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The Politics of Ethnic IdentityConstructionAnton L. AllaharPublished online: 12 Nov 2009.
To cite this article: Anton L. Allahar (2001) The Politics of Ethnic IdentityConstruction, Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, 1:3, 197-208,DOI: 10.1207/S1532706XID0103_01
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Requests for reprints should be sent to Anton L. Allahar, Department of Sociology, University of West-
ern Ontario, London, Canada N6A 5C2. E-mail: [email protected]
The Politics of Ethnic IdentityConstruction
Anton L. AllaharDepartment of Sociology
The University of Western Ontario
The issue of identity or identity formation is simultaneously psychological and po-
litical. It is psychological because one’s identity speaks subjectively to how one
feels and how one interprets subjectively one’s position in a social context. Those
factors that one chooses to emphasize in the definition of oneself may not always
coincide with the ones that another will choose. Hence, there is potential for mis-
understanding, if not disagreement, over the criteria that different parties will use
to define one’s identity, for one does not always see oneself as others do. This is
where the political dimension enters.
Social identities often involve social negotiation, and negotiation will always
imply at least two opposing sides. Also, every process of social negotiation is a po-
litical process because politics speaks to the distribution of power in a social situa-
tion. The ability to label (give an identity to) another, and to make that label stick is
purely a matter of power. Therefore, in any dispute over identity it is the one with
greatest power who will ultimately determine the outcome. Following Weber, be-
cause those with power often seek to have their decisions ratified or legitimized by
the majority, the battle over legitimacy is a political battle (Weber, 1978, pp.
941–955). Who decides what criteria will figure in the determination of legiti-
macy?
Depending on the context, criteria of legitimacy can be quite arbitrary. Thus, in
certain situations one’s age, sex, class, race, or even one’s accent and dress, might
confer legitimacy. Understandably, then, in those situations in which identities and
identifications serve to assure access to social goods, the possibility for conflict is
quite high. Those who are excluded feel aggrieved and the threats to social order
can be quite sharp.
IDENTITY: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THEORY AND RESEARCH, 1(3), 197–208
Copyright © 2001 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
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In this special issue, we are concerned with ethnic identities in modern settings.
For all practical purposes today’s world is smaller than yesterday’s. The modern
world is one in which rapid, long distance travel via jet aircraft, instant communi-
cation via the information super highway, the globalization of world economies,
and mass migrations of populations have left few peoples and cultures untouched
by the rest. This has led to a somewhat contradictory set of expectations among
politicians and lay observers alike. On the positive side, one anticipated conse-
quence of this rapid and easy contact has been a greater exposure to the Other, and
among some this was generally expected to lead to a higher degree of tolerance and
acceptance of cultural and individual difference. On the negative side, however,
one might argue that the increased proximity or closeness of the Other has condi-
tioned the greater likelihood of conflict between and among groups whose differ-
ences and dislikes for one another previously were separate or distant enough for
them to ignore one another.
THE PROBLEM
What, then, is the reality of the situation? Is it that ethnic encounters are increas-
ingly peaceful and productive? Or are they increasingly divisive and conflictive?
How do we understand the dynamics at play?
One of the most hotly contested issues in the literature discussing social identi-
ties relates those identities to social movements and the political mobilization of
ethnic populations. Political mobilization takes for granted the gregariousness of
human beings and their preference for collective, social pursuits as opposed to in-
dividual isolation. It is also expected that in such pursuits individuals and groups
will make assessments of what is in their best interests and will devise strategies
for realizing those interests. However, because social reality is always “perceived”
(Klandermans, 1984, p. 584) and open to negotiation, neither political sociologists
nor their subjects are ever in total agreement about the previously mentioned inter-
ests and strategies. Ideological differences abound, and nowhere are those differ-
ences more marked than in considerations of the multiple bases of political
mobilization.
The concept of primordialism—which holds that group attachment and iden-
tity, especially in premodern or traditional societies, are natural, perhaps even bio-
logical—will serve as the point of departure. Those identities of clan, tribe,
village, community, and race were thought to make sense in traditional, mechani-
cal, or folk society. Modern society, on the other hand, was fully expected to erode
the bases of such traditional identities and identifications. For in modern society, it
was anticipated that one’s economic and class position would play a far more im-
portant role in the survival of the individual. This view was held by both conserva-
tive and progressive scholars. From the point of view of Marxists, for example, it
was felt that in the struggle to overthrow capitalism, (proletarian) class identity or
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consciousness would prevail over other types of (primordial) identities (Glazer &
Moynihan, 1975, pp. 7 & 15). The homogenizing impact of the factory experience
and wage slavery were supposed to provide the means by which workers every-
where would be made to recognize their class interests vis-à-vis capital, which in
turn, was expected to unite them against its exploitive and alienating forces. Forms
of identity and consciousness that were not based on class were dismissed as divi-
sive of workers; as false consciousness (Hall, 1980; Parkin, 1979; Solomos, 1986).
