The Paradoxes of Environmental Policy and Resource …joshuamuldavin.org/documents/publications/academic/... · 2012. 3. 18. · 244 The Paradoxes of Environmental Policy and Resource

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The Paradoxes of Environmental Policy and ResourceManagement in Reform-Era China*

Joshua MuldavinDepartment of Geography, University of California,

Los Angeles, CA 90095–[email protected]

Abstract: Over the last 5,000 years serious environmental problems—deforesta-tion, desertification, erosion, and widespread pollution of air, land, and water—have prevailed throughout most of China, brought about by a diverse set of socialand political contexts. In this paper I focus on an enduring contradiction associatedwith the post-1978 reforms, namely accelerated environmental resource degrada-tion in rural areas amid unprecedented national economic growth. Declining enti-tlements to assets and social capital in China’s rural village populations are a cru-cial aspect of altered state-peasant relations, as these are increasingly mediated bythe market during China’s transition to a hybrid economy. This has resulted inchanging patterns of resource use, impacting both the environment and peasantlivelihoods. A brief assessment of China’s postrevolutionary environmental policyand management practices provides the context for detailed case studies in HenanProvince. These examples highlight the relationship between political-economicchanges and environmental policy and management. Contrary to reform rhetoric,rural peasants’ embracing of reform policies does not necessarily optimize theirwelfare or promote sustainable use of resources. The case studies reveal alternativepathways for villages, ones that ought to be brought into the policy debate spotlight.

Key words: China, environmental resource management, policy, political ecology,entitlements, social capital, property relations, vulnerability, reforms, villages, ruraldevelopment, peasants.

owed some of the nation’s more intractableproblems, particularly those of environ-mental management. Decollectivizationand privatization in the reform era have ledto intensification of the environmentaldegradation found in prerevolutionary andMaoist China. The combination of massivesustained growth with simultaneous envi-ronmental degradation and social stratifica-tion—unintended consequences of thetransition from a state-planned socialisteconomy to a state-interventionist capital-ist economy—points to the need to assesssubsequent changes in environmentalmanagement.

Environmental policy anywhere can onlyseek to change environmental manage-ment indirectly through encouraging, pro-hibiting, or introducing new ways of usingor conserving resources. Such policy setsup levers, but these have to be pulled by

Within the context of contemporaryChina’s much-heralded economic successin socialist transition, extraordinary eco-nomic growth has until recently overshad-

* Thanks to Piers Blaikie for his constructivecritiques of a number of drafts of this manu-script. I would also like to thank Joseph Nevins,Alex Clapp, and Patrick Burns for their insight-ful comments and research assistants ManijaSaid and Bahram Fazeli for adding depth anddetail. Two anonymous referees and the editorsof Economic Geography also provided helpfulcomments. I would also like to thank Jeri Stolkfor her superb copy editing, which significantlyclarified my prose. Funding for this researchwas provided by grants from the MacArthurFoundation, the UCLA Academic Senate, andUCLA’s International Studies and OverseasPrograms. Of course, all shortcomings of thefinal manuscript are solely the responsibility ofthe author.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 245

local actors themselves: peasant farmers,forest officials, entrepreneurs, local offi-cials, and so forth. These actors all havetheir own agendas—economic, social, andcultural. They also compete with eachother, ideationally and materially, and areshaped by social relations in which they areenmeshed (Sargeson and Zhang 1999, 98).

Environmental policy, of course, has lit-tle control over these social relations andthe conflicts associated with them. Indeed,the social transformations which China isexperiencing are so profound, so rapid andcontradictory, that the state, through itsenvironmental policy, has had difficulty inidentifying the root structural causes of itsenvironmental problems, let alone mitigat-ing them. The processes of collectivization(1949–78), followed by decollectivizationand market reforms (1978–present), have apolitical dynamic of their own. Myriadenvironmental outcomes, often unfore-seen, have resulted. Environmental policyhas therefore tended to be reactive anddetached from the social causes of environ-mental problems. It has not addressed—and perhaps, within the limitations of envi-ronmental policy as presently articulatedand enacted, cannot address—thoseaspects of the ongoing social transforma-tion which are driving environmentalchange in China.

In this article, I begin by theorizing thechanging social relations of production andsubsistence within China, contrasting thecollective and reform eras. This exposé onChinese peasants’ changing entitlementsand access to assets leads to a historicaloverview of China’s environmental policyand management. I argue that rather thanusing the standard communist-collectiveversus market-private dichotomy to struc-ture policy thinking about China, we oughtalso to recognize a range of other alterna-tives, in particular those where, within amarket economy, there continues to be asignificant level of collective organizationof production and exchange. I then presenta structural analysis of environmentalresource use in three villages in HenanProvince to suggest that these alternatives

in fact exist on the ground, and that theyappear to offer prospects for the improve-ment of rural livelihoods.1 Through theseexamples, I aim to highlight how broadstructures of the Chinese political economyintertwine or articulate with localities tocreate particular social entitlements, vul-nerabilities, and environmental ramifica-tions. Understanding this complex processallows us to perhaps envision an environ-mental policy where the divide betweenpolicy rhetoric and reality in practice isbridged rather than serving to maintain thestatus quo. Such an environmental policywould better advance the interests of thoseliving the reality of China’s environment.

I carried out long-term research in thethree Henan Province villages from 1989to 1997. My methods varied by village con-ditions and relative access. In both Nanjieand Beixu villages I interviewed the villageleaders, as well as ten random households,during multiple-day visits. I physically sur-veyed the villages, their industries, andagricultural areas, while simultaneouslyinterviewing people as they worked. InBeixu village, I interviewed workers in thebrickworks, most of whom were not fromthe village. In Nanjie village, I interviewedworkers in the instant noodle factory, flour-mill, and bakery. In contrast, in Village 3, Idid participatory ethnographic researchand observation. During four extendedvisits I lived with one family of seven in atypical walled compound. I participated infieldwork, harvesting, transport, and pro-cessing, primarily of corn. I completed adetailed physical survey and mapping ofthe village and its infrastructure and hadrepeated interviews with approximately 70percent of the villagers. I also interviewedthe county leadership that representsVillage 3 and surveyed the market town,grain-buying station, and other commodity

1 This reverberates with work on other coun-tries and socioeconomic formations that talk ofrenegotiating market relationships from below(Bebbington 1996; Szelènyi 1998). This mightbe described as a social economy or “third way.”

246 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

outlets. In addition, I did brief surveys ofnearby hamlets to study kinship networksand labor reciprocity.

Changing Entitlements andEnvironmental Policy

I analyze China’s transformation interms of four concepts: entitlements, com-munal capital, property relations, and vul-nerability. By analyzing the transition withthese concepts, I attempt to provide a newwindow into China’s evolving environmen-tal policy—revealing both its limitationsand the prospect of creating policy thatreduces the vulnerability of those most atrisk. China’s social transformation hasunfolded largely outside of the centralstate’s environmental policy purview. Thestate has sought to issue environmentaledicts in a manner totally detached fromthis process. Each of these four concepts iscontentiously debated in the literature, andI therefore outline and interconnect thembriefly before returning to a more detaileddiscussion of China’s environmental policy.

The concept of entitlements is used cre-atively by theorists to help explain the rela-tive vulnerability of people under stressfrom “natural disasters.” These theoristsfocus upon famine and hunger in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Drèze andSen 1990; Blaikie et al. 1994; Bohle et al.1991; Watts and Bohle 1993; Swift 1989).This concept has yet to be applied to Chinaunder socialism or in its more recent tran-sition to a market-oriented economy.Entitlements can be defined as the right tomake a claim on a person or an entity. Inother words, entitlement describes therelationship between a claimant on an asset(rural peasants, urban laborers), an institu-tion that grants access to the asset (thestate, social norm, community institution),and the asset (tangible or intangible) itself.Thus, entitlement is a three-way relation-ship.

Theoretically, the distinction betweenproductive resources (understood as tangi-ble assets) and access to those productive

resources can be understood as an entitle-ment process, albeit one that is sociallymediated and conditioned. Income oppor-tunities are another kind of asset (intangi-ble) that help define livelihood strategies,but they are not entitlements since they aremediated through the market and socialconnections. The confusion of terminologyresults from the evolving but eclectic andpersonalized use of the major concepts inthe literature. Membership in a group, forexample, gives an individual entitlement toassets. This is either formalized or under-stood through community regulation andsocial norms, as asserted by Leach,Mearns, and Scoones (1999). Incor-porating the moral economy into entitle-ment analysis is further advocated by Gorein his argument that competing notions oflegitimacy and “unruly” practices challengelegally established rules, determining peo-ple’s command over commodities. In hisstudy, power relations and discursive prac-tices are instrumental to entitlement analy-sis, and entitlements are seen as a result ofan active process of negotiation in whichunruly practices are central to transformingformalized access (Gore 1993). Nonethe-less, the notion remains of a set of claims,rules, and expectations underpinned byformal custom or legal instruments.

Blaikie (1985) and Watts (1991) discussaccess to resources in a broad way thatincorporates the role of the state and glob-alization trends, avoiding an excessive andnarrow focus on proximate causation.Using a dynamic approach in which socialaspects of political economy may precipi-tate entitlement crisis, Blaikie et al. (1994,86), in their access model, extend Sen’s(1981) rather economistic entitlement con-cept to encompass socially derivedresources which can be called upon byindividuals according to the current alloca-tive rules of the society. Extending Sen’s“relations and flows of surplus,” they linklocal actors—such as moneylenders andlandlords—to international changes in cur-rency valuation, food grain prices, andimports. Watts, too, moves away from a sta-tic notion of entitlements by revealing enti-


lective organization of production. Forexample, previously privately held capitalassets were redistributed among groups ofpoor peasants, who were then encouragedto use them collectively. Redistributionalso allowed peasants to operate in a lessvulnerable situation and coordinate theirefforts toward the creation of, for example,windbreaks, terraces, and other anti-ero-sion methods. The benefits of theseimprovements would be captured collec-tively, hence their classification as commu-nal capital (Muldavin 1997).

