The Post-Modern Identity Crisis a Narratological Exploration of Identity_By Jonathan Pearmain

7/28/2019 The Post-Modern Identity Crisis a Narratological Exploration of Identity_By Jonathan Pearmain

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The Post-Modern Identity Crisis:

A Narratological Exploration of Identity.

By Jonathan Pearmain

Ba (Hons) CG Art and Animation

UCA

2012

Word Count: 8552


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Contents

Introduction:

Identity as Narrative i

Chapter One:

The Development of Post-Structuralist Narratology 1

Chapter Two:

The Point of 'Being' 6

Chapter Three:

Fractured Stories 12

Conclusion:

Post-Post-Structuralism 18Bibliography 21


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Introduction

Identity as Narrative

The human identity is an elusive and much sought after concept. Its realisation and portrayal

has been and continues to be the focus of a variety of disciplines; across art, music, performance. As

an area of study, it has fascinated philosophers throughout the centuries; thinkers that have sought to

question the very nature of existence, the purpose of 'being'. The desire to discover a supposed

'truth' to our existence is unique to the human mind, the quest to provide the time we are alive,

indeed the entirety of our species, with a point an identity.

An identity gives meaning a position within the world, an origin to have come from and a

purpose to strive for. It becomes the narrative of the human life, a narrative for existence.

A narrative is simply a story, an account of the perception of things moving through time.

Professor Mark Currie, who's work will feature prominently in this dissertation, states that

Narrative is as inescapable as language in general, or as cause and effect, as a mode of thinking

and being (Currie, 1998:2). This idea, that narrative in inherently human, will be a key point of

discussion within this essay as will its role as either constructing identity, or being constructed by

it. Narratology's post-structuralist methods, of deconstruction and narrative theory, will allow us to

explore the identity as narrative and the very concept of 'being'.

Initially, the study of narratology will be discussed its methodologies and principles

explored, as well as an account of it history. Narratology has undergone a dramatic change in the

last century, from a traditional literary based discipline it has expanded to linguistic then to a

anthropological method of studying identities and cultures across humanity. Chapter one will

identify a working definition of Narratology and enable us to then look further into its

understanding of 'being'.

The concept of 'being', the idea of a consciousness, will also be examined. Before discussing

how a narratological approach may aid in the understanding and definition of an identity, it must be

established exactly what forms the identity; what is the point of it? And why is so important to keep

it free from oppression? This chapter will focus on exposing the malleability of objective

knowledge, and the fickle goal that is 'liberty'. It will then attempt to derive what actually forms a

consciousness, and what implication this has on identity. The principles thinkers used as reference

for these ideas will be the French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre and the German philospher, Martin

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Heidegger. Combined with the work of other post-structuralist and post-modernist writers, they will

help establish conclusions from which we can reach the crux of this dissertation: can narratological

thinking allow us to understand better, and even construct better, the narrative of the human identity

and remain free from the very paradoxes and fallacies it reveals regarding the concept of

narrative.

It is a common rebuke to the post-structuralist mode of thought to state that it is impossible

for it to provide any conclusion, and that it even revels in this inability to satisfy. Indeed the

influential post-modern thinker, Jacques Derrida, saw no shame in labelling his work 'viral'. He

destabilised institutions without any intention of replacing them with some enlightened idea he

repelled the very idea of enlightenment.

The thoughts of American philosopher, John Searle, and British philosopher, Roger Scruton,are the primary opposition to post-structuralism in this dissertation. They champion a more

empirical outlook, seeing the destructive, abstract and inconclusive nature of post-structuralism as

nihilistic, 'trivial' and 'phony'. Their points and merit will be considered and answered in turn.

By the end of this essay the aim of the last chapter will be to re-define narrative from a post-

structuralist point of view perhaps what could be termed a post-post-modern perspective. It is

understood that it was necessary for the deconstructionist cultural revolution of the 20 th century to

destroy the authority of the grand-narrative ; but its critics do have a valid argument in striving to

find some resolution to this crisis identification. What can be re-constructed using a narratological

understanding of the consciousness to define identity in such a way that it can be attainable? How

does narrative help us to move on from the post-modernist apocalypse?

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Chapter One

The Development of Post-Structuralist Narratology

To delve deeper in the implication of narratology upon the understanding of the human

idenity, first an understanding of narratology must be established. As a methodology or mode of

thought, it has crossed disciplines and is the result of a vast variety of contributors and thinkers. In

this chapter a brief account of narratology's transformation into a post-structuralist study will be

given, and its reasons discussed. Its transition from a purely linguistic and literary based discipline

to an anthropological one is key to the rest of this essay's use of it methodologies and reasoning;

therefore important to outline.

A primary source of knowledge on the subject is Professor of Contemporary Literature at the

Queen Mary University of London, Mark Currie. His work on the theory and structure of narrativeis notable and provides an excellent overview of narratology and its past. As narratology during the

post-modern era is approached, the work of French philosopher Jacques Derrida will also be

introduced using readings from Jeff Collins, Bill Mayblin and American cultural theorist Hugh

Silverman to better understand Derrida's impact. Work from French sociologist, Jean Baudrillard,

will also be included and studied.

As an opposition to many of post-structuralism's arguments, Professor of Philosophy at the

University of California, John Searle's thoughts will be brought to bear his frustration at

narratology's seeming lack of solution, and deconstruction's denial of any such solution existing.

