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The political economy of

electricity access Lessons from Mozambique

Matthew Cotton

Joshua Kirshner

Daniela Salite

November 2019

EEGEnergyInsight November2019

©AppliedResearchProgrammeonEnergyandEconomicGrowth 2

Introduction

ThispaperdiscussestheissueofelectricityaccessasakeydevelopmentchallengeintheGlobalSouth.Thedevelopmentofenergyservicesisavitalcomponentof any social development policy strategy. Energyservices such as heating, cooling, cooking andlighting meet basic needs to sustain life, and fulfilsecondary socio-economic benefits such asrecreation, educational attainment, economicproductivityandpovertyalleviation.Meetingenergyservice needs for the world’s poorest peoplenecessitates the use of different fuel sources andtechnologiesundervaryinggeographic,politicalandsocio-economic conditions. For many in thedeveloping world, energy services are met by theburningofsolidcarbon-basedfuelssuchascharcoal,wood, peat or lignite (commonly referred to asbrowncoal).Theuseofsuchfuelsisproblematicdueto the health and environmental costs of theirproductionanduse.Movingawayfromblack-carbonintensive fuelsources towardscleanerburninggasandelectricsourcesisofcriticalimportance.Assuch,improvingelectricityaccess through theexpansionofelectricitytransmissionanddistributionsystems(so called electricity ‘grids’) and the connection ofcommercialandresidentialproperties,hasbecomean energy policy priority – driven byintergovernmental organisation and donorprogrammes to improve (primarily rural)electrification.

Althoughtheexpansionofelectricityinfrastructureacrossurban,ruralandperi-urbanspacesprovidesopportunities for improving the wellbeing andlivelihoods of the world’s poorest people, thisprocess is not automatic. Electricity access iscommonlymeasuredintermsofthetotalnumberofgrid-connected communities and/or households;however,thefocusuponthetechnicalinfrastructureand the expansion of grid connection often beliesproblemsexperiencedbyhouseholds.Issuessuchaselectricitypricing, supply intermittency, poor grid-connectionreliability,aswellasculturalandsocialpracticesofenergyserviceuse(suchaspreferencesfor specific cooking fuels for example) create acomplexinterwovenpictureofenergyuse,demandand supply. Moreover, expansion of grid andelectricity access is embedded in institutional andpolicy contexts that favour certain outcomes,geographies and social groups. Such problems ofunequal access are exacerbated by domestic andregional disruption – i.e. civil unrest, politicalcontestation andmilitary conflict – and exogenousfactors such as extreme weather events(exacerbated by anthropogenic climate change),global financial crises, changes in diplomaticrelations, inward investment and potential‘enclaving’ [1, 2]. Electricity access is thereforefundamentally an issue of energy justice [3]– one

that is attendant to broader political, geographicalandsocio-culturalfactors.ThisEnergyInsightpaperpresents two aspects of the electricity accesschallenge.Thefirstpartoutlinesthedifficultiesandopportunities of expanding grid access to improveelectricity service provision to the poorest peopleglobally,andthesecondexploresthecomplexityofthe political and justice implications of electricityaccessprovision,withreferencetoanin-depthcaseofMozambique.

Part 1 – The electricity access challenge

Povertyalleviationforthelowestincomedevelopingnations is understood as a multi-dimensionalproblemthatinvolvessimultaneousprogressacross17SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs).TheSDGscoverhealth, genderequality, jobsand livelihoods,environmental protection, and institutionalgovernance. They are a comprehensive policy andplanning tool for setting a global agenda to endpoverty [4]. However, although there is a cleartransnational political commitment to improvingdevelopment outcomes through the mechanism ofthe SDGs, despite significant progress in the lastdecade, nearly 800 million people still live inextremepoverty–definedasthoseearning$1.90perdayorless[5].Theglobalchallengeofmulti-scalarand multi-sectoral poverty alleviation involves acomplexarrayofpolicyandeconomicdevelopmentoptions.Atthecore,however,isaneedtoimproveopportunities for the poorest people, primarily bywideningaccesstopublicservices(includinghealthand education) and basic infrastructure such asenergy access [6], as well as their respectivecapabilitiestomeettheirownneeds[7-9].

Withregardstoenergy,SDG7emphasizestheneedto“ensureaccesstoaffordable,reliableandmodernenergyforallby2030”[4].TheSDG#7isprimarilyinterpretedbynationalpolicyinstitutionsasaneedto directly improve electricity and fuel access.Energy access is commonly posited as the mirroroppositeofenergypoverty–aconditionofunstableand/orunaffordableaccess toelectricityandcleanfuels. SDG#7 presents a challenge to policyinstitutions, non-governmental, industry and thirdsectororganisations.Achievingthisgoalrequiresthesimultaneous development of both physicalresources (including technological infrastructures,mineralsandotherextractivecommodities,researchandinnovation,andecosystemservices)andsocialinfrastructures (including political institutions,publicservices,culturalassets,capacitybuildingandnurturing local capabilities, and transparentgovernance systems) [10, 11], such that socialwelfare is maximised through access to energyservices, and not just the private profit of energyorganisations. Social scientists commonly refer tothese inter-related sets of social and physical



components as ‘socio-technical’ systems [12, 13]thatbringtogetherawebofinter-connectedhuman,physical, material and technological elements.Electricityprovisionandaccessarekeyexamplesofthissocio-technicalframing[14-16]–theprovisionof the service is not solely explained by theconstruction of the technical infrastructure, butrather in-relation to the broader patterning ofenergy services, contexts and cultures in whichenergy connects with the social life of users.Electricity access also underpins relatedcommitments to reduce the risk of anthropogenicclimatedisruption fromgreenhousegasemissions,andsothesocio-technicalsystemofenergyservicesconnects deeply with the broader ecological andgeophysical systems that support human andnon-humanlifeandwellbeingonaglobalscale.

Energy access as a policy priority involvesincreasingly complex and interconnectedinternational agreements on sustainable energyaccess and climate change. The global spotlight onrural electrification and sustainable energytransitionsismobilisingbillionsofdollarsinfinancefortechnologytransfertotheGlobalSouth,eithertoincrease generation capacity or to extend gridinfrastructures and domestic, or householdconnections[17,18].Forinstance,in2013investorsmobilisedUS$13.1billiongloballyinenergyaccess,with 97% of that funding targeting electricitynetworks [17]. However, the deployment ofsignificant financial resources to advancesustainableenergygoalshasoftenreproducedwhatcould be termed neoliberal policy prescriptions.Publicsectorrolesinenergyservicesprovisionare,inmanycases, limitedtoregulatoryfunctionssuchas creating an ‘enabling environment’ for cleanenergytechnologiestogrow[19].Thisrepresentsashift towards the development of the ‘regulatorystate’ [20], characterised by processes ofprivatisation and deregulation which replaced the‘dirigistestate’ofthepast(wherebythestateexertsa strongdirective influenceover investment) [21].Thus regulation, rather than public ownership,planningorcentralisedadministration,havebecomethe key contextual factors influencing how lowcarbonenergytransitionshavecometobegoverned[22].

