The Post Modern Significance of Max Weber Legacy by Dr Basit

THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF

MAX WEBER’S LEGACY

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THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF

MAX WEBER’S LEGACY:DISENCHANTING DISENCHANTMENT

BY

BASIT BILAL KOSHUL

THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY

© Basit Bilal Koshul, 2005.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of briefquotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.

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To my parents:Dr. Muhammad Ikram Koshul

andMrs. Shagufta Ikram Koshul

My Lord! Shower Your grace upon them both, just as they cherishedand reared me while I was a child!

(Qur’an, 17:25)


CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ixAbbreviations of Weber’s Works xi

Introduction 1The Chapters in Brief 2

1. The Disenchantment of the World and the Religion vs. Science Divide: An Enlightenment Reading of Weber 91.1 Disenchantment as the Fate of Our Times 111.2 The Effects of Disenchantment on Practical Rationalization 171.3 The Effects of Disenchantment on Theoretical Rationalization 281.4 Religion and Science in Disenchanted Times:

An Interpretation of Weber 34

2. Beyond the Enlightenment: Weber on the Irreducible Relationship Between Faith and Science 412.1 The Faith Dimension of Science 432.2 The Empirical Dimension of Faith 492.3 Weber the Person on Religion and Science 56

3. The Value of Science in a Disenchanted Age: Bridging the Fact/Value Dichotomy 653.1 Science: A Uniquely Modern Way of Knowing 673.2 Practical Rationalization and the Value of Science 723.3 Theoretical Rationalization and the Value of Science 763.4 Meaning and Knowledge: Bridging the Fact/Value Dichotomy 80

4. The Constitutive Components of Scientific Inquiry: Bridging the Subject/Object Dichotomy 894.1 The Methodenstreit: The Issues and Parties 904.2 A Logical Flaw in the Methodenstreit 964.3 Imputation and Ideal Type: Bridging the

Subject/Object Dichotomy 105

5. Disenchanting Disenchantment: Bridging the Science/Religion Dichotomy 1195.1 The Relational Character of Weber’s Methodology: Some Recent

Valuations 1235.2 Two Possibilities of Progress: Disenchantment and Self-Awareness 1295.3 The “Progress” of Weber Scholarship: From

Disenchantment to Self-Awareness 1345.4 Weber and the Disenchanting of Disenchantment 137

Endnotes 153Bibliography 169Name Index 173Subject Index 175

viii / CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First:

All praise and glory is due to Allah, who has guided us to this destination, for we wouldnot have been able to guide ourselves had it not been for the guidance of Allah.(Qur’an, 7:43)

Thereafter:The completion of this project is the result of support, patience, and encouragementfrom two other quarters, my family and my teachers. All that I have accomplishedthus far, and anything that I accomplish in the future, could not have been possiblewithout the prayers and sacrifices of my parents, Dr. Muhammad Ikram Koshul andMrs. Shagufta Ikram Koshul. Besides the prayers and sacrifices of my parents, thepatience and support of my wife, Samia Nazneen Tabassum, was a most indispensa-ble element that gave me the space and the time to complete this project.

After acknowledging the debt I owe to my family, I acknowledge the debt I oweto my teachers. With respect to this particular project, I am most indebted to Prof.Otto Maduro. Beginning with the process of gaining admission to the doctoralprogram at Drew University, continuing through the coursework and comprehensiveexam stage of the studies and culminating in the work on the dissertation, Prof.Maduro has been the most helpful (and demanding) of mentors. I am also gratefulto Prof. Jacques Berlinerblau and Prof. Bill Elkins for their assistance and support inthe completion of this project. Even though he did not make any direct/formalcontribution to the present project, the mentor-friendship of Prof. Peter Ochs madean invaluable, indirect contribution. Having a fairly good idea of what it is that I wastrying to do in this project, the support of my teachers helped me to improve the“how” of it.

I am also grateful to my colleagues in the Religion Department at ConcordiaCollege for their encouragement and support. The conversations with them, bothimpromptu and during the monthly department colloquia, helped me to refine someof my ideas and express them more coherently. I am also grateful to Mary Thornton,secretary for the Religion Department, for her assistance.


ABBREVIATIONS OF WEBER’S WORKS

● BTL(2002) “Between Two Laws.” In Weber: Political Writings. Ed. Peter Lassman andRonald Speirs. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

● LCS(1949) “Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences: A Critique of EduardMeyer’s Methodological Views.” In Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences. Ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.113–188.

● MEN(1949) “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality.’ ” In Max Weber on The Methodology ofthe Social Sciences. Ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: The FreePress. 1–47.

● OSS(1949) “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy.” In Max Weber on TheMethodology of the Social Sciences. Ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe,IL: The Free Press. 49–112.

● PESC(2002) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. Stephen Kalberg. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Press.

● PV(1946) “Politics as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber. Ed. H.H. Gerth and C. WrightMills. New York: Oxford University Press. 77–128.

● RK(1975) Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics. New York:The Free Press.

● RRW(1946) “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions.” In From MaxWeber. Ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.323–359.

● SPWR(1946) “The Social Psychology of World Religions.” In From Max Weber. Ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press. 267–322.

● SR(1993) The Sociology of Religion. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

● SV(1946) “Science as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber. Ed. H.H. Gerth and C. WrightMills. New York: Oxford University Press. 129–156.

xii / ABBREVIATIONS OF WEBER’S WORKS

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after Max Weber died in 1920, Wittenberg characterized him as “a child ofthe Enlightenment born too late” and described his scholarship as “a vitriolic attackon religion.” With only a few notable exceptions, the subsequent evaluation ofWeber’s legacy has been a variation of Wittenberg’s assessment. For example, Hekman(1994) has asserted that “the central dichotomies of Enlightenment thought” (i.e.,fact vs. value and subject vs. object) serve as the foundation of Weber’s “philosophyof social science as well as his ethics.” Gane (2002) concurs with Hekman’s assess-ment. Casanova (1994) argues that Weber’s thesis about the “disenchantment of theworld” has “its ideological origins in the Enlightenment critique of religion.” In makingthis assessment, Casanova is echoing Schluchter (1989). In sum, secondary literatureon Weber has largely characterized Weber’s scholarship as (a) merely an expression ofEnlightenment thought, and (b) inimically hostile to religion. If this is indeed thecase, then Weber’s scholarship is largely irrelevant to contemporary discussions aboutformulating post-Enlightenment models of discourse and inquiry that hold thepromise of transcending the limitations of disenchantment and investing contemporaryculture with meaning and significance.

But this is far from being the case. Only a gross misreading of Weber would labelhim a “child of the Enlightenment born too late”—one who remains committed tothe Enlightenment dichotomies of fact vs. value, subject vs. object. A careful readingof his work reveals Weber to be a post-foundationalist thinker, far ahead of his time.Weber’s reflections on the methodology of scientific inquiry (often called Weber’smethodology of the social sciences) replace the dichotomous logic of Enlightenmentthought with a relational logic that posits an intimate and irreducible relation betweenfact/value (Ciaffa, 1998) and subject/object (Ringer, 1997). In making the movetoward relational logic, Weber anticipates the trend in late twentieth-century socialscience that seeks to replace disenchanting dualisms with relational dualities—a trendnoted by Lawrence (1989), among others. Weber’s scholarship is also a far cry frombeing inimically hostile to religion. Weber’s critical analysis of scientific rationalismreveals that suprarational elements are always present in the very foundation of scien-tific rationalism and that “only a hair line separates faith from science” (OSS, 110).Weber offers this valuation in the concluding pages of an article titled “ ‘Objectivity’in Social Science and Social Policy.” Weber’s rationalization of the methodology ofscientific inquiry reveals that suprarational presuppositions and extra-scientific value-ideas are at the very root of all scientific rationalism—there cannot be anythingcalled “scientific inquiry” that is not rooted in this “un-scientific” ground. Weber’s

exposition of the presuppositions and value-ideas (Wertideen) underpinning scientificrationalism opens up novel possibilities of facilitating a mutually enriching dialogbetween religious rationality and scientific rationality. Once again Weber is far aheadof his time: this dialog is now well underway between the natural/physical sciencesand religion—for instance, Polkinghorne (1998, 2001) and Barbour (1997, 2000)—but it is not even being seriously contemplated by the social sciences.

The failure to appreciate the potential contemporary significance of Weber’s workis in large part due to a particular way of reading Weber. Much of the secondaryliterature in the field of Weber studies is divided between those who see Weberprimarily as a sociologist of culture (i.e., Mitzman, 1970; Schluchter, 1979, 1989)and those who see him primarily as a methodologist of the social sciences (Kalberg,1994). Arguments have been advanced that there is no relationship at all betweenthese two aspects of Weber’s work (Bendix, 1962). This dichotomous reading ofWeber’s corpus reinforces the reading of dichotomies into his work. A defining char-acter of the present study is that Weber the methodologist of the social sciences andWeber the sociologist of culture will be in sustained conversation with each otherwith respect to a central theme—disenchantment of the world. In the vast body ofsecondary literature in Weber studies, it is rare to see these two aspects of Weber insustained conversation with each other. This is a significant oversight in light of thefact that Weber the methodologist of the social sciences comments upon, clarifies,and sometimes completes critical observations made by Weber the practicing socialscientist—especially with respect to the relationship between scientific rationalismand the disenchantment of culture. An integrated and relational reading of Weberinvests his work with fresh meaning and significance that is not possible otherwise.This reading shows Weber’s corpus to be a veritable gold mine of insights that canmake unique and significant contributions to the contemporary debates about themethodology of the social sciences and the existing cultural condition.

The Chapters in Brief

Chapter 1 begins with laying bare those aspects of Weber’s writings that seem tojustify Wittenberg’s observation that Weber is nothing more than “a child of theEnlightenment born too late” whose work is “a vitriolic attack on religion.” Weber’sobservations as a sociologist of culture can be interpreted as asserting that history hasbeen a process of the progressive rationalization of human thought and action—aprocess that he called the “disenchantment of the world.” As a historical develop-ment, disenchantment is a product of the rupture between religious rationalism andscientific rationalism. While tension between the two rationalisms has been alwayspresent throughout human history and in all cultural milieus, it is only under moderncultural conditions that the tension reaches a breaking point. For Weber it is thisrupture that has led to the complete disenchantment of culture. Disenchantment ofthe world brings with it meaninglessness as the penultimate value—meaninglessnessas the value through which the universe is viewed and as the value that ultimatelydetermines human existence in the universe. I integrate Weber’s observations fromScience as a Vocation, Religious Rejection of the World and Its Directions, and The SocialPsychology of World Religions to provide a detailed description of disenchantment.

2 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY

Weber’s analysis suggests that the rupture between religious rationalism and scientificrationalism—and the resultant disenchantment—cannot be redressed by any modernor premodern means. Schluchter (1989) and Casanova (1994) identify Weber’sdisenchantment thesis with the process of secularization and posit that it is an expres-sion of Weber’s judgment that the rift between religion and science is permanent.Consequently, disenchantment is the inevitable and irreversible “fate of our times”according to Weber’s sociological analysis of culture.

Chapter 2 offers an alternative reading of Weber’s work. I argue that while Weber’sdisenchantment thesis can be interpreted as the description of a historical process, itis neither a prescription for modern culture nor the product of some immutableevolutionary process. In making this argument, I turn to Weber’s analysis of the philo-sophical and epistemological underpinning of (social) scientific inquiry—often calledWeber’s “methodology of the social sciences.” While other writings from Weber areincluded in the discussion, the article titled “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and SocialPolicy” is at the center of the discussion in chapter 2. In his methodological writings,Weber demonstrates acute awareness of the fact that religion and science havecompletely distinct identities. The tone and frequency with which he makes thisobservation make it appear that his methodological insights affirm his sociologicalinsights that the divide between religion and science is natural and unbridgeable.But at the end of the discussion summarizing his position on the philosophical andepistemological underpinnings of (social) scientific inquiry, Weber states:

We are now at the end of this discussion, the only purpose of which was to trace thecourse of the hair-line which separates science from faith and to make explicit the mean-ing of the quest for social and economic [i.e., cultural] knowledge. (OSS, 110)

Löwith (1989) offers an insightful analysis of this particular observation by Weberand identifies it as a critical aspect of understanding “Weber’s Position on Science.”Löwith notes that Weber’s understanding of science is predicated on positing anintimate and irreducible link between faith and science.

For Weber, while science is a rational inquiry of empirical reality, it is underpinnedby a variety of supra-rational elements. Weber posits that the activity of scientificinquiry is not possible without a suprarational (i.e., faithful) affirmation of the nonra-tional presuppositions and extra-scientific value-ideas that lie at its roots. Conversely,belief in ultimate values shapes the way human beings behave in the world and rationallyarticulate their vision of the world and of their place in it. Weber posits that all suchactions and rationally expressed ideas generated by belief in ultimate values (i.e., faith)provide the cultural science with material that they can investigate—and provide“objective knowledge” about. On all of these accounts, Weber’s understanding ofscience posits an intimate relation between faith and science. While Weber the soci-ologist of culture documents constant and progressively intensifying conflict betweenreligious rationalism and scientific rationalism, Weber the methodologist of sciencesees an intimate and irreducible proximity between faith and science.

While chapter 2 establishes the fact that Weber sees an intimate proximitybetween faith and science, my argument goes further—I see Weber establishing abridge between faith and science. Chapters 3–5 will present evidence supporting this

INTRODUCTION / 3

hypothesis. Summarily stated these three chapters will explore the “what?” “how?”and “why?” of science according to Weber. Chapter 3 will address the question“What does science study?”—Weber’s answer to this question bridges the fact/valuedichotomy. Chapter 4 will attend to the question “How does science arrive at anobjectively valid description of reality?”—Weber’s answer to this question bridges thesubject/object dichotomy. Chapter 5 will explore the question “Why does oneundertake a scientific investigation of culture?”—Weber’s answer to this questionbridges the religion/science dichotomy. Taken together, Weber’s bridging of thesedichotomies bridges the “hair-line which separates science from faith.”

I begin presenting the evidence of a Weberian bridge linking faith and science inchapter 3. In this chapter I address the question: What does (cultural) science study?In identifying meaning (Sinn) as the ultimate object of scientific investigation, Weberbridges the fact/value dichotomy because the very concept of “meaning” is possibleonly by bridging the fact/value dichotomy. For Weber, all human culture and allhuman activity that produces culture is made possible by the meaning (Sinn) thathuman beings confer upon a finite segment of empirical reality. At this level meaningis a value that produces human culture. But at the same time meaning is the mostimportant (perhaps all important) fact that (cultural) scientists investigate and try toexplicate in scientifically objective terms. In the final analysis it is the meaning thatsocial actors invest in cultural institutions and acts that brings these institutions andacts into existence and creates the facts that (cultural) scientists deem worthy of study.At this level meaning (Sinn) is the penultimate fact that (cultural) scientists study.

