The possibility of prudence

JANET BROUGHTON

THE P O S S I B I L I T Y OF P R U D E N C E

(Received 10 November, 1981)

I

In Part II of The Possibility o f Altruism, 1 Thomas Nagel tries to answer this

question: how is it possible that "there is reason to do not only what will

promote that for which there is presently a reason, but also what will

promote something future for which it is expected there will be a reason"

(p. 36)? Nagel describes the method he uses to answer this question as a "method ... of metaphysical ethics: moral and other practical requirements

are grounded ... in a metaphysics of the person" (p. 18). The particular

account of prudence Nagel gives using this method is, roughly, that prudence is that practical expression of a person's conception of himself as equally real over time.

I am first going to lay out what I take to be the important steps of Nagel's argument for this account of prudence, and then I will try to show that this

account produces a type of counterintuitive result. After showing what it is in Nagel's account that produces this result, I will make what I think is the

best possible revision of the account. Finally, I will argue that there may be a fatal flaw even in the revision, and suggest that if the flaw is fatal, then the

"method of metaphysical ethics" cannot explain the possibility of prudence.

If someone is to conceive of himself as a person, Nagel begins, part of his conception should acknowledge his persistence as a person over time. If some-

one conceived of himself as a person but could acknowledge his personhood only at, say, the present moment, then his conception would be so degenerate that it would merit our attention only as a curiosity. I f someone is to have a full-blown conception of himself as a person, he must be able to conceive

of himself as "equally real over time" (p. 71). He must be able "to identify

Philosophical Studies 43 (1983) 2 5 3 - 2 6 6 . 0031-8116/8310432-0253501.40 Copyright �9 1983 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

254 J A N E T B R O U G H T O N

with past and future stages of himself and to regard them as forming a single

life" (p. 58).

Someone cannot acknowledge his persistence as a person over time if he

regards "the fact that a particular stage is p r e s e n t ... as conferring on it any

special status" (p. 60). In one sense, of course, a person does regard the

present as having a special status when, for example, he acknowledges that

it is the only stage of his life at which he can (now) act. The point, however, is that a person must also acknowledge that any given past stage of his life was the only one at which he could (then) act and that any given future

stage of his life will be the only one at which he will be able (then) to act.

Nagel makes precisely this point, and all the analogous ones, in the next

step of his argument. He says that a person can avoid conferring special status on the present

simply because it is present only by believing that what he asserts about the present is true or false of other times in exactly the same s e n s e that it is true

or false of the present. Roughly, if someone believes a tensed statement, then

he must also believe a tenseless statement which has the same content as the tensed one. More precisely, a person must believe (a) a corresponding tenseless statement about the time the tensed one refers to and (b) a statement giving the relation between that time and the time the tensed

statement is uttered, i.e., the relation which makes the tense of the tensed

statement appropriate (p. 61). So far, then, Nagel has argued as follows: first, someone can conceive of

himself as a person persisting over time only if he does not think that the

present's being present confers special status on it. Second, if someone does not think that the present's being present confers special status on it, then

when he believes a tensed statement he must also believe statements of types

(a) and (b), as described above. Among the tensed statements which a person may believe, Nagel continues,

are statements that he has (did have, will have) reason to promote something (call it x). These statements are expressions of a person's practical judgments, and a p r a c t i c a l judgment must have motivational as well as factual content. When someone makes a practical judgment, he does not just aver that a reason-predicate applies to x; he must also accept the reason as a reason for his acting. The motivational content of a person's practical judgment is his acceptance of a justification for promoting x (p. 65). When there are no contrary influences on him, his practical judgment can motivate him to "the

T H E P O S S I B I L I T Y OF P R U D E N C E 255

appropriate act or desire" (p. 66) and can serve as a "sufficient explanation"

