐Pontyistothisextent

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a“realist”—thoughthe“real”canneverbeknownpurelyasthereal,butonlythat

whichescapeslanguagelinguistically,sotospeak.

ThelaterWittgensteinisofcoursenotoriouslymuteaboutmetaphysical

questions,butforMerleau‐Ponty,theknowableunknowabilityofBeingisthe

overridingthemeofallreflection,whilethestrugglesofphilosophyitselfaretaken

assymptomaticnotofpathologicalhabitsoflinguisticbehaviorbut,attheirbestand

mostauthenticallyapproached,oftherigorsofthinkingthroughthedialectical

structureofphenomena.

Inthisfinal,culminatingchapterofthepresentdissertation,myfocusis

mostlyonMerleau‐Ponty,butIalsobrieflyexamineandcompareHusserl’s

approachtoparadoxtoMerleau‐Ponty’sthroughtheformer’sfamousdiscussionin

theCrisis370ofthe“paradoxofsubjectivity.”Fundamentally,Iwillshowthatwhile

forMerleau‐Pontyparadoxitselfplaysafundamentalroleinexplicatingthe

meaningofphenomenology,forHusserl,phenomenologyispreciselyameansto

solveparadoxes—amethodtoendallphilosophicaldisputes,infact.371Inthisway

Husserlrepresentsthemainstream,onemightsay,ofphilosophyinthe“Western”

philosophicaltradition—aswellas,importantlyforthethemesofthisdissertation,

theimplicitparadigmof“scientificthinking,”whichseesitselfinsimilarly“problem‐

solving”terms.Thereis,ofcourse,aninterestingwayinwhichevenHusserl

370Husserl,Edmund.TheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenologicalPhilosophy.Tr.DavidCarr.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1970.Hereafter“Crisis.”371See:Husserl,Edmund.EncyclopaediaBritannicaArticle.In:CollectedWorks,Vol.6.Tr.ThomasSheehanandRichardE.Palmer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1997

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embracessomethinglikethecentralityof“paradox”—butonlyinthesenseofits

beinga“reversalofcommonsense”;thisisacaseofsimplehomonymy.

Merleau‐Ponty’sincreasinglysophisticatedrelianceondialecticbecomes

entirelyexplicitinTheVisibleandtheInvisible372,inwhichheendorsesit

wholeheartedly,whiletryingtodistinguishitfromitsHegelian(andevenSartrean)

versions.ThusIbrieflyexaminethisphilosophicalappropriationandthewaysin

whichMerleau‐Pontydoesanddoesnotconceiveofphilosophyasadialectic.

Finally,andrelatedly,IlookatMerleau‐Ponty’suseandanalysisofthenotionof

“reflection,”alongwith“hyper‐reflection,”hislabelforthephilosophicalattitude

oncephilosophyhasbeentransformedfromaproblem‐solvingtoaself‐

problematizing(andthereby“self‐recovering”)enterprise.373

II.Merleau­Ponty’sPhilosophyofParadox

A.OverviewofMerleau­Ponty’sReferencestoParadox

TheseedofMerleau‐Ponty’sapproachtoparadox,andBeingasaparadoxical

phenomenonthatis(quasi‐)intelligibleinthoughtthroughamovementof

372Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheVisibleandtheInvisible.Tr.AlphonsoLingis.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1969.Hereafter“VI.”373Note:Merleau‐Pontyachievesgreatluciditywhenitcomestohismatureepistemologicalviews.Infact,hespeaksmoreclearlyforhisownpositionsthananyparaphrasecoulddo.Forthisreason,IrelyinthischaptermorethanIhavetothispointonlengthydirectquotationsfromthesourcehimself.ThisisparticularlythecaseforcertainsectionsfromtheVI,especiallychapter1,“ReflectionandInterrogation.”

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controlledcontradiction(dialectic),aretobefoundalreadyinthisdenseand

startlingpassage,whichisworthquotinginfull,fromThePrimacyofPerception374:

“Itistruethatwearriveatcontradictionswhenwedescribetheperceivedworld.Anditisalsotruethatifthereweresuchathingasanon‐contradictorythought,itwouldexcludetheworldofperceptionasasimpleappearance.Butthequestionispreciselytoknowwhetherthereissuchathingaslogicallycoherentthoughtorthoughtinthepurestate.ThisisthequestionKantaskedhimself…OneofKant’sdiscoveries,whoseconsequenceswehavenotyetfullygrasped,isthatallourexperienceoftheworldisthroughoutatissueofconceptswhichleadtoirreduciblecontradictions375ifweattempttotaketheminanabsolutesenseortransferthemintopurebeing,andthattheyneverthelessfoundthestructureofallphenomena,oreverythingwhichisforus.…Iwishonlytopointoutthattheaccusationofcontradictionisnotdecisive,iftheacknowledgedcontradictionappearsastheveryconditionofconsciousness.[myemphasis]…Thereisavainformofcontradictionwhichconsistsinaffirmingtwotheseswhichexcludeoneanotheratthesametimeandunderthesameaspect.…Thereisthesterilenon‐contradictionofformallogic[versus]thejustifiedcontradictionsoftranscendentallogic.Theobjectionwithwhichweareconcernedwouldbeadmissibleonlyifwecouldputasystemofeternaltruthsintheplaceoftheperceivedworld,freedfromitscontradictions.”(Primacy18)

Thatwecannotputupsuchasystemof“eternaltruths”islessacriticismof

Husserlianmethod,perhaps,whicharguablyalreadyproblematizesthequestionof

“eternity”throughitsembraceoforiginarytemporality,thanofclassical

metaphysicalthought,particularlyitsanti‐paradoxicalandanti‐dialectical

character.Theabove‐quotedpassagestatesallofthefundamentalthemesof

paradoxicalthinkingthatMerleau‐Pontywouldcontinuetodeepenandthat,finally,

cometoastartlinglyfreshnewexpressioninhislaterwritings.Merleau‐Ponty

makesitclearthatheisnotinterestedinthesterilecontradictionof“AandnotA”

foritsownsake.Itisonlyundercertainconditions,forceduponusbytheexigencies

oflivedexperience,thattherearisethe“justifiedcontradictions”ofphilosophy,

374Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePrimacyofPerceptionandItsPhilosophicalConsequences.”Tr.JamesM.Edie.InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.Hereafter“Primacy.”375Compare:“Everyattemptatelucidationbringsusbacktothedilemmas.”(VI11)Itisinterestingthatoneoftheearlywordsheusesforhismethodisinfact“elucidation.”(See,forexample:VI23)

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beginningalreadywiththeawakeningofreflectionfromtheoblivionofourpure

“perceptualfaith,”Merleau‐Ponty’stermofartfortheconditionofnatural

consciousnessand,indeed,thenaturalattitude:

“Weseethethingsthemselves,theworldiswhatwesee:formulaeofthiskindexpressafaithcommontothenaturalmanandthephilosopher—themomentheopenshiseyes;theyrefertoadeep‐seatedsetofmute‘opinions’implicatedinourlives.Butwhatisstrangeaboutthisfaithisthatifweseektoarticulateitintothesesorstatements,ifweaskourselveswhatisthiswe,whatseeingis,andwhatthingorworldis,weenterintoalabyrinthofdifficultiesandcontradictions…WhatAugustinesaidoftime—thatitisperfectlyfamiliartoeach,butthatnoneofuscanexplainittotheothers—mustbesaidoftheworld.”(VI3,myemphasisonlatter)

Merleau‐Pontyiswidelyknownasaphilosopherof“ambiguity,”asIhave

mentioned,butlesssoasoneof“paradox.”Yetthecontradictionsofphilosophyare

organized,dialectical,andfitapattern.Ambiguity,inMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophy,

appearstomeasamoreinchoate‐soundingversionofwhathemeansby“paradox”;

oralternately,ithasadifferentdiscursivefunction.Thatis,tosay(forexample)that

thehumanbeingisan“ambiguous”phenomenonistodeny,inessence,various

strictlydelineatedandone‐sideddescriptionsofhim/herorhisorherexperience

(“intellectualism,”“empiricism,”“naturalism”).Butitdoesnotclearlyposean

alternativeview.SinceMerleau‐Pontyhasnomonolithicalternative,thealternative

issomethinglike“paradox”or“justifiedcontradiction”—thatis,alogosofambiguity.

Merleau‐Ponty’srepeatedpositiveinvocationsofparadox,paradoxicalthinking,

dilemmas,contradiction,anddialecticityareconstantthroughouthiswritings—but

initiallyonlyinthebackground,almostlikeanafter‐thought.Thischangesas

Merleau‐Pontyseekstoemphasizethathonestreflectioncannolongerpretendto

dophilosophyinthemannerthattraditionhasimaginedituptothispoint—thatis,

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withthetacitassumptionthatitcaninreflectionmaintainaholdontheparadoxical

truth,soeffortlesslyinhabitedbyeverydaypre‐reflectivelife.

ItisimpossibletomentionallthewaysinwhichMerleau‐Pontyembraces

paradoxorallofthecountlessparadoxeshementions,butitisworthnotingthathis

mainpreoccupation—perception—wasexplainedbyhimasfundamentally

paradoxicalalreadyinthePhenomenologyofPerception,inthiscasewithrespectto

immanenceandtranscendence,theparadoxmentionedascentralto

phenomenology.376Herepeatsthesameideaoftheparadoxicalityofperceptionin

Primacyandreferstothe“internalparadoxofmyperception”inVI377,wherehealso

speaksofthe“paradoxesofvision”andthe“figuredenigmas,thethingandthe

world.”378Theessay“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow,”devotedtoHusserl,also

stressesenigmasofperceptionaswellasthehidden/revealeddualityofthings.379In

anotherplacewecanfindareferencetothe“fertilecontradictionofhuman

consciousness.”380Inthe“MetaphysicalinMan,”Merleau‐Pontycharacterizesthe

taskofmetaphysicsasoneofinquiringintoparadoxes,which,heexplainsina

footnote,heevenoutrightcallscontradictions:

376Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962.Hereafter“PP.”(p.425)Notealsothewordingheusesinthesamepassage,furtherdown:“Atthelevelofbeingitshouldneverbeintelligiblethatthesubjectshouldbebothnaturansandnaturatus,infiniteandfinite.Butwerediscovertimebeneaththesubject,andifwerelatetotheparadoxoftime,thoseofthebody,theworld,thething,andothers,weshallunderstandthatbeyondthesethereisnothingtounderstand.”(myemphasis)377VI,11378Ibid.,4379Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.”Tr.RichardM.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.167‐8)380Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.SenseandNon­Sense.Tr.HubertL.DreyfusandPatriciaAllenDreyfus.NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.p.96Hereafter“SNS”

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“Ihavetherighttoconsiderthecontradictionsofmylifeasathinkingandincarnatesubject,finiteandcapableoftruth,asultimateandtrue[myemphasis]becauseIhaveexperiencedthemandbecausetheyareinterconnectedintheunquestionableperceptionofathingorintheexperienceofatruth.Icannolongerintroducea‘transcendenceinimmanence’behindmeasHusserldid(eventranscendencequalifiedashypothetical),forIamnotGod,andIcannotverifytheco‐existenceofthesetwoattributesinanyindubitableexperience.”381

AndinoneofMerleau‐Ponty’slesserknownessaysonMontaigne382,inthe

beginningoftheessay,hechidesDescartesfortryingto“solve”paradoxinsteadof

acceptingit,averytellingsentiment.(Montaigne,201)

DuetothelimitedfocusofthisdissertationIhavehadmostlytobracketthe

questionofintersubjectivity,buthere,too,Merleau‐Pontythinksintermsof

paradox.InSorbonnelectures,itseemsthatMerleau‐Pontyacceptsthatthereisa

“contradiction”inthefactthatIcannotexperienceotherpeople,yetnaturallydo

experiencethem,inthecourseoflife.383Thereisalsoa“contradiction”ofself/other

attheheartofintersubjectivityaswell.(Toadvine,248).Interestinghereisthe

methodologyofsimplyacceptingacontradictorysituationandproceedingfrom

there.Inthe“Preface”ofPPhediscussesthe“paradoxanddialectic”ofthe“Egoand

theAlter.”(PPxiii)Amongotherthings,“theother”isparadoxicalasan“I”thatis

“notI”(notme),aswellasan“other”thatis“notother”(forIcannotbemyself

withouttheother).Allhumansolidarity,andallhumanviolence,onemightsay,

stemessentiallyfromthesamesource,theparadoxoftheother(or

intersubjectivity).