By the end of this chapter we will be ready to delve deeper into the study of the human

identity and the role narratology plays in allowing us to define it.

Narratology's definition has changed dramatically over the last century; transforming from a

structuralist study of literature to a contemporary study of identity. German Professor of Literary

Theory, Jan Christoph Meister provides a concise summary of narratology, stating thatnarratology

is a humanities discipline dedicated to the study of the logic, principles, and practices of narrative

representation(Meister, 2011). It has always been a study of narrative methodologies, but the

keyword here that separates Meister's definition from that of the early structuralists is

'representation'. It widens narratology's scope to include anywhere that narratives may be found.

Currie expands upon this further, that today's study recognises that narrative is central to the

representation of identity, in personal memory and self-representation or in the collective identity

such as regions, nations, race and gender (Currie, 1998:2). The applying of principles found in

traditional narrative theory to humanity is a leap that allowed existence to be analysed under a new

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microscope, providing new understanding and interpretation.

To understand the significance of the shift in narratological study, it must be understood

what is meant by 'classical narratology' and who its main contributors were. In the introduction to

Postclassical Narratology, editors Alber and Monika outline a suitable compendium:

What is subsumed under classical narratology primarily embraces the work of the

French structural-ists (Roland Barthes, Claude Bremond, Tzvetan Todorov, A. J. Greimas,

and Grard Genette), but also the German tradition in narrative theory (Eberhard Lmmert

and Franz Karl Stanzel) (Abler & Monika, 2010:1-2).

While today structuralism is considered applicable outside of linguistics taking itsunderstanding of language and using these principles to investigate cultural and social structures

in its genesis in structural linguistics it examines components in their relationships of difference,

exchange, [and] substitution (Collins & Mayblin, 2005:57). The key philosophy that emerged was

the understanding that nothing existed or could be defined in isolation; that all elements within

language gained their definitions through their relationship with other components. The significant

result of this mode of thought was that it altered the focus of the search for 'meaning' from the

whole to the individual elements. Eventually structuralism's relevance in language came under

critique during the 1950's; however its methods were taken to anthropological level garnering

widespread interest.

This transition from the formalist and structuralist narratologies of the recent past into a

study of humanity allowed for the classical linguistic methods, which were now being superseded

by more modern disciplines, to be utilised in forming a narratology capable of bringing its

expertise to bear on narratives wherever they can be found, which is everywhere (Currie, 1998:1).

Although structural linguistics was being criticised in the latter 20 th century as an impoverished

and thoroughly inadequate conception of language (Chomsky, 1972:20), it was also being

recognised during the post-modern and post-structuralist era as a starting point for more

sociological study. In theEncyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory, this change was

characterised by an increase of interest in non-literary narratives and by an influx of ideas from

other disciplines (Ryan & Van Alphen, 1993:112).

One such contributor was the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida. He was hugely

responsible for the destabilising of structuralism's logocentric principles, but also developing many

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of its key claims especially surrounding the interrelation of components. Whilst Derrida derided

the search for some Platonic truth, he built upon what structuralist writers had already established in

the search for meaning, through the study of the bearing of elements upon each other within a

system coining the term: Deconstruction. In his book,Derrida and Deconstruction, Silverman

puts forward an explanation of deconstruction's agenda:

Deconstruction is concerned with offering an account of what is going on in a text

not by seeking out its meaning, or its component parts, or its systematic implications

but rather by marking off its relations to other texts, its contexts, its sub-texts

(Silverman, 1989:4).

Claiming that all elements, styles and forms... figures of speech, metaphors, even layout onthe page are neversimply present or absent (Derrida, cited in Collins & Mayblin, 2005:12, 70),

Derrida proposed, similar to structuralism, that observing the correlations - or the lack thereof

between systems was the key to the correct study of them. Counter to structuralism, Derrida sought

no external truth; instead proposing that to seek true or real meaning was not only unattainable

but also undesirable.

A notable opponent to Derrida's deconstruction, and indeed the post-modern and post-

structuralist viewpoint in general, is Professor John Searle. Frustrated by the lack of any apparent

conclusion or argument presented by post-modernism, Searle sees it as unhelpful and fogging of the

pursuit of knowledge. He outlines his key issues with the position below:

According to this view, we never attain certain, objective, and universal knowledge

at all... it is impossible to have objectivity, because all claims to knowledge are always

perspectival; they are always made from a certain subjective point of view it is

impossible to have universality, because all science is produced in local, historical

circumstances and is subject to all of the constraints imposed by those circumstances

(Searle, 2003:5).

Searle's frustration is clear. The proposition that the inter-textual nature of not only

language, but also knowledge and identity, makes futile any attempt to gain any concrete truth, is

clearly nihilistic to him the denial of any external truth cannot be a self-sustaining view and is

merely making claims that... under analysis often turn out to be silly or trivial. Indeed he writes

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that deconstruction is simply a self-justiying enterprise, criticising its patrons as nave - stating

they think that since everything is phony anyway, the phoniness of deconstruction is somehow

acceptable, indeed commendable (Searle, 1984).

His response is to propose a difference between knowledge claims and the representation of

knowledge, that the perspectival character of representation and knowledge does not imply that

the knowledge claims in question are dependent on the preferences, attitudes, prejudices,

predilections, of observers. The existence of objectivity is in no way threatened by the perspectival

character of knowledge and representation (Searle, 2003:7). This view concedes that knowledge is

vulnerable to prejudice, that its profundity and truth can be distorted but it insists that it is folly to

believe that any knowledge cannot be claimed to be independent of the aforementioned corruption.

