The Populist Dream of Chinese Democracy

CitationPerry, Elizabeth J. 2015. “The Populist Dream of Chinese Democracy.” The Journal of Asian Studies 74 (04) (November): 903–915. doi:10.1017/s002191181500114x.

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ThePopulistDreamofChineseDemocracy

ELIZABETHJ.PERRY

Abstract:MainstreamChinesediscussionsof“democracy”havelongbetrayedadecidedly

populistunderstandingoftheconcept.XiJinpingdrawsfreelyonthistraditioninformulating

hisChinaDream.Xi’seffortsarepartoftheChineseCommunistParty’s“re-Orientation”of

officialpropagandatoshowcasethegloriesoftheancientcivilizationthatitclaimstorepresent

andrejuvenate.Thispopulistinterpretationof“democracy”seekstoelidethefundamental

contradictionbetweenEnlightenmentvaluesandilliberalpolitics.Whetheritwillprove

persuasivetocontemporaryChineseintellectualsremainstobeseen.

ElizabethJ.Perry(eperry@gov.harvard.edu)isHenryRosovskyProfessorofGovernmentat

HarvardUniversityandDirectoroftheHarvard-YenchingInstitute.

PROSPECTSFORCHINA’SDEMOCRATIZATION

SoonafterMaoZedong’sdeathin1976,observersbegantoasktheseeminglyobvious

question:whenwillChinademocratize?Intheearlypost-Maoperiod,heartenedfirstbythe

DemocracyWallmovement(1978–79)andthenbythePRC’simplementationofvillage

electionsandotherpoliticalreforms,interestintheprospectsforChinesedemocracygrew

apace(Fincher1981;Nathan1985;Schell1988).AcrosstheTaiwanStrait,ChiangChing-kuo’s

liftingofmartiallawin1987encouragedexpectationsoftop-downdemocratizationonthe

mainlandaswell.StudentprotestsinmanyChinesecitiesinthelate1980sappearedatfirstto

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enjoytacitsupportfromareformwingoftheChineseCommunistParty(CCP),heightening

hopesforpoliticalliberalizationfromabove.EventheJuneFourthmassacre,followedasitwas

bythesuddencollapseofcommunismacrossEasternEuropeandtheSovietUnion,didnot

stiflepredictionsofdemocratizationinChina.AlthoughtheChinesestatewasnolongerseenas

alikelysourceoftop-downpoliticalreform,scholarssoughttheseedsofbottom-uppolitical

liberalizationintheescalatingpopularprotest,vibrantassociationalactivity,commercialized

media,andcontentiousInternetdebatethatmarkedpost-Tiananmensociety(Ding2002;Gilley

2004;Goldman2005;O’BrienandLi2006;Ogden2002;G.Yang2009;Zhao1998).

Today,however,nearlyfortyyearsafterMao’sdeathandmorethanaquartercentury

afterTiananmen,theChinafieldhaslargelyretreatedfrompredictionsofimminent

democratizationinfavorofresignationtoauthoritarianendurance(HeilmannandPerry2011;

Reilly2012;K.Tsai2007;L.Tsai2007;Whyte2010).Theveryfactorsthatoncewereheralded

asharbingersofpoliticaltransformation—protests,NGOs,socialmedia,arisingmiddleclass—

arenowmoreoftenportrayedasoperatingwithinstate-controlledconstraints,thereby

contributingtosystemstabilityratherthantoregimechange(J.ChenandDickson2010;Chen

Xi2012;Wright2010).EventherareChinascholarwhoprophesiestheimpendingcollapseof

theCommunistsystemdoesnotpaintarosydemocraticfuture.1Moreover,Chineseleaders

themselvesappearmorecommittedthanevertotheperpetuationofCCPrule.XiJinping’s

recentlyannounced“fourcomprehensives”(sigequanmian四个全面)ofgovernance—building

amoderatelyprosperoussociety,deepeningreform,governingthenationaccordingtolaw,

andbeingstrictingoverningtheParty—repeatthefamiliarmantrasofhisautocratic

forerunners.A“princeling”whosepoliticalpowerderivesfromhisfamilyconnectiontothe

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foundinggenerationofChineseCommunists,Xihasanobviousstakeinmaintainingand

legitimizingtheexistingpoliticalsystem.Prospectsforelectoraldemocracyappeardimindeed.