381“TheMetaphysicalInMan.”In:SNS(p.96)382Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ReadingMontaigne.”Tr.RichardC.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.198‐210).Hereafter“Montaigne.”383Referencefoundin:Toadvine,Ted.“Merleau‐Ponty’sReadingofHusserl:AChronologicalOverview.”InMerleau­Ponty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.227‐286).Hereafter“Toadvine.”

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Merleau‐Ponty’sacceptanceofparadox—evencontradiction,inthesensewe

haveseen—canbegleanedindirectlyaswell,forexamplethroughhiscommentary

onotherphilosophers.WehavealreadyseenthiswithKantandMontaigne.Butin

hisalready‐examinedcritiqueofBergsonfromtheNaturelectures,forexample,he

comments,“WecannotreproachBergsonforthiscontradiction,buthedoesnotgive

ittheplacethatitmerits.”384InBergson’svoiceMerleau‐Pontyinoneplaceremarks

favorablythat:“Here,perceptioniscontradictionrealized.”385Oragain,onCoghill’s

experiment,alsodiscussedinChapterFour:

“Coghillgoesfurther.Heshowsthatthematurationoftheorganismandtheemergenceofbehaviorareoneandthesamething.Fortheaxolotl,toexistfromheadtotailandtoswimarethesamething.Thisdoublephenomenon,whichamountstoaparadox,developsatthesametimeintwocontradictorydirections.…”(N144,myemphasis)

Merleau‐Pontyevencallstheaxolotllizarditselfaparadox!(N144‐5).Finally,inhis

criticalcommentaryonGuéroult’sconciliatingapproachtoDescartes,alsointhe

Naturelectures,hecommentsthat“Thecontradiction[ofthetwoorders,subjective

andobjective]isconstitutiveofthehuman.Thedomainofthehumanisalways

equivocal...”(N129)

384Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003.Hereafterthe“Naturelectures”inthebodyoftextor“N”incitations.385Ibid.,p.57

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B.Paradoxandthe“PerceptualFaith”

Ifthebasicparadoxofperceptionisthequestionoftranscendence‐and‐

immanence,aswehaveseendescribedabove,thefactisthatinperceptualfaith,this

isnotaproblemassuch:

“The‘natural’manholdsontobothendsofthechain,thinksatthesametimethathisperceptionentersintothethingsandthatitisformedthissideofhisbody.Yetcoexistasthetwoconvictionsdowithoutdifficultyintheexerciseoflife,oncereducedtothesesandtopropositionstheydestroyoneanotherandleaveusinconfusion.”(VI8)

Merleau‐Pontyinterestinglycallsournaturalcertitude“unjustifiable”:an

“unjustifiablecertitudeofasensibleworldcommontousthatistheseatoftruth

withinus.”386Itis“unjustifiable”ofcoursebecauseitisprimordial—presupposedin

anyjustification(especiallythejustificationofthe“skeptic,”whichwewillsee

pointedoutbelow).

Merleau‐Pontyalsocallsperceptualfaith“opennessuponbeing.”(VI88)But

opennessentailsnotonlyaccessbutocclusion:accesstoworldexistssidebyside

withoccultation(inaccess):“…thesetwopossibilities,whichtheperceptualfaith

keepssidebysidewithinitself,donotnullifyoneanother.”(VI28)Wehavealready

ofcoursevisitedthisnotionofasidebyside“contradiction”inwhichthesides

neverthelessdonotnullifyeachother—Merleau‐Pontyhascalledthis

“complementarity,”afterthesamenotioninquantummechanics(withwhose

lessonshecontinuestobepreoccupied).Thus“complementarity”and“paradox”

386Seealso:VI14“insolubleantinomies”inperceptualfaith.

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(“contradiction”)arecloselyintertwined,andtogethertheybegintorevealnew

foldsinMerleau‐Ponty’supdatedconceptionof“dialectic.”

AswesawintheNaturelectures,Merleau‐Pontycontinuestoregardthe

phenomenonofwholenessortotalityasacluetonotonlythestructureofbeingbut

alsotheinabilityofthoughttothinkBeingotherwisethanparadoxically.Totalityis

of“anotherorder”hestatesinoneplace,inthiscaseintermsofbinocular

perception.(VI7)Justasoneeyeseesandsodoestheother,evenasneitherbyitself

seesthe“miracleoftotality”anddepthpresentedinperception(VI8),so

philosophersaretrappedinone‐sidedwaystograspBeing:“…‘objective’and

‘subjective’[shouldbe]recognizedastwoordershastilyconstructedwithinatotal

experience,whosecontextmustberestoredinallclarity.”(VI20)Notethatitisthe

contextwhoseclarityistoberestored,notthetotalexperienceitself.Theexperience

isalreadyclarified,ironically,throughthecontradictionstowhichitgivesrisein

philosophy,fortheseare“complementary”descriptionsofthewholeitself—we

havealreadyseenhowMerleau‐Pontydisposesofthe“problemoftheoneandthe

many”inthisway.

Asatotality,“theperceivedworldisbeneathorbeyondthisantinomy[of

being‐objectandbeing‐subject].”(VI22)Itisthisfactwhichcallsfora“…re‐

examinationofthenotionsof‘subject’and‘object.’”SaysMerleau‐Ponty,“Every

question,eventhatofsimplecognition,ispartofthecentralquestionthatis

ourselves,ofthatappealfortotality[myemphasis]towhichnoobjectivebeing

answers...”(VI104)AgainstHusserl’sframingofphenomenologyasa“rigorous

science,”Merleau‐Pontyoffers,“Philosophyisnotascience,becausescience

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believesitcansoaroveritsobjectandholdsthecorrelationofknowledgewith

beingasestablished,whereasphilosophyisthesetofquestionswhereinhewho

questionsishimselfimplicatedinthequestion.”(VI27)Butevenifphilosophyisnot

abletograspits“object”inself‐coincidentreflection(notleastbecausethe

reflectionmusttakeaccountofitselfasafactor),itcanandmust—aswewillsee,in

regardsto“hyper‐reflection”—takestockofitssituationandfindexpressionforthe

inexpressible“totality”inwhichitfindsitselfalwaysalready.“Suchisthetotal

situationthataphilosophymustaccountfor.Itwilldosoonlybyadmittingthe

doublepolarityofreflection[reflectionandperception/reflectedandunreflected]

andbyadmittingthat,asHegelsaid,toretireintooneselfisalsotoleaveoneself.”

(VI49)

Thewindingmannerinwhichphilosophydoesanddoesnothaveawayto

addressthecontradictorilyself‐unified“subjective‐objective”realityofthepre‐

reflectiveperceptualsituationleadsMerleau‐PontytoofferatwistontheSartrean

notion,deridedbythatauthorasamorbidimaginalconstructidenticaltothe“God”

notionofChristianity,ofthe“In‐Itself‐For‐Itself.”OfcourseitisHegelwho

announcedhissystemasoneinwhich“substance”becomes“subject”(tyingthe

lattertothehistoricaladventofChristianity).Merleau‐Pontyfindsawaytosteer

betweenSartreandHegelonthispoint,whilealsotryingtomaintainadistance

fromKant’snegativist/idealistinterpretationoftheTranscendentalDialectic:

“ThetruthoftheSartreanIn‐Itself‐for‐itselfistheintuitionofpureBeingandthenegintuitionofNothingness.Itseemstousonthecontrarythatitisnecessarytorecognizeinitthesolidityofmyth,thatis,ofanoperativeimaginary,whichispartofourinstitution,andwhichisindispensableforthe

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definitionofBeingitself.Withthisdifference,weareindeedspeakingofthesamething…”(VI85,myemphasis;check)

C.ParadoxandPhilosophy

Merleau‐Ponty’snotionofparadoxorcontradictioncaneasilybe

misunderstoodandcaricatured.Onecouldalwaysarguewitha“pro‐paradox

position”thatit“permitseverything”387oristooschematicandabstract,allowingall

binariestobeswallowedupwithinit,butthatispreciselywhyMerleau‐Ponty’s

phenomenologicalmethod,whichatleaststrivestobetruetoexperience,isso

important.Dialecticallogicisalogicofthethingsthemselves.388

Merleau‐Ponty’sprioritizationofparadoxshapesthewayheunderstandsthe

natureofthephilosophicalenterprise.Heapprovinglystatesthat“philosophy[atits

best]becomestheenterpriseofdescribinglivingparadoxes.”389Philosophysimply

“interrogates”theperceptualfaith.Or,evenmoreprecisely,“philosophyisthe

perceptualfaithquestioningitselfaboutitself.”(VI103)InanotherplaceMerleau‐

Pontycomments:“Philosophybelieveditcouldovercomethecontradictionsofthe

perceptualfaithbysuspendingitinordertodisclosethemotivesthatsupportit.”

(VI50)Merleau‐Pontythusalsospeaksofthe“reflectiveviceoftransformingthe

387Fordiscussionofsuchacritiquefromacontemporaryphilosopher,see:Sainsbury,R.M.Paradoxes.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995(pp.136‐7)388Insupportofthisidea,seeforexampleonN94‐5,whereMerleau‐Pontyexpresslyrejectsthenotionofrefutingdeterminismwitha“dogmaticindeterminism”which,asitwere,“logicallydisproves”determinism,showingsomething“contradictory”init.Seealsofirstfullparagraphon92.Alsonotethefollowingremarks:“Wewantthereforetoopenlogicwithoutconsideringitsimplyasasimplyformalwayofdefiningphysicalreality.”(VI166)389Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollègedeFrance1952­1960.Tr.JohnO’Neill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970(p.108)HerehealsocitesHeraclitusandcallsforan“openBeing”—oneofmanysuchauspiciousreferencestothemasterphilosopherofparadoxhimself.

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opennessoftheworldintoanassentofselfwithself,theinstitutionoftheworld

intoanidealityoftheworld,theperceptualfaithintoactsorattitudesofasubject

thatdoesnotparticipateintheworld.”(VI51)TheimplicitcritiqueofHusserlin

thesewordsisevident;noticealsotheappealonceagaintothe“opacity”oftheself

toselfwhichmustaccompanythereflectiveflightfromperceptualfaith.