A post-structuralist argument however would put forward the view that the representation ofknowledge is all there is there exists no external truths, no external meaning. Knowledge is

merely assembled and shared as a simulacrum; subject to an observer's interpretation. Currie states

this succinctly, writing that perception of the real world is determined by the particular language

through which reality is being seen. Different languages encode the world in different ways, so that

reality can be seen as culturally relative (Currie, 1998:36). It is interesting to note that Currie

does admit the existence of 'the real'. Of course things exist whether or not they are perceived by

sentient observers; but Currie also attaches no value or 'truth' to this world of the real. Instead all

meaning is derived purely through the interrelation of cultural interpretations.

Rather than being nihilistic, Derrida's view that no element can function without relating to

another element which itself is not simply present,becomes the basis for a rich tapestry of

correlating and conflicting 'knowledge' that is subject to endless exploration and re-interpretation.

The fact that each element is constituted on the basis of the trace in it of the other elements of the

system (Derrida, cited in Collins & Mayblin, 2005:70), leads to the rather utopian view that

humanity's various cultures are unified and defined through their differences and disagreements as

much as their similarities.

Once this view is established, what freedom or condemnation, as Searle would have it

does it bring? Narratology's transformation and re-appropriation over the last century is in itself a

narrative, one linked closely to the development of modern philosophy; which Baudrillard outlines

thus:

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Over the years, the Beautiful, the Good, and the True have played out a strange

game of musical chairs. In the beginning, Good and moral values reign supreme. But then

Evil assumes an aesthetic value: ugliness becomes beautiful. This is all swept away by the

Real which, being neither beautiful or ugly, becomes true. Objectivity becomes the

dominant moral value. But not for long, for in the end the simulacrum and the Virtual win

out over all values (Baudrillard, 2003:6).

While Baudrillard takes a rather fatalistic view of the rise of the Virtual, he sums up well the

crux of post-structuralist narratology's position which is to supersede any existence of the Real

in return for an acceptance of a self-reflexive existence. This narrative can be traced throughout

language, literature, art, music, politics human identity as a whole. The lack of logocentrism, a

lack of any 'truth' to be sought, is something to be preserved and indeed, according Baudrillard,the very cornerstone upon which our survival as a species relies, Only something which has

purpose comes to an end, since once that purpose is achieved, all that remains is for it to disappear.

The human species has survived only because it has no final purpose. Those who have tried to give

it one have generally sent it hurtling to its destruction (Baudrillard, 2003:21).

In this chapter then, we have established a suitable definition of narratology and its

methodologies. It's linguistic origins have been discussed and its re-appropriation as a sociological

study examined. The post-structuralist agenda of denying any universal truth or meaning is key to a

narratological study of identity that the emphasis is placed up the relationship of component parts,

and the proxemics of that system in relation to others.

The issue with the sense of nihilism evoked by post-modernist thinking has been raised and

not yet answered the following chapters will discuss whether narratology can give us any solution,

or if a solution is even desirable? Analysing the identity is always an introspective exercise

undertaken in the hope of shedding more light on what it is to exist as a conscious human being,

what it means even to be conscious. This will be the focus of the next chapter.

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Chapter Two

The Point of 'Being'

In the previous chapter we ascertained an understanding of contemporary narratology and its

relevance to the study of the human identity. The question was also raised as to whether it was able

to provide any response to the criticism that it, along with much other post-modern and post-

structuralist thought, was in fact empty and inconclusive postulating. Before discussing whether

narratology can provide more than mere critique, it must be discussed as to what exactly is the so

desperately sought concept: identity. From where does it emerge, and what is the point of it?

As an empirical voice - and in opposition to the inconclusivity of deconstructive thinking -

English philosopher, Roger Scruton's thoughts on the motives of post-modernism and the pursuit of

liberty will be brought to bear. In answer, the work of Mark Currie will continue to be used todefend the importance of narratology in preserving the liberty of the identity. To help define liberty,

the seminal work of British social and political theorist: Sir Isaiah Berlin will be referred to, in

tandem with the work of British philosopher John Stuart Mill.

To better understand identity, and its vulnerability to influence, the work of existentialist

French philosopher: Jean-Paul Sartre, will be used as a key to understanding the nature of human

consciousness and being. To further develop this, the thoughts of German philosopher Martin

Heidegger will also be referred to.

Once this chapter has explored the susceptibility of identity to oppression or persuasion,

narratology's role in forming and protecting the identity can be discussed.

Narratology, along with western culture as a whole, underwent dramatic changes in the latter

half of the 20th century a change which brought controversy, confusion and irreversible impact on

human identity. Whatever label be applied to this cultural revolution be it counter-culturalism,

deconstructionism or post-modernism they aim to retain the same core agenda, which is to

'liberate' the student from the oppressive structures of the traditional curriculum, and also from the

social institutions which that curriculum covertly endorsed (Scruton, 2012:57). After dramatic

increases in scientific discoveries and knowledge of the last century, the rise of power and the

institution, and the betrayal of that trust through the examples of the corruption and manipulation of

knowledge - shown by the wars and dictators in the 20th century - groups of philosophers and

society as a whole began to grow wary of being part of grander narratives and the motivations

behind those who promoted them.

