THE PERENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY · THE PERENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY meaningful aims in the world and teach us methods of achieving them. For apart from the sciences, it is said,

THE PERENNIAL SCOPEOF PHILOSOPHY

THE

PERENNIAL SCOPE

OF PHILOSOPHY

by

KARL .J ASPERS

Tr01t!lated by RAlph Manheim

ROUTLEDGE & KEG -\N PAUL LTD

L()~D()N

CONTENTS

1. WHAT Ili PHILOSOPHICAL FAITH? page 7

II. CONTENTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL FAITH 28

III. MAN ~O

IV. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 76

V. PHILOSOPHY AND ANTI-PHILOSOPHY II~

VI. THE PHILO~OPHY OF THf FUTURE ISO

INDI:X 177

Chapter One

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHICALFAITH?

I F WE ASK: by what and toward what shall we live,one answer wIll no doubt be: by revealed faith; foroutside 1t there can be only nihilism. A theologian

recently declared' 'It IS no mere presumptlOn on thepart of the Church to say that the crucial alternatlve is:Chmt or nihilism.'-If this were the case, there wouldbe no phllo~ophy. There would be on the one hand ahIStory of phtlosophy, that 15, a history of unbehef leadIng to nihilism, and on the other hand a system of concepts m the serVice of theology Philosophy itselfwouldbe depm-cd of Its heart, and where a theological atmo

sphcre has pre":uled, thiS has mdeed been ItS lot. Evenwhen works of consummate lntellectual artlstry havebeen created In such an atmosphere, they have takenthcl! mood from an ahcn, non-phllosophlcal source,eccleSiastical religIOn; thclr Independence has been borrowed and Illusory, and they have not been taken quiteseriously as philosophy

Another answer to our gucstlon IS that we shouldlive by human reason, by the SClences, which point to

7

THE PERENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

meaningful aims in the world and teach us methods ofachieving them. For apart from the sciences, it is said,there are only illusions. Philosophy is not autonomous;step by step it has sloughed off all the sciences, and inthe end even logic has become a specialized science. Sothat by now nothing is left.-If this were so, therewould again be no philosophy. Philosophy was once aroad to the sciences. Now at best it can drag on a moreor less superfluous existence as a handmaiden to thesciences, perhaps in the form of epistemology.

But both these conceptions seem to contradict theinner meaning of philosophy in the three millennia ofits history in China, India and the West. They are incompatible with the seriousness of our attitude towardphilosophIcal problems to-day, at a tIme when philosophy has ceased to be the handmaiden of the SCIencesas it was towards the end of the runeteenth century, yethas not relapsed into a position of subservIence totheology.

These facile alternatives of revealed faith or ruhilism,of total science or illusion, serve as weapons of spiritualintimidation; they rob people of their God-given responsibility and make them subservient. They rendhuman possibilities into antinomies, and authentichumanity is forgotten.

Those who accept such alternatives declare that anyone who dares to carry on the venerable tradItion ofphilosophy must either be a ruhilist or an illUSIOnist.And if we do not live up to the preconceived pIcture,we are reproached with shallowness, inconsistency,

8

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHICAL FAITH?

trivial rationalism, unworldliness; we are attacked fromboth sides, by the proponents of an exclusive revealedfaith and of a 'science' that has developed into superstiuon.

We shall take up this challenge. We shall attempt tokeep open the horizons of humanity in our philosophical thinking. Philosophy must not abdicate. Least ofall to-day.

We live in the awareness of perils that were unknownto past centuries; our communication wtth the men ofother ages may be broken off; we may heedlessly depriveourselves of tradition; human consciousness may decline; there may be an end to open communicationamong men. In View of the dangers with which we arefaced, we must in our plulosophlzing prepare for everyeventuality, In order that our thinkIng may helphumanity to preserve its highest potentialities. Precisely because of the catastrophe that has overtaken theWestern world, philosophical thought can regain fullindependence only by dIscovering its relation to theprimal source of humanity.

I wish to speak to you of philosophical faith, whichunderlies all these ideas. The subject is vast. In order tostress certain Simple prinCIples, I shall divide our inquiry into six lectures:

1. What IS philosophical faith? 2. Contents of plulosophical faith. 3. Man. 4. Philosophy and relIgion.5. Philosophy and anuphilosophy (demonology, deification ofman, nihilism). 6. The philosophy ofthe future.

Faith is a different thing from knowledge. Giordano

o


Bruno believed and Gahleo knew. Outwardly theywere both in the same sItuation. An inquisitorial courtdemanded of them both a retraction on threat of death.Bruno was wllling to retract certain of lus proposItions,but not those which he regarded as essential; he died amartyr's death. Gahleo retracted rus theory that theearth revolved around the sun, and accordlng to theapt but apocryphal anecdote later remarked: Eppur simuove. Here is the difference: On the one hand we havea truth that suffers by retractlon, and on the other atruth which retraction leaves intact. Both men acted inkeeping with the truth they stood for. A truth by whIchI live stands only if I become Identical wIth It; it IS hiStorical in form; as an objective statement it is not universally vahd, but it is absolute. A truth which I canprove, stands without me; it IS uruversally vahd, unhistoncal, timeless, but not absolute; rather it dependson firute premises and methods of attaining knowledgeof the finite. It would be unfitting to die for a truth thatIS susceptible to proof. But at what pOlnt the thInkerwho believes he has plumbed the depths, cannot retracthis statements without harm to the truth Itself-that ishis own secret. There IS no universal pnnciple demanding that he become a martyr. But when, hke Bruno, hesuffers martyrdom, not out of emotional enthUSiasm,not out of the defiance of the moment, but after a longand arduous conquest of hImself, he reveals authenticfaith, that is, certainty regarding a truth which I cannotprove as I can prove a scientlfic theorem regardingfinite things.

10


Nevertheless the case of Bruno is unusual. For ph1losophy is not ordinanly concentrated in propositionsthat assume the character of a credo, but in 10tellectualstatements that bear upon existence as a whole. ThatSocrates, BoethlUs, Bruno are 10 a sense the sa10ts ofphilosophy, does not make them the greatest philosophers. But they are revered for vindicating a phIlosophical faith after the manner of martyrs.

As against the platitude that man m1ght base everyth10g on his intelhgence-Jfonly there were no stupidityor III Will, everything would be all right-as againstthis rationahstlc delUSiOn, but still on the terram of therational, we deSignate the other thing to which we arebound as the urational. One may reluctantly accept thiSirrational element, or one may cultivate it as an intnnslcally ummportant play of the emotions, as an illUSIonindispensable to the psychic orgamsm, as recreation forone's leisure time. One may even find 10 this Irrationalelement forces to which one appeals as psychologicalpassions, 10 order to achieve certain aims WIth theuhelp. Or, finally, one may find the truth 10 these forcesand plunge 1Oto the Irrational, taking frenzy for authentiC life.

But faith must not be taken to mean the irrational.This polarity of rational and urational has only led toconfusion. The 1l1SIstence, now on SCience, now onsome undiscusslble and supposedly ultimate Instance,the tendency to invoke now reason, now emotion, hasgiven rise to an endless exchange of op1Oions withoutcommunIcation. Such a game was pOSSible as long as

II


the light of a great tradition, though growing steadilyweaker, still served as a beacon. The life of the spiritended when man knowingly based it on the irrational.It burned itself out in cheap attacks on everything, instubborn adherence to arbitrarily selected ideas whichwere held to be effective, in the frivolous squanderingof tradition through a seemingly superior freedom, andin high-sounding unreliable statements. All this cannotbe combated, for there is no adversary to grapple with,but only an opaque, shifting, Protean muddle, so ephemeral that the Intellect cannot pin it down; this situationcan be surmounted only by determmation to thinkclearly.

The irrational is at bottom mere negation; our faIthcannot be a plunge into the darkness of antl-reason andchaos.

PhilosophIcal faith, the faith of the thlnkmg man,has always thlS distinguishmg feature: it is allied withknowledge. It wants to know what is knowable, and tobe conscious of its own premises.

Unlimited cognition, science, is the basic element ofphilosophy. There must be nothing that is not questioned, no secret that is withheld from inquiry, nothingthat is permrtted to veil itself. It is through critique thatthe pUflty and meaning of knowledge are acquired, andthe realization of its hmits. Anyone who engages inphilosophical actIvity can protect himself against theencroachments of a sham knowledge, against the aberrations of the sciences.

Plulosophical faith must also elllCMate itself. When I


philosophize, I a.ccept nothing as it comes to me, without seeking to penetrate it. Faith cannot, to be sure,become universally valid knowledge, but it should become clearly present to me by self-conviction. It shouldbecome unceasingly clearer and more conscious, andby becoming conscious unfold more and more of itsinner meaning.

What then is faith?In it, the faith through which I am con....inced, and

the content of faith, which I comprehend-the act offaith, and the falth that I acquire by this act-fides quacreditur and fide.r quae creditur-are inseparable. The subjective and the objective side of faith are a whole. If Itake only the subjective side, there remains a faith thatis merely a believing state of mind, a falth without object, which in a manner of speaking believes only itself,a falth without inner content. If I take only the objective side, there remains a content of faith, as object, asproposition, as dogma, as inventory, as a dead something.

Thus falth is always falth in something. But neithercan I say that it is an objective truth that is not determined by faith but determines It-nor can I say that itis a subjective truth that IS not determlned by the objectbut determines it. Faith IS one In that wruch we separateas subject and object, as faith by which and in wruch webelieve.

Accordingly, when we speak of falth, we shall havein mind this falth that comprehends subject and object.Therein lies the whole difficulty of defining faith.

13


Here we must recall the great doctrine of Kant,which has its precursors in the history of both Westernand Asiatic philosophy, whose basic idea inevitablymade its appearance wherever men philosophized, butwhich only with Kant-here too In historical form butin its essential outlines valid for all time-was workedout consciously and methodtcally and became an element of philosophical elucidation. It IS the Idea of thephenomenality of our eXIstence in its division Into subject and object, bound to space and time as forms ofsensibility, to categories as forms of thought. All beingmust be objectified for us in such forms, it becomesphenomenon for us, it IS for us as we know It, and notas it is in Itself. BeIng is neIther the object that confronts us, whether we perceIve It or thInk it, nor IS Itthe subject.

The same IS true of faith. If faith is neither solely content nor solely an act of the subject, but is rooted in thevehicle phenomenality, then it should be conceIvedonly in conjunction with that whIch is neither subjectnor object but both In one, with that whIch manifestsitself in the dualIty of subject and object.

We call the beIng that is neither only subject nor onlyobject, that IS rather on both sides of the subject-objectsplit, das Umgreifende, the ComprehenSIve. Although Itcannot be an adequate object, It IS of thIS, and wlth thisin mInd, that we speak when we phIlosophIze.

Faith, it would appear, IS ImmedIate, In contrast toeverythIng that is medtated by the understanding.Faith would then be an experience, an experIence of the

14


Comprehensive, that either fulls to my lot or does notfall to my lot.

But in such a conception, the ground and primalsource of our being seems to slip Into the psychologically descnbable, into contingency. Hence .Kterkegaardsays: 'What Schleiermacher calls religiOn, and the Hegel1an dogmatists faith, is at bottom nothIng other thanthe first immedIate condition for everydung-the vital£iuidum-the spintual atmosphere that we breathe.'(Journals, I, 54.) Anything 'that is so volatillzed, sodissolved in mist' (.Kterkegaard is here refernng toChnstianity) is not faith.

For Kierkegaard an essential attnbute of faith is thatIt relates to a uruque histoncal event and is ltself historical. It is not experience, not somethmg immediatethat can be descnbed as given. It is rather a primalawareness of bemg through the medIation of historyand thought.

Philosophical falth realtzes thiS. It looks on all formulated and written philosophy only as preparation orrecollection, only as InSpiratiOn or confirmation. Henceno meaningful philosophy can be a self-contained conceptual system. The conceptual structure is never morethan half, and attams to truth only if, m addltlon tobemg conceived, 1t is embodied In the thmker's ownhistorical existence.

Hence the phl1osopher freely confronts his ownthoughts. Philosophical faith must be charactenzednegatively: it cannot become a credo. Its thought doesnot become -dogma. PhIlosophical faith is not firmly

15


grounded in anything objective and finite in the world,because it merely uses its propositions, concepts andmethods, and does not subordinate itself to them. Itssubstance is purely historical and cannot be anchoredin the universal-though it is only in the universal thatit can express itself.

Accordingly philosophical faith must continuallydraw upon the primal source within each historicalsituation. It achieves no rest in a body of doctrine. Itremains a venture of radical openness. It cannot invokeitself as ultimate authority, but must manifest itself bythought and reasoning. Even the pathos of the inevitable statement that sounds like revelation constitutes a danger to philosophy.

The universality of true faith cannot however beformulated as a urnversally valid statement, it cannot beaccepted as immediate, or objectively fixed as a productof history; we can only ascertain it historically byfollowing the movement of time. But this occurs in the,.calm of the Comprehensive, which is neither exclusivelysubject nor exclusively object. The presence that alwaysmanifests itself historically includes within itself thesources of all faith.

In order to understand what faith is, we would haveto elucidate the Comprehensive. The always medIated,for ever new immediacy of the Comprehensive, thatwhich is always present, has several modes. In our description, the Comprehensive appears in a multiplicityof its modes. I shall here avail myself of a schema resulting from our philosophical tradition. In this place

16

WHAT IS PHILOSePHICAL FAITH?

I can set it down briefly (and I must ask you for a fewmoments to attempt the imposs1ble with me, to attemptwithin the confines of object tlunking, the only thinking of which we are capable, to transcend this thinking,to go beyond the object with the implements of objectthought, to do something indeed wlthout which therecan be no philosophy, but wh1ch here I can only showin a schema).

The Comprehensive is either the Being in itself thatsurrounds us or the Bemg that we are.

The Being that surrounds us, is called world andtranscendence.

The Being that we are 1S called dasem, 'bemg there',consciousness in general, spirit, existence.

(a) The Bung that surrounds us.-Th1s being that is,.even if we are not, and that surrounds us, but that isnot ourselves, is of twofold nature: it IS the world, thatis to say: the being of wh1ch one aspect of our essenceconstitutes an infinltesimal part, 1f the world as a wholebe cons1dered as someth1ng that 1S not ourselves and inwhich we are Immersed; it IS transcendence, that is tosay: the bemg that is intrinslCally different from us, inwhich we have no part, but in which we are rooted andto which we stand in a certain relation.

(aa) World: The world as a whole IS not an object,but an idea. What we know is in the world, but 1S neverthe world.

ebb) Transcendence: Transcendence is the being thatnever becomes world but that speaks as it were throughthe being that is in the world. There is transcendence

B 17

THE PERENNIAL SCePE OF PHILOSOPHY

only if the world does not consist only of itself, is notbuilt upon itself, but points beyond itself. If the worldis everything, then there is no transcendence. But ifthere is transcendence, perhaps there is something inthe world's being that points to it.

(b) The Being that we are.-The modes in whIch webecome consclOUS of our own being are as follows:

(aa) We are dasein, being-there. LIke all hVIng thingswe live in an environment. The Comprehensive in thisbeing alive becomes an object of inquiry 10 its manifestations, in the products of Me, in physical forms, inpsychological functions, 10 heredItary morphologicalcontexts, in behavIOur patterns, in envIronmentalstructures. In addition, man, and only man, produceslanguages, tools, Ideas, acts, 10 short, he produces hImself. All life except for man is merely being-there WIthInits environment. What completes man's belng-there isthat the following modes of the ComprehenSIve enterinto It, either through man as a vehicle or forced byman into hIs service.

(bb) We are consciousness as such In the dIvision ofsubject and object. Only what enters Into thIS consciousness IS being for us. We are the comprehensiveconsciousness, in which everythIng that IS can beknown, recogruzed, intended as an object. We breakthrough our mere environment to the Idea of the worldto which all environments belong, indeed, we thinkbeyond the world, and in our thoughts we can make It

disappear as though it were nothIng.(cc) Weare mind. The life of the mind is the life of

18


ideas. Ideas-for example, the practical Idea embodiedin our professions and tasks, the theoretical ideas ofworld, soul, life, etc.-function as impulses in us, as anabstract of the total purpose inherent in the object, assystematic method of penetration, adaptation, and realization, and as such they lead us. They are not objects,but manifest themselves in schemata and forms. Theyare effective, actual, and at the same tIme they are infinitetasks.

These three modes of the Comprehenslve-beingthere, consciousness as such, mind-are the modes inwhich we are objects in the world; i.e. as this Comprehensive is objectIfied into a thing that confronts us,we ourselves become adequate empincal objects ofblOlogical, psychologIcal, soclOloglcal and historIcalInquiry. But thIS does not yet exhaust our being.

(dd) We are potentIal eXIStence: \Ve take our hfe froma primal source that hes beyond the beIng-there thatbecomes empirIcal and obJectIve, beyond conSCIOUSness and beyond mInd. This aspect of our nature is revealed: (I) In man's experience of dissattsJaction withhimself, for man feels constantly that he IS tnadequateto what he is, to hIS knowledge, hIS tntellectual world;(2) in the Absolute, to which he subordInates hIS empIrical eXIstence as to hIS own authentic selfhood, or asto that whIch is saId to hIm tntelhglbly and convincingly; (3) in the unremItting urgefor Untty; for man is notcontent in one mode of the Comprehensive, or in allmodes taken together, but presses toward the fundamental unity which alone is being and eternity; (4) in

19

THE PBRBNNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

the consciousness of an indefinable memory, as thoughhe shared in the knowledge of creation (Schelling), oras though he remembered something beheld before anyworld existed (plato); (5) in the consciousness of immortality, that is not a survival in another form, but atime-negating immersion in eternity, appearing to himas a path of action for ever continued in time.

The Comprehensive that I am is in every form apolarity of subject and object:

As being-there I am: inner world and environment,as consciousness 1 am: conSCIOusness and object,as mind I am: the idea that is in me and the objective

idea that comes to me from things,as existence I am: existence and transcendence.The Comprehensive that 1 am comprehends, as it

were, the Comprehensive that Being is and at the sametime is comprehended by it. This Being is called'world' in the first three polarities and then refers to theenvironment, the objectively intelligible, the idea. Inthe fourth polarity, it 1S called 'transcendence'.

Faith in the broadest sense then means presence inthese polarities. For this presence can in no event beobtained by the understanding; it always comes froma source of its own, which I cannot will, but throughwhich I will, am and know.

We take the fact of our being-there so for grantedthat we are not usually aware of the secret that lies 1n

the simple consciousness of reality: 1 am there, thesethings are there. Some mental patients temporarily losetheir sense of reality. They stamp on the ground, vainly

20


striving to make certain of reality. Everything seemsillusory. They feel as if they were dead, they feel likeghosts who are not alive, and, in same grave states ofinsanity, as if they were doomed to live for ever in thiscondition of non-living. They call themselves puppetsor by some other term indicating unreality. Descartes'cogito ergo sum is to be sure an intellectual act, but itcannot give one a sense of reality.

It is as pure consciousness that I experience the truthof a proposition. This eVIdence is compellIng. In everysingle case, I expenence a compelling need to recognize a thing as true or false. But this evidence IS alwaysimmedIate and ultimate.

As mind, I am filled with ideas, through which Icapture the idea that confronts me. What is fragmentedIn the understanding is held together in the mindand becomes an intellectual movement. Where ideasvanIsh, the world collapses into an mfinity of scatteredobjects.

As existence I am, since I know that I have beengiven to myself by transcendence. I am not by virtueof my decision alone. Even my freedom, my beingthrough-myself has been given me. I can be absentfrom myself and no will can then enable me to givemyself to myself.

Now we speak of sense of reality, evidence, idea, asfaith in the broader sense. On the level of empuicaleXistence there is somethmg akin to Instinct, on thelevel of pure consciousness there is certainty, on thelevel of mind there is conviction. But faith proper is

21


the existential act by which transcendence becomesconscious in its actuality.

Faith is life out of the Comprehensive, it is guidanceand fulfilment through the Comprehensive.

Faith that springs from the Comprehensive IS free,because It is not fixed in any finite thing that has beenmade into an absolute. It has a character of indetermination (i.e. in reference to what can be stated-I donot know whether and what I believe) and also of theabsolute (in practice, in the actiVIty and repose thatgrow out of the decision).

To speak of it requires the basic philosophical operation, which is to ascertain the Comprehensive by transcendlllg the object wtthIn the object thlllking thatremains for ever inevitable, l.e. to break through theprison of our being that appears to us as split into subject and object, even though we can never really enterinto the sphere outsIde It.

There is something In us that resists this basIc operation and thus reSIsts philosophIcal thought itSelf. Westrive always for something tangible. Hence we erroneously take philosophical ideas for object knowledge.As a cat falls on Its four paws, we fall upon the tangIbleobject. We fight against the vertigo of philosophy,against the Intunatlon that we should stand on ourheads. We Wish to remain 'sane', holding on to ourobjects and evadIng the rebtrth of our nature In the actof transcending.

But nothing avails. We can retire to the supposedrefuge of common sense, but if we try to force every

zz


thing into its forms, we succumb to the superstitionwhose essential characteristIc is that it freezes into anobject, and thus makes tangIble, BeIng itself that transcends any dichotomy of subject and object.

Philosophical faith, with its keen eye for superstition, for faith that is pinned to an object, IS consequently incapable of profess1Og dogmatic creeds. Therealm of the objective must rematn 10 motlon, mustevaporate as It were, so that as the object vanishes, afulfilled consciousness of bClllg IS made clear by thisvery vanish1Og. Accordingly, phl1osophical faith is forever immersed in a dlalectlcal process of fusIon andnegatlon.

Dralectlc has very dIverse mearungs. Common tothem all IS only the essentlal Importance of contradictions. DIalectic means the logical progress throughantltheses to a solutlon 10 syntheses. Dialectic denotesthe movement of reality WIth ItS contradlctlons that tIlt1oto one another, umte, and produce something new.But dlalectlc also means the exacerbatlon of anmheseslnto 1Osoluble antlnorrues, the fall tnto the insolubleand the contradIctory-It means also a process thatleads us to the frontiers where betng seems absolutelytorn apart, where my authentic bemg becomes faith,and faith becomes the apprehensIon of Bemg m theseemingly absurd.

Philosophical faith contains such d.1alectlcal elements.

Just as Being and Nothingness are inseparable, eachcontaining the other, yet each violctltly repelling the

13


other, so faith and unfaith are inseparable, yet passionately repel one another.

The contradictions of empirical existence, the mind,the world, are reconciled in a harmonious total vision,and the vision is shattered by existential revolt againstthis untruth.

Faith withdraws to a minimum at the borders of unfaith, and from thIS Infinitesimal point, it reverses theprocess and spreads anew: thus can I compress myselfin my own shrinkIng self-In the cogzto ergo sum-; inthe pride of inner Integrity; si jrachls zllabitur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae-; In the hfeless attitude of theonlooker: such is life-; in annihIlating condemnationof the world ('they can have my ticket back'). In eachcase I deceive myself Into believing that I still existeven when I have no desire to be anything definite, asthough it were possible for me to exist outSIde of theconditions imposed by the finiteness of the world.Through my experience of Nothingness, indeed Inspired only by this extreme experience, I once again,with new faIth, sail into the open, and begin once moreto elucidate all the modes of the Comprehensive whichI am and in which I find myself.

It is true that philosophical faith passes throughNothingness, but it IS not without roots. It does notbegin from scratch, even though it goes back to theprimal source. Why do you believe?-Because myfather told me. Mutatis mutandIS, this answer of Kierkegaard applies also to philosophy.

Philosophical faith is in tradition. To he sure, this

24


faith exists only in the independent thinking of eachindividual, it does not offer the shelter of an objectiveinstitution, it is what remams when everything elsecollapses, and yet it IS' nothmg if one trIes to cling to itas a practical support in the world. But always manconquers it by coming to himself, and this he doesthrough traditlOn. Hence phllosophy is determined byits history, and the hIstory of philosophy IS roundedout by the philosophiz1Og of each perIod....

Nowhere at any time has a phtlosophta perennis beenachIeved, and yet such a phIlosophy always exists in theIdea of philosophIcal thought and 10 the general plctureof the truth of philosophy considered as ItS lustory overthree millenma which become a s10gle present.

The question is indeed raIsed-particularly In viewof the achievements of the rehglOns: Does phIlosophyhelp man in dIstress? The question is asked by thosewho seek an objective, tangible support. But 10 philosophy there is no such support. The support offered byphilosophy is reflection, a gathenng of spiritual sustenance through the actuahzation of the Comprehensive, to win oneself by being given to oneself. Philosophical faith sees ltSclf as exposed, without safeguardor shelter.

And yet the tradition of philosophy IS sometlung likea support. The reality of past philosophical thought, ofthe great philosophers, of the works of philosophystands before our eyes. Despite our love for particularphilosophers through their work, we can never see in aman any more than a man, we must everywhere per-

2S


ceive errors and limits and failures. Even the highesttradition is bound to time, gives neither security nor realfellowship; it cannot become a collection of sacredbooks, and it knows no work wluch is valid under allcircumstances. Nowhere is the truth ready made; it isan inexhaustible stream that flows from the hIstOry ofphilosophy as a whole from Chma to the West, yetflows only when the primal source IS captured for newrealizations in the present.

The word 'Philosophy' has become a symbol of ourgratitude for the possibJIity of contlnued dIalogue wIththis tradition. It has become our lingUistic usage tospeak of it as of a hving person. Clcero and, most impressively of all, Boethius effected thiS personification.

Plulosophlcal fauh venerates tradItlOnal phIlosophybut does not mamtain an attitude of obedience to It.

It does not look on history as an authomy, but as onecontinuous spiritual struggle.

History has many meanings. How easily phIlosophy goes astray when It becomes creed, solIdifies mtodogmas, establishes school curncula, turns traditioninto authority, makes heroes of founders of schools,and where it lets the play of dialectIC lead It into Irresponsibility. PhilosophIcal faith reqUires coolness andalso complete serIousness. Perhaps great Ideas havebeen more often misunderstood than understood. Perhaps, for example, the history of Platonism (begmningwith Speusippus) is a history of perverslOns and obliVIOns with but rare moments of redIscovery. Throughphilosophy men have, contrary to the spirit of phtlo-

26


sophy, found the road to mhilism. And so philosophyis held to be dangerous. Not infrequently it is even heldto be 1mpossible.

Only through philosophical faith, which always goesback to the primal source, is always capable of recognlZlng 1tself10 the other, can the road be found throughthe tangle of aberratlons 10 the hlstory of ph110sophyto the truth that has dawned in it.

Chapter Two

CONTENTS OF PHILOSOPHICALFAITH

FROM PHILOSOPHY ONE tends to expect compelrng rational insight, somethmg the truth ofwhicheveryone must see and then can know, without

any need to believe.Actually philosophy invokes no revelation and auth

ority. But what the man engaged in philosophicalthinking knows through his reason, is far more thancompelling intellectual knowledge. It is what from aninner source he apprehends as true, and actualizes withall the organs of his being.

In philosopluzmg man breaks through hIS merenature, but by virtue of his own inner being. What hethus apprehends as Being and as himself, that is hisfaith. In philosophizing, we travel the path to theprimal source of the faith that IS the prerogative of manas man.

Rudimentary philosophical ideas come to every man,and it is sometimes in children that they occur in theirpurest state. To find such thoughts, to clarify anddevelop them and to repeat them in the recognition of

18

CONTENTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL FAITH

what has been thought through the millennia, is thebusiness of philosophy taken as the professional pursuit of thinking. To this belongs first a methodicalreflection on the area of the contents ojfaith, second, reflections on the contents offaith themselves.

We have attempted the first. I shall repeat it brieflyin a different form.

I. T HE AREA OF THE CONTENTS

\XTe are led Into the area by four questloQ.S: What doI know?-What IS authenttc?-What IS truth?-Howdo I know?-With the help of the concepts developedin the first lecture, we shall gIve answers:

First questIOn: What do I know? The answer is: Everything I know falls WlthIn the subject-object dichotomy,It is object for me, 1t IS phenomenon, not a thIng InItself. But in the subject-object dIchotomy object andsubject are bound together. There can be no objectwithout a subject, but neIther can there be a subjectwIthout an object. Hence what I experience as beingresides always in the whole of the subject-object dichotomy, not only in one term.