Despite the socio-technical nature of electricityservices, analysts commonly frame sustainableenergyprovisionasamatterfortechnicalexperts–achallengeofincreasingtransmissiondistancesandmaximisingthenumberofconsumerconnectionstocentralised grid infrastructures. With a stronginternational focus on electricity grid extension,much existing development research has focusedupon binary metrics, such as whether or not ahouseholdhasanelectricityconnection[23].Yettheenergyaccesschallengeismorecomplex.Clearly,theexpansion of domestic connections does not

automatically guarantee access to reliable andsustainable electricity. Moreover, even where theheadlinemetricofgridaccessisincreasing,thisdoesnot necessarily help policymakers to understandhow expanding energy access relates with overallsocio-economicdevelopment.

Electricityaccess canbeproblematised inmultipleways. First, is that where electricity grid accessexists,itisoftenunreliable(especiallyinremoteandrural locations). In many developing states,electricity access is commonly through irregular,patchyandinformal(oftenillegal)connections[24].On a technical level, there are further factors toconsider,suchas– is theconnectionto thecentralgrid or an independent ‘islanded’ micro-grid? Areconnections safe and well maintained? Are gridconnections and electricity supply affordable? Isaccessdependentononeormoreenergygenerationtechnologies? Is there sufficient skills capacity forrepairandmaintenanceofelectricityservices?[25].Second, forelectrificationprogrammes intended toconnect new users nationally, these often do notsignificantlycontributeeither to the intensificationof electricity consumption nor to the reduction ofbiomass (such as charcoal and fuelwood) use inhouseholds.This isbecause thedomestic choiceofenergy source is dependent on factors such asfluctuating and uncertain prices and on householdcapability to invest in new energy-consumingappliances. Conversely, however, biomass sourcesandkeroseneareoftenmoreexpensiveperunitofusefulenergythanhigher-gradesources,suggestingthatalthoughelectrificationhasprovedchallenging,it should (normatively) remain a key povertyalleviationstrategy[26].

Byrelegatingelectricityaccesstoasolelytechnicalissue, the solution is often viewed at least bymainstream observers and decision-makers, as aprocessreliantonachievingeconomiesofscale,andone that can be delivered and managed in adepoliticised and socially-neutral manner [27].Critical geographers and social scientists studyingenergy,however,haveincreasinglycometoquestionthisview,pointingtothecomplexitiesofaccessandthe socio-political dimensions of energy provisionand energy infrastructures as key sites ofcontestation [28, 29]. On a simple level, electricityaccess can be understood in terms of the three“Rs”—ruralelectrification(theprocess),reformofthe electricity sector (the catalyst), and renewableand other low carbon energy technologies (themeans)[30].Yet,intryingtoimproveaccess,acrosstheworld therehasbeen significant growth in thedevelopment of centrally planned electricitytransmission and distribution networks, with littleattention paid by policy-makers, infrastructuredevelopment bodies, and planners to the broadersocialimpacts,institutionalconfigurationsandlocal-regional development goals that drive particular



socio-technical system changes. It is necessarytherefore,tostructureenergytransitionsandsocio-technicalsystemchangesincontext-specificways–to incorporate ‘bottom-up’ assessment of thepolitical, economic and social circumstances ofregional, national or sub-national energy systemsinwhichnewtechnologiesaretobeapplied[31].

Moreover,quantifyingtheimpactsofenergyaccessgains (or conversely the lost opportunities) tovulnerablepopulations remainshighly challenging,sothatcalculatingthecostsandbenefitsofdifferentelectrification strategies remains difficult.Furthermore,manyof thecentralisedgridsystemsemerginggloballyrelyonfossilfuel-basedsourcesofelectricity, such as thermal coal, oil or gas. Energynetworks are commonly subject to technological‘obduracy’ and ‘carbon lock-in’ – or, how acombinationofpolitical,economicandtechnologicalpathdependenciesresultingfromcolonialhistories,poverty, resource availability and technologicalcapacity,steerenergysystemdevelopmentdownacarbon intensive pathway, which becomesincreasinglydifficulttoreverse[32-34].

National governments are frequently motivated toexpand centralised grid networks (either low-carbonor carbon-intensive) becausedomestic andcommercial energy consumption is a key tool foreconomic growth of local and national economies.Somestatesarefurthermotivatedtoinvestinlargeenergy-related infrastructures as a means forgevisible connections with citizens (and voters) intheir daily lives, at least at the level of politicalrhetoric[35,36].Thisissueofthepoliticalframingofenergy infrastructure is significant. Of note is theproblemoftheso-called“securitisationframing”ofenergyaccess.Securitisationisapoliticaldiscourseorpolicyframeinwhichdecision-makersappealtonational-interestconcernsofpublicsafety inordertoreduceindividualrightsandfreedoms,andpressforward with controversial policy measuresunimpeded by democratic scrutiny. The energysecuritydilemma is one formof this securitisationframe – the perceived need to build newinfrastructure to meet development needs meansthat land-use changes for grid infrastructure,renewable energy generation technologies andothers(suchasbiomass,ornewfossilfuel-poweredsystems) are implemented without access toinformation, opportunities for public scrutiny,accesstopublicparticipationindecision-makingorlegal redress in the event of environmental justicedisputes. Securitisation as a mechanism forinfrastructure expansion is a growing problemacrossbothhighand low-incomeeconomiesunderconditions of rapid low-carbon transition [22, 37,38].

Fromadevelopmentperspective,wearefacedwithmultiple, seemingly incommensurable problems.

The first, is the mass expansion of universalelectrification (and supporting, yet often largelyinvisibleinfrastructures,includingpowergridlinesandsubstations,pipelines, convertersandoutlets).The second, is the assurance of rights, justice,environmental protections and democraticaccountability within the energy sector and itsinteraction with the wider political economy. Thethird, isavoidanceofdangerousclimatechangebyreducing the carbon footprint of multiple (andoverlapping) socio-technical energy systems.Balancing these three policy priorities is anenormous challenge for international governanceinstitutions, national and regional governments,localdevelopmentagenciesandcivilsocietygroups.ThisEnergyInsightaimstocontributetodebatesonsustainable energy access across this ‘trilemma’ ofthe political economyof energy [39-41].Wedo sothrough suggesting thathistorical-institutional andpolitical-economicperspectivesofferasetoftoolstoexamine energy access and energy usage inparticularplacesandcontexts.Thesetoolsfosterananalysis of structural conditions [42] while posingquestionsaboutwhowins,wholosesandwhy,asaresult of particular policy frameworks and socio-technical systems [43]. As Castán Broto et al. [44]observed, “Not all transitions are just, andtransitions themselves may generate furtherinequalities.”