Given the growing role of the marketand private property over the last twodecades in China, it is important to addressthe concept of shifting property relationsin order to help analyze the changing socialrelations of production and subsistence andtheir effects on the environment.Redefined property relations were centralto the creation of peasants’ entitlements tobasic needs on the commune and to ensur-ing social capital. Chinese collective agri-culture had many similarities to traditionalcommon property regimes, in that landcontrol was divorced from both individualand market yet was overlaid with an eco-nomic and political centralism thatdirected production and planned distribu-tion (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).

In the subsequent reform period, therewas a fundamental change in property rela-tions and entitlements to assets, and there-fore a deterioration of the conditions underwhich communal capital was previouslyreproduced and called upon by all mem-bers of the population. This led to anincrease in vulnerability, the final concept,defined as “a combination of factors thatdetermine the degree to which someone’slife and livelihood is put at risk by a dis-crete and identifiable event in nature or insociety” (Blaikie et al. 1994, 9–10).Underpinning this loss of entitlements formany was a restructuring of property rela-tions that defined sets of rights and obliga-tions which form part of these entitle-ments. For example, communal landtenure and the labor point system ensureddistribution of the products of land and

2 Similarly, Swift (1989) breaks down the enti-tlement bundle into assets, tangible and intangi-ble. Through this he also introduces the idea ofcollective assets, so important in the China caseboth before and after market reforms.

tlements as a terrain of struggle within soci-eties in which group interests (defined byclass, caste, gender, age, and ethnicity) arein contradiction (Watts 1991). In the laterwork of Watts and Bohle (1993), they con-tend that entitlement analysis shouldinclude long-term political, economic, andsocial processes along with the structuralnotions of “capability” and “totality ofrights.” They argue for inclusion in entitle-ment analysis of a process by which abroader range of rights are contested anddefined (“empowerment” and “enfran-chisement”). Furthermore, they point outthe benefits of examining the distributionof entitlements and the ways they arereproduced under specific circumstances.

I incorporate social capital into thisanalysis because of its importance inChina’s postrevolutionary history. Accessto basic needs and the specific naturalresources involved in their fulfillment isdependent, among other factors, upon thecreation and deployment of social capital.This second major concept is defined hereas forms of nonstate, nonprivate assets cre-ated through collective action, socially con-trolled and accessed through cultural andjuridical measures (Muldavin 1997;Dickenson et al. 1996, 260). A particularkind of social capital produced under thecommune system of postrevolutionaryChina is communal capital (Muldavin1997).2 Examples of communal capitalrange from agricultural implements forlarge-scale production, agro-processingfacilities, education and health facilities, tosoil erosion control measures—all con-structed through collective labor, by defin-ition. During the collectivist period, thestate provided the conditions for the cre-ation of communal capital through materialredistribution and successful ideologicalconversion from household-based to col-


labor to all. When land became de factoprivatized in different ways, these rightswere no longer assured, entitlements fellaway, and vulnerability increased for many.

Building on Blaikie and Brookfield(1987), Swift resolves the problem of dif-ferentiating poverty from vulnerability byintroducing the notion that many tangibleand intangible assets are directly related tocommunity expectations of reciprocitywhich can be drawn upon in a crisis (Swift1989, 11). Thus, households with equiva-lent levels of poverty can have differentlevels of vulnerability, because intangiblehousehold assets (such as assistance fromneighbors and kin networks) are not typi-cally included in poverty statistics butnonetheless offset some vulnerability.Whereas poverty statistics often representa snapshot of current household condi-tions, relative vulnerability is based uponthe complete set of variable assets, bothphysical and social, available to the house-hold and its individual members over time.

China’s period of socialist agriculture(1952–78) is completely different from anyother case study used to inform the work ofthe above authors. Still, when entitlementanalysis is applied to the socialist context,the focus is constructively redirected fromthe strictly economic and material to intan-gible and social aspects. Examples rangefrom identifying noncommodified forms ofexchange (reciprocity claims, assets); tostate political commitment to the well-being of peasants (intangible assets); toindividual claims to goods and services byvirtue of membership in socialist institu-tions such as commune, brigade, and team(collective entitlements); as well as the dis-tinctly social yet materially based commu-nal accumulation process and resultingcommunal capital (Muldavin 1986), such assoil conservation, irrigation systems, andproductive infrastructure—Swift’s (1989)“collective assets” and Blaikie’s (1985)“access to collective resources.”

In the transitional reform period(1978–84) Chinese policy instigated adevolution of risk and responsibility awayfrom the collective to the household and

individual. In this respect, the new expo-sure that peasants continue to experience issimilar to, though much more severe than,the dynamic of market penetration undo-ing traditional common property regimeselsewhere in India, Africa, and LatinAmerica (Peet and Watts 1996; Schlagerand Ostrom 1992). In the prereformperiod, the market did not operate in theallocation of entitlements, the state beingthe primary actor. But entitlements inChina’s recent history of transition areincreasingly determined through the mar-ket, though an imperfect one. Despite thestate’s retreat from a commandist economy(Kelliher 1997; Zweig 1997; Hussain andStern 1994), a contradiction emergesbetween its desire to maintain controlwhile allowing the market to take over theallocation of resources. The impact ofdecollectivization upon resource use ismediated through altered livelihood strate-gies. At the macro level, the changing rela-tions between state, peasants, and marketsboth constrain and enable alternativestrategies (Muldavin 1998). With decollec-tivization in China, certain state-guaran-teed entitlements for individuals declined.For example, the state once provided forthose who could not work “five guarantees”of food, clothing, shelter, education, anddecent burial, as well as access to healthservices (Aziz 1978, 66). Furthermore, thecrucial entitlement of land access was rede-fined along contractual lines originatingwith male heads of households (Selden1998; Kung and Liu 1997). This hadadverse implications for the entitlements ofwomen as well as households, who lost outin the competition for securing official landrights, receiving either less land or land oflesser quality (Judd 1994; Griffin and Zhao1993; Khan et al. 1993; Riskin 1993).

Sustainable livelihoods are those whichallow individuals to recover from stress andshocks, maintain their capabilities andassets, and provide long-term opportunitiesand benefits for the next generation(Chambers and Conway 1992). Batterburyand Forsyth (1999) see sustainable liveli-hoods as an extension of Sen’s entitlements


concept, which focuses on individualaccess to resources rather than that of thecommunity. They argue that a strengthen-ing of institutional capacity alleviates vul-nerability and pressure on naturalresources, thus maintaining sustainablelivelihoods. In China, market devolution,by decreasing institutional capacity, hasseverely impaired the prospect of sustain-able livelihoods for many peasants(Muldavin 1998).

As entitlements for women, children,elders, and some households are under-mined and disappear, it is up to the indi-vidual in an uneven and imperfect marketto find a viable livelihood strategy. Accessto resources and assets, the basis of liveli-hoods, are now primarily achieved throughthe market under competitive circum-stances, and therefore are uncertain.Secondarily, livelihoods are guaranteedthrough the building up and expenditure ofsocial capital—directly connected to con-trol over various assets and access to anarray of resources (Bebbington 1999;Kelliher 1997). Market primacy, particu-larly for households with less-powerfulsocial networks, profoundly changes peo-ple’s livelihood strategies, encouragingshort-term opportunism as people seek tolay claim to and consume public goods(e.g., timber, grazing lands, potable andirrigation waters). For those householdswith particularly valuable forms of socialcapital—for example, networks into localofficialdom—accessing this social capitalbecomes an individualistic accumulationstrategy. In either case, as the futurebecomes more highly discounted, in anuncertain and conflictual social environ-ment, sustainable forms of developmentare severely undermined (Redclift 1987,36; Muldavin 1998). This supports Leach,Mearn, and Scoone’s (1999) contentionthat dynamic and changing institutionalcontexts determine people’s access to andcontrol over resources, which, in turn,influences resource use and the course ofenvironmental change.

The loss of access to collective entitle-ments and resources cannot often be palli-

ated through the opening up of other enti-tlements. This is because the poor haveneither the political networks in local offi-cialdom nor the social capital deriving fromexpectations of collective responsibility forfood security. Nor can they successfullypursue claims upon shrinking commonproperty resources. Furthermore, they aremuch more vulnerable to the encroach-ment of more well-off peasants and entre-preneurs upon common property, fromwhich the poor have drawn importantresources with which to augment theirlivelihoods. This is because they are politi-cally weak, geographically dispersed, andusually function within informal culturalorganizations (e.g., kinship groups). As inmany other parts of the developing world,a major risk aversion strategy of the poor isto rely on common property (Shanin 1987).Privatization, both de facto and de jure,then, has immensely unequal socialimpacts. With marketization, familial rightsof access are lost or codified, ending previ-ous access through common propertyregimes (Bromley 1987; Ostrom 1990;Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Privatizationalso has a serious gender component inrural China, since land is passed to themale head of household, thus squeezingwomen out of previous entitlements thatwere accessible through familial and col-lective rights (Judd 1994). In China’s case,the abrupt transition from state property,previously underpinned by collective socialcapital, to quasi-private property has led toa huge “free-rider” problem, degeneratingto a virtual “open access” situation withoutregulation. Because the policy climate is sovolatile, peasants simply do not know whatthe state will do next, whether it will abro-gate or return their rights to assets(Muldavin 1993). Thus their livelihoodstrategies shift accordingly. Uncertainty inpeasants’ entitlements, and risk to theresources which form part of them, leadsthem to overconsume and despoil localresources in an attempt to exploit thembefore someone else does. For example, ifa powerful peasant cuts and sells trees froma hillside that was previously managed col-


lectively by a village, others in the villageare encouraged to follow suit for fear ofbeing left with nothing. The result is rapidmining of hitherto communal assets,destroying the productive base upon whichfuture development might occur(Muldavin 1986, 1992).