The subject-object dIchotomy has many facets: Belog-there IS wlthin its world whIch 15 the environment;consciousness as such is confronted by objects; themind lives 10 ideas. Existence stands 10 relation totranscendence. But environment, ideas, transcendencebecome objects of cognition only in consciousnessthrough the objeCtlVIzation in schemata and symbols.

19


What I know is therefore always object consciousness and hence limited; but though finite, it is a possiblespringboard toward transcendence.

Secondquestion: ff7hat is authentic? The answer is soughtand found not by listing the many types of the eXistentthat occur, but by apprehending that which is in itself,or is authentic. Since our Inquiry always takes placewithin the subject-object dIchotomy, but since beIngmust transcend or comprehend subject and object, thequestion of being also bears upon the questioner. Theanswer must show what beIng is for us inseparablyfrom what we ourselves are; for bel11g must makepoSSIble the inqUiry Into it through the nature of ourown being, and It must be accessIble to thIs inquiry.

There are certain typIcal answers (some half apt andsome utterly fallaCIOUS) to the qucstIon of BeIng. FIrstof all, things existing as obJccts In the world werctaken for Being or for the foundauon of all the eXIStent: matter, spatial orders, world systems. Be111g isobject.

Conversely the subjectIVe was regarded as the sourceof all beIng, which It created and objectified. Bel11g IS aproduct of the I.

Purified of the accidents of matenal determl11atlon,being came finally to be conceived as the thought structures (categorIes), which perffilt us to apprehend allbeing, because they lie WIthIn being ltself. In thIS thinking that is inherent 111 bel11g, it becomes Immediatelycertain that being IS, IS not, becomes, IS present, IS substance, cause and effect, etc. BCl11g IS the logos.

30


The inadequacy of any such ontology points to thespecific traits of the phIlosophical inquiry into being:

(I) If that which authentically is, IS not an object,that is, not an object for a subject, then It is beyondcognition, which denotes object knowledge of something.

But since everything that IS an object for us revealsto us Its phenomenalIty in contrast to its being-in-Itself,phenomenal being pOints to authentIc beIng, whichspeaks and is perceptible through It.

(2) If authentIc being IS not experience as subject for afocal point of consciousness observing It, then It alsoevades all psychologIcal knowledge.

But since beIng IS present In everythIng that IS experienced, the sUbjectIve mode of beIng-there IS a basicmanifestatIOn of being: expenence and understandIngare IndIspensable for the ascertamment of beIng.

(j) If authentlc beIng IS not the thougbt structure of thecategorIes, not logos, It also evades logical knowledge.

But SInce everythIng that IS for us must enter intosome mode of thought, knowledge of the categoriesis a necessary conditlon of phIlosophical clanty.

The authentIC beIng, that IS neither object nor subject, but that IS manifested In the whole of the subjectobject dIchotomy, and that must fill the categories inorder to give them purpose and meaning, we havecalled the Comprehensive.

The questIon of authentlC beIng must therefore findits answer through elucidation of the modes of the Comprehensive-of world and transcenclence-of being-

JI


there, consciousness, mind, existence. But in so far asall these modes are rooted in one, the ultimate answeris that authentic being is transcendence (or God), aproposition the true understanding of which embracesall philosophical faith and all elucidating philosophicalthought, but the path to which leads through all themodes of the Comprehensive.

Third question: What is truth? Answer: In every modeof the Comprehensive that we are, a specific meaningof truth is rooted.

In being-there resides truth as the immediacy of thesensibly actual, as Vital utihty, as instinct, as the practical and the opportune.

In consciousness resides truth as the freedom fromcontradiction of that wluch is thinkable as object in theuniversal categories.

In the mind resides truth as conviction of Ideas.In existence resides truth as authentlc faith. Faith is

the conSCiousness of existence In reference to transcendence.

All truth is expressed in the medium of conSCiOUSness, whIch however proVIdes only formal truth,whereas the source of truth is to be sought in the othermodes of the Comprehensive.

Fourth question: How do I kn01V? 'When doubt puts inan appearance, I seek foundations. I ask how I know,I inquire into the meaning and limits of this knowledge.Then it becomes clear that all truth is apprehended in aspecific mode of thought. We become conscious ofthese modes of thought through the study of the cate-

32


gories and of methodology, which provide a basicframework of philosoplucal thought. Thus I am enabled not only to know, but to know how and by whatmeans I know.

For one wishing to philosopluze, it IS of particular,indeed of crucial importance to ascertaIn the differencebetween the object cogrunon that IS achieved In thesciences, and the transcending thought that characterizes philosophy. A philosophical diSCUSSiOn may besaid to have reached its goal when the matter under discussion becomes obJectless, In the double sense that forthe posinvlst nothIng remaInS to be done, because heno longer sees an object, and that for the phIlosopherthe hght IS just beglnrung to dawn. The philosophercannot to be sure apprehend authentic beIng In thevarushmg of the object, but he can be filled by it.

Our four questions result In intellectual operationswluch transcend the hnuts of the knowable and of theworld as a whole, so that through these limits we become aware of the phenomenal1ty of empirical eXistenceand hence of the Comprehensive nature of bemg, thusentenng Into the area of faith. ThiS transcendent thinkmg IS a thmkmg that through method acquires asCIentific character and yet, because In it the deternunate object IS dissolved, differs from SClentlnC cogrutlon.

These Intellectual operatIons do not carry compellmgeVidence lIke emplt1c and rauonal lnsights Into finiteobjects, but they have a compelling character for mmwho performs them, who In them transcending thefinite, gains awareness of the Infinite through the finite.

c 33


Since he moves in the area of the limit, he inevitablybecomes aware of the limit as such; using categories, hemethodically transcends these same categories; in nonknowledge he finds a new mode of objectless knowledge. This philosophizing carnes out intellectualoperations which do not yet reveal any contents offaith, but do pave the way for them.

2. CONTENTS OF FAITH

The contents of philosophIcal faith can be stated ill

such propositions as the following:God is.There IS an absolute imperative.The world IS an ephemeral stage between God and

existence.(1) Godh:Transcendence beyond the world or before

the world IS called God. There IS the profoundest dIfference whether I regard the universe as beIng in ltSelf andnature as God, or whether I regard the universe as notgrounded In Itself and find the foundatiOn of the worldand myself In somethmg outside the world.

\Ve have the proofs for the existence of God. SlOceKant, honest thmkers arc agreed that such proofs areimpossible if they alm to compel the mtellect, as onecan compellt to reahze that the earth revolves aroundthe sun and that the moon has a reverse side. But thearguments for the existence of God do not lose theIrvalidity as ldeas because they have lost their power toprove. They amount to a confirmation of faIth by ill-

H


intellectual operations. When they are original, thethinker struck by their evidence experiences them as theprofoundest event oflife. When they are reflected uponWIth understanding, they make possible a repetition ofthis experience. The idea as such effects a transformatIon in man, it opens our eyes, in a sense. More thanthat, it becomes a fundament of ourselves, by enhancingour awareness of being, it becomes the source of personal depth.

The arguments for the existence of God start fromsomethIng that can be found and experienced m theworld, to arrive at the conclUSIOn: if this is, then Godmust eXist. Thus the fundamental mystenes of the cosmos are brought to awareness as steppIng stones toGod.

Or one performs mtellectual operations in whichthInking 15 understood as awareness of Being, whtchthen IS deepened Into an awareness of God: this isspeculatlVe philosophy proper.

Or the presence of God IS ascertaIned existenually:the distmction between good and eVIl is viewed in ltsfull import as a commandment of God. God speaks inthe realIty of love.

And In every case, the presence of gaps In the worldstructure, the faIlure of all attempts to conceIve of theworld as self-contamed, the abortion of human planmng, the futlhty of human designs and reahzations, theimpOSSIbIlIty of fulfillIng man himself brmgs us to theedge of the abyss, where we experience nothingness orGod.

35


But never do we gain a scientifically cogent proof.A proved God is no God. Accordingly: only he whostarts from God. can seek hIm. A certainty of the existence of God. however rudImentary and Intangible itmay be. IS a premIse, not a result of philosophicalactivity.

Since Kant's magmficent confutation of all arguments for the eXistence of God, Since the bnlhant butcomfortable and false restoration of these proofs byHegel, since the revIved Interest In the medIeval proofs.a philosophical reformulation of the arguments for theexistence of God has become an urgent necessity.Theodor Haubach. the socIalist and conSpIrator of theJuly 2.oth upnsIng, who was hanged by the Gestapothis pohtical thinker and reahst, inspired by hope in thenew Germany to be bUilt after the certaIn collapse, tooka deep Interest dunng the war years In the argumentsfor God's eXIstence. whICh he looked upon as an In

dispensable foundation for the conSCiOusness thatwould unite us all.

The thought that God is, IS directly followed byspeculation as to what he IS. ThiS is impOSSible to discover, and yet speculauon on It has unfolded nch, 10

spinng thoughts. The field, to be sure, IS held by thenegative theology that tells us what God IS not-towit, he IS not something that stands In finite form beforethe eyes or the mind. But fimte thmgs serve as metaphor, symbol. analogy, enabhng us to realize thepresence of the divine.

(2.) There IS an absolute Imperative: In general the im-

36


peratives that are addressed to us, are based uponpractical aims, or upon an unquestioned authority. Suchimperatives are determmcd by the aim or by bhndobedience.

An absolute impeuuve has its source wlthm me, mthat It sustains me. Neuher finue alms nor authority canaccount for tills absolute. That the absolute eXists as afoundation for action IS not a matter of cognltlon, butan essential element of faith. Our finite thmklllg IS

always relative and thus can in some way Justify everything. The apprehenSIon of the absolute has, III thehlstonclty of our here and now, an lnfirute character;although It is elUCidated III umversal propOSitIOns, itcannot be adequately dcfined and denved through anyuniversal.

The absolute ImperatIve confronts me as the command of my authentiC self to my emplflcal eXistence, asthe command as It were of what I am eternally in theface of the transcendent, to the temporality of mypresent Me. If my Will IS grounded III the absolute, Iapprehend It as that which I myself authentIcally am,and to which my empIrical eXistence should correspond.

The Absolute Itself does not become temporal.\',('herever It IS, It cuts straight across time. It eruptsfrom the Transcendent Into this world by way of OUffreedom.

(3) The realt~y of the world subSists ephemerally hero'eenGod and fXlstCl/Ce: The llldetcrmlllatc character of allmodes of known realtty, the lllterpretive character ofall cognltlon, the fact that we apprehend all being III the

37


dichotomy of subject and object-these essential characteristics of the knowledge that is possible for us meanthat all objects are mere phenomena, that no being thatis the object of cognition IS being in itself and the wholeof being. The phenomenality of the empi!1cal world isa basic Insight of philosophical thought. This insIghtis not empirical; it can be attaIned only by an act oftranscendence; on the other hand, it Imposes itself onevery intellect that is capable of transcendence. It doesnot add a new particular item of knowledge to previousknowledge, but effects a shift in the whole conSCIOUSness of being. Hence the sudden but permanent lightthat dawns upon one after a more or less prolongedstudy of Kant. The student of Kant who fails to experience this revelation has not understood his teachings,has bogged down in a doctrine of which he does notrealize the ultimate implicatJOn.

The world as a whole does not become an object forus. Every object is in the world, none IS the world. Anydefinition or judgment of the world, whether it be anoptimiStlC affirmation or a pessimlstlc negatJOn of theuniversal harmony, leads to generallzatl0ns which givepreference to some reallties at the expense of others. Ifwe reject such generahzauons, we realize that the worldIS not self-contamed, that It IS not grounded m ltself,and we become willing to open ourselves permanentlyto all the modes of the world's being, to what happensoutside ourselves and to what we ourselves have done1n the temporal course of life. Such willingness 15

bound up with:


First, recognition of the absolute transcendence ofGod in relation to the world: the deus absconditus recedesinto the distance when I seek to fathom him, he is infinitely near in the absolute hlstoncity of the uniquesituation-and the situation is always unique.

Secondly, the experience of the world as the languageof God: the world has no independent eXlstence, init is manifested the speech of God, a speech that hasalways many mearungs and that can become historically unequIvocal for existence only in the evanescentmoment.

For such faith our being m time is an encounter ofexistence and transcendence-of the eternal that weare, as bemgs that are both created and self-given-andof the eternal In Itself. The world IS the meeting pointof that whIch IS eternal and that which mamfests Itselfin time.

But Since the encounter between eXIstence and transcendence IS an encounter m the world, it is bound tothe world from the standpOint of time. Because what isfor us, must mamfest Itselfwithin the temporality oftheworld, there IS no dIrect knowledge of God and existence. The study of the world 1S our only road toknowledge, self-realization In the world IS the onlyroad to eXistential self-realization. If we are lost to theworld, we are also lost to ourselves.

Of these propositions expressmg the substance offaith it can be said:

None IS demonstrable in the same sense as finiteknowledge. ThclI truth can be shown only by calling

39


attention to them, by following their line of thought,or by rememberIng their substance. They remain in theuncertain realm of non-knowledge.

One feels a certain dIffidence about giving a clearstatement of articles of falth. When clearly stated, theyare too readily treated like knowledge and then theylose their meaning. They beguile him who states themto raising false claims.

But I am compelled to make a direct statement ill

philosophizing, for here the questions anse: Is thereGod? Is empmcal existence subject to an absolute law?Is the world the ultimate, or IS it precarlous andephemeral?

The propositions of unfaIth are:First: there is no God, for there IS only the world and

the laws of nature; the world IS God.Second: there IS no absolute, for the commandments

that I follow came Into beIng and are conditIOned byhabit, practice, tradltlon, obedience; everythmg is relative ad infinitum

Third: the world is everything, the sole and authentic realIty. EverythIng In the world IS Indeed tranSIent.but the world itself IS absolute, eternal, not ephemeral.not suspended m transltlon.

In phllosophIzmg, non-knowledge should not beinvoked as a pretext for evadmg all answers. I do notknow whether I believe. But faith takes hold of me tosuch an extent that I dare to hve by it. WhIle the philosopher's statements may remam IndetermInate andsuggest mdecision. hIS actual attitude m a hlstorlcal

4°


situation is one of resolution. ThIs tensIOn characterizesphilosophy.

The essential philosophical themes of Western phIlosophy have theIr hIstorical source not only in Greek,but In BiblIcal thought as welL Those who cannotbelieve in revelation as such, can nevertheless make theBiblical source thea own, letting themselves be permeated by Its human truth, Without revelation. Thestudy of the Bible has mdeed been one of the foundations of nearly all Western philosophy up till to-day.This unique work belongs to no one denommatlon orreligion, but to all.

We become aware of our speCIfic roots In BIbltcalre1iglOn when we compare It to Indian and East ASIaticrehglOns. True, the fundamental charactenstlcs of BiblIcal reltglOn are not entirely lacking In the otherrellglOns, but here they do not permeate the wholestructure. Even In the Bible these fundamental charactenstlcs are not everywhere, some of them are to befound only 1U a few pas~ages, but these passages areumquely effectIve. Let me recall these fundamentaltraIts:

(1) The one God: The One becomes the foundation ofconsciousncss of bCIng and ethos, the source of actlveimmerSIOn In the world. No other gods beSide God,that IS the metaphvs1cal foundation for the senousstrivmg for the One 111 the world.

(2) The transcendence of the God-Creator: The conquestof the daemonlc world and of maglC bnngs to conSCIOusness the transcendence of the Image1ess, formless,

41


unthinkable God. The idea of creation brings the worldas a whole into a state of suspension. The world is notgrounded in itselft and does not originate in itself.Man as an individual in existence achieves his freedomin the world through being created by God; ltllus bondwith the transcendent God t and only by virtue of thisbond, is he independent of the world.

(3) EncoNnte,. of man with God: The transcendent Godhas a personal aspect. He is a persont to whom manturns. There is a stnving toward God t a sttlving tohear God t and out of it grows a passionate personalquest for God's personality. Biblical religion IS a religion of prayer. Prayer in its pure form-free fromworldly desires-is praIse and thanksgiving and endsin the trustful: 'Thy WIll be done.'

(4) God's commandments: WIth a uruque simplIcity,fundamental truths are expressed 10 the ten commandments as commandments of God. The difference between good and eVIl IS conceIved as an absolute eItherIor. Since the days of the prophets, chanty is enjoined,cultrunatlOg In the maXIm: 'Love thy neighbour asthyself.'

(5) Sense of hIStorIcity: Tills appears 10 the epoch ofpolitical catastrophes as a umversal histoncal consciousness of a history gUIded by God. It becomes thefoundation of the religlOcentric hfe that draws thewhole universe into the here and now. LIfe IS no longerendlessly fragmented and accidental; God-sustainedactuality invests it with its full SIgnificance.\ (6) Suffering: Suffering achieves digrnty, suffering be-

42


j comes a road to godhead. In the story of the servant ofGod (Deutero-Isaiah) and in the symbol of the Cross

I (Christ) it becomes the antithesis of the Greek tragicI principle. Biblical religion lives outsIde or beyond the: sense of the tragic.

(7) Openness to the insoluble: The certitude of faithexposes itself to the utmost trIals. It dares to disclosethe insoluble that grows out of given religious positions-and every statement becomes inevitably a pOSItion. The impassioned struggle with God for God isuruquely revealed m Job. Nihilistic despair-seen asa transitIonal stage whIch the man of integrity cannotevade-Is gIven unequalled expression in EccleSiastes.

Each of these fundamental traits is subject to specificdistortlOns.

(1) The one God becomes abstract and then remains onlya negative prinCiple opposed to the world, to its multipliCIty and plemtude. The One kills the Many.

(2.) The transcendent God detaches himself from theworld. God without creation is an Idea in wluch everythmg va01shes. 1\S the world becomes not only vain,but VOId, we are led to reduce transcendence also tonothIngness, as it \vere, and so nothIng is left.

(3) The ",eet11l~p' lJJ/tb God is mterpreted m a selfish orsentimental sense. ThIS reltglOn of prayer holds thedanger of an egocentnc importumng of God.

Another danger IS the tendency to imagmc that God'swill can be known with certaInty; this becomes a sourceof fanaticism. Many of the homble things done in theworld have been justified by God's Will. Fanatics fall to

4~


hear the many meanings inherent in every experienceof God's voice. Anyone who knows for certain whatGod says and wants, makes God lnto a being In theworld, over which he disposes, and is thus on the roadto superstition. But no worldly claim or justificationcan be based upon the voice of God. What IS sohd certainty in the indIvIdual and sometimes can become sofor a commumty, cannot be concretely formulated interms of uruversal validtty.

(4) God's commandments are transformed from simplefoundatIons of morahty lnto abstract jundical propositions and develop Into an Infinity of particularrulings.

(5) The sense of blstorirt~)' l~ perverted Into a conception of history as a process Independent of man.Then man ImaglOes that he IS the master of history,whether lntellectually In a knowledge of the \vhole, oractively, In the convlct!on that he IS famIliar With thedIVIne plan and IS carrYing It out. Or there anses an~sthetlc conception, In which man makes ltght of hiSown eXlstence as agaInst history as a whole.

(6) SlIjJermg, through psychological transpOSItionsbecomes maSOChIStiC pleasure or IS sadlstlcally approved, or it IS conceIved as a sacnfice In outdatedmagical categones.

(7) Openness to the JIlsoluble leads to despau ormhlhsm, to the revolt of a boundles~ negation.

Up to our own day Biblical rellgJOn has given nse tosuch aberrations. The savagery that not Infrequentlyappears in it, IS a sort of perversion of the ongmal

44


pathos of faith. The old reltg10us impulse still has compelling force, and when men translate 1tS aberrat10nsinto practice, the result 1S a hideous combination ofvital urges and their perverslOns.

3. REASON AND COMMUNICATION

Reference to the realm of the Comprehens1ve, andto a number of propositions wluch state the essentialthemes of fa1th but nevertheless remaIn indeterminate,is not sufficIent to charactenze phllosophical falth. Foressentlally phIlosophIcal thInking takes place In tIme.Philosophy IS a tranSit10n between origin and goal.SomethIng In us that leads us along thIS road, somesubjectlve dnve or compulsIon and oblectlve attraction, though It IS Itself nothIng tangIble, somethIngthrough whIch we really have ph1losophIcal Me, IScalled reason. Reason IS never Without mtelhgence, butit IS infimtely more than intelligence. Reason is an indIspensable element of phIlosophIcal faIth. All othertruth-meanings become dearly VISIble only when theyare decanted In the movement of reason. Let uscharactenze reason'

Reason relates all the vanous meanmgs of truth toone another, by assertmg each one. 1t prevents anytruth from bemg confined to itself. It understands thatany faIth whIch Isolates and hypostatizes one mode ofthe Comprehensrve, IS false. Thus for example, eventhe 'faith' of conSClOusness errs when It mamta1ns thatbeing IS free from contradICtiOn. For pure conSCI0US-

45


ness can only go' so far as to say that what does notaccord with its principles, the law of contradiction, forexample, is beyond its grasp. But even the total contentsaccessible to the pure consciousness are not yet beingitself, but only the mode of its manifestation in thecategories of universally valid thought.

Reason forbids fixation in any truth-meaning thatdoes not embrace all truth. It forbids resignation, itforbids us to lose ourselves in bhnd alleys, it forbids usto content ourselves with limIted solutions, howeverseductive, it forbids us to forget or pass anything by,whether it is reahty or value or possibihty. Reasonurges us to leave nothing out of account, to relate ourselves with everything that IS, to seek beyond all hmitswhat IS and should be, to encompass even antinomies,and always apprehend the whole, to apprehend everypossible harmony.

But then again reason strives to effect the necessarybreak-through in every totality. It forbids definitiveharmony. It goes to the extreme to apprehend authenticbeing.

Its root IS not a destrucove Will, such as IS mamfested10 the relaovlsm of intellectual sophistry, but opennessto the infimty of meaningful contents. To doubt IS Im

perative to it, but It doubts in order to gain pure truth.The understanding, as unanchored thought, IS nIhilistic; reason, as grounded 10 eXistence, is salvation frommhlhsm, because It preserves the confidence thatthrough its movement in conjunction with the understandmg, it wIll, amid the conflicts, diVisions, and

46


abysses of the concrete world, regain in the end itscertitude of transcendence.

Reason is the ComprehenSIve in US; it does not Howfrom the primal source of being, but is an instrumentof existence. It is the existential absolute that serves toactualize the primal source and bnng It to the wIdestmanifestation.

There is something like a climate of reason. Thepassion for the open works in cool clarity. The rationalman lives resolutely out of the root of his own histOIlcal sOil, and at the same time he gives himself to everymode of historiCIty which he encounters, in order topenetrate to the depth of the world's historicity,through which alone a sympatheuc understanding ofeverything becomes possible. From thIs develops whatwas also the motive force from the outset-the love ofbeing, of everythIng existent as existent In its transparency, thanks to whIch Its relauons to the pIlmalsource become vIsible. Reason ennches man by sharperung his hearIng, increases hiS capaCIty for commurucation, makes him capable of change through newexperience, but while dOIng all this It remains essentiallyone, unswervmg in its faith, hying In actually efficaciousmemory of everythIng that was once real to it.

He who engages In pllllosophy cannot sufficientlypraise reason, to which he owes all hIS achievements.Reason is the bond that unites all the modes of theComprehenSIve. It allows no eXistent to separate Itselfabsolutely, to SInk Into isolation, to be reduced tonotlungness by fragmentation. Nothing must be lost.

47


Where reason is effective, that which is strives for unification. A universal fellowship arises, in which menare open to all things and everytlung concerns them.Reason quickens dormant springs, frees what IS hidden,makes possible authentic struggles. It presses towardthe One that is all, it does away with the delusions thatfixate the One prematurely, incompletely, 10 partIsanship.

Reason demands boundless communication, It IS itselfthe total will to commUnlcate. Because, In time, wecannot have objectIve possessiOn of a truth that IS theeternal truth, and because being-there IS possible onlywith other belng-there, and existence can come lnto itsown only with other existence, communication is theform In whIch truth IS revealed in time.

The great seductiOns are: through belief In God towIthdraw from men; through supposed knowledge ofthe absolute truth to JUStify one's isolatIon; throughsupposed posseSSIon of belOg Itself to fall IOto a stateof complacency that IS 10 truth lovelessness. And tothese may be added the assertIOn that every man IS aself-contalned monad, that no one can emerge fromhimself, that communication IS a delUSiOn.

In oppositIon to these stands philosophical faith,which may also be called faith In commUnlcatIon. Forit upholds these two propositions: Truth IS what jOlnSus together; and, truth has ItS ongin in commUnlCatIOn.The only reality With whIch man can reltably and In

self-understandlng ally himself 10 the world, IS hISfellow man. At all the levels of commUnlcatlon among

48

CONTENTS OF PffiLOSOPHICAL FAITH

men, companions in fate lovingly find the road to thetruth. This road is lost to the man who shuts lumselfoff from others in stubborn self-will, who lives in ashell of solitude.

D 49

Chapter Three

MAN

T HE GIGANTIC TOPIC of 'man' can barely betouched upon in an hour's time. Since we aremen, it 1S assuredly of the utmost 1mportance

flU us tG kn<JW of man. We are even told: To knowwhat man is, 1S the only knowledge that 15 poss1ble forus, for we are men ourselves-and that alone 15 essential-for man 1S the measure of all things. One can speakof all other thmgs only in relation to man, that is, onecan speak only of what he encounters in the world, ofwhat serves rum, and of what 1S beyond his powers.What he sees, hears, touches, has for him the characteristlc of real actuahty. Whatever else he has In histhoughts, IS hIS Imagtnlng, produced by him. If weconfine ourselves to man, we shall have what is access1ble to US, what concerns us; we shall have everythingthat is.

For a moment this sounds convlncing and yet it isreplete with fallacy. It IS Indeed true that everythingthat is mamfests itself to us In such a way that we canapprehend it. Hence the great postulate that all beingbecome actual for man, that he experience It, that he

5°

MAN

receive it in his here and now. This postulate IS a fundamental characteristic of humanity; witness the extraordmary fact that infinitesimal man, a nothing in a tinycorner of the lnfimte umverse, in his narrow space, ISconcerned with what stands beyond and before theexistence of the world. Vahd for rum IS only whatbecomes present for him. After WIlting hiS famouswords about the starry heavens above me and the morallaw wlthln me, Kant contlnues: 'These two thlngs Imay not do ... seek beyond my sphere and merelypresume; I see them before me and link them immediately With the conscIOusness of my existence. Thefirst beglns at the place that I occupy In the outwardsensory world.... The second beglns With my inviSibleself ... and represents me In a world ... with which Iknow myself to stand not In a mete aCCidental relationas WIth that other world, but In a umversal andnecessary context . . '

But though what IS must become actual for man,since for him all being hes In presence, It IS not broughtforth by man; man produces neither senSible realtties,nor the content of hls Ideas, hiS thoughts and symbols.What really IS, IS even Without man, even though Itappears to us In forms and modes that onginate In man.Indeed, we have better knowledge of all those trungsthat we ourselves are not-what man is, is perhaps lessclear to him than anything else he encounters. He becomes for himself the greatest of all mysteries when hesenses that despite hiS finite nature, rus possibilitiesseem to extend into the Inhrute.

5I


Man defined himself first by means of great images,as though he already understood himself: First he conceived of himself in the hierarchy of the creatures. As asensual being, he is the highest of the beasts, as aspiritual bemg, the lowest of the angels; yet he isneither beast nor angel, but related to both by a part ofhis nature, superior to each by virtue of that which islacking in one or the other, but which he possessesfrom his own origin, as the dIrect creation of God.

Or man is conceived as the mIcrocosm which contaIns everythmg that the world, the macrocosm, enfolds. Man corresponds to no other beIng, only to theworld as a whole. ThIS idea was developed In detail andgrapillcally illustrated by speCIfic correspondences between man's organs and cosmIC phenomena. Anstotleexpressed it sublImely and profoundly when he said:The soul is In a certaIn sense everything.