The benefits of electrification

Mass electrification and access to reliable energyservicesisanimportantgoalforsocialandeconomicdevelopment and human wellbeing. As previouslymentioned, electricity provision has tremendoussocial value, as well as offering secondaryimprovements to health and local environmentalconditions[11,45,46].Formanypeopleacrosstheworld, heating and lighting is provided by openflames–suchaswicklampsoroillamps,openfiresand candles [47]. These are very low-efficiencyheating and lighting sources. The greenhouse gasemissionsassociatedwithwoodfuelandkerosene-based systems is significant. There are alsoconsiderablehealth impacts from the inhalationofblack carbon and particulates produced by openflames. Providing electricity-based solutions toheating, cooking and lighting therefore hasimmediate health benefits from improved airquality, reduced risk of uncontrolled fires andassociated injury and death, as well as potentialdomestic cost savings, thus improving householdincomes.

Policies and industry strategies to improve energysecuritythroughmasselectrificationinurban,peri-urbanandrural locationscanprovideanumberofsubstantive advantages. First, improvement ofelectricity-based energy provision can raise living



standards for the poorest people, in terms ofamenitiesandservices.Forexample,inmanycases,increasing access to electricity reduces householdexpendituresforenergyservices(suchaskerosene)byreplacingthemwithdirectaccess[48,49].Otherenergy services are of growing social significance.Mobile phones are becoming an important part ofmany local and regional development strategies.Phonesareoftenpresentedinthepopularmediaasnon-essentialluxuryitems,however,wearguethatthey should be understood as basic needstechnologies across all levels of society. Access tomobile phones improves educational outcomes,mental health, political engagement and socialcapital available to the poorest people [50-54].Additionally, phone access provides betterintegration of family networks and social support(particularlyunderconditionsofforcedorseasonalmigration due to environmental stressors, civilunrest or market changes), improvedcommunication with business services, supplychains and financial organisations (includingparticipation in the marketplace through mobilebankingandmoneytransferusingsmartphoneappsandtelephonebanking).AccesstoInternetservicesthroughmobilephonedataalsoimprovesaccesstoeducational materials, practical information toimprove community adaptive capacity and thestrength of social networks. Mobile phones andunderlying electrical and terrestrialtelecommunications infrastructure reducecommunication costs and therefore allowsindividuals and firms to send and to obtaininformation quickly and cheaply on a variety ofeconomic,social,andpoliticaltopics.Reducedcostofmediatedcommunication, inturn, leadstotangibleeconomic benefits, improving agricultural andlabour market efficiency, producer and consumerwelfare,alongsidewithwiderruralconnectivity[55,56].However,thepoorestpeople,particularlythosewho live off-grid usually in rural and peri-urbancommunities,spendsignificantamountsoftimeandpersonalfinancialresourceschargingmobilephonebatteries;electricityaccesswouldameliorate theseconstraints. Given the (variable but generallyincreasing) rate of uptake of mobile phonetechnologies across the developingworld [57, 58],providing reliable electricity sources for thispurpose alone would have beneficial developmentoutcomes.

Second, improvements in the availability ofelectricityservicesincreasesthedirectandindirectemployment opportunities for supply-side energyservices. These include electricity generation,technologyinstallation,distributionandsaleacrossthe energy delivery chain, and the economicdevelopment effectson thedemand side– suchasimprovingproductivityofrural industries(suchasfoodprocessing)[30,49].Asmentionedinrelationto the twin commitments of improving electricity

access and reducing global climate change risk,numerous innovations have emerged in the low-carbon energy innovation ‘space’. These includemicro-renewables, suchas stand-alone solarwaterheaters and solar photovoltaics (PV), wind powerand geothermal technologies, micro/mini-grids,alongside innovations such as agrivoltaics, whichcombinesolarPVsuspendedabovegrowingareastoprovideshade forhigh-valuecrops [59].Therearealso innovations with aquavoltaic systems, or so-called “floatovoltaic” technology – water-deployedsolar photovoltaic systems combinedwith farmingof aquatic organisms [60]. Accordingly, there is arapid expansion of local markets for renewableelectricity generation, technology installation,maintenanceandconsulting[61,62].

Giventhesedynamics,enhancingelectricityaccessisnot solely a challenge for developmentorganisations, it also represents opportunities forhuman-centred and bottom-up community energyprovision [63], entrepreneurialactivity,new formsof public-private partnerships, and models ofcommunity ownership for energy generation [64,65].AsAlstoneetal.[66]argue,thecontemporaryelectricitytechnologylandscapeispermeatedwithrapidly developing (and rapidly spreading)decentralised network models and systems.Community energy provision is primarily broughtabout through the deployment of decentralisedenergy networks, which combine high-efficiencyconsumer and end-use appliances and low-costrenewable energy generation technologiesincluding (but not limited to) low-costphotovoltaiccells[64,65,67].AsAlstonetal.[66]continue, the growth in decentralised systems toimprove rural and peri-urban electrification is atype of technological evolution, facilitated by thegrowth in information technology access,specifically through mobile phone networkinfrastructureandvirtual financial services.Theyargue that decentralised electricity systems aredisruptive in that they rapidly increase access tobasicelectricityservicestoimprovequalityoflife,whilstsimultaneouslydrivingactiontowardslow-carbon development – effectively bypassing theneedforcentralisedandgrid-connectedfossilfuel-basedsystems.

Third, a shift from black-carbon based energy andfuelsources(e.g.,lignite[browncoal],peat,dungordomestic charcoal) towards domestic electricity-poweredlightingandgasorgeothermalheatingwillgreatly reduce the health risks [68], such asrespiratory disorders, cancer and heart diseaseassociatedwithprolongedexposuretoblack-carbonfuels[24,68-71].Moreover,ashiftfromcentralisedfossil fuel-based electricity production from coal(particularly lignite) will reduce the carbonemissions per unit of energy and thus mitigateclimate change impacts from rapid economic



development[72,73].Itwillalsoreducethehealthrisksassociatedwithambientairpollution,suchassmogandozonepollution thatblightsmanyof theworld’s most populous cities. There is a needtherefore for the simultaneousmass electrificationand rapid transition towards low-carbon/low-particulate pollutant energy-generationtechnologies.

Fourth,relianceuponblack-carbonfuelsourcesforheatingand lighting is associatedwithwidespreadlocal environmental degradation and poorenvironmentalhealth,primarilyfromdeforestationforfuelwoodandcharcoal.Anestimated2.7billionpeople globally rely upon wood-based fuels forcooking[74].Thereisalackofreliablebaselinedataonglobalcharcoalconsumption,andassuch,thereisariskthatover-generalisationaroundtheextenttowhich charcoal is causing forest damage ispreventing an effective policy response [75].However, case studies in different developingcountrycontextsusingdifferentmethods(includingsatellite image observational studies andethnographic studies) do show deforestationoccurring [76-78]. Mass charcoal productionprovidesopportunities for income-generation [79],though it commonly damages biodiversity andecosystemserviceprovision,withresultantnegativeimpacts upon agricultural capacity and humanhealth and wellbeing [80, 81]. Over 80% of urbanhouseholds in sub-Saharan Africa employ charcoalasaprimarycookingfuel,andcharcoalalsoprovidesasignificantsourceofincomeforruralhouseholdsinareaswithaccesstoperi-urbanandurbanmarkets;thoughcharcoaluseisofcoursenotlimitedtoruralcommunities [82-85].AsZuluandRichardson [86]haveobserved,poorerhouseholdsaremorelikelytoparticipate in the production and sale of charcoal,primarily to provide an economic safety net bysupplementing other sources of income. Policyresponses to reduce household dependence oncharcoalmustthereforenotonlyreplacewoodfuelsin domestic settings but must also provide analternative income stream for farmers andlabourers.