It was clear that the 'pure knowledge' sought by the Enlightenment, that would bring

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humanity into the modern as a unified society, was not beyond distortion and nepotism. Currie

states a truth that was becoming clear to new thinkers, thatsocial power derives from moral

sympathy which is controllable by techniques of information management and not by rectitude

(Currie, 1998:22). Knowledge was revealed as something malleable, a means to an end for those

with power to influence others. The identity of the self, separate from authority, became of the

utmost import and its liberty sacred.

Before discussing the importance of narratology in emancipating the identity in pursuit of

liberty, first an initial understanding of liberty will be established. Liberty, or freedom, is a state of

being that features as a goal in many human ideals or projects in some form or another. Berlin

supports this in his work: Two Concepts of Liberty, writing that almost every moralist in human

history has praised freedom. However, he also makes clear its ambiguity, like happiness andgoodness, like nature and reality, it is a term whose meaning is so porous that there is little

interpretation that it seems able to resist (Berlin, 1969:2). His wording is appropriate, that

freedom is unable to 'resist' any interpretation applied to it, meaning it's definition is subject to the

intent of its user.

It is generally agreed across philosophy that complete freedom is both an impossibility and

undesirable for a civilised society. Berlin makes it clear that it was obvious to classical philosophers

that'natural' freedom1would lead to social chaos in which men's minimum needs would not be

satisfied; or else the liberties of the weak would be suppressed by the strong (Berlin, 1969:3). The

capability of the sentient to sympathise and morally reason, and to also manipulate others'

reasoning, results in the extortion of the many for the benefit of the few - based purely on principles

such as physical or intellectual strength. An unethical and barbaric system.

Mill sought to examine common factors in humanity's approach to establishing society, and

although his work agrees with Berlin's need for necessary restraints upon society, statingall that

makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of

other people, he highlighted the difficulty of establishing what these rules should be. Facing the

fact that no two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of

one age or country is a wonder to another, Mill sought to find ubiquity in the methods behind the

establishment of these laws, stating rather simply that the likings and dislikings of society are

thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance,

under the penalties of law or opinion (Mill, 1859). He goes on to state that the inefficiency and

vulnerability of this methodology lies in its susceptibility to the the whim and manipulation of those

1 a state in which all men could boundlessly interfere with all other men (Berlin, 1969:3)

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with power and control whose despotic rule interferes with personal freedom and identity. So

identity is crucial to withstanding malicious intent and manipulation; and avoiding navety.

Narratology's awareness of the importance of narrative in human consciousness exposes the

weakness and subjection of that very fact. Currie warns that narrative is one of the ways in which

identity, the ideological subject, is manufactured (Currie, 1998:32), but surely this is encouraging?

It reinforces the concept that our identities can be protected from corruption by creating our own

narratives that we prescribe; rather than being at the mercy of external tyranny.

This is however to take a rather modernist view; that we are the masters of our own

enlightenment but Currie does not promote an unlocking of the 'real' or an inner potential. A

deconstructionist understanding of identity strips it of any internal meaning; revealing that identity

is not within us because it only exists as narrative. He argues that identity, or any 'true' meaning,cannot be formed in isolation that all the 'real' is merely a web of interrelation between elements.

Sartre puts it thus, [appearances] are all equal, they all refer to other appearances, and none of

them is privileged (Sartre, 2001:45). Continuing in this vein, Currie proposes that the only way to

explain who we are is to tell our own story ... that we learn how to self-narrate from the outside,

from other stories, and particularly through the process of identification with other characters

(Currie, 1998:17).

It is the inescapable symbiosis of existence that makes identity vulnerable to external

influence and corruption; yet also what makes us irrevocably human. Sentient consciousness is

dependant upon it.

This is not to say that the individual is lost in this web of blurred simulacra quite the

opposite, it is what enables the forming of one's self. Without this realisation Heidegger suggests

that even the individual would be unable to relate himself on his own to a being, to something that

remained selfsame, that is, he would be unable to be human (Heidegger, 2010:46). It is interesting

to note that Heidegger equates being able to relate to oneself as necessary to being human; that in

existing as human one is inherently then able to be aware of one's own consciousness and identity.

This view could be summed up in the existentialist phrase coined by Sartre as existence precedes

essence, that the 'real' or 'truth' of something is of less import and in fact created by the initial

existence of something that through existing a being manufactures its own value.

It could however tentatively be suggested that is an oversimplification, even a

misinterpretation of Sartre. Discussing consciousness' role in identity, Sartre writes,

Consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence, and inversely it is consciousness of a

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being, whose essence implies its existence; that is, in which appearance lays claim to being

(Sartre, 2001:62). Initially somewhat enigmatic and impenetrable, Sartre's meaning can be

unpacked thus. Sartre initially states that the essence, the true value, of consciousness is only

realised through its initial existence that it creates its own essence; in accordance with the

traditional existentialist view. However, Sartre then immediately concedes that it is the essence of

being the awareness of one's identity and 'real' self that implies our existence as sentient

human beings.

This simultaneous relationship between our interactions with the world and our

consciousness of these experiences is key. Sebastien Gardener, professor at university College

London, attempts to explain Sartre's thinking like so, Sartres point is that consciousness must be

grasped, not just as involving, but as identical with the relation of intending (Gardener,

2009:45), Consciousness defines its value through its own existence, whilst considering its ownexistence reflected by its essence. It is this perpetual reflection which constitutes the self and is

eventually dissolved in an identity (Sartre, 2001:65).