Secondly, man's being was seen in his situation ratherthan in the image of h1s form. The fundamental humansituation in which he finds hImself, is at the same timethe fundamental characterIstlc of his being:

Bede tells of the Anglo-Saxon councIl summoned todecide on the questIon of the acceptance of the Chnstlan faith in 627. One of the dukes compared the He ofman on earth w1th the fhght of a sparrow through abanquet hall in winter,! 'a good fire in the mIdst, whilstthe storms of rain and snow prevail abroad; the sparrow, I say, flying in at one door, and Immediately out

1 Bede the Venerable, ECCUJlaJNcaJ HIJ/Ory of/he E'll,!uh Nahon(London 1916), p. 91.

MAN

at another, whilst he is within, IS safe from the wintrystorm; but after a short space of fair weather, heimmediately vanishes out of your sight, Into the darkwinter from whIch he had emerged. So this life of manappears for a short space, but of what went before, orwhat is to follow we are utterly Ignorant.' ThIS Germamc heathen feels himself dependent on somethingalien, he feels that he is here in the world by accident,but In thIS lIfe he feels happy and sheltered; rus care isfor the brevIty of lIfe and for what comes after.

Like hIm, St. Augustine (de beata vita) sees themystery of man's entrance Into this life, but with anOppOSIte value Judgment: 'For SInce God or nature ornecessity or our will, or all together-the matter is veryobscure-seemIngly unthInkIng and at random hascast us into this world as Into a stormy sea... .'

Thirdly, man's beIng has been seen in his misery andgreatness at once, In hIS weakness and potentlal1ty, inthe mystery of how hiS opportUnltles and tasks developpreCIsely out oEhlS fragihty. ThiS Image of man runs inmodulatlons through all Western hIStOry:

The Greeks knew that no man IS to be called happybefore hiS death. He IS exposed to an uncertain fate;men pass away, hke the leaves in the forest. To forgetthe measure of man IS hybris, the ensuIng fall IS all themore preCipitate. But the Greeks also knew that: Thereare many mIghty thIngs, but nothIng mlghtler thanman.

The Old Testament knows the same polarity. Itexpresses the nothingness of man:

53


Asfor fila", his days are as grass,As aflower of the field, so he flourisheth.For the windpasseth over it, and it is gone,And the place thereof shall know it no more.

Psalm ciiI, 15, 16.

But man's greatness is also seen:

For thou hast made hinl a little lower than the angels,And hast crowned him 1Pi!h plory and honour.Thou modest hlnl to h01JC dommion over the 'JJ/Orks of tl!)

hands,'Tholl hast put all tbmgs under his feet.

Psalm viti, ,. 6.

But exalted above thIS conception of man's fragihtyand greatness, whIch IS common to many peoples, ISthe Old Testament conception of man as the likenessof the godhead: God created man in HIS Image. Manfell from God and now embodIes both the likeness toGod, and SIn.

The Chnsttans contInued on thIS road. So definitewas their knowledge of man's ltmltatIon that they foundit even in the man-god: In the deepest torment Jesusexperienced what he expressed on the Cross In thewords of the Psalm: .My God, my God, why hast thouforsaken me? Man cannot stand on hImself.

This candId VIew of man's lImitatIon permIts theChristIans in theu legends to look upon even the holIestofmen as capable ofdespair and guilt. Peter, questionedby the maid and in fear of the executloners, thrice

54

MAN

denied Jesus. Rembrandt paInted this man (the painting, now in Leningrad, was for a time on exhibit inHolland): Peter's face at the moment of his denial,unforgettably revealing a basIc trait of our humannature; the menacing executioners; the funous, triumphant maId; the mlld gaze of Jesus In the background.

St. Paul and St. Augustine understood the impossibIlity of the good man belng really good. Why can henot be really good? When he does a good deed, he mustknow that he IS dOing a good deed; but this very knowledge IS self-satIsfactlon and therefore pnde. WIthoutself-reflectlon there can be no human goodness, WIthself-reflection the goodness cannot be blameless andpure.

PlCO della .Mlrandola, in the joy of the still ChrIstianRenaissance, portrayed man In accord with the Idea ofrum outlined by God when He put hIm Into the worldat the end of the creatlon: God made man in hIS Image,combIning 10 him all things, and sald to hIm: We havegIven thee no defimte dwelllng-place, no particularheritage. We have subordInated all other beings increation to defimte laws. Thou alone art in nothlngrestncted and canst take upon thyself and choose to bewhat thou wilt. Thou thyself, accord1Og to thy will andthy glory, shalt be thlne own masterworker and sculptor and form thyself of the stuff that IS to thy lIkmg.Thus thou art free to descend to the lowest level ofthe anImal world. But thou canst also raise thyself to

the highest spheres of godhead.-The anImals possessfrom bIrth everythlllg they will ever possess. In man

55


alone God scattered the seeds of every action and thegerms of every kind of lIfe.

Pascal, tormented by the ChrIstian sense of sin, sawboth the greatness and the misery ofman. Man is everything and he is nothing. With no ground beneath hisfeet, he stands between two infimtes. Composed ofirreconcilable opposites, he hves in Insatiable unrest,he is neither a reconciled middle term, nor a complacentmediocrity. 'What a chimera IS manI What a monster,what a chaos, what a thing of contradiction ... judgerof all things, foolish earthworm . . . glory and excrement of the universe.... Man infimtely transcendsman.... Unhappy as we are we have an idea of happiness, and we cannot attain it. We carry WIthin us animage of the truth and possess only error. We areincapable of absolute ignorance and of certaIn knowledge.'

But we have given enough historical examples of theconception of man's nature. Let us now attempt toachieve fundamental claflty concerning the knowledgeof man.~ere are two ways of lookIng at man; eitheras an oDJect of inquiry, ~s freedom.

Man is an object of inquiry for anatomy, physiology,psychology and sociology. Anthropology-ethnologyand morphology-studies his phySIcal existence as awhole. We have acquired a considerable body of knowledge, the baSIC feature of whIch is that all its insIghts,even the relative generalizations, are particular; the insights remain scattered, do not combine into a complete system. Consequently this knowledge of man

~6

MAN

always goes astray when it leads to total judgments onman, to supposed understanding of the whole.

Of essential phIlosophical Importance are the fundamental questions. The question of the difference between man and beast (and with it the question of man'sorigin) is perhaps the most interesting question of all.Here we have possibllitles of empmcal Investigation,while an Inquiry into the dIfference between man andangel can only be carried on in imaginative constructions whIch-though instructive-measure man byhypothetical potentlalttles.

Two contradictory basic expenences are the pointsof departure of SCientific Investigation. We see ourselves as a ltnk in the chaIn of livIng dungs, one amongmany. The question of the difference between man andanimal has become rrusleadIng. I can only propound adefinite and answerable questlon concerrung the difference, for example, between man and ape, between theape and other ammals, etc., but I cannot lOqUlre intothe difference between man and ammal.

The other expenence is: We see man's body in itsincomparable expression. It belongs to man lumself,has its own umquc speCIfiCIty, its noblltty and beauty,in comparison to whICh every other living thing seemsparticular, as though moving down a blind alley. Evenin man's body we seek after these incomparable baSICtraits, and in our comparison place him in oppositionto all other living thmgs.

Facts have been disclosed along both lines of approach, but really declSlve ones only In the first. Yet

n


answers leading to important fundamental results canbe obtained only by following the second approach. Ifsomedung truly unique were found in the physicalstructure of man~ the first hne of investigation wouldacquire a more specific mearung. Up to now~ tlus hasnot been done~ despite the many answers offered, fromthe discovery that only man can laugh~ to the assertionthat the structure of man's body is physiologically andmorphologically open, and that in distinction from allother living things that seem to adhere to rIgId patterns,his body somehow embraces all the potentialiues of theliving.-The question of present fact must be dIStinguished from the question of ongin. The latter isinvolved when man is conceived as an abortive embryonic development or as a phenomenon ofdomestication through cIvIhzation, analogous to the domesticanimals-both absurd conceptions. Portmann's epochmaking research into the phenomena of man's earlychildhood and adolescence has revealed, no doubt forthe first time, by biologIcal methods, that even asregards his phySIcal structure man aclueves hIS specifically human characterisucs WIth the help of elementspertaining to histOrIcal tradItion; In other words, man,including hIS biological traits, cannot be explamedmerely by the laws of heredIty, but must be placedwithin a historical framework.

But we are far removed from any certain biologicalunderstanchng of the uniqueness of man's physical life,although we think we can see it without scientificknowledge.

MAN

Clesely connected with the question of the differencebetween man and animal, 15 the question of man'sorigin, of how he became man. In this connection, itmay be presumed, science will undergo the same experience as in the question of the origin of hfe ingeneral. The progress of knowledge Increases our nonknowledge of the fundamental questlOns and thussuggests the existence of limits and the need to drawupon sources other than cognition.

Thuty years ago a geologist asked me to dehver alecture on the ongin of life. I replied: The greatness ofbiology IS revealed by the fact that In contrast to earlierunclear conceptlons of transitions, It IS coming to anincreas10gly definite reallzation that thiS ongin is unfathomable. The geologIst: But either lIfe must haveoriginated on earth, that is, from the lnorganic, or Itsgerms must have flown 10 from the cosmos. Myself:This looks like a perfect dIsJunctlve propos1t!on, butObvIOusly both alternatlves are ImpossIble. The geologist: Then you take refuge 1D mlracles? Myself: No,but in knowledge I seek to galn only the essentlal nonknowledge. The geologist: That I do not understand.You are purSUing someth1Og negative. The world isafter all understandable, otherwise our whole sCiencewould be meaningless. Myself: But perhaps \vhat givesit meaning IS precisely and solely that through understandIng it comes up against that which IS authentlcallyun-understandable. And perhaps it IS meaningful toexpress the un-understandable through the play ofthought at the 11mIt of cogrutlOn. To conceive of life

59


germs in the cosmos, flying everywhere, creating life,seems just such a play of thought, because life of thiskind has always been. But that is a trivial and meaningless play of thought. It seems to me that a moreexpressive play is to be found in Preyer's idea that theworld is one single gigantic body oflife, and that everything that is not ahve is ltS excrement and corpse. Thenit is not the origin of life, but the ongin of the nonliving that would have to be explained.

A similar problem is that of the ongin of man. Important material has been contnbuted, consisting forthe most part of hypotheses, but also of some Isolatedfacts. On the whole, the mystery has grown deeper, ourvision of prehistory has been somewhat illumined, butthe fundament of man's origin has become more andmore unfathomable. The best of these impossible conceptlOns seems to me that of Dacque: man has alwayseXlsted, he hved In various ammal forms, yet wasentirely different from the morphologically relatedanimal forms, from the fish, the reptile, etc. Man, oneffilght continue, has always been the authentlc form oflife, and all other hfe IS a degeneration from man; inthe last analysIs, It was not man that developed fromape, but ape from man. And now perhaps we are faCInga new and long-term process of regression: perhapsthere will come into being a new ammal species whichwill become petrified In a technologICal mode of hfe,and beside it a new humamty Will develop, from whosevantage point this mass will seem like another species,something that is merely living but is no longer human.

60

MAN

These are far-fetched speculations, and yet they do casta certain l1ght upon our non-knowledge.

The matter was admirably summed up by a joke thatappeared m Stmplicissimus during the first World War.Two Bavarian peasants are talking things over. Peopleare pretty dumb, says one, maybe Darwin was right

\

after all. Maybe we are descended from the apes.-Yes,says the other, but Just the same I'd like to see the apethat first noticed that he wasn't an ape any more.

Man cannot be denved from somethmg else, but isimmediately at the base of all thmgs. To be aware ofthi~ _~JR~fies man's'freedom, which is lost in everyother total determination of his being, and comes enurely mto its own only in thiS one total determmation.All emplfical causahtles and biOlogical processes ofdevelopment would seem to apply to man's materialsubstratum, not to h1mself. No one can tell how farscience will advance in the knowledge of the development of this human substratum. And scarcely any fieldof research is more excltlng and captlvatmg.

Every insight mto man, if it is absolutized mto asupposed knowledge of man as a whole, destroys his

. freedom. And thiS IS the case with such theories ofman,meaningful for hmlted perspectives, as have been propounded by psychoanalysIs, '\lar-mm, racial theory.They veil man himself as soon as they attempt to investigate anything more than aspects of his nature.

Science, it 1S true, shows us remarkable and highlysurprising dungs about man, but as It attains greaterclarity, the more evident It becomes that man as a whole

61


can never become the object of scientific investigation.Man is always more than he knows about himself. Thisis true both of man in general and of the mdividualman. We can never draw up a balance sheet and knowthe answer, either concerning man in general, or concerning any indtvidual man.

To absolutize knowledge that IS always particularinto a whole knowledge of man leads to the utterneglect of the human image of man. And a neglect ofthe image of man leads to a neglect of man himself.For the image of man that we hold to be true IS ltself afactor in our hfe. It influences our behavlOur towardourselves and others, our vital attitude, and our choiceof tasks.

Each of us for hImself IS certa111 of what man IS, In away that precedes scientific research and also comcs,after It. Tills is the prerogative of our freedom, whIchknows itself bound up WIth cogent knowledgc, but isnot included m It as an object of cognitIon. For m sofar as we make ourselves the obJcct of SCIentIfic InqUIrY, we see no freedom, but factuality, finIteness,form, relation, causal necessity. But It IS by our freedomthat we have awareness of our humamty.

Let me sum up once again, In order to gain a morcsecure foundatIon for our conSClOusness of freedom.

Man cannot be understood on the baSIS of evolutIOnfrom the animals.

In opposition to this we have the theSIS: WIthoutsuch evolution it IS impossible to explain his ongin.Since dus is the only intelligible explanation and smcc

61

MAN

everything in the world takes place in accordance withintelligible laws, man must have come into beingthrough such an evolution.

The answer: True, for our cognition, everything isIntelligible, for only where there IS intelligibIhty isthere cognition; beyond cognition, notlung exists forcogrution. But the whole of being does not by anymeans resolve into intellIgIbIlity, If by cognition wemean scientifically cogent knowledge capable of beingcommunicated. unchanged. ThIS knowledge ltself ISalways particular, it refers always to definite, finiteobjects-whenever It approaches the whole as such, itsl1des Into fundamental fallacles.

The world as a whole cannot be apprehended on thebasis of one or several or many IntelligIble princIples.Cognltlon breaks It Into fragments-after the firsterroneous and vam thrust toward the whole. Cognitionis m the world and does not comprehend the world.Umversal knowledge-as in mathematics and in thenatural sClences--does Indeed encompass somethInguniversal, but never reallty as a whole.

But it would be a new fallacy to effect a leap withinknowledge to other knowledge. To Imagine, forlnstance, that at the limit of the knowable there is acreator of the world, and to suppose that trus creatorintervenes in the course of the world. As far as knowledge IS concerned, these are merely metaphoric tautologIes for non-knowledge.

The world IS dIsclosed as having no foundation initself. But In himself man finds what he finds nowhere

63


!else in the world: something unknowable, undemonstrable, something that IS never object, that evades allscientific inquiry: he finds freedom and what goes withit. In this sphere I have experience not through knowledge of something, but through actlon. Here the roadleads through the world and ourselves to transcendence.

To those who deny 1t freedom cannot be proved likethtngs that occur in the world. But since the primalsource of our actIon and our consciousness of beinglies in freedom, what man is, is not merely the objectof knowledge, but also of faith. Man's certamty as tohis humamty IS one of the basIc elements of philosophIcal falth.

But man's freedom is inseparable from his conscIousness of hIS finite nature.

Let us briefly outline the main pomts: Man's finiteness is first of all the fimteness of allltving thIngs. He isdependent upon hIS envIronment, upon nounshmentand sensory contents; he IS mexorably exposed to themute and blInd natural process; he must die.

Man's fimteness IS secondly hIS dependence on othermen, and on the hIstorical world produced by thehuman collectIvity. He can rely on nothIng In tillsworld. The fruIts of fortune come and go. The humanorder is ruled not only by justice, but also by the powerof the moment, that declares its arbitrary WIll to be theorgan of justice, and hence is always based pardy uponuntruth. State and national community can destroymen who work for them all their lives. Reltance can beplaced only on the loyalty of man in existential com-

64

MAN

munication, but this cannot be calculated. For what onerelies on here is not an objective, demonstrable reality.And the man closest to one can at any time fall sick, gomad, die.

Man's finiteness lies thirdly In the nature of hiscognition, in his dependence on the expcnence that isgIven hIm, especIally on daect perceptlon. My mtellectcan apprehend nothmg but the matter of duect perception that fills in my concept.

Man becomes consciOUS of his finiteness by companson with something that is not fimte, with theabsolute and the mfimte:

The absolute becomes actual for him in hiS decision,the fulfilment of which directs rum to an ongin otherthan that which SCience makes intellIgible to him inhiS finite eXistence

The mfintte is touched, though not apprehended,first in the idea of mfimty, then In the conceptlon of adivlne knowledge essentially different from man's finiteknowledge, finally In thoughts of immortality. Thelnfinite whIch though unfathomable does enter lntoman's conSCiOusness, causes man to transcend his finiteness by becoming aware of it.

Through the presence of the absolute and the In

fimte, man's fimteness does not remain merely theunconsciOUS datum of hiS empmcal eXistence; butthrough the hght of transcendence it becomes the basictrait 10 hiS consciousness of his created nature. Thusthough man cannot annul hiS finiteness, he does breakthroug~jt·

E 65


But if in the absoluteness of his decision in the faceof everything finite in the world, he becomes throughhis independence, certaln of his lnfiruty as his authenticselfhood, this lnfinity also reveals a new mode of hisfiniteness. This finiteness as existence means that evenas himself man cannot ascnbe himself to lumself. It isnot through himself that he is onginally himself. Andjust as he does not owe hIS empmcal eXistence in the_world to his own will, hIS self IS a free gIft to him bytranscendence. He must be given to himself over andover agam, if he IS not to lose hImself. If man maIntains his inner Integnty in the face of fate and even ofdeath, he cannot do so by hImself alone. What helpshim here is of a different kind than any help In theworld. Transcendent help reveals itself to hIm solely inthe fact that he can be himself. That he can stand bylumself, he owes to an intangible hand, extended tohIm from transcendence, a hand whose presence he canfeel only In hIS freedom.

Man as object of InVestlgatIon and man as freedomare known to us from radtcally dtfferent sources. Theformer is a content of knowledge, the latter a fWldamental trait of our faIth. But If freedom for Its partbecomes a content of knowledge and an object ofinveStlgatlOn, a special form of super~tItlon anses:

Farth stands on the road to freedom that IS not anabsolute and not an empty freedom, but that IS experienced as the pOSSIbIlIty of beIng given or not given to

oneself. It IS only through freedom that I becomecertain of transcendence. By freedom, to be sure, I

66

MAN

!attain to a point of independence from the world, but'precIsely through the consciousness of my radIcal:attachment to transcendence. For It IS not throughmyself that I am.

Superstition on the other hand anses by way of asomething that IS the express content of faith, and thusalso through a supposed knowledge of freedom. Amodern form of superstitlon for example is psychoanalysis taken as a philosophy, and the pseudo-medIcinethat makes man's freedom a supposed object ofsCIenufic research.

As I conceIve of the nature of my humamty, so IconceIve of transcendence-I.e. I conceIve of It eitheras something that hmm me or as somethmg that en-

, abIes me to soar, It IS superstItIOn steeped 1n the object(hence associated with sClentlfic aberration), or faith,mner expeflence of the ComprehensIVe (hence assoCIated with the consummation of non-knowledge).

Man, m common with everythIng he sees around: him, In common with the beasts, IS branded as a finitecreature. But hiS human finIteness cannot become seljCOlttamed, In the same sense as the anImal.

Every animal IS perfect m Its own way, m ItS hffiltatlon It fulfils Itself wlthm :l contlllually repeated hfecycle. It IS exposed only to the natural process In whichall thlllgs merge and arc brought forth. Only man cannot fulfil hImself m hiS finIteness. It IS only man whosefimteness lllvolves 111m tn history, m wruch he stnvesto reahze hiS potentialIties. f lis openness IS a sign ofhIS freedom

THE PERENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPH Y

Because man cannot fulfil himself in his finite existence, because he must for ever search and strive (ratherthan live unconsciously In the uncha.ngIng rut of recurrent cycles), he, alone of all liVIng creatures, knowsthat he is finite. Bccause ofhis incapacity for perfection,his finiteness becomes more to him than is revealed inthe mere knowledge of the end. Man feels lost in It,and as a result becomes aware of hIS task and potentiallties. He finds himself In the most desperate SItuatiOn,but in such a way, that from It Issues the strongestappeal to raIse hImself up through his freedom. Andthat is why man has agaIn and agaIn been representedas the most astoundIngly contradIctory of crcatures, themost wretched and the most magruficent.

The proposition that man 15 fimte and unfulfillablehas an ambIvalent character. It 15 an InSIght, It denvesfrom demonstrable knowlcdgc of the fimte. But In ItS

uruversalIty It pOints to a faIth content, In which thefreedom of human tasks 15 gcnerated. In the fundamental experience of hIS nature, transcendIng the planeof knowledge, he IS aware of both hIS unfulfilment andlus infinite potentiality, lus bondage and hiS freedomthat breaks through thIS bondage.

ConSCIOUS of hIS freedom, man desIrcs to becomewhat he can and should be. He conceIves an Ideal ofhis nature. As on the plane of cognitIOn, the Idea ofman as an object of sCIentific InqUlry may lead to afalsely definitive image of him, so on the plane of freedom he may falsely choose a path leading to an absolute

68

MAN

ideal. From helpless questlOnlng and bewtlderment, hethus aspires to take refuge In a Universal that he canimitate In Its concrete forms.

There are numerous Images of man that have servedas ideals with whIch we wIshed to IdentIfy ourselves.There is no doubt that such Ideals have been effective,and that social types actually Influence our behaviour.The ideal can be magnified to a vague conception ofman's 'greatness', of somethIng In man that IS In a sensemore than human, that is superhuman or inhuman.

For our philosophical conSCIOusness It IS crucial thatwe conVlnce ourselves of the untruth and ImpossIbilttyof such paths. Kant has gIven us the purest expreSSIonof thIS.1 'To attempt to realIze the Ideal in an example,that IS, as a real phenomenon, as we mIght represent aperfectly WIse man 111 a novel, IS impOSSIble, nay,absurd, and but little encouragll1g, because the naturallImits, whIch are constantly lnterfenng wIth the perfection 111 the idea, make alll1luslon In such an expenment ImpOSSIble, and thus render the good Itself In theIdea SUSpiCIOUS and unreal.'

Just as we lose sight of man when he becomes anobject of SCIentific Il1qulry m raCIal theory, psychoanalYSIS, or Marxism, :lI1d IS represented as fully understandable, so we lose sIght of the human task when hebecomes an Ideal.

The Ideal IS somethmg fundamentally dIfferent fromthe idea. There IS no Ideal of man, but there is an Idea

I Cnl1quc ofPNrC RC(l.fOfl, tr by F Max Muller (New York 19%7),p. 461.


of man. Ideals of man collapse, the idea of man servesas a goal to his march forward. Ideals can in a sense beschemata of ideas, road signs. That is the truth in thegreat philosophical conceptions of the Noble Man inChina, or of the Stoic WIse Man. They are not imagesof fulfilment, they only stImulate man's deSIre to nseabove himself.

Something else agaln IS onentatlOn by the honouredand beloved rustorical figure. We may ask: \Vhat wouldhe say In thIS case, how would he act? And we enterinto a livlng discussion with him, though withoutregardlng hIm as the absolutely true model to belnutated unCOndItlOnally. For each man is a man, andtherefore hves In finiteness and Imperfection, and alsoIn error.

All Ideals of man are Impossible, because man'spotentialIties are 1116mte. There can be no perfect man.Tills has Important philosoplllcal consequences.

(1) The true value of man ltes not III the speclcs ortype that he approxlmatcs, but In the historIcal 1Il

dlvldual, for whom no substltullon or replacement ISpOSSible. The value of each lIldlvldual man can beregarded as unassailable only when men cease to beregarded as expendable material, to be stamped by aumversal. The SOCIal and professlOnal types that weapproximate have bearIng only on our role 1Il theworld.

(2) The Idea that all men are cqualls obViously false,1Il so far as psychological aptitudes and talents arc concerned-it is also untrue consIdered as the reallty of a

7°

MAN

social order, in which at best there can be equalopportunltles and equity before the law.

The essential equality of all men hes alone in thosedepths, where to each man the road IS opened by freedom to attain to God by leading an ethicaillfe. It 1S theequahty of a value that no human knowledge can ascertain or objectify, of the indIvIdual as an eternal soul. Itis the equalIty of nghts, and of the eternal Judgmentaccording to wluch a man merits a place in heaven orhell. ThIS equahty means: a respect for every man whIchforbIds that any man should be treated only as a meansand not at the same t1me as an end 111 hImself.

The danger facing man 1S the self-assurance whichtells him that he already 1S what he 1S capable of becomIng. The faIth by wh1ch he finds the road of h1spotentlalttles becomes then a possesslOn that concludeshIS road, whether It take the form of moral selfcomplacency or of pnde 11l hIs 11lnate gifts.

From the StOIC view that man should ltve so as to bepleas11lg to himself, to the harmony w1th himself thatKant ascrIbes to the man who acts m an etlucal way,there has preYalled an arbItrary self-complacency, to\vhlch St. Paul and St. August11lc, Indeed Kant hImself,opposed the 1dea of man corrupted In the root.

The es~ent1aI1s that man as eXIstence 11l h1s freedomshould expenence the fact of bemg given to hImself bytran~cendence. Then humln freedom IS at the heart ofall h1s potcntlaltttcs and through transcendence,through the onc, man IS gUIded to hiS own inner urnty.

ThIS gllld,mcc IS rJdlcally dIfferent from any gU1dance

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in the world; for it offers no objective certainty; it coincides with man's complete attainment of freedom. Forit operates only by way of the freedom of subjectivecertainty. God's VOIce resides In the light that comesas ms own conVIction to the lOdlvldual open to tradition and his envIronment. God's voice becomesaudible in the freedom of subjective convIction, andthis is the only organ by which It can impart Itself toman. Where man's resolve arises out of hIS depths, hebelIeves that he IS obeying God, though he has noobjective guaranty for hIS knowledge of God's WIll.

Guidance operates through man's judgment concerning hIS own acts. This judgment checks mm andspurs him on, corrects and confirms. But 10 fact, mancan never wholly and defimuvely base hiS Judgmentconcerning himself upon himself. He deSIres to hearthe judgment of his fellow men, In order to attaInclanty through communication. But the cruCIal Judgment is not 10 the last analysis that of the people heesteems, although this is the only judgment that isaccessible to him 10 practice. The deCISIve judgmentwould be that of God.

Thus 10 time the truth of Judgment IS ulumately attained only by way ofsubjective conviction, whether themoral law claims umversal or only msto!1cal validity.

Inward obedience to the freely accepted, unIversal. ethical law-to the ten commandments-Is bound up: with the realization that transcendence is present inlthis very freedom."--But since specific action cannot logically be deduced

72.

MAN

from the universal law, God's guidmg voice can beheard more chrectly in the primal source of the historically concrete law than 10 the umversal. But for all thesubjective certainty this VOice gives, its meamng remams uncertain. ObedIence to God's voice alwaysinvolves the risk of error. For its message IS susceptibleof many interpretations, the freedom that would consist in the clear and unmistakable knowledge of thenecessary is never complete. The fisk implied in thequestion of whether in thiS matter J am really myself,whether I have truly heard the gUIdmg vOice from theprimal spring of being, never ceases.

In tlme, this consciousness of risk remains the condition for increasing freedom. It excludes completerehance on subJective certamty, forbids the generalIzatlon of the subJectlve commandment into a unIversallaw, and bars fanatiClsm. Even in the certamty of theresolve, there must, In so far as It is translated intopractical action, remain a certam margm of mdetermination. There can be no subjective security. Theprtde of the absolute truth destroys truth in the world.The humlhty of the permanent question is inherent 10

subJective certainty. For It 15 always possible that thingsWill subsequently look quite different. Even the clear,but never adequately clear, conscience can embark onerror.