Fifth, electrification has secondary social benefitoutcomes beyond the direct economic benefits tohouseholds fromreducedheating, lightingandfuelcosts, or the alterative incomegeneration streams.Forexample,improvedheatingandlighting,reducedtimegatheringwoodfuels,andreducedtimespenton seeking mobile phone charging, will improveopportunities(particularlyforwomenandgirls)toengageinrecreationandeducation,thusimprovingwellbeing,healthandsocialoutcomes[87].Studiesof rural electrification find that the greater thelikelihoodofahousehold’saccesstoanelectricgrid,themoretimethehousehold’schildrenarelikelytospendstudyingathome,offeringindirectevidenceofanimprovementinlevelsofschooling[88,89].Other

researchershaveshownelectrificationtoaccelerateopportunities for women. Domestic electricityaccess helps to move women and girls into moreeconomically productive activities, and Samad andZhang [90] find that electrification measurablyimproves women's decision-making ability,mobility,financialautonomy,reproductivefreedom,andsocialparticipation.

Overall, the analyses discussed here haveimplications for the ability of lower-incomedeveloping economies to promote and sustainincreases in energy access, along with a range ofassociatedbenefitstothisprocess.Giventheextentoftheenergyaccesschallenge,withanestimated1.1billionpeoplecurrentlylackingaccesstoelectricity[16],severalauthorsarguefordevelopmentalistandpublicly-funded interventions, alongside nurturingopportunities for innovation and entrepreneurialapproaches[19].Yet, thepictureremainscomplex;andapartfromhighlightingthesedirectandindirectbenefitsreachedthroughincreasingandimprovingenergy access, geographers, STS (science andtechnologystudies)scholars,andothercriticalsocialscientistshavedevelopednew linesof researchonenergyaccessintheglobalSouth.Suchresearchhasfocused heavily upon energy poverty, justice andpeople’severydaylivedexperiences[44],lowcarbonenergy transitions, along with social and culturalaspects of new lighting and cooking technologies[91].

Related to the emerging debates in which theconcept of ‘energy justice’ figures prominently,Castán Broto [63] and Castán Broto et al. [44, 92]have recently explored the notion of ‘energysovereignty’ over energy generation, transmissionand distribution systems. In a developing andpostcolonial context, this means learning torecognise how people themselves engage with themaking of technologies of everyday life throughhybrid formsof contextuallygenerated innovation.Anotherstreamofliteraturehighlightsthelocalandglobal infrastructures of production, transport anddistribution of energy, along with practices ofsecuring such activities and their spatialmanifestations [93]. Such spatial justice issuesconcern problems of land-grabbing, displacementand social oppression linked to large-scale energyinvestments[2,94].Thisanalysisseekstouncoveremergingspatialdimensionsofpowerandpolitics,adding to our understanding of state-building andgeopolitical relations, particularly in postcolonialcontexts.

Inthesecondpartofthispaper,wenarrowthefocusof electricity access within a geographically-bounded case study. Specifically, we explore theseissues in the context of Sub-Saharan electricityaccess and development. This is followed by adiscussion of a critical case of electricity access in



Mozambique: one of the Southern African region’slargest hydropower-generating yet energy access-poor,countries.Weoutlineandanalysesomeofthechallengesinvolvedinextendingenergyaccessinanequitableandsustainablemanner,and thenreflectupontheMozambicancaseforbroaderenergy-and-developmentpolicyandplanning.

Part 2 – The political economy of electricity

access: the case of Mozambique

Electricity access in sub-Saharan Africa

Although the benefits of electrification for globalsocialandeconomicdevelopmentareclear[95-97]inmanystates,notablyinsub-SaharanAfrica,mostinvestments in the energy sector fail to meet theenergy needs of the poorest people, even incountries where access to grid-connected energyservices,unplannedservicedisruptionsandpoweroutages are commonly experienced. Moreover,supply of electricity is not always affordable, andmany rural, off-grid and micro-grid systems onlyhave sufficient capacity to provide a few hours ofelectricityservicesperday.Consequently,even formany of those who have gained access through apermanent grid connection, the absolute level ofelectricity consumption, and access to electricityservices is low, and as the International EnergyAgency argue, there is no universally acceptedminimumthresholdforwhatconstituteselectricityaccess,particularlyinestablishingpolicytargets[18,98,99].

Fullytwo-thirdsoftotalenergyinvestmentinAfricais dedicated to producing energy for export whileroughly half of current electricity consumption isused for industry – primarily mining and refining,according the most recent Africa Energy Outlook[98]. Moreover, the needs and priorities of users,particularly those of the poor, have been widelyoverlookedinnationalenergyplanning,asthefocushaslargelybeenonlocatingstrategicresourcesforglobal markets rather than providing energyservices tailored to local needs and conditions, orofferingameaningfulvoice tousers [17,100]. It isnecessary, therefore, to better understand andengagewiththeinterests,powerrelationsandpolicynetworks that shape the prospects of realisingclimateandenergypolicygoals;actingasbarriersinsome cases and as vehicles for change in others[101].

ChallengesaroundenergyinfrastructureandsupplyintheglobalSouthareoftenapproachedfromwhatcouldbecalleda“top-downperspective,”suchthatconcerns with energy security and sovereigntycompete with the demands of export markets andtheneedtofacilitateglobaltradeandresourceflows.

Such national-economy scale concerns often takeprecedence over household and communityperspectivesonenergyaccessanduse.Thispresentsa serious challenge if ambitious targets to achieve50% - 100% access to modern energy services by2030 in Africa are to be achieved. Electricityinfrastructureplanning,construction,operationandmaintenance remain technically challengingwithincountries that have geographically isolated andpoliticallyfracturedregions[102].Theexpansionofcentralisedelectricityinfrastructureisthencoupledwithcomplexlong-termgovernancechallenges,notleasttheeffectivemobilisationoffundingfrombothinternal sources (e.g. taxation-based publicmonetary and fiscal policy, public-privatepartnerships) and external sources (donors, loans,inward investment and venture capital) funding[103]. Furthermore, the management of complexfinancing programmes for energy systeminvestmentrequiresgreateremphasisbothupontheproductive uses of energy, and upon effectiveprocessesofinstitutionalgovernancetoensurethatthe vicious circle is broken between low incomesleading to poor access to modern energy services,which in turn places limitations on the ability togenerate higher incomes. Breaking this cyclerequiresnewthinkingbothintermsofthetypesofelectricitytechnologiesandresourcesdeployed,andin terms of the range of actors involved in themanagement of such complex socio-technicalsystems[42,96,97].