(p. 67) of his action or desire, if he performs the appropriate act or has the

appropriate desire. Another way to put this point is to say that when someone believes he has reason to promote x, he must believe both that a reason- predicate applies to x and that the reason provides him with a justification

for promoting x. Nagel next applies what he has said about tensed statements to those

tensed statements which express practical judgments. When someone believes that he has (did have, will have) at time t reason to promote x, he must also

believe (a) a tenseless statement about t to the same effect as the tensed

statement and (b) a statement giving the relation between t and the time the tensed statement is uttered, the relation which makes appropriate the tense

of the tensed statement (p. 68). For the 'same effect' clause in (a) to hold,

the tenseless statement must contain not only the tensed statement's factual

content but also its motivational content. In other words, regardless of the tense of a statement expressing one of a person's practical judgments, if he believes that statement, he must also believe that he has a justification for promoting x. Of course, one cannot know which action, if any, he can take to promote x unless he knows his temporal location; but this is a matter of

opportunity, not justification, for action. Nagel makes the same point about practical judgments another way. He

says that the reasons which practical judgments incorporate must be timeless

ones. Dated reasons have motivational content only when they apply to the

present; and so if the reason in the tensed statement expressing a practical

judgment were a dated reason, then the (a)-type tenseless statement could

not have the same motivational content as the tensed statement. To say

that a person's reasons must be timeless is just another way of saying that if

he believes that he has (did have, will have) reason to promote x, then he must also believe that he has a justification for promoting x, regardless of

when he thinks the reason applies. In short, Nagel has connected the feature of reasons (their timelessness)

which would make prudence possible to an aspect of the concept of a

person (persistence over time). By making this connection, he has argued that prudence is possible only when a person conceives of himself as equally real over time. We should notice that a person's conceiving of himself in this way does not make prudence necessary for him. He might believe the appropriate (a)- and (b)-type statements for all the tensed statements he believes


except for those expressing his practical judgments. This exception would

mean that in the practical realm he is dissociated from his future, past, or

even present self. What is true is that prudence is necessary for a person if he is to avoid dissociation in the practical realm.

III

I want now to show how this account of prudence yields a type of counter-

intuitive result. I will begin by developing a notion Nagel mentions toward

the end of Chapter VIII, the notion of "principles about what things constitute reasons for action" (p. 74).

A person will count some predicates as reason-predicates and will not count others. For example, someone might not count "causes innocent

children to suffer" as a reason-predicate. He does not just decide that in his

situation a given reason cannot by itself justify an action of his, nor does he

just decide that in his situation a given reason has no place in his deliberations.

"Causes innocent children to suffer" is not, for him, even a merely prima facie reason for action. He does not count it as a reason at all (cf. p. 51, Note

1).

The "principles about what things constitute reasons for action" are

principles expressing values. For example, someone might not count "causes

innocent children to suffer" as a reason-predicate because he values freedom

from suffering for innocent children. (I will say more about the connection

between reasons and values later.) Different people value different things, and one person himself can value different things now from the ones he used to

value, or from the ones he expects to value.

This means first that someone may expect that he will later count R as

a reason-predicate, even though he doesn't now. For example, John might

expect in five years to begin valuing his humility and thus to start counting

'makes John humble ' as a reason-predicate. Yet he does not now value his

humility and does not now count 'makes John humble' as a reason-predicate. Second, someone can now count R as a reason-predicate and yet expect

that later he will not do so. For example, John might now value his physical comfort and thus now count 'makes John physically comfortable' as a reason-

predicate. But he might also expect that in five years he will no longer value

his physical comfort and thus no longer count 'makes John physically comfortable' as a reason-predicate.


In either of these cases o f expected change, we get counterintuitive results

when we apply Nagel's account of prudence. First, suppose someone believes

that a predicate R will apply to an event x , which will occur in 1986. Suppose

that he now does not count R as a reason-predicate but expects that in 1986

he will. Because he believes that R will apply to x in 1986, he believes that he

will have (in 1986) reason R to promote x. To avoid 'dissociation", he must

believe that the fact that R applies to x in 1986 justifies him in promoting

x, regardless of his temporal location. In particular, he must believe that the

fact that R applies to x in 1986 justifies him in promoting x in 1981, i.e.,

now. But he does not now count R as a reason-predicate. So he must believe

that something he does not now even count as a reason would all the same

justify a present action of his.