Only in retrospect are we Justified In admmng theunfathomable Wisdom of God's gUidance. But eventhen It IS never certain, God's unfathomable gUidancecan never become a posseSSIOn.

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From the psychological point of viewt God's voicehas no other expression tn time than man's judgmentof himself. This judgment may come upon man with asudden cenainty, after man has honestly and carefullystriven for it, weightng all the contradictory possibilities; and then he dIscovers 10 it God's judgment,though it is never defirutive and always equivocal. Butonly in exalted moments is It aud1ble. It 1S by suchmoments and for such moments that we live.

The road of the thtnklng man is a philosoplucallife.Philosophizing IS a specifically human pursmt. Man ISthe only beIng In the world to whom bel11g 1S marufestedthrough h1S empincal existence. He cannot fulfil himself 1Il empIrical existence as such, he cannot contenthimself with the enjoyment of empirical eXIstence. Hebreaks through all the empirical reahtIes that find theirseeming fulfilment 10 the world. As a man he onlyattains to real knowledge of hImself when, open tobeing as a whole, he relates hIS hfe 10 the world to

transcendence. In the very effort to master rus empmcalexistence, he strIves toward being. For he cannot adequately account for his sojourn 10 the world by thelaws Immanent to the world. AccordIngly, he goesbeyond hIs empmcal eXIstence, beyond the world, to

the ground of eXistence and the world, where heattalls awareness of hIS pnmal source. Here, though Ina sense he is 10 communton with creation, he does notfind a secure refuge, nor IS he at hiS goal. He must seeketernity in his life, which medIates between the pnmalsource and the goal.

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MAN

In unfaith the human condition becomes a biologicalfact among other biologIcal facts; man surrenders towhat his finite knowledge determines as necessities andinevItabilities, he gives 1n to a sense of futility, theenergy of his mInd declines. He stifles In his supposedfactuali ty.

Philosophical faith, on the other hand, is the faithof man 1n his potentIalities. In It breathes IDS freedom.

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Cbapter Four

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

THROUGHOUT THE MILLENNIA philosophy andreligion have stood III alliance with, or In

hostility to one another,They go hand In hand, onginally in the myths and

cosmologies, later in theology-for philosophy hasappeared in the cloak of theology, just as at other timesit has worn the dress of poetry and, most frequently,of SCience,

But, then, as the two separate, relIgIOn becomes forphIlosophy the great mystery that It cannot understandThe cult, the claIm to revelation, the clallTI to power ofa commumty founded on reltglOn, of Its orgamzatlonand politics, and the InterpretatIOn .that rehglOn confersupon Itself, become objects of phllosophlCalulqulry.

In thiS attItude of inquiry lies the germ of thestruggle. For phIlosophy, the struggle can only takethe form of a strtvlng for truth by exclusively Intellectual means.

NeIther religlOn nor philosophy IS a clearly definedentity; We cannot take them as fixed pOints from whichto stan on our comparative investigatIon. They are

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both involved in historlcal transformation, but bothconceive of themselves at all times as vehicles of eternaltruth, whose historical garb at once conceals and transmits the truth. I cannot speak of the one eternalreligious truth. Philosophical truth IS the philosophiaperennis to which no one can lay claim, but with whicheveryone engaged in phIlosophIcal thought IS concerned, and which IS present wherever there are truephIlosophers.

There IS no standp01nt outSide the OppOSItiOn ofphIlosophy and rehglOn. Each one of us stands at oneof the poles and speaks of some cruCIal aspect of theother, without personal expenence. Consequently youcan expect me too to be bltnd In certaIn potnts and tomIsunderstand. I hesltatc and yet I must speak. Tospeak of relIgIOn, without beIng personally Involvedin It, IS questionable, but It IS Indispensable as a meansof expressIng one's own clear defiCIency, as a means ofseeking after the truth, and also of testing rehglousfaith by the questIons that thus anse. RehglOn IS noenemy of phIlosophy, but somethmg that essentiallyconcerns It and troubles It.

But to-day we arc in a sltuation that I shall Illusttateby a personal reference. Because rel1glOn IS of suchpnme importance, awareness of my defiCIency mademe eager to hear what was being said In religIOUS Circles.It IS among the sorrows of my hfe, spent In the searchfor truth, that diSCUSSion With theologIans always dnesup at cruCial pOInts; they fall Silent, state an IncomprehenSIble proposition, speak of something else, make

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some categoric statement, engage in amiable talk, without really taking cognizance of what one has said-andin the last analysis they are not really interested. Foron the one hand they are certain of their truth, terrifyingly certaIn; and on the other hand they do not regardit as worth whtle to bother about people lIke us, whostrike them as merely stubborn. And commurucattonrequires lIstenIng and real answers, forbids SIlence orthe evasion of questIOns; It demands above all that allstatements of fauh (whtch are after all made in humanlanguage and directed toward objects, and whIch constttute an attempt to get one's bearings In the world)should continue to be questtoned and tested, not onlyoutwardly, but Inwardly as well. No one who IS indefirutive possession of the truth, can speak properlywith someone else-he breaks off authentic communtcation in favour of the behef he holds.

I can touch on this great problem only from certa1l1angles and only Inadequately. I am concerned In thISdiSCUSSIOn With throwmg hght on the onginal phtlosophtcal falth.

Religion, contrasted With phIlosophy, reveals thefollowtng charactenstIcs:

RehglOn has Its cult, IS bound up with a pecuharcommuruty of men, ansIng from the cult, and It IS inseparable from the myth. ReltgIOn always embodIesman's practical relation to the transcendent, in theshape of somethmg holy in the world, as delimItedfrom the profane or unholy. \X7here thiS IS no longerpresent, or is rejected, the pecultar character of religIon

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has vanished. Almost the whole of mankind, as far ashistorical memory extends, has lived religiously, andthIS is an indication that can scarcely be Ignored, of thetruth and central importance of relIglOn.

Philosophy proper, on the other hand, knows nocult, no commumty led by a pnesthood, no eXIstentinvested with a sacred character and set apart fromother existents In the world. What relIgIOn localIzes ina specIfic place, can for philosophy be present everywhere and always. PhIlosophy IS a product of the individual's freedom, not of socially determined conditlOns, and It does not carry the sanctlon of a cOlleCtiVIty.PhIlosophy has no rites, no roots In a pnmItlve mythology. Men take It from a free tradwon and transform Itas they make It thea own. Although pertaining to manas man, It remains the concern of Individuals.

Religion IS Intent upon embodymg ItS truth intangible symbols, phIlosophy pursues only effectivesubjective certamty.-To religIOn the God of the phJ.ksophers seems threadbare, pale, empty; It dIsparaginglycalls the phllosophlcal state of mmd 'deism'; to phllosophy the tanglblc symbols of rellglOn seem lIke deceptIve veIls and mlsleacl!ng slmphficatIOns.-RehgIOndenounces the God ofphIlo~ophyas a mere abstractIOn,phIlosophy dIstrusts the rehglOus Images of God asseductive idols, magOlficent as they may be.

Yet, though the maIllfestatlons of phllosophy andrehglOn seem to clash, there IS a contact, and even aconvergence In their contents, as may be Illustrated bythe Ideas of God, prayer, revelation.

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The idea of God: In the West, the idea of the one Godarose in Greek philosophy and ill the Old Testament.In both cases, a stupendous work of abstraction waseffected, but in entirely different ways.

In Greek philosophy monotheism arose as an idea,it was postulated from ethical consIderations, it imposed itself on the mind in an atmosphere of prulosophie sereruty. It did not set its imprint upon massesof men, but upon illdividuals. Its results were indIviduals of a high human type and a free philosophy. Itwas not an effective civllizmg agent.

In the Old Testament, on the other hand, monotheism grew up ill the passIon of battle for the pure, thetrue, the one God. The abstraction was not accomplished by logic but by a reactlon agamst the Imagesand embodiments of the deIty, which veIl God morethan they reveal hIm, and a revolt agalllst the seductlonsof the cult, against DIonysIan rltes, and against bebef inthe efficacy of sacnnce. ThIS cult of the one, living Godwas won ill battle against the Baals, agamst Immanentreligion WIth Its shallow optImism, Its festivals andorgies, its self-complacency and moral indIfference.

This true God suffers no Image and hkeness, sets nostore by cult and sacrifice, by temple and rites and laws,but only by nghteous actions and love of our fellowmen (Micah, IsaIah, JeremIah).-The monotheIsticabstraction, like mhihsm, negates all worldly eXIstenCe,but actually spnngs from the spuitual fullness of a mindto wruch the supra-mundane creator-God with rusethical laws has revealed rumself.-This abstraction IS

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not based upon the development of an idea, but uponthe word of God, upon God hImself, who was experienced in the word which the prophet Imparted as theword of God. The force of God's reality refracted msuch a prophetic mind, and not the power of an Idea,brought forth this monotheIsm. Hence the miraculouspart of it IS that In thought content the monotheism ofthe Greeks and of the Old Testament should coincide,though they differ radIcally as to the mode of God'spresence. The difference is that between philosophyand religion. Consequently It IS also the difference between divmlty and God-between transcendence as anintellectual Idea, and the hvmg God; the One of phIlosophy is not the One of the BIble.

But if prulosophical clarity prevaIls, the questlonanses whether the Incomparable faIth of the prophets,that moves us so deeply even to-day, was possible onlybecause they were still Intellectually naive, stlll unaffected by phllosophlcaI thought, and accordmglyfailed to notIce that the (word', spoken lITUnedlately byGod, sull embodied a remnant of sensIble reallty-<)fthe Image and hkeness which they combated.

Greek and Old Testament monotheIsm have together dommated the Western Idea of God. TheyInterpreted each other. That was pOSSIble because thefaith of the prophets effected an abstraction that isanalogous to philosoprucal abstractlOn. The propheticfaith is more powerful than the phIlosophical idea,because It arises from the direct experience of God.But in intellectual clarity it IS Infenor to prulosophy;

F 81


hence it was lost in the subsequent religious development, even in the Bible.

Prayer: The cult is the act of the community, prayeris an act of the Individual in his solitude. The cult existseverywhere, while prayer is discernible here and therein history; in the BIble it becomes dIstinct only withJeremIah. The liturgy, in whIch the cult is embodied,contaInS a number of texts that are called prayers,because they serve to Invoke, pralse, and supplicate thegodhead. But theIr salient feature 15 that they originatedin the remotest past, that although they once grew andchanged over a penod of generatIOns, they have SIncethen retaIned ngid, Immutable forms and are experienced as something permanent. Parts of them havelong since become Incomprehensible, they either playthe role of a mystery or have been endowed with anew, transformed meaning. In contradistinction to this,prayer is indIvidual, existenually present As a subordInate element of the cult, It is performed by the IndIVIdual In a fixed form, and then he remaInS enmelywithIn the sphere of religion. But when lt IS reallypersonal and pnmal, prayer stands at the frontier ofphIlosophy, and it becomes philosophy In the momentwhen it IS dIvested of any pragmatic relation to thegodhead or deSIre to Influence the godhead for practicalends. It marks a break with the concreteness of a personal relation to a personal God, whIch is one of thesources of religIOn, and a movement toward abstractphilosophical contemplatIon; at first It expresses onlydevotIon and gratitude to God, but later it becomes

81


progressively internalized and man finds in it a firmground on which to stand. The aim of thIs contemplation is no longer to achieve practical mundane results,but inward transfiguration. Where such speculativespiritualIzation developed into genulne contemplatIon,it was lIke one continuous prayer. WhIle thIS contemplation was a part of the whole that IS embodIed In

religIOn, to-day it has become separate from religIOUSactivity and possible by ItSelf.

Rei/elatIOn: RelIgiOns are based on revelation; tills ISclearly and consciously the case wah the IndIan andBiblical religiOns. Revelation IS the ImmedIate utterance of God, locahzed in time and valId for all men,through word, commandment, action, event. Godissues hiS commandments, he institutes the congregatiOn, founds the cult. Thus the cult of the ChnstIans isfounded as an act of God, \vho instituted the Lord'sSupper. Since the content of a relIgiOn denves originallyfrom revelation, this content IS notvahd In Itself, but onlywlthlO a commuOltv-the people, the congregation, thechurch-which IS ItS actual authority and guaranty.

With reference to the efforts to arnve at a philosophical concept of God, these efforts in which eachstep seems to cancel out the preceding-we often hearit saId that any attempt to arnve at God by thought 15

vain, and that man knows God and can know God onlythrough revelatIon. God gave the law, God sent theprophets, He himself descended 111 the form of hisservant, to redeem us on the Cross.

But revelation that IS communicated as such, must

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have a mundane form. Once it is stated, it deterioratesinto finiteness, and even into trivial rationality. Inspeech, its meaning is perverted. The word of man isnot the word of God. That part of revelation that concerns man as man, becomes a content ofphilosophy andas such is vahd Without revelation. Have we to do withattenuation of relIgIOn, a loss of Its substance?-thenwe call the process seculanzatlon. Or have we to dowith a punfication, a deepening, a distillation or evenreahzation of its pnmal essence? Both processes wouldseem to exist. The danger of an emptYing by rationalization IS coupled with the pOSSlblhty that man mayrealize an authentiC truth.

Since antiqUity rehgIOn has been contInually rejectedby plulosophers. Here let us list a number of typicalobjections to rehgIOn and attempt to examine each oneCritically and assign to It Its proper place.

(a) 'The existence of so many religIOns proves thatnone IS true. For there IS only one truth.'

ThiS argument stands only If statements of faIth areaSSimilated to contents of knowledge; It does not applyto religIOUS faith Itself. RelIgIOUS faIth has its histoflcalmanifestation; ItS outward expreSSIon must not be confused with the Inner mearung of relIgIOUS hfe Itself,whICh speaks In It: Una re'~f!,!O in ntuum tJarletate(Nicholas of Cusa).

(b) 'Up to the present time relIgIons have sanctionedevery evil, they have perpetrated or Justified the mostatrocious deeds, violence, lies, human sacrifice, thecrusades, the religious wars.'

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It is hard to draw up a balance sheet of good and evilin the workings of relIgion. Every value judgmentmust be based on an investIgatlon of the historicalfacts. The reproach must be consIdered along with thesalutary effects of religion in deeperung the soul, inordering human affaus, In Its vast welfare activities, 10

supplying meanIngful themes to art and thought.But if one should go so far as to argue that good

relations among men, peace and order, are more readIlyrealized through reason than through relIgIOn; thatJustice is more efficaCIOUs than faith, practical moralItythan religIOUS belIef; that what is good tn mankind ISthe work of sClcncc and reason, not of religlOn-thenIt must be answered that religion does not excludereason, and that up to now religion has tn fact realizedthe most endunng and most mearungful order, withthe help of reason, not by direct mjunctlons butthrough the devotion and responSibIlity of believtngmen. While thus far all attempts to bUIld solely onreason-and here the understanding IS meant-havebeen speedily followed by mhlhstlc chaos.

(c) 'Rehgion evokes false fcars. IllUSIOns torment thesoul. The torments of hell, the wrath of God, the incomprehensIble reahty of a merclIess WIll, etc. aresources of horror, plrtlcularly on the deathbed. Theliberation from reltglon bnngs peace of mind, becauseIt IS a hberatlon from delUSions.'

ThiS argument IS sound, in so far as specific superstitions arc meant. It IS false when it IS apphed to thefear itself. If ltUlumerable souls have been Impelled to

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choose good instead of evil by the fear of hell, it is onlyseldom that such fear is nothing other than fear of asupposed reality. Often the figuration of hell serves totranslate profound existential motives for the choice,motives within one's own belng. Existential angUlshis a baSIC charactenstic of the awakened man. The peaceof mind that arIses from the negation of hell does notsuffice; it must be rooted In a positive confidence, abaSIC attitude of the soul, whIch follows the good willwhIch conunually overcomes fear. Where there IS nofear, man is superficIal.

Cd) 'The rehgions foster an all-pervading disregardof truth. Because they put the unfathomed, the thoughtless, the absurd at the begmnlng and WIthdraw It fromall questionlng, they create a dommant mood of dullobedience. \Vherever a question arIses, the religIOusman does violence to hiS own intellIgence, and lookson thIS lack of integrity as a virtue. The habit of notqucstlorung makes for untruthfulness III other sphere~.

The rehglOus man overlooks the contradICtiOnS 10 hISown thmkmg and behaVIOur. He permits perverslOnsof what was ongmally true, because he falls to noticethem. There IS an affmlty between religIOUS faith andcontempt of truth.'

In answer to this argument we can only say that thesame phenomena do not necessanly occur 10 the ongmalreligions as in their later developments. Ewen If, according to Jakob Burckhardt, the degree 1n whIch thereligious artists were lack10g In crItIcal sense canscarcely be understood by modern man, the lack of

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critical sense does not necessanly imply disregard oftruth. Limits and mystenes that the understandingtends to conceal from Itself, are directly present In thereligious mind, though In a mythical form with atendency to degenerate Into superStitIOn.

(e) 'RehgIOns define as sacred, thmgs whIch areIndeed profane and made solely by men. The halo ofmystery which they cast about these thIngs tends todevaluate everythmg else in the world. Where an attitude of reverence IS bound to relIgIOn, It tends toinduce Irreverence 1fi all spheres to which relIgion doesnot penetrate. The attltude of reverence WIth regardto all mamfestatIOns of being IS lost, If reverence ISspecJf1cally locallzed. Such delImItatIon Implies bothexclUSIOn and destruction.'

This reproach by no means applies to all rehglousmen. RelIgIOn IS, on the contrary, capable of bnngmgthe whole world Into ItS I1ght, of casting a reflection ofIts speCIfic radIance upon all realities. But the argumentdoes apply to many reahzatlons of relIgIOn, eventhough such reahzatlons w1l1 perhaps be condemnedby the relIglom man himself as distortions.

None of thec;e diSCUSSions of relIgIon touches uponwhat IS cruClal These antl-rel1glOus arguments swkethe distorted verSlOns of the vanous rehglOns, notreltglOIl Itself.

Moreover, we have spoken only of relIgion andreligIOns, not of what represents and proclaIms ltselfas a unique revealed truth and dechnes to be claSSIfiedas one religion among many. ThiS is the case 10 the

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churches and denominations deriving from the comprehensive Biblical religion to which all of us belong,Jews and Christians, Greek Orthodox, Catholics andProtestants, and perhaps Mohammedans as well.

In this connection there are two propositions (onenegative and one positive) that result from philosophical faith. I should like to explain them here:

(I) The claim to exclusivity was an original elementin Biblical religion and this claim has been marufestedin all its ramifications, but perhaps it is not necessaryto Biblical relIgion, and perhaps It Will not be raisedfor ever. Both In its motive and in its consequences,this claim IS catastrophic for men. We must fight forthe truth and for our soul agamst tills fatal claim.

(2) Biblical rehgion IS one of the wellspnngs of ourphilosophy, and in it we gather Irreplaceable truth.

We regard both proposltlons as Important. They arebound up With a questIOn that has a beanng on theentire destinies of the West: what IS the future ofBiblical rehgion?

Against the claIm to exclusivity.The substance of faith is regarded not merely as

absolute truth, but also as exclUSive truth. The ChriStian does not say: thiS is my way, but, thiS is the way;and he quotes Christ, the son of God, as saYing: I amthe way, the truth, and the hfe. The behever 10 Christis perffiltted to think of himself: Ye are the salt of theearth: ye are the light of the world.

Such objections as the followlOg may be raised: IfGod can have men as chtldren, It seems more hkely

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that all men, and not just a few, or certain individuals,should be hIS children.-The claim that only those whobelieve in Christ wIll have eternal Me, IS not convlOcing.For noble men and pure 10 soul are qUIte dIscernibleoutside of Christianity; it would be absurd for them tobe lost, particularly If we compare them to certainamong the most conspIcuouS ChristIans in history,who have been none too lovable or admlfable in anyhuman sense.-The lOner conversIOn of man from hisown self-will to boundless self-sacnfice and devotlOn isnot found solely among Chnstlans.-But all thesearguments fat! to strIke the core.

Wherever in the world men are struck by a relIgioustruth, this truth has absolute vabdIty for them. Yetoutside the BIblical world-they do not thereby exclude the possibIlity of another truth for other men.From a phIlosophIcal pOInt of VIew, thIS general attItude of men IS also the sound one. And here we mustclarify certaIn fundamental dIfferences in the mearu.ngof truth (whlch we had In mtnd in our dISCUSSIon ofBruno and Gableo).

When I act absolutely because I believe absolutely,there is no suffiCIent reason and no goal on the baSlS ofwhich my actlOn IS purposeful, that IS, rationally Intelligible. The absolute IS not universal, but IS hIstoricalin the impenetrable, self-illumtned dynamIsm of thepresent act. It is profoundly unknown, much as can beknown and said through it. Nothing can take its place,it is always umque and yet It may serve others not onlyas an onentatlon, but as a prototype by WhICh to recog-

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nize something of their own, whIch differs from it inits historical manifestation and yet cOIncides with it inthe light of eternity. That which IS historically, existentially true is indeed absolute, but this does not meanthat the expression or manifestation ofit IS a truth for all.

Conversely: what is universally valid for all (likesCIentific and other logIcally true propositions), is forthat very reason not absolute, IS universally valid forall from a speCific standpomt and on the basis of adefirute method, hence under certalO conditIons andnot absolutely. ThIS kmd of true proposition is cogentfor all whose intelligence can grasp it. But It 15 relativeto the standpoint and method by which it IS disclosed.It 1S existenually lOdlfferent, because 1t 1S fiOlte, partIcular, objectively cogent-no man can or should diefor it.

In short: The absoluteness of historical truth Impliesthe relatiVIty of every formulation of It, and of all ItShistoncally firute marufestattons. UOlvcrsally val1d statements can be based only upon relative standpOints andmethods. Formulable faIth contents must not betreated hke u01versally true prOpOSltlOnS; the absoluteawareness of truth In faith 1S something fundamentallydifferent from the comprehension of the universalvalidity of scientifically true proposltlons, which arealways particular. Historical absoluteness does notcarry WIth it the uOlversal valIdity of its marufestationsin word, dogma, cult, rttual, institutlOns. It is the confusion of the two that makes It possible to claImexclusivity for a rehglous truth.

9°


It is in itself a fallacy to treat the universally valid inscientific knowledge as an absolute by which one mightlive, to expect of science what it can never achieve.True, my devotion to truth forbids me to overlookanything that IS mtellectually cogent, and enjoins meon the contrary to allow it full scope. But to claim forits content what only metaphysical meanings can provide, that IS, a sense of contentment with being, ofrepose In being, IS a deceptiOn that offers not fulfilmentbut ultimate cmptmess.

But the oppOSite fallacy is really fatal: to transformthe absoluteness of eXistential decision Into a knowledge of truth that can be stated in the form of morallaw, or to pervert the hIstOrical absoluter -.:, Jf faahInto a universal truth for all.

The conseguence of such fallaCies IS self-deceptlonconcernmg whar I really am and deSire, It IS intolerance(refusal to countenance anything but my own statements that have solidified into dogmas) and incapacityfor commumcatlon (InabIlIty to hear anyone else or toadmit honest guestiomng of oneself). Impulses such asthe Will to power, cruelty, the impulse to destroy,become ulwnatcly the real motive forces behind themask of thiS perverted Will to truth. And then theseImpulses, finding a hideously false justification in thelfostenSible advocacy of truth, move toward their moreor less open satisfaction.

Only in the sphere of BiblIcal religion does this exclusivity of the apprehended truth of faith appear to

belong to the faith itself, to be consciously professed

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and developed in all its consequences. For the believerthis can be a new supernatural mark for the truth of hisfaith. Philosophical insight, on the other hand, sees notonly the untruth implied in the fundamental quid profJNO of such falth, but also the ternble consequences.

We may take as an example of this Biblical religion,Christianity wlth Its claIm to absolute truth for all.Our knowledge of the extraordinary accomplishmentsof Christiaruty, of the noble figures who have lived inthis faith and by thlS falth cannot prevent us from seeing how this fundamental perversiOn brought forthrustorical evils that wore the cloak of sacred andabsolute truth.

Let us conSider some of the consequences of thISclaim to exclusivity. Even the New Testament makesJesus, who turns the other cheek and preaches theSermon on the Mount, utter the words: I bnng notpeace but a sword. He presents the alternative to followhim or not to follow him: he who IS not WIth me IS

against me.And innumerable Chrtstian beltevers In history have

acted in keepIng with thiS InJunctlon. According tothelr doctrine of salvation, all those men are lost wholived before ChrIst or WIthout ChrISt. The many religions are a sum of untruths or at best of partial truths;their adherents are all heathen. They are summoned to

give up their religion and follow the faith of Christ.The universal mission not only proclaimed the faith toall peoples with all the instruments of propaganda, butit has continually revealed an underlyIng will to force

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behefwhere it was not accepted voluntarily (coge tntrare).Campaigns of annihilation, crusades were unleashed.The Christian denominations even earned on religiouswars among themselves. Politics became a weapon ofthe churches.

Thus the will to power became a basic factor In thisrelIgion, whIch originally had nothmg to do wIthpower. The claim to world dommation is a consequenceof the claim to exclUSive truth. In the great process ofseculartzation-that IS, the movement to retain Biblicalvalues while castlng off thel! religlOus form-even thefanaticism of unbeltef shows the Influence of ItS Biblicalorigin. The secularized philosophical positions WlthlOthe Western clvl!lzatlons have frequently revealed thistrait of absolutism, this persecution of other beliefs,this aggreSSIve professIOn of faith, this InquisItonalattitude towards other faiths, always In consequence ofabsolute claims to a truth whIch each one believes hepossesses.

In view of all thIS, phllosophlCal faith must reluctantly recognize that where dIscussion IS broken off andreason countenanced only uncler certam conditions, thebest intentions of maIntaining open commumcatlonare doomed to failure.

I do not understand how anyone can maintain anattitude of neutrality toward the claim to exclusi"ity.That would be pOSSible t.f intolerance could be regardedas a strange and harmless anomaly. But tlus is by nomeans the case With the claim to exclusivity that ISrooted in the Bible. By its very nature it tends to assert

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itself through powerful institutions that keep constantlyarising, and it stands for ever in readiness to kindle newfires in which to burn heretics. This lies in the verynature of the claim to exclusivity in all forms of theBiblical religion, regardless of how many belIevers havepersonally not the slightest leaning toward violence,let alone toward the anruhilation of those whom theyregard as unbelievers.

Because intolerance against intolerance (but onlyagainst intolerance) IS indispensable, intolerance agamstthe exc1usivist claim is necessary when it not only propounds a doctrine for consideration by others, butstrives to force it on others by law, by compulsoryschools, etc.

QUite different is the Christian faith that frees itselffrom the excluslvist claim and Its consequences. Ourera confronts us with the question whether the declming behef m Christ-whIch would by no means meanthe end of Christlaruty as a Blbltcal reltglon-Is only atemporary declIne or whether It is the consequence ofa definitive histoncal transformation. To-day It appearsthat fewer and fewer people belteve m ChrISt as theonly begotten son of God, as the uOlque mediator sentby God. '(he truth of this 15 hard to test. Men of highpersonal stature sull seem to be Imbued with faith. Noone can say 10 advance whether a transformed faith inChrIst can be captured and made Into the motive forceof a Biblical relIgIOn freed from the stigma of exclusivity. And what this faith would mean, is a question tobe decided within the framework of the Biblical religion

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after it has succeeded by Virtue of its own profounddynamism in reintegrating this absolutized form of it,which is abjunng its true ongin.

The claim to exclusivity is present in the Christianfaith, in the Jewish doctrine of the law, in the vanousforms of national religion, in Islam. Blbhcal rehglOn ISthe inclusive mstorical area from wmch, If we overlookother contents, each denommation derives its particularemphasIs. The whole Bible, mcludlng the Old and theNew Testament, IS the sacred book only of the Christian denommations. For the Jews the New Testament,which was produced by Jews, is not regarded as part ofthe BIble; but m its ethical and monotheistIc content it

is no less important for the Jewish religlOn than for theChmtian. Islam does not regard the BIble as sacred,although Islam sprang from the same rehgl0us foundation under the mfluence of Jews and Chnstians.