WewillrevisittheissueofMerleau‐Ponty’sreconceptionofthetaskof

philosophyinthefuturesectiononreflection.

III.HusserlandParadox

Husserlrecognizesplentyof“paradoxicalenigmas”inhisownpresentation

ofphenomenology.390Hisapproachtothemistypicalofphilosophicaltradition,

however,stemmingallthewaybacktoAristotle’sMetaphysics(BookIII),inseeking

toremovetheseenigmasinthenameoftruthandclarity.391Husserlneverquestions

thenotionthattheparadoxes,whichappearonly“atfirst[as]insoluble”(Crisis,175)

needtobe“resolved”onceandforall,lesthisownprojectoftranscendental

phenomenologyfail.Husserlcouldnot,forexample,bemoreexplicitabouthowhe

feelsaboutparadoxeswhenhecriticizesthesciencesinthe“Epilogue”toIdeasII

(IdeasII,427‐8),whereheclaimsthattheirresulting“paradoxes”arepreciselythe

390Crisis174391Aristotle,CompleteWorksofAristotle.Tr.JonathanBarnes.PrincetonUniversityPress,1971.(pp.1572‐1584)

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deleteriousresultofbeing“unphilosophical”intherequiredsense.Whenproper

proceduresaretaken,“Insuchacasetherecannotbeanyunclear,problematic

conceptsoranyparadoxes.”392(IdeasII,428,myemphasis)

AllofthisbecomespertinentintheCrisiswhenHusserlconfrontshisown

philosophyanditsapparentparadoxes,thosewhichcriticshadonseeminglygood

groundspointedout.Inthistext,theparadoxHusserlpaysthegreatestattentionto

istermedmemorablybyhimthe“paradoxofsubjectivity.”Howisit,theparadox

goes,thattheentireworldisconstitutedbyonlyonepartoftheworld,namelythe

partthatconsistsofhumansubjects—thatis,“real”humanbeings,the“community”

ofmonadsastheyareelsewheredescribed?Ofcourse,verymuchthesameparadox

wasonHusserl’smindeveninIdeasI:

“Thus,ontheonehandconsciousnessissaidtobeabsoluteinwhicheverythingtranscendentand,therefore,ultimatelythewholepsychophysicalworld,becomesconstituted;and,ontheotherhand,consciousnessissaidtobeasubordinaterealeventwithinthatworld.Howcanthesestatementsbereconciled?”(IdeasI124)

The“solution”totheparadox(a“paradoxwhichcanbesensiblyresolved”—Crisis

180)takesafamiliarformintheCrisis.Husserlmerelyreaffirmsthedistinctionhe

hasbynowmadelongagoandmanytimessince,namelybetweenempirical‐real

humansubjects,eachofwhomalsotranscendentallyco‐constitutestheworld(along

withotherhumansubjects),andthetranscendentalsubjectivity/intersubjectivity

forwhomindividual,particularegosaremerely“phenomena,”ego‐polesof

noematic‐noematicaprioricorrelativityofconstitution.

392Husserlfollowsthisbyannouncingthatheseesspreadoutbeforehimthe“promised”land.(IdeasII,429)

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“Concretely,each‘I’isnotmerelyanego‐polebutan‘I’withallitsaccomplishmentsandaccomplishedacquisitions,includingtheworldasexistingandbeing‐such.Butintheepochéandinthepurefocusuponthefunctioningoftheego‐pole,andthenceupontheconcretewholeoflifeandofitsintentionalintermediaryandfinalstructures,itfollowseoipsothatnothinghumanistobefound,neithersoulnorpsychiclifenorrealpsychophysicalhumanbeings;allthisbelongstothe‘phenomenon,’totheworldasconstitutedpole.”(Crisis183)

Husserl’ssolution,inotherwords,comesdowntoadistinctionbetween“real”and

“phenomenal”sensesinwhichwecanunderstandthe“I”ofthehumansubject.

Thereishereatrulyirresolvableparadoxofsubjectivityonlyifweareforcedto

understandthetranscendental“I”asidentical,withoutqualification,withthereal

“I.”ThisissuetrulyiscentraltoHusserl’senterprise.“Iftheparadox…were

insoluble,”Husserlexplains,“itwouldmeanthatanactuallyuniversalandradical

epochécouldnotbecarriedoutatall,thatis,forthepurposesofasciencerigorously

boundtoit.”(Crisis180).Forphenomenologywouldreducetopsychology.Itis

interestingtorememberthatMerleau‐Pontydeniedpreciselythepossibilityofa

“radical”oruniversalepoché,whichshowsfromacertainanglewhyhedidnothave

toworryaboutHusserl’sversionofthe“paradoxofsubjectivity.”

ThedistinctionasphilosophersbetweenHusserlandMerleau‐Pontycanbe

illustratedthroughcontrastingstatementstheymakeontheirultimatetask.

Husserl’srelentlessgoalistounderstand,andtohimthismeans,toalargeextent,

framingthingseidetically—thatis,seeingthemintheirconceptualform:

“Fromthebeginningthephenomenologistlivesintheparadoxofhavingtolookupontheobviousasquestionable,asenigmatic,andofhenceforthbeingunabletohaveanyotherscientificthemethanthatoftransformingtheuniversalobviousnessofthebeingoftheworld—forhimthegreatestofenigmas—intosomethingintelligible.”(Crisis180)

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OfcourseMerleau‐Ponty,inacceptingthereduction,parallelsHusserlwhenhesays

thatphilosophy“dispossesseshumanity…byinvitingittothinkofitselfasan

enigma.”(VI3)Buthefollowsthisupwiththedistinctlyun‐Husserliansentiment:

“Thisisthewaythingsareandnobodycandoanythingaboutit.”(VI4)

IncontrasttoHusserl,thatis,forMerleau‐Pontytheobviousnessofthe

world,orratherthe“perceptualfaith”withwhichwetaketheworldandour

relationwithit,intheiressentialoneness,forgranted,is,strictlyspeaking,beyond

intelligibility.ItisinterestinginthisregardthatHusserlcantacitlyconcedethis

point,atleastinacertainlimitedrespect,yetwithoutacceptingitsconsequences.

Thushewrites,

“Noteventhesinglephilosopherbyhimself,withintheepoché,canholdfasttoanythinginthiselusivelyflowinglife,repeatitalwayswiththesamecontent,andbecomesocertainofitsthis‐nessanditsbeing‐suchthathecoulddescribeit,documentit,sotospeak(evenforhisownpersonalone),indefinitivestatements.”(Crisis178)

ItismorethanapparentthatHusserlthrivesontheself‐imageofbeinga

“paradoxical”philosopherinthesenseofmilitatingagainstcommonopinionandthe

“naturalistic”and“realistic”biasesofthecommonmanandthescientist.Butforhis

part,Merleau‐Pontyshowslittlepatienceforrestingcontentwiththissortofstrict

reversality.Considerforexamplehisremarksonthewayspeopleinterpretthenew

physics:“Thusthe‘strange’notionsofthenewphysicsarestrange…onlyinthe

sensethataparadoxicalopinionsurprisescommonsense,thatis,without

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instructingitindepthandwithoutchanginganythingofitscategories.”393(VI17,my

emphasis)This,inessence,isexactlywhatIhavearguedgoesoninIdeasIIwith

respecttothattext’shybridmixtureofanti‐naturalismandtacitnaturalism,which

conspiretooccludeaskingthemeaningfulquestionsofnaturelefttoMerleau‐Ponty

(andothers)toraise.Withacriticaltone,Merleau‐PontysummarizesHusserl’s

attitudetowardsphilosophyandparadoxalikeinthefollowingmanner:

“Thus,withthecorrelationbetweenthoughtandtheobjectofthoughtsetupasaprinciple,thereisestablishedaphilosophythatknowsneitherdifficultiesnorproblemsnorparadoxesnorreversals:onceandforall,Ihavegraspedwithinmyself,withthepurecorrelation…thetruthofmylife,whichisalsothetruthoftheworldandoftheotherlives.”(VI48)

IV.TheParadoxofReflection

A.TheReflectiveAttitude

Thecomplex,ambiguousrelationshipbetweenMerleau‐PontyandHusserl,

whichwehaveexaminedatlengthinChapter3andelsewhere,becomesonceagain

stronglyapparentinMerleau‐Ponty’sremarksonreflection.Considerthefollowing

quote:

393Merleau‐Pontymakessimilarlyderogatoryremarksonthesuperficialversionof“paradoxical”thinkingintheNaturelectures.See:N108,114.Thereferencesherearetothe“paradoxes”generatedbyrelativitytheory.

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“Thoughtcannotignoreitsapparenthistory,ifitisnottoinstallitselfbeneaththewholeofourexperience,inapre‐empiricalorderwhereitwouldnolongermerititsname;itmustputtoitselftheproblemofthegenesisofitsownmeaning.”(VI12)

Ontheonehand,thisistheverytaskofHusserl’sgeneticphenomenologyinits

morematurephases,a“questioning‐back”ofthoughtbythought.ButMerleau‐Ponty

placesacertainemphasison“experience,”which,initspurepre‐reflectiveform,

thoughtcannot—withoutincurringcertainpregnantcontradictionsthatmuststay

withitasremindersofitsdistance‐in‐proximityfromtheorigin—trulyaccess:

“Throughtheconversiontoreflection,whichleavesnothingbutideates,cogitata,ornoematasubsistingbeforethepuresubject,wefinallyleavetheequivocationsoftheperceptualfaith,whichparadoxicallyassuredusthatwehaveaccesstothethingsthemselvesandthatwegainaccesstothemthroughtheintermediaryofthebody,whichthereforeopenedusuptotheworldonlybysealingusupinthesuccessionofourprivateevents.”(VI30)

The“solution”totheantinomy,notesMerleau‐Ponty,is“ideality,”forwhich“the

worldisnumericallyonewithmycogitatumandwiththatoftheothersinsofarasit

isideal(idealidentity,beneaththeseveralandtheone).”Butthisisnotagenuine

solution,inasmuchasitisactuallydeployedasadodgeoftheactualproblem:

“Thismovementofreflectionwillalwaysatfirstsightbeconvincing:inasenseitisimperative,itistruthitself,andonedoesnotseehowphilosophycoulddispensewithit.Thequestioniswhetherithasbroughtphilosophytotheharbor,whethertheuniverseofthoughttowhichitleadsisreallyanorderthatsufficestoitselfandputsanendtoeveryquestion.Sincetheperceptualfaithisaparadox[myemphasis],howcouldIremainwithit?”(VI31‐2)

Itisclearbynowthatthe“perceptualfaith”isanothernameforthe“natural

attitude,”conceivednowinitsfullest,andnotfullyelucidatable,depths.And

reflection,asIhavemaintainedallalong,iswhatMerleau‐Pontymeansbythe

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“transcendental”attitude394,andclearly,itcannotforhimpulleffectively

consciousnessoutofitsimmersionintheworld,itspre‐reflectivehome:“AndifIdo

notremainwith[perceptualfaith],whatelsecanIdoexceptre‐enterintomyself

andseektheretheabodeoftruth?”(VI31)Theproblemwith“philosophiesof

reflection”isthattheytryto“comprehend”theself‐worldbondby“undoing”itfirst,

thenfalselytryingtore‐fabricateit:“…thereflectionrecuperateseverythingexcept

itselfasaneffortofrecuperation,itclarifieseverythingexceptitsownrole.The

mind’seyetoohasitsblindspot…”(VI33)Furthermore,“reflective

thought…performsallitsoperationsundertheguaranteeofthetotalitythatit

claimstoengender”(VI33),whereasclearlythetotalityexceedsit.