While the diversification of energy resources,policies, investment models and governancepractices would be beneficial for rapid sociallysustainableenergytransitions,thecurrentdominanteconomicmodelacrossmuchofsub-SaharanAfricafocuses on large-scale energy consumers whoseactivitiesaregearedtowardsthegrowthoftop-leveleconomicindicators,suchasGDP,incontinuitywiththe colonial era. Conversely, a broad range ofdomesticandruralelectricitybenefitsareconstruedas‘socialwelfare’or‘uneconomic’policyobjectives[104].In20thCenturyEurope,electricityaccesswasachieved through centralised power generationsystems (usually situated in fossil fuel heartlandslocated close to industrial cities), and masselectricity transmission and distribution systemsbranchingoutwardsfromindustrialcentrestorurallocations [105-107]. The centralised electrificationmodelof20thCenturyEuropeanruraldevelopmentis increasingly challenged by decentralised andalternative energy transitions, incorporating newenergygenerationforms(includingon-andoffshorewind,hydro,solarandlimitednuclearandbiomass),andinvestmentmodelsincludingmicro-renewablesand community energy schemes [108-110]. Thus,thenormativeidealofcentralisedpowergenerationinEuropeisnowshiftingtowardsonetodispersedand decentralised socio-technical energy systems[66, 111, 112]. However the rural electrification



model still remains influential across the Africancontinent, where mega-projects and centralisedpowersystemsarestillheavilypromoted[35].Thedevelopmentofspecificinfrastructuremodelsundercertain governance arrangements is thus mutuallyreinforcing – political governance models thatinvolve state owned/controlled infrastructure andenergyresourceswilltendtowardstheconstructionofcentralisedsystemsofenergyproduction,whichin turn creates a system of centralised politicalauthority through the control of access to energyservices[102,113].

The case of Mozambique

Mozambique’spoliticalandsocialhistory isdeeplyshaped by its colonial past. Mozambique lived forfour centuries under Portuguese colonial rule, andthe violent effects of colonial action remainsignificant–withtheoppressionof theslavetradeand brutal civil political repression by Portugueseauthorities remaining salient in Mozambicanmemories[114].Mozambique’senergysystem,initscurrent form, is also shaped by this political andeconomichistory.During the colonial period, deepdivisionsbetweenthenorthern,thecentralZambesi

Figure 1 Figure 1 Map of Mozambique's electricity grid system



valley, and the southern regions emerged. UnderPortugueseruleinthe19thandearly20thcenturies,the territory thatwas tobecomeMozambiquewasdividedintoseparateconcessionareasandgovernedbychartercompanies,oftenBritish,until1942[115].Thisissignificantbecausegeographicalconstraintstoanintegratednationaldevelopmentstrategyalsostemfromthelocationofthecapitalinthefarsouth,physicallydistantfromtherestofthecountry.Thedevelopment of infrastructure networks (e.g.railway corridors, roads and later powertransmission lines), which linked regions of thecountry to their inland neighbours (South Africa,Zimbabwe,Malawi) rather than to interior regions[115,116]followedthispattern.

Thepoliticalfragmentationofthecolonialterritorywasalsoreflectedintheelectricitynetwork,whichdeveloped as three distinct systems: one in thesouth, around Lourenço Marques (the colonialdesignation of Maputo); another system in thecentre,associatedwiththecityofBeira;andathirdsystem consisting of dispersed urban centres, butlargely disconnected from each other [117] (seeFigure1).ThecoastalcityofBeiraisconnectedtothecentral grid, which extends through the centralregiontoZimbabwe,anddrawsontheChicambaandMavuzidamsbuiltin1950and1960,respectively,asopposedtoCahoraBassa,whichsuppliesthesouthandfarnorth.

After Portugal’s Carnation Revolution of 1974 andthedecolonisationof itsAfricanoverseas colonies,the People’s Republic of Mozambique formed in1975, thoughafter twoyearsof independence, thecountrydescendedintoaprotractedcivilwarlastingfrom 1977 to 1992. During the conflict, theFRELIMO-led (Frente de Libertação deMoçambique) government sought to use energyinfrastructures as part of the larger project ofnationalunityandmodernisation.TheCahoraBassahydroelectricdamwastoplayakeyrole,butitwouldalso require the integration and expansion of thevery limited colonial-era electric grid. To this end,the government created a state-owned electricityutility,ElectricidadedeMoçambique,E.P.(EDM)in1977, integrating some two-dozen dispersedcolonialproductionanddistributionunits[117].ThegovernmentprovidedEDMwitha‘socialmandate’tosupportnationalsocialandeconomicdevelopment,butthiswascurtaileduntiltheendofthecivilwarin1992. From 1995, the post-war democraticrestructuring of Mozambique saw theimplementation of multi-party presidential andparliamentary elections – a process ofdemocratisation that nonetheless has created adivideincivilauthoritybetweentherulingFRELIMOparty, and the opposition party RENAMO acrossmultiple political scales – affecting both nationalpolicy and local frameworks of governance [118].Thepost-warperiodalsosawtherebuildingofcivil

infrastructure. As such, EDM began to expand thedomestic grid, with support from the donorcommunity, regional partners and foreigninvestment(ibid).Sincethen,thegridhasexpandedsubstantially, connecting all provincial centres andall128districts(asof2014)[119].However,severalimportantlimitationsremain.Theexistingnetworkbypasses extensive rural areas, where the lowdensityandlow-incomepopulationmakesitdifficultandcostlytoconnectpeopletothegrid.Thecentralandnorthernprovincesdependlargelyonasingle,ageingtransmissionlineeach,suchthatasinglelinefailure is enough to cut electricity to a vast area[120]. The low rate of electricity access remains akey challenge for the country’s economicdevelopmentandsocialwellbeing.

Currently,Mozambiquehasoneofthelowestratesofelectricityaccessintheworld,withroughlyone-quarterofits28.8millioninhabitantshavingaccesstoelectricity in2018[121]. It isan importantcasestudybecause,similartoanumberofAfricanstates,itenjoysabundantnaturalenergyresources(naturalgas,coalandhydropower,windandsolarpotential)but continues to face entrenched energy poverty.Furthermore,thecountryhasexperiencedaregimechangefromsocialismtocapitalism,followedbytheprivatisation of much of the means of production,along with protracted job scarcity and new socio-economicdynamicsandchallenges[115].Concernswere raised in the post-war redevelopment andprivatisation of state-owned firms and assets thatsuch privatisation was tantamount to re-colonisation[122].Energyaccessunderpinsmanyofthese challenges, including rapid urban growth,gender and spatial inequality, and long-termenvironmental degradation. TheMozambican statehasmade electrification—bothurbanand rural—amajor component of its development programs[123]. Despite the Mozambican government’smodernising aspirations from the post-independence period to the introduction ofmultiparty democracy in the 1990s, through torecenteffortstoattractglobalinvestorsinthe2000s,auniformenergyprovisioninfrastructurehasfailedto emerge. Policymakers and agencies havestruggled to coordinate interventions arounddomesticcooking,electrificationandmechanisationneeds in agriculture into long-term, integratedenergyplanningmodel.