The BJble and Blbhcal rellgJOn have from a plulosophical pomt of view thiS essential characterIStic: theyform no total doctnne and offer nothing definltlve.The claim to exclUSIVity does not belong to BIbltcalreligion as a whole, but only to certain forms that markfixations of the lustorical movement of thiS rehglOn.The claIm to eXclUSIVIty IS the work of man and notbuilt on God, who provided man with many roads tolumself

The Bible and Blbhcal rellglOn are a foundauon ofour philosophy, a lasting onentatlon and a source ofirreplaceable contents. Western phllosophy-whetherwe ad1IUt it or not-is always With the BIble, even when

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it combats it. In concluding the present lecture, weshould like to make certain remarks concerning thepositive contributions of the Bible to philosophy.

For the Biblical religion.In the Bible the most extreme rationally inevitable

contradictions come to expression.(I) From the sacrifice of the patriarchs to the com

plicated daily sacnficial servIce in the temple at Jerusalem and the Lord's Supper of the Christians, thecultic religion runs through the Bible. Within this cultic religIon a tendency to hmit and spuituahze the cultcontinually makes Its appearance-as 10 the ehmmationof the 'high places' (the many sttes of the cult throughout the country) In favour of the one cult in the templeat Jerusalem-simtlarly 10 the transformation of thelocally expenenced and hying cult into an official,abstract ritual-and also In the subhmation of the cultfrom the sacnficlal servIce to the Lord's Supper and theMass. Cult It always remalns. But the prophets begInto turn passionately against the cult itself (not onlyagainst the false lnterpretatJon of the cult). Yahwehsays (Amos v. 2I): '1 hate, 1 despise your feast days, and1 will not dwell In your solemn assembltes. Though yeoffer me burnt offerings and your meat offerings, I WIllnot accept them: neither will I regard the peace offeringsof your fat beasts. Take thou away from me the noiseof thy songs; for 1 WIll not hear the melody of thyviols.' And again Yahweh speaks (Hosea vi. 6): 'ForI desired mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledgeof God more than burnt offerings.'

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(2) From the decalogue and the covenant to the compendious laws of Deuteronomy and Leviticus, runs thedevelopment of the religlOn of the law. The law 1Spresent in the revelation of God through the word ofthe Torah; it 1S wntten. But Jeremiah turns agalnst thewntten law as such: 'The pen of the scnbes hath madeit Into lies' (Jeremiah vi!. 8). God's law does not resideIn the fixed law of Scripture, but in the heart: 'Mterthose days, salth the Lord, I will put thea laws In theirinward parts, and wnte it in thea hearts' (XXXI. 33).

(3) Beglnrung with the concluslOn of the covenantin the days of Moses, the Jews' conSClOusness of beingthe chosen people runs through the Bible. But at a veryearly time the chosenness is also suspended. 'Are yenot as children of the Ethiopians unto me, a ch1ldrenof Israel?' says Yahweh. 'Have not I brought up Israelout of the land of Egypt and the Ph1listlnes fromCaphtor, and the Synans from Klr?' (Amos lX. 7). Herethe peoples enJoy equal rank. In the period of exile,God becomes once more the God of Israel-but at thesame time In HiS role of creator, He becomes the Uill

versal God, who hves for all peoples and even takespity on the heathen of Nlneveh as agalnst the smallhearted Jonah.

(4) Jesus becomes the Chnst God. But contrary tothiS from the outset are the words of Jesus himself:'Why callest thou me good? there is none good butone, that IS, God.' (Mark x. 18.)

Such examples can be mult1plied. One might venturethe assertion that in the Bible seen as a whole, every-

G 97


thing occurs in polarities. For every formulation onewill ultimately find the opposite formulation. Nowhereis the whole, full, pure truth-because it cannot exist inany sentence of human speech or in any living humanfigure. In our limited view of things, we are alwayslosing sight of the other pole. We touch upon thetruth only when, in clear consciousness of the polarities, we approach It through them.

Thus we find opposed to one another: the religionof the cult and the prophetic rellgion of the pure ethos;the religion of the law and the relIgIon of love; thelocking ofreligIOn lOto rIgId forms (10 order to preservethe preclOUS heritage of faIth down through the generations) and Its operung up for the man who only beltevesin God and loves hIm; the rellglOn of the pnests andthe free religIon of prayer that IS earned on by In

dividuals; the nauonal God and the uruversal God; thecovenant with the chosen people and the covenant withman as man; the balancing of guIlt and retnbutton In

this lIfe (happIness and unhappiness considered asmeasures of virtue and sin) and the attitude of faIth ofJeremiah, of Job in the presence of the diVine mystery;the rehgion of the congregation and the reltglOn of themen of God, seers, prophets; magical rellglOn and theethIcal religion of the rational idea of creation. TheBIble indeed embraces the great antitheses of faith: theanti-faith of demonology, of delficatlon of men, ofnihIlIsm (thIS last In EccleSIastes). The consequence ofthese polanues within the Bible IS that in subsequenthistory all parties and trends have been able to lOvoke

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some passage in the Bible. The polarities that are clearlydeveloped lU the Btble have recurred over and overagain, JewIsh theocracy In Chnstlan churches, the freedom of the prophets lU the mysucs and reformers, thechosen people in any number of Chnsuan peoples,commumues, sects whIch have regarded themselves aschosen. The BIblical rehgion has repeatedly lUspiredreturns to the onginal source, counteractiOn agalnstfixations, living creative aCUvlty, as though It were thedesuny of Western civlhzauon, wruch IS grounded lUthe sacred book, to find in theu authonty a prefiguration of all life's contradicuons, and thus to be madefree for all pOSSIbilltles and for the unrerrutting strugglefor the elevauon of man, who knows that lU rus freeacuvity he is given to hImself by God.

The BIble embraces 1n 1tS texts sp1f1tual depOSIts ofthe most pnmltlve and most subhme human reahues.ThIS 1t has In common WIth other great documents ofrehgiOn.

But even the barbanc element in the beginmng hasthat ancient grandeur which makes us hesitate to callit merely barbanc. There 15 In it a sImphcIty of expression, a naive strength.

Through the Bible runs a passiOn that makes a uruqueimpression, because It refers to God. God IS In the fireof the volcano, ill the earthquake, 1n the storm. Henses to inaccessIble heIghts, lets the storms serve as Hismessengers, while He himself becomes mystenouslypresent ill the sull small \'()lcc-and as He nses aboveall Images, He rises also above these sensible manifesta-

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tions, to become the 'purely transcendent creator, theuniversal God, who is inconceIVable, above all passions,impenetrable in HIS decisions, but always in a sensepersonal in the pathos by which man knows hImselfto be seized.

Because they stand before this God, the men of theBIble, even whIle they know themselves to be nothing,grow to superhuman stature. These men of God andprophets wIthout weapons are sp1!ltual heroes, whomalntam themselves agaInst the world around themsometimes m smgle combat agamst all others-becausethey feel themselyes to be servants of God. The legendary Moses and EIIph, the real figures of Amos, Isaiah,and Jeremiah, haye indeed the stature of ~\1tchel

angelo's VISIon.The heroism of the Bible IS not the defiance of force,

standmg upon Itself. The Impossible is ventured at thebehest of God. The herOism IS sublimated.

But the ongmaildea of God that make~ thIS pOSSIblecan eastly degenerate. Then heroism is denatured intothe ugly, distorted stuhbornness of a perverse SpJr1t. Aschizophrenic (EzekIel) can-once-mfluence all hiStory.

But there are also words In the BIble that ~eem qUletand pure as the truth Itself. They are rare and they areImmersed in a whulwmd of the most extreme possibIlities. The Immoderate, eccentrIC and ugly IS an element in the BIble. And finally, a veil of sophIsm andmonotony hes over the whole. But even here thoseenergIes must have been at work which prevented the

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religion of Ezra from takIng on a deadly rigidity; thefire which gave rIse to Job, the Psalms, Ruth andEccleSIastes, was preserved.

The permanent bond between the truth of the Bibleand the substance of myths, soclOloglcal realltIes, untenable cosmologIes, pnmltlve, pre-sCIentIfic knowledge, caused the phenomenon of Blbhcal truth, whichin itself IS hving hIstory, to become subsequently amere thing of the past. Even In the BIble the garmentsof this truth are Interchangeablc.

Except for a very few rudIments, the BIble IS lackIngIn phIlosophIcal self-consclOusness. Hence the powerof the speaking eXIstence, the source of revealed truth-but hence also the persIstent excesses in oppositedirectIOns. The gUIdance of cntlcal thought is lackIng.PassIon is corrected by passIOn

The BIble IS the deposIt of a thousand years of humanborderhne experience. Through these expenences themInd of man was Illummed, he achIeved certaInty ofGod and thus of hImself. And thIS IS what creates theumque atmosphere of the BIble

In the BIble we see man In hIS fundamental modes offallure. But m such a way that eXIstentIal expenence,and realIzatIon, are mamfested prcClsely In hIs faIlure.

In our approach to the BIble the essentlal is alwaysto regain from the devIatIons the truth that IS alwaysthe same, though It IS ncyer obJectIvely, defimtIvelypresent. True transformatIon IS a return to the primalsource. Garments that have grown old must be cast off,garments suited to the prescnt must be found. But the

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primal source is not what was in the beginning, butwhat is eternally present and authentic. On the otherhand, to formulate the primal truth is to dress it 10 atemporal garment. Yet in tlme, thIS garment corresponds to the temporal form of faIth.

But it is not only old clothes that must be cast off;the primal source must also be retneved from Its fixations and perversions-the polar tensions must be reestablished-one must stnve, always 10 the SImplestpossible way, to clanfy and enhance the eternaltruth.

(1) The retrtet1ing of the truth from fixations: The truthof BIbllcal religlOn runs counter to the fixations thathave been effected withln It, that were once perhapshIstorically valId, but are no longer vahd for phl1osoprucal reflcctlon. If I am not ffilstaken, examples ofsuch fixations are the natlonal rehglOn, thc religIon ofthe law, the speCIfic rellglOn of Chnst:

\VIe must abandon the Idca of a natlonal religlOn. Inthe early stage of the BIblIcal rehglOn, the IsraelIte cultof Yahweh actually was national. Protestant and espeCIally CalVInIStiC tendenCIcs rcvIVed rchgious natlonahsmwhen they based thea ChnstIalllty more on parts of theOld Testament than on the whole of It and on the NewTestament.

We must abandon the religion of the law, whichtook form in Ezra and NehemIah, In the most important sections of Levltlcus, and in the Talmud, andwhich assumed Its sP'fific form as JudaIsm, 111 thenarrow sense of the term. Along with the religion of

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the law, we must abandon the rule of the priesthood(hierocracy), which was created and realized by theJews under foreIgn domination, and which was continued or demanded by Christian churches.

We must abandon the religion of Christ, that seesGod in Chnst and bases the doctrIne of salvation on anIdea of sacnfice found 10 Deutero-Isaiah and appliedto Chnst.

Each of these three forms of reltgion becomes narrow, though they all ong1Oated in an element of truth.But the nattonal relIgIon as such cannot be the absolutereligIOn and can only express a surface aspect of thetruth. The reltgIOn of the law formalIzes the profoundidea of law, dIssIpates It in absurdlties of all kinds.

The religIOn of Christ conta1OS the truth that Godspeaks to man through man. But God speaks throughmany men, In the BIble through the successive proprophets of whom Jesus IS the last. No man can beGod; God speaks exclUSIvely through no man, andwhat IS more, HIS speech through every man has manymeamngs

The relIgion of Chnst furthermore embodIes thetruth of refernng the lOdlvidual to hImself. The spmtof Chnst belongs to every man. It IS the pneuma, I.e. thespmt of an enthUSiasm surging upward to the suprasensory. It IS also the openness to one's own suffenngas a road to transcendence; he who has taken the crossupon hImself can ascertam the authentic In faIlure. Thespmt of Chnst is finally a bond with the God-gIvennobtlitas mgemta wruch I follow or which I betray, the

1°3


actuality of the divine in man. But if the religion ofChrist means that I should apprehend in faith the redeeming Christ outside me by realIzing the spirit ofChnst wltlun me, then a twofold conclusion is inescapable for plulosoplucal thought: the Christ withinme IS not exclusively bound up wIth the histoIlcal JesusChrist; and Jesus as ChIlSt, as the God-man, IS a myth.The process of demythicizatlon must not arbitranlyhalt at this point. Even the profoundly meamngfulmyth remains a myth and a fancy, and becomes anobjective guaranty only through a rellglOus truth (thatphilosophy cannot see) or through deception.

(2) The re-establuhl11e1Jt of the polar tenslO1lS: In orderto appropriate the truth that IS manIfested in the Bible,we must be fully consclOUS of the contradIctIons thatoccur In It. ContradIctions have dIverse meanings.Ratlonal contradICtiOnS lead to alternatives only oneterm of whIch can be formally true. Opposing forcesalways constItute a polar whole, through whIch thetruth marufests ltSelf. DIalectic contradictIons constltute a movement of thought, through whIch the truththat IS not accessIble to dIrect statement speaks.

Blbhcal rellglOn IS dlStlngUIshed by ItS abundance ofcontradICtIOn, polar tensIon, dIaleCtIc. It IS not by willalone, but by constant openness to the contradIctory,that we can retain the dynamIC energy of tenSIOn, QrretrIeve it where It has been lost. Rauonallsm and thedesire for repose, as well as the destructIve wIll to fight,strive to do away WIth the polarIues, In order to establIsh the rule of the definitIve and one-sided.

1°4


We can recognize in the Scriptures the fundamentaltenslOns whIch up until now have kept the Westernworld m motion: God and the world, church and state,reltglOn and philosophy, religIOn of the law and prophetlc religlOn, cult and ethos.

The eternal truth can accordmgly be apprehendedonly If we are open to the msoluble problems inherentin empuical existence, if we continuously question allour achIevements, If we do not lose sIght of extremesituations, of our absolute failures.

(,) ClarificatIOn and enhancement of the eternal truth: Byour expenence of the tenslOns, the dIalectic and thecontradictions stflvmg toward a decIsIon, we can POSI

tively apprehend what words can express only abstractly-the truth that we outlIned In formulatIng the basIccharactenStlcs of BIblIcal relIgIOn. Let me restate theelements of thIS truth, which constitutes phIlosophIcalfalth. They are:

the Idea of the one God;the realIzatIOn of the absolute nature of the deciSIon

between good and eVllm nnIte man;love as the fundamental actualIzatlon of the eternal

In man;the act-both Inward and external-as the test of

man;types of moral world order which are always hIstori

cally absolute, although none of thea manIfestations isabsolute or exclusIve;

the incompleteness of the created world, the factthat It docs not stand by Itself, the lOappllcabllity of all

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types of order to borderline cases, the experience ofthe extreme;

the Idea that the ultimate and only refuge is withGod.

How pale does all we have saId seem beside thereligious reahty. As soon as we set out to discuss thequestion, we enter upon the plane of philosophicalfaIth. We are thus led automatically to mterpret renewal of rehgious faith as a return to the pnmal source,as a renewal of the phIlosophical faith that is implicitin the religious, as a transformation of rehgion mtophilosophy (or philosophical relIgIOn). But thIs, thoughperhaps it WIll be the road of a minonty, will certainlynot be that of mankmd.

The philosopher cannot possibly tell the theologiansand the churches what to do. The phIlosopher can onlyhope to help create the prelimmary reqUIrements. Hewould like to help prepare the Rround and to helpproduce awareness of the mtellectual situation necessary for the growth of what he hImself cannot create.

What more and more people have been saymg forhalf a century contmues to be qUIckly forgotten,though nearly everyone has been saymg It: a new era ISarismg, In which man, down to the very last mdlvidual,1S subject to a process of transformation more radicalthan ever before In history. But SInce the transformation in our obJective livlng condItions goes so deep,the transformation In our forms of religiOUS belief mustgo correspondmgly deeper In order to mould the new,to fructify and spiritualize It. A change IS to be ex-

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peeted in what we have called the matter, the dress, themanifestatIon, the language of faith, a change as farreaching as all the other changes that have taken placetn our era-or else the eternal truth of BIblical religlOnwIll recede beyond the honzon of man; he will nolonger experience this truth, and It IS Imposslble to saywhat might take its place. Hence it is tn order, that wedo everyth10g 10 our power to restore the eternal truth;we must plumb Its very depths and, unconcerned overwhat IS transient and historIcal, utter this truth in a newlanguage

Here the philosopher only becomes 1Ovolved 10questIons that ht: cannot answer, though he knows thatthe future wIll assuredly gIve the answer. Such questlons arc:

Which dogma~ can be dropped because they haveactually become allen to modern man and lost thet!crcdlb1lIty~ Even If for the present we say notlung aboutdroppl11g dogmas, the thinking man must sull ask:which dogmas are no longer fully believed even by theprofessed commUnlcants of the reltgl0ns?

What solId rcllglOus foundation remains?Is there an element of absurdIty that IS tenable or

even deSirable as a content of faith to-day? It wouldseem that the capacity for the crudest absurditIes has ifanythIng been astoundIngly intenSIfied 1n modem man.He succumbs so caslly to superstltlon. But where thereis superstition, only f.lith can conquer, not science.What absurdity might to-day still be the inescapablesign of an authentIC faIth content?

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H all dogmas are to be transformed, by whom will itbe done?

Does the fact that the masses of the people continueto attend church serVIces indIcate that they gravitatetoward an absolute faith? Or must their capacIty fordevotion to the POInt of martyrdom be rekindledthrough new contents that will be found by an uncompromising quest for the truth? Or will it in the endturn out, as Plato thought, that deliberate concealmentof the truth by an elite is indispensable in order toeducate the masses and preserve even the deepestmeamngs? Here I belIeve that the answer IS: No. Whatlies to-day would be Indispensable and effective vehiclesof truth? Surely there are no such hes.

Again we realize that wlth such questIons we do notstrike at the core of the matter. The religIOUS essenceitself, inaccessible to the phl1osopher, must be presentin advance. It cannot be construed, it cannot be VIewedfrom outSIde. The sIgmficance of the cult, of ntes, offestivals, of dogmatlc certaInty, of priests, IS lost InphilosophIcal diSCUSSIOn. Is thIS a cruCial argumentagainst all phIlosophy? Is the Idea of phIlosophical falthto-day as In all preViOUS epochs a lIfeless illUSIon? Weare told so. But I do not believe It.

What the phIlosopher has to say of religIOn IS morethan inadequate, he does not seem able to touchreligion when he discusses It.

Philosophy strives always to broaden itS horIZon. Itextends the scope of its viSIOn from the particulardenomInational religion to the more comprehemive

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Biblical religion, and thence to the truth in all religions.But in so doing it loses precisely that which distinguishes actual religion. WhIle philosophers supposethat by broadening their scope to the universal, theycan penetrate the depths of religIon, they lose sight ofthe fact that religions are always bound up wIth thetangIble symbols m WhICh they are embodIed. Thoughthey see that such tangIble embodIments of the collectIve and tradltIonal faIth arc the necessary form ofrellgl0n, religIon remams allen to them because theydo not have this faIth, and thus arc mdeed unable tounderstand what they see.

Philosophy, whether It affirms or combats rel1g10n,wtthdraws from rellglOn m fact, and yet IS constantlyconcerned with it.

(a) Phtlosophy takes up the cause of the Blbl1calrehglOn: \\'estern phllosophy cannot hide from itselfthe fact that none of its great philosophers up to andIncluding Nietzsche approached philosophical thoughtwithout a thorough knowledge of the BIble. This IS noaccident. We repeat:

FIrst: Phllosophy cannot give man the same thing asrehglon. Hence It at least leaves the field open forreligion. It does not force ItSelf on mankmd as thewhole and exclUSIve truth for all men.

Second: PhIlosophy can scarcely hold tts position inthe world If the human cOlleCtlVlty does not !lve m thepeople through re!lpous faIth. Philosophical commurucatlon In thought has no compelhng force, butonly clanhes for the llldividual man what arises from

J


within himself. Philosophy would be dispersed amongfewer and fewer individuals and finally disappear, If thehuman collectivity did not live by what becomes clearin philosophical faith. Philosophy cannot realIze thesociologically effecnve transmissIon of the contents indIspensable to man, wmch occurs solely throughreligious tradinon assimllated from early childhood,thus becoming the vemcle also of philosophy.

Third: The contents of the BIble can be replaced forus by no other book.

(b) Philosophy goes beyond Biblical relIgIOn: Thedevelopment of communicatIons, which has broughtall the things ever produced on earth into contact withone another, and which has created a need for evercloser understanding among men, has in additIOn tothe BIble revealed to us two other great reltgIOus areas:IndIa With the Upanishads and Buddhism, China WithConfucIUS and Lao-tse. The soul of the thoughtful mancannot remain closed to the depth of the truth emanating from these sources. The soul strives to extend ItShorizons without end.

Here an error IS hkely to crop up. The EnlIghtenment sought to find the true relIgIOn by assembhng thebest from all rehgIOns. The result however was not theauthennc truth, punfied of hlstoncal accident, but acollection ofabstractions watered down by ratlonalism.The source of tills u11lversal faith was In fact only acntlcal, measunng intellIgence. The profound meamng,the pOIgnancy was lost. Tnvlal generaltzatlons remained.

tIO


Since all faith is historical, its truth does not lie in asum of articles of faith, but In a primal source that ishistorically manIfested in various forms. True, themany reltgions lead to the one truth, but thIS truthcannot be attained at one stroke, but only along theroads that were really travelled, roads which cannot betravelled all at once and in the same way.

Hence no ratIonal critique can apprehend this truth.On the contrary, man must, in the context of hIs owndestiny, let the truth be revealed to him as it 15 utteredthrough tradltlon, i.e. he must make it his own. Insounding the depths of the past, one can accomplishthis only by being given to oneself through inneraction.

With regard to religIOn, phIlosophy will in practiceapprove the followmg propoSltlons: In order to partiCIpate In BiblIcal rebgion, one must grow up In thetradltlon of a definite denomInatlon. Every denominatIon is good to the extent that the people hving in ittake posseSSIOn of the Btbhcal relIgIon as a whole inspIte of the specIal and finite hIstorIcal degenerationsof the partIcular histoncal form. Loyalty and histoncalconSCIOusness bind me to the denomination in whIchI awakened. A change of religIOn IS dIfficult WIthout abreach in the soul. But though in every denominationalform of RIbhcal relIgion the fixatIon of faIth IS determined by the speCIfic time in which It occurs, In individual beheyers the presence of the full BIblicalreligion IS pOSSIble and real. The communtty of thepious cuts across all denomInational lines. And the end-

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less struggles, schisms, and condemnations that haveoccurred in this field can, in Melanchthon's words, bedesIgnated as rabIes theologorlill1.

(c) Authority for philosophy: The philosopher isalways an indIVIdual, he lives at hIS own nsk by drawing upon his own pnmal depths. But as a man he is partof a whole, and his phl1osophlzing also stands from itsvery inception in this context.

This context is safeguarded by the secular authorityof state and rehglOn. \\I'ithout authonty no human Meis possIble.

The churches see the necessity of mass gUIdance, thepractical necessity of valid Images of realIty, of tangiblesymbols, of an ordered tradltlon. TheIr claim to comprehenSIve truth demands control over the actions ofthe individual and gUIdance of hIS pubhc behaviour.As all-embraCing authonty for truth, they can, accordIng to their own idea, assimIlate all truth, leave roomwithIn themselves for all contraruetlons, everywherefind a synthesis. What no indiVIdual can do, because heis finite, particular and one-sided, the church can do asa spokesman for the collectivity.

Again and again the IndiVidual rebels agaInst thIS.In such claIms to totabty, sInce they are always raisedby men and by no means realIze the true totalIty, hecannot but see a fundamental deception. Though hemay recogruze an authentic purpose In these claims, hecannot regard the de facto authority of the whole as thewhole truth. But he for hIS part, as an Inruvidual,cannot reallze thIS truth either. Though in hiS spiritual

lIZ


efforts he relies on himself, he does not for that reasonwish to do away' with the church conceived as an embodiment of the universal, as an irreplaceable crystallization of tradition and education, as a form of order.But he strives to prevent it from becorrung rigid andexclusive. Consequently he endeavours at his own riskto find the more comprehenSIve princIple by breakingthrough an actually estabhshed universal authonty. Heseeks hvmg contact with the ComprehenSIve by striving toward phIlosophIcal faIth.

This faith however is not Invented by hIm, it is inturn bullt upon authonty. For It grows out of the totaltradition of the penod extendmg from the last mlllennium B.C. to the present day.

AuthOrity is not merely the obedient acceptance ofthe gUIdance ofan Institution and Its representatives, thepriests, It IS also the acceptance, In reverence and trust,of the spmtual gUidance of the great past which thelast three millenma represent. Here It can truthfully besaId: no one can lay a foundatwn other than that whIChhas been laid from the beginning. It is in thiS past thatwe find a proper spmtual climate, a gUIdance that isauthontative though leavmg a margm of mdeterrrunauon, and that cannot be formulated m obJectIve,universally binding terms.

Any meamngful philosophy must develop m thiSauthority. The danger that this authOrity will bewatered down mto general abstractions withm reachof the understanding and superfiCIally edifymg, in anyevent existentially empty, is avoided by travelling the

H 113


historical road: Beginning with his own proximatetradition in family, home country, people, rooted in hisown past, the philosopher broadens and deepens it,extending his scope to the vast worlds of the West andthence to all mankind, until finally he consciously findsthe pivot of the whole In the epoch between 800 and200 B.C. Then historical tradition, instead oflevelhng offin a philosophical system, will become a meaningfulwhole with Its high points, its great men and world,its classical interpretations and Its varied articulationin historical development.

PhIlosophy, always in the form of indIvidual effort,strives to realize UDlversality, to preserve men's openness, to disul the sImple, to concentrate it and I1lurrunate it in its unfathomable depths.

Whether such endeavour can contribute any spark,whether the preparatory work of philosophy-whichin itself can represent a fulfilment of lIfe for Indlviduals-is to be used in the relIgIOns, can be determlned byno plan. But in all phl1osophical effort there hes a tendency to aid religIOUS InStitutiOns, whose practicalvalue IS affirmed by philosophy, though phIlosopherscannot directly participate in It.

114

Chapter Five

PHILOSOPHY AND ANTI-PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL TRUTH IS not the only truth 10

the world. Up to now it has nowhere been theform of truth In whIch the majorIty of men have

lived. But phIlosophICal thought is inherently open toevery possIble mode of bfe, stnYIng not only to understand It, but abo to recognize the truth-meaning itembodies.

Yet at the frontIers of phllosophy there IS found amode of livIng and thmklng In which the sources offaith without whIch phl1osophy must lose Its meaningappear to be abandoned \'fe call thIs thtnking antIphIlosophy when It represents and conceives Itself asphIlosophv, and when It IS recognIzed by others asphIlosophy. In the cloak ofphllosophy, anu-phIlosophyturns against philosophy. Since It sIgmfies the negationof philosophy, philosophical thought must defend ItselfagaInst It. It IS not only an error \vlthm phIlosophicalthought, whIch In that case could be corrected by inSight; it is a fundamental error, a complete negationthat is thinly disgUised as an affirmation by means ofsubstitute constructions. It can be corrected by man

I15


self-given and reborn through rediscoverlng himself inthought. Pseudo-philosophy runs in broad streamsthrough history. Every philosophy must, in transitionalphases, succumb to this sham. A philosophically inclined man becomes a philosopher by transcending theanti-philosophy that IS always present in hImself.

We call unbelief any attitude that asserts absoluteimmanence and dentes transcendence. The questIonthen arises: what is thiS immanence? Unbelief says:Empirical existence-reality-the world. But empmcalexistence is only ephemeral presence; unbelief tries tograsp it by affirming becoming and appearance as such.-Reality slowly recedes when I try to know it in Itselfand as a whole; unbelief tnes to get hold of It byabsolutizing particular realitIes.-The world IS incomplete, not fully knowable, It IS idea; unbelief falselymakes of It an object In a self-contamed world system.-In short, unbeheflives m IllusiOn, in isolated realities,in world systems.

Unbelief IS never m contact WIth bemg, but itcannot avoId admitting m superstitions a substItutc forbeing. It recognizes only Immanencc, but It cannotavoid asserting a perverted transcendence of thIS sort.