NotonlyhasChinacometobeviewedasabastionofauthoritarianism;increasinglyitis

seenasintentuponexportingitsundemocraticpracticesinacalculatedbidtodisplacethe

UnitedStatesanditsdemocraticwayoflife. AnewbookbyMichaelPillsbury(2015)claimsthat

China’sactionsareguidedbyasecretplanknownasthe“Hundred-YearMarathon,”which

seekstorestoreChinatoits“proper”placeatoptheglobalhierarchybyestablishinganew

worldorderfavorabletoChina.Chinesestrategy,Pillsburymaintains,includesunderminingthe

appealofanAmericanmodelofelectoraldemocracy.ArecentarticleintheJournalof

DemocracybyLarryDiamond(2015,151)alsowarnsthattheChineseare“pushingbackagainst

democraticnorms”bytrying“todiscreditWesterndemocraciesanddemocracyingeneral,

whilepromotingtheirownmodelsandnorms.”

ObserversarecertainlycorrecttopointtoanemergentChineseassertiveness,whichis

apparentinthePRC’smuscularapproachtoeverythingfromoldmaritimedisputes(e.g.,the

Senkaku/DiaoyuIslands)tonewmultilateralinstitutions(e.g.,theShanghaiCooperation

OrganizationandAsianInfrastructureDevelopmentBank).ButChina’sgrowingconfidencein

performingontheworldstagehasnotactuallybeenaccompaniedbyanattackondemocratic

normsordemocracyingeneral,norhasitbeenbuttressedbyovertproselytizingofalternative

authoritarianmodelsandnorms.AsChinaspecialistAndrewNathan(2015,158)notesinan

articleimmediatelyfollowingthatofDiamondintheJournalofDemocracy,“Fornow,atleast,

Chinadisplaysnomissionaryimpulsetopromoteauthoritarianism.”AlthoughNathandetails

halfadozenwaysinwhichChina’spoliciesexertadecidedlynegativeimpactonthefateof

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democracyaroundtheworld,heacknowledgesneverthelessthat“Chinesepropagandadoes

notexplicitlycharacterizeChina’ssystemasundemocratic,insteaddescribingitas‘socialist

democracy,’‘Chinese-styledemocracy,’and‘people’sdemocraticdictatorship’amongother

locutions”(161).

HowshouldweinterprettheChinesestate’sfrequentuseoftheterm“democracy”

(minzhu民主)tocharacterizeitsownpoliticalsystem?Isthisnothingmorethanacaseof

obfuscatingrhetoriconthepartofadisingenuousregime?Oristhelabeltobetakenmore

seriously—ifnotasanaccurateappellationforChina’spresentpoliticalsystem,thenperhapsas

anauthenticaspirationforthefuture?TheChineseCommunistPartyfeaturesdemocracy

prominentlyonitslistofprioritiesfornationalmodernization.WhetherornotChinahasa

secret“Hundred-YearMarathon”plantoovertaketheUnitedStates,asPillsbury(2015)claims,

itdoeshaveanopenlydeclaredhundred-yearplanofdemocratization.InNovember2012,the

18thPartyCongressoftheCCP(whichselectedXiJinpingasitsnewgeneralsecretary)

concludedwiththepromise,“withinonehundredyearsafterthefoundingofNewChina(i.e.,

bytheyear2049),tobuildasocialistmodernizedcountrythatisprosperous,democratic,

civilized,andharmonious”(zaixinZhongguochengli100nianshijianchengfuqiangminzhu

wenminghexiedeshehuizhuyixiandaihuaguojia在新中国成立100年时建成富强民主文明和

谐的社会主义现代化国家)(Xi2014,emphasisadded).

Oneyearlater,inDecember2013,theofficialPartynewspaperPeople’sDailyrana

seriesofeditorialsintroducingasetofonedozenso-called“coresocialistvalues”(shehuizhuyi

hexinjiazhiguan社会主义核心价值观)thatboththePartyandthepeopleareenjoinedto

cultivateandpractice.FormingthemainpillarsofXiJinping’s“ChinaDream,”thesevalues

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includethefournationalgoalsofprosperity,democracy,civility,andharmonyfuqiangminzhu

wenminghexie富强民主文明和谐);followedbyfoursocietalgoalsoffreedom,equality,justice,

andruleoflaw(ziyoupingdenggongzhengfazhi自由平等公正法治);andfourindividualvalues

ofpatriotism,professionalism,integrity,andfriendshipaiguojingyechengxinyoushan(爱国敬

业诚心友善)(Xinhua2014a).BillboardsacrossChinaadvertisethe“coresocialistvalues,”and

newlyeditedtextbooksateveryeducationallevelexpoundontheirimportance.