Our identities are formed through the synchronicity of our 'true' self as posited by merely

existing as a conscious being, and the effects of the subjection of that self to external narratives

upon its existence.

An understanding then of narrative's role in defining our identities presents a problem:

narratives are logocentric. Writers Jeff Collins and Bill Mayblin, in their workIntroducing Derrida,

define logocentrism as the drive to ground truth in a single ultimate point an ultimate origin. In

searching for the 'real' or the 'true nature of things', Metaphysics ascribed truth to the logos, along

with the origin of truth in general. Metaphysics in its search for foundation is logocentric (Collins

& Mayblin, 2005:45). Surely this is the point of discovering our identities through grand narratives,

of religion, culture or society, that the subject seeks guidance from something outside themselves

some pure knowledge that is untouchable from human corruption? We have already established that

the consciousness exists as inseparable from experience; where is the error in seeking after

metaphysical knowledge to guide us?

The problem lies in the perception and the presentation of that knowledge. Lyotard

highlights the key issue, that knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: who

decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided? (Lyotard, 1984:9). At the

end of chapter one it was ascertained that the 'real' does exist, but holds no inherit value beyond that

which consciousness places upon it. Since our consciousness is a being formed through our

relationship with other beings, our entire interpretation of the 'real' is authored by others. This

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awareness allows narratology to warn against legitimising grand narratives, since they hold no value

beyond that which is created by people they are no more than an act of authorial ventriloquy

where the ventriloquists own polemic can be hidden among the fictional voices of puppets (Currie

1998:19).

What, then, is a 'subject' to do? Once one has realised that one's inner life is constituted ...

by the illusion that one is a free agent, that they are in fact subject to some greater authority

(Currie, 1998:28), what enlightenment does this give us? Surely for narratology to offer any

solution is to become a narrative itself, another supposedly metaphysical conclusion that is in fact as

vulnerable to all the corruption it itself warns against.

We are left unsatisfied, nervous without some kind of emergent truth, yet afraid of drawing

any conclusion. It is perhaps the elusive and unwholesome nature of post-modernistic thinking thatleads Scruton to dismiss many of its contributors as manufacturers of junk thought (Scruton,

2012:183). Rather conversely to the typical view of post-modernism as anarchical, Scruton claims it

as utopian as any institution's attempt to order and change the world as it sees fit. It is guilty of what

Scruton calls the 'best case fallacy', which arises when hope prevails over reason, in the presence

of an important choice (Scruton, 2012:65). Post-modernism's self-awareness as a a virus ... not a

microbe ... neither living or non-living (Derrida, cited in Collins & Mayblin, 2005:16), as

something that can never truly be fulfilled, is merely aloofness, an avoidance of responsibility in the

face of reason. Scruton argues that they need never turn [their] backs on [their] utopian aims,

since utopia itself can never be realised and thus never disproved (Scruton, 2012:70), that its

destabilisation of any disciplined thought or metaphysical truth is simply a fortified citadel of

nonsense, a circular and self-justifying argument designed to accuse the critic of ignorance or

lack of logical skill (Scruton, 2012:181).

But is it the job of philosophy to provide conclusive answers? Currie does not argue that

post-structuralist's role is to provide an alternative to the corruptible meta-narratives it exposes but

merely to make one aware of it. This is in line with Heidegger's thoughts on the purpose of

philosophical thinking: Philosophy is not a worldview in the sense of the presentation of a picture

of the world that is constructed from the current results of the sciences today ... Making such

pictures of the world is not only artificial, derivative, and ineffectual, but is a fundamental delusion

about how humanity comes to know of beings as a whole (Heidegger, 2010:8). Philosophy is

perhaps much more about understanding ourselves, that we might in turn better understand the

reality within which we exist.

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Over the course of this chapter the concept of 'being' has been thoroughly examined, and

narrative established as a necessary component of it existence. Based upon the work of Heidegger

and Sartre this chapter has also begun to explore the co-dependant relationship between

consciousness and narrative that each is formative in the other.

However, it has also been highlighted that narrative is informed by external knowledge and

experience - thus exposing the subject to manipulation and coercion. The 'liberty' of the identity is

at the mercy of the person who's definition of 'liberty' the identity subscribes to. The malleability of

knowledge is a prominent danger to the identity.

Yet narratology, and post-structuralist thought in general, appears to give no answer once it

has pointed this fact out. The objection to the 'phoniness' of post-modernism has been mentioned

and has yet to be satisfactorily answered. How can the awareness of the 'real' and 'consciousness'

that narratology provides the human mind with, equip it in creating a firmer understanding of theidentity, and aid in preserving it sanctity?

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Chapter Three

Fractured Stories

Now that a better understanding of the nature of 'being' has been established what role

does narrative play in forming the identity? Is identity itself a narrative? Or is it the result of one?

Using an understanding of narratology's approach to narrative systems, and the conclusions on the

nature of consciousness explored in chapter two, this chapter will aim to find a way for

narratological thinking to provide a basis for constructing an identity.

The work of prominent literary scholar and critic Marie-Laure Ryan will be used to outline

the subjectivity of the real, and the role of the consciousness in creating its own interpretation of the

'actual'. Narrative will be suggested as a tool for the construction of the identity, the work of Wolf

Werner (Professor of English Language and Literature at the University of Graz, Austria) andMichael Bamberg (Professor of Psychology at Clark University, Massachusettes) will support this

claim.