Weber goes on to address two other critical questions that shed greater light onthe fact/value character of meaning (Sinn). He addresses the question “What contri-bution can the scientific study of facts make to the understanding of values?”Furthermore, “What is the value of science itself as a fact of human culture (i.e., asan activity that modern cultural beings find meaningful?).” These two questions takeon special significance in light of Weber’s contention that science can neitherproduce value nor pass judgment on values. But, for Weber, it is nonetheless themost precise analytical tool that cultural beings have at their disposal to gainuniquely valuable knowledge about the values that human beings find meaningful.Chowers (1995) notes that irrespective of the angle from which one approachesWeber’s work, the investigation, understanding, and critical role of meaning (Sinn)in human culture is at the heart of Weber’s methodology of scientific inquiry.Consequently, Weber’s methodology of the social sciences establishes the categoricalindispensability of that which Weber’s sociology of culture has documented to havebecome superfluous in modern culture—that is, meaning (Sinn).

In identifying meaning (Sinn) as “what does cultural science study?”, Weberbridges the fact/value dichotomy. In explicating “how does cultural science arrive atan objectively valid description of reality?”, Weber’s methodology bridges thesubject/object dichotomy. Chapter 4 presents evidence from Weber’s methodologi-cal writings to illustrate this point—a point that implicitly informed almost all of thediscussion in chapter 3. When the cultural scientist studies any part of empiricalreality, he/she is studying an “objective fact” that is a manifestation of a “subjectivevalue” held by an actor. Furthermore, while the investigator is studying an “objectivefact,” invariably, the orientation of his/her investigation has been determined by


a “subjective value” that he/she holds. Subjective and objective factors are intimatelyintertwined in both the empirical phenomena being investigated and in the processesof the investigation itself. Consequently, it would be a most illogical assumption thatthe scientific account given at the end of the investigation (i.e., the investigator’s“conclusion”) could be characterized as being purely “objective” or purely “subjective.”For Weber, the final account comes in the form of an “imputation” that is composedof objective elements (i.e., the ideal type and observed nomological regularities) andsubjective elements (i.e., the investigator’s own imagination and cultural value-concerns). In Weber’s methodology, an imputation is a “causal interpretation” thatprovides the scientific account for empirical phenomena. Weber’s notion of imputa-tion integrates, while it simultaneously rejects, specific elements from the “objectivecausal explanation” offered by proponents of the historicist method and the “subjectiveinterpretive understanding” offered by the proponents of the Verstehen school. It isnot only Weber’s notion of imputation that bridges the subject/object dichotomy.Weber offers a detailed argument illustrating that all scientific inquiry ultimatelyproduces knowledge not only about “objects” in empirical reality. For Weber, ifscientific inquiry is done well, it ultimately lays bare the hidden presuppositions andvalue-ideas of the subject that has undertaken the inquiry. In other words, for Weber,scientific inquiry is no less a means of gaining self-knowledge by the inquiringsubject as it is about gaining knowledge of objects.

By the beginning of chapter 5, there would be sufficient evidence to demonstratethat Weber’s methodology of the social sciences bridges the faith vs. science, fact vs.value, and subject vs. object dichotomies. If even one (to say nothing of two, andeven less of three) of these dichotomies pollutes Max Weber’s work, then a coherentaccount cannot be provided for a very important part of empirical reality, that is,Max Weber’s work on the sociology of religion, law, music, economic history, poli-tics, methodology of the social sciences, and so on and so forth. The depth, breadth,and significance of Weber’s work are the product of a philosophical and epistemo-logical understanding of scientific inquiry that is free of any of these dichotomies.Taking this as the starting point, chapter 5 focuses on the postmodern significanceof Weber’s scholarly legacy.

Chapter 5 begins with posing the question “Why does a scientist undertake ascientific investigation of culture?” This question is posed to not only deepen anunderstanding of Weber’s methodology of scientific inquiry, but also to understandWeber’s own motivations for dedicating his entire life to the pursuit of scientificknowledge about culture. I present evidence from Weber’s writing to demonstrate thatit is not possible to adequately appreciate his answer to this question without bridgingthe religious/scientific dichotomy. The “why?” of scientific inquiry has an irreduciblereligious element in it in the form of a desire to transform the “what is” into the “whatought to be”—the very intellectual problem that Weber identified as being at theheart of all religious rationalism. Weber finds the “what is” of his cultural condition(i.e., disenchantment) to be deeply problematic because it is undermining passion-ately held values that he deems worthy of being held. He undertakes a scientific inves-tigation of the origins, trajectory, and salient features of this “what is” with the hope ofidentifying the parameters and possibilities of challenging and modifying the disen-chanted cultural condition. Weber himself notes that one of the major tasks of

INTRODUCTION / 5

religious intellectuals has been the construction of possibilities that make a challengeto the “fate of the times” plausible. Consequently I argue that, by his own definition,there is a religious dimension to Weber’s work insofar at it contains the resources thatmake it rationally plausible to challenge and undermine the “what is” of the disen-chanted condition and offers a vision of post-disenchantment cultural possibilities.

My argument that Weber’s work contains the resources that could be used tochallenge disenchantment as the “fate of our times” is premised on the claim that theappreciation of this potential requires a recognition of the post-Enlightenmentcharacter of Weber’s work. Because of the importance of this point, the first part ofchapter 5 concentrates on demonstrating how an Enlightenment reading of Webermakes his work largely irrelevant to contemporary intellectual and cultural debates.This point is illustrated by looking at the evaluations of Weber offered by Gane(2002) and Hekman (1994). They posit that Weber remains trapped inside theEnlightenment paradigm and then explicitly identify this as being the primaryreason for his contemporary irrelevance. But this evaluation of Weber’s work andrelevance is challenged by Ciaffa (1998), Ringer (1997), and Alexander (1983). Allthree of these thinkers posit that Weber’s methodology bridges a particulardichotomy—for Ciaffa the fact vs. value dichotomy, for Ringer the subject vs. objectdichotomy, and for Alexander the real vs. ideal dichotomy. Furthermore, all three arguethat the manner in which Weber bridges the particular dichotomy has a great deal tocontribute to methodological and epistemological discussions taking place at the endof the twentieth century. I build upon the insights offered by Ciaffa, Ringer, andAlexander by first bringing the three disparate perspectives into conversation witheach other and then taking their line of reasoning further. This synthesis is thencomplemented by Weber’s own reflections on “progress.” Weber notes that “progress”can lead to either differentiation (and subsequently disenchantment) or it can leadto heightened self-awareness and an increased capacity for self-expression. Thisdiscussion sets the groundwork to present the argument that Weber’s work containsuniquely valuable resources that rationally disenchant disenchantment—in a scientif-ically valid manner. Weber’s work disenchants disenchanting scientific rationalism onthree accounts:

(a) His analysis of the constituent parts of scientific rationalism lays bare the factsthat it stands on nonrational foundations and that the practice of science ismade possible only by suprarational affirmations of these foundations.

(b) He demonstrates that while competing values (and value systems) of theworldly spheres cannot be rationally reconciled (the process of rationalizationbeing itself responsible for the conflict), one can practically reconcile conflict-ing values in one’s vocational commitment.

(c) He offers a theoretical image of the world that demonstrates that one canrationally and scientifically challenge disenchantment as the “fate of our times,”even though scientific rationalism posits that no such challenge is possible.

Even though Weber does not provide a remedy to the malaise of disenchantment—Weber would say no scientist should even make a pretension of doing so—he doesdemonstrate that a rational and scientific stand against disenchantment is possible.


In sum, I demonstrate that Weber’s disenchanting of disenchantment is the furtherdevelopment of the historical process of intellectualization and rationalization—withWeber’s oeuvre representing a watershed in the process. Weber’s rational inquiry intothe origins, character, and development of scientific rationality disenchants thescientific rationalism that had earlier disenchanted religious rationalism, which in itsturn had initiated the process of disenchantment by shattering the enchantedsymbiosis. Consequently, Weber’s work is a progression of the process of disen-chantment. But Weber’s self-critical exploration and self-conscious explication of thecontents and dynamics of scientific rationalism prove to be an exercise in whichscientific rationalism is at the receiving end of the process of disenchantment ratherthan its perpetrator. The insights offered by Weber, taken together, reveal that disen-chantment is the result of particular historical circumstances and particular value-ideas embraced by particular cultural beings. Disenchantment is not the inevitableor irreversible fate of any epoch. This conclusion can be drawn on the basis ofWeber’s scientific, rationalized explication of the characteristics defining disenchant-ing scientific rationalism and the dynamics of its development. This reading ofWeber shows him to be opening up new horizons of post-disenchantment possibili-ties at both the intellectual and cultural levels.

Because I argue that Weber’s understanding of “science” makes a critical contributionto “disenchanting disenchantment,” it is no surprise that his article “Science as aVocation” plays a central role in the following discussion. But when I reread Weber’sarticle titled “Politics as a Vocation” after completing the present work, I was struckby the similarities in Weber’s arguments in the two articles. One notices similaritiesin the flow and structure of the argument and sometimes even in the language thatis used. The similarities are so striking that I have an intuitive feeling that an entirelydifferent account of “disenchanting disenchantment” could be written from theperspective of Weber’s understanding of “politics.” This different account wouldparallel, enrich, and affirm the account from the perspective of “science.” While theformer deals largely with epistemological concerns, the latter is concerned largelywith ethics. Due to a number of constraints, I do not pursue this line of investiga-tion in the main body of the text; however, at the same time I do not want to leaveit completely unaddressed. As a compromise, I decided to confine to the endnotesthe discussion of Weber’s exposition of politics and the contribution that this discus-sion can make to disenchanting disenchantment. In the main body of the text, theendnote cues that are highlighted and underlined indicate that this endnote specifi-cally deals with Weber’s writings on politics, disenchantment, and disenchantingdisenchantment. For obvious reasons, the discussion in the endnotes is not nearly asdetailed as the discussion in the main body of the text; more often than not a quickobservation is offered noting the parallel with his writing on science, and the rele-vant text from Weber’s writings on politics are cited. This perfunctory treatment ofWeber’s writing on politics from this particular perspective does not in any waysubstitute for a more considered study exploring the similarities in the logical structureof Weber’s exposition of science and politics.

INTRODUCTION / 7


CHAPTER 1

THE DISENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD AND

THE RELIGION VS. SCIENCE DIVIDE:AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING

OF WEBER

Weber’s sociology of culture distinguishes between two different cultural conditions:enchanted and disenchanted. In the enchanted cultural condition, charisma or“extraordinary powers” (SR, 2) are thought to be inherently present in all empiricalphenomena. Charisma is “either a gift that inheres in an object or person simply byvirtue of natural endowment” or it may be “artificially produced in an object orperson” that already contains a dormant germ of it through some ascetic or preter-natural regimen (SR, 2). It is of little consequence whether this extraordinary poweris “actual, alleged, or presumed” (SPWR, 295)—these are all modernist value judg-ments. The fact is that, for the individuals living in the enchanted cultural condition,this supernatural power permeates the natural world and it is very real. This is somuch the case that, for the individuals concerned, the attainment of their materialand ideal needs depends on the direct manipulation of and interaction with charis-matic persons, objects, entities, and so on. In the enchanted cultural condition, therelationship between “supernatural” charisma and the “natural” empirical world canbe described as one of complete symbiosis.

In stark contrast, the disenchanted cultural condition views all empiricalphenomena to be completely devoid of charisma or supernatural powers. In thedisenchanted cultural conditions, all empirical phenomena are seen as the result ofnatural processes that can be rationally understood and technically controlled. Twoimportant principles underpinning the disenchanted cultural condition are that“there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play” in empirical realityand that “one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (SV, 139). The claimthat the world is free of all incalculable, mysterious, supernatural forces “means thatthe world is disenchanted” (SV, 139). In the disenchanted cultural condition, humanbeings do not need to interact with charismatic (i.e., “supernatural”) powers to meettheir material and ideal needs; they seek to fulfill the needs through rational andtechnical means. Weber also describes disenchantment as the process of “increasingintellectualization and rationalization” (SV, 139). The following observation by

Weber contrasts the enchanted and disenchanted cultural conditions:

One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore thespirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical meansand calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization means.(SV, 139)

Between the enchanted and disenchanted cultural conditions, Weber identifies athird cultural possibility—that of historical religion. Religious culture seeks to estab-lish a middle position between enchantment and disenchantment. In contrast todisenchanted cultural claims, historical religion recognizes supernatural charisma asa “fact” that is no less real (actually more real) than any fact in natural, empiricalreality. But in contrast to enchanted cultural claims, historical religion rejects theclaim that charisma is inextricably a part of empirical reality. From the religiousperspective, the empirical and the charismatic are different but related domains.With respect to the relationship between supernatural charisma and natural empiri-cal reality, the position of the three cultural conditions can be described as enchant-ment as the symbiosis of charisma and empirical reality, historical religion as thedifferentiation but intimate relation of charisma and empirical reality, and disen-chantment as complete absence (or autonomy) of charisma from empirical reality.

Weber’s research on the history of Western culture arrived at the conclusion,among others, that historical development led from an enchanted to a religious, andultimately to a disenchanted, a-religious worldview. He used the phrase “disen-chantment of the world” (SV, 155), to describe the modern1 condition that is theculmination of this historical process. Weber argues that while there is a movementtoward disenchantment in every single culture known to historians, the completedisenchantment of culture is the unique achievement of modern, Western culture.2

In other words, disenchantment is a universally latent potential in all human cultures butthis universal potential is actualized in only one particular, unique cultural condition—that of the modern West. For Weber, a fundamental task of social (or cultural) scienceis to understand the defining characteristics and developmental processes and discoverthe “causes” that have led to disenchantment. He notes:

Any child of modern European culture will, unavoidably and justifiably, addressuniversal-historical themes with a particular question in mind: What combination ofcircumstances called forth the broad range of ideas and cultural forces that on the onehand arose in the West, and only in the West, and on the other hand stood—at leastas we like to imagine—in a line of historical development endowed in all civilizationswith significance and validity? (PESC, 149)

Weber’s disenchantment thesis has often been interpreted to be both assuming andadvancing the idea that there is an unbridgeable divide between religion and science.This interpretation finds its justification in the historical and cultural analysis offeredby Weber in a number of his writings. Even though the purpose of the present proj-ect is to challenge this interpretation, an exposition of the thesis and the interpreta-tion with reference to Weber’s work is necessary, as it sets the ground for challengingthe interpretation, again with reference to Weber’s work.