Itisnoteworthythatdemocracy(minzhu民主)rankssecondontheParty’slistoftwelve

corevalues,trumpedonlybynationalprosperity(fuqiang富强).Itisevenmorestrikingthat

theCCP’sparamountleader,XiJinping,insiststhatthecultivationanddevelopmentofall

twelvecorevaluesmustbefirmlybasedon“Chinesesplendidtraditionalculture”Zhonghua

youxiuchuantongwenhua(中华优秀传统文化)(Xi2014,163–64).Ifthe“democracy”thatthe

CommunistPartyhasinmindisrootedinChinesetradition,thenclearlyitreferstosomething

quitedifferentfromwhatAmericansocialscientistsgenerallyhaveinmindwhenwedebate

theprospectsforChina’sdemocratization.

CHINA’SPOPULIST“DEMOCRACY”

AccordingtoChina’sofficialnewsagency,Xinhua(2014b),theterm“minzhu”connotes

abroaderanddeepermeaningofdemocracythaniscapturedbyanypurelyinstitutionalor

operationaldefinitionstressingcompetitiveelections,majoritarianrule,orpopularcheckson

centralgovernmentpower.The“minzhu”advocatedbyleadingintellectualsthroughoutthe

courseofChinesehistory,Xinhuatellsus,derivesfromtheancientpoliticalprincipleof“the

primacyofthepeople”(yiminweizhu以民为主).ThisideaistracedbacktotheBookofHistory

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orShujing书经withitspronouncementthat“thepeoplearethesolefoundationofthestate;

whenthefoundationisfirmthestateispeaceful”(minweibangben,bengubangning民惟邦

本，本固邦宁),anotionthatwasfurtherdevelopedbyMenciusinafamouspassage:“the

peoplearemostimportant,thecountrycomesnext,theruleristheleastimportant”(minwei

gui,shejicizhi,junweiqing民为贵，社稷次之，君为轻).2

IndiscussionsofXiJinping’scontemporaryMassLineEducationandPracticeCampaign,

CommunistPartytheoreticianslocateitsintellectualpedigreewithinaChinesetraditionof

“populism”(minbensixiang民本思想)thatextendsfromMenciusthroughtheMassLine

(qunzhongluxian群众路线)ofMaoZedongandotherearlyCCPrevolutionaries(Liu

ChuanshengandWeiZhimin2013a,34–36;2013b,31).Muchismade,forexample,ofan

earthyinjunctionbyXiJinping’sownfather,XiZhongxun,atawartimecadres’conferenceon

legaladministrativereform:“Plantyourassessquarelyonthesideofthemasses”(bapigu

duanduandizuozailaobaixingdezheyimian把屁股端端地坐在老百姓的这一面)(Liang2013,

41–42).WhileWesternsocialscientistsarepronetoconflatelegalreformwithpolitical

liberalization,intheChinesecontext(imperialandCommunistalike),legalreformshavemore

oftenbeenassociatedwithpopulismthanwithliberalism(Liebman2011).

Incontrasttothisindigenouspopulisttradition,contemporaryCCPtheorists

counterposeAnglo-AmericandemocracyasderivingfromaWesterntraditionof“humanism”

(renbensixiang人本思想)thatstretchesfromtheancientGreekadage,“ManistheMeasure

ofAllThings,”throughtheRenaissancetoEnlightenmentconceptionsofnaturalrights.3

Interestingly,thesepartytheoreticiansdonotdenyordenigratethevalueofWestern

democraticideasandinstitutions.Rather,theyacknowledgethatcertainprominentfeaturesof

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theirownpoliticalsystem,mostnotablyPeople’sCongresses,havenoantecedentsinChinese

traditionandwereobviouslyinspiredbytheexampleofWesternlegislatures,asinterpretedby

theSovietUnion(Zhang2013;seealsoLeibandHe2006).Moreover,theyarguethatChinastill

hasmuchtolearnfromWesterndemocratictheoryandpractice.Forexample,someauthors

pointtoAustralianpoliticaltheoristJohnDryzek’swritingsondeliberativedemocracy(xieshang

minzhu协商民主)asaparticularlyusefulsourceofideasforimprovingParty-massrelations.

Deliberativedemocracy,inwhichordinarycitizensareinvitedtoparticipateindiscussions

aboutgovernmentpolicies,theysuggest,maybebetterablethanelectoraldemocracyto

encouragecompromiseamongconflictinginterests,anessentialattributeofanyfunctional

systemofgovernanceintoday’sincreasinglycomplexanddiverseworld(LiuChuanshengand

WeiZhimin2013a,162–64;seealsoLeibandHe2006).