The numerous varietlcs of anti-phIlosophy assumethe forms of unbelief. They conceive of themselves asfaIth or knowledge or Intuition. They Invoke Ul1

mediate perceptions and reasons.I shall choose three examples of philosophical un

belief-demonology, the deification of man, nihlhsm.We encounter them in both open and concealed forms.

JIG


They are so closely interrelated that one form of thisunbelief will soon call forth another. They are exceedingly hard to grasp, because they evade definite formulation. In their utterances they make use, unconsciouslydeceiving themselves and others, of the Implements ofphilosophy. In trylOg to characterize them, we easilyarnve at false dcfiOltions, for we try to delimit a chaosthat in fact is continuously changing, conttnuouslyreveahng a different face, for ever contradIcting itself,and always ready to attack philosophy at any point.We are facmg no clear-cut adversary. In the demonologIcal conception, mystagogy is combIned WIth theIdolization of men, to whom the i01tiates submit, andWIth O1htlism that cancels out all the rest.

The characterizatIOns which I shall attempt are Idealtypical constructtons of POSSibIlities that are inherentin us all. But each man IS always to a greater degree andprimarily the possibilIty of faIth that overcomes thesemodes of unbeltef. And even these modes of unbeliefcontaIn some truth, upon which we must finally reflect.

DEMONOLOGY

\Ve call demonology a conceptton which makesbeing reside In powers, In effective, form-constitutingforces, constructtve and destructive, that IS In demons,benevolent and maltgnant, In many gods; these powersare perceived as dIrectly eVident, and the perceptionsare translated into ideas and formulated as a doctrine.Good and evil alIke are hallowed, and the whole is

117


enhanced by a gazing into dark depths that are manifested in images. The immanent itself is experienced aspassion, power, vitahty, beauty, destruction, cruelty.There is to be sure no transcendence, for in this conception all being is immanent, but this immanence isnot exhausted by the reality accessible to abstract consciousness; it is more than this; in Simmel's words, itpasses as an Immanent transcendence, in so far as itsreality does not resolve into the reality that can beapprehended by the senses and the reason. The paradoxical term immanent transcendence no longer refersto thmgs as the possible language of God but as apower and factor in the world, and a power that isnecessanly split into many forces.

Where man surrenders to these forces, hiS experienceacqulres its enhanced mean1Og, itS radiance, from asense of mystery. These forces are perceIved withhorror, emotion, spectral shudders, or ecstasy, andtake on a tangible character. The struggle agamst themplaces man himself 10 the world of the demontc. Sympathy with them, possession With the demon, gives itSlrrauona] Impetus to the theory Justified by demonology that the forces I follow are necessary, and remforcemy superstitious belief in the success of my own hfeand actions. The longing to return to the mythical age,the creation of new myths of my own, the think109 inmyths, suffuses the very fundament of my hfe.

There is an urge In man to come close to the dtvIne,to expenence it dtrectly, as present In the world. ThiSis accomplished by hallowing all human Impulses-it

IIS


was a 'god' who did it, not I-and by enchanting theworld in the mythical light of the divine.

To-day a good many people have taken to speakIngof demons and the demonic. Yet the mearungs associated wlth these words are so vaned that a dlscusslOnof them may be useful:

(I) W'here a demonological conceptIOn was mdigenous itwas, like the myth, the rustorical form of existentiallyexperienced reality. The perception of demons meantan active relation to them, struggle against them, orsurrender to them.

Then the great alternatIve arose for man: to conceivethe dIvine as demonic or to conceive God as transcendence-Immanent forces (the many gods) or the onetranscendent cause.

At a later date, the demoruc forces were lOtegratedlOto the religIOus conceptIOn of the world; this wasdone elther by transforming them from forces lOtosymbols, a Cipher of transcendence, or by a mythicalsubordination of the demons as angels, messengers andIntermediarIes of God and the deVIl. Demonologyvamshed or was brought under control.

But when demonology IS revived In our present-dayworld, thiS mythologIcal mode of thought producesonly unreal fantaSies. It IS an Illusion to treat demons asrealities, to accept them as facts, to 'reckon with' them.There are no demons. Such anti-ratIOnal acceptance ofso-called expenence gives me to a false interpretationof reality as a sum of forces. ThIS absolutlzing of avague feellOg leads to a self-deluslOn that makes it

II9


possible to gain prestige by identifying oneself withdemonic forces and, in the confusion of an age madespiritually and by science, to justify one's actions asdictated by such forces.

IT the alternative between demons and God is resolved in no clear decision, a confusion of conceptIOnbrings confusion mto the emotlons, the thInking, andthe attltude of man.

(2.) It is qUIte a different matter when the demonicserves as an expression for somethmg unfathomable thatis situated at the Iilm! of reaMy, of my Will and bemg,something that though not actually perceived 1S nevertheless conceived as an effectlve entity. Here we nolonger have to do wlth demonologism, but with animaged expressIOn for somethmg which as a whole wedo not understand, somethmg unwilled, perverse,acc1dental, that exerts an overpowenng mfluence asthough from a primal source of its own. Here we nolonger have to do with demons, but with the demonic.But tlus demonic does not take form, does not becomea theory; It remams an elusive expressIOn for a borderhne condmon.

It was m this sense that Goethe used the termdemonic and spoke With mcomparable penetrauon ofthe demonic, but 10 such a way that its essence remamsungraspable. For It moves only affild contrad1ctlons andcannot be conceptually formulated. Hence m Goethethe demOniC remams a word With mfirutely manymeanmgs, which he apphes to that which is not understood, when he WIshes to express It as the mystery of

110


an eXIstent, of an occurrence, a causal connection, butcan only circle round it with surmises. This is whatGoethe, who for a long time had been speaking ofdemons in multlple meanings as a poetic metaphor, hasto say of the demonic:

'It was not divlOe, for It seemed irrational, nothuman, for it had no lOtelllgence; not diabohcal, for itwas beneficent; not angellcal, for it often revealedpleasure at people's pam. It resembled chance, for itseemed to break the natural order; It was hke providence, for it suggested causal connection. It seemedable to penetrate evcrythlOg that h!l11ts us. . . . Itseemed to thrive only on the ImpossIble and to rejectthe possIble With contempt. ... It cOllSmuted a powerat cross purposes when not opposed to the ethicalworld order....

'But thIs demOnIC power appears most terrible whenIt predommates m any man.. . These are not alwaysthe most excellent men, neither In rrund nor in talents,they are seldom to be commended for theu klOdness ofheart; but an Immense power emanates from them.. . . All moral forces combIned are powerless againstthem, it is 10 vam that the more lucId among mankindtry to cast SUspiCion upon them as victims of delusIon,or sWllldlers, for the masses are attracted to them. Seldom or never do they encounter thea match amongtheir contemporaries, and they can be conquered onlyby the UnIverse Itself, against whIch they have joinedbattle.'

(3) Goethe describes the demoruc as an objectively121

THE PERENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSO~HY

effectlve power; he circumscribes it by naming its contradictory phenomena. Kierkegaard sees the demonicexclusively in man. DemonIc is the man who desires toassert his self absolutely. Kierkegaard elucidates thisconception of the demonic by throwing light on theSelf and Its possible perversion.

'Demonic is that mdividuality which without intermediary (hence its imperviOusness to all others) standsin relation to the idea entirely through himself. If theidea is God, the indIvIduality is religibus; If the idea isevil, it IS demonic In the narrower sense.'

In so far as the demoOlc (In trus narrower sense) isentirely lucid, It IS the Devil. 'The Dev1l1s solely mindand therefore absolute consciousness and lucidIty' (itis charactenstic for Goethe's wholly dIfferent Interpretation that Mephisto IS not demonic, because he ismerely totallucldlty of Intellect, and negative). But infact, the demOniC In man cannot be lUCid. Lucidityarises in the self through ltS absolute relation to God,not through absolute relation to itself as absolute self.

The demonic and the divllle are to be sure incomprehensible: 'Both are SIlence. SIlence is the artifice of thedemon, and the greater the silence, the more terriblebecomes the demon, but SIlence is also the testimonyof the divine within the mdIvidual'; the demOniC, likethe religious, places man outSide the unIversal. ButsubmersIon In the darkness of the demonic has itsopposite 10 boundless Illuminatlon before God. To belost in the demOniC paradox is the opposite of beingredeemed in the chvine paradox.

12.2.


The demonic as the stubborn adherence to one'scontingent self is a desperate desue to be oneself. 'Themore consciousness there is m such a man, the morepowerful, the more demoruc his despair becomes. Aman torments himself in some sorrow. He throws hisentire passlOn into this very torment. Now he desiresno help. He prefers to rage agamst everything, hewants to be the man who has been unjustly treated bythe whole world, by hfe. In this despair, he does noteven WIsh to be himself In stoic self-renunciation, hewants to be hImself in hatred of the world, himself inhis wretchedness. In rebelling agaInst the whole world,he supposes that he has a proof against it, against itsgoodness. The desperate man imagInes that he llimselfis that proof, and that IS what he wants to be, 1n orderto protest aga.lnst all the world with thIS torment.'

This demoruc WIll, though llltensified by consciousness, cannot become lUCId, It can only preserve itself mdarkness. Consequently It forces Its way into consciousness and at the same time strengthens all the forces oflOner occlUSIon. For It struggles agaInst revelation.Hence the dialectic of revelation and occlusion: 'OccluSiOn can desire revelatIon, but It must be accomplIshedfrom WIthout, it must befall It. It can desire revelationup to a certaIn degree, but would lIke to withhold acertaIn remnant, so that the occlusion can begIn afresh.It can desire revelation, but Incogmto (m certam poets).Revelation can already have conquered; but at the lastmoment occlusion ventures a last attempt and is shrewdenough to transfonn the revelation into mystification,

123


and then it has won the day.' 'The question is whethera man desires to know the truth in the profoundestsense, to let it permeate his whole bemg, to accept allits consequences, or whether he reserves a last hidingplace for himself in case of need.' The demonic is cunning at self-concealment. For this it makes use of thedialectical, in which it veils itself 'with the demomevirtuosity of reflection.'

Since the demonic has no support in itself, it cannotpersevere. For in its occlusion It cannot endure silence,'and in the end the unfortunate forces his secret uponeveryone.' But at the same time he is afraid to revealhimself: 'In confronting one who is superior to him mgoodness, the demomc man can plead for himself, hecan plead for himself lU tears that the other should notspeak to rum, should not make him weak.'

The true hall-mark of the demomc man, who haswithdrawn lUto his aCCidental self as lUto the absolute,IS that he can take nothing senously. 'He does not wishto think seriously of eternIty; he IS afraid of It, and hiSfear finds a hundred evasions.'

(4) In the recent period the word demonic has beenused vaguely and superficially for all dlSturbmg thingsthat evade definitIon-for the 'irrational'. The unwtlledthat emerges unexpectedly from the realizatIon of thewilled is called 'demomc', The 'demomsm of technology' is the overpowering and seemlUgly spontaneousreaction arising from the attainment of technologIcalmastery of life. Thus the unconscious is also calleddemonic, when something that is not and cannot be

U4


clearly understood rises out of the depths of the psychiclife of man to dominate him. Helplessness, absence ofwill, involvement, hopelessness, the sense of beingoverpowered-all these can call forth the epithet:demonic!

All four of these originally meaningful modes ofspeaking of the demonic, from mythical objectivizauonto the mere metaphor, from the behef In a real force inthings to an insight Into the perversion of man's freedom, have been cut off from theIr roots and have beenabsorbed, pell-mell, In modern demonology, whIch isone of the forms of unbelief. This demonology IS ashard to apprehend as Proteus, it IS a nothIngness thattakes on constantly new dIsguises and in its multlforml ty makes use of all the old twists of the demonic.

Consequently, philosophy can speak against thisdemonologism only when It can be defined and heldfast for a moment 10 certam typical experiences. Acrmque of demonology can then be formulated In thefollowmg propositions:

(I) It mISses transcendence. It IS precIsely transcendencethat demoOlzation with Its undue stress on immanentlife does not achieve. Without God, only idols remain.The gods themselves have become world. They partlcipatc In the Impotence of the world, they are under thesway of something other, something absolutely allen,the VOId.

(2) Man is lost. In demonologlsm freedom is merelythe acceptance of the fate that seIzes upon man. Mancan, to be sure, be happy in the success of his hfe under

115


favourable circumstances-with an occasional melancholic recollection of the uncertainty of existence-butwhen excluded from worldly happiness he is wretched,and in misfortUne he can only be empty and despair1Og.There prevails an inner indIfference and matter-of-facthardness toward the unsuccessful or those Smltten by amisfortune from wruch there is no issue. The Individualman has no irreplaceable value. The Sptrlt of humanityis reduced to an Inner dIsposition to behave humanelyunder certain circumstances, It IS not an awe before thesoul that IS rooted In eternlty by its relation to transcendence, before man as such.

(3) No relation to the one IS gamed. There IS rather afragmentation, a diversity of conception. Man splItsinto his potentialities, taking up one to-day and anotherto-morrow-life becomes forgetfulness. Life with thedemons becomes a flux, a dissolution 10 the Indeterminate. This unbelief cannot be grasped 10 Its authenticmeaning, for it 10terprets ItSelf always dIfferently. In It

we are at the mercy of the stream of· Impulses andpassions that rend us to plcces. Everythmg can bejustified. Despite the power of the given moment, continUity IS lackIng. Desplte the IntensltT of the affirmatIOn, inner concentration IS lacking.

The ascent to the transcendence of the one has alwaysbeen accomplIshed through the conquest of demonology. Socrates wrested hImself away from the demonsin order to follow hIS daimomon and in it the divinecommandment. The prophets conquered the worshIpof Baal, in order to serve God.

126

PIDLOSOPHY AND ANTI-PHILOSOPHY

(4) Demonology is submerged in nature. Nature is regarded as the ultimate, all-embracing necessity. Thebeasts are demonic. And man feels demonic in so faras he is like a beast. Where demonologism 1S dominant,man loses his sense of distinction from nature. Whenthings go relatively well, demonolog1sm takes the formof trust in nature. But trust 10 nature 1S not trust inGod. When the trust in nature 1S frustrated, what isleft of it loses its moorings. Trust in nature becomesidolatry, such as was once pract1sed throughout theworld in the nature cults.

(5) Modern demonology is purelY an aesthetIc attitude.Characteristic of tlus 1S the urespons1b1lity of demonicthought. It is contemplation of supposed reality, ratherthan fulfilment of one's own reality. It 1S an escape intoaesthetic1sm accompamed by an obscure desire for theIndetermmate as the mediUm best sU1ted to a perverseself-assemon. Tlus makes possible pasSion as momentary emotion, but bars the way to the passiOn of theltfe-sustaming, unswervlngly persevenng deciSiOn.Here 1t becomes poss1ble to demand a dec1S1on betweengood and eVil, but to reduce any such dec1sion to impotence by recogruz1ng evil 1n the tragic. A constantconfusion between the etrucal and aesthetic is madepossIble. Fust one speaks with moral pathos of goodand evil, then aesthetically of the demonic. Whenevera situation is w1thout issue, one is permitted to leapfrom the ethical to the aesthetic. Man no longer needcommit himself, because for every sItuation he has astock of aesthetic Images with their illusory grandeur.

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LIfe IS fragmented into the multiplicity of the contingent.

(6) Demonology sets up an intermediaryform of being thatis neither empirical reality nor transcendent actuabty. Itstrives to apprehend reality but misses it, deludingitself instead with a supposed supersensory sphere:even the knowable becomes obscured. It deSIres thesupersensory, but mIsses It in the belief that it IS immanent: it loses God. But everythIng that is not eitherworld (as demonstrable reality) orGod IS deception andillusion, and particularly when our urge for edIficationand sensation is divided Into a torrent of passIOn andintoxication. There IS God and the world and nothIngin between. All realities can be the language or messengers of God, by virtue of their symbolism, but thereare no other gods beSIde God, there are no demons.The essential here is how I discern the finger of Godat the ltmlts of reality. What thrusts Itself between meand God, appears to be materIalIstic folly or godlessraving.

DEIFICATION OF MAN

For men to heap fulsome reverence on an indiVIdualman, to elevate him to the superhuman, to see the Idealofhumanity realized In him, IS a universal phenomenon.Men tend to submit blindly to such an indiVidual, toexpect wonders of him. Consider for example thatmotIon picture stars must travel Incognito to aVOidbeing crushed by the crowds, or that Gandhi was

128


obliged to protect himself systematically from 'darshanseekers' (darshan means the sIght of a saInt). And incenturies gone by when kmgs showed themselves tothe people, the slck were cured.

The delfication has its effects on the man who isdeified: men torment the man they regard as holy tomake him act In accordance with thea ldeal. Theyexpect hIm to submIt, they exhlblt hIm, as It were, andhe must be avaIlable. There IS In the masses an aVIdltyfor a cult of man. As though the object of dClficatlOnconferred a certaln tranquIllIty by hIS mere presence,just as the queen bee keeps the hIve In order by herpresence.

The most eVIdent form of human power IS represented by rulers and generals. The self-wIll and generalIndISClphne of men leads to the appearance of thetyrant who does vlolcnce to thcm all. He who does notobey the law out of freedom, succumbs to the compulsIon to obcy an extcrnal force. And then the astorushlngthIng occurs. The tyrant, tl1IS lnstrument of evil for therestramt of eVIl, becomes an object of deIfication.Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon and others make the!!way through hIstory as Idols. They were Indeed menextraordinary for theIr uger-hke energy, theu presenceof mllld, theIr unernng reahsm, theu memory, l11dustry,and Instinct for cvcrrthl11g conducIve to dOmInatIOnand power. Even In their hfetlme they were magmfied,either in that they declared themselves to be God or theson of God, or acceded to the desues of the crowd andused them as an lllstrument of power. The tyrants

U9

1'HE PERENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

become gods. Alexander became the son of God, theRoman god-emperors enforced the official state cult oftheir numen. Even where thIS superstluon is cast off,we are still confronted with manifestations of irrationalobeisance, and we see human idols as an object ofsecular veneration. It IS always extraordlOary howeasily the actual facts concerning the deified individualsare evaded, veiled, reInterpreted.

And tyrants are not the only men to be deIfied.Many an anCIent plulosopher was demOnIzed or heroized. To-day, In a world of fadIng cultural values, thereis a remnant of this attItude m the blInd veneration thatis accorded to great men and charlatans. Both arelooked upon as absolutely unassaIlable. The tendencyto make myths of such figures 15 meradicable.

It is true that a man wIll not readIly proclaIm hImselfas a god, unless he IS mad or does so for polItical purposes. He is more lIkely to claIm the uOlque dlsunctlonof speaking God's message. He alone IS called to do so,and thiS gIves him a claIm to the reverence of men.

The deification of man IS also a factor In the shaplOgof great re1iglOns. But the mterpretation then IS suchthat there IS no deification of man at all. The case inquestion IS differenttated from all other mstances of thedeification of man, whIch IS condemned as such.

Why the deIficatIon of man?There IS 10 man an mcl1Oatlon to seek a perfect man

who will 10 a sense be for hIm what he hImself wouldlike to be but cannot.

The deification of man cannot dIspense with an

13°


authority in the world toward whom absolute obedIence(not relative obedience to laws, officIals, Institutions) ISposSIble In the sense of obedIence to God; It rests onthe need for the physical, tangible prOXIlTI1ty of thedistant, hIdden God.

Sometimes the deification of man functions as a substitute for faith, an absurd faith that tnes to regardItself as authentic. Most characteristic of thIS actualunbellef 1S perhaps Its inSIstence that all men beheve InIts object; It is fanatical, unlOVIng, angry, It finds Itintolerable that others should not have the same faith.Let all men worship what I worship.

Fundamentally, the deification of man IS one kind ofdemonology. As the godless seize upon demons as asupposed transcendence, so do they also seize uponlivmg men and make gods of them.

Regardless of the motives WIth whIch the deificationof man IS assocIated, regardless what sublIme formsand profound mterpretatIons It may take on, It is at theroot a fallacy. Philosophical faith unmasks it 10 everyform. It never for a moment forgets the finiteness andunfinIshed character of man. It holds firmly to God'scommandment not to confound HIS Identity, not tosnatch him by means of falsehoods out of the concealment to whIch he Will only return the more resolutely.It demands of man that he dare to stand Immedtatelybefore Him and await what He WIll say. 1fan shouldnot withdraw from HIm, by conceiVing a man as anabsolute, by ltstening to that man instead of God or asthough he were God. Man IS subject to the hard com-

13 1


mandment to bear up wIth the world's emptiness, inthe realization that God IS not present like somethingor other in the world. Only In this austere sItuation ISman free to hear God when God speaks, only then doeshe remain ready, even If God should not speak, onlythen does he remain open to the reality that IS historically manifested to him.

There is in the world no man capable of belng Godfor us, but there are men whose freedom In hearingGod encourages us by showlng us what IS possIble formen. W'e cannot seize the hand of God in the flesh, butwe can seIze the hand of our comparuon m fate.

The delficauon of man dlshonours man by makIngthIngs easy for hIm. It gives hIm the tangIble, whereasit is lus situation in the world that he must do withoutthIS tanglblhty, and mstead find only hIeroglyphs andImages along the road by whIch he can, and henceshould, come to hImself through God.

NIHILISM

While demonology and the delflcauon of man offera substitute for faith, open unbehef IS known as nihIlism. The mhihst ventures to appear without dIsgUIse.For him all contents of faIth are untenable, he hasunmasked allmterpretations of the world and of beIngas delusions; for hIm everything IS conditIonal andrelative; there IS no fundament, no absolute, no beingas such. Everytiung IS questionable. NothIng IS true,everything is permissible.

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Nihilism can only eXIst In one who lives by impulsesofvitality, love of life, wl1l to power. By affirming these,mhilism cancels itself out In favour of a vital faith.

Or it is really senous In its expenence of the vOld.I can feel nothmg, love nothmg, respect nothlng. Mysoul is empty. The nihl1lstic Idea justifies me In thIS,

tells me that I am right.Or a boundless dIsappointment causes me to expen

cnce the collapse of evcrythmg In willch I havebelieved-the dIsloyalty of one I loved, the betrayal ofthe state leadership, the falSity of statements proclaimedas authontatlve. The course of the world shows howeverythmg that once was accepted as true varushes In

illuslOn. The mhlllstic Idea sets out to prove to me thatmy expenencc IS no special experience, but reveals thewhole of bemg.

But the mhlhstlc Idea can negate only when It startsfrom somethmg recogruzed, measured by which nothingness, dlsllluslOnment, betrayal, the he, Illusion aredIsclosed. In order to speak, mhl1lsm requires a fundament which, If f(~allv apprehended, would cancel outmhlhsm m favour of the positive value represented bythIS fundament. Consequently, the method of radIcalmhlhsm conSIsts In first rejectIng everythIng on thebaSIS of standards regarded as self-evident, and thencaUSmg everythmg to val1lsh In a smgle whul ofreciprocal negation.

Let us cxanune a few eXJmples of mhIhstlc negation:(I) There IJ 110 Cod -For the eXistence of God, the

creator of the world, IS not proved, there IS not even a

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suggestIon ofa proof to show that It is even possible orprobable.

The premise of thiS negation is the validity of what ishere recogruzed as the possibility of proof, to wit,factual statements about something present in theworld, and rational proofs of firute thmgs by finitemeans. Hence thiS negative idea treats questIons oftranscendence like questIons dealing with finite thingsin the world; and it does not even touch upon what IS

intended in statements about God, SInce It takes theircontent as a factual statement about somethlllg presentin the world.

(z) There IS no rdaflonsbip bctwcctJ God and man.-Forsuch a connection cannot be experienced and IS notexperIenced, because there IS no God. What IS represented as such experIence rests on psychologIcal delusions and the mistaken Interpretation of experrence.

The premise In this negation is the factuality of experience in the world. It IS hypostatIzed as BeIng per se,parucularly III the form of empIrical knowledge thatthe temporal and spatial process reveals a recurrent,regular pattern. But the eXIstentIal experIence of freedom is demed.

(3) There 1J no obl;~~atlOn toward God.-For this obligation is in fact only subjection to laws and decrees eXIsting in the world. Here obedience IS possible, contIngentupon the power and prestIge of the authOrItIes In

question.The premise III thIS negation is the absolute character

of such authOrIties in the world. It IS on the baSIS of

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this premise that the profound, absolute, life-sustainingobligation IS denied, which can nowhere find so comfortable a support In the decrees and laws of man.

These examples reveal a pOSItiViStiC mhIhsm. It seemsto regard being as identical with empincal existence,which can be fully known, in the tnvlal sense of thisterm. But If there IS nothing, then this emp1flcal eXIstence, in so far as It is posIted as absolute, is alsonothIng. On the basis of such positivism, mhIllsm concerns Itself With the ordenng of human lIfe, under thepresupposltlon that such an order can be denved fromthe knowledge of empmcal reahtIes.

For example: sex relatIOns are to be regulated according to prinCiples of hygIene With a view to realIZing theaim of a happy hfe, Without further religIOUS or ethIcalconsIderatIOns. The premise here IS the absolute character of a mere lIfe. But It IS untenable for two reasons:'happmess' cannot be clearly defined (not to mentionIts fragIlity In every form), and POSItiVIStiC regulatIOn ISIn fact unsuccessful.

In these cases llIhllIsm, at first concealed, makes itsappearance only when the uncfltlcally accepted latentpremIse (namely, that our hOrIzon IS lImIted to emp1flcal knowledge, current value Judgments, effiCienttechmcal devices) becomes conscIous and hence untenable. The negations are then retained but in additIOnthe mInimum of truth that IS always premised 1ll thenegatIOns IS also neg:ueJ. Again we have the whirlpool,agaIn there IS no firm ground but only the mearunglessvltahty of the moment, with ItS unthinkIng ImmedIacy;

13~


man IS surrendered to the natural process, to the levelof which nihihsm, in simplifymg itself, descends.

QUIte different from thiS mhllIsm, which mIght becalled the ruhIhsm of the Philistines, is the nihilismonginatmg in horror at the realIty of the world and ofhuman life. The idea of God Itself-the Idea of Godand goodness, love, truth and ommpotence-becomesa standard by which to condemn God and the world.

If God desIred truth-tills hne of thought runs-Hewould have created man and the world dIfferently.Hence God IS either not omrupotent or not good.

Throughout hIStOry we hear the desperate accusatlons of man agamst God. 1t IS not God but an eVIldemon to which this world owes ItS existence. And In

mhthsm these accusations collapse: the object of accusation IS lacking, there IS nClther God nor cvl1 demons,thmgs are as they are-there IS nothing but thIS worthlessness and deViltry of human eXlstcnce.

InterrelatIon of the three forms of Il!lbe/;ef: Demonology,the deIficatIOn of man, and ruhlbsm belong together.Just as the true IS onented toward the one, even thoughthe one truth IS never vIsible, so docs the fragmentationof antI-phIlosophy seem to arrive at an analogy of theone, 111 so far as m It the posltlons reciprocally produceone another.

Nihiltsm IS mtolerable. It seeks evaSIons 111 demonology and deificatIOn of man. Here It finds a footmg.But the mhlhstic cltmate remams. Hence there IS m thearea ofdemonology a kind of urge toward nothIngness,a conjuring of forces out of t he VOId.

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Where man is hardened to the nothlUgness and doesnot despair, life becomes a life wIthout hope. There ISeither poverty of soul and InsensIbility, or a pretensIonof herOism, which, however, SlUce It knows itself anddehberately acts Itself out, IS only a herOlStIC gesture,not existence.

The deIfication of man IS a kmd of escape fromruhlhsm, yet IS Itself covertly ruhIlIstlc. It must lead todisillusionment when the deified man IS livmg andviSIble, a contemporary. Then the realization that theman is after all nothmg but a man, dnves one all themore resolutely mto mhillsm. And from the outset, thedeification of one man serves as a means of despismgall others. These others arc demed all nghts, are used asmatenal and expenJed.

Tmth tfl each oj the tbree jorms: It IS the task of phIlosophy not only to reject, but at the same tIme toacknowledge the truth m what has been rejected.