Weber posits that disenchantment has shaped not only the institutional structuresand procedures in modern society but also the psychological attitudes of modernhuman beings. Given the fact that disenchantment manifests itself at both the exter-nal institutional level and the inner psychological level, an adequate treatment of thesubject requires that it be analyzed on both levels. Weber argues that even though theimpact of rationalization and intellectualization at the two levels is intimately related,its effects are not the same and therefore should be considered separately. Afternoting that “rationalism” may have a variety of meanings, Weber further notes:

It means one thing if we think of the kind of rationalization the systematic thinkerperforms on the image of the world: an increasing theoretical mastery of reality bymeans of increasingly precise and abstract concepts. Rationalism means another thingif we think of the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end bymeans of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means. These types of ratio-nalisms are very different, in spite of the fact that ultimately they belong inseparablytogether. (SPWR, 293)

To the extent that the following discussion is an exposition of Weber’s position, itadopts the definitional structure proposed by Weber. To the degree that it is a partic-ular reading of Weber that is interested in a particular issue, it adopts its own flowof argument. The discussion in this chapter focuses on

(a) disenchantment as the irreversible and inescapable fate of modern times;(b) the effects of disenchantment on practical rationalization (i.e., “methodical

attainment of . . . ends by means of precise calculation”) and the fragmentation/autonomization of value spheres;

(c) the effects of disenchantment on theoretical rationalization (i.e., “theoreticalmastery of reality by means of . . . concepts”) and the loss of meaning andsignificance in the world.3

The discussion of the disenchantment thesis in these terms seeks to establish groundson which this thesis has been interpreted as being an expression of Enlightenmentthought. The phrase “Enlightenment thought” is explained in greater detail in thelatter part of the present chapter. For the time being, it can be understood to be anexpression of the modernist claim regarding the universal validity and objectivity ofrationality and reason. Enlightenment thought utilizes this understanding to formu-late the position that an unbridgeable divide separates religion from science becauseof the differing relations the two have with respect to this universally objective andvalid reason/rationality: one (science) is an expression of rational thought par excel-lence, while the other (religion) is an expression of irrational thought par excellence.While the goal of this book as a whole is to challenge this interpretation of Weber’sdisenchantment thesis, the goal of this chapter is to present (partially, butadequately) the grounds on which this interpretation is built.

1.1 Disenchantment as the Fate of Our Times

Weber begins the concluding part of his last public lecture with the words: “The fateof our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all,

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 11

by the ‘disenchantment of the world’ ” (SV, 155). He defines the terms intellectual-ization and rationalization, and links them to the disenchantment of the world,earlier in the lecture, in these words:

The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not . . . indicate an increasedand general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives.

It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if one but wished onecould learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysteriousincalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master allthings by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. (SV, 139)

Even though there are a variety of factors contributing to the process of intellectual-ization, rationalization, and the resultant disenchantment of the world, Weber arguesthat the progress of science is the most crucial of these. Weber notes: “Scientificprogress is a fraction, the most important fraction, of the process of intellectualiza-tion which we have been undergoing for thousands of years” (SV, 138). The fact thatscientific rationalization and intellectualization and the resultant disenchantment ofthe world define the fate of our times has far-reaching implications for the place ofreligion in modern culture. While the processes of intellectualization and rationali-zation have come to be almost exclusively identified with scientific progress inmodern times, Weber notes that they cannot be viewed in such exclusive terms froma historical perspective. This is due to the fact that, in its origin, intellectual andrational thought is intimately connected with religious thought. If one traces thegenealogy of scientific rationalism back far enough, one finds that its ancestral rootsare to be found in the religious domain. The fact that the genealogy of scientificrationalism can be traced back to religious roots means that the subsequent develop-ment and progress of scientific rationalism would directly impact the standing ofreligious rationalism in human society.

In identifying disenchantment as the fate of the times, Weber begins with describ-ing the commonality and the differences between religious rationalism and scientificrationalism. Weber posits that theology can be considered a type of science as itrepresents a particular sort of rationalization and intellectualization—it “representsan intellectual rationalization of the possession of sacred value” (SV, 153). Theologyis illustrative of the exercise of rationality or the “imperative of consistency” (RRW,324) in the domain of religious thought. Insofar as theology is a “science” in the mostgeneral sense of the word, it shares a fundamental characteristic with all science: “Noscience is absolutely free of presuppositions, and no science can prove its fundamen-tal value to the man who rejects these presuppositions” (SV, 153). The acceptance ofthe validity and value of the presuppositions on which all and every science is builtcannot be proven by appealing to “rational” or “scientific” grounds. Consequently,for Weber, the presence of such rationally/scientifically unjustifiable presuppositionsin science evidence the presence of a suprarational element in the scientific domain.The presence of the rational in the religious domain and that of the suprarational inthe scientific domain evidence the existence of common ground between the two.But, for Weber, a fundamental difference remains between religion and science, inspite of some common characteristics. This is due to the fact that theology(i.e., rationalized religious thought) “adds a few specific presuppositions for its work


and thus for the justification of its existence” (SV, 153). The “few specific presuppo-sitions” that theology adds for the justification of its existence come in the form ofthe claim that

certain “revelations” are facts relevant for salvation and as such make possible ameaningful conduct of life. Hence, these revelations must be believed in. Moreover,theologies presuppose that certain subjective states and acts possess the quality of holi-ness, that is, they constitute a way of life, or at least elements of one, that is religiouslymeaningful. (SV, 154)

Besides the presuppositions of revelation, holy acts, and holy states, theologycontains an additional element that sets it apart from science. This additionalelement is the requirement of an “intellectual sacrifice” (SV, 154) on the part of thebeliever as a necessary prerequisite for the possession of the quality of holiness—themost valuable of religious goods. In the absence of this intellectual sacrifice, the indi-vidual does not have recourse to any other means in the attempt to attain faith orany other state of holiness. Weber notes:

Whoever does not “possess” faith, or the other holy states, cannot have theology as asubstitute for them, least of all any other science. On the contrary, in every “positive”theology, the devout reaches a point where the Augustinian sentence holds: credo nonquod, sed quia absurdum est. (SV, 154)

Weber identifies “faith” as a holy state that can be attained only by a sacrifice of theintellect. No system of intellectual rationalization, not even theology, can vouchsafefaith to an individual who is not willing to make the intellectual sacrifice. Weber goeson to emphasize that if one cannot hope to obtain faith from a system of rationali-zation, such as theology, he/she is even more at a loss in this regard if he/she turns tosome other science besides theology. In sum, faith is a holy state that cannot be justi-fied on intellectual, rational, or scientific grounds; it can only be justified in terms ofa sacrifice of the intellect.

The fact that religion requires an intellectual sacrifice on the part of the believerto (among other things) a prophet or a church as a prerequisite for attaining faith,means that religious rationalism is fundamentally at odds with the spirit of an agethat is shaped by scientific progress and scientific rationalization. This is due to thefact that science demands an unflinching exercise and defense of intellectual integrityin the face of any and all claims to the contrary. In return, science offers itself as ameans to a type of knowledge that cannot be had from any other source:

Science today is a “vocation” organized in special disciplines in the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of seers andprophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does it partake of the contem-plation of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe. This to be sure,is the inescapable condition of our historical situation. We cannot evade it so long aswe remain true to ourselves. (SV, 152)

Since the modern historical condition has been, and is being, shaped by scientificprogress, we as moderns cannot evade the consequences, implications, and requirements


of scientific rationalism if we are to remain true to ourselves and our historicalcondition. Plain intellectual honesty and integrity require that we, as moderns, rejectall claims of special gifts and grace claiming to provide access to, and possession of,sacred values and revelations because such claims cannot be justified on rational,scientific grounds. In sum, scientific rationalism and religious rationalism are funda-mentally at odds with each other in the modern historical condition because of thediffering attitudes that the two have toward the intellect. Whereas religious rational-ism promises the gifts of sacred values and revelation in return for a sacrifice of theintellect, scientific rationalism promises self-clarification and knowledge of interre-lated facts in return for the maintenance of integrity and autonomy of the intellect.This account of the relationship between the intellect and faith and the intellect andscience puts religion and science at the ends of a mutually exclusive dichotomy.

This dichotomy is reinforced by Weber’s more detailed description of the role thatthe rational intellect plays in modern culture. Scientific progress has disenchantedthe world to such a degree that it is no longer possible to offer an adequate rationaldefense of sacred values and revelations in the modern historical setting. The modernintellect, if it remains true to itself, has to reject any such defense in the name ofintellectual honesty and integrity. This means that religion is nothing more than anantique in modern times that cannot play a constructive or positive role in the lifeof moderns. Weber notes that many modern intellectuals maintain a deep longingfor religion in spite of this fact. In order to fulfill this longing, such intellectualsattempt to fashion a type of religion that is suitable for the modern disenchantedmilieu. Weber goes on to argue that all such attempts are nothing more than exam-ples of intellectual chicanery that are devoid of both religious and scientific value:

Never yet has a new prophecy emerged . . . by way of the need of some modern intel-lectuals to furnish their souls with, so to speak, guaranteed genuine antiques. In doingso, they happen to remember that religion has belonged to such antiques, and of allthings religion is what they do not possess. By way of substitute, however, they play atdecorating a sort of domestic chapel with small sacred images from all over the world,or they produce surrogates through all sorts of psychic experiences to which theyascribe the dignity of mystic holiness, which they peddle in the book market. This isplain humbug and self-deception. (SV, 154 ff.)

In a disenchanted era devoid of genuine prophecy, “the ultimate and most sublimevalues have retreated from public life into the transcendental realm of mystic life orinto the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations” (SV, 155).Consequently, modern culture is devoid of something corresponding to the“prophetic pneuma, which in former times swept through the great communities likea firebrand, welding them together” (SV, 155). In spite of the best attempts and mostardent wishes of some modern intellectuals, the vacuum created by the absence ofthe binding force of religion in the public sphere cannot be filled by the artificialconstruction of new religions by means of academic prophecy.

Consciously making the intellectual sacrifice and returning to traditional religionis another response to the fate of the times. For Weber, this response, if done prop-erly, is intellectually more honest and ethically more praiseworthy than the attempt


of modern academic prophets:

To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must say: may herather return silently, without the usual publicity build-up of renegades, but simply andplainly. The arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for him.After all, they do not make it hard for him. One way or another he has to bring his“intellectual sacrifice”—that is inevitable. If he can really do it, we shall not rebukehim. (SV, 155)

The individual making this choice turns his/her back to a fundamental characteris-tic of the historical epoch of which he/she is a part—the progress of scientific ration-alization and intellectualization.

Whether it is the modern intellectual trying to construe new religions in theabsence of genuine prophecy, or someone bringing his/her intellectual sacrifice to theold church (or masjid, synagogue, temple), both are sidestepping the fundamentalissue facing the moderns. This issue is the fact that while there has always been atension between religious rationalism and scientific rationalism during the course ofhistory, it is only in the modern disenchanted era that this tension has developed intoa full-blown rupture. The locus of the tension between the two centers on the issueof meaning (Sinn). Weber notes that religious rationalism (in all its variety of histor-ical and cultural expressions) posits that all the events in the world and the event ofthe world itself are inherently infused with meaning:

At all times and in all places, the need for salvation—consciously cultivated as thesubstance of religiosity—has resulted from the endeavor of a systematic and practicalrationalization of life’s realities. To be sure, this connection has been maintained withvarying degrees of transparency: on this level, all religions have demanded as a specificpresupposition that the course of the world be somehow meaningful, at least in so faras it touches upon the interests of men. (RRW, 353)

Religious rationalism infuses meaning into the world by positing that the empiricalworld does not exhaust all of reality, that is, a part of reality exists above and beyondthe empirical world. From the perspective of religious rationalism, the supra-empiricaldomain of reality is intimately related to the empirical domain and to all of theevents taking place in the empirical domain. Religious thought posits a relationshipof the empirical world that is encountered by the senses and analyzed by the intel-lect, with a heavenly realm that lies beyond the senses and the intellect that can onlybe accessed through charismatic means. While the events in the world may not befully clear and comprehensible (i.e., rationalized) in their own terms, they can beunderstood and made sense of (i.e., rationalized) when linked to the heavenly realm.From the perspective of religious rationalism, it is the positing of a relationshipbetween the worldly and heavenly realms that makes the events of the worldly realmand the world meaningful and significant.

Even though there is a clear distinction (or differentiation) between the two, religiousthought posits a rational link between the empirical worldly and the supra-empiricalheavenly sphere. But even in this religious postulate, a possibility exists that theempirical world be affirmed on its own terms rather than in relation to the heavenly


sphere. In other words, the potential exists that the two spheres, beyond beingdifferentiated distinctly into “the worldly” and “the heavenly,” become autonomous intheir own right. The tension that this potentiality engenders for rational thought ismanifest in the event–meaning (or cognition–interpretation) rupture that is implicitin the dualistic world image that sees reality as being composed of a supra-empiricalheavenly realm that is above and beyond the realm of the empirical world.Schluchter notes that the

[n]ear-identity between cognition and interpretation [in the enchanted world view]becomes problematical with the transition to the dualist theocentric world view. Nowcognition and interpretation can separate in the name of autonomy of the valuespheres, and thus the relations between scientific rationalism and ethico-religiousrationalism can become tense. (Schluchter, 1979, 45)

Religious rationalism posits a discontinuity between cognition and interpretationbut at the same time attempts to maintain a relationship between the two in spite ofthe discontinuity. It is only by maintaining a relationship despite the discontinuitythat meaning can be deciphered and attached to the event that is observed.

Scientific rationalism, on the other hand, rejects any and all religious, philosoph-ical, or metaphysical attempts to attach meaning to any particular event that isobserved in the empirical domain, just as it rejects the attachment of meaning to theempirical world itself. For scientific rationalism, all of the events in the world andthe world itself can be understood and explained in terms of laws of natural causal-ity that are imminently present in the empirical domain. Weber posits that thetension between the religious claims of a meaningful cosmos and the scientific claimsof a cosmos of natural causality represents the “greatest and most principled” clashbetween religious rationalism and scientific rationalism (RRW, 350). According toWeber, this clash finds its sharpest and most acute expression in modern disen-chanted culture:

The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge definitely comes to the forewherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked to the disenchantmentof the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism. For then science encoun-ters the claims of the ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hencesomehow meaningfully and ethically oriented, cosmos. In principle, the empiricalas well as the mathematically oriented view of the world develops refutations ofevery intellectual approach which in any way asks for a “meaning” of inner-worldlyoccurrences. (RRW, 350 ff.)

In the cognition–interpretation dialectic, religious rationalism identifies otherworldlymeaning as the conclusive interpretation, whereas scientific rationalism identifiesinner-worldly, natural causality as the conclusive interpretation. As long as theunderstanding of the world and worldly events remained tied to otherworldly mean-ing (in premodern culture), an autonomous development of scientific rationalismwas not possible. But once scientific rationalism posited inner-worldly, naturalcausality to explain the events in the world and the event of the world, then itbecame possible for the (originally religious) differentiation of the two spheres to


develop into full-blown disenchanted/disenchanting autonomy of each sphere. Thismarks the divorce of scientific rationalism from religious rationalism. It is in theaftermath of this secession that scientific rationalism completely and consistently“worked through to the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into acausal mechanism” (RRW, 350). It is the fate of the moderns to live in a disen-chanted age in which scientific rationalism has not only become autonomous fromreligion, but has also challenged the fundamental presupposition on which religiousrationalism is based (i.e., that the cosmos is inherently meaningful).