ThewritingsofCCPtheoreticiansarenotnecessarilyreflectiveofpopularattitudes,of

course.AndamongChinesecitizens,asamongAmericans,understandingsofdemocracyvary

widely.Butaninstitutionaldefinitionofdemocracythatrequirestheselectionofpolitical

leadersviacompetitiveelectionswithuniversalsuffragedoesnotseemtobewhatmost

Chinesehaveinmindwhentheyspeakof“minzhu.”AnencounterbetweenanAmerican

reporterandaChinesestudentinTiananmenSquareattheheightofthe“Democracy

Movement”inthespringof1989,recordedbyeyewitnessCraigCalhoun,istelling.Calhoun,a

prominentsociologistwhowasteachingatauniversityinBeijingatthetime,recalls,

AroundMay18,severalofmyChinesestudentsandIweremarchingalongChang’an

BoulevardonourwayintoTiananmenSquare.AreporterforaCalifornianewspaper

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strodealongsideusandaskedmetotellherwhatthestudentsreallywanted.“Ask

themyourself,”Isaid,“theyspeakEnglish.”Sheaskedone,whorepliedsimply,

“Democracy.”“Whatdoyouthinkdemocracymeans?”sheasked,asthoughofachild.

Mystudentrespondedwithexaggeratedhumility,“Oh!YoucomefromAmerica.What

doesdemocracyreallymeantoyou?”Thereporterstammered,“Well,er,um,youknow,

electionsIguess.”“Ah,”saidthestudent,“IthinkmoreintermsofRousseauandthe

modelofdirectparticipation.”(Calhoun1997,243–44)

Whilethisparticularstudentwassurelymorearticulateonthesubjectofdemocracythanmany

Chinesecitizens(nottomentionAmericanjournalists),heranswerdoesneverthelessindicatea

morepopulistconceptionofdemocracythanaSchumpeterianstressoncompetitiveelections

wouldimply.Inthispopulistview,thegoalisnottorestraingovernment,buttoempowerit

throughtheactivepoliticalparticipationofthecitizenry.Thestudent’sreferencetoJean-

JacquesRousseauinthisregardisapt—evokingaradicalunderstandingofdemocracythat

infusednotonlythe1989studentmovement,butalsotheCulturalRevolutionthatprecededit.

PoliticaltheoristBenjaminSchwartz(1970,158–60)notedshortlyaftertheonsetoftheCultural

RevolutionthattheideologicalunderpinningsofMao’stumultuouscampaignboremorethana

passingresemblancetoRousseau’sdoctrinesof“civicmorality”and“generalwill”asappliedby

JacobinsduringtheFrenchReignofTerror.

AsDanielChirotemphasizesinhisintroductoryessay,illiberalchallengesto

EnlightenmentvalueshavebeenarecurringfeatureofthemodernerainEuropeandthe

UnitedStatesaswellasinAsia.IncontemporaryChina,politicalilliberalismhasoftentakenthe

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formofmass“revolutionarydemocracy.”Aretrospectiveonthe1989TiananmenUprisingby

(now)NobellaureateLiuXiaobooffersastingingcritiqueofthemassprotesthehelpedinspire,

indictingitasanundemocraticmovementthatunwittinglyreproducedmanyoftheworst

featuresofChineseCommunistrevolutionarypracticeandculture:

Mostoftheresourcesandmethodswemadeuseoftomobilizethemasseswereones

thattheCommunistPartyhadusedmanytimesbefore....Assoonaswebeganour

revolution,webecameextremelyconceited–justasifwehadrevertedtothetimeof

theCulturalRevolutionandfeltourselvestobethemostrevolutionary.Assoonaswe

joinedthe1989protestmovement,weconsideredourselvestobethemostdemocratic.

Afterall,hadwenotfastedfordemocracyanddevotedourselvestoitandmade

sacrificesforit?...Ourvoicebecametheonlytruth.(LiuXiaobo1994,315,318)

TheconflationofrevolutionarymassparticipationandCommunistPartyleadershipwith

“democracy”wascertainlyahallmarkofMaoism(Mao1940).Butthetendencytoidentifythe

willofthepeoplewiththestrengthofthenationhasanolderlineage,reflectedinChinese

visionsofdemocracyeversinceLiangQichao’sseminalwritingsonthesubjectinthelate

nineteenthcentury.AsAndrewNathan(1985,128)explains,“democracywasseenasahighly

efficaciousmeansoftappingthevastenergieslatentinthemassestopropelthecountryoutof

backwardnessandintoapositionofworldpower.“

AnanalysisofChinesepoliticalculturebyapoliticalscientistattheChineseAcademyof

SocialSciences,basedonanationalsurveyofpoliticalattitudesconductedin1988—oneyear

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beforetheTiananmenUprising—highlightsthismoreexpansiveviewofstate-societyrelations.