Thecountry’selectricityconnectionmetricsinclude20.17% of the population being grid-connected,where access in rural areas remains low at 5.7%,whilsturbanareascontinuetogrow[121].Besidesthewidevarianceacrosstherural-urbancontinuum,electricityaccessratesalsovarygreatlybyprovinceand city. For instance: 95% of households haveaccess to electricity in Maputo City, the capital ofMozambique, but this figure is 66% in Beira,historicallyMozambique’ssecondlargestcity[117].



EDM[121]attributesthelowfiguresanddivergencein access to electricity to the uneven distributionnetwork, alongwith the historical exclusion of theprivatesectorfrominvestinginelectricityprojects,and low tariffs that are insufficient to fund newexpenditure without subsidies, while remainingbeyond reach for many Mozambican households,particularly the poorest. Nonetheless, theelectrification rate has significantly increased overthepasttwodecades,growingfrom5%in2001to27% in 2017, which has renewed optimism aboutthe possibility of reaching 50% by 2023 anddelivering universal energy nationally by 2030[121].

The Mozambican government has endorsed theSustainableEnergyforAll(SE4All)targetsby2030and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). ItintendstoachievetheSDG#7throughtwostrategiesbasedonthecharacterisationofareasaseitherruralor urban, which has shaped the approaches forenergyaccessadoptedbystateagenciesanddonors.First,thereisastrategyofgridexpansioninwhichthestate-ownedutility,EDM,extends transmissioninfrastructuretomeetgrowingdemand,particularlyin cities and areas well-linked to commercialnetworks. Second is a strategy of decentralisedgeneration,operatingoffthemaingrid,andshapedbyarecognitionofthelimitsofgridextensionandbydonor priorities for addressing clean energy andclimateagendas.ThelatterisimplementedbyFundotheEnergia(FUNAE),apublicinstitutionestablishedin1997withDanishassistance,topromoteaccesstolow-cost, sustainable and alternative sources ofelectricityinareasnotservedbythegrid[121].

FUNAE promotes access to electricity throughfunding and implementing off-grid powerproduction systems, specifically solar PV stand-alonesystemsandmini-grids,mini-hydropowerandbiomass[124].However,lessthan1%ofhouseholdshavebenefitedfromoff-gridconnections,asFUNAEhasmostlyfocusedonelectrifyingschools,hospitals,administrative offices and pumping stations withsolar panels [125]. What is more, many of thehouseholdconnectionshavefailed,duetooperationand management issues [126]. Thus, there aredifficultiesinconnectingthroughoff-gridsystemsaconsiderable percentage of the 5.9 millionhouseholds needed to achieve universal access toelectricity networks [125]. Compounding thesechallenges, urban population growth hasoutstrippedthepaceatwhichhouseholdshavebeenconnected to thegrid [96,127].Moreover, inearly2019, two major cyclones – Idai and Kenneth –causedsignificantdamagetoenergyandotherbasicinfrastructure in Mozambique’s central andnorthern regions, the cost and governancechallenges of rebuilding a resilient electricitynetwork system in the affected areas requireongoingfinancialsupportandpoliticalscrutiny.

Some analysts emphasise the need to create theconditions forprivatesectorparticipation toscale-up and accelerate the pace of off-grid connections[123,126]inordertoachieveelectrificationtargetswhilst simultaneously reducing the burden ofinfrastructure provision on public finances [126].Fael [128] has suggested that private sectorparticipationwillrequirethecreationofaregulatingentitytocontrolandinspectthetariffsappliedbyalloperators to avoid oligopolistic/cartel practices.Infrastructures such as electricity networks arecommonlysubjecttonaturalmonopolismfollowingprivatisation,duetothehighcostsandleadtimesforconstruction,makingitdifficultfor‘newplayers’toenter electricity supply markets without publicfinance assistance and governmental policy andplanningsupport[129].Strongregulatorypracticesare necessary to protect consumers’ rights andinterests regarding tariffs and network costs, thetype and quality of service provided, includingcomplains related to damage to their householdelectricalappliancesduetopoweroverloadafterablackoutorbrownout.

Access to grid-connected electricity remainsaspirationaltomanyhouseholdsinMozambique.Assuch, promises of electricity provision are oftenmobilisedasatoolforpoliticalcampaignstoattractvoters, including in the recent national, provincialandlocalelectionsofOctober2019.Yet,themajorityof Mozambicans continue to rely on charcoal andbiomass to meet their energy needs. In urbancentres, charcoal is the major energy source forcooking,whilstfuelwoodremainstheprimaryfuelinruralareas[117,130].Growingdemandforbothfueltypes drives high wood extraction rates overincreasingareasof forest [130].CO2 emissionspercapitaremaincomparativelylowamongstSouthernAfrican states, at an estimated 0.2 metric tons percapita(2016)growingatanaverageannualrateof5.52 % [131]. However, the transition to a lowcarbon economy is gaining policy and publicattention in Mozambique. By most accounts,Mozambique’s energy system is in transition:renewables are shifting the expectations of energyaccess,particularlyinruralareas[132].Asgrowingdeforestation pushes the supply of charcoal andfuelwoodfurtherfrommajorcities,raisingcostsandsecondary environmental impacts, there aregrowing calls to use domestic fossil fuel resources(including the newly-discovered natural gasdeposits in the northern Rovuma basin, on theborderwithTanzania)forthesocialbenefitorpublicgood of citizens [133]. The ambivalence andcontradictory implications of an emerging energytransition are yet to be fully addressed, includinglong-termenvironmentaldegradationfromafossil-fuel-basedtransitionpathway.!



Mozambique’s colonial history influences

its evolving energy system

Mozambique’s electricity generation is heavilydependentuponhydropower.Hydroelectricityistheprimaryenergysource,accountingforabout77%ofallelectricitygenerated[120].Alongsideproductionfromothersmallerdams,withacombinedcapacityof565MW[127],theCahoraBassadam(2,075MW)sits at the heart of the national energy system,supplying25%ofelectricity suppliedbyEDM.Thebulk of the electricity load (1500 MW) is thenexported to SouthAfricaunder a long-termPowerPurchaseAgreement(PPA)betweenHidroeléctricadeCahoraBassa(HCB)andSouthAfrica’selectricityutility (Eskom), in force through 2029 [121].Mozambique has registered a deficit, however,betweendemandandsupplyasthePPArestrictsitscapacitytoincreasethesupplytoattendthegrowingnational and regional demandof electricity access.ThishasrequiredEDMtopurchaseelectricityfromother energy sources that have emerged since theearly 2000s. These include gas-fired power plantsrunbyprivatefirms,knownasIndependentPowerProducers(IPPs).ThetariffsfromthesenewplantsarehigherthanforHCB-suppliedpower,whiletheyexceed the amount that can be recovered fromcurrentelectricitytariffs[119].ThisuseofIPPshasexacerbated EDM’s finances and constrained itsability to raise funds for grid extension andmaintenance.