However, the universal and teleological nature of their arguments will be challenged by

referring to the work of Friedrich Nietzche and his speculations on the source of human ambition,

and the work of Peter Raggat, senior lecturer in psychology at James Cook University, Australia.

His work on the multiplicity of narrative will be central in concluding the definition of identity and

the role narrative has to play.

Since narratologys iconoclastic rampage leaves narrative looking weak, malleable and

deceptive how are beings to form self-awareness without a constant paranoia as to whether they

are subscribing themselves to the will of others? In the introduction to their collection of essays

centring on identity within narratives, editors McAdams, Joesselson, and Lieblich, write that we

are all storytellers, and we are the stories we tell (McAdams, Josselson, and Lieblich, 2006:3).

Similar to Sartres idea of the cyclic conscious, this statement suggests identity is both implied by

and posits narrative. Werner draws a similar conclusion, confident that existing as narrative is

inherent to human self-realisation. Man can be defined as a 'storytelling animal', driven by an

instinctual need and intelligence which makes us the animal which demands an explanation, the

animal which asks Why' (Werner, 2003:185). However, post-structuralist narratology has already

warned us of the dangers of the human minds insistence in discovering some metaphysical truth as

a guide to existence; revealing it as an entirely subjective construct.

It has already been discussed that contemporary narratology doesnt seek to deny the

existence of the real, but rather deconstruct the value applied to it to change the focus to

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analysing the value the consciousness seemingly places upon it. Whilst it may be true that only one

world exists independently of the human mind, Ryan looks beyond this to what she perceives as

the more interesting area of the study, the human minds ability to depart from this world, select

another world as actual, and create through further mental acts a network of alternative possible

worlds around the new centre (Ryan, 1991:554). Actuality becomes subjective to the individual,

who willingly departs from the real and places some other truth at the centre of their reasoning.

This departure from the real has already been discussed as the very reason that grand-

narratives are to be treated with suspicion. But what are its implications on the individual narrative

of identity?

A possible conclusion to draw from post-structuralist narratology is that it doesnt dismiss

the mode of the narrative as unreliable, but rather shifts the value from the subject of the narrativeto the framework of the narrative itself. Ryans point is neatly summed up by Professor of Romance

Languages at the university of Pennsylvania, Gerald Prince, in his article: Remarks on Narratology.

He discerns Ryans key conclusion to be that narrative texts create a world by depicting particular

entities and events and they provide that world with coherence and intelligibility (Prince,

1996:99). Self-reflexive narrative serves to allow the mind to assign its own values to an otherwise

valueless world. Ryan expands her argument, stripping the real of any authority, writing that the

actual world is simply the world we inhabit, and the term "actual" is indexical, as are the

expressions "I," "you," "here," and "now." every possible world is the actual one from the point

of view of its inhabitants (Ryan, 1991:554). Narratives are no longer external, grand, intimidating

manipulations of knowledge but rather an empowering, internal tool.

Once equipped with this tool, does it grant the ego complete emancipation from external

influence? Not entirely, rather it provides a frame through which to wittingly interpret other

narratives. Bamberg puts this in context, highlighting both the importance of the self-narrative and

its reliance on externally provided experience.

Engaging in any activity requires acts of self-identification by relying on

repertoires that identify and contextualize speakers/writers along varying socio-cultural

categories, often compared to mental or linguistic representations (Schemata) that are less

fixed depending on context and function (Bamberg, 2012).

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The two important conclusions to draw here are that: firstly, to engage that is to interact

with something on equal terms, as opposed to being subjectified by it requires an internal

narrative. Secondly however, this narrative is based on accumulated experience gathered from

previous social and cultural engagements and the conclusions drawn from them. Schemata refers

to the codification of these experiences into narratemes, units that make up a narrative, that

contribute to self-identification. Does this reliance of the identity on external socio-cultural

inputs weaken the self-narrative?

If narrative is to be considered a window which allows the viewer to interpret the world,

then we are to believe that identity precedes narrative allowing us to perceive the weaknesses and

flaws within the framework and avoid distortion. Narrative, as merely an implement, enables a

conscious perception of time and thus contributes to creating and stabilizing a centralepistemological category as a basis of human experience (this is the 'experiential function' of

narrative) (Werner, 2003:184). By this Werner means that narrative is a method by which we are

able to stabilise our position in the world through it we establish epistemological knowledge in

the form of experience, as perceived through our narrative voice. The view proposes narrative as a

construct of the identity.

However, based on the conclusions drawn in chapter two, it would seem impossible to see

the relationship between identity and narrative as entirely one directional. Currie sees narrative as

crucial to constructing the identity, something agreed upon byIdentity and Storys editors. They

write, We use the term narrative identity to refer to the stories people construct and tell about

themselves to define who they are for themselves and for others (McAdams, Josselson, and

Lieblich, 2006:4). Does narrative then precede identity? Do we then not project narratives onto the

world so that our consciousness can interpret the actual - rather we establish ourselves within the

actual by creating an identity out of experiential narrative.

It would seem that identity is formed out of the consciousness doing both creating a

network of experiential narrative and what could be termed explanatory narrative. Werner expands

upon this concept further, declaring that Narrative does not only relate perceptions to each other.