In assessing changing vulnerability inreform-era China, the reasons why vulner-ability has increased for some anddecreased for others within China’s newhybrid economy is central.3 One explana-tion may be found in seeing the asset statusof rural communities not as static but as anevolving “prime determinant of vulnerabil-ity” (Swift 1989, 13). For some, state enti-tlements (e.g., minimum provision of food,clothing, health services, and housing) havedecreased, while for others, exchange enti-tlements (e.g., the ability to produce agri-cultural or manufactured goods for themarket) have increased. Those who bearthe burden of decreased state entitlementsare often not those who get the benefit ofincreased exchange entitlements, as thecase studies will illustrate. This applies inparticular to elders, pensioners, and thosewith little to exchange, since householdwealth is increasingly connected to thecharacteristics of the household and itscomparative advantages over others (i.e.,its internal makeup and the dynamics ofage, gender, and skills of available laborpower). Freedom of market participationbelongs to those who have something tosell. Yet the shift to market mechanisms forallocation and signals in decision makingconcerning all resources is occurring withinwhat is still state-directed development.

Thus, changing entitlements, propertyrelations, and the nature and deploymentof social capital have brought important

changes in resource use and environmentalmanagement. Increased vulnerability hasled in some instances to a desperate eco-cide, with encroachment into forests,movement of cultivation up steep slopes,overgrazing, and the despoliation anddestruction of fragile environments(Blaikie 1985; Muldavin 1996a). The fulfill-ment or denial of entitlements can lead tosuch environmental degradation. Thus,environmental policy must incorporateenvironmental justice, since it may other-wise criminalize the already vulnerable bydenying entitlements derived from naturalresources (Blaikie and Sadeque 1999). Anunderstanding of these issues can provideimportant insights for the formation andimplementation of environmental policy.

China’s Social Transformationand Environmental Policy

Serious environmental problems—deforestation, desertification, erosion,habitat loss, and widespread pollution ofair, land, and water are the most obviousmanifestations—have prevailed through-out most of China for over five millennia,brought about by a diverse set of social andpolitical contexts (Elvin and Liu 1998; Smil1984). Here I address a number of endur-ing contradictions in the more recent his-tory of Chinese environmental policy.During the last 50 years, the state hasbecome increasingly aware of environmen-tal problems; it has recorded them, studiedthem, and enacted an almost endlessstream of environmental edicts at the cen-tral, provincial, and local levels. But theedicts are almost universally ignored inpractice. Why? Through an analysis of enti-tlements I outline here one possibleanswer to this difficult question.

Environmental policy, if it is to reach itssocial and biophysicial objectives, mustaddress the underlying structural aspects ofresource use and degradation (Blaikie1989). This requires an understanding ofthe linkages between socioeconomic condi-tions and resource use—why and how peo-

3 In Russia, the nominal creation of a marketeconomy has not brought an actual increase inmany exchange entitlements to the vast major-ity, and yet it has brought a breakdown in stateentitlements. This helps explain problems cen-tral to Russia’s contemporary quandary (Selden1998).


ple use resources the way they do, andwhat the implications of that use are(Kasperson and Dow 1991; Rieger 1978).Without such an understanding, environ-mental policy is reduced to a series of tech-nocratically determined and politically vac-uous edicts, usually of a punitive yetmyopic nature, running counter to existingsocial relations. The Chinese state has had,at various times, an ability unparalleled byany other state in Asia to control the socialrelations shaping its environment, oftenwith catastrophic outcomes (e.g., the GreatFamine of 1961–63 (Becker 1996)). Butsince 1978, ironically, it has lost that con-trol amid an often chaotic scramble foreconomic growth, with serious implicationsfor sustainable management as well as theprovision of a minimum level of basicmaterial needs for the most vulnerable. Forexample, rapid deforestation in the Yangtzeand Songhua river watersheds since thelate 1970s has resulted in catastrophicflooding in the 1990s, with immense eco-nomic destruction and loss of life (Zhang1985). In this section, I examine changingentitlement provision and access to assetswithin the context of the state’s environ-mental policy, gauging the often conflictingdemands of China’s evolving socioeco-nomic transformation and sustainableresource management.

In China, an “environmental policy”existed under the Xia (2100–1600 B.C.),Shang (1600–1066 B.C.), and Zhou(1066–256 B.C.) dynasties (Dunstan 1996;Vermeer 1998; Elvin and Liu 1998).4 Thestate has long played a role in trying toadjudicate the conflict between pressuresfor economic intensification and necessaryecological and social stability (Osborne1998, 203). But what might be termed con-temporary environmental policy was onlyinitiated in 1932 under the Guomindangadministration (Elvin and Liu 1998;Vermeer 1998). Thereafter, a number oflaws and regulations were promulgated,

and the state has since maintained a certainamount of continuity in environmental pol-icy. But two critical junctures brought sub-stantial changes in environmental policy:the creation of modern China in 1949 andthe economic reforms of 1978.

China under Maoism: StateEnvironmental and Natural ResourceUse Policies, 1949–1978

Historically, the majority of Chinesepeasants have had a weak claim even onsubsistence—the end goal of their entitle-ments—let alone surpluses generatedthrough their labor. Following the revolu-tion in 1949, the state took control of majorindustrial and commercial assets, as well asresponsibility for providing certain entitle-ments. The role of the state in terms of nat-ural resources shifted to an implied respon-sibility for environmental management,including the creation of numerous regula-tions concerning soil and water conserva-tion, potable drinking water guarantees, andthe protection of forests (Ross and Silk1987, 65–66).5 Peasants gained collectiveentitlements to land, social welfare, educa-tion, health care, and improved means oflivelihood. From the late 1940s through thefirst years after the founding of the People’sRepublic of China, land reform (the redis-tribution of land held by landlords andwealthy peasants to landless and land-poorpeasant households) was the principal enti-tlement that brought the new controllers ofthe state immense legitimacy. State respon-

4 See Elvin and Liu (1998) for informative dis-cussions of China’s environmental history.

5 Forestry policy provides an interesting exam-ple of the changes in environmental policy fol-lowing the founding of modern China. Theforestry ownership system was reformed alongwith land reform after 1949. The general policywas as follows: large forested areas belonged tothe nation, and smaller forested areas belongedto towns, villages, or private owners. The wood-lands that originally belonged to small individuallandowners or peasants remained in their hands.Active government support reportedly helpedmotivate these peasants to manage their forestsin a fairly sustainable manner (Zhang 1985).


sibility had as its counterpart peasantaccountability to the state, its representa-tives, and plans. Under a policy of “land tothe tiller,” the claim on land became recog-nized, and in the process land turned into anentitlement for peasants. During the subse-quent process of collectivization in the latterhalf of the 1950s, this land asset was slowlyenveloped into larger and larger entities.Access to land as an entitlement remained,though primarily through peasant accep-tance of the collective labor process andnew property relations. The continuous sub-sistence entitlement of “garden plots,” aver-aging 15 percent of arable land, helpedlegitimate the shift to large-scale productionon the remaining 85 percent of collectivelymanaged lands.

In the early 1950s state policies wereheavily influenced by populist peasantdemands. Mao had successfully rearticu-lated peasant claims from consumption-oriented assets to fulfill immediate needsto production-based assets (land, water,and machinery) as part of the gradualprocess of collectivization. Peasants’ legiti-mate claims on consumption were subse-quently channeled through their engage-ment with the state’s productionist goals.The Great Leap Forward (1958–61) was areversal of these peasant-led populistagrarian policies and the imposition of atop-down blueprint, with disastrous conse-quences for both the peasantry and envi-ronmental management (Becker 1996;Smil 1984). This period witnessed wide-spread pollution, deforestation, the drain-ing of lakes, mass extermination of “pests,”and the building of large-scale environ-mentally destructive infrastructure projectsto increase grain production (Becker 1996;Palmer 1998). The resulting natural disas-ters and famines devastated the peasantryand brought an end to many of the most ill-conceived policies. An incipient environ-mental policy had first been initiated inChina with the 1956 “Regulations of theProtection of Mineral Resources” to ensurethe maintenance of water quality againstindustrial waste and the 1957 “StateProvisional Program on Water and Soil

Protection,” which addressed soil erosionproblems (Palmer 1998). In the period1962–65—following the Great LeapForward—such regulations were resusci-tated and rationalized with improvementsbased on lessons from earlier agriculturaland industrial mistakes. This included anexpansion of individual household produc-tion and local markets to help overcomethe widespread food shortages and famineand a restrengthening of a peasant voice inpolicy debates (Hsu 1995).

The Cultural Revolution’s first period(1966–72) once again emphasized growthat all costs, with unattainable goals forindustrial expansion and increased grainproduction causing serious ecological dam-age despite environmental regulations.Peasant life was ideologically interpreted ascentral to political discourse, while thestate simultaneously strengthened its top-down control over land use decisions andenvironmental management. Control wasreimposed over exchange of household-produced surpluses in small local markets,though a significant percentage of landassets, in the form of garden plots,remained under household control.Maintaining their average 15 percent ofarable land even during the CulturalRevolution shows the importance of a pri-vately held subsistence entitlement forstate legitimacy with peasants.

An important turning point came in1972, when three critical events brought anexplicit environmental awareness to majorpolicy circles. First, a red tide in the Bay ofDalian caused substantial shellfish andaquatic production losses. Second was theBeijing fish market pollution incident. Fishfrom Guantian reservoir, sold to the capitalcity of Beijing, were found to have high lev-els of toxic chemicals in their flesh becauseof massive industrial pollution of the reser-voir. The State Council, under ZhouEnlai’s direction, formed an investigationand treatment committee. This was thefirst top-level state acknowledgment ofwidespread pollution problems. Third, theUnited Nations Conference on Health andEnvironment, held in June of 1972, had an


important impact on the development ofan environmental protection organizationin China. The Chinese delegation returnedfrom the conference with concrete recom-mendations for the leadership, and theState Council responded with a series ofdecrees (Qu 1994). The UN conferenceprovided the impetus for China to createenvironmental policies regardless of thefear that First World states would use envi-ronmental issues to impede its economicpotential. China’s environmental bureau-cracies, such as the State EnvironmentalProtection Administration, have their ori-gins in the historic 1972 UN conference.The incorporation of the environment innational planning was another importantresult (Ross 1998).