From a governance perspective, the Mozambicangovernmenthasrecentlyapprovedanewmandatefor the energy regulatory authority, ARENE, tooperatefrom2018,withenlargedpowersovertariffsetting,concessiongrantingandcompliancecontrols[125]. The government’s announcementnotes thatARENE’s main activity is to regulate electricitysubsectors, including those resulting from anysource of RETs, liquid fuels, biofuels, and thedistribution and commercialisation of natural gas.Accordingly,ARENEcouldpotentiallyplayaroleinbridgingpreviouslyseparategrid-connectedandoff-gridapproaches,alongwithfosteringlinksbetweenelectrification and fuel provision in multiplecontexts. Shifts inMozambique’spolitical economyofenergyhavebeenongoingsincetheearly2000s,whenthegovernmentopeneditseconomytolarge-scale foreign investments, especially in extractiveresources. In harnessing investment in theseresources, including coal and offshore gas, thegovernment aims to reduce long-term aiddependence while developing untapped markets[134,135].Yet,thesedevelopmentsriskentrenchingcarbon-intensiveresourcesinMozambique’senergymix.

Notwithstanding these trends, two major policyinitiatives towards electrification include theGovernmentofMozambique’s(GoM)regulatoryand

structuralreformofitselectricitysectortoimprovepovertyalleviation,knownastheEnergyReformandAccess Programme (ERAP). The second is theRoadmap for a Green Economy (GER) since 2012,primarily aimed at rational natural resourceutilisation (particularly energy) to preserveecosystems for meeting The SustainableDevelopment Goals. The Mozambican stateleveraged funding and support from the AfricanDevelopmentBanktogeneratewhatitdescribesasa“high-level” policy strategy. The roadmapestablishes a series of ambitious developmenttargets, namely, to become an inclusive middle-income country by 2030, whilst simultaneouslyincreasing ecosystem service protections. TheGERpolicyledtotheGreenEconomyActionPlan(GEAP),whichtheCouncilofMinistersapprovedinOctober2013. GEAP was lauded as an inclusive andpluralisticmodelofpolicydevelopment–includingthe participation of multiple governmentalinstitutions,alongsideregionalandlocalauthorities,civil society and private sector stakeholders, andoperatinginconcertwithregional-to-nationalscalepublic consultation. Thus there is considerableevidenceofaparticipatory-deliberative ‘turn’[136,137] in energy policy – whereby the legitimacy ofpolicyoutcomesisderivedfromtheopportunityofaffected stakeholders, including so-called ‘laypublics’, to have direct input into the decision-makingprocess.

The GEAP intended to shape the government’s 5-yearplanandtoprovidethebasisforgreeningtheNational Development Strategy currently underdevelopment. The plan is based on three pillars:sustainableinfrastructure,efficientandsustainableuse of natural resources and strengtheningresilienceandadaptability.Thesepillarsinclude15sub-sectorsanda totalof119greengrowthpolicyoptionswereidentifiedthroughthetechnicalreviewandtheconsultativeprocessbytheGoM.Theaimofthe former programme has been to increaseefficiencyof theelectricitydistributionservices,aswellasexpandaccessmainlyintheurbanandperi-urbanareas[138].

Although both policies focus on energy systemdevelopment as economic growth and policyalleviationmeasures,reviewsofgovernmentpolicyprogrammesshowslowprogressontheground.InMozambique,electricityaccesshasbeenchallengedby complicated governance factors. Externalevaluationofenergygovernanceinstitutionsdeemsthemtobeoperationallyinefficientandplaguedbypoor institutional reform [138-140]. As such, TheWorld Bank Doing Business indicator for ‘gettingelectricity’suggeststhattheprocessforconnectingbusinessesandconsumerstoelectricitygridsisveryslowevenwhentheyareinfullreachofgridcapacity[119].



Broader governance challenges

Aside from the electricity grid access, affordabilityandreliability,Mozambique facesmultiplebroadergovernance challenges. Additional factors concernthecountry’spoliticaleconomyofenergyandwidernetworksinwhichthecountry’senergyproductionand consumption currently circulate. The policyfocus upon grid expansion has prioritised energy-generation ‘mega-projects’ such as hydro-dams,which have stimulated rapid GDP ,growth, butcreated few jobs and few local linkages [141].Megaprojectsaresignificantbecause,inbothhigherandlower-incomeeconomies,theyprovidesomeofthe most enduring technical achievements createdwithinsociety,andalsosomeof themostcostlyordamaging mistakes [142]. Altshuler and Luberoff[143] argue that the neo-liberalisation ofinfrastructure management has encouragedgovernments to court major investors intoinfrastructure development through processes ofprivatisation of utilities, fiscal and regulatoryinducements; effectively politicising infrastructuredevelopment(andsimultaneouslyprivatisingpublicworks–shiftingawayfromdirectpublicinvestmenttowardspublic-privatepartnerships).Thishasledtoa‘scaling-up’ofinfrastructuredevelopmentleadingto a turn towards ‘grand scale’ or ‘mega-project’development.Megaprojectshavebecomea formofsymbolic urban revitalisation through economicgrowth,andsincethe1990sbecameanincreasinglycommon feature of economic development acrosstheworld.

In Mozambique, in broad terms, the logic ofneoliberal restructuring [122] has worked againstdistributiveintentions:foreigncompaniesareluredtolarge-scale,export-orientedprojects,ratherthanconnecting thepoor to the grid,while theongoingfinancialisation of the energy sector makes itcomplicatedfornationalenergycompanies,suchasEDM, and local communities to exert influence.Theseproblemsofgovernancearethenexacerbatedbythehighlevelsofdebtaccumulatingfromenergymegaproject development [144]. Energymegaprojects take decades to develop and build,involve agreement and cooperation from multiplepublic and private interests, and impact uponmillionsofpeopleeitherdirectlyorindirectly[145].The broader social benefits from profit-sharing,infrastructure provision and regional developmentare commonly stressed by energy megaprojectproponents to ‘sell’ the idea of a disruptivemegaprojecttopublicauthorities.Itisthepotentialmass profits and the supposed benefits that thesebring in terms of employment and reducing‘economic friction’ [145] that “justifies” theinvestment risk; megaprojects are thereforeappealingtopolicy-makersforpoliticalandsymbolicas well as practical reasons [146]. However,megaprojects such as major hydro-schemes

commonly fail to achieve their stated objectives,oftenimposeheavycostoverruns,projectdelaysandunintended consequences, and these can only beabsorbedwith greatpain anddifficulty, oftenwithlittlepublicsupport[145-147].