Looking at the political history of the 20th century, it is clear that the Marxist
expectations around class were vindicated. In several countries, segments of the
working class and the peasantry came together to advance class claims and suc-
cessfully brought about revolutionary changes aimed at bettering the conditions
under which they lived and worked. As a matter of fact, appeals to class solidarity
under the rubric of socialism proved more successful in that century than any other
appeals and attempts to mobilize human populations anywhere. The success of so-
cialism, as measured by the social benefits that have accrued to workers as a class
(health care, education, employment, and housing) has not been equaled by any
other social movement based on sentimental appeals to race, tribe, nation, or reli-
gion.
It seems, then, that class identity, as it has become crystallized and sharpened
under capitalism, is able to transcend other forms of political identities as a mean-
ingful basis for social action. However, this statement needs to be tempered. For in
the modern world, ethnic and racial identities continue to flourish, to shape eco-
nomic opportunities, and consequently, to inform political action or mobilization.
The key question, then, is under what conditions do ethnoracial identities and sen-
timents become activated in pursuit of both economic and noneconomic interests
in a modern setting?
Stated differently, given the growing ethnically plural composition of modern
societies, and the fact that ethnoracial identity markers are still widely adhered to
in virtually all the advanced, industrial nations today, traditional class analysis
needs to be amended to take account of those who increasingly understand their
class situations as ethnically or racially conditioned, and whose political actions
are informed by such understandings. Examples may be seen in the following: the
1992 Los Angeles race riots in the United States; ethnic cleansing in the former
Yugoslavia; attacks on Turkish immigrants in Germany, Algerians in France, and
East Indians in Britain; Kurdish genocide in Iraq; Arab–Jewish atrocities in the
Middle East; Basque struggles in Spain; linguistic and cultural disputes between
the French and English that threaten to divide Canada; and the ongoing genocidal
battles between the Shaka Zulu and the African National Congress in South Af-
rica. In addition to all of these, I might also mention the related disputes surround-
ing the ever-present claims to nationhood being registered by aboriginal
populations in countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States. These
facts necessitate another look at primordialism.
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PRIMORDIALSIM
The term primordialism or primordial attachment can be understood in two
senses: the hard and the soft. The hard version of the term holds that human beings
are attached to one another (and their communities of origin) virtually by mutual
ties of blood that somehow condition reciprocal feelings of trust and acceptance. It
is the type of attachment that siblings or parents and their offspring are said to ex-
perience, and implies an unquestioned loyalty or devotion purely on the basis of
the intimacy of the tie. In this sense, primordial attachment is natural, automatic,
and supposedly prior to explicitly social interaction.
On the other hand, the soft meaning of the term stresses the social,
nonbiological bases of attachment and draws attention to the importance of inter-
pretation and symbolic meaning in the individual’s social organization of his or
her life. In other words, feelings of intense intimacy and belonging do not have to
be mediated by blood. They can be socially constructed as in the case of fictive kin-
ship or love for one’s country, and excite in adherents the same passion and devo-
tion that are to be found among blood relatives. Understood in the soft sense, then,
primordial attachment depends on the circumstances at hand and understands that
sociopolitical identities are situational, not biological, flexible, not fixed.
Such attachments are the stuff of life as humans go about their daily affairs and
seek to impart meaning to what they do. Such meaning, which is largely symbolic,
is seldom explicitly articulated but is nonetheless shared by all members of a given
community. Therefore, at a certain level those people, places, and things that are
closest—that sustain physical and emotional life—come to acquire a power and
control over humans that they elevate to the level of the sacred, in much the same
way as they develop and maintain their beliefs about God and religion. The un-
questioning devotion that often follows is to be seen as an acknowledgment of the
vulnerability of the individual human being, and the fact that his or her survival is
dependent on forces larger than him or her: “One’s parents give one life. The local-
ity in which one is born and in which one lives nurtures one; it provides the food
necessary for one’s life” (Grosby, 1994, p. 169). Thus, Shils (1968) wrote earlier of
the prominence and ubiquity of self-identification
by kinship connection and territorial location [but, he charges, such self-identification
must be related to] man’s need to be in contact with the point and moment of his origin
and to experience a sense of affinity with those who share that origin. (p. 4)
On this basis, as individuals with perceived common characteristics come to-
gether, groups coalesce and mobilize around common interests.
