The Perils of Policing for Profit

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Beacon Center of TennesseeP.O. Box 198646 Nashville, Tennessee 37219 (615) 383-6431 [email protected] www.beacontn.org

Founded as the Tennessee Center for Policy Research

PolicyBriefMarch18,2013

No.13-01

ThePerilsofPolicingforProfitWhyTennesseeshouldreformitscivilassetforfeiturelaws

byTreyMoore&ScottSumner

IntroductionImagine living ina society inwhichyou

are guilty until proven innocent. Thenotion turns the concept of Americanjusticeonitshead.Yet,thisscenarioplaysoutdailyacrossTennesseebecauseofthestatescivilassetforfeiturelaws;and,toooften,innocentpeoplebearthecost.Under the states civil asset forfeiturestatutes, law enforcement officials mayseize personal property, including cash,based upon a mere suspicion that the

property is related to a crime. Undercurrent Tennessee law, no standard ofprobable cause is required to seize andhold private propertya hunch is all ittakes.Even worse, this practice shifts theburden of proof to property owners.Often, innocent property owners find itmoreeconomicaltosettleforafractionofthe seized propertys value instead of

fightingtheseizureincourt.Becausecivilasset forfeiture laws allow local lawenforcementtoretainseizurestopayfortheir units operating expensesincluding payrollthese laws inherentlycreate perverse incentives in lawenforcement.

PolicingForProfitUnder Tennessees civil asset forfeiture

statutes, ownerswho have had propertyseized have the burden of proof. This iscontrary to the public policy underlyingour criminal code and is often aconsiderableexpensetopropertyowners.If the owner fails to prove the propertywas not used ina crime, the property ispermanentlylosttothelawenforcementagencythatmadeseizure.Thehearingstodecide whether to return privateproperty are ex parte, meaning only the

officers side of the story is heard by ajudge,andsometimesapropertyownerisneverevengivennoticeofthehearing.With the deck stacked against propertyowners, these forfeitures become acommonoccurrenceandadubioussourceofrevenuefor lawenforcement.Whenitcomestotheseizureofproperty,cashisafavorite target, and out-of-state driversareoftenpeggedsimplybyvirtueoftheir

licenseplate.Theburdenofretrievingprivatepropertyiscompoundedforout-of-statedrivers,asitisdifficult,inconvenient,andsometimescostprohibitivefortravelerstoreturntothe state and reclaim their property.


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2 ThePerilsofPolicingforProfitWhyTennesseeshouldreformitscivilassetforfeiturelaws

Because the money seized goes directlyintotheoperationofthelawenforcementunitandpaysforequipment,vehicles,andsalaries, officers are given a direct andobvious incentive to seize as much

property as possible or as necessary tomaketheirunitprofitable.TennesseesProfitMotiveIn the state of Tennessee, this profitmotivecouldnotbeanyclearer.Onehasto look no further than the policies andpractices of drug interdiction units thatpatrolthe50-milestretchofInterstate40

westofNashville.On December 21, 2012, NewsChannel 5airedastorymarkingtheconclusionofatwo-year investigation into civil assetforfeiture practices. The investigationexposed a considerable disparity in thenumber of stops based on the directioncars were travelling. Conventionalwisdominlawenforcementcirclesholdsthatthemajorityofillicitdrugtrafficking

along Interstate 40 west of Nashvilletravels into the city on eastbound laneswhiletheproceedsreturnonwestboundlanes. Notably, a review of daily activitylogs revealed that officers of the 23rdJudicial District made 10 times morestopsonthewestboundormoneysidethan on the eastbound drug side.Officerswere also documented onvideostoppingdriverswithout cause andthencoercingdriversintoavehiclesearch.

Dealshaveevenbeenstruckinwhichlawenforcement officers patrol stretches ofhighway outside their jurisdiction underanagreementthatashareofanycashorliquidatedvalueofpropertyseizedwillgo

to the agency that has jurisdiction. Forexample, NewsChannel 5 documentedWilliamsonCountyofficersmakingastopand seizure in Smith County, more than70milesoutsidetheirjudicialdistrict.

AbuseAboundsAbsentAccountability

Numerous cases highlight the absurdityoccurringbyvirtueofcivilassetforfeiturelaws.Inoneinstance,$20,000wastakenfrom anAfricanAmericanmanwho hadjustwontheGeorgiaLottery.Inanother,$27,500was taken fromaHispanicmanwhowas helping his mother move with

herlifesavingsintow.Theprevalenceofsuch cases reveals a focus by lawenforcement that is less concerned withenforcingthecriminallawsonthebooksandmoreconcernedwithprofitingunderthisharmfulcivilstatute.