TheauthortitledtheworkChinesePoliticalMan(Zhongguozhengzhiren中国政治人),inan

obviousreferencetoSeymourMartinLipset’s(1960)classicworkonAmericanpolitics,and

usedafour-characterChinesephrase,“PreventHarm/PromoteGood”(yi’eyangshan抑恶扬

善),tocapturewhathesawasafundamentalcontrastbetweenthepoliticalculturesofthetwo

countries.WhereasAmericanspurportedlybelievethatthechiefpurposeofgovernmentisto

preventharmbyrestrainingindividualsandgroupsfrompursuingtheirowninterestsatthe

expenseofothers,Chinesearesaidtoenvisionamoreproactiveandpopulistmissionfortheir

governmentofpromotinggood—withofficialsexpectedtosetforthgoalsforthebettermentof

societyandtoguidecitizensinachievingthosecollectivegoals(Zhang1994).

InChina,populistconceptionsofdemocracy,forwhichthelitmustestofa“democratic”

governmentiswhetheritbenefitsthepeopleandreflectsthewillofthepeople,seem

consistentlytotrumpelectoralconceptions.Ina2011nationalsurveyofpoliticalattitudes

conductedundertheauspicesoftheChineseAcademyofSocialSciences,onlyasmallminority

ofrespondents(15percent)agreedwiththestatementthat“democracymeansasystemof

periodicelectionsinwhichnationalleadersarechosenthroughcompetitionbetweenpolitical

parties.”Theoverwhelmingmajority(85percent)preferredadefinitionofdemocracyas“a

systeminwhichgovernmentleadersreflectpeople’sinterests,servethepeople,andsubmitto

supervisionbythepeople.”Responsesvariedbyeducation,withbetter-educatedrespondents

morelikelythantheirless-educatedcounterpartstoequatedemocracywithelectoral

competition.Butevenamongthebesteducated,thevastmajority(75percentofthosewith

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PhDandMAdegrees)chosethe“populist”overtheelectoraldefinitionofdemocracy(Zhang

2013,57–60).

Moreinterestingthanthedefinitionalissuewereresponsestoquestionsaboutthe

desirabilityandfeasibilityofelectoraldemocratization.Onesurveyquestionread,“InAmerica,

therearetwomajorpoliticalparties.Everyfewyearsthereareregularelectioncampaignsin

whichthetwopartiescontendforgovernmentleadershippositions.DoyouthinkChinanowor

infutureshoulddevelopinthisdirection?”Aclearmajority,61percent,chosethe“shouldnot”

option.Again,better-educatedrespondentsweremoresympathetictoAmerican-style

democracythantheirless-educatedcounterparts,butstillonly50percentofPhDandMA

degreeholdersexpressedsupportforChinamovinginthisdirection(Zhang2013,81–84).

Whenrespondentswereaskedwhichthree(outoffive)factorsposedthegreatestobstaclesto

buildingdemocracyinChina,“severecorruption”toppedthelist,with72percentof

respondentsselectingit;“leadersnotfullycommittedtoservingthepeople”wassecondwith

52percent;“severebureaucratism”cameinthirdwith48percent;“inadequatemass

supervisionofgovernment”rankedfourthwith46percent;and“lackofregularcompetitive

elections”cameinadistantlast,withamere19percentofrespondentschoosingitasamajor

obstacletoChina’sdemocratization(91).

Thisgeneraldisinterestinelectoraldemocracymayhelptoexplainthenotablelackof

enthusiasmamongmainlandChineseforHongKong’sOccupyCentralMovementlastyear

(YangHengjun2014).FormanyinthePRC,therealissueatstakeintheprotestswasnotthe

restrictiveregulationsforelectingtheHongKongchiefexecutive.Populardiscourseinthe

mainlanddenouncedtheHongKongdemonstratorsasunpatrioticingrateswhoseactions

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betrayedbothalackofgratitudeforChina’sgenerousassistancetotheIslandandadeplorable

deficitof“Chineseculturalidentity”(Zhonghuawenhuarentong中华文化认同).