Moreover, there has been a lack of connectionbetween EDM’s planning for grid expansion andmunicipalplanningaroundwhichareasare,inturn,growing and expanding. This has affected EDM’scapacitytosupplyelectricity,includingthequalityofelectricitysuppliedtobotholdandnewcustomers[148].OfficialsinFrelimohavebeen,untilrecently,committedtothismodelofcentralisedprovisionofservices, in order to promote security of energysupply,andspecificallythesupplyofelectricity[35].Yet, the revelation in late 2016 of undisclosedgovernment loans and debt have caused economicturmoil,whichinturnhasaffectedtheprovisionofsocialservices[149-151].TherehasbeenresurgentconflictbetweentherulingpartyandRenamo,whichresulted in armed clashes in 2013 through 2017.Thispolitical-economiccontestationand insecurityhas affected the central government’s push toexpand energy provision and access to energy bylocalpopulationsaffectedbytheconflict.

Apart from these challenges, we still haveinsufficient knowledge concerning the practices ofacquiringandusingenergyatthehouseholdlevelinMozambique. It is clear that shifts in the politicaleconomy of energy production have yet to fullytransform energy provision and everyday energypractices in Mozambican households andbusinesses.For instance, fuelsupplychainsremaindisconnected from the electricity generation anddistributionsystemsandtheextractionofresourcessuchascoalornaturalgas[85].Theconsumptionofbiomassisofconcerntoauthoritiesbecauseofrapiddeforestation, particularly within the hinterland ofmajorcities.Thoughthereisapaucityofqualitativeand quantitative evidence, CastánBroto’s researchonclimatecompatibleplanninginthe“ChamanculoC” neighbourhood of Maputo [152] found thatresidentshavelimitedexpectationsofmunicipalornational intervention in the provision of urbaninfrastructure, including roads, sanitation, wastecollection and electricity. Maputo has the highestelectrificationratesinthecountry,butmanyoftheouter bairros (neighbourhoods) are characterisedby theubiquitouspresenceofcharcoal forcookingandheatingwater.Morerecently,CastánBroto[63]hasobservedthatthepersistenceofcharcoaluseinMaputo’speripheryisduetothefactthatitenablesa measure of local control, or ‘sovereignty’ overenergyresources.

Baptista [29] offers an account of the shift to aprepaidelectricitymeters inMaputo, implementedby EDM since 2004 to, among many reasons,facilitate access among consumers, reducehouseholds’ non-payment of electricity bills and



discourage illegal connections to the grid. Usingethnographic research to examining everydaypractices in local communities,Baptista found thatthe prepaid system has given households greatercontrolovertheirownelectricityconsumptionandallows urban dwellers to more easily gauge andunderstand what they consume, whilst reducingunexpectedhigh,cumulativeorincorrectbillingsbyEDM, and thus avoid debt. Pre-payment hasextended access to residents facing energyvulnerabilities,despitethestructuralinequalitiesinMaputo’s provision of services [29]. On the otherhand, the electricity tariffs that are above mosthousehold incomes have limited their continuoususe of electricity services, and have forcedhouseholdstoadjusttheirelectricityconsumptiontothe financial resources available by combiningcharcoalusewithlimiteduseofelectricity[29,63].These conditions resonate with the concepts ofenergy justice [153], scalar justice [154], and justtransitions [43], which have argued that we mustconsiderthemulti-facetedentanglementsofelectricpower and political power when discussinggenerational and spatial justice within energyproductionandconsumption.

Conclusions

Mozambique is a major centre of hydropowerproduction and has extensive coal and naturalreserves, making it a potentially energy-resourcerich nation. Yet, while energy resources in thecountryareabundant,Mozambicancitizenshasthusfar received littledirectbenefit,especially thoseoflower-income status or in rural and peri-urbanareas. Demographic growth, new energyconsumption patterns, growing risks of extremeweather and climate disruption events, andinstitutional accountability deficits are allexacerbatingwhatisexperiencedonthegroundasanenergycrisis[148].Ourfocusonurbanandperi-urbanenergyrepresentssomethingofashiftawayfromtheprioritygiventoruralelectrificationwithintheobjectiveofnationwideaccesstoelectricity.

Asdiscussedabove,increasedelectricityaccesscansupporteconomicdevelopmentandtheeradicationof extreme poverty by supporting citizens insecuring sustainable, cleaner and safer energysources to power multiple productive activities,mediatedcommunication,education,socialnetworkgrowthandentertainment.However,thismovementis neither linear nor guaranteed, given widerpolitical-economicframeworksandtheinstitutionalopportunities,constraintsandconflictsthatwehaveoutlined in thispaper.Wemustbetterunderstandandenlargeouranalyticalframeworkstoaccountforthecontextualfactorsthathaveshapedthegrowthand stagnation of electricity network development

and its effects on everyday practices and uses ofenergy.

It is also important to explore scenarios of futuredevelopment, andhow theymightbe achieved (orresisted),inordertoenactpracticalandsustainablegrid access benefits to the poorest in the country.What isneeded is furtherdecision-support relatedresearch,inwhichpolicyresponsescanbetailoredto future access goals, which account for broadersocioeconomic and governance challenges and theways in which social and political dynamics mayreshape new energy systems. Currently, there is agap between seeking to fulfil national SDGs(including SDG#7 on universal energy access by2030) and the needs of poor households [125].Fostering local ownership of community-basedsystems, capacity-building approaches andstakeholder empowerment are approaches withuntapped potential. The case of Mozambique alsopoints to the importance of examining social andmaterialpracticesofacquiringandusingenergy,insome casesproducedbynew technologies such assolar PV and gas-fired cooking, and the ways inwhichpeople interactwith them.Furthermore,wemust better understand the historical andgeographic scope of electricity sector reform inregions beyond the capital, Maputo, and movebeyondstaticunderstandingsofgridextension.

Acknowledgements

This Energy Insight was produced as part of theproject:APolitical-EconomicAnalysisofElectricityGrid Access Histories and Futures in Mozambique(POLARIZE),attheUniversityofYork.POLARIZEisfundedaspartofTheAppliedResearchProgrammeonEnergyforEconomicGrowth(EEG)ledbyOxfordPolicy Management. The programme is funded bytheUKGovernment,throughUKAid.!

The Applied Research Programme on Energy andEconomic Growth (EEG) produces cutting edgeresearchonthelinksbetweenenergyandeconomicgrowth,workingcloselywithpolicymakersinSub-Saharan Africa and South Asia to build moresustainable, efficient, reliable andequitable energysystems. EEG is a five-year programme, led byOxfordPolicyManagement(OPM)andfundedbytheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment.Formoreinformationvisit:

www.energyeconomicgrowth.org

The views expressed in this Energy Insight do notnecessarily reflect the UK government's officialpolicies.



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s

DrMatthewCottonisaSeniorLecturerinHumanGeographyattheUniversityofYork,[email protected]

DrJoshuaKirshnerisaSeniorLecturerinHumanGeographyattheUniversityofYork,[email protected]

DrDanielaSaliteisaPostdoctoralResearchAssociateattheUniversityofYork,UK,andvisitingresearcherattheUniversityofEduardoMondlane,[email protected]

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