It remains unclear exactly how muchprivate property has been seized frominnocent Tennesseans or others passingthrough the state, since current law

imposes no disclosure requirements onthepartoflawenforcement.Unfortunately,entireprogramsandmanypositions depend on the ability to seizeproperty. For example, officers workingfor agencies such as the DicksonInterdictionCriminalEnforcement(DICE)Unit must seize cash to stay employed.Everythingispaidthroughseizuresandfines, Dickson Police Chief Ricky

Chandler said when questioned byNewsChannel 5s Phil Williams. DistrictAttorneyGeneral Kim Helper of the 21stJudicial District also stated that themoney seized is used to fund agencyoperations.1


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The abuse and perverse incentives ondisplay expose the need for immediatereform. Government should never playtheroleofthief.

LackofDue Process:ABrief Historyof

ModernCivilAssetForfeiture

Under both the FifthAmendment to theUnited States Constitution and Article 1,Section 8 of the TennesseeConstitution,citizensareentitledtodueprocessoflawbefore their property is seized withoutjustcompensation.Tennesseescivilasset

forfeiture laws, in their current form,raiserealconstitutionalconcerns.

The Institute for Justice, a nationalnonprofit law firm, concluded thatnationwide,civilassetforfeitureisoneoftheworstabusesofpropertyrightsinournationtoday,withmorethan$1.6billiondollarsconfiscatedthusfar.2In 1984,Congress, through amendments

to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse andPrevention Act of 1970, created the U.S.Departmentof JusticesAssets ForfeitureFund. Further amendments dramaticallyexpandedwhatlawenforcementcoulddowiththesefunds,permittingtheiruseforexpenses such as vehicles and overtimepay. These loose-ended amendments,giving federal agencies the ability toretain and spend forfeiture proceeds,securedtothemadirectfinancialstakein

generating forfeiture funds. Many statessubsequently followed the federalgovernments profit-making example byamending theirown civil forfeiture lawstogive law enforcementagencieswithintheir borders a direct share of forfeitedproceeds.

While modest reforms of federalforfeiture laws did in fact take place in2000 through the Civil Asset ForfeitureReform Act, they did not change how

forfeiture proceeds are distributed orcurb the profit incentive. Still today, lawenforcementagenciesin42statesreceivesomeorallofthecivilforfeitureproceedstheyseize.Astoundingly,theInstituteforJusticealsofound that 80 percent of those whoseproperty was seized by the federalgovernment were never charged with acrime.3

When Did Carrying Cash Become

Illegal?When questioned about why victims ofcivil asset forfeiture were neverprosecuted,DistrictAttorneyKimHelperresponded that, the transportation ofillegaldrugproceedsthroughthestateofTennesseeisnotacrime. 4Thisresponse

is misleading, but raises a good point:carrying U.S. currency is not a crime,regardlessoftheamount.What the statement also reveals is thatofficers in this situation have noevidencenot even the requiredprobable cause to charge, much lessconvictto show that the currencyamounts to proceeds of illegal drugs. Ifsuchproofexisted,theprosecutorswould

beabletochargesuchdefendantswithacrimeinadditiontoseizingthecash.This type of response is typical of lawenforcement with regard to civil assetforfeiture, and it shines light on theincredible, and dangerous, amount of


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discretion provided to officers underTennesseescivilassetforfeiturelaws.FewStatesontheRightTrack

In its report, the Institute for JusticegradedTennessee aD-minus for its civilforfeiturelaws.OnlythreestatesMaine,North Dakota, and Vermontreceivedgrades of B or higher. These statesprovidetheirpropertyownerswithsomeof the better protections against civilforfeitureabuseinthecountry.5In Maine, the government must show

through an abundance of evidence thatthepropertyisactuallyrelatedtoacrime.Unfortunately,thisstandardremainslessthanthereasonabledoubtstandardthatisrequiredforacriminalconviction.Moreimportantly, by mandating that allforfeiturefundsgodirectlyintothestatesgeneralfund,Mainesforfeiturelawshaveeliminated the perverse incentivescreated by Tennessees asset forfeiturestatues.6

North Dakotas forfeiture lawstates thatresidencesandotherrealestateshallnotbe subject to forfeiture if they are co-owned by someone who has not beenconvicted of the underlying criminaloffense. Also, no proceeds from civilforfeiture become allocated to lawenforcementinNorthDakota.7Vermontsforfeiturelawsincludesimilar

measures,asthestatemustshowbyclearand convincing evidence that thepropertyisrelatedtoacrimebeforeitcanbeforfeited.Propertyseizedthroughcivilforfeiture goes to the state treasuryandnottolawenforcement.8