Suppose, for example, that John expects that by 1986, he will count

'makes John humble' as a reason-predicate. Perhaps he dimly feels a religious

conversion impending, or hopes one is. Suppose also that right now he does

not count 'makes John humble' as a reason-predicate; either he is indifferent

to the humbling properties of events or he feels justified in promoting the

non-occurrence o f an event he thinks will humble him. Next, suppose that

John has been invited to enter a competition for pianists scheduled for 1986.

He is sure that if he plays in the competition he will emerge from it humbled.

Does the anticipated humbling effect of the competition justify him in

entering it now? According to Nagel, it does, if John is to avoid dissociation.

But John does not now even count 'makes John humble' as a reason at all.

So something he does not now count as a reason would justify a present action of his. Surely this is peculiar.

As for the second case, suppose someone believes that a predicate R

applies to a present event x. Suppose he now counts R as a reason-predicate

but expects that in 1986 he will not. Because he believes that R now applies

to x, he believes that he has reason R to promote x. To avoid 'dissociation',

he must believe that the fact that R applies to x now justifies him in promoting x, regardless of his temporal location. In particular, he must believe that

the fact that R applies to x now justifies him in promoting x, even if his tem-

poral location is in 1986. But he also believes that in 1986 he will not count

R as a reason-predicate. So he must now have these two beliefs:

- In 1986, he is justified in promoting x by the fact t ha tR applies to x now;

- In 1986, he does not count R as a reason-predicate.


Of course, in this case the promoting will take the form of something like

retrospective wishing; but still, he must believe that there will come a time

when that which he does not then regard as a reason could justify his

then promoting something. This, too, is surely counterintuitive.

Before I discuss why I think Nagel's account of prudence yields these

results, I want to examine what Nagel himself might say about them. He

would say, I think, that most apparently problematic cases can be redescribed

in one of two unproblematic ways (p. 74, Note 1), and that the remaining

cases are ones where a person's beliefs about his future values do not "give

him any grounds for judging what he will have reason to do" (p. 74) at the relevant future time.

In the one kind of unproblematic case, someone now finds his expected values so pernicious that he completely ignores the reasons he expects to have

in the future. I do not think this really is an unproblematic case. According to Nagel's explanation of prudence, if someone ignores expected future reasons, then he must be regarding his future self as less real than his present

self. Thus he will not, contrary to what Nagel says (p. 74, Note 1) be able to formulate the reasons he pays attention to as timeless ones.

In the second of the unproblematic cases, a person is treating his values

like preferences, "regarding them each as sources of reasons under a higher principle: 'Live in the life-style of your choice '" (p. 74). I think here the

counterintuitive results indeed do not arise. But, of course, this kind of case is not the only one. 2

I think Nagel is wrong to suppose that if a case cannot be redescribed in

one of the two favored ways, then it involves a person whose beliefs about

his future values would not give him grounds for judging what he will have reason to do. Those beliefs are no worse than any others which a person

might use for judging what he will have reason to do. The question whether

any beliefs can give someone such grounds is a question Nagel himself thinks his explanation of prudence leaves open (pp. 55-56). And if his explanation is to leave that question open, then the counterintuitive results will follow when a person does take his beliefs about his future values to be grounds for judging what he will have reason to do.

IV

Why does Nagel's account of prudence yield the peculiar results I have just

T H E P O S S I B I L I T Y O F P R U D E N C E 259

described? I think the problem is that his account grounds prudence on a

feature of the concept of a person which is too abstract to support prudence.

That feature, again, is the conception of oneself as equally real over time.

But a person can conceive his future self to be equally as real as his present

self even if he also conceives that his future self will have different values

from the ones his present self has. And it is the temporal scope of a person's

values, not the temporal scope of his reality, which determines the extent in

time over which his reasons can exert their influence. A conception which

is independent of values cannot by itself be the ground for that which is

dependent on values.