During the last years of the CulturalRevolution (1973–76) there was a strength-ening of environmental awareness andregulatory work, with the first national con-ference on environmental protection heldin Beijing in August of 1973.Representatives from all over the countryused this opportunity to bring evidence ofextensive environmental problems to theattention of the leadership in Beijing,resulting in 11 regulatory decrees. Thesecovered problems ranging from water andair pollution, to agricultural chemicals andloss of species, to proximity of industrialplants to residential areas. The conferencesuggestions were approved by the StateCouncil in November of 1973, putting inplace “Several Rules on Protecting andImproving the Environment,” the firstpurely environmental law since 1949(Palmer 1998). An environmental protec-tion group was formed under the StateCouncil, and in 1974 the State Council seta goal of controlling pollution in five yearsand solving it in ten years. One of the pri-mary difficulties identified was the “irra-tional” geographic distribution of indus-tries. It was officially acknowledged thatthis placed immense structural obstacleson any efforts to reverse or control envi-ronmental pollution from industrialsources (Qu 1994). Hence, the combina-tion of acute episodic and longer-term

environmental problems (Smil 1984) stim-ulated the beginnings of an explicit envi-ronmental awareness by the state. Despitethis growing awareness, the followingperiod witnessed an intensification of theseand other intractable environmental prob-lems.

China under Market Reform:Decollectivization and Its Impact onthe Environment, 1978–1996

Another turning point in China’s ongo-ing structural transformation occurred in1978. By emphasizing the problems of theprevious period under Mao, the state andnew leadership created the much-neededpolitical support, both nationally andlocally, to implement a range of new poli-cies. Many of these policies (decollectiviza-tion, for example) were only begun on anational level in 1982, but were essentiallycompleted by 1984. With the implementa-tion of the Household ResponsibilitySystem, which divided all land into house-hold-controlled plots, there was a dramaticchange in entitlement structures for thepeasantry. The state exposed sectors of thepeasantry to economic forces far beyondlocal control. To cope with the subsequentincrease in risk and vulnerability, peasantsresponded (where possible) by diversifyingtheir livelihoods (Ronnås 1993). Uncertainproperty relations beset by free-riding alsoreflected a declining sense of communityand common property management ofresources. The maintenance of communalcapital assets (such as irrigation ditches,terraces, forest and grassland reserves,windbreaks, erosion control infrastructure,and so on) is one cornerstone of local statelegitimation. The neglect of common prop-erty goods seriously undermined produc-tive capacity, further increasing the vulner-ability of the peasantry (Smil 1999, 1998;Muldavin 1992, 1986; Hinton 1990).

The late 1970s also ushered in a newlevel of central government attention to theenvironment with passage of theEnvironmental Protection Law in 1979.This significantly increased regulatory


activity, although the power of local envi-ronmental agencies was very limited (Jahiel1998). In the early 1980s, the central statebegan a slow retreat from command of theeconomy, increasingly relinquishing landuse and environmental management deci-sions to the market and local governments(Walder 1992; Huang 1990). Environ-mental policy building suffered its greatestsetback during the 1982–83 Deng adminis-tration structural reforms that streamlinedthe Chinese bureaucracy (NEPA 1988).The Environment Protection Office wasmade subservient to the Ministry ofConstruction, obstructing environmentalprotection efforts well into the 1990s(Jahiel 1998).

With the process of decollectivizationbegun on a wide scale, there was a corre-sponding deregulation of environmentalmanagement and a significant loosening ofland use decision making as collectiveassets were either formally sold off to indi-vidual households or informally comman-deered by them (Muldavin 1986).Decommunization, accompanied by areturn to populist appeals for individualand household control over production,struck a responsive chord among peasants,but it was happening within a risky, unsta-ble, and undeveloped market context.While peasants’ immediate direct controlover production increased, indirectly theircontrol has been substantially reduced inland and resource management decisionsas the market has replaced collectiveaction. This loss of control is apparent aspeasants shift to less sustainable produc-tion practices in this highly competitiveenvironment, despite their knowledge ofresulting long-term problems. Any otherchoice is difficult given the increased vul-nerability they are experiencing. The struc-tural factors behind this behavior are dis-cussed and theorized more fully in the nextsection, together with examples from theaccompanying village case studies of unsus-tainable practices on the part of knowl-edgeable peasants.

The current problems faced by forestmanagement in Yunnan province are a

good window into the general structuralenvironmental problems (Zhao 1993). Asin many other forested areas of China,Yunnan’s forests are under enormous pres-sure from peasant demands for land to usein basic food production. That is, many ofthe poorer peasants have become morevulnerable to food shortages in recent yearsand are obliged to put additional forestland into cultivation illegally. Officials sim-ply look the other way, as enforcement ofthe regulations would lead to serious hard-ship for these peasants. Their entitlements,hitherto collectively ensured, are now seri-ously eroded. In turn, this has led to whatBlaikie (1985) calls desperate ecocide—adramatic term perhaps, but one that ade-quately describes the environmental impli-cations of increasing socioeconomic differ-entiation. Furthermore, the policy ofprivileging economic growth above sustain-ability has led to a reluctance to invest inenvironmentally safe road construction,adequate industrial and domestic wastetreatment, and longer-term investment inthe planting of trees for watershed protec-tion (Smil 1993; Zhang 1985). The result-ing high sediment loads in most of thelarger rivers led to record floods in 1998and 1999 (“China’s Record Floods” 1998;Laris 1999).

Another important reform-era economicactivity, which has profoundly affected landuse and environment, is the Township andVillage Enterprises (TVE) system. TVEsare an attempt by the state to address theproblem of conflicts between excess laborin the countryside and limited capability ofurban areas to absorb additional labor(Vermeer 1995–96; Sichuan Jingji ShehuiWenhua Fazhan Zhongda Wenti DuiceYenjiu Zhongxin 1995; Odgaard 1992). TheTVE policy attempted to fuse and over-come the predominant binary economicstructure of countryside and city, agricul-ture and industry, as exhibited in the casestudy for Village 1 below. TVEs, whichhave developed rapidly, have contributedmuch to the improvement of farmers’ liv-ing standards since 1979. In 1990, total


output value from the TVEs accounted for30 percent of national output by value.

But the TVEs have also led to manyenvironmental problems. Development ofthe TVEs resulted in extensive transforma-tion of large areas of croplands into indus-trial facilities. Furthermore, there has beena shift away from subsistence food crops tocrops providing raw inputs for local indus-tries, such as textiles and cigarette produc-tion. Together, this has intensified pressureon the remaining fields planted to subsis-tence crops. Additionally, it is expectedthat as of 2000, TVEs are predicted to beresponsible for 50 percent of all pollutantsnationally (Vermeer 1998). Due to lack ofnecessary technology and skills, the TVEsexcavate coal, minerals, sand, stones, andconstruction materials in a wasteful man-ner which often seriously pollutes air andwater and degrades the environment. Afterexcavation, they fail to restore land, so ero-sion is usually very heavy. Nonetheless,these enterprises frequently manage toobtain preferential treatment and relax-ation of existing regulations by local staterepresentatives dependent upon TVE taxrevenues.

Paradoxically, while the reforms broughtderegulation in many spheres of produc-tion, environmental laws were strength-ened on paper. The 1979 EnvironmentalProtection Law of the PRC (NPC 1979)was strengthened from provisional to per-manent status in 1989 (NPC 1989). Onpaper the 1989 law was a significantimprovement on the earlier version(Palmer 1998). It expanded the specificresponsibilities for environmental protec-tion at all levels of government, created theFive New Systems (xin wu zhidu) for pol-lution control, and added strong sanctionsto help improve enforcement (Ma andOrtolano 2000). China’s Agenda 21, a“white paper” created following the Rioconference of 1992, provides official posi-tions on China’s implementation of envi-ronmental policy changes (State PlanningCommission and State Science andTechnology Commission 1994). Manyenvironmental laws and national plans

delegate the implementation of policies tomunicipal and county authorities, however,and local governments and enterprises areexpected to provide the capital for state-planned projects (Jahiel 1998). As a result,many regulations are poorly or unevenlyenforced (Vermeer 1998).

Additionally, the implementation ofenvironmental policies is largely concen-trated in urban state-owned industries andneglectful of village-owned rural indus-tries, reflecting China’s institutional andeconomic division of urban and rural areas.This is exemplified by the 1997 Ninth Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protectionand Distant Targets for the Year 2010,which is almost exclusively focused onurban and state-owned industrial sectors.The rural industrial and agricultural sectorswith serious nitrate surface and groundwa-ter pollution, for example, as well as unreg-ulated pesticide use, have largely beenignored by this plan. Generally, large sec-tions of industry managed by TVEs are out-side the control of the State EnvironmentalProtection Administration, escaping envi-ronmental monitoring and regulationenforcement (Vermeer 1998). Thus, com-prehensive national legal provisions forenvironmental protection are bypassed andhave almost no impact in rural areas.

While this brief and generalized accountof social transformation and national envi-ronmental policy over the past 50 yearsexposes some overall trends, actual mani-festations on the ground cannot be dis-cussed in the same manner. A high degreeof heterogeneity of environmental out-comes is apparent. The interpretation andimplementation of national and provincialenvironmental regulations and guidelinesvaried enormously across space and timeand were mediated by state, provincial, andlocal politics. Also, the socioeconomicprocesses outlined above (socioeconomicstratification, a reduction of communalcapital ensuring the meeting of basic needsfor all, and an altered distribution of enti-tlements) developed with varying intensi-ties and speeds in different parts of thecountry. Likewise, agricultural systems and


environmental conditions are highly vari-able, adding to this overall unevenness.