While these three have better laws inplacethanmoststates,theirlawsarefarfromperfect.Allthreestatesstillallowapresumption of guilt antithetical to theAmericanconceptofcriminaljustice.9

SolutionsforTennesseePrivatepropertyrightsarethefoundationof the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions.As such, Tennessee would do well torepeal its current civil asset forfeiturestatutes,astheyallowforuntoldassaultson private property rights. In order toseize private property, law enforcement

shouldbecompelledtomeetthecriminalstandardsappliedtoarrests.Afterall,anarrest is indeed itself a seizure ofpropertytheperson.Anditisfromthisnotionthatflowalltherightsenumeratedin the first 10 amendments to the U.S.Constitution. As such, law enforcementshould be held to the same standardwhen seizing other forms of privateproperty, and property should bepromptly returned upon failure tomeet

suchstandards.10Short of abolition, measures should beemployedtoatleastcurbabuse,suchas:

Civil asset forfeiturerevenues shouldbe placed into a neutral fund,preferablyinthegeneralrevenuefundofthelocalorstategovernment.

Lawenforcementshouldbeheldtoahigher standard, transferring theburdenofprooffrompropertyownerstothegovernment,whereitbelongs.

State law should require that allseizures of cash or property be


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recordedandreportedtothestateforthe sake of transparency. Such datashould be readily accessible by thepublic.

Ex parte hearings should beprohibited when forfeiture issuesappearbeforeajudge.

If a judge determines that theproperty should be returnedbecauseit was improperly seized, the lawenforcement agency should beresponsible for any associated costs.Thisshouldincludeanylostincomeorinterest resulting from the property

beingtiedupfor aperiod oftime,aswell as all court costs and attorneysfees necessarily incurred to reclaimtheproperty.

Conclusion

Therighttoprivatepropertyisabedrockofournationsfounding.ButTennesseescivilasset forfeiture lawshave created a

climate ripe for corruption. These laws,by allowing and incentivizing lawenforcement agencies to profit directlyfrom property seizures, have caused anunsavoryshiftinagencypriorities.The priority of all law enforcementofficials should be the fair and impartialadministration of justice, yet abusesabound when statutory arrangementsdirectly affect the ability of law

enforcement tocarryout their jobsdulyandresponsibly.It isbeyond time for Tennesseeto enactreforms on the issue of civil asset

forfeiture. The problem is clear. Thesolution is obvious. The state ofTennessee should act to protect itscitizensprivatepropertyrights.1 Phil Williams, NewsChannel 5 Investigates:PolicingForProfit.December21,2012.http://www.newschannel5.com/story/20342745/nc5-documentary-examines-policing-for-profit.2Ibid.

3 Marian R. Williams, Jefferson E. Holcomb,Tomislav V. Kovandzic, and Scott Bullock,Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil AssetForfeiture. Institute for Justice. March 2010.http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf.4Williams,NewsChannel5Investigates.5Williams,etal,PolicingforProfit.6Ibid.7Ibid.8Ibid.9Ibid.10 Legislators Guide to the Issues: 108th

Tennessee General Assembly. Beacon Center ofTennessee.p.59.http://www.beacontn.org/wp-content/uploads/108th-Legislators-Guide-to-the-Issues.pdf.


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AbouttheAuthors

TreyMoore is the directorofpolicy at the Beacon Center ofTennessee. ScottSumner isa

researchassociateattheBeaconCenter.

AbouttheBeaconCenterofTennessee

TheBeaconCenterofTennessee,foundedastheTennesseeCenterforPolicyResearch,isan

independent,nonprofit,andnonpartisanresearchorganizationdedicatedtoprovidingexpert

empiricalresearchandtimelyfreemarketsolutionstopublicpolicyissuesinTennessee.The

Centersmissionistochangelivesthroughpublicpolicybyadvancingtheprinciplesoffree

markets,individualliberty,andlimitedgovernment.

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The Beacon Center of Tennessee is committed to delivering the highest quality and mostreliableresearchonTennesseepolicyissues.TheCenterguaranteesthatalloriginalfactual

data are true and correct and that information attributed to other sources is accurately

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Copyright2013bytheBeaconCenterofTennessee,Nashville,TennesseeP.O.Box198646Nashville,Tennessee37219(615)383-6431Fax:(615)383-6432

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The Perils of Policing for Profit