If the moderns are to remain true to themselves, they must remain true to theirparticular historical situation and not turn to the old churches (or masjids, syna-gogues, temples, etc.) of a bygone era in order to respond to the disenchanted fateof the times. To continue to affirm premodern religious claims about the cosmosand behave according to premodern religious teachings in modern times is akin toliving in a permanent state of cognitive dissonance, that is, living in a world irrevo-cably shaped by scientific progress as if such progress has not taken place. Thesynthesis of religious rationalism and scientific rationalism is a part of the historicalnarrative which has been replaced by the empirical disenchanted reality of the differ-entiated autonomy of the two spheres—this autonomy is not something that can beeither ignored or wished out of existence. This account of the relationship betweenscience and religion in a disenchanted age suggests that it is the fate of the timesthat the two will remain mutually antagonistic because they are, and will remainautonomous. Before discussing whether this antagonistic relationship betweenreligion and science is Weber’s final word on the issue, a more detailed account ofWeber’s understanding of the effects of disenchantment on practical rationalizationand theoretical rationalization is required.

1.2 The Effects of Disenchantment on Practical Rationalization

Let us keep in mind that the expression “practical rationalization” refers to the“imperative of consistency” being applied to the practical–ethical attitude, and focusthis discussion on the effects of disenchantment on practical rationalization. Webernotes that religious rationalism seeks to shape all aspects of human behavior in theworld in line with an “exclusive orientation” that aims at attaining “the ‘one thingthat is needful’ ” (SV, 149). This means shaping the entirety of an individual’s andcollectivity’s worldly behavior with reference to a supreme, supra-empirical value:

[T]he substance of prophecy or of the savior’s commandment is to direct a way of lifeto the pursuit of a sacred value. Thus understood, . . . prophecy or commandmentmeans, at least relatively, to systematize and rationalize the way of life, either in particu-lar points or totally. (RRW, 327)

In practical terms, the “pursuit of a sacred value” means that all worldly activity, beit political, economic, esthetic, or intellectual, is systematically and rationallyoriented in a particular direction. Weber posits that such exclusive orientation of


human behavior in the world goes against the most fundamental character of empiricalreality. Weber notes:

“Scientific” pleading is meaningless in principle because the various value spheres ofthe world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other. The elder Mill . . . was onthis point right when he said: If one proceeds from pure experience, one arrives atpolytheism . . . . (SV, 147)

Weber posits that the economic, political, religious, and esthetic value spheres areexamples of worldly spheres that have different values, differing in their demands onthe individual. Both the values and demands of the different orders are irreconcilablein the end—just as they are irreconcilable with religious values and demands(RRW, 330 ff.). Weber argues that it is impossible to resolve the perpetual conflictamong the different value spheres through any ‘scientific’ means. He uses theologi-cal imagery to further detail the impossibility of scientifically reconciling not onlythe differences between the value spheres, but also trying to determine the value ofany given value sphere with reference to the value of another value sphere. He usesthe term “god” to refer to the supreme value of a particular value sphere:

I do not know how one might wish to decide “scientifically” the value of French andGerman cultures; for here, too, different gods struggle with one another, now and forall times to come. (SV, 148)

The inability of scientific rationalism to decide upon the worth of a particular valueof a particular value sphere or to choose among differing values of different valuespheres (thereby leading to a polytheism of values) is the direct opposite of the goalof religious rationalism.

In addition to being in a perpetual conflict with each other that cannot be resolvedby scientific rationality, the inner logic of the worldly values rejects the very notion ofbeing judged from the perspective of a single, supra-mundane, otherworldly value. Ifanything, the “god” (or supreme value) from one perspective looks like the “devil”(or nadir) when viewed from another perspective. Weber notes:

What man will take upon himself the attempt to “refute scientifically” the ethic of theSermon on the Mount? For instance, the sentence, “resist no evil,” or the image of turn-ing the cheek? And yet it is clear, in mundane perspective, that this is an ethic of undig-nified conduct; one has to choose between the religious dignity which this ethic confersand the dignity of manly conduct which preaches something quite different; “resistevil—lest you be co-responsible for overpowering evil.” According to our ultimatestandpoint, the one is the devil and the other God, and the individual has to decidewhich is God for him and which is the devil. And so it goes throughout all the ordersof life. (SV, 148)

While the gods of the different worldly value spheres are engaged in an irreconcil-able conflict that cannot be decided rationally, they are simultaneously in conflictwith the supreme value of religious rationalism that seeks to integrate all worldlyvalues/behavior with reference to a supra-mundane ideal.


Weber uses the imagery of the “struggle of the gods” to describe the intractabletension that exists between the different value spheres (or orders) (SV, 152). Not onlydoes this tension exist amongst the different worldly value spheres, but the worldlyvalue spheres as a collectivity also stand in intractable opposition to the religioussphere. Weber notes: “[P]rophetic and redemptory religions have lived not only in anacute but in a permanent state of tension in relation to the world and its orders”(RRW, 328). The one point that illustrates this permanent state of tension better thanany other is the stark contrast between the religious ideal of universal brotherhood4

and the impersonal, un-brotherly ways of the worldly spheres. The religious ethic isbased upon an ordered and systematic code of daily life in which the command to loveone’s neighbor is of supreme importance. Beginning with this command, the end ofthe religious ethic is a call for universal love of all human beings:

The more imperatives that issued from the ethic of reciprocity among neighbors wereraised, the more rational the conception of salvation became, and the more it wassublimated into an ethic of absolute ends. Externally, such commands rose to acommunism of loving brethren; internally they rose to the attitude of caritas, love forthe sufferer per se, for one’s neighbor, for man, and finally for the enemy. (RRW, 330)

For Weber, the progressive rationalization of the religious command to “love thyneighbor” culminates in the claims of a universal brotherhood as being the supremereligious value in this world. But this penultimate religious value is challenged by theprogressive rationalization of the particular values in the different worldly spheres.Weber notes:

The religion of brotherliness has always clashed with the orders and values of thisworld, and the more consistently its demands have been carried through, the sharperthe clash has been. The split has usually become wider the more the values of the worldhave been rationalized and sublimated in terms of their own laws. (RRW, 330)

As the values of the world come to be rationalized and sublimated in their ownterms, they become more and more impersonal, and the clash with the religious ethicof universal brotherhood intensifies. Weber notes: “The religious ethic of brotherli-ness stands in dynamic tension with any purposive-rational conduct that follows itsown laws” (RRW, 340). This can be illustrated by contrasting the religious ideal ofuniversal brotherhood with the supreme values of the economic, political, esthetic,and erotic spheres. But in order to adequately appreciate the modern clash betweenthe supreme religious value and the various disenchanted/disenchanting values of theworldly spheres, it must be kept in mind that there was an original enchanted/enchanting synthesis of the supreme religious value and the various worldly values.

Weber locates the origin of the modern rationalized economy in pre-modern reli-gious communities. He notes that the religious communities, centered aroundtemples and monasteries, have always depended “upon economic means” for theirown maintenance, propaganda/propagation, and other forms of “accommodation tocultural needs and the everyday interests of the masses” (RRW, 332). These religiouscommunities represent the earliest example of collective rationalized economicactivity because this activity was not directly dependent on the natural world


(i.e., procuring material needs by means of hunting/gathering or subsistence farming).Consequently, “[t]emples and monasteries have everywhere become the very fociof rational economies” (RRW, 332). In such a cultural condition, “religion” and“economy” stand in such close proximity to each other that it is difficult to separatethe two. But with progressive rationalization, the economic market attains an iden-tity of its own, distinct and separate from the temple, and economic values come tobe distinguished from religious values. The emergence of a particular type ofreligious actor is a crucial factor in catalyzing the process of differentiation:

The ascetic monk has fled from the world by denying himself individual property; hisexistence has rested entirely upon his own work; and, above all, his needs have beencorrespondingly restricted to what was absolutely indispensable. The paradox of allrational asceticism . . . is that rational asceticism itself has created the very wealth itrejected. (RRW, 332)

Rational asceticism makes it possible to conceptualize a “worldly” realm, character-ized by economic possession (and by extension attachment to the world), that is setapart from a “heavenly” realm characterized by eternal salvation (and by extensiondisregard for everything the world has to offer).

The differentiation of market and economic values from the temple and religiousvalues, catalyzed by the emergence and spread of rational asceticism, attains full-blown autonomy in the modern disenchanted milieu when the values of each of thesphere come to be interpreted in its own imminent terms. Weber notes that amodern, rational economy as a functional organization “originates in the interest-struggle of men in the market” (RRW, 331). The impersonal, abstract notions ofcalculation, estimation, and above all money shape the interaction and behavior ofhuman beings in the market. The market and everything connected with it is devoidof brotherly love among individuals:

The routinized economic cosmos, and thus the rationally highest form of the provisionof material goods which is indispensable for all worldly culture, has been a structure towhich the absence of love is attached from the very root. (RRW, 355)

The worldly economic order is not only based on a “structure to which the absenceof love is attached from the very root,” but it is also based upon the most impersonaland abstract of all worldly concepts, money. The more an individual shapes his/herpractical life according to the inner demands of a rational economy, the furtherhe/she will be removed from religious values:

Money is the most abstract and “impersonal” element that exists in human life. Themore the world of the modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, theless accessible it is to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness.The more rational, and thus impersonal, capitalism becomes, the more . . . this [is] thecase. (RRW, 331)

The absence of love and the absence of brotherly relations are the defining charac-teristics of the disenchanted economic order, with competition in/of the marketplacereplacing love and money replacing brotherly relations.


The origin and fate of the religious ethic vis-à-vis the political sphere is similar towhat has been noted about its relation to the economic sphere. In the enchantedworld, there is no “political” that is distinct from the “religious.” Weber notes:

The ancient god of war as well as the god who guaranteed the legal order were func-tional deities who protected the undoubted values of everyday routine. The gods oflocality, tribe, and polity were only concerned with interests of their respective associa-tions. They had to fight other gods like themselves, just as their communities fought,and they had to prove their divine powers in this very struggle. (RRW, 333)

This enchanted/enchanting symbiosis is shattered by the revolutionary claim ofhistorical religion. This claim posits that human affairs are not governed by a multi-tude of “gods of locality, tribe, and polity . . . only concerned with interests of theirrespective associations” but rather by the One God of the universe who is concernedabout everything and everyone in it. This One God requires the believers to use allmeans at their disposal to spread His name and domain throughout His world sothat all may come to know His love and the possibility of salvation through His love.This mission requires the use of “political” means to achieve “religious” goals. Webernotes that the tension between the religious and political spheres arises only in thecase of the universalist claims of historical religion:

The problem only arose when these barriers of locality, tribe, and polity were shatteredby universalist religions, by a religion with a unified God of the entire world. And theproblem arose in full strength only when this God was a God of “love.” The problemof tensions with the political order emerged for redemption religions out of the basicdemand for brotherliness. (RRW, 333)

The tension that results from the differentiation of the political and religious spheresin the aftermath of the revolutionary claim of monotheism is as obvious as it is acute.The God of love demands that the believers use coercive violence to spread Hismessage of love and salvation throughout the entire world. From this perspective, theonly legitimate use of violence is in the cause of the God of love.

The just war is engaged in for the sake of executing God’s commandment, or for thesake of faith, which in some sense always means a war of religion. Therefore, salvationaristocracies reject the compulsion to participate in those wars of political authoritywhich are not clearly established as holy wars corresponding to God’s will, that is, warsnot affirmed by one’s own conscience. The victorious army of Cromwell’s saints actedin this way when it took a stand against compulsory military service. (RRW, 337)

With the increased rationalization of the political sphere, the political authoritycomes to claim a monopoly on “legitimate coercive violence.” In this cultural condi-tion, the political authority claims that it and only it can legitimately use violence,and it does so in the interests of maintaining worldly political order, and categori-cally rules out the possibility of using the same for the sake of some otherworldlyvalue. Weber notes that the political state “is an association that claims the monop-oly of the legitimate use of violence, and cannot be defined in any other manner”(RRW, 334). Violence and the threat of violence are the defining characteristics of


the political state:

It is absolutely essential for every political association to appeal to the naked violenceof coercive means in the face of outsiders as well as in the face of internal enemies. Itis only this very appeal to violence that constitutes a political association in ourterminology. (RRW, 334)

Rationalized in purely political terms, in the final analysis, it is power relations thatdetermine the legitimacy of the state to employ coercive violence and not any notionof ethical right:

“Reasons of state” thus follow their own external and internal laws. The very success offorce, or the threat of force, depends ultimately upon power relations and not onethical “right,” even were one to believe it possible to discover objective criteria for such“right.” (RRW, 334)

The competing claims of different state actors to legitimately use coercive violencegive rise to conditions that further challenge the penultimate religious value ofuniversal love and brotherhood. The political order directly competes with religionwhen “[a]s the consummated threat of violence among modern polities, war createsa pathos and a sentiment of community” (RRW, 335). This sentiment of commu-nity during times of war cuts across all social, ethnic, economic divides and welds themodern polity into a unity that is comparable to the religious achievement ofconstructing a social body based on the ethic of brotherliness. Additionally, “wardoes something to the warrior which, in its concrete meaning, is unique: it makeshim experience a consecrated meaning of death which is characteristic only of deathin war” (RRW, 335). For the moderns, death is an immanently meaningless eventbecause the “why?” of it cannot be explained in any logical or rational terms. It isonly the warrior on the battlefield who can give him/herself a coherent answer to the“why?” of his/her death and thereby infuse it with meaning. Consequently, themodern polity comes into direct tension with religious practical–ethical attitude ontwo decisive points:

The very extraordinary quality of brotherliness of war, and of death in war, is sharedwith sacred charisma and the experience of the communion with God, and this factraises the competition between the brotherliness of religion and of the warrior commu-nity to its extreme height. (RRW, 336)

Weber sees an intimate link between the claim of the modern political state to havea monopoly on the use of violence with the “meaningful” death on the battlefield:

This location of death within a series of meaningful and consecrated events ultimatelylies at the base of all endeavors to support the autonomous dignity of the polity restingon force. (RRW, 335)

In addition to the pathos of war generated by the modern policy, the bureaucracy ofthe modern nation-state further undermines the religious ethic. Just as the worldly


economic order is based on the abstract, impersonal notion of money, the worldlypolitical order is based on impersonal bureaucratic management of society. Thismanagement refers to the application of rational rules determined by an impersonalauthority, “the state,” in a “matter-of-fact manner, ‘without regard to the person’ . . .without hate and therefore without love” (RRW, 334). In contrast to the interest-struggle in the marketplace that directly pits one individual against another, politicalbureaucracy attempts to facilitate relationships between individuals, groups, andsociety. But this facilitation is not done for the sake of the persons concerned, or interms that concern persons as such, it is done for the sake of maintaining an imper-sonal entity, “the state,” and in terms of impersonal rules and regulations:

The more matter-of-fact and calculating politics is, the freer of passionate feelings, ofwrath, and of love it becomes, the more it must appear to be an ethic of brotherlinessto be estranged from brotherliness. (RRW, 334 ff.)