THECHINADREAM

AnemphasisonChineseculturalidentityisattheheartofXiJinping’sChinaDream,

whichenvisionstheriseofapowerfulandwealthynationandispresentedastheParty’s

responsetothecollectiveyearningoftheChinesepeople.Shortlyafterhisselectionasgeneral

secretaryoftheChineseCommunistParty,XistoodproudlyintheGreatHallofthePeoplein

frontofamonumentalpaintingoftheGreatWallwherehereferencedChina’s5,000-year-old

civilizationandproclaimedthat“realizingthegreatrevivaloftheChinesenationisthegreatest

dreamoftheChinesepeopleinmodernhistory”(shixianZhongghuaminzuweidafuxing,jiushi

Zhonghuaminzujindaiyilaizuiweidademengxiang实现中华民族伟大复兴，就是中华民族

近代以来最伟大的梦想)(GlobalTimes2012;Xinhua2012).SoonthereafterXiledfellow

membersofthePolitburoStandingCommitteeonawell-publicizedvisittotheNational

MuseumofChinatoviewanexhibitionentitledTheRoadtoRevival,whichfeaturedtheheroic

roleoftheCommunistPartyinspearheadingChina’snationaliststruggles.OpeningwithChina’s

humiliationinthemid-nineteenth-centuryOpiumWars,theexhibitconcludedonatriumphal

notewithitsdeclarationthat“todaytheChinesenationtowersmajesticallyintheOrient;the

brilliantprospectofthegreatrevivalisalreadyunfoldingbeforeus.Thedreamandquestof

China’ssonsanddaughterscandefinitelyberealized!”(NationalMuseumofChina,n.d.).

EmployingabrandofextravagantrhetoriconcereservedforpraiseofChairmanMao’s

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revolutionaryline,theCCPwasre-Orientingitspropagandatoshowcasethegloriesofthe

ancientcivilizationthatitnowclaimedtoberepresentingandreviving(Perry2013).

Inframingthenationalquestasa“dream,”XiJinpingdrawsuponimagerythathas

figuredprominentlyinChinesestatecraft,philosophy,andliteratureformillennia.Oraclebone

artifactsshowthattheinterpretationofdreamsinancientChinawasoftenlinkedtocritical

militaryandpoliticaldecisionsbystaterulers(Brennan1993).TheDaoistphilosopherZhuangzi

isrememberedforhisvividbutterflydream,whichimpliedthepossibilityofradical

transformationthroughactiveimaginingandawakening(Watson1996).4Themostfamous

novelintheChineseliterarycanonisDreamoftheRedChamber;indeed,anentirefieldof

academicresearch,knownas“Redology”(hongxue红学),isdevotedtoitsstudy.

Earlytwentieth-centuryChineseintellectualsfrequentlychosetopresenttheirutopian

visionsofpopulistdemocracyindreamlikestyle.In1902,forexample,LiangQichaopublisheda

shortnovelentitledTheFutureofNewChina,whichwassetintheyear2062inaprosperous

landknownas“GreatChineseDemocracy”(DaZhonghuaminzhuguo大中华民主国).The

novelopenswiththecitizensofGreatChineseDemocracyhavinginvitedaseventy-second-

generationdescendantofConfuciustodeliveralectureattheShanghaiWorldExpoonhow

Chinesedemocracyhasbeenimplementedinthecountry.Thelectureofthislatter-day

Confuciandrawsahugeandappreciativeaudience,includingthrongsofoverseasvisitors.

LiteraturescholarDavidDer-weiWang(2015)observesthatLiangQichao’soncefuturisticnovel

exudesan“uncanny”auraofauthenticitytoday,intheaftermathoftheShanghaiWorldExpo

andtheestablishmentofhundredsofConfuciusInstitutesaroundtheworld.AsWangputsit,

“the’future’ofnewChinaseemstohavebecomerealityinthenewmillennium.”Theeerie

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senseofdéjàvuanticipatedinLiangQichao’sprescientnovellanotwithstanding,thereareof

coursesomekeydiscrepanciesbetweenhisvisionandcontemporaryreality.DespitetheParty’s

recentendorsementofConfucianism,theofficialideologyofthePRCremainsMarxism-

Leninism-MaoZedongThought.