The peculiar results arose just when a person conceived the temporal

scope of certain of his value to be different from the temporal scope of

his reality. Nagel's account of prudence requires that reasons exert their

influence throughout the latter scope; but as I have already suggested (and

will presently insist) something is not a reason unless it is connected to a

corresponding value. Hence something is not a reason unless it operates

within the former scope. Thus Nagel's account requires, in effect, that a

person conceive the two scopes as coinciding. But this requirement cannot

be right; a person can expect his current values to change without expecting

that the reality he currently enjoys will also change.

We can look at this problem with Nagel's account as being a problem

about the structure of reasons, as well as a problem about the kind of concep-

tion on which to ground prudence. Very simply, reasons are not in Nagel's

sense timeless, because their influence does not extend to times at which

they are not counted as reasons. Further, the extent in time of their influence does not depend on some structural feature they have, but rather on the

extent in time which the values underlying them have.

I do not think we should reject Nagel's "method of metaphysical ethics"

just because the metaphysical conception on which he grounds prudence is

too abstract. We should first try to find a feature of the concept of a person

which is more suitable. The feature we are looking for should have something to do with values, as well as persons and time. I think that the most natural

conception to settle on is that of a kind o f person, as persisting over time. To

explore thoroughly the notion of a kind of person would clearly be a tremen-

260 JANET BROUGHTON

dous task, and I would certainly not undertake it here even if I could. All I

require o f the notion is this: first, that the values a person has be connected

with the kind of person he is; and second, that if a person conceives himself

to be a certain kind of person, then he conceives himself to be the same kind

of person over some span of time, and conceives himself to be equally real over that span (i.e., any other conception of himself as a kind of person

would be a degenerate one).

I want to give an alternative explanation of prudence to the one Nagel

gives, using this notion of a kind of person, and see how the alternative fares.

I want to preface the explanation by elaborating a little on something I have

already mentioned, namely, the connection between values and reasons.

A person will value some things because he values others. For example,

someone might values exercise because he values good health, or he might

value walking because he values exercise. If someone values x then he will

value y if y bears to x any of these relations: (1) y is identical with x; (2)

y will produce, sustain or contribute to the production or sustention of x;

(3) y is a logically necessary condition of x; (4) y is not-z, and z bears any

of relations (1), (2) or (3) to not-x (p. 52). One might require simply that

a person believe that y has the appropriate relation to x; such a requirement

would not, I think, affect anything I am going to say. In addition to the

things someone values because he values something else are those things he

simply values, but not because he values something else. Let me call these

a person's basic values.

A person's reasons will likewise be both basic and derivative. Why might

someone have reason R to promote x? Perhaps because he has reason R ' to promote x. When the things to which R applies bear any of the relations listed

above (save the first) to the things to which R' applies, then R is a derivative

reason. Notice that these reasons are not derivative in the same sense the ones Nagel discusses on page 52 are. Nagel is asking why, if someone has reason R to promote x, might he then have reason R to do y . I am asking why, if some-

one has reason R ' to promote x, might he then have reason R to promote x.

Some of a person's reasons are not derivative. I f R is a basic reason for

someone, then when we ask why he has reason R to promote x, we must

asnwer that he values what R applies to. Because the same relations hold

between derivative and basic values as hold between derivative and basic reasons, and because what a person's reason-predicates describe is what he values, his basic values constitute his basic reasons. And because derivative


reasons ultimately derive "from basic ones, a person's basic values indirectly

constitute his derivative reasons. 3 (If the structure of reasons and values are

parallel in the way just described, we might want to say that a person's

derivative reasons are directly constituted by his corresponding derivative

values. I do not think I need to argue this point one way or the other.)