The increasing, and finally autonomous, rationalization of the political spherereplaces the religious value of love with that of legitimate use of coercive violence andthe religious value of brotherhood with impersonal bureaucracy.

The increasing rationality of the economic and political spheres makes thereligious practical–ethical attitude appear to be that much more nonrational and irra-tional. But even at the level of nonrationality and irrationality, the religious ethicstands in profound tension with the worldly spheres. If anything, the religious tensionwith esthetic and erotic spheres, “whose character is essentially non-rational or basi-cally anti-rational” (RRW, 341) is even more profound and intractable than its tensionwith the rational economic and political spheres. Weber notes that in certain cultural/historical setting, there is a synthesis of the “esthetic” and “religious” spheres—a synthe-sis so intimate that every specific aspect of the esthetic sphere (i.e., visual art, music,dance, architecture, etc.) can be traced back to religious roots. Weber notes that

religion has been an inexhaustible fountain of opportunities for artistic creation, on theone hand, and of stylizing through traditionalization, on the other. This is shown in avariety of objects and processes: in idols, icons, and other religious artifacts; in thestereotyping of magically proved forms, which is a first step in the overcoming of natu-ralism by a fixation of “style”; in music as a means of ecstasy, exorcism or apotropaicmagic; in sorcerers as holy singers and dancers; in magically proved and therefore magi-cally stereotyped tone relations—the earliest preparatory stages in the development oftonal systems; in the magically proved dance-step as one of the sources of rhythm andas an ecstasy technique; in temples and churches as the largest of all buildings, with thearchitectural task becoming stereotyped (and thus style-forming) as a consequence ofpurposes which are established once for all, and with the structural forms becomingstereotyped through magical efficacy; in paraments and church implements of all kindswhich have served as object of applied art. (RRW, 341)

The synthesis is replaced with a tension-ridden differentiation of the artistic and reli-gious spheres when salvation religion makes a conceptual distinction between “form”and “meaning”:

The sublimation of the religious ethic and the quest for salvation, on the one hand, andthe evolution of the inherent logic of art, on the other, have tended to form an increasingly


tense relation. All sublimated religions of salvation have focused upon the meaningalone, not upon the form, of the things and actions relevant for salvation. Salvation reli-gions have devalued form as contingent, as something creaturely and distracting frommeaning. (RRW, 341)

Even though there is tension between the two spheres, the synthesis is maintainedbetween the two spheres “for so long as the creative artist experiences his work asresulting from the charisma of ‘ability’ (originally magic) or from spontaneous play”(RRW, 341). But this differentiation-harmony is replaced with disenchanted/disenchanting autonomy with the increasing intellectualization and rationalizationof the artistic values because “under these conditions, art becomes a cosmos of moreand more consciously grasped independent values which exist in their own right”(RRW, 3422). Not only is an entire inner-worldly cosmos created by art (completelyindependent of the cosmos posited by religious rationalism), but this creation alsoseeks to provide “salvation from the routines of everyday life, and especially from theincreasing pressure of theoretical and practical rationalism” (RRW, 342). Art comesto take on a redemptory function in a highly intellectualized and rationalized worldand thereby starts to directly compete with religion on the all-important (actuallyonly-important) issue of salvation. Speaking of art’s irrational origin and irrationalclaim of providing an escape from routinized modern existence, Weber notes:

Every rational religious ethic must turn against this inner-worldly, irrational salvation.For in religion’s eyes, such salvation is a realm of irresponsible indulgence and secretlovelessness. (RRW, 342)

The inner-worldly salvation offered by art is directly related to the form of the artisticexpression, whereas the otherworldly salvation offered by religion is divorced from allnotions of “form.” Consequently, “[a]rt becomes an ‘idolatry,’ a competing power,and a deceptive bedazzlement; and the images and allegory of religious subjectsappear as blasphemy” (RRW, 343). In a most principled way, the inner-worldlysalvation offered by the esthetic sphere clashes with the claims of (otherworldly)salvation religion.

Beside being in profound tension with the irrational esthetic sphere, the rational-ized ethic of “salvation religion is in profound tension with the greatest irrationalforce of life: sexual love” (RRW, 343). This tension is the product of certain histori-cal and cultural developments in light of the fact that there are historical and culturalexamples that demonstrate that a synthesis between “religion” and the “erotic” is apart of the human experience. Weber notes:

Originally the relation of sex and religion was very intimate. Sexual intercourse wasvery frequently part of magic orgiasticism or was an unintended result of orgiasticexcitement . . . Sacred harlotry has had nothing whatsoever to do with an alleged“primitive promiscuity”; it has usually been a survival of magical orgiaticism in whichevery ecstasy was considered “holy.” (RRW, 343)

But this synthesis between the religious and the erotic is shattered due to certaincultural and historical developments that lead to the emergence of differentiated


spheres of the religious and the erotic. Weber describes the developments contributingto the emergence of the differentiated spheres in these words:

A certain tension between religion and sex came to the fore only with the temporarycultic chastity of priests. This rather ancient chastity may well have been determined bythe fact that from the point of view of the strictly stereotyped ritual of the regulatedcommunity cult, sexuality was readily considered to be specifically dominated bydemons. Furthermore, it was no accident that subsequently the prophetic religions, aswell as the priest-controlled life orders, have, almost without significant exception,regulated sexual intercourse in favor of marriage. The contrast of all rational regulationof life with magical orgiasticism and all sorts of irrational frenzies is expressed in thisfact. (RRW, 344)

The rational regulation of sexual relations by salvation religion gives rise to thedifferentiated spheres of the religious and the erotic. This regulation is the middlepoint between enchanted orgiastic frenzy and disenchanted eroticism where sexuallove is raised to the “sphere of conscious enjoyment (in the most sublime sense of theterm)” (RRW, 345). Weber describes the religious rationale regulating marriage andits attitude toward eroticism in these words:

[M]arriage is accepted as one of the divine ordinations given to man as a creature whois hopelessly wretched by virtue of his “concupiscence.” Within this divine order it isgiven to man to live according to the rational purposes laid down by it and only accord-ing to them: to procreate and to rear children, and mutually to further one another inthe state of grace. This inner-worldly asceticism must reject every sophistication of thesexual into eroticism as idolatry of the worst kind. (RRW, 349)

The “idolatry” of the erotic sphere that has become autonomous from the religioussphere expresses itself in a variety of ways. Most obviously it is the conscious enjoy-ment of the sexual union for what the union itself has to offer—without any referenceto a transcendent value. This enjoyment appears as “a gate into the most irrational,and thereby real kernel of life, as compared with the mechanisms of rationalization”(RRW, 345). Weber further notes:

This boundless giving of oneself is as radical as possible in its opposition to allfunctionality, rationality, and generality. It is displayed here as the unique meaningwhich one creature in his irrationality has for the other, and only for this specific other.(RRW, 347)

When the meaning underlying this “boundless giving of oneself ” to a “specificother” is subject to close rational scrutiny, it presents itself as a type of “sacrament.”Weber notes:

From the point of view of eroticism, this meaning, and with the value-content of therelation itself, rests upon the possibility of a communion which is felt as a completeunification, as a fading of the “thou.” It is so overpowering that it is interpreted“symbolically”: as a sacrament. The lover realizes himself to be rooted in the kernel ofthe truly living, which is eternally inaccessible to any rational endeavor. (RRW, 347)


Similar to the reprieve that art offers from the intellectualized and rationalizedexistence of everyday life, the irrationality of the erotic experience frees the individ-ual “from the cold skeleton hands of rational orders, just as completely as from thebanality of everyday routine” (RRW, 347).

On another level, the irrational experience engendered by erotic love gives theindividual a false sense of elation that clouds his/her view of the world at large. Thesense of euphoria that is experienced by the lover in the aftermath of a romanticencounter leaves one in a state that sees nothing but goodness and beauty in thewhole world:

The euphoria of the happy lover is felt to be “goodness”; it has a friendly urge to poet-icize all the world with happy features or to bewitch all the world in a naïve enthusi-asm for the diffusion of happiness. (RRW, 348)

This sense of euphoria can be interpreted as being the manifestation of a corruptedpsyche because, in one sense or another, religion sees the presence of human beingsin this world and the conscious enjoyment of pleasures in this world to be “residuesof the Fall” (RRW, 349).

In addition to being the locus of surrogate (and thereby false) notions of salva-tion, the erotic sphere directly challenges the penultimate worldly religious value,brotherhood:

From the point of view of any religious ethic of brotherhood, the erotic relation mustremain attached, in a certain sophisticated measure, to brutality. The more sublimatedit is, the more brutal. Unavoidably, it is considered to be a relation of conflict. Thisconflict is not only, or even predominantly, jealousy and the will to possession, exclud-ing third ones. It is far more the most intimate coercion of the soul of the less brutalpartner. This coercion exists because it is never noticed by the partners themselves.Pretending to be the most humane devotion, it is a sophisticated enjoyment of oneselfin the other. (RRW, 348)

Not only does eroticism set the couple involved in the sexual union apart from therest of humanity, but it is also fundamentally a coercive relationship that sets onepartner in the relationship in a domineering position above the other. In sum:

A principled ethic of religious brotherhood is radically and antagonistically opposed toall [the values of eroticism.] from the point of view of such an ethic, this inner, earthlysensation of salvation by mature love competes in the sharpest possible way with thedevotion of a supra-mundane God, with the devotion of an ethically rational order ofGod, or with the devotion of a mystical bursting of individuation, which alone appear“genuine” to the ethic of brotherhood. (RRW, 347 ff.)

At the level of practical rationalization, the religious ethic of universal brotherhoodstands in sharp tension with the rational worldly spheres of economics and politicsand the irrational worldly spheres of estheticism and eroticism. The rational worldlyorders challenge the religious ideal of universal brotherhood in this world and seek toreplace it with institutions, procedures, and attitudes based on impersonal, bureau-cratic, functional relations. The irrational worldly spheres challenge the religious


ideal of salvation being only an otherworldly experience by positing values thatappear to offer inner-worldly salvation from the mundane, rationalized routines oflife. Besides this tension with the religious ethic, the values of the different worldlyspheres are also mutually antagonistic. The rationalized behavior shaped by commit-ment to “reasons of the state” will often conflict with, and remain antagonistic to,rationalized behavior that takes “interest-struggles of men in the market” as its ulti-mate value. The cosmos that is created by esthetic endeavors to escape the routinesof rational life is meant to be enjoyed by all. The experience of “salvation” in an eroticrelationship is meant only for the individuals involved. Furthermore, the rationaland irrational worldly order remain mutually antagonistic. As the overarching andunifying impetus of a universal religious ethic has been shattered by modern practi-cal rationalization, the mutual antagonism of the disenchanted worldly orders makesitself felt in an especially acute manner. The inability of scientific rationalism tochoose among different values, and its principled rejection of any attempt to inte-grate the different worldly values, with reference to a supra-mundane ideal, creates adisenchanted form of polytheism that is similar to, but not the same as, the poly-theism of a bygone era. The unifying impetus of the religious ethic had the effect ofpartially suppressing the tensions and struggles between the different worldlyspheres. But in the disenchanted modern period, these struggles break out into theopen in much more stark terms:

Our civilization destines us to realize more clearly these struggles again, after our eyeshave been blinded for a thousand years—blinded by the allegedly or presumably exclu-sive orientation towards the grandiose moral fervor of Christian ethics. (SV, 149)

While the polytheism of a bygone era has returned, it has returned with a significantdifference. Weber describes the manner in which the disenchanted age is similar tobut also different from the ancient world:

We live as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods anddemons, only we live in a different sense. As Hellenic man at times sacrificed toAphrodite and at other times to Apollo, and, above all, as everybody sacrificed to thegods of his city, so do we still nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchantedand denuded of its mystical but inwardly genuine plasticity. (SV, 148)

Each of the worldly spheres has its own supreme value that is in perpetual tensionwith the supreme value of other value spheres. The human being lives in the midstof this conflict of value spheres and his/her life is shaped by the manner and time inwhich he/she decides to sacrifice to one god at one time, and to another god atanother time. As noted above, religious prophecy sought to eliminate the tensionbetween the different value spheres by orienting them all in the direction of “onething that is needful.” But in the aftermath of the progressive rationalization of theworldly spheres the unifying ethos of the religious ethic has been shattered and theancient battle of the gods resumes. Since the psychological bearing of moderns isdevoid of a mystical (or religious) component, the ancient battle of the gods takes


place under novel conditions:

Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the formof impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives and again they resumetheir eternal struggle with one another. (SV, 149)

At one point in the historical development/rationalization of culture salvationreligion replaced the enchanted symbiosis of the “religious” and “worldly” sphereswith the religious differentiation of the worldly from the religious. But at the sametime, it used the universal ethic of brotherhood to synthesize the differentiatedspheres. The further development/rationalization of culture has shattered the synthe-sizing impetus of salvation religion. This shattering has resulted in a modern disen-chanted milieu, where scientific rationalization has done to religious rationalismwhat religious rationalism had done to the enchanted symbiosis—it has asserted theindependent identity of that which had been originally integrated. The synthesizingethos of the universal ethic of brotherhood has been negated by a disenchantedrationalism that not only negates this ethos, but also produces an “eternal” and irrec-oncilable struggle between the ultimate values of the worldly spheres. In short, disen-chanting rationalism has negated the ethos of brotherly love and has replaced it withan eternal and irreconcilable struggle among the values of: (a) impersonal money,(b) impersonal bureaucracy, (c) irrational escape into an artistically created cosmos,and (d) irrational escape in erotic love.