XiJinping’sChinaDreamdrawseclecticallyuponimperialandrevolutionarysymbolism

alike,asthoughpartandparcelofoneseamlessandunitary“Chinesenationaltradition.”But,

essentialistandOrientalistasthisconstructionmaybe,itisnotputforwardinoppositionto

Westerndemocracy.Democracy,likescience,isexplicitlyacknowledgedbytheCCPtobeakey

elementofmoderngovernance.However,thegoalinembracingthesetwinEnlightenment

valuesisnottheflourishingofindividuallibertiesbuttheflourishingoftheChinesenation.The

term“Chinesenation,”orZhonghuaminzu中华民族,designatesakindofsupra-nationalityof

ChinesepeoplethatbothincludesandtranscendstheHanmajoritynationalityalongwiththe

fifty-fiveminoritynationalitiesthattogetherofficiallycomprisethePeople’sRepublicofChina

(Elliott2015,187).Thisexpansiveethnoculturalconstructionisintendedtoappealnotonlytoa

domesticconstituency,butalsotooverseasChinesewhoareexpectedtoidentifyculturallyand

sympathizeemotionallywiththeriseofthemotherland.Thegrowingprideandprosperityof

theChinesenationisseenasenhancingpopularsovereignty,or“minzhu.”

Massiveanti-PRCprotestsinbothHongKongandTaiwanlastyearsuggestthatnot

everyoneinGreaterChinadreamsthesamedream,however.AsthecaseofTaiwanin

particulardemonstrates,Chinesepoliticalcultureisnotuniform.NordoesChineseculturepose

aninsuperablebarriertoliberaldemocratization—evenwhen“princelings”areincommand.

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Afterall,ChiangChing-kuowasalsoderidedasa“princeling”whenhefirstinheritedthereins

ofpowerinTaiwan,yethedefiedexpectationsbybreakingwithhisfather’sautocraticpractices.

ItishardtoimagineXiJinpingfollowinginthefootstepsofChiangChing-kuo,however.

Xi’sAnti-CorruptionCampaignandMassLineEducationandPracticeCampaign,withtheirhard-

hittingattackoncadrecorruptionandharkeningbacktoMao’scallto“servethepeople”by

adheringtothe“massline,”areclearlyintendedtoappealtopervasivepopulistsentiments

amongPRCcitizens.Hisapproachisunlikelytopromotechangeinadirectionthatmost

Americanswouldrecognizeasdemocratic,but—totheextentthatXi’seffortssucceedin

significantlyreducingofficialcorruptionandbureaucratism—hisfellowcompatriotsmaywell

credithimwithadvancingtheCCP’scentury-longcommitmenttobuildingminzhu.

CONCLUSION:INTELLECTUALLIMITSOFTHEPOPULISTDREAM

WilltheChineseCommunistParty’spopulistdreamsucceedinfinessingthe

fundamentalcontradictionbetweenEnlightenmentidealsandilliberalpolitics?CantheParty’s

syncreticblendofscience,democracy,Confucianharmony,andMaoistrevolution,allwrapped

upinonedreamypackageofnationalmodernity,serveasasustainableframeworkforregime

legitimacy?DanielChirotnotesthatintheenditisuptointellectualstotakeastandonthe

ongoingbattlebetweenEnlightenmentliberalismandtheCounter-Enlightenment.HowChina’s

intellectualswilladjudicatethisissueisfarfromcertain.

Indeed,nowherearethecontradictionsofthePRC’scurrentintellectualclimatemore

glaringthanwithintheinstitutionthatmostembodiesthelegacyoftheAgeofEnlightenment:

themodernuniversity.Itisoftenassumedthatgreatuniversitiescannotthriveabsentthe

16

freedomsofthoughtandexpressionthatareguaranteedonlyunderaliberaldemocraticpolity.

ThePRCisbettingotherwise.Spurredonbygenerousinfusionsofstatefunding,China’sleading

universitiesareembarkeduponaconcertedefforttoenterthetopranksof“world-class

universities.”Theironiesandambiguitiesofthisendeavorabound.WhiletheChinesestate

investsheavilyinareasbelievedtobeessentialforbuildingatwenty-first-century“knowledge-

basedeconomy”(i.e.,theSTEMfieldsofscience,technology,engineering,andmathematics),it

alsoappreciatesthatintellectualinnovationmayrequireexposuretothecriticalthinkingfound

inthehumanitiesandsocialsciences—despiteseriousworriesaboutunwelcomeliberalizing

side-effectsofsuchexposure.Asaresult,universitiesinChinaofferWestern-styleliberalarts

programsandConfucian-stylelearningalongsideParty-mandatedclassesinpoliticalideology

andcompulsorymilitarytraining.Glitzynewmega-universitiesboastexpensiveinfrastructure

andhandsomelyfunded“innovationbases”(chuangxinjidi创新基地)equippedwithstate-of-

the-artlaboratoriesandothercutting-edgeresearchfacilities.Atthesametime,universitiesare

firmlycontrolledbyCommunistPartycommittees,andInspectionGroups(xunzhizu巡视组)