Itisclearthatthe“reflectiveattitude”appliestoDescartes,Kant,Husserl,and

evenHegelindifferentways.Themomentofrecoveryorrecuperationrepresented

byreflection,andultimatelytheself‐interrogationofthoughtinthenaturalattitude

thatHusserlidentifiesasthephenomenologicalreduction,isproblematic,indeed

paradoxical395,insofarasitcontainsamomentofdisruptionor“non‐coincidence”396

whichwehaveseenbefore:“Whatisgivenisnotamassiveandopaqueworld,ora

394Iftherestillisanydoubtaboutthis,Merleau‐Ponty’sownwordsshouldputittorest:“Withonestrokethephilosophyofreflectionmetamorphosestheeffectiveworldintoatranscendentalfield;indoingso,itonlyputsmebackattheoriginofaspectaclethatIcouldneverhavehadunless,unbeknowntomyself,Iorganizedit.”(VI44)395Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollègedeFrance1952­1960.Tr.JohnO’Neill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970(p.106):Reduction“involvesaparadox.”396Merleau‐Pontymakesthepointthatphilosophyismoreorlessatranslation.Onemightgosofarastosaythattheproblemsoftranslationarecoextensive,forMerleau‐Ponty,withthoseofhisstyleofphilosophy,whicheffectsa“translation”ofthe“mute”senseofnature/beingintothelanguageofconcepts(i.e.,languageinitspropositional‐cognitiverole).Forapowerfulandrelevantexaminationoftheissueoftranslationfromwithinthephenomenological‐hermeneuticaltraditionsee:Vandevelde,Pol.TheTaskoftheInterpreter:Text,Meaning,andNegotiation.Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress,2005

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universeofadequatethought;itisareflectionwhichturnsbackoverthedensityof

theworldinordertoclarifyit,butwhich,comingsecond,reflectsbacktoitonlyits

ownlight.”(VI35,myemphasis)Merleau‐Ponty’sverdict:

“Thiswholereflectiveanalysisisnotfalse,butstillnaïve,aslongasitdissimulatesfromitselfitsownmainspring,andaslongas,inordertoconstitutetheworld,itisnecessarytohaveanotionoftheworldaspre‐constituted—aslongastheprocedureisinprincipledelayedbehinditself.”(VI34)

Merleau‐Pontydoesconsiderchallengestothispointofview.Forexample,

headdressesthekeychallengethatsaysthathowreflectiongetstoitsperchis

irrelevant,astheprocessislikealadderthatcanbekickedaway;buthenoteson

thecontrarythatinthatcase,“there[wouldbe]nolongertheoriginatingandthe

derived”andhenceno“philosophyofreflection,”strictlyspeaking,atall.(VI35)In

otherwords,the“ladder”isbuiltintothedefinitionofreflectivityinrelationto

somethinglike“first‐order(unreflected)experience.”

Yethedoesnotendorsequietism,either.“Itisaquestionnotofputtingthat

perceptualfaithinplaceofreflection,butonthecontraryoftakingintoaccountthe

totalsituation,whichinvolvesreferencefromtheonetotheother.”(VI35,my

emphasis)(Recallthatwehaveseenthisreferencetothe“total”situationabove.)

Thisisofcourseexactlywhatsetsuptheproblematicofnature—namely,the

problemofatotalitythatcannot,intermsofspirit,fullyenvelopitself,butwhich

knowsitselftobebonded,rooted,andevenensconcedtherein.Thatbondisof

courseexactlywhatmakespossiblethe“truth”—evenasthe“truth”inthisdeeper

ontologicalsense(deeperthanlinguistic‐conceptualtruth)devolvesinto

contradictoryconceptswhenweattempttoexpressitlinguistically‐logically.The

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unityofthisbond,apre‐reflectiveunitythattranscends,finally,thedistinction

between“identity”and“non‐identity”thatpreoccupiestheGermanIdealists,is

irrecoverable:“…therelationbetweenathoughtanditsobject…containsneitherthe

wholenoreventheessentialofourcommercewiththeworld…whichweshallhere

calltheopennessupontheworld(ouvertureaumonde)…”397(VI35)

B.“Hyper­Reflection”

SowhatdoesMerleau‐Pontyopposetoreflection,pureandsimple,without

“replacing”reflection(thetranscendentalattitude)with“perceptualfaith”(the

naturalattitude)?Hisansweris“Hyper‐reflection.”Hyper‐reflectionisthus,Iwould

propose,akindof“thirdattitude”tomatchthe“thirdway”Merleau‐Pontymentions

elsewhere:a“natural‐transcendental”attitudeifyouwill,whichcomestobeingan

awarenessofwhatHeideggercalls“radicalfinitude.”398InMerleau‐Ponty’sparlance,

whatneedstobegraspedis,asusual,theprimacyofperception.

“Tofoundthelatter[perception]ontheformer[reflection],andthedefactoperceptionontheessenceofperceptionsuchasitappearstoreflection,istoforgetthereflectionitselfasadistinctactofrecovery.Inotherwords,wearecatchingsightofanotheroperationbesidestheconversiontoreflection,morefundamentalthanit,ofasortofhyper­reflection(sur­réflexion)thatwouldalsotakeitselfandthechangesitintroducesintothespectacleintoaccount.Itaccordinglywouldnotlosesightofthebrutethingandthebruteperceptionandwouldnotfinallyeffacethem,wouldnotcutthe

397ItseemsthatforMerleau‐Ponty,quantummechanicsshowsthatthereisno“representationofreality”throughmeasurement,exactlyinthesameway(perhaps)thatthoughtitself(asreflection)cannot“retrieve”nature.(N94‐5)Butitisnotsimplyamatterofitsbeing“unable”toretrieveit,intheway“God”(anintellectusarchetypus)forexample,could.ItisveryimportantthatevenGodcouldnotretrieveit,becauseNatureitselfisinvirtueofitselfirrecoverable,a“permanentpast.”398Insomesenses,itcouldalsobeconceivedasananswertoFoucault’scritiqueofthe“transcendental‐empiricaldoublet”fromTheOrderofThings.See:Foucault,Michel.TheOrderofThings:AnArchaeologyoftheHumanSciences.NewYork:VintageBooks,1994(p.318)

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organicbondsbetweentheperceptionandthethingperceivedwithahypothesisofinexistence.”399(VI38)

Thetaskforphilosophy,byimplication,istothinktheworldoftranscendenceinits

transcendence,difficultlyandevenimpossibly,using“thesignificationsofwordsto

express,beyondthemselves,ourmutecontactwiththethings,whentheyarenotyet

thingssaid.”Wemightcallthisthe“paradoxofreflection”:“Thereflectionfinds

itselfthereforeinthestrangesituationofsimultaneouslyrequiringandexcludingan

inversemovementofconstitution.”(VI45)400

Merleau‐Pontyfindsinhisnotionof“hyper‐reflection”awaytocritique

Husserl’sidealisticinterpretationofphenomenologicalmethod.401Whatthenotion

thateverytranscendentalreductionisalsoaneideticreductionmeans(aHusserlian

principlewehavequotedelsewhere),forhim,isthatwecannotcapturethe

“concreteflux”ofexistence.ToreflectinHusserl’sstark,transcendentalsenseisto

“…disengagefromthethings,perceptions,world,andperceptionoftheworld,bysubmittingthemtoasystematicvariation,theintelligiblenucleithatresist…Itthereforebyprincipleleavesuntouchedthetwofoldproblemofthegenesisoftheexistentworldandofthegenesisoftheidealizationperformedbyreflectionandfinallyevokesandrequiresasitsfoundationahyper­reflectionwheretheultimateproblemswouldbetakenseriously.”(VI45‐6)

399Compare:45reflection:“[as]reflection,re‐turn,re‐conquest,orre‐covery,itcannotflatteritselfthatitwouldsimplycoincidewithaconstitutiveprinciplealreadyatworkinthespectacleoftheworld…”400ComparetoMerleau‐Ponty’sdescriptionofphilosophyasconcerningthe“far‐offasfar‐off.”(VI102)401Seebohmmentionsthattherearehintsof“paradox”and“contradiction”inMerleau‐Ponty’smethodology,butclaims(Ithinkcorrectly)thatithasmoretodowiththe“what”thanthe“how.”See:Seebohm,ThomasM.“ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InMerleau­Ponty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(p.66)

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NotethatevenhereMerleau‐Pontydoesnotstrictlyspeakingopposeeitherthe

eideticorphenomenologicalreductions;hesimplywantstopushfurtherand

deeper,inanefforttobetrulytruetothe“thingsthemselves”andtheirparadoxical

(becauseaccomplishedthroughdifference)unitywithus.AsLangerpointsout

helpfully,Merleau‐Ponty’slaterprocedureofthinkingtheorigin,usingreflectionto

gobeyondit,isradicallyparadoxicalonlyinawaythatmatchesourown(i.e.,

humanity’sown)paradoxicalbeing‐in‐the‐worldinthefirstplace.402(Langer165‐6)

Indeed,onceagain,aswehavecometoexpect,Merleau‐Pontyfindsthereversalof

theHusserlianimpulseinHusserl’sownphenomenologicalimperative:“In

recognizingthateveryreflectioniseideticand,assuch,leavesuntouchedthe

problemofourunreflectedbeingandthatoftheworld,Husserlsimplyagreesto

takeuptheproblemwhichthereflectiveattitudeordinarilyavoids—the

discordancebetweenitsinitialsituationanditsends.”(VI46)Eveninanearlier

essay,Merleau‐Pontymakesasimilarpoint,saying,withwhatMerleau‐Ponty

interpretsasthematureHusserl:“Wemust,rather,becomeawareofthisparadox—

thatweneverfreeourselvesfromtheparticularexceptbytakingoverasituation

thatisallatonce,andinseparably,bothlimitationandaccesstotheuniversal.”403

“Hyper‐reflection”becomesanothernameofphilosophyitself.Ittakes

accountofdimensionsoffaciticity,spatialityandtemporality,andidealityalike,

sparingnodimensionofexistenceinitsrayofregard.(VI46)Hereisthe“third

dimension”wheretheantinomiesofreflectiveanalysisare,inasense,lifted.But

402Langer,MonikaM.Merleau­Ponty’sPhenomenologyofPerception:AGuideandCommentary.Tallahassee:TheFloridaUniversityPress,1989.(164‐5)403Merleau‐Ponty.“PhenomenologyandtheSciencesofMan.”Tr.JohnWild.InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.(p.82)

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hyper‐reflectiontakesplacethrough,andnotoutsideof,reflectionitself;inorderto

seethatwhich“delivers[thethinker]overtoperceptionandtophantasms…hemust

reflect.Butassoonashedoesso,beyondtheworlditselfandbeyondwhatisonly‘in

us,’beyondbeinginitselfandbeingforus,athirddimensionseemstoopenup,

whereintheirdiscordanceiseffaced.”(VI29)

HowdoesallofthissquarewithMerleau‐Ponty’snotionofasilentLogosof

theworld?Thatis,hedeclaresinmanyplacesvariationsofthisthought:“Thereisa

Logosofthenaturalaestheticworld,onwhichtheLogosoflanguagerelies.”(N

212)404WhatiskeytoseeisthatMerleau‐Pontydoesnotwanttodenyintelligibility

tothegroundor“mainspring,”hesimplywantstodenythatitiscompletely

isomorphic,asitwere,withhumanunderstanding.Inthiswayitisakintothe

being‐in‐itself‐and‐for‐itselfMerleau‐Pontyspokeofbefore.Alreadyin“InPraiseof

Philosophy,”Merleau‐Pontyobservesthat“mancontainsinsilencealltheparadoxes

ofphilosophy.”405Thatis,humanity’sownbeinghasadialecticallogicthatcanbe

expressedinwords,butonlyobliquely.Merleau‐Ponty’sunderstandingofthe

tightlywoundunityofcontrariesinBeingactually,inhiseyes,servestopreserveas

opposedtowoundtheintelligibilityofBeing.Thusheremarks(VI268)thatIdeasII

trieswronglytodisentangleknots,sincedisentanglementdestroysintelligibility!