1.3 The Effects of Disenchantment on Theoretical Rationalization

While disenchantment makes itself felt in the form of perpetual and irreconcilableconflict between the different worldly spheres in terms of the practical–ethicalrationalization, it makes itself felt differently in terms of theoretical rationalization(i.e., the application of the “imperative for consistency” to the intellectual–theoreticalattitude). The nature and scope of the challenge at the theoretical level can be betterappreciated when viewed in light of the historical relationship between rationalismand religious thought. The direct challenge that disenchanted rationalism poses toreligious rationalism is a historical anomaly in light of the fact that religion andrationalism have been mutually supportive of each other during much of history.Weber notes that prophetic and priestly religion have stood in “intimate relationwith rational intellectualism” because the “more ‘doctrine’ a religion contains, thegreater is its need for rational apologetics” (RRW, 351). The need for doctrine inprophetic and priestly religion is based on the fact that there is a basic contradictionbetween the fundamental postulate of religion and the observed empirical reality. Itis a fundamental postulate of religion that the cosmos and human existence areinfused with meaning. The proponents of religion, especially the prophets, present

a unified view of the world derived from a consciously integrated and meaningfulattitude towards life. To the prophet, both the life of man and the world, both social andcosmic events, have a certain systematic and coherent meaning. (SR, 59)


In order for the religious postulate of a meaningful cosmos to make rational sense,religious thought has had to provide a rational explanation for the vicissitudes of fateand fortune that human beings encounter in the world. But the postulate of mean-ingful human existence has stood in sharp tension with the inexplicable and appar-ently unwarranted and unfair distribution of fortunes among human beings in theworld. Weber describes this contrast in these words:

The need for an ethical interpretation of “meaning” of the distribution of fortunesamong men increased with the growing rationality of the conceptions of the world. Asthe religious and ethical reflections upon the world were increasingly rationalized, andprimitive, magical notions were eliminated, the theodicy of suffering encounteredincreasing difficulties. Individually, “undeserved” woe was all too frequent; not “good”but “bad” men succeeded. (SPWR, 275)

A postulate of human existence that could be both meaningful and rational requiresthat the “good” succeed and the “bad” fail, but lived human experience in the worldprovided ample evidence to the contrary. Theodicy has attempted to bridge the gapbetween “what is” and “what ought to be” by providing a variety of rationalizedexplanations. These explanations attempt to justify not only the woes of those whoare the victims of bad fortune, but also the felicity of those who are beneficiaries ofgood fortune. Weber notes that, at a psychological level, those benefiting from goodfortune need as much assurance that their good fortune is legitimate fortune, as thosesuffering from bad fortune need assurance that they will be eventually compensatedfor their misery (SPWR, 271). Theodicy represents that aspect of religious thoughtthat attempts to reconcile the apparently inexplicable and arbitrary (i.e., meaning-less) human condition that is often observed in the human world, with the postulateof a fundamentally and inherently meaningful cosmos. This reconciliation is done bypositing the existence of a heavenly realm above and beyond the earthly realm, andan afterlife in the heavenly realm. It is asserted that all unjust suffering and unde-served fortune in the worldly realm will be justly compensated in the afterlife ofthe heavenly realm. The irrationality of human fate in the world is renderedrational by appealing to the notion of “compensatory causality” (RRW, 355) in theheavenly realm.

In light of the psychological human need to rationally comprehend the apparentirrational vicissitudes of human fate, it is easy to see why salvation religion has stoodin “intimate relation with rational intellectualism” (RRW, 351). But with progressivedifferentiation of culture, rational intellectualism begins to follow its own inner logicand eventually comes to challenge the most fundamental claim of religious rational-ism regarding the nature of the cosmos in which human beings find themselves.Weber describes the original relationality, subsequent differentiation, and eventualautonomy of religious rationalism and “scientific” rationalism in these words:

Ethical religiosity has appealed to rational knowledge, which has followed its ownautonomous and inner-worldly norms. It has fashioned a cosmos of truths which nolonger had anything to do with the systematic postulates of a rational religious ethic;with the result that the world as a cosmos must satisfy the demands of a religious ethicor evince some “meaning.” On the contrary rational knowledge has had to reject this


claim in principle. The cosmos of natural causality and the postulated cosmos ofethical, compensatory causality have stood in irreconcilable opposition. (RRW, 355)

Weber notes that the postulate of natural causality, which lies at the root of scientificrationalism, means that the modern has the ability to know everything aboutthe cosmos and the human condition in the cosmos with reference to naturalfactors/laws that can be understood and explained in worldly terms. In principle, themodern can come to know all things that affect his/her life by means of calculation,so much so that he/she does not need to have any recourse to references to unknown/unknowable mysterious factors in order to explain/master his/her life-condition.Consequently, there is no need to explain and understand the vicissitudes of humanfate and fortune in this world with reference to otherworldly factors. The scientificpostulate of natural causality negates the religious postulate of compensatory causal-ity as a means of understanding and explaining (i.e., rationalizing) the cosmos andthe human condition in the cosmos.

In replacing the postulate of compensatory causality with natural causality, theground is prepared for scientific rationalism to challenge religious rationalism on themost crucial of issues. As cited above, Weber notes:

At all times and in all places, the need for salvation—consciously cultivated as thesubstance of religiosity—has resulted from the endeavor of a systematic and practicalrationalization of life’s realities . . . on this level, all religions have demanded as aspecific presupposition that the course of the world be somehow meaningful, at least inso far as it touches upon the interests of men. (RRW, 353)

The fundamental presupposition of religious rationalism is that “the world be some-how meaningful.” In the absence of this presupposition, there is no historical “reli-gious” thought to speak of—and it is this very presupposition that modern scientificrationalism rejects as a matter of principle. Weber notes:

Who—aside from certain big children who are indeed found in the natural sciences—still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry could teachus anything about the meaning of the world? If there is any such “meaning,” alongwhat road could one come upon its track? If these natural sciences lead to anything inthis way, they are apt to make the belief that there is any such a thing as the “meaning”of the universe die out at its very roots. (SV, 142)

Complementary to the manner in which modern rationalized economic activity isbased on “a structure to which the absence of love is attached from the very root”(RRW, 355), scientific rationalism causes the very concept of meaning to “die out atits very roots.” Consequently, the challenge posed by modern scientific rationalismto religious rationalism is no less acute at the level of theoretical rationalization thanit is at the level of practical rationalization. On both accounts, scientific rationalismmakes claims that strike at the very roots of religious rationalism—in one case itnegates the postulate of the ethic of universal brotherhood, and in the other case itnegates the postulate of a meaningful cosmos.

Given the fact that, historically speaking, religious rationalism had intimaterelations with intellectual rationalism, the modern antagonism between the two


described by Weber requires further exploration. Rationality in all its forms, whetherreligious or scientific, is faced with the same empirical, social reality in the world.There is a great deal of unjust suffering and grossly unequal distribution of materialand ideal goods. As long as rational thought remained tied to religious apologetics,a generally agreed upon religio-rational explanation and a religio-ethical system ofsocial organization was formulated that ideally posited an ultimately just compensa-tion and retribution both in this world and in the hereafter. But

[t]he more intensely rational thought has seized upon the problem of a just andretributive compensation, the less an entirely inner-worldly solution could seem possi-ble, and the less an other-worldly solution could appear probable or even meaningful.(RRW, 353)

From the perspective of religious rationalism, the intense rational reflection onworldly suffering pointed to an otherworldly solution. But there is a principled clashbetween this rational explanation for an ethical dilemma offered by religious ration-alism and the explanation offered by scientific rationalism to a conceptual dilemma.When modern scientific thought is confronted by the “claims of the ethical postu-late that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethi-cally oriented, cosmos” (RRW, 351), it has to reject this claim as a matter ofprinciple. As far as scientific thought is concerned, the world is not “God-ordained,”it exists and functions according to immanent laws of natural causality and nothingmore. Even though there has always been tension between the two, religious thoughtand rational thought have been able to establish a working relationship during thepast millennia. But the modern antagonism between religion and science is a uniquephenomenon in human history:

Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion from therational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become the irrational oranti-rational supra-human power. (RRW, 351)

It is understandable and logical that science cannot accommodate the most funda-mental of all religious presuppositions—that the world is a meaningful cosmos. Thisis not the only case where a particular sphere cannot accommodate the fundamentalpresupposition of another sphere. It is more often the case rather than the exception.But when judged in light of its own standards, scientific rationalism is faced withintractable dilemmas of its own. Weber notes:

Science has created this cosmos of natural causality and has seemed unable to answerwith certainty the question of its own ultimate presuppositions. Nevertheless science,in the name of “intellectual integrity” has come forward with the claim of representingthe only possible form of a reasoned view of the world. (RRW, 355)

A view of the cosmos that cannot deal with a “question of its own ultimate presup-positions” all the while that it rejects the religious presuppositions, and then statesthat its own view of the cosmos is the most “reasoned view of the world” makes theproblematic of meaning even more acute. The value of human culture when viewed


from the perspective of a rational scientific cosmos makes human culture and humanexistence positively senseless. On the one hand, the development of rational thoughthas emancipated human beings “from the organically prescribed cycle of natural life”(RRW, 356). On the other hand, it has rejected the notion of a religiously meaning-ful cosmos. In having broken free of the cycle of nature and of the religious under-standing of meaning, it has not filled the vacuum created thereby with anything;“[c]ulture’s every step forward seems condemned to lead to an ever more devastatingsenselessness” (RRW, 357). Not only does scientific rationalism negate the religiousclaims of a “meaningful cosmos,” but it also rejects all such claims coming from anyquarter.

The increasing sense of senselessness is directly tied to the defining character ofscience and culture—progress. A life led in the pursuit of cultural values, all of themultimately created artificially, is bound to be an exercise in futility because one cannotbut fleetingly grasp a minor portion of what progressive culture, cumulative knowl-edge, evolving science and developing rationality have to offer. Talking of the deathof a modern from the perspective of a life lived in the pursuit of cultural idealsdefined by the idea of progress, Weber notes:

He catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings forth everanew, and what he seizes is always something provisional and not definitive, and there-fore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And because death is meaningless, civi-lized life as such is meaningless; by its very “progressiveness” it gives death the imprintof meaninglessness. (SV, 140)

Those individuals who lived and died within the organic cycle of life could die“satiated with life” because they had “fulfilled a cycle of their existence beyond whichthey did not reach” (RRW, 356). But the moderns do not have the option ofcompleting a cycle of existence because their worldview rejects the notion of cyclicaltime altogether and replaces it with the notion of linear progress. One can becometired of pursuing progress but he/she cannot become satiated, since there is alwaysmore to be had. Because the perfectibility of the modern is tied to the acquisition ofever-progressing cultural goods, perfectibility will always remain out of reach ascultural values continue to progress into the indefinite future. Furthermore,

the segment which the individual and passive recipient or the active co-builder cancomprise in the course of a finite life becomes the more trifling the more differentiatedand multiplied the cultural values and the goals for self-perfection become. (SV, 140)

The pursuit of cultural values is senseless not only for the above-mentioned reasonsbut also because it is a “senseless hustle in the service of worthless, moreover self-contradictory, and mutually antagonistic ends” (RRW, 357). Judged from theperspective of their own inner logic, the values of the worldly economic, political,esthetic, erotic, and intellectual spheres are, at best, mutually antagonistic and ofteneven mutually contradictory. It is against this background that for the moderns“senseless death has seemed only to put the decisive stamp upon the senselessness oflife itself ” (RRW, 356).


The modern disenchanted view of the cosmos, and of the disenchanted humancondition in the cosmos, is a product of the rationalization process that was initiallycatalyzed by historical, salvation religion itself. Historical religion posited that thenatural world was a creation of God and was devoid of all extraordinary powers, thatis, charisma. In doing so it challenged the enchanted symbiosis that saw the entirecosmos and everything in it being permeated by charisma. For historical religion,charisma was to be encountered on the stage of history in the person of prophets whohad been chosen by God and/or in the events of history that marked God’s inter-vention into history to protect His people against their enemies. While the world ofnature was devoid of mysterious incalculable forces for historical religion, the stageof history certainly was not. Scientific rationalism rejects all claims of mysteriousincalculable forces on the stage of history, just as historical religion rejects all claimsof enchantment in the world of nature. Disenchanted rationalism explains/understands the unfolding of the historical process in terms of laws of causality, incontrast to the religious explanation/understanding that links this process to aDivine Will. From the perspective of scientific rationalism, while the laws of histor-ical causality may be more difficult to decipher than the laws of natural causality,they are nonetheless knowable in principle.

In furthering the process of disenchantment, modern rational thought does tohistorical religion what religion had done to primitive enchanted thought—it revealsto be profane what had been considered sacred. Weber argues that, in revealing thatwhich had been considered sacred to be profane, rational thought creates the condi-tions for the actualization of latent possibilities already present in historical religiousthought. In the context of the present discussion, the most relevant of these possi-bilities is the antireligious skepticism that leads to a disenchanted view of the cosmosand of the human condition in the cosmos. For Weber, this “anti-religious” possibil-ity is already present in historical religion:

Anti-religious skepticism, per se, was represented in China, in Egypt, in the Vedas,in post-exilic Jewish literature. In principle, it was just as it is today; almost no newarguments have been added. (RRW, 351)

While antireligious skepticism has always been a possibility in historical religiousthought, and even an actuality in minor, isolated instances in the past, it did notbecome a social phenomenon until the modern period. The basic reason for this is thefact that rational thought has remained tied to religious apologetics for most of history.But as the historical process unfolded and rational thought matured, it has come todefine itself in terms of its own autonomous, inner-worldly logic. In the modernhistorical situation, rational thought has proven to be a natural ally of the latent skep-ticism already present in historical religious thought. Even though in principle “almostno new arguments have been added” to the antireligious positions already contained inthe sacred literature of historical religion, the disenchanted modern world imagethat understands the world in terms of natural causality greatly enhances the plausibil-ity of such skepticism. In short, the modern disenchanted condition creates thecultural milieu in which a latent potential in historical, salvation religion can beactualized—a potential that could not be actualized in other cultural milieus.5


At the level of theoretical rationalization, scientific rationalism rejects all philo-sophical, religious, and metaphysical claims that attempt to infuse meaning into theworld. At the same time, its own view of the cosmos sees the universe functioningaccording to immanent laws of natural causality that are devoid of meaning. Whencombined with modern practical rationalization, the modern pursuit of material andideal interests takes on a character unknown in human history. The cosmos of thecapitalist economic order is

Tied to the technical and economic condition at the foundation of mechanical andmachine production, this cosmos today determines the style of life of all individualsborn into it, not only those directly engaged in earning a living. (PESC, 124)

Economic pursuit becomes a compulsion that one is forced to pursue whether onewants to do so or not. The implications of this modern necessity for leading a reli-gious life are as far reaching as they are problematic. Weber notes: “Under the tech-nical and social conditions of [modern] rational culture, an imitation of the life ofBuddha, Jesus or Francis seems condemned to failure for purely external reasons”(RRW, 357). The world image offered by modern science culminates in makingsenselessness the supreme value—the meaninglessness of a modern’s death is anexclamation mark on a meaningless worldly existence. The pursuit of economicinterests is the supreme pragmatic value offered by modern rationalism, so much sothat even those who are not directly engaged in the most loveless of worldly pursuitsare engaged in it indirectly. Weber’s analysis reveals that on both accounts, the disen-chanted fate of the time destines the moderns to live in a world in which religiousvalues and ideals have been irrevocably undermined by scientific rationalism. Afterhaving undermined other values and ideals, scientific rationalism offers nothingmeaningful and significant in their place, in the name of rational, intellectualintegrity. Wolin summarizes the results of Weber’s analysis about the disenchantedfate of the times in these words:

Meaninglessness was no longer an aesthetic experience of the few, but a contagion.Having undermined religious, moral, and political beliefs, the forces of rationalizationhad finally exposed the meaning of meaninglessness to be power without right.(Wolin, 1981, 422)

1.4 Religion and Science in Disenchanted Times:An Interpretation of Weber

The account of disenchantment given by Weber can be interpreted as positing anunbridgeable divide between religion and science, and this interpretation in turn canbe viewed as being a reflection of Weber’s own value judgments. Wittenberg offeredsuch an evaluation of Weber’s work in the 1930s. Commenting specifically onWeber’s “Science as a Vocation” lecture, but within the larger context of Weber’swork on the sociology of religion, Wittenberg argues:

Weber may be seen to be mounting the most vitriolic of attacks upon religion. And allthis in the name of science! . . . It is perhaps in his adoption of this purely value-laden


stance, in his passionate and implacable critique of religion, that Weber’s attachment tohis own world-view stands most clearly revealed. (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 118)

Wittenberg sees Weber’s passionate and implacable critique of religion to be thecomplementary side of his passionate and “unconditional acceptance of the value ofscience” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 114). Weber’s “resolute affirmation of the secu-lar” and the “uncompromising rationalism of his world-view” (Wittenberg, 1989[1938], 117), seems entirely out of place to Wittenberg in the aftermath of the tragicevents of World War I. While such an attitude could be justified at an earlier periodof European history, it was both historically and intellectually untenable by the timeWeber delivered his “Science as a Vocation” lecture.