In sum, China’s historic reality has morecontinuity than change in its ultimatedirection and sets of environmental out-comes (Smil 1984, 1990; Purdue 1987;Edmonds 1994; Vermeer 1998; Elvin andLiu 1998). What have changed are the poli-cies, organization of production, and thesocial and political contexts under whichpeople have access to their resources(Lamouroux 1998). In the recent past it hasbeen characterized as a commandist para-dox of man over nature, development atthe expense of environment (Smil 1984;Dunstan 1996). Now it is increasingly char-acterized as an unregulated, unruly mar-ket-inspired loss of command that hasbrought about a continuation of the sameenvironmental problems, some at higherrates, others at lower rates—still justifiedby growth and development (Smil 1990;Muldavin 1997).

Simply stated, while the Chinese centralgovernment has maintained commandismin the political realm, it has attempted toput in place an apolitical commandism inthe environmental realm. This has led to aseries of technical decrees that are oftenunrelated and do not take into account theessentially political nature of environmen-tal management. This is ironic givenChina’s postrevolutionary highly politicizedsocial context (Ma 1994). The politicalnature of environmental management isclearly demonstrated by continuous powerstruggles over issues directly linked to it,such as land control and ownership, rela-tions of production, and mobilization ofresources. And so, modern Chinese envi-ronmental policy has a peculiarly dated andstatist feel. On the one hand, it is technicalin its rhetoric and fails to engage the fun-damentally political character and diversecircumstances of China’s environmentalreality. On the other hand, it employspolicy initiatives, many of which are drivenby implicit political agendas and fadedexhortations out of touch with China’senvironmental and social realities. Hence,while the state is acutely aware of severe

environmental problems, its edicts andpolicies have little impact on the ground inreducing identified environmental degra-dation. Lastly, China contains an immensediversity of environments, a broad range indegrees of regional autonomy and thus dif-ferentiated local relationships with the cen-tral government, and an often underesti-mated cultural and historical heterogeneitythat makes generalization difficult (Oakes1996; Chai 1996). Beyond the difficulty ofgeneralization of outcomes, there is thefurther real difficulty of formation andimplementation of even the most well-meaning environmental policies within thiscomplex political mosaic.

Given the current evolution of nationalenvironmental policy, I now turn to whathas occurred at the local level of rural vil-lages. Have the reforms, through theirtransformation of peasants’ access toresources and entitlements, produced vul-nerability and environmental degradationdespite claims to the contrary? Have thedevelopmentalist goals of the state, and itstechnical and apolitical definitions of envi-ronmental problems and solutions, trulyfailed to overcome the significant environ-mental problems facing China’s ruralmajority? These research questions cannotbe answered for the whole country, but thethree village case studies below fromHenan Province provide examples of thenuanced mosaic of China’s rural reality.

Case Studies from HenanProvince

The three case studies in HenanProvince show the great diversity acrosseven this small geographic region, which issteeped in historical importance. HenanProvince is at the heart of Chinese civiliza-tion, the center of its agricultural heritage,and the founding place of Han culture andcentralized administration. Four thousandyears of continuous use of these lands bor-dering the Yellow River prevents any quickanalysis based on such a short period ofstudy as seven years (Purdue 1987; Elvin


and Liu 1998). Nevertheless, these casestudies show three outcomes from amongthe enormous heterogeneity that is ruralChina under reform—three separate anddistinct outcomes under unified nationaland provincial environmental policies andlegal decrees. As such, I make no claim thatthese case studies are in any way represen-tative of rural China as a whole; they sim-ply suggest the diversity of pathways fol-lowing decollectivization.

Treated as three points on a continuum,the villages discussed here range from asuccessful transition and relatively benignenvironmental outcome, to the breakdownof institutions, severe environmentaldegradation, and organized resistance.6

Village 1 (Nanjie) is a recently proclaimedmodel “reunified” village that has under-gone rapid industrialization, completelytransforming the livelihood strategies of allof the villagers (Kaye 1994; Kou 1998).Whereas in the past the village was primar-ily agricultural, today only 2 percent of itsresidents are engaged full time directly inagricultural production. Village 2 (Beixu) isa model, partly decollectivized “agroeco-logical” village that has purportedly main-tained and improved sustainable produc-tion practices, while still diversifyingpeasant income opportunities for its resi-dents. This has been done through a com-bination of indigenous technology, inten-sive tree planting, and new industrialactivities such as brick making. Village 3 isnot a model village. On the contrary, withdecollectivization and privatization it hasexperienced rapid resource degradation, asinfrastructure declines through lack ofinvestment and production and resource

use practices intensify. The resulting dete-rioration in livelihoods has not been ame-liorated through an expansion of incomeopportunities. This has led to labor out-migration as well as state delegitimation,visible through small but everyday forms ofresistance.

Village 1: Nanjie, A Model NewCollective Village

The challenge then is to build short-termpragmatic and realistic responses that workfrom contemporary contexts, and do so in away that is coherent with and builds towardslonger-term utopias that are already imma-nent within the strategies and hopes of popu-lar sectors. (Bebbington 1996, 105)

Nanjie Village, located near Luohe Cityin Henan Province, provides a relativelyunusual case study in postreform China.Unlike most villages, Nanjie chose todecollectivize on paper and in name, butthen continued to collectively farm andkept all of its industry within the village col-lective, refusing to contract out any villageassets to individual households. Despite itshistorically contingent and spatially specificoutcome, such a refusal to implementreform policy has many other examples inrural China resulting in locally specificinstances similar to Nanjie (Oi 1995; Lin1995; Yep 1998; Sichuan Jingji ShehuiWenhua Fazhan Zhongda Wenti DuiceYenjiu Zhongxin 1992). In a clandestinemanner, Nanjie became an experiment incollective production within an increas-ingly market-oriented economy. The vil-lage diversified livelihood strategiesthrough land conversion to value-addeduses, such as expansion of village collectiveenterprises. The result was immensely suc-cessful, so much so that in the early 1990sNanjie was finally recognized by the stateand was held up as an important model(Kaye 1994; Kou 1998; Henan NanjiecunGroup Co. 1999). But as a model, it is aparadox, demonstrating that while theshortcomings of reform policies were coun-tered by maintaining collective production

6 Although Villages 1 and 2 are identified byname in this discussion, I have not providednames or identifying information (population,area, etc.) for Village 3 in an effort to protectindividuals who took part in the research sur-veys and interviews. Villages 1 and 2 do notrequire the same level of anonymity due totheir widespread recognition as “model vil-lages,” as well as the numerous interviews andsurveys conducted there.


and distribution, new environmental prob-lems were created through its very success.

In terms of agriculture, Nanjie’sincreased production has not come withoutenvironmental problems. Increased pro-ductivity has been achieved primarilythrough a rapid increase in the use of fer-tilizers. Combined with a correspondingdependence on pesticides, this has manypotentially negative environmental andpublic health impacts. On the industrialfront, the rapid expansion of unregulatedvillage enterprises has encroached on thelimited arable land, while utilizing occupa-tionally hazardous processes. In addition,many of these industries contribute to sig-nificant air, water, and soil pollution—“externalities” that are ignored in the ever-expanding production statistics—whilegiving Nanjie another advantage in themarket. Further land conversion hasresulted from new housing constructed forall villagers. This loss of arable land resultsin further intensification of agriculture onremaining lands, while the soil and watertable of land converted to industrial pur-poses is severely polluted by chemicaleffluent.

Because of its success in achieving pro-duction growth, providing social welfare,and guaranteeing the livelihood of itspopulation, Nanjie’s leaders have not beenforced as of yet to attend to the significantenvironmental impacts of their chosendevelopment path. Recent scrutiny of thevillage by higher authorities may lead to areassessment of this model (and should beseen in the context of political struggles atthe highest levels of government), but isunlikely to result in strict implementationof existing environmental regulations. Nan-jie’s political importance as a model almostguarantees its ability to adopt such regula-tions only in the realm of rhetoric, and notin reality. In fact, Nanjie has become a pil-grimage site for China’s old and new Left(Eckholm 1999).

Thus, Nanjie represents the best thatcan be expected of collective entitieswithin an increasingly competitive market-oriented and risky economy, and yet it

embodies contradictions that limit itsapplicability throughout China. Nanjie’ssuccess comes through exploitation andmarginalization of people from otherplaces—both neighboring villagers andmigrant laborers. But as a step along theway, it challenges assumptions about bothmarkets and collectives, showing how localcontrol and empowerment can beenhanced within a market context throughcollective production organization.7 Thecollective provides a framework withinwhich all of the village’s households areable to prosper through the spreading ofrisk, efficient use of all forms of capital(communal, money, and human), and theexpansion of livelihood opportunities with-out a massive increase in vulnerability.

Nanjie peasants’ access to an expandingset of assets are guaranteed through mainte-nance of a system of entitlements, despitestate withdrawal from the broader economy(Eckholm 1999). The enhancement of thestrong sense of community is also critical inthe preservation of these entitlements, asreciprocal arrangements (intangible assets)are continued and social ties strengthenedthrough the overall growth in communitycontrol and regulation of resources.Further, the maintenance of common prop-

7 Bebbington (1996) argues that rather thanjust discard “the modern” as fundamentally dis-empowering of local peoples, the adoption ofcertain practices (such as chemical use in agri-culture) can be both empowering and commu-nity enhancing. In the case of Nanjie, the main-tenance of collective institutions and theirarticulation with an increasingly competitivemarket need not necessarily lead to the kinds ofsocially and environmentally destructive prac-tices critics of the market, myself included,often predict. The strengthening of communityprovides both a unique buffer and potentialcomparative advantage to the community in itscompetition with other producers. Withouteither the market or the collective, NanjieVillage would be in a worse situation. Thusappropriate adaptation to rapid economicchanges becomes a crucial element in rural sus-tainability.


erty institutions in Nanjie, with agriculturalproduction practices socially regulated, forexample, provides the potential for rela-tively benign environmental management,though perhaps only after other productivistgoals are met.