Echoing clear Durkheimian sentiments, Shils (1957) argued that the attach-
ments characteristic of primary groups (close-knit community, neighborhood, and
even family units) are at the base of the “moral solidarity” of the group, which is to
be contrasted with “the anomic individualism, unrestrained by common moral
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standards, characteristic of modern urban society” (p. 133). For Shils, however,
the intense attachment to a primary group—for example, one’s kinship group—is
neither a function of simple interaction among members, nor is it merely a matter
of affect or emotion. Indeed, the attachment is not easily explicable in words for it
embraces a unique type of deep bonding that fellows do not deem necessary to ar-
ticulate consciously. It is seen to comprise, “especially ‘significant relational’
qualities which could only be described as primordial … . It is because a certain in-
effable significance is attributed to the tie of blood” (p. 142).
Furthermore, we are told that the tie itself assumes a sacred quality so that mem-
bers of the same group also feel a spiritual communion, an extreme
“we-consciousness” with their fellows, even if they do not know them directly;
even if they do not particularly care for each other personally. It is not difficult to
understand how such common sentiments can be appealed to and aroused if, and
whenever, group survival deems it necessary to mobilize them.
BLOOD IS THICKER THAN WATER?
The argument I advance here is that the primordial tie of blood is not the only type of
primordial tie that exists. Ethnic, religious, national, political, and other forms of
identity or attachment to a perceived community that are not necessarily based on
blood, have been known to elicit high levels of uncritical devotion and commitment
among adherents. This is why, in the context of political mobilization, primordial at-
tachments are sometimes seen to be blind and even irrational (Bonacich, 1980, p.
10); or, according to Patterson (1983), purely emotional and belonging “centrally to
that area of experience which Weber designated as non-rational” (p. 26).
However, to argue that some aspect of behavior is irrational is not to say that it
does not exist or is not real because the consequences are quite real for those whom
they touch, whether the latter accept the definition of the situation adopted by those
who initiate the behavior in question. Thus, whether a blood tie actually exists be-
tween a given person and his or her community, is less important than the fact that he
or she believes it does and acts in accordance with such a belief (Allahar, 1993, pp.
46–47 & 52). This is the soft or modified understanding of primordialism.
Following Shils, Geertz (1973) attempted to systematize the treatment of the
concept of primordialism, and to elaborate its meaning. He spoke of “a corporate
sentiment of oneness (p. 260),” which Weber (1978) dubbed “a consciousness of
kind” (p. 387); which could stem from the sharing of a common geographical
space, common ancestors, common culture, language and religion, and in turn,
produced “congruities of blood, speech and custom” (p. 387). Such congruities,
Geertz argued,
are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of them-
selves. One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor, one’s fellow believer, ipso
facto; as a result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common inter-
ETHNIC IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION 201
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est, or incurred obligation, but at least in general part by virtue of some unaccountable
absolute import attributed to the tie itself. (p. 259)
This is a crucial and powerful summary statement that has been the target of
much criticism recently (Bonacich, 1980; Eller & Coughlan, 1993; Hoben &
Hefner, 1990; Mason, 1986). However, the critics, although pointing out some im-
portant flaws in the details of the primordialist argument, have been unable to dis-
miss its general claim. Bonacich, for example, identified the creation of a new
(ethnic) group such as Asian Americans, which is the combination of two previ-
ously warring and hostile nations, and underscores the social as opposed to the pri-
mordial identity held by Asian Americans (p. 11). Similarly, Hoben and Hefner
challenged the notion of primordial identities as fixed or given because at the very
least they are “renewed, modified and remade in each generation. Far from being
self-perpetuating, they require creative effort and investment” (p. 18). Eller and
Coughlan attacked (a) the a priori givenness of primordial identity, (b) its ineffa-
bility or inexplicability, and (c) its emotional or affective content (pp. 187–192).