The combination of an implacable critique of religion and an unconditionalacceptance of the value of science on Weber’s part, in his particular historical setting,makes him “the last great representative of a European rationalism that is groundedon radical skepticism” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 114). This commitment toEuropean rationalism has the effect of “boldly tearing asunder science and politics,persons and things, science and religion” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 118)—tendenciesthat most clearly characterize Weber’s scholarship as a whole. Wittenberg describesthe European, Enlightenment rationalism that Weber was so passionately com-mitted to, and its relation to his work, in these words:

Max Weber was a child of the technological age; the quantitative, formal–logical,rational–conceptual methodology he adopted was moulded, down to the very lastdetail, to the features of that age. It is entirely in keeping with the technological spiritof that age that Max Weber should feel able to apportion the task of governing thatworld by “rational calculation”—and of “disenchanting” that world—to science.(Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 119)

The tearing asunder of science and politics, persons and things, religion and scienceby scientific rationalism overlooks the fundamental fact that there is “an intimaterelationship between politics and science, science and world-view” (Wittenberg,1989 [1938], 119). The intimacy of this relationship can be best illustrated by thefact that when Weber’s work is critically analyzed, this relationship presents itself tobe “both deep-seated and indissoluble” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 118), eventhough Weber himself would have us think otherwise. Wittenberg is arguing thatwhile a plain-sense reading of Weber suggests that there is an unbridgeable dividebetween religion and science, the manner in which Weber frames the entire discus-sion implies that there is an intimate relationship between the two. For Wittenberg,Weber’s lifework is riddled with the basic contradiction that that which he statesexplicitly in the form of scientific analysis is at odds with the implicit methodologyon which Weber constructs his scientific analysis. This characteristic of Weber’swork, in turn, is a reflection of the Age of Rationalism as a whole. Wittenberg drawsthe link between the two when offering a summary statement of Weber’s work:

[I]t is in Max Weber that the decline of the Age of Rationalism finds its embodiment;as Weber descends to his grave, so too does rationalism. For it is he who, for one lastgrandiose moment, embodies that age in all its splendor and its weaknesses.(Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 120)


For Wittenberg, Weber is “a child of the Enlightenment, born too late” (Wittenberg,1989 [1938], 119).

Wittenberg sees Weber’s disenchantment thesis as being a forceful and finalarticulation of

a tradition of the Enlightenment that wanted to replace religion by science, either byasserting that religious statements could be turned into scientific ones or by claimingthat religion was a prescientific stage of knowledge destined to be succeeded by it.(Schluchter, 1989, 251)

Enlightenment thought sought to give science a privileged position over religionbased on the claim that scientific rationalism is the expression of disciplined, objec-tive rationality while religious ideas are the expressions of subjective irrationality.Enlightenment thought posits an unbridgeable divide between religion and sciencein which the origins, defining characteristics, and practical effects of one are thedirect opposite of the other. Religion is considered to be rooted in immature, emo-tional impulses that inevitably hinder the refinement and progress of the individual/society. Science is considered to be the product of mature rationality that naturallypromotes the progress and development of the individual/society. Hume6 gives voiceto this divide between religion and science when he notes that whereas “the pure love oftruth” is at the root of mature reason and rational inquiry, the origin of the religiousidea is to be located in the human being’s

[a]nxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, thethirst for revenge, the appetite for food and other necessities. Agitated by hopes andfears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with trembling curiosity, thecourse of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life.And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, theysee the first obscure traces of divinity. (Hume, 1998, 28)

Whereas Hume’s observation sees the origin of religion in the subjective, immature,and irrational impulses of primitive people, Freud contrasts the mode of inquiryengendered by mature, objective rational reflection of science with the immaturesubjectivism of religion:

The riddles of the universe only reveal themselves slowly to our inquiry, to many ques-tions science can as yet give no answer; but scientific work is our only way to the knowl-edge of external reality. Again, it is merely illusion to expect anything from intuition ortrance; they can give us nothing but particulars, which are difficult to interpret, aboutour own mental life, never information about the questions that are so lightly answeredby the doctrines of religion. (Freud, 1975, 40)

For Freud, religion is concerned with particular, subjective phenomena that do notyield any positive, reliable knowledge about external reality—such knowledge canonly be had from an objective, rational scientific inquiry. The views of Hume andFreud are illustrative of a tradition of Enlightenment thought that posits anunbridgeable divide between religion and science. Wittenberg’s evaluation of Weber’sdisenchantment thesis sees it as being an expression of this Enlightenment tradition.


Writing almost sixty years after Wittenberg offered his assessment of Weber’sdisenchantment thesis, Casanova reaches a similar conclusion. If one discounts thehyperbolic and rhetorical tone of Wittenberg’s assessment of Weber, it is clear thathis evaluation of Weber’s relationship to Enlightenment thought is an earlier expres-sion of Casanova’s more deliberate, scholarly analysis. Casanova notes that the theoryof secularization has “often served as the unstated premise” of the theories of manyof the founding fathers of sociology and the sociology of religion (Casanova, 1994,17). He goes on to note that “foundations of the more systematic formulations of thetheory of secularization are to be found in the work of Emile Durkheim and MaxWeber” (Casanova, 1994, 17). The relationship between the theory of secularizationand Weber’s disenchantment thesis is implicit in the definition that Casanova offersfor the theory of secularization as

[t]he conceptualization of the process of societal modernization as a process offunctional differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres—primarily the state,the economy, and science—from the religious sphere and the concomitant differentia-tion and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious sphere.(Casanova, 1994, 19)

In light of the discussion about the “struggle of the gods” in section 1.2 on practicalrationalization, Casanova’s definition of secularization equates secularization withthe process of disenchantment. In doing so, Casanova concurs with Schluchter whosees Weber’s description of the process of disenchantment as being a description ofthe process of secularization (Schluchter, 1989, 253).

Just as Wittenberg saw Weber’s disenchantment thesis as being an expression ofEnlightenment thought,7 Casanova sees Weber’s account of secularization as beingan expression of Enlightenment thought. The theory of secularization, as it wasformulated by the founding fathers, had “its ideological origins in the Enlightenmentcritique of religion” (Casanova, 1994, 19) and it “may be the only theory which wasable to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences” (Casanova,1994, 17). Its status, especially in the aftermath of its systematic formulation byDurkheim and Weber, is such that

[I]ndeed, the theory of secularization is so intrinsically interwoven with all the theoriesof the modern world and with the self-understanding of modernity that one cannotsimply discard the theory of secularization without putting into question the entire web,including much of the self-understanding of the social sciences. (Casanova, 1994, 18)

The self-understanding of modernity, as expressed in the theory of secularization, isbased on the “myth that sees history as the progressive evolution of humanity fromsuperstition to reason, from belief to unbelief, from religion to science” (Casanova,1994, 17). In other words, according to Casanova, the theory of secularization isboth based upon and reinforces the claim of an unbridgeable divide between religionand science. The outcome of this polarization is that religion is gradually pushed outof the public (and rational) domain into the private (and irrational) domain with thecontinued development of modernity. According to Schluchter, this is a defining


characteristic of modern societal development:

[s]ecular humanism, with the support of some sectors of theology, helps to makereligion subjective through its idea of a world that can in principle be controlledthrough calculation and is thus without surprises. Religion is translated from an exter-nal fact into a component of individual consciousness. (Schluchter, 1989, 256 ff.)

But developments in recent times have begun to present a pointed challenge to thereceived wisdom of the Enlightenment tradition. Casanova notes that the dichoto-mous view of the religious vs. secular split, in contemporary times, is advocated by“cognitive minorities” in the religious camp and in the secularist camp, while the“majority of Americans tend to be humanists, who are simultaneously religious andsecular” (Casanova, 1994, 38). Beyond the fact that the Enlightenment viewpoint isnow only accepted by a cognitive minority, the Enlightenment understanding ofsecularization has to be corrected because, empirically speaking, there is compellingevidence that the secularization process has not unfolded as the theorists hadprojected that it would. Furthermore, there has been a softening of the positions inboth the religious and the secular camps in recent years. On the one hand, the“charisma of reason, which proved its historical efficacy during the Enlightenmentand the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century, . . . [has] largely disap-peared” (Schluchter, 1989, 255). On the other hand, there has been a conscious real-ization on the part of modern religion that a significant portion of the modernistcritique of religion was not merely the expression of antireligion animus, but anaccurate account of empirical reality. Casanova argues that the realization of thelimits of reason and an acceptance of a portion of the rational critique of religionhave contributed to a rapprochement between the religious and the secular in recentdecades. Speaking of the mutual move on the part of the religious and secular spherestoward rapprochement, Casanova notes:

The rapprochement has been reciprocal, for religion has often served and continues toserve as a bulwark against “dialectics of enlightenment” and as a protector of humanrights and humanist values against the secular. (Casanova, 1994, 39)

The fact that Casanova sees Weber’s disenchantment thesis positing an unbridgeabledivide between religion and science (and the religious and the secular) is evidencedby the fact that he does not refer to Weber’s work except with reference to the divide.In fact, Casanova identifies Weber’s work as being one of the basic sources uponwhich the hypothesis of this divide has been constructed. In offering his own evalu-ation of the need and the manner in which this divide can be bridged, Casanova doesnot see Weber’s work as containing any resources or pointers that could prove usefulin this task. The interpretation of Weber offered by Wittenberg and Casanova isillustrative of the generally accepted view of Weber’s work. In sum, this interpreta-tion sees Weber’s assessment of the movement of history and modern culture asimplying the inevitable disenchantment and secularization of all human culture inthe near future, with religion being consigned to a diminishing corner of humansocial life. In other words, the disenchanted fate of our times is actually the historical


manifestation and historical inevitability of the unbridgeable divide betweenreligious rationalism and scientific rationalism.

The fact that this is a truncated and one-sided interpretation of Weber’s work onthe issue of the relationship between religion and science can be demonstrated bylooking at Weber’s writings on the character and components of scientific inquiry.Weber’s writings on this topic are often referred to as his “methodology of the socialsciences.” In fact, it is Wittenberg’s scathing critique of Weber that points the pres-ent inquiry in this direction. As noted earlier, Wittenberg states that the manner inwhich Weber framed his entire discussion about the disenchantment of the worldbelies the conclusions that he reached. In other words, the principles according towhich Weber carried out his scientific inquiry present the most readily available refu-tation of the conclusions reached by the disenchantment thesis. Leaving aside theissue of whether there is a fundamental contradiction between Weber’s science andhis methodology of science, the discussion now turns to Weber’s methodologicalwritings with a view to gaining more critical insight into Weber’s view of therelationship between religion and science in the modern disenchanted milieu.



CHAPTER 2

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT: WEBER ON THE IRREDUCIBLE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAITH AND SCIENCE

Weber’s self-conscious acceptance of the value of scientific rationality is expressed inthe assertion that science is an absolutely unique source of knowledge, and the one“for whom scientific truth is of no value will seek in vain for some other truth to takethe place of science in just those respects in which it is unique . . .” (OSS, 110 ff.).Weber sees scientific truth as being a unique source of knowledge insofar as it offers“the provision of concepts and judgments which are neither empirical reality norreproductions of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering in a valid manner”(OSS, 111). In asserting that scientific rationality is a unique source of knowledgethat is intimately tied with progress and that such knowledge is worth having, Weberis very much a part of the Enlightenment tradition.

But Weber moves beyond the naïve Enlightenment confidence in scientificrationalism when he carefully details its limitations. He raises the issue of the limita-tions of science with reference to the work of Tolstoy:

Now, this process of disenchantment, which has continued to exist in Occidentalculture for millennia, and, in general, this “progress,” to which science belongs asa link and motive force, do they have any meanings that go beyond the purely practical and technical? You will find this question raised in the most principled formin the works of Leo Tolstoy. He came to raise the question in a peculiar way. All hisbroodings increasingly revolved around the problem of whether or not death is ameaningful phenomenon. And his answer was: for civilized man death has no meaning.(SV, 139)

Weber concurs with Tolstoy on this point and links the meaninglessness of death inthe disenchanted period with the limitations of the value of science. Again using Tolstoy as the reference point, Weber notes: “Science is meaningless because it givesno answer to our question, the only question important for us: ‘What shall we doand how shall we live?’ ” (SV, 143). For Weber, science is of great technical and theo-retical value because it is a unique source of knowledge. But in the final analysisits value is limited by the fact that it cannot positively answer “the only questionthat is important for us.” Here Weber is recognizing the limitations of scientific

rationalism. In the final analysis, the limitation of science can be summed up thus:

[T]he fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must knowthat we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the result of its analysis, be it everso perfect. (OSS, 57)

For Weber, scientific rationality, investigation, and knowledge reach their limitswhen issues of meaning, value, and significance are to be resolved—the very issuesthat are the most pressing of human concerns.

The conscious recognition of the limitations of scientific reasoning is an expres-sion of the post-Enlightenment aspect of Weber’s thought. In the words of Horowitzand Maley,

Max Weber’s work is exemplary in expressing and at least partially articulating themoment at which the Enlightenment becomes irreversibly reflective concerning its ownreason. (Horowitz and Maley, 1994, 1)

Horowitz and Maley go on to note that Nietzsche’s work marks the end of theEnlightenment’s innocence regarding its supreme confidence in the meaning andsignificance of rationalism. Taking Nietzsche’s critique into account, Weber’s worksimultaneously marks a self-conscious acceptance of the uniqueness and value of scien-tific rationality, as well as a self-critical recognition of the problematic it has givenrise to.1 While scientific truth has provided knowledge of the world that cannot behad by any other means, it has also created a problematic that is unique in humanhistory—the disenchantment of the world. The disenchantment of the world, inpart, refers to the phenomenon of a world that has become devoid of all meaningand significance in the face of the scientific, rational critique of all philosophical andreligious attempts to confer meaning and significance on the world. The selfconscious and self-critical engagement with the Enlightenment intellectual traditionis illustrative of Weber’s departure from that tradition.