reminiscentofMaoistworkteamsencouragestudentsandfacultytolodgedenunciations

(jubao举报)againstanyonesuspectedofpoliticalorethicalimpropriety.Ontheonehand,

China’sMinistryofEducation(MOE)urgesitsuniversitiesto“globalize”byengaginginawide

rangeofinternationalacademicprogramsandexchanges;ontheotherhand,thesameMOE

enjoinsuniversitiesagainstadoptingtextbookstaintedby“Westernvalues”(He2015).Under

thecurrentregime,so-calledNewLeftintellectuals(xinzuopai新左派)enjoyfargreater

latitudeforpoliticalexpressionthandoChina’sbeleagueredLiberals(ziyoupai自由派).

17

Despitethesecontradictionsandconstraints,todatetheparty-state’sapproachto

highereducationappearssurprisinglyeffective:Chineseuniversitieshaveindeedbeenrising

steadilyintheglobalrankingsofresearchuniversities(Kirby2014).Moreover,amidafloodof

popularprotestthathasengulfednearlyeverysectorofpost-TiananmenChinesesociety,the

country’scollegecampuseshaveremaineduncharacteristicallyquiet(Perry2014).

ComplianceoftheChineseintelligentsiaisundoubtedlyaconditionofcontinued

CommunistPartyrule.Yet,aseverygenerationofstudent-led“democracy”movementsfrom

MayFourthtoJuneFourthdramaticallydemonstrated,suchpoliticalquiescencecannotbe

takenforgranted.WhetherXi’spopulistdreamofrecoveringChina’sancientglorywillwinthe

abidingallegianceoftoday’sdescendantsoftheNewCultureMovement(orthe“Chinese

Enlightenment”asthatheadyperiodfromthemid-1910sto1920sisoftencalled)remainsto

beseen.Afterall,themostcelebratedwriteroftheNewCultureMovement,LuXun,warned

darklyofthedangersoftryingtomodernizeChinaonthebasisoftraditionalvalues.

LuXun’sscathingcritique,Kuangrenriji狂人日记[DiaryofaMadman],publishedin

1918,accusedtheChinesetraditionofhavingfostereda“man-eatingsociety”thatwouldhave

tobethoroughlyexpungedifthecountrywereevertoadvancetowardanewandmore

humanefuture.5PosthumouslylionizedbyMaoZedonginhisOnNewDemocracy(1940)as

“thegiantofChina’sculturalrevolution,”LuXunhasalwaysbeenreveredasaniconicfigurein

thePRC.ButthesedaysLuXun’swritingselicitlesseffusivepraisefromtopPartyleadersthan

inthepast,duenodoubttohisinsistenceonthefundamentalincompatibilitybetween“old”

Confucianand“new”revolutionaryideas(Wasserstrom2015).

18

InthisdayoftheubiquitousChinaDream,itisworthrecallingaremarkablestatement

thatLuXuncomposed,notlongbeforehisdeath,onthesubjectofdreams:

Todreamistobefreezuomeng,shiziyoude(做梦，是自由的)，

Totalkaboutdreamsisbeunfree(shuomeng,jiubuziyou说梦，就不自由).

Todreamistodreamrealdreams(zuomeng,shizuozhenmengde做梦，是做真梦的)，

Totalkaboutdreamsissurelytolie(shuomeng,jiunanmianshuohuang说梦，就难免

说谎).(citedinWang2015)

Theelegantverseofthemosteloquentvoiceofthe“ChineseEnlightenment”advisesdue

skepticismtowardtheofficialarticulationofdreams,implyingtheinherentlimitsoftheParty’s

publiclyproclaimedvisionofpopulistdemocracy.

Acknowledgments

IthanktheaudienceandfellowpanelistsattheAssociationforAsianStudiesroundtable

wherethispaperwasfirstpresented,aswellasTeresaWrightandtheeditorsoftheJournalof

AsianStudiesforchallengingquestionsandhelpfulsuggestions.

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1Shambaugh(2015)foreseesacollapsethatis“likelytobeprotracted,messyandviolent.”

2http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2014-08/15/c_1112089028_2.htmiomBookIII.

3Ofcourse,theymightalsohavenotedthattheEnglishterm“democracy”derivesfromthe

Greek“demos-kratos”or“people-power,”andthatAtheniandemocracywaspredicatedonthe

desirabilityofdirectcitizenparticipationingovernance(Ober2007).

4Onthethemeof“awakening”inmodernChinesehistory,seeFitzgerald(1996).

5Formoreonthe“darkside”ofLuXun,seeLee(1987).