On the other hand, contrary to villageleaders’ official pronouncements, Nanjie isnot a model of development for the area,though it is being repeated throughoutChina. In any particular region, it repre-sents a system resulting in highly stratifiedincomes between the model village and thesurrounding region of subcontracted-laborvillages (Sargeson 1999). It is also a modelin which the foundation for its successintensifies significant environmental prob-lems. Corporatist/collectivist activity mayprovide some incentives for environmen-tally sound policies. But top-down pop-ulism also leaves environmental regulationin the hands of those with a strong incen-tive to maximize surplus extraction forsocial and political benefit. As such, theseunderstandable goals may lead to interpre-tation and implementation of state envi-ronmental policies in ways inconsistentwith the goals of their creators at thenational level.

Village 2: Beixu, An AgroecologicalModel

As a model agroecological village begin-ning in the 1950s, Beixu is credited withexpanding tree planting to cover 30 per-cent of the total village area of 193hectares. In this Wuyang County village, allthe land is intensively intercropped (aver-aging 2.46 crops per year), with wheat themost important crop (planted on 79% ofthe total cultivated area), followed bymaize (59%), fruit and grapes (29%), soy-beans (17%), cotton (17%), vegetables(17%), tobacco (14%), rapeseed (7%), andsesame (7%).8 Since 1980, irrigated area

expanded from 17 percent of cultivatedland, to 100 percent in 1992. This wasachieved through collective investment inwells (a combination of collective capitaland labor), one for every 1.4 hectares. As aresult, output increased because of theavailability of irrigation water despite aserious drought in 1992, unlike Village 3 inthis study (Muldavin 1996c). Average out-put has grown from 4.5 to 12 metric tonsper hectare over this same period. Most ofthis increase in production is attributed toirrigation, improved seeds, increased fertil-izer use (growing from 225 kilograms perhectare to 750 kilograms per hectare),more intensified and complex croppingpractices, and relatively higher prices forproducts. Average income also rose from200 to 850 renminbi yuan (U.S. $25 to$104) per person between 1980 and 1992.

In 1980, the collective divided all landamong private households and demecha-nized production. But with stagnant yieldsin the mid-1980s, the village decided toreunify certain aspects of production whilekeeping individual contracts for the dividedplots. Thus, all plowing and bed prepara-tion is once again mechanized, and the vil-lage collective repurchased two large trac-tors in 1987.9 Although agriculture is themain focus of the village, animal hus-bandry, agro-processing, forestry, and fish-eries have been incorporated into a com-plex “ecological” system of production. Thevillage’s claim to practice ecological agri-culture is somewhat contradicted by prac-tice. Although cropping patterns are moreagroecological than in comparable villagesin the area, this same system is dependentmore than ever on high levels of chemical

8 The percentage is greater than 100 becauseof multiple crops being planted each year, aswell as intercropping.

9 The loan for these tractors took five years topay off, with an average charge of 28.3 yuanRMB per hectare ($3.48 per hectare) each year,for cultivation. The village’s original tractor wassold in 1980 at a heavily discounted price of 500yuan RMB ($61.35), when it was deemed use-less during the implementation of theHousehold Responsibility System (Muldavin1996c).


inputs, particularly chemical fertilizer. Theimpact of this intensive fertilizer use onsoils is mitigated to some extent by thesimultaneous use of large amounts oforganic fertilizers (methane digester com-post, fish pond dredgings, fruit tree clip-pings, more readily available crop residues,and so on).

Methane digesters have been main-tained and expanded from the communeperiod, incorporating local knowledge intoinnovative new technologies. Thus, 50 of352 (14%) households have their ownmethane pits producing gas and no longerrely on other fuel for cooking, lighting, andheating of water. This has significantlyreduced village air pollution and potentialhealth problems common in villages with-out such innovations (Hricko 1994). It hasalso reduced village reliance on other non-renewable energy resources. Commonenergy sources such as coal briquettes,stalks, and wood not only rob soils of scarceorganic matter via lost crop residue, trans-form land through coal mining, or denudehillsides through woodgathering, but thesmoke produced adds significantly to vil-lagers’ health problems.

Despite the shift to market-orientedproduction, this village has been able toarticulate with the regional economy whilemaintaining a certain amount of localautonomy and control over resource use.This is possible partially because of strongvillage leadership in the maintenance andexpansion of collective institutions thatsupport such villagewide activities.Although land was divided to households(unlike Nanjie), the new plots have gener-ally incorporated many of the best aspectsof agroecology, predominantly in the formof integrated fish farming with multistoriedmixed crop agriculture. Fruit trees, berrybushes, and a large variety of plants areinterspersed with grain and vegetablecrops. Use of some pesticides continues,but the quantities are generally small andonly for extreme outbreaks. The ability ofthe village to maintain these kinds of envi-ronmentally sound practices has to do witha number of unique features: (1) a strong

sense of continuity with the organization,technological successes, and knowledgegained during the commune period; (2)effective and legitimate collective gover-nance; (3) strong community participationin resource regulation (through socialnorms and policing); and (4) the produc-tion of marketable commodities that haveexpanded income opportunities and theability of the village to maintain entitle-ments. This has prevented short-termexploitation of resources and assets thatmight otherwise have resulted fromincreased vulnerability and risk with enti-tlement declines.

Some of the contradictions of this villageare seen in development which still rests onexploitative labor practices, similar toNanjie Village. For example, the brick-works hires workers, many from outsidethe village, on a piecework basis to do thedifficult and dangerous work in the brickkilns. In addition, despite providing a sig-nificant amount of income for the village,the brick industry is far from ecologicallysound, causing extensive air pollution, soiland coal mining for raw materials, and thecreation of other toxic waste, which is cur-rently dumped on village commons adja-cent to the brickworks.

But Beixu Village illustrates the benefitsof a successful partial decollectivization.Continued strong collective institutionsand efficient use of productive villageassets have enabled the maintenance ofcrucial social welfare entitlements, buffer-ing households from the emerging marketeconomy. By only allowing access to manyassets by collective entities, these resourceshave not been diverted to consumptivedemands of individuals and households.Labor demand is increasing through col-lective support for expansion of sidelinesand limited but significant industrializa-tion. Indigenous technological innovationsand maintenance require primarily labor,rather than scarce capital, thus structurallylimiting the need for labor out-migration.Only 100 village residents work outside ofthe village on a regular basis, a relativelysmall number compared to Village 3


(Muldavin 1996c). Together these factorsand choices enable community stability,enhancing some intangible assets (such asreciprocity claims) and thus reducing vul-nerability.

Beixu’s adherence to environmental reg-ulation is limited to its tree planting cam-paign over many decades. Other environ-mental regulations are not acknowledged,with the village’s ecological public imageproviding a buffer to scrutiny. The implicitassumption is that as an agroecological“green” village, the environment is a toppriority of all villagers. While in relativeterms this may be so, it still leaves open thepotential for abuse. The village’s brick-works are a clear example of this problem.Still, overall, it could be rightfully claimedthat the village does better than most (bothin its region and throughout China) interms of environmental awareness andimplementation of environmentally benev-olent production practices and technolo-gies. The fact that this is not a response toexplicit environmental regulation and pol-icy speaks to the unintended consequencesof daily practice by villagers, as well as thechallenges to policymakers to achieveintended results. The ability to identifyunintended consequences may provide thekey to clarifying alternative environmentalpolicies.

Village 3: A Hinterland MarginalVillage

Village 3 completely decollectivized in1982, dividing and distributing all landassets as well as village sidelines and indus-trial assets to individual households. Thevillage collective was left with few claims toresources and few responsibilities to vil-lagers. Privatizing access to most naturalresources, and breaking up and distribut-ing agroindustrial assets to a few house-holds (such as grain mills, tofu workshops,and tractor repair stations) led to rapidsocial stratification. Access to these limitedindustrial assets placed a few families wellon their way to becoming the new villageelite. Peasant loss of entitlements, from the

closing of the health clinic and the increaseof school fees to a loss of guaranteed accessto irrigation water, led to changing produc-tion practices quite different from the twovillages already discussed. Individualssought to rapidly mine communal capitalassets—trees, gravel, grasslands, water,ditches, and so on. As collective buffersdeclined, investment decisions in thisincreasingly vulnerable context shiftedtoward short-term goals, such as quickincreases in production and productivitythrough, for example, heavy fertilizer use(for those farmers able to afford it).10

In Village 3, agricultural yields have stag-nated and declined as a result of changingcropping patterns and techniques, withsubsequent soil degradation and growingpest problems. Soil degradation is primar-ily due to overuse of chemical fertilizers.Peasant farmers complain about “soil burn-ing” from long-term fertilizer use. Becauseof the loss of soil structure and decline inoverall quality, the soils become harder,less friable, and available nutrients dimin-ish despite large additions of chemical fer-tilizer. The ability of widely used hybridcorn varieties to achieve consistent yieldincreases is dependent upon optimal fieldconditions. The combination of growingpest resistance to pesticides and repetitivemonocropping intensifies disease and pestproblems. As a result of declining availabil-ity and reliability of irrigation water, due tothe lack of investment in crumbling irriga-tion works (constructed and previouslymaintained collectively), agricultural pro-duction has become both more intensiveand unstable, with complete crop failurestwo years out of three (Muldavin 1996c).

10 Collective buffers include, first, entitle-ments provided by the state to collective entitieswhich limit risk for all households; second, thespread of risk among a large number of house-holds as a consequence of collective organiza-tion of production and consumption; and third,the ability of collectives to spread investmentand consumption over long terms and thusenable the maintenance of collective capital for-mation.


During my investigations between 1989and 1996, the irrigation systems were clearlyin disrepair, not only in the village, butthroughout the county. Lack of irrigationdrastically reduces the efficient use of avail-able chemical nutrients in most crops, ren-dering additional fertilizer applications use-less. The decline in communally maintainedirrigation infrastructure and resultingdependence on seasonal rains dramaticallyincreases peasants’ risk and susceptibility ofthe village to natural disasters.