It also, by making them appear as the result of a certain past and/or the starting point of a

particular future, provides possibilities of explaining them. Explanatory narrative is based upon

knowledge discerned by experiential narrative which is in turn informed by explanatory narrative,

continuing ad infinitum. Werner proposes that this function fulfils two purposes key to the forming

of human identity; firstly, the desire to connect a given state of affairs to an explanatory past, and

secondly, the desire, fear or curiosity to see the end or outcome of certain states, decisions, events

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etc. in the future. By providing the identity with telicity, Werner draws an interesting conclusion;

that these collections and predictions can then be reused as models or 'master-narratives for

giving meaning to similar cases, for accounting for the past, or for projecting possible futures

(Werner, 2003:185). The identity manifest as its own meta-narrative, informing its future actions

based up its self-reflexive interpretation of its past providing purpose and direction.

Identity can then be seen as a unifying construct; the result of years of extrapolating

narrative to perceive past, present and future a human becomes the writer of their own story.

Bamberg breaks this position down as thus: a teller accounts for how s/he (a) has emerged (as

character) over time, (b) as different from others (but same), and simultaneously (c) how s/he views

her-/himself as a (responsible) agent. Managing these three dilemmas in concert is taken to

establish what is essential to identity (Bamberg, 2012). The self clearly splits into differentelements, all of which a teller creates their own narrative of giving themselves a situational

awareness within existence, a life story. Life stories, therefore, may be seen as bringing different

aspects of the self together into a unifying and purpose-giving whole (McAdams, Josselson, and

Lieblich, 2006:5).

Bamberg writes that the narrators quest for identity or sense of self is motivated

primarily by the question Who am I? Similar to Werner, Bamberg supports the view that self-

narrating is inherent to human existence our ability to reflect upon our own purpose. He

continues, stating that the goal is rather to condense and unite, to resolve ambiguity, and to deliver

answers that lay further inquiry into past and identity to rest (Bamberg, 2012). Uncertainty is the

villain that human nature instructionally tries to iron out that identity strives to erase to establish a

firmer sense of self.

However, did we not in agree chapter one that the victory of contemporary narratological

thinking was to expose fallibility of grand narratives? That since we know that any value attributed

to the real, by way of a unified teleological purpose, is to navely deny the subjectivity of that

truth to alternate interpretations. Nietzsche, writing on human ambition and purpose, discredited

the attempt to unify consciousness. He writes, the assumption of one single subject is perhaps

unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction

and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? (Nietzsche. 1968:270).

In a mode of thought that was to become central to post-modern thinking, Nietzsche entirely strips

the unified truth of any meaning, instead finding value amongst the interplay of the identitys

constructive elements.

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The conclusion leaves behind a helpless schizophrenia, an awareness of life as a linear

trajectory narrative, but also aware that any meaning given to it is as valueless as the next construct

that any narrative can be deconstructed to inconsequential elements made significant only through

the merit given to them via the consciousness observation of their relationships. Nietzsche

expresses a frustration similar to Searles anger at deconstructions lack of solution:

One would have to know what being is, in order to decide whether this or that is

real (e.g., "the facts of consciousness"); in the same way, what certainty is, what knowledge

is, and the like. But since we do not know this, a critique of the faculty of knowledge is

senseless: how should a tool be able to criticize itself when it can use only itself for the

critique? (Nietzsche. 1968:269)

It seems we are now left in a state of aporia, scared to commit to any meta-narrative for fear

of creating something insubstantial and contrived. This fear though is based upon one potential

flaw; as Raggatt points out; it presupposes a narrative that is linear, integrated, and coherent, with

all the facts about your life neatly tied together with a golden thread, a single narrative voice

(Raggatt, 2006:15). Does there then exist an alternative to this confusion?

Seeing identity as a purposeful narrative gives it a driving force guided by a truth that is

subjective and not based upon any universal truth since we believe no such thing exists. This is

the utopian mind set Scruton criticised, summarised here by Bakhtin as he analyses an identity

driven by an ideal: an idea becomes for him an idea-force, omnipotently defining and distorting

his consciousness and his life it is not he but the idea that lives (Bakhtin, 1984:22). Since the

value is placed upon the object, the components of the life story, the narratemes of conscious, are

second in value to the grand-narrative whose value is entirely false.

Raggatt understands this, arguing against the idea of the over-arching plot he intends that

we adopt quite the opposite, that the story you tell will probably be but one story from a number of

possibilities, and therefore the life story could never be encompassed by a monologue I argue

that the life story is really more like a conversation of narrators, or perhaps a war of historians in

your head (Raggatt, 2006:15-16). Once again value is assigned to the space in between

components, rather than the elements themselves meaning found in comparison rather than result.

Raggatt is approaching the conclusion that identity is not in itself a narrative, and perhaps not even

the descriptor for one single outcome or being but rather the output from the concert of a

multitude of narrating conscious.

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It is true then that narrative plays a key role in the formation of identity, that narratives are

inescapably teleological in nature and that it is teleology that most closely meets the human desire

mentioned earlier to see the outcome of certain situations (Werner, 2003:187), but that that

teleology is not taken as based upon logocentric truth since that truth will be manufactured

rather appreciated within the intertextual nature of the narratives. Meaning cannot be found in one

narrative and its purpose, since consciousness never gravitates toward itself but is always found in

intense relationship with another consciousness. Every experience, every thought is internally

dialogic, adorned with polemic, filled with struggle (Bakhtin, 1984:32). Bakhtins conclusion that

it is through the dialogue of narrative we derive value allows us to safely and wittingly utilise

narrative in forming and analysing identity whilst avoiding utopian naivety.