I can now say a little more about the notion of a kind of person; then I

will sketch the alternative account of prudence I have in mind. The connec-

tion between a person's basic values and the kind of person he is is a tight

one. If someone's basic values at one stage of his life are different from his

basic values at another stage, then he is a different kind of person at the one

stage from the kind he is at the other. Further, I propose this stronger claim:

if someone has a basic value at one stage of his life which he lacks at another

stage, then he is a different kind of person at the one stage from the kind he

is at the other. This claim has a certain plausibility of its own; and, as I will

show presently, it is necessary for the alternative account of prudence. The

claim should look plausible to anyone who can think of it this way: a person

has relatively few basic values at any given time, and a very great number o f

derivative values flow from each basic one. A change in one basic value makes

a big difference; it makes someone a different kind of person.

The final remark I will make about this notion of a kind of person is that

becoming a different kind of person does not entail some sort of sequential

schizophrenia. It happens at least once to nearly everyone who moves from

childhood into adolescence, from adolescence into adulthood, from middle

age into old age. It can happen to someone when he undergoes a religious

conversion, serves a stretch in prison, suffers bodily disfigurement, gets

married, gets divorced, has children, etc. It also happened to Dr. Jekyll; he

at least would become a different kind of person, if not a different person

altogether. But the difference between an extraordinary change and an

ordinary one need not concern us here; all I want to stress is that many

changes are of the ordinary variety.

Now I want to show just how we can use Nagel's method to explain

prudence by beginning with the conception of a kind of person, as persisting

over time. Someone may expect to become a different kind of person, to

change at least one of his basic values; or he may expect indefinitely to remain the same kind of person he is now. In either case, he will conceive

himself to be the same kind o f person he is now within the temporal scope his

expectation sets. This scope may, of course, include some or all of the person's


past. Let us say that this scope covers all and only the times t 1 through tn.

We will assume that the person's 'now' falls between t 1- tn, because although

there are, of course, other cases, they are not relevant to prudence. I f the

person is to conceive of himself as the same kind of person over t l - t n as

he is now, he must conceive of himself as having the same basic values at each

time in t l - t n as he does now. And if he is to conceive of himself qua a

certain kind of person as persisting over times t l - t n , he must also conceive

of himself as being equally real at least at each of those times. Thus he must

believe that what he asserts about the present is true or false at any other

tired at least within t 1 - t n in exactly the same sense that it is true or false of

the present.

Suppose that such a person now believes a tensed statement expressing the

practical judgment that he has (did have, will have) reason at tk to promote

x, and suppose that tk falls in t l - t n . If his conception of himself is to meet

the requirements just stated, then (a) he must believe that a tenseless state-

ment about t k to the same effect as the tensed statement is true at each time

in t l - t n and (b) he must believe a statement giving the appropriate relation

between tg and now. The (a)-type statement will possess the motivational,

as well as the factual, content of the tensed statement.

To put this another way, suppose that someone expects to count R as

a reason-predicate from t I through t n. Then if he has (did have, will have) at

t k reason R to promote x ( t k falling in t 1 - t n ) , then he also has reason R to

promote x at any other time in t l - t n . Reasons extend their influence to any

time within the scope determined by a person's basic values. 4

This account does not generate the counterintuitive results that Nagel's

did. It cannot generate those results because it places no requirements on a

person's beliefs at times outside the scope t l - t n . If someone does not now

count an expected reason as a reason, then the expected reason cannot ex-

tend its influence to the present; such a person is a different kind of person

now than he expects to be later. Of course, if the expected reason is one

which someone now counts as a reason, then the revised explanation of

prudence allows that the future reason for promoting x can provide him with

a present reason for promoting x. Whether it will provide such a reason

depends on his ability to conceive of himself as equally real over the span

during which he expects to be the same kind of person he is now.


v I

Earlier, I stated this claim: if someone has a basic value at one stage of his

life which he lacks at another, then he is a different kind of person at the one

stage from the kind he is at the other. We can now see why the revised ex-

planation of prudence requires this claim. Suppose we dispensed with it. Then

someone might have a change in a basic value which occurs within the scope

during which he conceives himself to be the same kind of person. But then he

might expect to have at t e reason R to promote x (tk falling in t I - t n ) , and

yet not now count R as a reason-predicate. Without the claim, in other words,

familiar counterintuitive results follow.