It would also appear that natural disas-ters enable peasants to compel the state,via moral imperative, to relinquish controlover the area’s surplus in any given year.For example, in 1996 villagers forced thestate to further subsidize agricultural pro-duction through easy credit that, by prece-dent, the state writes off if there is a naturaldisaster. Hence, it appears that peasantfamilies are increasingly using claims ofnatural disasters, real and otherwise, toreduce their obligations to the state, just asthe state has limited their entitlements—an indirect form of resistance.

The effects of unregulated individuallivelihood strategies on the environmentare severe in the village. This can be seenin dilapidated irrigation infrastructure,overgrazing of hillsides, destruction of for-est resources, an end to investment in ero-sion control projects, and expansion ofcropping onto the most marginal and easilydestroyed lands. Attention to environmen-tal regulations is nonexistent. The leader-ship of the village is almost universallyignored, since few entitlements of any kindstill emanate from it or the county. As such,attempts by the county to enforce environ-mental regulations concerning land use,such as land conversion fees and fines fordestruction of tree windbreaks, are resistedas additional forms of unfair taxation. Thefew village enterprises are taxed but notregulated in terms of polluting effluents. Insum, local village leaders have little legiti-macy or real leverage in their attempts toimplement environmental policy. Countyleaders have more power, but they are con-strained by ongoing, everyday resistance to

regulation, whether perceived as necessaryor punitive in nature.

Summary of Village Studies

In the three villages studied (see Table1), Village 1, Nanjie, paradoxically benefitedfrom the reforms by avoiding total decollec-tivization. But Nanjie features the environ-mental externalities from industrial pollu-tion that accompany rising peasant incomes.It has also attempted to prevent a resourcefree-for-all by maintaining social/collectivecontrol of resources. Village 2, Beixu, isboth a model of the reforms and a favoredcontext via extra investment from theprovincial government. Beixu has createdagroecological conditions that improve thelocal environment and uses renewableresources (methane) and increased treeplanting, but it also has a brick kiln that ispolluting the air and destroying land. Village3 did not benefit from the reforms becauseof the high degree of exposure to the newpolitical economy of declining entitlementsand degraded collective assets. In essence,there were few buffers to the riskier aspectsof the transition process. There is a stronglinkage between increased vulnerability dueto reduced entitlements and discounting thefuture, creating Blaikie’s (1985) desperatesort of ecocide. Subsequently commonproperty management institutions andmutual trust break down, inducing free-rid-ing and declining legitimacy of the localstate.

Villages 1 and 2 were relatively successfulin avoiding this precipitous decline. In thesetwo villages, productive assets were pre-served by disallowing consumptive needs ofindividuals to reappropriate assets. Whereallowed (Village 3), the shift of assets fromproduction to consumption created vulnera-bility outcomes similar to the prerevolution-ary period. Ironically, Village 3 has agricul-ture without the environmental impacts ofchemicals because of its relative poverty andlack of resources. Few in the village can stillafford fertilizers, insecticides, or herbicides.But the declining investment in infrastruc-ture, and subsequent loss of irrigation, has


Table 1

Environmental Characteristics of Henan Province Case Study Villages← Recollectivized Decollectivized →

Relative vulnerability ofmajority of villagers

Characteristics ofresource useÑAgricultureÑForestryÑLand conversionÑFisheries

Environmental pollution& resource degradationoutcomesÑTVEsÑAgricultural practicesÑHousehold activities

Environmental policyÑExisting regulationsÑActual implementation

Policies, regulations, anddecrees

Degree to whichdecollectivizationimplemented

Constraints andenablers

Village 1, Nanjie

• Low (medium forsurrounding labor-shedvillages)

• Land conversion fromagricultural to indus-trial uses.

• Successful industrialdiversificationincreases potentialresource degradation.

• Village enterprisesproduce significanteffluent dischargedinto local water sup-plies, air, and onto soil.

• Limited household-level pollution due tocontinued village-levelorganization of pro-duction.

• No explicit environ-mental policy focus.

• Productive assets con-served via collectiveownership, limitinginfrastructure decline.

• Modified decollec-tivization.

• Constraints on prof-itability and competi-tiveness cited as result-ing from excessiveregulation and taxremittances.

• High incomes, but viamediation of individualclaims to resourcesthrough collective units(shareholding) enablesmaintenance of socialwelfare and infrastruc-ture investment.

Village 2, Beixu

• Low to medium

• Explicit agro-ecologicalemphasis on agricul-tural and industrialdevelopment.

• Environmentalism,self-reliance, and recy-cling focus, e.g., inmethane productionand fisheries system.

• Tree-planting cam-paign throughout vil-lage lands.

• Brickworks destroylands though miningactivities, as well asincrease soil, air, andwater pollution.

• Only village thatexplicitly used term“environmental policy”in interviews and inpractice.

• Agro-ecology and for-est planting program.

• Partial decollectiviza-tion of village assets.

• Stable social welfareentitlements.

Village 3

• High

• Lack of cash or collec-tively supplied inputssuch as pesticides orfertilizers leads to low-input, low-productivityagriculture for mosthouseholds.

• Significant environ-mental benefits of low-input agriculture offsetby soil degradationthrough over-taxingregimes.

• Destruction of com-munal capital via indi-vidual claims on for-merly collective assets.

• Intensified use of localresources, with result-ing degradation.

• Overuse of fertilizerleads to “soil-burning”and loss of soil fertility.

• Lack of implementa-tion beyond fines andlevies directed towardfilling county cofferswithout parallel provi-sion of services orinvestment.

• Complete decollec-tivization.

• Increase in fees, taxes,fines imposed by localstate constrains house-hold income andinvestment.

• Decline and disappear-ance of social welfareentitlements and assetsincreases householdvulnerability.

• Complete lack ofinvestment in or main-tenance of rural pro-ductive infrastructureconstrains production.


led to a significant rise in vulnerability. Theresult is intensified use of remainingresources. Declining irrigation may in astrict sense bring better environmentalpractices—dry farming, decreasing saliniza-tion, and less “burning” of soils with fertiliz-ers—but it also increases overutilization ofother resources to compensate for loweragricultural incomes.

In attempting to explain the geographicvariations in levels of collective actionacross China as a whole, it is important toaccept that in each individual case they arehistorically and politically contingent. Forexample, we need to examine to whatextent these circumstances arise from dif-ferent conditions in pre- and postrevolu-tionary China, from varied experienceswith collective production, or from unevenpatterns of party activity across villages.These questions are important to under-stand if we seek to generalize from thecases presented. Answers to these ques-tions are beyond the scope of this essay.Still, the analytical framework laid out inthis article might help us to understand theuneven geographies of collective actionpresented by the three villages.

In this sense the incorporation of a vil-lage into modern markets is a means ofrural survival, though neither without con-tradictions nor a transformation of what isunderstood to be rural. This is an option,but not the only one, in the diversity ofexperiences that now make up rural China.But the revalorization of the collectiveexperience within the hegemonic discoursethat overwhelmingly denies its value is animportant step in itself, particularly forChina’s New Left (Eckholm 1999;Bernstein 1998; Sichuan Jingji ShehuiWenhua Fazhan Zhongda Wenti DuiceYenjiu Zhongxin 1995). Our understandingof alternative strategies cannot be limitedto visions that ignore the realities whichpeople must struggle with today. Butsimultaneously, alternative pathways suchas that taken by Nanjie must still be seen aslimited, as they are embedded within thebroader context of China’s structural trans-

formation and as they shift the costs ofreforms to others.

In Village 2, at the same time that eco-nomic growth is now emphasized above allelse, a contradictory policy of ecologicalagriculture is also promoted. The policyaim of ecological agriculture is to achieveoptimum economic, ecological, and socialbenefits (Ma 1984). Chinese ecologicalagriculture is somewhat different from itsWestern counterpart, which emphasizesincreasing land use efficiency, even some-times using high inputs of material andenergy. The Chinese version, at least inprinciple, emphasizes increasing use effi-ciency of inputs, so that costs can be low-ered and dependence on inputs lessened(in Western parlance, low-input agricul-ture). It expressly excludes chemical fertil-izer, though as can be seen in BeixuVillage, this is often overlooked for the sakeof expanding overall production.

In 1984, the State Council advocated amore ecologically sound agriculture in theSecond Meeting of National Environ-mental Protection, drawing up a documentadvocating that environmental agencies atdifferent levels should cooperate withother governmental agencies to spreadeco-agriculture technology and preventenvironmental destruction (Ross 1988).The central government’s Document No. 1of 1992 indicated clearly that agriculturaldevelopment should be focused on low-input, high-efficiency methods and be sen-sitive to environmental protection. Manyother examples of specific environmentalregulations related to different productivesectors exist in the contemporary period.For example, Article 5 of the AgriculturalLaw stipulates that “the state forbids any-one to burn mountain land for cultivation,reclaim land from lakes, and to cultivatesteep slopes.” Article 57 stipulates that “thestate forbids anyone to denude hillsides,and requires protection of forests, andincreased forest coverage.” Article 55 stip-ulates “special protection for basic crop-lands.” Article 10 of the Grassland Lawstipulates that “grassland plant communi-ties must be protected strictly, and forbids


anyone from reclaiming or destroyinggrassland” (Guowuyuan huanjing baohuweiyuanhui wenjian huibian 1995; Palmer1998). The question at issue here is the rel-ative effectiveness of these decrees on theground. While the laws have played a posi-tive role in protecting agriculturalresources and the environment in princi-ple, pressures to fulfill contracts and poorpeoples’ necessity to break many of theselaws in order to survive have forced offi-cials to turn a blind eye toward manyinfringements. Beixu Village, despite itsobvious achievements in agricultural sus-tainability, is no exception.