Cartesiandualism,forinstance,hasincreased“intelligibility”ofpartsattheexpense

ofmakingentirelyunintelligiblethewhole—thatis,thewholebeingthatisalive,

embodied,thinking,andsensing.Hyper‐reflectionrestoresthe“sense”ofthiswhole,

404SeealsoVI,145:“mindorthought”is“sublimationoftheflesh.”405Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.InPraiseofPhilosophyandOtherEssays.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1988(pp.63‐4)

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eventhough,atthesametime,thisisa“sense”thateludesthelogicofnon‐

contradiction.

Merleau‐Ponty’sthoughtonreflectionandtheparadoxicalperceptualfaith

precedenttoithasmaturedsincePP,thoughsubtly.Noticewhathesaysinthe

earliertextabouttheissue:

“Itwillperhapsbemaintainedthataphilosophycannotbecenteredaroundacontradiction,andthatallourdescriptions,sincetheyultimatelydefythought,arequitemeaningless.Theobjectionwouldbevalidifwewerecontenttolaybare…alayerofprelogicalormagicalexperiences.Forinthatcasewewouldhavetochoosebetweenbelievingthedescriptionsandabandoningthought,orknowingwhatwearetalkingaboutandabandoningourdescriptions.…[Thus]wemustreturntothecogito,insearchofamorefundamentalLogosthanthatofobjectivethought…”(PP425)

Inaslightbutimportantcontrasttothesestatements,theMerleau‐PontyoftheVIis

morecomfortablelivingintheabsenceofanother,deeper,non‐objective“Logos.”

Thisisnottosaythereisnosuchlogos,orthat“wildBeing”lacksmeaninginits

wildness(wehavealreadyseenthatNatureforMerleau‐Pontyautoproducesits

ownmeaning),onlythatthedistancebetweenitsmeaningandthe“meanings”ofthe

ideal,reflectiveorderisinacertainsenseunbridgeable,andthathereinliesthe

ultimateparadoxofreflection:thatwhilethereisameaningwithoutthought,justas

thereistranscendencewithoutimmanence—thesetruthscanonlybeappreciated

throughthought,immanently.Consciousnessisbondedtoitsunconsciousorigin;

weareprivilegedtoknowthedepthsofourignorance.

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V.Merleau­Ponty’sParadoxicalThinkingInRelationtoOtherStylesofThinking:Dialectic,Skepticism/Quietism,andMysticism

A.Merleau­PontyandHegelianDialectic

Merleau‐Ponty’sunderstandingof“paradox”and“philosophy”alikeisdeeply

informedbyhisreadingandresponsetothe“dialectical”philosophyofHegel.Hugh

SilvermanexplainstheprecisesenseinwhichMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyisa

“dialectic”:

“[Merleau‐Ponty]verymuchseeshimselfaspartofahistoricalsuccessioninwhichthediscoveryofsubjectivityandthediscoveryofhistoryturnintoadialecticofexistenceanddialectic.But…hisdialecticisnotofaHegeliansort.Hisdialecticissuchthathefindsthephilosopherencounteringwhatisalreadythere;hisdialecticisoneofexperienceandphilosophybecomingthatexperience,philosophyinterrogatingwhatisandfindingitselfthereinwhatisinterrogated.Hisdialecticismoreofatensionbetweenexistenceanddialectic,anambiguitybetweenthetwo.”406

Thenotionofadialecticwhichincludesdialecticasoneofthetermsofthedialectic

itselfischaracteristicofthesortofreflexivelyself‐criticalendeavorMerleau‐Ponty

launchesinespeciallyhislaterperiod.UnlikeHegeliandialectic,Merleau‐Pontian

dialectichasno“goal”otherthanitsownmovement,whichisnothaphazardbut

purposefullyself‐inverting—butonecannotevensaythismuch,itturnsout,

withoutaffixinganessencetowhateludesessentialdescription:

406Silverman,Hugh.“IsMerleau‐PontyInsideorOutsidetheHistoryofPhilosophy?”InChiasms:Merleau­Ponty’sNotionofFlesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Albany:2000(p.138)

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“[Thedialecticis]Self­manifestation,disclosure,intheprocessofformingitself.…Thedialecticisindeedallthis,anditis,inthissense,whatwearelookingfor.Ifnonethelesswehavenothithertosaidso,itisbecause,in[the]historyofphilosophy,ithasneverbeenallthatunadulteratedly;itisbecausethedialecticisunstable(inthesensethatthechemistsgivetotheword),itisevenessentiallyandbydefinitionunstable,sothatithasneverbeenabletoformulateitselfintotheseswithoutdenaturingitself,andbecauseifonewishestomaintainitsspirititisperhapsnecessarytonotevennameit.”(VI92)

Merleau‐Pontyformallyendorsesthemethodofdialecticinchapter2ofVI,entitled,

“ReflectionandInterrogation.”(VI89)(Thechapteritselfisasustainedresponseto

Sartre’sBeingandNothingness.)Merleau‐Pontygoesontogiveadetailedaccountof

whathemeansbythe“instability”(quotedabove)ofdialectic,itsnatureof

subverting,mediating,andtransforming,notforthesakeofrestinginonefinalized

thesis,butforthesakeofexpressingtheinnernatureofBeingitself.Heremorethan

anywhereelse,Merleau‐Ponty’sadoptionofacertainradicalHeracliteanism,one

thatbreaksawayfrombothPlatonicandHusserliancontainers(whichopposean

existentialHeracliteanfluxtoanidealParmenideanorder,sotospeak)becomes

clear.Indeed,heallbutsayssohimselfbyapprovinglypointingoutthatHeraclitus

alreadyshowedtheway,“oppositedirectionscoincidinginthecircularmovement.”

(VI92)

Asweexaminedbefore,Merleau‐Ponty’sthoughtembracesaparadigmof

oppositionthathecalls“complementarity”;itisadialecticthatrefuses,wemight

nowsay,toremain“static”bycrestingintoanyformofsynthesisofhorizons.Itisin

thisspiritthatIreadMerleau‐Ponty’sremarkableintertwiningofhiscritiqueof

Sartreanontologyandhisownburgeoningdialecticalmethod:

“Hasnotourdiscussionconsistedinshowingthattherelationshipbetweenthetwoterms[BeingandNothingness](whetheronetakestheminarelativesense,withintheworld,orinanabsolutesense,

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oftheindexofthethinkerandwhathethinks)coversaswarmofrelationswithdoublemeaning,incompatibleandyetnecessarytooneanother(complementarity,asthephysicistssaytoday),andthatthiscomplextotalityisthetruthoftheabstractdichotomyfromwhichwestarted?”(VI92,myemphasis)

WealreadysawinthepreviouschapterexamplesofMerleau‐Ponty’s

suspicionoftheHegelianformofdialectic,albeitindirectly,withregardspecifically

tohisapprovalofSchelling’sefforttobreakawayfromHegelianism.Inthisrespect

Merleau‐Pontyrevealinglyruminates:

“Position,negation,negationofthenegation:thisside,theother,theotherthantheother.WhatdoIbringtotheproblemofthesameandtheother?This:thatthesamebetheotherthantheother,andidentitydifferenceofdifference‐‐‐‐this1)doesnotrealizeasurpassing,adialecticintheHegeliansense;2)isrealizedonthespot,byencroachment,thickness,spatiality‐‐‐‐“407(VI264)

Whatismostofnoteforushereinhisself‐comparisonwithHegeliandialecticand

hisrejectionofanultimateteleology,a“surpassing.”408Merleau‐Pontyiscarefulto

identifywhathecallsa“trapinthedialectic”andthe“baddialectic”(VI94)that

ensues,ironicallyechoingHegel’sownterminologicalstyle(“badinfinity,”etc.).As

againstthese,Merleau‐Ponty,characteristicallyadvancesanewformofthinking

called“hyperdialectic”:

“Whatwecallhyperdialecticisathought…thatiscapableofreachingtruthbecauseitenvisageswithoutrestrictionthepluralityoftherelationshipsandwhathasbeencalledambiguity.Thebad

407Compare,alsoinanobviousreferencetoHegel:“Againstthedoctrineofcontradiction,absolutenegation,theeither/or­­Transcendenceisidentitywithindifference.”(VI225)408Inotherrespects,ofcourse,manyofMerleau‐Ponty’sdialecticalobservationsmirrorHegel’smethodstrongly,includingtheHegelianprincipleoftheconvergenceofoppositesattheirextremes(mostfamously,theconvergenceof“Being”and“Non‐Being”in“Becoming”).ThusintheNaturelectures,forexample,wecanseethewayheshowshowtheefforttopreservedeterminisminphysicsendsupgoingironicallytowardstheoccult(N92),oragainhowsciencemovestowardsidealisminthenameofrealism(N91).Inanotherplaceheobservesthatpossibilityandnecessityarecloselyaligned,sincenecessityisjustoneofmanypossibilities.(N88)Similarly,rigoroustheismthreatenstobecomepantheism(sinceGodisthesameasBeingitself),andsoonandsoforth.

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dialecticisthatwhichthinksitrecomposesbeingbyatheticthought,byanassemblageofstatements,bythesis,antithesis,andsynthesis;thegooddialecticisthatwhichisconsciousofthefactthateverythesisisanidealization,thatBeingisnotmadeupofidealizationsorofthingssaid,astheoldlogicbelieved,butofboundwholeswheresignificationneverisexceptintendency…”(VI94)

Merleau‐Ponty’scritiqueofHegelthusliesinthelatter’snotbeingthoroughenough

orauthenticinthinkingdialectically.Thus“theonlygooddialecticishyperdialectic.”