Demonology contalnS a kernel of truth, namely, thaton the empltlcal plane transcendence cannot be perceived duecdy but only In signs whIch need to bedecoded. The fedll1g that sensible reahty has a nonsensIble substratum, that the face of thmgs and eventspOUlts to a hIdden meamng, IS not wIthout Justification.Mythological categones contam a truth that stnkes uswith Irresistible eVIdence when the chaff IS separatedfrom the grain. To Ignore thIS truth, is to Impoverishone's soul, to create a vacuum. A man who has lost hisear for such language seems no longer capable of love.For If the transcendent has become entirely nonsen-

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suous, it no longer holds for him an object of love. Itmay be true that such an abstraction can supply nourishment to a unique love in the empirical world, and thata love so nourished remains pure and IS safe from error.But deprived of a tangible, sensuous expression of thetranscendent, man also runs the nsk of losing hImselfin the worldless, the Inhuman, the alien. Althoughdemonology is untrue, man can and should dIscern theIpeech of God in His Images and hieroglyphs andshould not be deterred by the fact that In obJectlvizingformulation, thiS speech IS utterly ambiguous. It is notonly the weakness ofour finite nature, but also our loveof the world as the creation of God, that forbids us toroot ourselves exclUSively In a sensual transcendence,except In extreme transltlonal cases.

The delficatlon of man contaInS In dIstorted formthe truth that In the world the only authentic thmg forman is man. There IS somethIng In man that makes It

possible to say that God created man In HIS image; butthat man fell away from God and consequently m everyman as man the Image of God IS veIled. Great men arefor those who come after them orientation and model,object of veneratIOn and pOSSible road to resurgence,even though they remain men wtth their defiCienCiesand failures, and hence can never he an object ofimitatlon. It IS a free relation of man to man when forthe mdlvldual there eXists a hfe-sustammg histoncalbond With certain mdlvlduals, grounded m traditionand fulfilled 1fi love.

In nihilISm something IS expressed that the man of

13 8


integrity cannot overlook. In the realtty of the world,despair is inevitable in extreme sItuations. Every faithmust explore the possibIltty of nothIngness. No faithmay arrogate to Itself a certaInty on which objectiverehance can be placed. SInce faith IS always a rIsk, agIft, It must be constantly aware of the nihIlIstic threat,lest It succumb to the temptatwn of pnde, to which Itso often has succumbed when It has become ossified.

NIhIlism differs from the demonology and deification of man Into whIch It escapes: mamfest milllism isirrefutable, Just as conversely no faIth IS demonstrable.Those who, when confronted by the tcrnble absurdIties and Injustices of the world, do not acknowledgethem In theIr full realIty, but pass over them wIth analmost automatic matter-of-factness by means of talkabout God, sometimes seem less concerned with thetruth than the mluhst hImself. Dostoievsky speaks ofthe torture and murder of Innocent chIldren. What kindof beIng, world, God IS It, whIch makes this possIbleand permitted? The man who has suffered horror andwho for ever after goes through the world WIth hateand mdlgnatlon, .U1d lust for revenge, IS assuredly themost difficult neIghbour. He hImself in turn inspiresfear and horror. Agamst hIm rise up the Instmcts ofself-preservation that would destroy hIm hke a madman. Just as a man can fall Into madness throughnature, so through other men can he fall Into thishorror that makes hIm completely mhilistic. We do notassent to thIS, we do not recognize that he has thisright, but declare that evl! remaInS evil even when it

139


occurs as a continuation and reaction to a precedingevil. But we become unable to believe in a harmony ofbeing. Boundless pity, silent perplexity, hopelessnessmust overcome us. It is more justified to ask: how is itpossible that we do not all of us become ruhilists?than to overlook the expenences that can lead tonihilism.

And yet all my lectures arc an attempt to ward offnihilIsm. I speak precisely of what I have just seemedto reject, I speak of God. Hence my reserve. I havenothmg to proclaim. Each of my lIsteners retams theright to examme for himself, not simply to follow thestatements of the lecturer, but rather to take them as anencouragement to strIve for hIS own certainty.

And so I venture to say once again that demonology,the deification ofman and mhilism carry out m differentways the same fallacy, the fallacy of attempung to apprehend the truth at one stroke that mIsses the goal. In thepresence of the smgle proposltlon: God IS, the wholefallacy must vanish like mist beneath the sun. But thenust presses upon us, for m short-sighted attempts tograsp It we apprehend somethmg tangible, concrete,visible-wlule if the truth remams mtangible and mvisible, it seems to dissolve into nothmgness. Thus wecan reach the truth only by the detour of worldhness,we succumb agam and agam to those fallaCies, and Dalyin transcending them are we able to perceive the depthof our authentic bemg, of godhead.

God is the most remote of all thmgs, he is transcendence; all attempts to absolutize anythmg else are mere

14°


shortsightedness. But what God, transcendence is, canbe discussed Indefirutely, can be cucumscnbed withnegations, but never really apprehended.

CONNECTION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY

AND ANTI-PHILOSOPHY

FaIth IS attained through unfaith. He who does notknow the expenence of unbelief, cannot attam a fauhthat IS conscious of Itself

The same 15 true of anti-philosophy. It must not besimply discarded. It is not somethIng superfluous,accidental, neghglble. It IS a frontier reglOn of philosophy, and a tranSltlOn wlthm phllosophy. But It IS atthe same time somethlng that IS rejected in belngtranscended.

Transcendence seems to be accessIble by all roads.There IS truth on the roads of antI-philosophy, yet eachof them leads to a specIal fallacy: demonology to thefallacy of superStltIOn and aesthetlCISm; deIfication ofman to the fallacy of confUSlng God and man; ruhlhsmto the despamng, hating, emptiness of a contmgencydissolving in chaos.

All three can as transltlon, as language, or as a spur,perform a function of truth, but In becorrung definttIveand fixed, they turn to fallacy

So far we have spoken of contents of unbelIef as anantitheSIS to phtlosophy. But the Instruments ofruhihstlcand of dogmatic anti-phIlosophy are categones wIDchare rooted In the very nature of the matter, wIDch

141


appear inevitably and require methodical and consciouselucidation. A logical discussion of the philosophicalmodes of thought, which are a methodically developedtranscending, and of the modes of object th10king andfixatlon on which phl1osophy runs aground, wouldhave to show what truth is and what form it takes.

The truth is simple, the false IS mamfold. The truthhas coherence, the false is scattered. The truth is Infinite, the false IS endless. Truth bUilds upon itself, thefalse destroys itself.

Truth IS the prunal source of our thinkmg and themeasure of the false. An inventory of the posslblhuesof the false could be drawn up only by the gUidance ofthe true, from which it anses through adulteration,perversion, transposlt1on. Here we shall give no suchinventory, but only a tentative ltst of the forms of anuphilosophy.

(I) AbsolutizatlOl1: The fallacy consists 10 Isolat1Ogand poSiting as absolute someth1Og that IS vahd at onelevel of be10g or of thlOking, that IS vahd from certampoints of view and 10 certatn respects, that has partlcular validlty.

Since knowledge IS always clrcumscnbed 10 meaning, Slnce furthermore all proof presupposes a reference to a firute thing wlthm the world, statements onbeing as a whole, e.g. concerrung the world as such,are false, in so far as statements standmg unequivocallyby themselves, demonstrable, and havlOg a definitivemeaning are 10 questIon. Demonstrable IS only theindemonstrabillty of universal statements, e.g. con-

I4a


cerning the world as a whole, whether they be negativeor positive.

V) Ontology: Ontology purports to be a doctrIne ofbeIng itself as such and as a whole. In practice, however, it inevItably becomes a particular knowledge ofsomethIng wuhIn being, not a knowledge of beingItself.

In truth there IS only the elUCidation of the Comprehensive; thiS elUCidation IS never completed, neverdefinitive, It leaves a margIn of Indeterrrunacy; andthere IS a UnIversal methodology and system of categories of the IntelligIble. Both take the place of ontology, which always passes by the truth.

Ontology, even when 1t Includes God, IS ultlmatelya doctnne of Immanence, of the subSistIng, not ofBeIng but of the EXIstent, In SO far as It IS known byman. True philosophy mu,>t not be confused WIth thISontologIcal perverSIOn of phtlosophical elucidation.Philosophy does not leave the area of the ComprehenSive, does not forget the process of transcendIng that ISInseparable from It, remaInS open to the being that cutsacross time, the beIng that thought apprehends as theactual presence of etermty In histoncity.

(3) EII/Pt)' reflectIon: ThiS IS the name we gIve to thethinlung which progresses endlessly, carried along bythe abstract categones, Without reference to contents.ReflectIon questIOns, but only In the movement ofnegatIon, shunmng ImmerSIOn In the prImal source andthus never transcendIng Itself. Thus It merely dissolvesall the given, all fixed goals. This endless annihilation

143


may, for example, take the form of a superficial accusingirony, understandable from psychological motives; it isunconscious of, and indifferent to, its own origin.

(4) Dogmatic professions of faith: Since all existentialrelations to transcendence are dialectical, any definitestatement IS false as regards Immediate content. Certainty is found in dialectical movement, not in securingthe title deed of a thing through logIcal formulation.

When creeds are made absolute, they become a kindof banner. They are the rallYlOg pOlOts, the SIgn ofmembershIp 10 a group, the badge of an enthusIasm,a battle emblem.

(5) The credo quza absurdllm: The premIses of formallogic are valId only In the sphere of the knowable, I.e.with regard to Ideal mathemaucal objects or cogentexperimentallOsights. It can be shown phIlosophIcallythat thIS knowledge does not exhaust beIng: thiS IS donethrough the antinomIes, through speculauve expressIonin paradoxes.

But it is both false and reckless to attempt expressIonin the forms of object knowledge of the empmcally orlogically Impossible as a truth postulated by relIgIOn.Such an attempt results in a complete perversIon ofmeaning. Instead of assertIng objectIve unfathomableness, we assert the pOSItiVe ImpossibIlIty of an objectthat IS defined 10 words; 10 the name of openness toextreme hOrIzons, thought dIsavows Itself; the abIhtyto hear (whIch IS a mark of love of truth) IS replacedby a sacrtJitiull" tntelleetus (whIch marks contempt fortruth).


These forms of anu-plulosophy exempllfy peculiartranspoSitionS, toward which we are at all times inclined:

(1) The fanaticism for truth that becomes untrue: As thedarkness from which we emerge 15 Illumined, wedevelop a desIre for unhmlted integnty. We feel impelled to elUCidate, Justify, motivate everythlllg. ThereIS nothlllg that should not be questioned and examllled.An enthUSIastic love for truth IS wllhng to run any nskJust for the sake of truth.

But tlus Impulse seldom remains pure. The love oftruth becomes assocIated wJth a sense of superiorItyand power, and soon there develops a combativeness,a deslfc to destroy and torment Hate exploIts seeminglove of truth as a weapon.

ThIS occurs all the more eaSIly because the questionof the meamng of truth-a questlon by no means easyto answer-Is In thIS case from the very outset unclarified, indced unasked. And so an amazlllg thInghappened: the man of the Enhghtenment became insincere. He could hypocntlcally Invoke truth, whilefighting for earthly lllterests, and was able to pourforth bathos about the truth In neurotic helplessness.

In particular, tnauthenttc fanattclsm for the truthpresupposes pseudo-aXioms, which take variOUS formsaccordIng to the Situation, for example: the worldcould be well ordered proVIded there were clear understandIng and good will; the truth can have only goodand deSirable consequences; one must tell the truthunder all Clfcumstances and at all tImes. Or conversely,

K 145

THE PBRENNIA L SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

after disillusionments, one might say: the world iscorrupt; truth is useless, it merely destroys; one mustconceal the truth and find the expedient, useful lie. Thusfanaticism for the truth attains its climax when out ofsupposed integrity it favours the lie. Such false totalassertions serve in fact as an escape from authenticeffort in behalf of the truth.

(2) The abandonment of dialectical circlmg: On the basisof formal alternatives, a tendency arises, instead ofreahzing the meaning of an idea wIth all its tensions,polarities, dialectical movements, to apprehend it in astraight, pragmatic line. The consequence of this is notmerely that one nusses the goal, but hfe Itself isparalyzed.

ThIs can be understood on various levels of analogy.The psycho-physIcal process IS Itself a cIrcular process,the rudiments of whose structure have already beendisclosed to research: in the psycho-physical functionsof motor activity, speech, locomotIOn, work, perception, respiration, evacuation, sexualtty. Where the purposive WIll and With It attention Intervenes, there canit is true be an increase in activity, but there can also bea radical disturbance. For the circular process, the lettmg oneself go in activity, the passive 10 the active,must always remain the foundation.-In the psychologIcal sphere, there IS a continuous union of oppo~1tes.The voluntary occurs only In the Involuntary, tensiononly along with relaxation, the conSCIOUS thought process only with the unconSCIOUS collaboration of inspiration. Where a state ofaCtiVIty occurs WIthout relaxation,

146


the result is hysteria. The will itself conceals within itthat which cannot be willed, for realization it reqUIresthat which It does not will. I cannot will will.-In theexistential sphere man is himself only when he is givento himself in his selfness. Freedom is a self-bestowal bytranscendence. Tills freedom is not expedience, notobedience to a calculated duty, not forced activity, buta will detached from all compulsion, and this Will istranscendent necessity.-Thus psycho-physical order,psychological naturalness, eXistential freedom, aremodes of real1zatlon which cannot be apprehended interms of clear-cut alternatives. Whatever our consciousness strtves to attain In rectihnear purposiveness remains dependent upon them.

The sacnnce of this fundament 1fi favour of rationalfixations of nrute goals, artses from lack of courage,from unwIllingness to run nsks, from the intellect'slove of comfort, from :l need to find secunty In the unequivocal, from the habit of Violent short-cuts inculcated In us by modern psychology. Then we seek arefuge at the POInt where life ceases and the voidmenaces, and it IS there precisely that our Intellect presumes to find the most relIable hold.

(3) Tbe confJlslOn of tbe CO/J/prehensll'e 1J'Ith tis partIcularo~ectlvlzatIOI1: Philosophical thought ames from an inward disposition of the soul to stuve for self-awareness In thought, hence for obJectlvity and communication.

In our understandl11g of plulosophlcal writings,it is essential that we partake of tills basic aspIration.

147


We must through thInking come to thIS fundamentwhich is the Comprehensive principle, by whichthought came into being, but which itself can never bean adequate object of thought. This fundament can bedIscerned by philosophical appropnation: in ItS depthand plenitude, in ItS emptiness and scantmess, in itsfragility and dIstortion. It IS a fundamental fallacy toconfuse the tangible content of Ideas, their definiteobjects, the sensible character of the eXIstent-to confuse all these partIculars WIth the ComprehensIve. It ISonly with the Comprehensive that authentIc communication, attractIon and repulSiOn, begl1l. Everythingsusceptible to objective statement IS on the other handmerely the language of the underlymg seektng attItude,and as mere language, It turns to nothIngness when thesource from which it arose vanishes. Thus man candelUSIvely fill his emptiness wah a language that ISmerely handed down, and a position contlfigent on thepractIcal interests of the moment can make a resplendent but Illusory cloak of old Ideas.

PhIlosophical thought grows out of the Comprehensive. Anti-phIlosophy stands always on the solid groundof a partlculanty and objectivity that It chooses at Will.It falls from the flUid eqUilibnum of hVlfig philosophyinto the stable banality of rauonal dIrectness, or evaporates in vague enthUSiasm.

\Vith this I conclude my diSCUSSion of the antiphilosophy wmch we reject but in which we arenevertheless always involved-agamst which we remamdefenceless if we do not consciously know it-whIch

148


we do not despise but which we must look in the facein order to know ourselves-and for this reason wemust never over-confidently suppose that we haveovercome it.

149

Chapter Six

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE

PHILOSOPHY STRIVES TO apprehend eternal truth.Is this truth not always the same, the one andwhole truth? Perhaps-but we do not gaIn

possessIon of it in an uneqUIvocal and unIversally validform. Being reveals melf to us only In time, the truthis revealed only in its temporal mamfestauon. But thecomplete truth IS not objectively acceSSIble in tIme.Neither man as an indIVIdual, nor history can apprehend It otherwise than in ephemeral manuestatlOns

As an IndIVIdual, each of us reaches the end of hIShfe without really knowlllg what IS. He achievesnothing definItive, but remains on a road whIch merelybreaks off and ends in no absolute goal.

The labour of philosophy IS a kInd of parable for allour aCtiVIty. Just as we come to the POlllt where wecan really start phtiosophizIng, says Kant, we mustleave the whole bUSIness In the hands of the begmner.That is what every philosopher who has not congealedin the possessIon of the truth must feel when he growsold. It is the feeling of 111tellectual youth 111 the sorrowof leave-taking.


But is life for the future the essential tmport of ourwork? I do not beheve so. For we serve the future onlyin so far as we realize the present. We must not expectthe authentic only from the future. Even though thispresentness cannot in fact attam to durable consummatlOn, in which I can rest and endure in ttme, it isnevertheless possible in penetrating tms actuality topenetrate In a sense the eternal present In ItS temporalmanifestation. The actuahty of the truth in time IS, tobe sure, as Impossible to capture as an optical unagebut it IS always with us.

Thus our Me 111 hiStory IS two things at once: thehfe that serves, and creates a baSIS for, the lIfe of thoseto come after us-and the Me that cuts across history,the bfe 11l actuahty as such, onented toward transcendence, that hberates us

This hberatlon In ItS completeness erases time. ButIf there IS such hberatlOn, It IS Incommu1l1cable, exceptIn art or In the spcculattve Idea, or In the rehglOus cult,or l1l lofty moments of harmony between two humanbeIngs-and m every case It IS questionable for subsequent reflectIon, that knows only of its outwardmanIfestatIon.

If history IS the revelatlOn of being, the truth ispresent l1l hl~tory at all times and never, It is always inmovement, and it IS lost when It appears to have become a defirutlve possession. Perhaps the truth IS mostprofoundly manifested where the movement IS characterized by the greatest upheaval. To-day we can attemptin the lIght of the past, to achieve awareness of the

151


specific conditions that determine our lives and thefuture. The questions arise: Are we to-day involved ina profound revolutionary transition? Are we movinginto a world of new possibiliues? Are we faced withchallenges raised by thiS very situation?

We all of us are aware that our era has altered thecourse of lustory more radically than any other eraknown to us. It seems comparable to the unknown agein wluch the first fire was kmdled, m which tools wereinvented, m which the earhest states were established.The new facts are: modern technology with Its consequences for man's workmg methods and for socletythe uruty of the globe created by modern communications, whICh have made the earth smaller than forexample the orbJS ferrari/ill of Roman days-the absolute limit represented by the smallness of our planetthe antmomies of freedom and effective actIOn, personality and mass, world order and Impenum-the crucialimportance of the lflcreased population, transformedfrom nations mto masses, seemmgly enabled to understand and partiCipate in developments, but actuallytransformed mto slaves to be made use of-the breakdown of all past Ideals of order and the need for findmga new human order to save us from mountmg chaos-the questionableness of all traditIOnal values, WhiChmust prove themselves or be changed-and further:the concrete political SituatiOn, determined by theworld powers, the Umted States and Russla-an Internally torn Europe, dimInishIng m size and thus farunable to find itself-the awakemng of the vast masses

15 z


of Asia, on their way to becoming crucial factors ofpolitical power.

The course of events has led us from an era ofbourgeois contentment, progress, educatlon, whichpomted to the hIstorical past as proof that It hadachieved security, Into an age of devastatlng wars, massdeath and mass murder (accompamed by an mexhausttble generatIon of new masses), of the mostternble sense of menace, an age m whIch humamty ISbelOg extmguished and chaotic dlslOtegratiOn seems tobe the master of all dungs.

Is all thIS a spmtual revolutiOn, or IS it an essennallyexternal process, ansmg from technology and Its consequences?-A catastrophe and an Immense, as yetunclear possIbIlIty, somethmg whIch WIll be merelydestructive until man awakens and becomes able to

react to It, until, Ill!o>tcad of unconscIously renouncmg,he discovers hImself amId the utterly new condItionsof hIS cXlstencc?

The pIcture of the future IS more uncertam and unclear, but perhaps both more proffilsmg and morehopeless than ever before. If I am aware of the task ofhumanIty, not wIth regard to the ImmedIate reqUIrements of eXIstence, but wIth regard to eternal truth, Imust inqUIre concernIng the state of phIlosophy. Whatshould philosophy do 111 the present world situation?

To-day there IS a de facto mhllIsm In numerousforms. Mcn have appcared, who seem to have abandoned allmwardness, for whom nothing seems to haveany value, who stagger through a world of accident

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from moment to moment, who die with indifferenceand kill with mdifference-but who seem to live inintoxicating quantItative conceptions, in blmd mterchangeable fanatlCISmS, dnven by elemental, irrational,overpowenng and yet qwckly passing emotions, andultimately by the instlnctual urge for the pleasure ofthe moment.

If we listen to the words that are uttered amtd thistumult, they seem lIke a veiled preparation for death.Mass education has made men blind and thoughtless,capable ofeverything in theu drunkenness, until finallythey accept death and killing, mass death in mechanized warfare as a matter of course.

But the most lucid philosophy also alms at enablingman to face death. Philosophy seeks to find a basis onwhich death IS to be sure not intellectually accepted,but borne In the turmoil of suffenng, not wtth stoicism, but with a lOVIng :Ind confident ImperturbabIlity.

It 15 seldom that eIther IS successful In a pure form.ThIS ruhilIsm lIves by mystlficauons, the unmasking ofwhich exposes man to despau, unless all has prevlOuslybeen lost In dull indIfference. And thIS philosophy is nosecure possession, It must be achIeved each day anew,and abandons one again and again. The result IS anintermediary state between mhIhsm and phllosophya man who has not entirely succumbed to mhilism butdoes not yet partake of phIlosophy. And here frightening situations arise. I shall cite two examples, occurrIngin the year 1938.

As was then the style, a young man was speaking of

q4


the empire that was to be founded. He seemed to befull of enthusiasm. I interrupted him with the question:What meamng has tills empue and the war that isexpected to lead to it? Answer: Meaning? No meaningat alll Those are Just thmgs that are commg. What canhave meaning IS at most that in a battle I bring mythIrSty comrade water at the rIsk of my bfe.

On 9 November 1938, a student, who was a SAleader, took part m the anti-Jewish pogrom. He toldhIS mother about it. He had carried out the action asmildly as possible. In one house he took up a plate,threw it crashmg to the floor, and cried out to his comrades: I hereby state that thiS house IS demolIshed, andleft It without having demolished It. But he went on torelate that the day had made a great and encouragmgimpresslOn upon him; he had seen what forces lIedormant In the people and of what the people werecapable; th1S seemed hopeful for a corrung war. He expounded the new ethiC and the greatness of the Fiihrer.HIS terrified mother Interrupted hIm: My boy, youdon't belIeve that yourself. For a moment he wasspeechless, but then said resolutely: No, I don't beheveIt, but one has to beheve It.

The first young man found a footing in the simplesthumanity, darkened however by the ImperIal climate,even though he saw through ItS nullIty. The second tookseriously the saymg: What matters is not what youbeheve, but that you believe. ThiS IS a wonderful perverSlOn. FaIth becomes a faith In falth. To this correspond a number of attitudes that attempt to be nihilistic

In


and positive at the same time: One wants to be braveand dispense with all meaning. hence one represents acalculated meaninglessness as mearung. One preaches'useless service' as an accomplIshment-the sacrifice ofeverything. but for nothing-one preaches the impassioned affirmanon of anytlung at all, fanatical determmation for notlung. One seizes upon old words likehonour, patnotism, loyalty, but at the same time saCrlfices everythl11g to the maclune, to orders from above,to terror, thus showl11g that all those words were mereprops. One develops an Iron mask, within which oneremaInS tense, always at the edge of explosion, anabsolute without content.

There are many beaten tracks of escape from thisdespair:

One sings the praises of 'dynamism' at any prlce,one exults in motion as such, one deSires the new andthe destruction of the old. One admires all the greatmen of VIOlence: Genghls Khan, 5luh Huang Tl,Agathocles, and those who have always been admired:Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon.

Or conversely, one praises the return to the past.The primltlve as such has charm and eternal truth,whether one IS refernng to the prehistonc era or to thelives of modern primitive peoples. Or one admires theMiddle Ages, the great static orders, the empires thatimposed their style upon centunes.

One stnves for a new myth, sets up a crude one Inthe dictatorial movements. or a more subhme one ineducated circles wluch make a cult of Holderll11, van

q6


Gogh (or even of theu epigoncs). Here it is forgottenthat those great men were wonderful exceptions, thatIn most cases theIr authentIcIty was bound up withruinous madness. The real mythIcal presence in themis extraordInarily ImpressIve In thIS unmythlcal modernworld. Holderlm's pure soul is mdeed unforgettable,its myth is enchanting, to enter mto Its sphere IS a JOY.But all thIs IS no true myth, it IS authentIc only In theseindiVIduals, It has no bndge to socIety, and hencesuddenly becomes as nothingness.

And there IS always the beaten track of the rehgIOusdenonunatlons. When everything IS confounded m thewhirl of unmeamng, they show theIr steadfastness. Inaccordance wah the freedom-shunning spmt of thetimes, they alternate between anarchy and dIctatorship,revealIng to-day thel! unhmtted orthodoxy, theIr aimof commandIng man's complete fealty-but WIthoutbemg able to restore what religIOn once was: a forcepervading thc whole of lIfe and all everyday Me, frombuth to death-the sphere m whIch everythlllg happensand by virtue of which man IS always at home. To-dayrelIgIon, too, has become a specIal sphere, a SundayaSide from and outSide of normal Me.

These rellglOns with thcu atternatlve 'either ruhllIsm or revelation' reject philosophy. PhIlosophy ISreproached as shanng the gUilt for the evil of themodern soul, as Its Intellectuallllstigator.

But it IS not only from those who WIsh to force usInto revealed faith wah their alternat1\'c, that we hearabout the end of phIlosophy. The end of philosophy

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was proclaimed also by the National Socialists, whocould not tolerate the independence of philosophicalthought. Philosophy was to be replaced by biology andanthropology. And in addition, every form of nihilismcondemns philosophy as a world of 1llusion, of vaindreams, of feeble self-deceptions. For nihilism, bothreligion and philosophy are at an end. Only the manwithout illusions, WIthout roots and without aim, isregarded as free. Furthermore, there IS a WIdespreadpubhc 0pIOlon which looks on prulosophy as at leastsuperfluous; for philosophy IS held to be blind to thepresent, Its forces and movements. What IS the use ofPhllosophy? It is asked. PhIlosophy does not help. Platowas unable to help the Greeks, he didn't save themfrom going under, In fact he contnbuted lndlCectly totheir decline.

All negatlons of philosophy ongInate In somethIngoutside of philosophy, either In some definite contentof faith that might be endangered by phllosophy, or In

practical aims for which philosophy is useless, or In amhilism that rejects everythmg, and hence also phtlosophy, as worthless.

But In philosophical effort somethIng takes place thatis not seen by all those who reject It: In It man rediScovers rus pnmal source. In thIS sense, phIlosophy ISabsolute and without aIm. It can neither be justifiedthrough something else, nor on the baSIS of utility forany purpose. It IS not a girder to support us or a strawto grasp at. No one can have philosophy at his dIsposal.No one can use it as a means.

15 8


We venture to assert that philosophy cannot ceaseas long as men are liVIng. Philosophy upholds theaspiration to attain the meamng of hfe beyond allworldly purposes-to make mamfest the meaning thatembraces all these purposes-eutung In a sense acrosslife to fulfil thIS meamng by actual reahzatlOn-to servethe future by our own actuahty-never to debase manor a man to the level of a mere tnstrument.

Our enduring task m phIlosophIcal endeavour ISto become authentic men by becoming aware ofbeing; or, and this IS the same thmg: to become ourselves by achlevmg certainty of God. The fulfilmentof thIS task has certam traIts that remain always thesame.

To-day as at all tImes we must do the work of thephIlosophical craft: develop the categones and methodsthat constltute the structure of our basIc knowledge,onent ourselves m the cosmos of the SCIences, assinulate the hIstory of phIlosophy, practtse speculauvethinking m metaphy-slcS, and apply the elucidaungmethods of eXistential phIlosophy.