The first of these criticisms dealing with the “apriority” of primordial senti-
ments may be responded to along with those of Bonacich (1980) and Hoben and
Hefner(1990), by pointing out the essential correctness of the criticism if pri-
mordial is interpreted according to what I call the hard sense or meaning of the
term: original, preexisting, prior, first. It is possible, however, to apply a softer
understanding of the term, which stresses its symbolic nature as opposed to its
absolute, inflexible, scientifically-proven existence or origins. This is what
Weber (1978) alluded to when he spoke of ideas becoming effective forces in his-
tory, and it matters little, Miles (1982) pointed out, if those ideas are proven
false. “Scientifically discredited notions can have a life of their own, a relative
autonomy. But … it is not being suggested that their continued existence is not
without explanation” (p. 19).
As far as Bonacich (1980) went, surely the newness of the Asian American eth-
nic group will mean literally that its origins as a distinct group with a sui generis
identity are also quite recent, and that the attachments of its members may indeed
not be as deep as those of older, more established ethnic groups, or other groups.
And there is not a rule that states that all ethnic groups, old and new, must have pri-
mordial links with the same degree of intensity among their members; or that sym-
bolic identity is equally useful to all groups and individuals at all times. Certainly
the soft approach to defining primordialism can accommodate the objections of
Hoben and Hefner (1990) as well as the apriority concern raised by Eller and
Coughlan (1993); for in this rendering social reality is seen as an entirely socially
negotiated matter.
On the question of the ineffability of primordial ties, Eller and Coughlan (1993)
seemed to answer their own criticism by acknowledging the fact that “social actors
are often unable to explain their feelings and behaviours, at least not in a sociologi-
cally interesting and useful way; there is nothing surprising in that” (p. 190). Be-
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cause not everyone is a sociologist, or agrees on what is sociologically interesting,
and because large numbers of people behave as if their links to their kin and other
primary groups were ineffable, the ineffability of those ties are real for them. And
this is what informs the social meanings that underpin their social actions in their
worlds. “Blood is thicker than water” seems to be sufficient justification for most
people to rally to the side of their coethnics, whether real or imagined, whenever
the latter are threatened.
Therefore, inability to explain some emotional attraction or attachment does
not mean that that attraction or attachment does not exist. Related to this, Eller and
Coughlan (1993) voiced an objection to using the term primordial, which they de-
scribed as “unanalytical and vacuous … unsociological and thoroughly unscien-
tific [and advocate] dropping it from the sociological lexicon” (pp. 183–184)
because it has come to be equated with the emotional, and because to discuss emo-
tions as having primordial bases smacks of sociobiology and genetic program-
ming. “If bonds simply are, and if they are to have any source at all, then they must
have a genetic source. Sociobiological explanations thus become, curiously, the
last bastion of any kind of analytic enterprise” (1993, p. 192).
The response to this criticism is quite straightforward. Human beings are emo-
tional beings and they do have genetic make-ups. Unlike lower forms of animals,
however, they are often able to control their emotions and impulses, and transcend
or even alter aspects of their genetic make-up. In the same way that feminists have
successfully argued that biology is not destiny, that culture and social learning can
overlay biological and natural urges, so too primordially-based emotions and sen-
timents need not be seen as absolute, rigid, and inflexible—hence the previous call
for the softer use of the term. Situationally created identities can, and do, include
primordial ones whenever social actors claim long-standing attachments to groups
and communities of feeling and meaning that, in their estimation, require no elabo-
rate explanation or justification. In the context of this argument, when those claims
serve to inform political action, they cannot be ignored.
This is what Geertz (1973) seemed to imply because in his own elaboration of
the concept he was clear to point out that the strength of primordial attachments or
bonds were subjective and varied with person, time, and place. Also, following
Shils, he invested those bonds with religious contents that “seem to flow more
from a sense of natural—some would say spiritual—affinity than from social in-
teraction” (p. 260, italics added). The insistence on the naturalness of primordial
ties as opposed to their generation in the process of social interaction is unfortu-
nate, confusing, and somewhat contradictory. This is precisely what opens up the
argument to so much criticism on the grounds that primordial attachments are ab-
solute, underived, and given, so-to-speak, from time immemorial. On the other
hand, the use of the word seem suggests a less-than-inflexible stand on Geertz’s
part; an attempt to introduce the element of unpredictability and inconsistency that
may stem from human choice and human error. “The power of the ‘givens’ of
place, tongue, blood, looks, and way-of-life to shape an individual’s notion of
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who, at bottom, he is and with whom, indissolubly, he belongs is rooted in the
non-rational foundations of personality” (p. 277).