(VI94)Hyperdialectic,the“good”dialectic,iscalledthisbecauseitcriticizesand

seesbeyonditself.Merleau‐Pontyemphasizes“process”andprocessualityagainand

again.Merleau‐Ponty’s“good”dialecticityisthusamovementofthoughtandthe

mannerinwhichthoughtmustpursuethewholewithoutpretendingtohaveagrasp

ofitunilaterally:

“Thepointtobenoticedisthis:thatthedialecticwithoutsynthesisofwhichwespeakisnotthereforescepticism,vulgarrelativism,orthereignoftheineffable.Whatwerejectordenyisnottheideaofasurpassingthatreassembles,itistheideathatitresultsinanewpositive,anewposition.…Whatweseekisadialecticaldefinitionofbeingthatcanbeneitherthebeingforitselfnorthebeinginitself—rapid,fragile,labiledefinitions…”(VI95)

B.Merleau­PontyandSkepticism/Quietism

Merleau‐Ponty’sviewsonphilosophy,reflection,anddialecticraise

importantquestionsabouttheextenttowhichMerleau‐Pontyhaseffectively“given

up”onphilosophyasnormallyunderstood,atleastasaknowledge‐acquiring

enterpriseforexample,andwhetherhisinterpretationofphenomenology,which

beginsinperceptualfaithandendsintherecognitionofitsownfutileattemptsto

reproducethisfaithinlinguistic‐conceptualterms,isquietistic.Thisisnotthecaseif

by“quietism”wemeanthepositionthatnothingcanbeaccuratelysaidofbeingor

thetruth.ItistruethatMerleau‐Pontybelievesthat“…the‘object’ofphilosophywill

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nevercometofillinthephilosophicalquestion,sincethisobturationwouldtake

fromitthedepthandthedistancethatareessentialtoit.”(VI101)Butwecanand

dospeakaboutthissituation—perhapsaclueastothemysteryofthe

“intelligibility”ofaNaturethatmakesitselfunknowntotheprogramsof

intelligibilityimposeduponiteideticallyby“grasping”thought.

Relatedtothe“quietism”chargeisthatof“skepticism.”Merleau‐Ponty

himselfhastoworryaboutskepticism,ofcourse,becausehehasopenedhimselfto

thecriticismofhispositionthatarguesthatit(Merleau‐Ponty’sstanceon

philosophy)effectivelyamountstoaversionofskepticism.Thekindofskepticism,

namely,thatthrowsitshandsupanddeclaringthatphilosophyresolvesmerelyto

“unresolvableparadoxes.”Onemightcallthis“Carneadeanskepticism,”afterthe

famousAcademicwhowouldlectureonedayforaposition,thenextdayagainstit,

demonstratingthefutilityofphilosophizing(underonestandardinterpretation)in

thefirstplace.Thiskindofskepticismeventuallydevelopedintothecanonical

Pyrrhonianviewoftheunresolvabilityof“equipollent”viewsinphilosophical

disputes,aviewthatresemblesMerleau‐Ponty’supuntilonerealizesthatMerleau‐

Pontygoesfurtherthantheskepticbyaffirmingacertainequipollenceinthetruth

itself.Inotherwords,Merleau‐Pontymakesametaphysicalclaim—supporting

himselfonthewingsofapre‐reflectivefaith—aboutNature,thoughadmittedly

withoutthe“dogmatic”supportof,say,an“infallible”firstpremise.Merleau‐Ponty’s

“metaphysics”isstill,inthisregard,“post‐metaphysical.”

StrictPyrrhonismaside,thefactisthatwhileMerleau‐Pontyisvigorously

anti‐dogmatical,eventothepointofembracinganinfinitedialectics,heiscertainly

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notskepticalinsofaras“skepticism”isanegativisticapproachtophilosophical

problemsthatdeniesonlywhatitcanfirstidentifyasmeaningfulinthefirstplace.

Theskepticinthissenseis,inSartre’sterms,in“badfaith,”playing(nowin

Wittgenstein’slanguage)thelanguage‐gameofphilosophyinordertoundermine

philosophy.ThusMerleau‐Pontyexplicitlyopposesskepticismfornegatingor

callingintothequestiontheexistenceoftheworld(andoftruth)toperceptualfaith

astheeffortlesspre‐reflectiveconfidenceintheworldthateventheskeptic

presupposes.(VI95)Indeed,Merleau‐Pontyconcernshimselfwithrefuting(or

defusing)skepticismfromthebeginningoftheVI.409Laterhequestionsatleast

Cartesianskepticismfortacitlypresupposingthe“positivityofthepsychic.”(VI95)

Onemightcallthisaclassically“phenomenological”critiqueofthe“psychologistic”

assumptionsoftheskeptic,whomustimplicitlyadvanceametaphysicsofsolipsistic

idealismtogroundhis/herpoints.

Merleau‐Ponty’sattitudetowardsphilosophyisnotdismissivebutrather,

onemightsay,bothcelebratoryandironic.Heunderstandsphilosophytobeatfirst

akindofefforttoreplaceperceptualfaithwithawebofstatementsandconcepts,

withanidealorder,whereasthereisneverreallyanyquestionofreplacingthe

world—andphilosophyitselfcandeterminethis,too.Theworldissomething

experienced,whilephilosophyistocapturemomentsofthisexperientiality,this

primordialcontactwithtruth,inpartbutnotinwhole.Thatwhichunitesustothe

world—intentionalityisonenameforit—isthatwhichseparatesusfromitaswell.

409SeeVI4,6;95

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Andlanguage,whichweasktodispelthemysteryofbeing,isjustasmuchpartof

thismystery,anexpressionthereof:

“Farfromharboringthesecretofthebeingoftheworld,languageisitselfaworld,itselfabeing—aworldandabeingtothesecondpower,sinceitdoesnotspeakinavacuum,sinceitspeaksofbeingandoftheworldandthereforeredoublestheirenigmainsteadofdissipatingit.”(VI95)

Intheend,however,itcannotbedeniedthatthereisacertainkinship

betweenradicalPyrrhonianskepticismandMerleau‐Ponty’sprocedure—especially

inthespiritofopennesspreachedfamouslybytheoriginalPyrrhonists,fromwhom

theterm“skepticism”(literally“searching”)derives.Thelink,asexplainedby

Merleau‐Pontyhimself,issummedupthusly:“If[skepticism]multipliescontrasts

andcontradictions,itisbecausetruthdemandsit.”AndthusMontaigne,askeptic

whoMerleau‐Pontyadmires,aswehavealreadyseen,“beginsbyteachingthatall

truthcontradictsitself;perhapsheendsuprecognizingthatcontradictionistruth.”

(Montaigne198,myemphasis)

C.Merleau­PontyandMysticism

IsMerleau‐Pontyamystic?Isthereareligiousdimensiontothisthought?

Thereiscertainlyameditative,almostprayer‐likequalityofMerleau‐Ponty’slater

discourse,nottomentionrespectfortheineffableunityofbeing,astapleideaof

mysticismacrosscultures,fromTaoismtotheNeoplatonically‐tingedmysticismof

the“Abrahamic”religions.Merleau‐Ponty’srejectionofcontraries(neither

intellectualismnorempiricism,neitherrealismnoridealism,etc.)resemblesthe

methodof“negativetheology”andthe“neti,neti”(“notthis,notthat”)methodology

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oftheUpanishads,whilehisembraceofanidentity‐of‐oppositescrossesthefinal

barrierofclassicallogic(inNeoplatonism,logismosasopposedtoNous)thatstands

inthewayofaphilosophicalexpression(whichmustalsooccludeor“obturate”)

whatonemightcallthe“One.”

Merleau‐Ponty’slackofspiritualisticreferences,however—atleast

comparedtohisinterestinart,literature,politics,psychology,andthesciences—

betrayadeeplysecularmind.Atthesametime,evenherethereliesaparadox.For

Merleau‐Pontystatesinoneplace:“Forme,philosophyconsistsingivinganother

nametowhathaslongbeencrystallizedunderthenameofGod.”410Theambiguity

ofthestatementspeakseloquentlyforitself:Merleau‐Ponty’s“philosophy”ispure

religion—inamannerreligionitselfdoesnotthink.Inthisspirit,Iamtemptedto

callMerleau‐Pontya“methodologicalmystic,”orathinkerwithtendenciestowards,

butnorealtiesto,aphilosophicalmysticism,perhapslikeHeideggerand

Wittgensteininthelastcentury,butunlike,say,SimoneWeil,EmmanuelLevinas,or

MuhummadIqbal.

Ofcourse,thereisnoshortageofreligiousimagery,intendedassuchornot,

inMerleau‐Ponty’swritings.Wehavealreadyseenhisreferenceto“miracles,”for

examplethe“miracleofthesenseorgan,”“themiracleoftotality,”etc.Thereare

othersuchreferencesaswell,almosttothepointofinvokinga“celebratory”

attitudetowardsexistenceakintoChristianNeoplatonistPseudo‐Dionysiusthe

410Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheMerleau­PontyReader.Lawlor,LeonardandTedToadvine,eds.NorthwesternUniversityPress,2007(p.240)

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Areopagite.411Italsocannotbeignoredthathismetaphysicsof“flesh”hasaclear

symbolicconnectiontothe“flesh”ofChrist,theman(visible)who,moreover,

was/isGod(invisible).Oragain,therearetheinvocationofperceptualfaith,the

ultimatemysteryoftheworldandbeing(PPxxiii),“pre‐establishedharmony,”grace

andthe“gift”ofvision,andfinally,tomoreindirectandesotericreferences,suchas

therepeateduseof“depth”todescribetheabsolute—aclassicallygnostic

(Valentinian)descriptionofthedivine,accordingtoElainePagels.412

ButIthinkthatGaryMadisongoestoofarwhenheclaimswecanonly

appreciateMerleau‐PontyinaChristiancontext.413Itistruethathisattitudeseems

ultimatelytobeoneofgratitude,humility,andwonderbeforeBeing.Butthisisalso

trueofplentyofsecularphilosophers,nottomentionmysticsfromotherreligions.

Also,thereisawayinwhichMadison’sclaimmightalsobetooweak,inadditionto

beingtoostrong.ForvirtuallyanyphilosopherwritingintheChristianWest—even

anatheistlikeSartre—canbesaidtobeindeliblymarkedbythedialecticsof

Christianity.Byitselfthisilluminesverylittle.

Therearecertainlythosebesidesthepresentauthorwhohaveidentifieda

distinctaffinitybetweenMerleau‐Pontianphenomenologyandcertainmystical

schools;acaseinpointisNewYorkUniversityHebrewStudiesprofessorElliotR.