The aim of phtlosophv IS at all tImes to achieve themdepmdeme of man as an mdtvidual. ThIS he gams byestabhshmg a relation to authentlc beIng. He gams independence of everythtng that happens In the worldby the depth of hiS attachment to transcendence. WhatLao-tse found 111 the Tao, Socrates In the dIvme nussion and 111 knowledge, JeremIah In Yahweh whorevealed hImself to hIm, what BoethlUs, Bruno, SpInozaknew: that was what made them independent. This

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philosophical independence must be confused neItherwith the sovereign arbmanness of libertinism, norwith the vital energy that defies death.

At all times the task is marked by this contradictIon:independence is to be found in aloofness from theworld, in renunciation and solttude-<.l1; m the worlditself, through the world, partiCipating In the world,but without succumbmg to It. Then the phtlosopher,who desires hIS freedom only with the freedom ofothers, his 11fe only in commUnIcatIon with men, ISwhat the fool called COnfuCiUS: 'That IS the man whoknows It'S impossIble and yet carnes on'-a truthapplYIng to the finlte knowledge that absolutlzes ItSphenomenahty, but a truth that does not shake theprofounder truth of phIlosophIcal faIth.

Philosophy addresses Itself to the l11divldual. Inevery world, in every situation phIlosophical endeavourthrows the mdlvldual back upon hImself. For only hewho is himself-and can prove hImself In sohtudecan truly enter into commUnIcation.

Now, can we, WIthIn these endunng tasks of phllosophy whIch I have formulated, say somethl11g of ItSpresent rrusslOn?

We have heard that faIth in reason is at an end. Thegreat step taken in the t\\'entleth century, It IS said, 15

the falling away from the lo,f?,os, the Idea of a worldorder. Some exult In the conSClOusness that hfe has beenliberated-others castigate thIS great betrayal of themind, this catastrophe that must lead to the destructIonof humanity.

160


On this point It can be said that the step 10 questionimplies an element of truth, because It destroyed theself-assurance of an Intelhgence forsaken by reason, unmasked the illuslOn of a world harmony, ended ourrehance 10 the rule of law and in laws as such. Thesewere high-sounding words behind which was hiddenthe sordidness of a hfe that was disclosed by psychoanalysIs This psychotherapeutic movement broadenedInto a pseudo-phIlosophy which took ItS partlal truthfrom Its relatlon to and dependence on a corruptage

\\ hen all tlllS 1S sloughed off, the root lies bare. Theroot 1S the pnmal source from Wh1Ch we grew andwblch we had forgotten In the tangle of OpInIOnS,hablts, Ideological formubs.

To-dav our ta:-.k IS to hnd In eXistence Itself a newfoundatlon for reason That IS the urgent task In thesplfltual ~ltuat1ondefined by Klerkegaard and ~letzsche,

PJ.scal and DostoieVskjIts fulrilmenr cannot consist In the restoratIon of

wh:lt has been To-day 1t would seem to Imply thefollOWing clements'

(1) \\'e seek peace of mInd by keepIng ourselvesconstantly alert.

(z) \\'e pass through mhlhsm to the assl1mlauon ofour tradition.

(3) \X'e seek the pumy of the sCiences as a premIsefor the truth of our philosophy.

(4) Reason becomes a boundless deSire for com

munication

L 161


(I) We seek peact ofmind by keeping ourselves constanf(yalert.

Peace of mind is the aim of philosophical thought.Amid the greatest devastation, we should like to be

cenain of what remains, for that is everlasting.-Indistress we reflect upon our primal source.-Amid thethreat of death, we seek a thought that wIll make ussteadfast.

Even to-day philosophy can give us what Parmenidesknew when he buIlt a shrine to the god In thanksgIvingfor the peace of mind that had come to him throughphilosophy. But to-day there IS so much complacency.

It is a ternfying fact that to-day, despite all the upheaval and devastation, we are still In danger of hVIngand thinking as though nothIng really Important hadhappened. It is as though a great mIsfortune hadmerely disturbed the good hfe of us poor ViCtimS, butas though life mIght now be continued In the old way.It is as though nothIng had happened. Fearful or helpless or enraged at the moment, we accuse others Anyone who feels in thiS way IS sull caught 10 !lnares thatmake possible only a delUSIve peace of mind. ThIS peacemust be transformed into unpeace. For the greatdanger is that what has happened may pass, consideredas nothmg but a great mIsfortune, Without anythInghappernng to us men as mcn, WIthout our heanng thevOice of transcendencc, without our attamIng to anyinsight and actIng with lOSJght. A tremendous decreasein clear awareness would then cause us to sink Into anarrowed existence.

16z


For the present situation and the future, we may takeas a prototype for orientation, not for imitation, theage of the Jewish prophets. Caught between East andWest, between the great empires of Babylorua andEgypt, Palestine suffered its political decline, torn anddevastated, a polltlcal plaything of the great states, incorporated now m thIS one and now m that. Thenprophets appeared with good counsels, Palestine mustally itself either with East or West, thus to obtam protection and friends, and to live happIly. In OppOSItiOnto these prophets of salvatlOn arose the prophets ofdoom, who have retamed their great name to thIS day.They saw the sltuatlOn and rejected any pOSItion infavour of East or \'(:est. They foresaw the Impendingdoom. But they did not see it as an accIdental eventbrought about by supenor war machines; they saw inIt a profound meamng that went far beyond itS particular mal11festatlons. It 1S God who unrolls the worldlIke a carpet. He causes the Assynans to subject peoplesupon peoples, and take them from their homes as onetakes birds from thel! nests. He gUldes the course ofevents, men and states serve hIm as lnstruments, dOingwhat they are intended to do, Without suspecting thatIt is m accordance WIth God's Will. The prophets whospoke thus deSired to :l\vaken their people and later allmen. Thev had but one counsel: to obey God bv lead-

• • J

ing a pure, ethIcal hfe. \V'hat IS of the world IS madefrom nothmg and is nothmg ill lt5elf. The meamngresides 1n what man does, In 1m obedIence to God.And God's wIll IS stated m the lnvlOJable ten com-

THB PERENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

mandmenrs. What God willed beyond them at anygiven momentt the prophets believed that they receivedfrom Him in revelatl0nt and this they communicated.But it remained ambiguous. God does not speak tomen directly. An enormous humility in non-knowledgeis necessary. Jobts questIons find no answer. The highpomt of humility is the aged Jeremiah.

We are far from helng prophets. The greatness ofthat age cannot be irrutated. But by a companson between the SItuations It might well be possible to Indicate what spIrItual unpeace might now be In place, andwhat son of peace the soul might seck.

The last century does present an analogy to theprophets. Klerkegaard and Nietzsche, In their dayseized with c1a.trvoyancc and horror at the course ofmankInd, are to-day stlll essential for our fundamentalexperience. Eyen now their goal, of makIng us trulyawake, is not yet achieved.

But they themselves were exceptions, WIthout bClngprototypes. To follow them is to go counter to thetrown will, and is Impossible for anyone \'\ihn understands them. They were at the same tIme YlctIms andprophets of the epoch. Both contrIbuted the profoundest truth, Inseparably bound up with strangeaffirmatIons that remain alIen to us. Klerkcgaard gaveus an interprctation of Christlamty as a faith of theabsurdt a faIth of the negative deCision according towhIch to choose no profession, to concludc no marriage, and to be only a martyr IS to be an authenticChristian-a.n interpretation which, where adopted,

164


means the end of Chrisuanity. NIetzsche gave us hisideas of the wIll to power, the superman, and eternalrecurrence, which though they have no doubt gone tosome people's heads, are as unacceptable as what wemight call Kierkegaard's excessive ChnstianIty.

But most of the refutations of Klerkegaard andNietzsche that have been wntten up to now, are basedon misunderstandIng and constitute a kmd of inVItation to continue sleeping. They comnbute tnvlal commonplaces calculated to remove the thorn that wasstuck m our consclcnce by Klerkegaard and NietzscheBut there can be no authentic development of phIlosophy In the future, that does not effect a fundamentalevaluation of these two great thinkers. For in the decayof their own work and the sacnfice of theIr own Itfe,they have revealed to us the Irreplaceable truths. Solong as we continue to indulge In a false peace of mInd,they remain an IndIspensable summons to be alert.

(2) IFe pass Ihrol~!',h mhtllSm to an assimilation of tradllIon.

If we rcfuse to be complacent, It means that nihilismIS actual 3.S a posslblltty of our own experience. W'eknow the decay of yahd norms, we know how precarrous the world becomes when no falth, no collectiveself-comclOusncss commands adherence. A few menhad such cxpenence even In NIetzsche's time, somehave had It slOce 1933, others more recently, but to-daythere is ~carcely a thoughtful man who has not had it.Perhaps we are now coming to the point at WhICh we

165


are ready to hear the message conveyed by all historicalepochs ofcultural breakdown, the call of their tlunkers.Nihilism, as intellectual movement and as histoncalexperience, becomes a transition to a profounderassimilation of historic tradItion. From an early time,nihilism has not only been the road to the pnmal source-nihilism is as old as philosophy-but also the acid invlhich the gold of truth must be proved.

From the begInmng there has been somethIng irreplaceable in philosophy. Through all the change Inhuman circumstances and the tasks of practical life,through all the progress of the SCiences, all the development of the categories and methods of thought, It 1Sfor ever concerned wlth apprehending the one eternaltruth under new cond1uons, with new methods andperhaps wah greater posslbIlJues of clanty.

It is our task to-day, amid the most extreme mhilism, to ascertam thIS truth once morc. ThiS presupposesthat we ass1m11ate our trad1tJOn: It 1S not enough thatwe know it externally, that we merely contemplate It;we must possess it Inwardly as our very own.

To ach1eve thIS, philosophy proper must, amongother thIngs, reject the 1dea of progress, which is soundfor the SCIences and the implements of philosophy.The advocates of thiS 1dea falsely belIeved that whatcomes later must supplant what comes earlier, as In

ferior, as merely a step to further progress, as haVingonly histoncal interest. In this conception the new assuch is mistaken for the true. Through the discovery ofthis novelty, one feels oneself to be at the summit of

166


history. This was the basic attItude of many philosophers of past centuries. Over and over again theybelieved that they had transcended the whole past bymeans of something utterly new, and that thereby thetime had finally come to inaugurate the true philosophy.This was the case with Descartes; in all modesty andwith the mo~t justIficatIon Kant held thiS same belief;it was held in arrogance by the so-called German idealiStS, FlChte, Hegel, Schelling; and then again byNIetzsche. And tragedy was followed by Satync drama.The publica.tion in 1910, In the first fascicle of Logos, ofHusserl's article on phIlosophy as an exact SCIence, inwhIch, speak11lg as the most Important, becausesupremely consistent representative of hiS department,he proclaimed that the defirutive pnnciples of philosophy were at last securely established, created a cleardlvldlOg lIne between the partisans of progress and theothers. Despite all thclr respect forthe rational disClplineof thiS phenomenology a.nd of Neo-Kantlarusm, somethinkers camc out aga11lst these claims, and returned tothe tradltlonal quest for eternal truth, which IS theessence of philosophy, considenng that the new wasquestionable and not worth stnvl11g for. Yet even so,thIS tone of aggressive novelty surV"lved and If I am notmistaken IS only now on the wane. The Idea of progress was a form In \VhlCh the expenence of the pnmalsource was misconstrued as the hlstoncally new, because philosophy confmed itself With modern science.In addltlon, the deSire for domlOatton, power and prestige took possessIOn of philosophy. Philosophy is some-

167

THE PER.ENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

thing entirely different from what it appeared to be 10

such deviations: ever since man became phl1osoplucallyconscious, he has realized the presence of eternity 10 theactual. To tear oneself away from the hIstorIcal fundament in favour of something new, to make use ofhistory as a quarry, from which to take material forarbItrary interpretations, that is a road that leads intothe abyss of ruhIlism. \'\"e must neither subject ourselvesto hypostatlzed marufestatlons of the past, nor irresponsIbly remm'e ourselves from it In the enjoymentof contemplating what has been, but above all we mustnot tear ourselves away from the histoncal fundament.But if we have done so, 11lbIlIsm WIll, by a paInfuloperatIOn, bnng us back to the authentic truth.

Out of 11lhIhsm there was born a new fund:lmentalapproach whIch tcaches us to take a dIfferent view ofthe hIstory of phIlosophy. Three thousand years of thehistory of philosophy become a~ a Single present. Thediverse phIlosophical strucrures contaIn WIthIn themselves the one truth Hegd was the hrst who strove tounderstand the unity of tl1lS thought, but he slllliookedon everythIng that had gone before as a prdll11lnarystage and partial truth leadIng up to hIS own philosophy. But the essential thIng IS that we asslmtlate thephtlosoplucal attaInments of e\'ct}' epoch by remainingIn constantly renewed communIcation WIth the Rfeatachievements of the past, 100k1Og upon them not astranscended but as actual.

If we succeed In establIshIng a lOVIng contact WIthall philosophical thought, then we know that our

168


present form of philosophy also stems from the primalsource, we know how IndIspensable IS the uruversaltraditIOn, the memory wUhout which we would smkinto the nothmgness of a mere moment wuhout pastand future. In our temporal tranSIence we know theactuality and sImultaneity of essential truth, of thephtlosophla perennis which at all times effaces time.

(3) U,"'e seek the punty of the sCIences as premISe for ourphtloJoph!cal thOl(~ht.

The premIse of the technology that IS revolutioruzmgour lives IS modern SCIence. But the effects of tlussCIence extend much farther. ThIS SCIence represents aprofound turnmj.; point 111 the history of mankmd, butunlIke technology, It IS fully known only to few men,and cven fewer actIVely participate In It, whereas themass of mank1l1d goes on liVing 111 pre-scIentific formsof thought and makes use of the results of SCIence asf()rmcrly pnmltl\'e peoples made use of European tophats, Albert chams and glass beads.

,\fter the crude begInnIngs made by men of earlIerepochs, particularly the Greeks, It has been the modernera, ~lOce the end of the MIddle Ages, that first appliedrc.11ly unlimited ImlUlf)', accompanIed by boundless~c1f-cntlclsm, to cYef),thlOg that happens and canhappen 10 the world.

SClenee proceeds methodlCally, It postulates universal acceptance, aod 10 so far as thIS IS the case, It does infact obtaIn unammous consent; 1t IS crItICally aware ofItS methods it systematically venfies the whole of ItS',. ,.

169


inventory at all times, it is never finished, but lives in astate of progress whose goal IS unforeseeable. Whateveris manifested in the world, science makes into its object. It sharpens and clarifies our consciousness of theexistent, and it provides the premIses for the practicalrealization of goals that It does not prescribe, but whichin tum become an object of Its inquiry.

Science is a necessary precondItIon of phIlosophy.But the spiritual situation that has arISen as a result ofSCIence has presented phIlosophy WIth dIfficult newtasks. Former epochs were not as clearly aware of theurgency of these tasks as we arc.

(I) SCIence must be made absolutely pure. For In

praCt1cal operatIon and average thInkIng, It IS shotthrough WIth non-scientific assertIons and attitudes.Pure and strIct sCIence In ItS application to the wholesphere of the existent has been magmficemly achlcvcdby lOdIvIdual SCIentists, but on the whole our spmtuallife IS far removed from It.

(2) Superstlt/oliS be/ref In scimce must be exposed to thelight of day. In our era of restless unbelIef, men havesnatched at sCIence as a supposedly finn foundat!on, settheu faith in so-called SCIentIfic findIngs, blindly subjected themselves to supposed experts, belIcved thatthe world as a whole could be put in order by SCIentificplanning, expected sCIence to prO\'lde 1Ife alms, wluchsCIence can never offer-and expected a knowledge ofbeing as a whole, whIch IS beyond the scope of sCIence.

(3) Phtlosophy Itself must be method'ca1b' re-clarified. Itis science In the age-old and endUring sense of metho-

17°


dical thought, but it is not science in the pure modernsense of an inquiry into things, leading to universallyvalid, cogent knowledge, identical for all.

The fallacious identificauon ofphIlosophy and scienceby Descartes, a Illisconception m keeping with thespuit of these last centuries, has made science intosupposedly total knowledge and has ruined phIlosophy.

To-day the punty of philosophy must be gamedalong wIth the punty of SCIence. The two are mseparable, but they are not the same thmg; phIlosophy isneither a speclaltzed SCIence along with others, nor acrownmg scIence resulting from the others, nor afoundatIon-laYing SCIence by whIch the others aresecured

PhIlosophy is bound to SCIence and tlunks m themedIum of all SCIences WIthout the punty of sCIentlfictruth, the truth of phIlosophy IS maccessIble.

SCIence has Its own realm and IS gUIded by phIlosophIcal Ideas whIch grow up In all the SCIences,though they themselves can never be sCIenuficallyJustified.

The modern aspIratIon for conSCIousness of truthhas become possIble only on the basIs of the scIencesof the last century, but it has not yet been aclueved.The work reqUIred for Its realtzation is amongthe most urgent needs of the present historicalmoment.

In OppOSItIOn to the dIsmtegratIon of SCIence Intounrelated speCIalties, In opposiuon to the scienuhcsuperstItIon of the masses, m opposItion to the super-

171


ficiahty brought upon philosophy by the confusion ofscience and philosophy-scientlfic research and philosophy must join hands to gUlde us on the path ofauthentlc truth.

(4) Reaso!1 becomes Ihe desire for bou!1dlesJ COIIJII1II111

call0n,

Through the secure vahdlty of a common pnnclplethat permeated all everyday life, there was, almost untilthe present time, a cohesion among men which rarelypermmed commurucatlon to become a special problem. People could content themselves with the sayIng:we can pray together, but not talk together. To-day,when we cannot even pray together, we arc at lengthbecoming fully awan: that humaOlty lmpllcs unreservedcommu11lcation among men.

Mamfested helng IS fragmented by tbe multlpltclty ofour sources of faith, and of the hl~tonc.ll form of ourCOmmU11ltles, each With Its o,'"n specIal background.The only things we have Identically In common arcsCience and technology as retlected In the general categanes of the understanding. '1 hese however arc unitedonly In an abstract, u11lversal cnnsCl()Usne~s, In practicethey serve both as weapons and media (If commUl11CUtlOn.

Everything real 111 man IS hlstof!caJ. But hl~toflClty

means also multiple hl~tonclty. Hence the r()~tulatc~

of true commumcation are:(1) to become concerned with the hlsroncally differ

ent WIthout becoming untrue to one's own hlstonclty-

172


(2) to reveal the relatIVIty of scientific truth, whilefully recognizing its just clalms-

(3) to abandon the claIm offal th to exclusiVI ty becauseof the breach of communIcation It Impltes, yet WIthoutlOSIng the absoluteness of one's own fundament-

(4) to take up the ineVItable struggle WIth the hlStoncally dIfferent, but to sublimate the battle In theloving battle, III communIcation through the truth thatdevelops when men act 1n common, not as abstractIndlVlduals-

(5) to onent ourselves toward the depths that aredIsclosed only WIth the dl\TISl0n Into mamfold hIStonCltlc~, to one of which I belong, but whIch allconcern me and which all together guIde me to that~ource

Phtlosophlcal faith IS Inseparable from completeopenness to commUnIcation For authentIC truth ansesonly \\There faahs meet ID the presence of the ComprehenSive Hence It is true that only beltevers can realtzecommU11lCatlon -On the other hand, untruth growsout of the fi>..ation of contents of faIth that merely repelone another. Hence It IS ImpOSSIble to talk WIth fanatlcs. PhIlosophIcal faith sees denltry In every compulsion to break off communicatIon and In every deSIre tobreak off commUI1lcatlon

ThIS phIlosophIcal faIth In commUnIcation has beencalled utopIan. Its crItICS argue that men are not so.They are moved by their paSSIons, their WIll to power,their competlng practical lfiterests. Commu11lcatlonnearly always faIls, and most certainly falls WIth the

173


mass of men. The best solution, according to this view,is to subordinate men to conventions and laws, whichserve to veil the general indiscipline and villainy, bothof which exclude communication. To expect too muchof men IS the best way to ruin them.

In answer to trus we may say:(I) Men are not as they are; they themselves remain

question and task: all total judgments concerrung themsay more than we can know.

(2) Communication in every form is so much a partof man as man m the very depth of hiS bemg, that itmust always remain possible and one can never knowhow far It Will go.

I (3) The Will to boundless communicatIon IS not aIprogramme but the very essence of philosophical faah-and from a stem the particular purposes and methodsIof communicatIon at alias levels.

(4) Boundless openness to commUnication IS not theconsequence of any knowledge, It IS the deCISIOn to

follow a human road. The Idea of commUI1lcatIon isnot utopIa, but faith. Each man IS confronted with thequestlon whether he strt\'es toward It, whether hebeheves In a, not as In somethmg other-worldlv, butas in somethIng utterly actual; whether he beheves In

our potentialIty really to li\'e together, to speak to

gether, through this togetherness to find our way. tothe truth, and hereby finally to become authentIcallyourselves.

In our present distress, we understand that communication is the fundamental task before u~. The

174


elucidation of communication from its multiple sourcesin the modes of the Comprehensive IS becommg acentral theme of phIlosophIcal endeavour. But to carrycommumcatlOn in all ItS possibilitIes closer to realization, is the daily labour of philosophy.

Index

Caesar, 129, 156CalvInism, 102Categones, 30-1China, 8, 26, 70, 110'Chosen people', 97Chnst, 7, 43, H, 88-9, 92,

94, 97, 102-4Chnstlamty, I ~, 92Chnstians, 83, 88CICero, 26Cogrntlon, 7CommurucatlOn, 48, 91, 160,

173,174Comprehensive, 14, 16-20,

22, 24, 2~, 31-3, 4~, 47,67, II3, 143, 147-8, 173,175

ConfuclUs, 110, 160ConsclOusness, 18, 20Cruelty, 91, 118Cult, 96, 10~, 108

Dacque, 60DarwIn,61Dasein, 17Death, 66

177

Baal, 80, 126Babylonia, 163Bcdt:, ~ 2.

Bemg, 17, 2.0, 30, 31 , 3~

BeIng-there, 20, 29, 31,48Bible, 41, 81, 82, 93, 9~ If.,

104, I09-IOBiblIcal rdlglOn, 83, 88, 91 ff.Boethlus, II, 26, 1~ 9Bruno, GIOrdano, 10, I 1,89,

159Buddhism, 110Burckhardt, Jakob, 86

Absolute, the, 37, 65Absolutism, 93AbsolutlzatlOn, 142AesthetICism, 39, 141

Agathocles, q6Alexander, 129, 156Amos, 96, 97, 100

AntI-philosophy, 9, 1 I ~ If.Anstotle, ~ 2

4'\sla, I ~ 3Assynam, 163Augustme, St., 5;, 55,71

INDEX

Deification of man, II 6,136-40, 141

Deism, 79Demonic, the, 1 19Demonology, 9, 98, 117,

II8-zo, 121. 126-8, 136-7,139, 140, 141

Descartes, ZI, 167, 171Destruction, I I7-I 8Deutero-Isaiah, 43, 103DevIl, the, I I 9, 12Z.DIonysian rites, 80Dogma, transformation of,

107-8Dostoievsky, 139, 161DynamIsm, I 16

EcclesIastes, 43, 98, 101Egypt, 163Eltjah, 100Enltghtenment, I 10, 14~

Epistemology, 8Europe, 112.Evolutlon, 62.ExclusivIty, 88, 92 , 94ExIstence, 19-10, 29, 37, 39,

40, 4z, 48, 66Existent, the, 143Ezektel, 100

Ezra, 101, 10Z

Faith, contents of, 34 If.;narure of, 9 If.; rehglous,84, 106

False, the, 142

Fate, 66Fears, 81Fichte, 167Freedom, 68, 71, 7~, 147Fuhrer, 111

Galileo, 10, 89Genglus Khan, 116Germany, 36God, eXistence of, 34-6God-man, 1°4Goethe, 121, 12.2

Greeks, Greek thought, 41,43> 13, 80-1, 169

GUIdance, 71-3

Happmess, 16Haubach, Theodor, 36Hegel, ;6, 167, 168Hierocracy, 103HistorICIty, 4 2 , 44Holdcrltn, 1 ~6-7

Hosea, 96Busserl, 167

Ideal[s], 69, 70Idols, 125

Immanence, 116, lIS, 143ImmortalIty, 20

ImperatIve, 36-7IndIa, 110

IndIan rehgion, 41, 83WOlty, 6~

Intuiuon, 116Isaiah, 80, 100

INDEX

Israel, 97, 10.1Islam, 88, 9~

JeremIah, 80, 8.1,97,98, 100,1~9, 164

Jerusalem, 96Jews, 88, 9~, 99, 10ZJob, 43, 98, 101, 164Jonah, 97Judaism, 102.

Kant, 14, 34, 36, 38, ~ I, 69,71, I ~o, 167

Klerkegaard, I ~, Z4, I ZZ,161, 164-5

Lao-tse, 110, 1~9

Law, 98LeVIticuS, 10ZLogiC, 8I....ogos, 2.7, 30, 3I. 160Lord's Supper, 83,96Love, 35,98,1°5,137-8

Man, 5° If., 57 If.Mark,97ManlJsm, 61, 69Mass, the, 96Melancthon, lIZMemory, zoMIcah, 8oMichelangelo, 100Middle Ages, 156, 169MInd, 18, ZO, 2.1

Mirandola, PICO della, ~ 5Monotheism, 80-1, 95Moses, 97, 100Mystagogy, 117

Napoleon, I Z9, I ~ 6NatIOnal religion, I0Z-3National Socialists, I ~ 8Nehemiah, 10ZNew Testament, 9z, 9h 10.1Nicholas of Cusa, 84NIetzsche, 109, 161, 164-~,

167NIhIlIsm, 7, 8, z7, 43-4, 46,

80,98, I 17, 132.-40 , I ~ 3-4,158,161,165,166, 168

Nlmveh,97

Old Testament, 53-4, 80-1,9~, 10Z

Ontology, 143

PalestIne, 163Parmemdes, 162Pascal, 56, I 6 I

Passion, 101, 118Paul, St , n, 71Peter, St , 54-5PhzJosophza perennrs, z5, 77,

176Plato, ZO, 108, 158Platomsm, 26Pneuma, 103Pogrom, 1~ 5Portmann, 58

INDEX

Power, II8Prayer, 42, 43, 8z, 83, 98Preyer, 60Priests, 98Prophets, 126Psalms, 101Psycho-analYSIs, 67, 69

RacIal theory, 61, 69RatIOnalIsm, 9Reason, 45-8, 85Rembrandt, 55RCyelatIOn, 83-4, 157RussIa, 15 zRuth, 101

SchellIng, 20, 167SchlcIcrmachcr, I j

SClcnn:s, thL, 7-8Scnptures, 10~

SeculanZ2tlOo, 84Sermon on the :;\[oum, 92ShIh Huang TI, Ij 6Slmmel, 1185rfllpbClfJIflluJ, 61

Sm, 54, 98Socrates, II, I z6, 159SophIsm, 100SpCUSlppUS, 26SpInoza, 159StoIC, 70, 71Subject-obJect dIChotomy,

z9

Suffering, 42-3, 44SuperstItIOn, 9, 23, 44. 67,

85,87, 1°7,116,141,170

Talmud,102Tao, 159Ten Commandments, 72,

163Torah,97TraditIOn, 24-6Transcendence, 17-18, ZO,

21, 29-31, 34, p-8, 41,45, 47, 64-7, 71, 74, 81,103, 1I6, 1I8-19, 126,13',137-8,144,147, Ip, 162

Truth, 29, 45-8, 89-9 1, 9',98,101, IOj, 108, 110-II,137, 141 , 14 j -6, 15 1

l"I~l!,rrrfend(', dar, 14C nltltl State,-, I P

LOltY, urge for, 19l'pamshads, 110

Van Gogh, 156-7VIrtue, 9!lVltallt\, I I 8

\XIII to Power, 91World, 17, 37-9, 40

Yahweh, 96, 97, 102, 119

180

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THE PERENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY · THE PERENNIAL SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY meaningful aims in the world and teach us methods of achieving them. For apart from the sciences, it is said,