Indeed, and this is a point that is too often missed in critiques of Shils and
Geertz, their comments were directed at those who lived in the colonies and other
less developed countries and regions of the world. This is particularly true in the
case of Geertz, who was clearly making recommendations to the leaders in those
countries and offering advice on what needed to be done to diffuse internal, politi-
cal unrest as their countries achieved modern statehood and began to experiment
with national and civil politics. Clearly eschewing any notion of the primordial as
genetically or biologically fixed, then, Shils (1968) wrote that “in nationality the
primordial element begins to recede” (p. 4), and Geertz (1973) cautioned that
what the new states—or their leaders—must somehow contrive to do as far as primor-
dial attachments are concerned is not, as they have so often tried to do, wish them out
of existence by belittling them or even denying their reality … [t]hey must reconcile
them with the emerging civil order by divesting them of their legitimising force … by
neutralizing the apparatus of the state in relationship to them, and by channelling dis-
content arising out of their dislocation into properly political rather than parapolitical
forms of expression. (p. 277)
If nothing else, this acknowledges and speaks directly to the social and political
construction of primordial sentiments (Horowitz, 1975, p. 133) and their capacity
to influence political mobilization, particularly in the colonial and newly inde-
pendent countries.
RACE IS REAL?
Given the growing ethnically plural composition of modern societies and the
fact that ethnoracial identity markers are still widely adhered to in virtually all
the advanced, industrial nations today, social theorists must begin to revise their
ideas around class. Such theorists must now take account of those who increas-
ingly understand their social and economic situations as ethnically or racially
conditioned and whose political actions are informed by such understandings.
Examples may be seen in the 1992 Los Angeles race riots in the United States;
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia; the bloody battles between the
Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire; Kurdish genocide in Iraq;
Arab–Jewish atrocities in the Middle East; the Basque struggles in Spain; and the
ongoing disputes between the French and the English that threaten to divide Can-
ada. In addition, we might also mention the related disputes surrounding the
ever-present claims to nationhood being registered by aboriginal populations in
countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States.
The persistence of conflicts based on race and ethnic (primordial) identities to-
day is seen in large measure (although not entirely) to follow from the inherent
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contradictions of three related sources. First, there are the large-scale international
migrations of peoples from more traditional cultures and societies to the so-called
more developed societies, where culture is highly secularized, and where the val-
ues of liberalism, individualism, and achievement have been constitutionally en-
shrined.
The second source of conflict relates to the fact that the previously-mentioned
constitutions formally embrace the ideas of social justice and equality, which im-
ply that social, economic, and political opportunities are free and open to all indi-
vidual citizens. However in actuality, because those notions of freedom, equality,
and justice are ideological, and because ethnic and racial privileges abound in
those societies, competition, confrontation, and resistance are likely to result
(Nagel, 1984).
A third source of conflict concerns to the international, post-Cold War conjunc-
ture, which began with the breaking down of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling
of the Soviet Union, where “there were about 130 officially recognized nationali-
ties” (Williams, 1994, p. 50). The removal of travel restrictions and the ensuing
flood of refugees from the former socialist bloc to the West have been accompa-
nied by widespread ethnonational conflicts. Thus, in a world that sees “ethnic
groups as emerging transnational actors” (Stack, 1981, pp. 17–45), ethnoracial
identities are adding new dimensions to the older, preexisting conflicts that are
now so rife around the globe.
This is the point alluded to at the outset. For in today’s smaller world, where
multiethnic and multicultural encounters are increasingly the norm, and where
governments seek to extend social benefits to various groups, immigrant and
other, on the basis of racial, ethnic, cultural, sexual and such bases, they literally
invite the manufacture of identities on the parts of the target populations. This is
what leads to conflict when the competition over scarce resources (jobs, housing,
education, and welfare) is settled by the application of physical and cultural crite-
ria that include some, although exclude others. On the part of the minority group
members, it just stands to reason that they would manipulate their identities to fit
the criteria set out by governments for the receipt of entitlements (situational eth-
nicity or identity). Hence, those who traditionally saw themselves as Indians are
transformed into “First Nations,” those who can claim even remote African ances-
try become “visible minorities,” many with physical handicaps become “differ-
ently abled,” and even comfortable, middle-class women who stand to gain from
it, proudly check boxes labeled “women and minorities” when such check marks
offer them special consideration in an otherwise keenly competitive environment.