Wolfson,whousesMerleau‐Ponty’sthoughttoilluminetheKabbalah.Comments

Wolfsoninthe“Prologue”tohismonumentalworkLanguage,Eros,Being:

411Forexample,the“miracle”ofthemany‐and‐the‐one—inreferencetopaintingandbiology.(N154)ThemostrelevantPseudo‐DionysiantextisprobablyTheCelestialHierarchy.(GeneralBooksLLC,2009)412Pagels,Elaine.TheGnosticGospels.NewYork:RandomHouse,1979(p.32)413Madison,Gary.ThePhenomenologyofMerleau­Ponty:TheSearchfortheLimitsofConsciousness.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,1981(p.222‐5)

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“Ishalllabor…moreonthepathwaysofMerleau‐Ponty’sthinking,asinhisthoughtIfindanaffinitywiththeunderstandingIhavederivedfromthestudyofkabbalisticliteratureandconsequentlyfeelitislegitimatetousehisjargontoformulatehermeneuticalandphenomenologicalsuppositionsinreadingthesesources.”414

Inanotherplacehenotes,“Sensiblebeings,orwhatweperceivetobesuch,are[for

Merleau‐Ponty]‘radiationsofverbalessences’—anotionthatresonateswitha

centralimaginalmodalityofJewishesotericism…”(xxiii)Wolfsonastutelyobserves,

moreover,thatforMerleau‐Ponty’sontologicalphenomenology,asforJewish

mysticism,thereisacentraldialecticofrevealingandconcealing,whichinthelatter

stemsfromtheessentialnatureofthe“effablyineffable”godhead,EinSof,andinthe

formerexpressesitselfintermsoftheattemptofphilosophytograsptheparadoxof

perceptualfaith/thelifeworld:

“Inthereconquestofthelifeworld,wethusdiscernamutualityofostensiblyconflictingimpulses:theurgetouncover,ontheonehand,andthediscoverythateveryuncoveringisacoveringover,ontheother.Asithappens,inEnglish,theword‘recover’uncoverstheparadox,foritmeansboth‘toexpose’and‘toconceal.’”415(xxiii)

ThequestionofMerleau‐Pontyandhis“methodologicalmysticism”hasmuch

todowithaquestionofattitudeandaffect.Merleau‐Pontyisasenthralledbyakind

ofnuminosityofnature,thehidden‐and‐revealedsourceofbeingandthemiracles

ofcreativityandtotality,justassurelyastheSufimysticisfixatedonthemajesty

andmysteryoftheoneineffableGod.ThereisinMerleau‐Pontyawonderatthe

414Wolfson,ElliottR.Language,Eros,Being:KabbalisticHermeneuticsandPoeticImagination.NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,2005(p.xxi)Wolfson’smassivevolumewasthewinneroftheNationalJewishBookAwardbytheJewishBookCouncil.415Seealso:WolfsonelsewherecommentsonMerleau‐Ponty’s“mysticaltone”invariouscitedpassages.(xxvi)

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“miracle”ofexperience,asifitwereawonderfully(thoughimperfectly)coordinated

dance,involvinggreatsuccessandeven“knowledge”ofakindthatnevertheless

cannotbeexplainedintermsofreflectionalone.Merleau‐Pontyrecognizestheway

inwhichhumanbeings(andsubjectivity)areessentially“of”thesamestuff(the

“flesh”)astheworld,or“Nature,”andthatthereinliesacluetothefundamental

compatibilityandevenonenessofselfandworld.Butthereisalsoaradicalbreak,a

‘dehiscence,’orseparation,whichsomehow,inaparadoxicalmanner,makesthis

relationshippossible.Thatis,thereisnotmerelyoneness,butamultiplicity

constitutingoneness—thusthereiswholeness,theultimatethemeofallphilosophy.

VI.Conclusion

Inhisarticle,“PhenomenologyandHyper‐Reflection,”TedToadvinenicely

summarizeshisown(andtoalargeextentmineaswell)approachtoMerleau‐

Ponty’slaterwritings:

“Despitehisongoingcriticalexaminations,Merleau‐Pontypresentsphenomenologyinapositivelightthroughouthislaterwritings…ThisisnottodenythatMerleau‐Pontyrecognizes,andincreasinglyaccentuates,certainparadoxicaltensionsofthephenomenologicalmethod.Butthesetensionsinevitablypointusbacktothecontradictoryintertwiningofimmanenceandtranscendencethatistheperceivedworld.”416

416Toadvine,Ted.“PhenomenologyandHyper‐Reflection.”InMerleau­Ponty:KeyConcepts.Eds.RosalynDiproseandJackReynolds.Stocksfield:Acumen,2008(pp.28‐9)

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ForMerleau‐Ponty,philosophyisnotamatterof“solving”aproblem,butof

understandingtheproblemasitsowntruth.(Thisisdifferent,ofcourse,than

understandingtruthasaproblem,perhapsamorecharacteristicpostureforradical

“postmodernism”thanthe“perceptuallypious”Merleau‐Ponty.)WhenMerleau‐

Pontystatesaproblem,itisstatedverymuchassomethingtobefurtherdeepened,

tobeexplored(the“absoluteisdepth”),etc.Towardsaddressinganissueinbiology,

forexample,hesaysapprovingly,asifhungeringtolearnfromthelessonofanother

discipline:“Let’ssayfirstthattheexpressionsemployedbythenewschoolof

biologyarenotsolutions:thenotionsoffieldandgradientaretheindexofaproblem,

notresponses.”(N151,myemphasis)ContrarytoBehnke,Idon’tbelieveMerleau‐

Pontyabandoned“description”for“explanation”417;onthecontrary,heshowswhy

aproperdescription,attentivetotheparadoxicalnuancesofthetruthmade

availabletous,makes(ultimate)explanationsmoot.Explanationisthegoal,one

mightsay,ofreflection;hyper‐reflection,bycontrast,comesbacktodescriptionby

wayofself‐descriptionoraradical,uncompromisingembraceofthefinitudeof

reflectionitself.

ItalsomayseemthatMerleau‐Pontyismoreradicalandsubversivethan

Husserl(forexample,by“throwingout”theuniversalisticortrans‐historical

pretensionsofphilosophyonceandforall),butthis,aswehaveseen,canbeturned

around.Husserl’sintentionsare,intheend,revolutionaryand“subversive”inaway

thatMerleau‐Ponty’sarenot.ForHusserlseeksa“radicalreshapingofourwhole

417Behnke,Elizabeth.“Merleau‐Ponty’sOntologicalReadingofConstitutioninPhénoménologiedelaperception.”InMerleau­Ponty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(p.49)

246

wayoflookingattheworld”(Crisis175),whileMerleau‐Pontyinstructsussimplyto

“relearntolookattheworld.”418PerhapsMerleau‐Pontyisthemoreconversativeof

thetwothinkersafterall.

418Moreprecisely:“Truephilosophyconsistsinrelearningtolookattheworld.”(PPxxiii)

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Conclusion

Wehavenowreachedtheendofourinvestigations.Inthisconcluding

sectionIwilloffersomewiderreflectionsonbothsomeofthesystematic

philosophicallessonstobelearnedfromtheHusserl‐Merleau‐Pontyencounter.

I.Merleau­Pontyvis­à­visHusserl

InthisdissertationwehaveseenhowHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty

understandandapplythephenomenologicalmethodandhowtheyinterpretits

results.Inparticular,wehaveseenhowMerleau‐Pontyreconsidersandmodifies

thebasicHusserlianprogram—whilesomehow,Ihaveargued,remainingtrueto

fundamentalaspectsofit.Heremains“true”toHusserlatleastinthesenseof

embracingtheHusserliancentralizationoflivingconsciousnessandthe

phenomenologicalreductionthatbringsthisconsciousnessanditsworld‐relationto

activeawareness(reflection).

AlthoughwedidnotexamineHusserl’sso‐called“laterperiod”inmuch

detail,wedidreviewIdeasII,which,throughthenotionsofthe“personalistic

attitude”andtheUmwelt,alreadycontainsmuchofthecoreofthelife‐world

philosophythatwastolateremerge.ThroughouthiswritingsHusserldisplaysan

ambivalence,asMerleau‐Pontypointsout,regardingthenaturalattitudein

particular:isitleftbehind,somehow,inthetranscendentalreduction,orisitmerely

illuminedtherein?Dowecomethroughthereductiontoknowourselvesas

“natural”consciousnessesmorefully,ordowerealizeourselvesasself‐split

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betweenhigherandlowerlevels,thelatterofwhichissubsumedinthemore

comprehensive(becauseintersubjectiveandorientedtowardstheuniversal)

former?IhavearguedthatwewouldberemisstounderstandHusserlasanentirely

consistentthinkerwithapredeterminedagenda;ontheotherhand,onecannot

ignorehispersistentlyrationalisticorientationandpreference,ifyouwill,forthe

realmof“ideas.”

Itistooeasy,however,toassignMerleau‐Pontythelabelsof“anti‐

essentialist,”“anti‐rationalist,”etc.Rather,Merleau‐Pontyseesthesamething,asit

were,thatHusserldoes;heknowstheworldtobeaphenomenalfieldormilieu,not

animpermeableObjectseparablefromitsmannersof“givenness,”andheknows

consciousnesstobeintertwinedwiththeworldthroughitsbodyanditsintuitive

graspoftheworld’s(inexactly)eideticstructure.ButMerleau‐Pontyalso,critically,

seesthematrixofbeing‐and‐consciousness(or,simply,“Being,”theontological

“totality”)tobe,inacertainsense,ineffable.Asawhole,Beingcannotbeproperly

thought—aKantianpointfromthelatter’s“TranscendentalDialectic”—butneither

does“reason”have“autonomy”suchthatitmaytametheformsofexperienceinto

anidealistictemplateofdeterminacy.Andthe“whole”isnotaregulativeidea,such

thatadivorcebetweentheoryandpracticebecomestheonlywaytoaccommodate

it.Rather,thoughtispartofthewhole,itispartof“nature,”evenifitisthatpartthat

hasthemeaningofwhatisa­partand“contrary”tonature—acontrarinessendemic

tonatureitself.

ThiskindofterritoryobviouslylendsitselftocomparisonswithHegelian

dialectic,withwhichitisnotunrelatedevenforMerleau‐Ponty.Hegel,famously,

249

understandsthespirittoknowitselfthroughitsidentificationwitha“higherform”

ofnature,namelytheculturalworldandthedomainsofart,religion,and

philosophy.AsIreadhim,Merleau‐Ponty,bycontrast,understandswhatHegel

meansby“self‐knowingspirit”tobeitselfaformofalienationfromitsownnature,

thoughatthesametimeanecessaryonethatholdsnatureandspiritalikeina

tensionthatstemsfromanoriginary“unityofopposites,”whichcannolongerbe

thoughtexceptparadoxically,andwhichleavesitslegacyoflastingambiguityinthe

humanexperience.

ThusforMerleau‐Ponty,Natureisneithertheobjectofthoughtnorasubject,

noreventheircoincidenceinahighersynthesis,butrathertheparadoxical“depth”

(“theabsolute”)and“otherness”(whichisnonethelessparadoxicallyinclusive)of

thehumanspirit.ByitselfthisisnotaHusserlianview,butitistheculminationofa

systematicmeditationMerleau‐Pontyreferstofromveryearlyonasthe

“phenomenologyofphenomenology”—areachingofthelimitsofwhatisthinkable

insubjectiveorconstitutionalterms,limitswhichrevealthedependenceofspiriton

apre‐reflectivenaturewhichisalso,atthesametime,preciselynotamenableto

theoreticizationalongthelinesofascientific“naturalism.”Inthisway,Merleau‐

Ponty’sphilosophypreservesthesenseofconsciousnessrevealedinthe

“transcendental”attitudeandthroughthetranscendentalepochéandreduction,but

withoutgoingsofarastoallowingthoughtto“takepossessionoftheworld.”The

transcendentalattitudebecomessubsumedintheparadoxofnature—ina

wholenessortotality,thatis,whichcanonlybethoughtasan“unthinkable.”

250

AllofthisexposesasignficantfaultlinebetweenHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.