Environmental policy finds no explicitexpression or vehicle for implementation,in terms of environmental aspects ofresource use, in Village 3. Lack of cash orcollectively supplied inputs, such as fertiliz-ers and pesticides, has led to low-inputagriculture by the majority of households,with unintended environmental benefits.These are offset by intensified croppingregimes that tax soils and increase erosion.Furthermore, forest and grassland destruc-tion have no external or internal con-straints. In communal production brigades,before the reforms, the state’s political cap-ital was built up through collective use ofand responsibility for resources, a practicecontinued in Village 1, Nanjie. This politi-cal capital, necessary for imposing unpopu-lar state policies, was lost in Village 3 dur-ing decollectivization. By transforming theperception of collective labor from anarchetype to a relic of a failed model, thestate forfeited in certain cases its hard-wonlegitimacy, and thus its means to carry outnegotiations over crucial resource issues.Accompanying changes included a loss ofeconomies of scale, a devolution of tech-nology, and a lack of institutions concern-ing property regulation and use.Voluntarist stewardship runs headlong intothe “green apple syndrome”11 and is an

irrational choice at best. Perhaps the even-tual emergence of a collective political con-sciousness will enable social regulation ofcommon property resources. It is too soonto speculate on this rather hopeful out-come, as Village 3 has no such seed of opti-mism.

Policy: The Contradictionsbetween Social Process andEnvironmental Sustainability

An extensive literature chroniclingchanges in modern China already exists(Hussain and Stern 1994). Here I havemapped out one set of diverse localresponses to reform, and in particular, theways in which resource use and environ-mental policies have played out at the locallevel. The impact on villages of interna-tional economic liberalization is shapedthrough the shifting evolution of relationsbetween the state, market, and the peas-antry. In some cases, local deregulationand diminishing entitlements, with declin-ing investment in social capital, are con-straining which development pathwaysemerge. In other cases, where entitlementsand investment have been maintained, thearticulation of the local with the globalthrough the market is enabling heretoforeunexpected hybrid strategies for improvinglivelihoods. In either case, local andregional-based societal forces, both formaland informal, play a key role in providingthe foundation for alternative developmentpathways, as well as opportunities for resis-tance by those who have experienced risingvulnerability.

During China’s transition era, there hasbeen a gradual shift from peasant-state topeasant-market relations and an increasingemphasis on market regulation of land usedecisions. This is coupled with a decline inthe power of participatory collective insti-tutions at a local level and the receding roleof the central state, as local state represen-tatives garner increased power in bothobtaining revenue and distributing assets,as well as profits of local government-

11 This refers to the situation where individu-als pick apples green, before they are ripe, outof fear of not getting any at all.


owned productive enterprises. This shiftincreases local particularism in the wayspolicies, laws, and guidelines are inter-preted, negotiated, practiced, and evolve.12

Particularism allows for appropriate adap-tation of policies across complex geogra-phies, and at the same time opens potentialnew avenues for corruption and abuse ofpower. Furthermore, it limits the state’sability to enforce unified environmentalpolicies on a national basis.

Declining peasant access to key tangibleand intangible assets appears as a funda-mental failure of the state in managingChina’s transition to a free market. Thebreakdown of collective action to maintaininfrastructure and communal capital hasresulted in a rapid degradation in suchimportant infrastructure as canal networksfor irrigation, tree farms, and windbreaks(“China Vows to Stop Deforestation .#.#. ”1998; Muldavin 1983, 1986, 1992, 1996b),as well as social services. It has also led totremendous socioeconomic differentiationas the state has retreated from the coerciveegalitarian principles of the communeperiod (Chai 1996). By allowing the poorlyfunctioning market to allocate resources,new kinds of motivation have replaced theold, based on corruption, cheating, andindividual desires to maximize incomes inthe rather chaotic new context. Thus thecoercion of the market has replaced that ofthe state, but with quite different results.Households with labor power have beenable to diversify livelihood strategies andminimize risk in the new context. Access toresources has been another importantmeans to expand income and diversifylivelihood strategies. In the three casestudies presented here, households in vil-lages that have maintained collective insti-tutions and production organization havefared better than most. The exceptions arethe limited number of households thatgained industrial and sideline assets upondecollectivization and became the new

economic elite. As such, these householdshave done best in every case study, with theexception of Nanjie, where a breakup ofcollective goods never materialized.

It is impossible to clearly assess theimpacts of the reforms without analyzingthe impacts of declining collective institu-tions on perceived risk and associated deci-sion making on the part of households andindividuals. In contemporary China, peas-ants are engaged in environmentallydestructive production practices, some-times against their better technical judg-ment. High-input agriculture is accompa-nied by soil deterioration and an increasein “natural hazards” as infrastructuredeclines through lack of investment(Muldavin 1992). Declining forests,degraded grasslands, increasing desertifi-cation, as well as transformation of coastalzones and remaining wetlands, continue toseverely undermine China’s environmentand therefore threaten long-term produc-tivity.

From huge controversial projects such asthe Three Gorges Dam (Holley 1992), tothe rapid expansion of highly pollutingTownship and Village Enterprises overarable land (Vermeer 1995–96; Muldavin1992), the specter of disaster in theChinese environment casts a sinister andlengthening shadow. Large corporate enti-ties, from newly independent collectivesrun on a shareholder basis to transnationalcorporations setting up far-flung produc-tion facilities in rural and suburban areas,tie China’s environmental problems intothe rapid restructuring of the global econ-omy.

The state too is directly responsible forongoing environmental destruction, aslarge state-run enterprises are slow to“green” toxic and outdated processes.13

13 Despite using most of the monies from theMontreal Protocol set aside to decreaseChlorofluorocarbon (CFC) output worldwide,China’s actual production of CFCs continues torise more than 10% annually. This is becominga serious liability for China in the donor com-munity (Muldavin 1995).

12 See Peet and Watts (1996) for an explo-ration of the changing roles of emergent institu-tions and organizations in the context of shiftingconfigurations of state and market roles.


Decentralization of political and economicauthority, accompanying the reforms, hasproduced uneven opportunities for entre-preneurialism and development by localgovernment entities (Oi 1992; Walder1994; Unger and Chan 1999; Sichuan JingjiShehui Wenhua Fazhan Zhongda WentiDuice Yenjiu Zhongxin 1995). Further-more, it is unclear whether this “localiza-tion” of the state has resulted in anincreased voice in environmental policydecisions on the part of peasants (Sargesonand Zhang 1999, 99). In some cases, con-strained by severely weakened village-levelcollective institutions, peasants havebecome primarily a reactive force,responding to perceived illegitimate acts oflocal state representatives. With little cen-tral government funding, county-level offi-cials increasingly view the peasantry andlocal resources as their primary means ofcreating revenue. In this context, surplusextraction often translates into exploitativelabor and resource use practices, as whencounty- and township-level industries actas subcontractors in extensive commodityproduction chains running from remoteChinese villages to U.S. cities (Vermeer1998; Muldavin 1992, 1996c). In caseswhere the local state loses legitimacy, peas-ants are unwilling to engage in collectiveactivities which support long-term sustain-able production for the village as a whole(Unger and Chan 1999).

The assumption that the introduction ofprivate property, individualized householdproduction, and “free” markets would leadto a better allocation of resources, and bet-ter decision making regarding long-termproductivity, is strongly refuted by the evi-dence now available from many local areasin China. It assumes a realignment of localpolitical economic power within a regula-tory framework and rule of law that wouldpromote policies and practices oriented tothe long term—a change that is unlikely tohappen any time soon. In some areas, theactual limits on privatization (social andstructural) provide the potential avenues toavoid some negative aspects of social andenvironmental decline. In other areas,

hybrid corporatism (quasi-private/quasi-collective) provides yet another potentialalternative to social and environmentaldecline (Oi 1992; Sichuan Jingji ShehuiWenhua Fazhan Zhongda Wenti DuiceYenjiu Zhongxin 1995).

Although China has increasingly reliedon individual entrepreneurship and privateenterprise to solve many problems, itwould be a mistake to view these individualundertakings as somehow beyond theinfluence of the strong social context inwhich they operate. Despite rising mobil-ity, place still greatly defines individuals,families, and clans in rural China (Potterand Potter 1990). Individuals’ ties to local-ity make comparisons with footloose profit-seekers in other countries misleading. Avillage moral economy still opposes suchentrepreneurial behavior, often dictatinglevels of redistribution of accumulated cap-ital and profits, as well as the provision ofsocial welfare benefits, either directly orthrough local government entities (Walder1995; Oi 1995; Bernstein 1998). Furtherresearch is needed on community pressuretoward responsible resource use by entre-preneurs and small private businesses.

Contemporary China’s political econ-omy has led to a spatially diverse range ofenvironmental outcomes, with divergentreasons for serious land degradation andpollution. These difficult problems aremore often than not a result of long-termstructural challenges, and because of theirseeming intractability, may not onlyrequire sustained state intervention butalso fundamental change in the ways pro-duction, distribution, and consumption arecarried out and resources are defined andused. In essence, solutions require a majorshift in the society-nature relationship—which is easier to diagnose than to rectify.

The implementation of the reforms haswitnessed a shift in state environmentalmitigation efforts from long-term invest-ment and allocation of state resources toregulatory policies and institutions (frominternational treaties to the establishmentof the National Environmental ProtectionAgency), combined with market signals to


provide the proper allocation of invest-ment. Yet, there is no cohesive state policyaddressing the accelerated destruction ofnature and resources in China today.Continued social stratification and chang-ing control over natural resource use hasresulted in growing resistance to state pol-icy initiatives within the new order. In thecontext of China’s new hybrid society, newthinking without the blinkers of ideologicalimperatives, whether left, right, or center,is needed to provide alternatives to thehegemonic modernization discourse.Unintended consequences of the reforms,seen in changing daily practices, may pro-vide the most creative and sustainableoptions to inform policy. Environmentallyoriented alternatives should have as theirgoal the reduction of vulnerability forChina’s vast peasant majority, as they notonly face the immense difficulties of main-taining livelihoods but also pay the highestcosts, no matter what pathway is chosen.

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