This claim, however, generates problems of its own. First let me discuss

a problem which I think is soluble. If a young thief expects to become a re-

spectable citizen in ten years, surely some of his expected respectable reasons

must be allowed to influence his present behavior. After all, how can he ex-

p e c t to become a respectable citizen if his expected reasons cannot begin to prevail against his present reasons for, say, robbing a gas station? Surely he

must count as a reason against the robbery that he may get caught and thus

have a criminal record, which will shut out the possibility of his being thor-

oughly respectable ten years hence. If he doesn't let a respectable reason

count now, then how can he expect to become respectable?

One remark to make first is that if a person really is a young thief who

runs high risks of arrest, and if he knows that he runs these risks, and if he

still expects to be respectable later, then he simply has a very unreasonable

expectation. More to the point, the objection assumes that thieves and re-

spectable people are different kinds of people. If this is true of the person

we are considering, then, yes, the thief simply does not coun t respectable

reasons as reasons. They do no t enter into his current practical reasoning. He

simply does not value what respectable people value.

There are other possibilities, though. First, the person may conceive of

himself as being the same kind of person, whether respectable or not. Rough-

ly, he may, for example, have as the principle of a basic value of his: get what

money you can. In the absence of principles to the contrary, this yields the

derivative principles: earn what money you can, and steal what money you

can. The person may think that in his present circumstances, he should put

his energy into stealing and minimize his risks. Then when he is older and in

different circumstances he can put his energy into earning. Second, the per-


son may conceive of himself as the kind of person who has as the principle of

a basic value: 'live in the life-style o f your choice' (p. 74). He now chooses

to live as a thief; he expects later to choose to live as a respectable citizen.

Third, the person may after all simply have a vague idea of himself as re-

spectable ten years hence; he may not really expect to become respectable.

But there is also a far more difficult problem which this revised explana-

tion of prudence generates. I f someone expects to become a different kind of

person, he may well expect that some of his current basic values will survive

the change. Shouldn't reasons expected after the change provide present rea-

sons? I think they certainly should, and I think an explanation of prudence

which cannot explain how that is possible is hopelessly inadequate.

We cannot solve this problem by requiring that a person change all his

basic values when he becomes a different kind of person. This requirement

would mean that we would very rarely be correct in saying that someone

had become a different kind of person. We would be wrong, for example, if

the person continued to think physical comfort is basically valuable after he

had supposedly become a different kind of person. More importantly, this

requirement would mean that some of a person's values could change while

he remained the same kind of person; and then we would get the same counter-

intuitive results Nagel's explanation generated.

If we are to ground prudence on the conception of a kind of person, we

must strike a balance between these claims: if someone changes even one of

his basic values, then he becomes a different kind of person; and if someone

becomes a different kind of person, then he changes all of his basic values.

The only suggestion I can make is that we treat kinds of persons as something

stratifiable. We could then say that someone remains the same kind of person in some underlying respect even though he becomes a different kind of person in another respect. We could then fiddle the explanation of prudence so that the right kind of person, the right basic values, the right reasons, and the

right temporal scopes get connected.

If we take this line for explaining prudence, we must say quite a bit about

what it is to be a kind of person, in order to support the claim that kinds of

persons can come in layers. Otherwise the line has the look of a merely ad

hoc solution. I f someone could do all this convincingly, then he could offer

a very complicated account of prudence. But one may think, as I do, that the way to strike a balance between the

two claims above is simply to say that a person changes some of his basic


values if and only if he becomes a different kind of person. I f this is the way

to strike the balance, then the revised explanation of prudence generates the

same counterintuitive results which Nagel's explanation did. This means that

even though the notion of a kind of person captures the idea of value, which Nagel's explanation lacked, it cannot serve as a metaphysical ground for pru-

dence. This suggests that the "method of metaphysical ethics" will not pro-

duce an account of the possibility of prudence.