ForHusserlseemstobroadlyacceptthescientific‐physicalisticdefinitionofnature,

addingonlythatitssenseas“physicalnature”isderivedfromtranscendental

subjectivity.ButthiswillnotdoforMerleau‐Ponty.Naturecannotbelimitedtosuch

asense,becauseitcannotbefullygraspedinthefirstplace.Astheconditionforthe

possibilityofconsciousness,itisnecessarilybeyondit.Atthesametime,the

transcendentalattitude—takentotheextremeofhyper‐reflection,whichthen

problematizesthescopeofthetranscendentalattitudeitself—isabletounderstand

this“beyond”asthehiddendepthsofitsownself,the“soilofsubjectivity.”Dueto

thisintertwiningbetweenthetwo—thisisMerleau‐Ponty’s“speculative”move,if

youwill—subjectandnature(note:not“object”)arenotsimplymutuallyalienated

“substances,”butrathermembersofanidentityrelationthatisnevertheless,atits

core,self‐splitting(dehiscence,theparadoxofthe“other,”etc.).Comparisonsto

whatHeideggercomestocall“samenesswithoutdifference”or“belonging‐

together”areprobablyapthere.

ItisclearthatMerleau‐Pontyisinakindofstruggleonlyorprimarilywith

the“transcendentalidealist”Husserlofthemiddleperiod(andofthelaterperiod,to

theextentthatthis“Husserl”remains).WecanonlyproperlyassessMerleau‐

Ponty’sphilosophyonceweacceptthepremiseoftherebeingcertain“self‐

contradictions”withinHusserl’sthoughtitself.Phenomenologybecomesin

Merleau‐Ponty’shandsameditationontheparadoxesofhumanexistenceand

incarnationleftbarebyHusserl’sanalysis.Colloquiallyspeaking,onemightsayin

thissensethatMerleau‐Ponty“pitcheshistent”inHusserl’s“backyard.”

251

Thusthisdissertationisaboutacritique,butitisastrangely“internal”one.

Merleau‐Pontyoperateswithinaframeworklargely(thoughnotwholly)definedby

phenomenology.Heshouldbeseen,Ithink,assomeonewhoquietlybutdecisively

reformsphenomenologyandbringsitintoasphereofinteractiverelevancewiththe

sciencesandwithotherrealmsofculture—history,politics,art,religion—by

softeningthedichotomiesthatHusserlrigidlyputsintoplace.

II.Merleau­PontyandSomeOtherPhilosophers

ForMerleau‐Ponty,philosophy—asphenomenology—isanexercisein

dialectics.Notpositiveornegativedialectics,sotospeak,butthedialecticsofself‐

meditation.LikeMontaigne,Merleau‐Pontyfindsaninfinityinhimself.Heis

fascinatedby“experience”anditsopen‐endedness.Hefindsthissame

wondrousnessinHusserl’swritings,buthealsoidentifiesrationalist,Cartesian

presuppositionstherethatdictateacertainresult.Incontrast,Merleau‐Ponty’s

dialecticisnotamovement“towards”anything.Experienceneitherbeginsnorends

inthought,butoutsideofit.Thusphilosophyisamattersimplyofovercomingits

need,asitwere,toovercomeexperience—itisamatteroffindingitshomenotin

itself(thisistheHegeliansolution,the“satisfaction”ofconsciousness)butinthe

questforitself,whichnecessarilydoesnotendinitself(asaconsciousness).

ThisisnotKant:forwhileKant,too,placesalimitonreason,helimits

experienceitselftoanartificiallycontrolleddomain,adiscursivefiction.InMerleau‐

Ponty,humanityisplungedintoaseaofunknowing,sotospeak,ontheraftof

252

perceptualfaith.Therearenoepistemicguarantees,notevenofa“transcendental”

kind.

Merleau‐Ponty’sembraceoftheHeideggerian“being‐in‐the‐world”inthe

“Preface”ofthePhenomenologyofPerceptioniswell‐known,butMerleau‐Ponty’s

conceptionofnatureandspiritdepartsfromHeidegger’sinasignificantway.For

whereasHeideggerprivileges“Being”over“beings,”suggestingaradicalbreak

betweenthemthatisconstantlycoveredoverby“metaphysics,”Merleau‐Ponty

doesnotunderstand“Being”tobeanythingotherthantheinterplayofnatureand

spirit,orexteriorityandinteriority,inacarnalfieldhefamouslytermsthe“flesh,”

andwhichhealsoidentifieswith“nature”inanexpanded,holisticsense.Inthisway,

Merleau‐PontyisclosertoHegel,butagainwithacriticaldifference.ForMerleau‐

Pontyrejectstheideathatnature(andhencetheself,sinceweare“of”nature)can

befullyknown,sinceitisnecessarilyunknowntoitself.InthisregardMerleau‐

PontycallsonSchelling’snotionoftheAbgrundor“abysswithinGod”thatisthe

“savageprinciple”ofnature.Merleau‐Pontyislessinterestedinthetheologicalor

moralimplicationsofthisthantheepistemologicalandontologicalones:natureisa

“wildbeing”thatcannotbeknownbyspiriteventhoughspiritisofit.

Inthisway,Merleau‐PontybecomesinterestedintheFreudianconceptofan

“unconscious,”inthathesawastructuralparallelbetweennature(orthebody)as

the“unconscious”ofspiritandtheinternalstructureofthepsyche,aninterplayof

consciousandunconsciousdimensions.

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III.The“PersonalisticAttitude”andtheLimitsofReflection

WehavespentagooddealoftimeexaminingMerleau‐Ponty’sreformulation

ofphenomenologyintermsoftheinterplayofperception,reflection,andwhatI

havecalledathirdandnewtypeofattitude,“hyper‐reflection.”Hyper‐reflectionisa

kindof“meta‐attitude,”anattitudeinwhichthenaturalandreflectiveattitudestake

theirrespectivepositions.

Husserl’srecognitionoftheuntenabilityofthesharpnessofthenatural/

transcendentaldivideisreflectedinhisnotionofthe“personalisticattitude.”Of

course,here,the“naturalattitude”comesperilouslyclosetomergingwiththe

“transcendental”;someofHusserl’sdescriptionsof“spirit”smackofasimilaror

identical“absolutism”and“ontologicalprivilege.”Merleau‐Pontyisfundamentally

righttoidentifyacentraltensioninHusserl’sphilosophybetweenanunderstanding

ofthe“naturalattitude”asonethatisopposedandsupersededinthe

phenomenologicalreduction,ontheonehand,anda“naturalattitude”thatissub‐

divided,initself,betweenlowerandhigherpoles(asIhavementionedabove).But

Husserl’s“poles”—thenaturalisticandthepersonalistic—arenotwhatMerleau‐

Pontywouldhaveinmind.Afterall,the“naturalistic”attitudeisnottrulynaturalat

all.Itispreciselyunnatural,thepurelytheoreticallensofthescientist.Unlikethe

transcendentalorphenomenologicalorreflectivestand‐point,itdoesnotseekto

understandtheworldasexistentiallyknown,muchlesstounderstandthenatural

attitudeitself.Itdoesnotthematizenaturalexperienceorbeing,itsimplyrestricts

thefieldofexperiencetoacertainsetofeidēthatframetheresultsofexperiments

performedintheworld.Anotherwaytoputitisthatthereisnotrue,separable

254

“scientificattitude.”ThisiswhatMerleau‐Pontymeanswhenhesuggestsinthe

Naturelecturesthatscience(bywhichhereferstoscientificpraxisandnottheory)

iscontinuoussimplywith“experience.”Clearly,itisthe“personalisticattitude”that

isthetruer,deeperformoftheeverydaynaturallifeoflivingsubjects—ofhuman

subjects,thoughofcourseevenanimalspossessUmwelten.

Butwesawthatwithhisdescriptionofit,Husserlmakesofthepersonalistic

attitudeakindofbasisforasubjectiveidealism.HowcanMerleau‐Pontyavoidthis

result?Hecandosopreciselybylimitingthescopeofreflection,byassigning

reflectivityorthe“thinkingattitude”toaneideticmatrix,itselfhistorically

conditioned,anattitudewhichatitsouterlimitsofreflexivityopensupintoan

interrogationintoitsorigins.Nature,astheultimatesourceofmeaningandbeing

(asopposedto“transcendentalsubjectivity,”eitherindividualorintersubjective),is

notcoincidentwiththeegocogito.Itappearsinvariousguisesasthehidden“other”

thatisalsothehidden“self,”theunknowabledepththatissimultaneously

inescapablytranscendent,andothersuchparadoxesthatresultfromtheattemptof

reflectiontothinktheunthinkable.Itisknownthroughactsofcreativity,through

thepulseoflifeandwilledmotion,andthroughtheprincipleof“totality”which

eludesratiocinativeanalysisandyetmustbeunderstoodasbeingatthebasisofthe

significanceoflanguage,behavior,art,politics,andevensexuality.

IV.PhenomenologyasParadox

Withbodilysubjectivity,Merleau‐Pontysupplementsthefirstparadoxof

phenomenology,thatof“immanenttranscendency”(or,theprincipleoftheworld’s

255

havingtobewithinusjustinordertobewithoutus)withitsflip‐side,namelythe

principlethatfortheretobea“within”atall,this“within”mustfirstbe“without,”

spreadoutintheworld,sotospeak.

Ofcoursebothformulationsareincompleteandeven,technically,

misleadinglydualisticintheirownright.ButthisiswhyMerleau‐Ponty’slater

reflectionsconcentratepreciselyonthemysteryoftheunsayabilityofthisunion—

which,asHeraclitushadmaintainedofallcontraries,is“one”becauseofdifference

ratherthaninspiteofit—anditsrelationtothought,whichmustcontradictitself,

finally,torecreateasenseoftheunity,sotospeak,“afterthefact.”

V.Naturalism

Merleau‐Ponty,unlikeHusserlorKant,doesnotopposeatimelessrealm(or

sphereofconsciousness)toatemporalone.Sothereisalsoamoveinhimtowards

naturalizationandimmanentism,thoughnotinthe“naturalistic”senseofthosewho

wouldcircumscribeconsciousnesswithinanunconscious“reality.”Merleau‐Ponty’s

“naturalism”defiesbothrealistandidealistinterpretationsoftheterm.Merleau‐

Ponty’snaturalismisphenomenological;hecannotbesafelyappropriatedby

modern“cognitivescientists”andthelike.Thisisaquestionofstarting‐point;

modernnaturalismstartslaterthanitthinksitdoes.Itobscurestheoriginby

theorizingit,indeedbyprivilegingtheoryoverexperience.Forwhatdoes

experiencetellusabouta“nature”or“world”thathasnoshareinthe“mind”or

“soul,”whichisafteralldoingtheexperiencing?

256

HusserlandMerleau‐Ponty,whilehavingverydifferentapproaches,areboth

respectfulofthecomplexityfacinganytheoryofnatureinwhichhumansubjectivity

istakenseriouslyasnon‐reducibletoscientific‐naturalisticcausality,whileatthe

sametimeinvolvedinthethickofperceptualexperience(asopposedtobeing

directedtoanetherealPlatonicrealmofIdeas).Husserl,however,believedthatthe

waytoovercomescientificnaturalismwastoswallowitwhole,asitwere,inthe

gulpoftranscendentalsubjectivity.Merleau‐Ponty’sapproachisrathertoquestion

bothnaturalismandtranscendentalphilosophyatonceasvictimsoffalse

absolutizationandavoidanceofthefundamentalparadoxesofhumanexistence.

257

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