Narratology then can be seen to also be constructive, rather than simply deconstructingthings into meaninglessness. The post-structuralist viewpoint both exposes 'truth' as something

manufactured, yet allows an observer to find value in the necessarily fractured and abstract nature

of narrative without overall telicity. This chapter has delved into the interpretation by contemporary

scholars of identity as a singular and linear narrative, but an informed narratological study of said

narrative, with an understanding of the multiplicity of the conscious destroys any credibility of the

'grand-narrative' of identity since it then denies the potential of any dialogical thought, leading to

ignorance.

Reaching a point of self-diagnosed schizophrenia - a clamour of different narratives all

treated equally - and then choosing not to unite them under a unified narrative, allows for identity to

be formed. Through self-aware and self-reflexive inner-narration informed by external observation

and an understanding of one's own conscious allows identity to remain free of some false inner

'truth' derived from a manufactured interpretation of the 'real'.

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Conclusion

Post-Post-Structuralism

Has the post-modern identity crisis then been solved? Perhaps the question this essay asks is

whether there exists any crisis at all. What constructive narratological thinking posits is that the

response to a 'reality' revealed as fractured and devoid of any linear solution, is to place value upon

the fractured nature of consciousness. Since any teleological goal is a contrivance, yet the telic

nature of narrative is inescapable, identity is found in preserving the separation of inner-narratives

as opposed to attempting to unify them.

In exploring the history of narratology and its transition from a literary area of study to a

broad socio-cultural study of humanity, a precursor to our conclusion is foreshadowed. That it is inthe forgoing of definitive, singular conclusions and in the re-appropriation and the preservation of

the multiplicity of definition that value is found. In the opening chapter we established that

contemporary narratatology took the methodologies of a structuralist approach to literature and

evolved them in tandem with the development of deconstructivism and the post-modern revolution;

refocusing it as an anthropological study. Derrida and Baudrillard's complete dismissal of

metaphysic value in the 'real' leads to the 'virtual', meaning as defined by the interplay of created

systems. This view is challenged by Searle who argues that empirical truth does still exist and

should be pursued, while Currie states that there's no value to empirical 'truth' beyond that which

human perception applies to it. The far more interesting and valuable area of the study is the human

mind, not the so called 'truth'.

This then was the agenda of chapter two to establish a better understanding of exactly

what constitutes as the human mind, and why it is so vulnerable to manipulation and coercion. In

this chapter Currie argues that a post-structuralist narratological awareness of the identity allows

one to be aware of the influence and controllability of 'social power' through the managing of

information and knowledge. It is suggested that this awareness seeks to liberate the identity from

being institutionalised. However, in looking at the work of prominent British thinkers, Isaiah Berlin

and John Stuart Mill, it emerges that liberty is an as malleable concept as any that to make it the

object of the identity is to simply subscribe to another contrived falsehood. Narratology reveals all

such 'grand-narratives' to be comparable to acts of 'ventriloquy', vehicles for the editing of

knowledge but can it then not provide any solution? Roger Scruton's criticism is brought to bear

upon this dilemma, dismissing the development of apparently impotent post-modern ideas as 'junk

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thought'.

Whilst chapter two left this challenge unanswered, it did reach a conclusion important to our

realisation of the identity: that the formation of conscious narrative is cyclical. That is to say, that

consciousness posits narrative to better perceive the real, while simultaneously the consciousness is

formed as an understanding of the real as perceived through narrative. Consciousness and narrative

are inseparable.

The next task then of this dissertation was to explore the consequences of this conclusion.

Since while the narrative conscious is a frame through which to interpret the world, that frame is

informed by the consciousness' experiential narrative. Thus the vulnerability and susceptibility to

exterior and manipulative influence remains.

The key argument then proposed in chapter three, based upon the work of Marie-LaureRyan, is that identity emancipates us to choose the 'actual' that we wish to exist in based upon the

cumulative experiential and explanatory narratives informing that decision. The fact that the actual

becomes 'indexical' allows narrative to become to tool to take on the 'real'. Wolf Werner and

Michael Bamberg both write that a need to understand one's position in a teleological narrative is an

inherent need in the human psyche and that the forming of one's identity is to provide stability by

drawing together the multitude of self-narratives into one grand-narrative.

However, based on the examinations of the previous two chapters, grand-narratives have

already been discredited as misguiding. To create a grand-narrative out of the self is to create a goal

or conclusion that becomes a metaphysical truth making all other actions logocentric; centred

around an impossibility: that there is no 'truth'.

Building upon contributions from Friederich Nietzche and Peter Raggat, an alternative is

suggested. Identity is not a unification of narratives, rather it is the name given to the fractured

whole meaning resides in the spaces in between. Allowing identity to exist as dialogical in nature,

in constant flux and transition, allows for external and internal narratives to inform the mind's

conclusions. Information is found in the friction between ideas rather than the unification of them,

since to unify something is to author meaning where none exists whereas to look at the interplay

between two different concepts is to find an understanding and an appreciation of both.

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The Post-Modern Identity Crisis a Narratological Exploration of Identity_By Jonathan Pearmain