In the process, class considerations appear increasingly to have been relegated
to a secondary position in explaining such conflicts. However, this is not without
consequence, for although race might be experienced as real by any number of so-
cial actors, when dealing with capitalist society one must remember that capital
has no race, ethnicity, color, nationality, or gender. This does not mean to say, how-
ever, that the ideologies of race, ethnicity, nationalism, and gender will not be uti-
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lized by capital to enhance the rate of exploitation of labor. And similarly, ordinary
citizens will not be reluctant to embrace a given identity if it promises political rec-
ognition and economic gain.
THIS ISSUE
The articles in this special issue address these and related questions. Depending on
the social climate or environment in which they exist, ethnic groups in multiethnic
societies will face differing degrees of pressure to assimilate or conform to the
dominant culture. In those cases where they resemble the dominant group cultur-
ally, that pressure is not likely to be perceived or interpreted negatively; con-
versely, however, in those cases where the ethnic group in question has less in
common with the dominant group(s) or culture, pressure to assimilate is likely to
be resisted. In addition, because groups, ethnic or otherwise, have a tendency to-
ward self-preservation, in instances where such pressure appears to threaten the
survival of the group one can expect that the resistance will be even greater.
In the first article, Alan Anderson offers a theoretical synthesis of the main de-
bates in the field and seeks to clarify a number of terms and concepts that are in-
consistently used in literature. Of special interest here are such concepts as
primordialism, diaspora, circumstantialism, and symbolic ethnicity. His article is
also useful for its treatment of postmodernist impressions of how diasporas and
multiethnic societies are able to accommodate themselves to the new transnational
and global realities of the 21st century.
The largely theoretical approach of Anderson’s article is complemented by the
offering of David Brunsma and Kerry Ann Rockquemore, which is given more to
testing theory. This article is more psychological than political in that it deals with
the subjective identity choices made by individuals of biracial backgrounds. To
that end, it is also concerned with such issues as situational identity construction
and soft primordialism. Anderson’s claim is that physical appearance plays a key
role in the identity one chooses to pursue or to embrace; it is more a matter of
agency than passivity.
If Anderson’s article is about elaborating theory, and Brunsma and
Rockquemore’s article seeks to test theory, the fourth article, by Mara Leichtman,
is aimed at applying theory. Focusing on the Jewish immigrants from Egypt and
Morocco to Israel, Leichtman cautions against the practice of essentializing ethnic
groups. Her article examines the differences between the ways in which the Israeli
census, on one hand, constructs the ethnicity of immigrants and, on the other hand,
the ways in which immigrants themselves construct their identities. She finds a
very important difference in the two processes and is keen to examine the histori-
cal dimensions of immigrant identity as well as the differences in ethnic identifica-
tion between first and subsequent generations of Egyptian and Moroccan
immigrants to Israel.
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The article by Jenny Burman is a rich mix of postmodern theorizing and anthro-
pological concerns with dance and performance. She brings these concerns to-
gether in an examination of Toronto’s Caribana parade, in which she sees “cultural
identity as performance.” Caribana is a Toronto phenomenon with Caribbean
roots (a diaspora?). As a site of identity formation and identity retention, it, like all
diasporic carnivals, is also seen as a form of cultural resistance. However, as in the
case of Caribana, such carnivals have multiple meaning for the participants. This
leads Burman to speak of “cultural remittances” that she divides into two types:
those immigrants who are “nostalgic” for a home they left behind (an elsewhere),
and others who “yearn” for a new set of possibilities in their new land (a beyond).
Caribana brings both together in a dynamic and fluid mix, and beneath the surface
of music, dancing, drinking, and the consumption of ethnic foods and dress, there
is simultaneously a serious process of identity negotiation taking place.
The last article, by Simboonath Singh also deals with the idea of diaspora, but
unlike those who speak of the Caribbean diaspora in other countries, he treats the
Caribbean itself as a diaspora. He traces the historical conditions and circum-
stances attending the institutions of slavery and indentureship, and analyses the
ethnic and racial divisions between those of East Indian and those of African de-
scent. A compelling finding concerns the very different ways in which African and
Indian descended people think of Africa and India. In the Caribbean, Africans
have developed an ideology of return that resulted, in certain instances, in actual,
physical repatriation to Africa. Indians, on the other hand, are delighted to note the
great civilization and the rich cultures of India from which they came, but there is
not the same ideology of return among the Indians. This is most interesting given
the postindependence politics of the Caribbean, which saw independence in the
various countries as being Black in complexion. Indians who arrived much later,
and who held on to their ancestral cultures longer, are not as keen on going home as
is the African.
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