Perhaps that suggestion is too sweeping: I have, after all, criticized only

two explanations which use the method. I think, however, that I have at least

illustrated something more general. Let me first put the point metaphorically.

An account o f prudence must make room for the fact that a person can at

one time count as a reason what he does not count as a reason at another

time. If the explanation is also to ground prudence on some metaphysical

conception o f the person, then the conception must be flexible enough to

leave room for the fact. But a metaphysical conception of the person which

is that flexible becomes either complicated and implausible or plausible but too fluid to ground prudence.

The problem of prudence is the problem of how certain reasons transmit

their influence to certain times. An explanation of the possibility of prudence

must account both for how reasons transmit their influence over time at all and

for how some reasons do and others do not transmit their influence to a

given time. The "method of metaphysical ethics" grounds prudence on the

conception of a person qua something-or-other, as persisting over time. This

enables us to explain how reasons transmit their influence over time at all.

If, however, we are also to explain how some reasons do and others do not

transmit their influence to a given time, then we must fill out the 'something-

or-otfier' in the right way. But if it is filled out in just the right way, the

something-or-other must be something which can change in just the ways a

set of basic values can change. Nagel did not fill out the something-or-other

at all. Thus the conception on which he grounded prudence was too abstract,

and hence too inflexible, to change in just the ways a set of basic values can

change. We cannot fill in the something-or-other with 'a set of basic values',

because a conception of a person qua a set of values is not a conception of a person at all, and with no conception of a person, we lose our account of

how reasons transmit their influence over time at all. The best alternative

seems to be picking a feature of the person which incorporates the notion of

value. But we have seen that even such a feature, on a plausible analysis, does not change in the ways a set of basic values can change.

266 JANET B R O U G H T O N

In s u m m a r y , I have t r ied to show t h a t we m u s t reject Nagel 's e x p l a n a t i o n

o f p rudence . I have suggested t h a t w h a t I t h i n k is the bes t a l te rna t ive expla-

n a t i o n using the " m e t h o d o f m e t a p h y s i c a l e th i c s " is ser iously f lawed. Final ly ,

I have t r ied to show t h a t i f we judge t h a t the a l te rna t ive e x p l a n a t i o n fails,

t h e n we m a y do well to judge t ha t the " m e t h o d o f me t aphys i ca l e th ic s" fails

as a m e t h o d for exp la in ing h o w p rudence is possible .*

University o f California, Berkeley

NOTES

i Nagel, Thomas: 1970, The Possibility of Altruism (Clarendon Press, Oxford). I refer to this book in the body of my paper by page numbers in parentheses. 2 Oddly enough, these two ways of redescribing problematic cases might work better on the analogous problems for Nagel's account of altruism. Self-abnegation (acting on reasons arising from someone else's values which are contrary to one's own) and pater- nalism (acting for another on reasons arising from values contrary to the beneficiary's) can perhaps be blocked by principles of intolerance and tolerance. If they can be, it is, I think, because the conflict of values is played out between persons, not within a single life. 3 Samuel Scheffler has pointed out to me that these remarks seem to make weakness of will impossible. Roughly, if values issue in reasons, and reasons in actions, then it is hard to see how my actions could betray my values. Although I haven't said anything about how one value (or reason) gets more weight than another, I do think that a weightier value constitutes a weightier reason. (This would actually be implied by my remarks, if the weight of one value relative to another arises from a third, ranking, value.) But this is to say nothing about how reasons do and do not issue in actions, and I think that is the place to look for an account of weakness of will. 4 Although a reason's influence is limited to t l - t n , a person's non-practical judgments may commit him to believing that many (a)-type statements are true at additional times. This split between practical and non-practical judgments might by itself be reason enough to reject the alternative account of prudence. * I want to thank Samuel Scheffler for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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The possibility of prudence