A review of Weber’s writing on the methodology of the social sciences reveals thatin addition to being aware of certain shortcomings of scientific rationalism, he sawcertain aspects of this rationalism and the empirical reality studied by this rational-ism unnoticed by Enlightenment thinkers. He identified a suprarational dimensionof scientific rationalism and an empirical dimension of religious rationalism that hadbeen overlooked (or ignored) by Enlightenment thought. Weber’s scientific analysisand explication of the following themes reveal a clear break from the Enlightenmenthypothesis of an unbridgeable divide between religion and science:

(a) The faith dimension of science.(b) The empirical dimension of faith.(c) Weber’s personal attitude toward the religion vs. science divide.

A review of these three issues reveals that in the place of an unbridgeable(Enlightenment) divide between religion and science, it becomes possible to posit a(Weberian) difference between the two—with the further possibility that this differ-ence can be mediated by establishing a relationship between the two.


2.1 The Faith Dimension of Science

Weber begins the concluding remarks of his article on “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy” (1904) with these words:

We are now at the end of this discussion, the only purpose of which was to trace the course of the hair-line which separates science from faith and to make explicit themeaning of the quest for social and economic knowledge. (OSS, 110)

Weber’s assertion that science stands in intimate proximity to faith runs counter tothe established Enlightenment claim that there is an unbridgeable divide between thetwo.2 It is not just Weber’s observation that faith and science stand in very close prox-imity that is of significance, the context in which this observation is made only addsto its significance. The quote is taken from an article written to explicitly outline theeditorial policy of a journal that Weber began coediting with Sombart and Jaffe in1904. The title of the journal was the Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik.3

The importance of this article is expressed by Weber himself in the opening lines ofthe article:

When a social science journal which also at times concerns itself with a social policy,appears for the first time or passes into the hands of a new editorial board, it is custom-ary to ask about its “line.” We, too, must seek to answer this question . . . Even thoughor perhaps because, we are concerned with “self-evident truths,” this occasion providesthe opportunity to cast some light on the nature of the “social sciences” as we under-stand them, in such manner that it can be useful, if not to the specialist, then to thereader who is more remote from actual scientific work. (OSS, 50)

This article serves as a statement, or “line” as Weber calls it, that outlines the edito-rial policy of the journal. In doing so, it interrogates some of the “self-evident truths”regarding the self-understanding/definition of the social and cultural sciences. Afterthese opening words, the article goes on to discuss a variety of issues related to themethodology of the social sciences, all of which lead up to the conclusion that only a “hair line . . . separates science from faith.”

In the conclusion, Weber further details the relationship between science andfaith with respect to two specific points: (a) the place of presuppositions in scienceand (b) the place of value judgments in science. He notes:

The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the orderingof the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense,namely that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on thepresupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge is alone able togive us. (OSS, 110)

The objective validity of scientific knowledge presupposes an acceptance of the presuppositions on which the inquiry is based and an acceptance of the value offeredby scientific knowledge. While these two factors combine to form the basis of all science, a comprehensive description of the cultural sciences requires the inclusion ofone additional factor. Weber posits that the centrality of meaning (Sinn) must be

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 43

highlighted when providing an accurate description of the cultural sciences. Weberdescribes the fundamental presupposition of the cultural sciences in these words:

The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding a certain culture or any “culture” in general to be valuable but rather in the fact that weare cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitudetowards the world and to lend it significance. (OSS, 81)

This presupposition of the cultural sciences contains a presupposition within it inthe form of a value judgment that posits that the cultural sciences are a source ofvaluable knowledge about empirical reality that cannot be had from any othersource. This value judgment is expressed in the claim that human beings have theability to “take a deliberate attitude towards the world” and endow meaning andsignificance on the world. Even though this value judgment lies at the foundation ofscientific inquiry about empirical reality, it cannot be reduced to empirical reality ordeduced from it. Weber describes the origin of such value judgments or “evaluativeideas” in these words:

Evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable and analyzable as elementsof meaningful human conduct, but their validity can not be deduced from empiricaldata as such. The “objectivity” of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that theempirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make themworth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evalua-tive ideas. But these data can never become the foundation for the empirically impos-sible proof of the validity of the evaluative ideas. (OSS, 111)

For Weber, empirical data and the scientific analysis of empirical data are, in principle, incapable of furnishing “proof of the validity of the evaluative ideas.” Thepresupposition on which all science is based, the value of scientific knowledge, andthe fundamental presupposition of the cultural sciences are all evaluative ideas andnone of them can be justified on strictly scientific grounds. Speaking of the place ofpresuppositions in science and the acceptance of these presuppositions, Weber notes:“No science is absolutely free from presuppositions, and no science can prove itsfundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions” (SV, 153). If anindividual chooses to reject the presuppositions of science, no scientific or logicalproof can be provided to him/her demonstrating the soundness of the presupposi-tions, and if the presuppositions on which science is based are rejected, the value ofscience itself is negated. The acceptance of these presuppositions and the value judg-ments implicit in them is a value judgment itself. For Weber, the acceptance of thisvalue judgment is no more scientifically valid than its rejection. The acceptance orrejection of this (and any other value judgment) simply lies outside the scientificsphere.

In even more direct terms, Weber identifies science as a “truth” that cannot be justified in scientific terms:

The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific


truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man’s original nature.(OSS, 110)

For Weber, the acceptance of the truth of science (and all the evaluative ideas under-lying it) is an act of belief, and the “belief in the value of scientific truth” cannot bejustified by appealing to either a necessity of scientific laws or a necessity inherent in human nature. In offering this analysis, Weber echoes Nietzche’s sentimentsregarding the character of the “discipline” of science:

To make possible for this discipline to begin, must there not be some prior conviction—even one that is so commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself ? We see that science also rests on faith; there is simply no science“without presuppositions.” (Nietzsche, 1974, 280 ff.)

The hairline separating faith from science can be described from two different angles.On the one hand, accepting the value of scientific inquiry is itself an act of faith thatcannot be justified on scientific grounds. On the other hand, scientific inquiry is composed of a number of extra-scientific factors such as presuppositions and evaluative ideas that cannot be reduced to or deduced from empirical reality. Both ofthese factors figure prominently in the transcendental presupposition of the culturalsciences that posits that human beings have the ability to take a deliberate attitudetoward the world in which they live and infuse meaning into the world. In sum, allsciences studying empirical reality, the cultural sciences no less than the other,are based on suprarational factors such as presuppositions, evaluative ideas—andultimately on a suprarational affirmation of the validity of these presuppositions andevaluative ideas.

In addition to suprarational presuppositions and suprarational affirmation ofthese presuppositions being a part of scientific inquiry, Weber identifies anothersuprarational element in scientific inquiry. Weber argues that a study of the mainscientists and principal scientific discoveries leads to the conclusion that “the reallygreat advances in knowledge in mathematics and the natural sciences” are the prod-uct of “the intuitive flashes of imagination” (LCS, 176). If an individual is not giftedwith the ability to produce imaginative “ideas or ideal intuitions,” that person maybecome an excellent “clerk or . . . technical official” (SV, 136), but such a person willnever become a great scientist. The ability to “divine” scientific hypotheses by meansof an “ ‘intuitive’ gift” (LCS, 176) that cause revolutionary advances in scientificknowledge sets the genuinely great scientist (and great scientific discoveries) apartfrom the technical application of already known scientific knowledge by technicalexperts. The possession of these intuitive gifts and the inspired scientific findingsthey produce is not something that can be rationally explained or attained: “Now,whether we have scientific inspiration depends upon destinies that are hidden fromus, and besides upon ‘gifts’ ” (SV, 136).

Weber criticizes the notion that scientific inquiry is exclusively a matter ofmechanical measurements, experimental manipulations, or the development ofpurely rational processes.4 He posits that a considered reflection on the issue reveals


the fact that the role of “inspiration” is as critical in scientific inquiry as it is in art:

[I]nspiration plays no less a role in science than it does in the realm of art. It is a childish notion to think that a mathematician attains any scientifically valuable resultsby sitting at his desk with a ruler, calculating machines or other mechanical means. The mathematical imagination of a Weierstrass is naturally quite differently oriented inmeaning and result than is the imagination of an artist, and differs basically in quality.But the psychological processes do not differ. Both are frenzy (in the sense of Plato’s“mania”) and “inspiration.” (SV, 136)

Calculations and experiments come into play at a relatively later stage in the processof scientific discovery, when the insights gained through frenzy, mania, inspiration,and so on have been formulated in the form of rationalized hypotheses, and thesehypotheses have to be subject to empirical and analytical validation. Weber posits thatthis is as true of the historical sciences as it is of the natural and mathematical sciences.After noting that all the great advances in the natural and mathematical sciences haveoriginally been in the form of hypotheses produced by suprarational intuitive flashesof brilliance, Weber goes on to note that the hypotheses are

[t]hen “verified” vis-à-vis the facts, i.e. their validity is tested in procedures involvingthe use of already available empirical knowledge and they are “formulated” in a logicallycorrect way. The same is true in history: when we insist here on the dependence of theknowledge of the “essential” on the use of the concept of objective possibility, we assertnothing at all about the psychologically interesting question which does not, however,concern us here, namely, how does an historical hypothesis arise in the mind of theinvestigator? We are here concerned only with the question of the logical categoryunder which the hypothesis is to be demonstrated as valid in case of dispute or doubt,for it is that which determines its logical “structure.” (LCS, 176)

The rationalized, logical structure of scientific hypotheses represents the objectiveform in which knowledge claims are presented in order to be tested, critiqued, and/orverified. While this is an essential step in the process of scientific inquiry, one shouldnot lose sight of the fact that the origin of a truly original/revolutionary scientifichypothesis is the suprarational intuitive flashes of brilliance experienced by thescientist.

In light of the foregoing discussion, Weber’s description of the “objective validityof empirical knowledge” (OSS, 110) leads to a radically different understanding ofthe “objective” character of science than that proposed by Enlightenment thought.Enlightenment thought viewed science as being “objective” because it was completelyfree from the subjective values, desires, orientations, and fears of the scientist.Scientific inquiry had to be expunged of all subjective factors because these factorscan lead to nothing more than knowledge of particulars, whereas objective scientificinquiry yields knowledge of universals. In contrast, Weber asserts that the objectiverational validity of scientific inquiry is based on three subjective suprarational factors:(a) presuppositions and value judgments, (b) the affirmation of these presuppositionsand value judgments, and (c) intuitive flashes of brilliance that give rise to new scien-tific hypotheses. For Weber, these subjective suprarational factors do not detract


from the objective and rational character of science, they actually make science possi-ble. These subjective characteristics are so intimately a part of the scientific enterprisethat science is hardly imaginable in their absence:

A chaos of “existential judgments” about countless individual events would be the onlyresult of a serious attempt to analyze reality “without presuppositions.” . . . Order isbrought into this chaos only on the condition that in every case only a part of concretereality is interesting and significant to us, because it is related to the cultural values withwhich we approach reality. (OSS, 78)

Weber asserts that cultural values play a critical role in bringing order to the chaoticform of an observed phenomenon that presents itself to the observer. These culturalvalues contain the extra-scientific, suprarational factors on which the scientificinquiry is based. For Weber, scientific inquiry is not possible in the absence ofspecific subjective, extra-scientific factors.

While Weber’s description of science and scientific knowledge sees subjective factors and value judgments to be an integral part of scientific inquiry, his very defi-nition of science argues for a value-free science. As noted earlier, Weber sees scienceas being a unique source of knowledge about empirical reality because it provides“concepts and judgments which are neither empirical reality nor reproductions of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering in a valid manner” (OSS, 111). Inproviding these concepts and judgments that facilitate the ordering of empirical real-ity in a valid manner, science is (or should be) completely free of value judgments.Weber seems to be saying that, while science is based on certain subjective factorsand value judgments, it is at the same time free of certain subjective factors and valuejudgments. This apparent contradiction in Weber’s thought is clarified by Löwith inthese words:

What Max Weber’s call for a value-free science sought none the less to demonstrate wasthat, in spite of science’s emancipation, its “facts” were underpinned by specific precon-ceived value-judgements of a moral and semi-religious type, some of which evenapproximated to fundamental principles. Science was to become free, in the sense thatits value-judgements were to become decisive, logically consistent and self-reflexive,rather than remaining concealed, both to others and to science itself, under the cloakof “scientific knowledge.” Weber’s call for the value-freedom of scientific judgementdoes not represent a regression to pure scientificity; on the contrary, he is seeking tobring those extra-scientific criteria of judgement into the scientific equation . . . .(Löwith, 1989, 146)

For Weber, the value-free character of science is not related to the fact that it is freeof subjective factors and value judgments of a “moral and semi-religious type.”Science is value-free in the sense that its “moral and semi-religious” dimension hasbecome “decisive, logically consistent and self-reflexive, rather than remainingconcealed.” Science becomes science only when its extra-scientific dimension isexplicitly recognized, accounted for, and made clear. As long as the extra-scientific,semireligious dimension of science remains concealed from the view of the scientist,science falls short of being science.


Weber’s consciousness of the fact that extra-scientific criteria underpinned scientificknowledge5 led him to reject the claim that the objectivity of science is either rootedin or leads to the knowledge of universally valid laws. He asserts that any claimof the objectivity of the analysis of cultural events that “proceeds according to thethesis that the ideal of science is the reduction of empirical reality [to] ‘laws,’ ismeaningless” (OSS, 80). This is not because “laws” are not at work in social, psycho-logical, historical (i.e., cultural) phenomena, but rather because an adequate under-standing of such phenomena cannot be reduced to the discovery of these “laws” ortheir application to particular situations once they have been discovered. Whileknowledge and application of “laws” is an important part of understanding empiricalreality, empirical reality cannot be reduced to such “laws,”

because the knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used by our minds for attaining this end; secondly, becauseknowledge of cultural events is inconceivable except on a basis of the significance whichthe concrete constellations of reality have for us in certain individual concrete situa-tions. In which sense and in which situations this is the case is not revealed to us by anylaw; it is decided according to the value-ideas in the light of which we view “culture” ineach individual case. (OSS, 80 ff.)

In science, the knowledge of laws is not an end in itself, it is “one of the various aidsused by our minds for attaining [an] end”—in the cultural sciences, the end is thestudy and understanding of the most important part of empirical reality, that is,meaning (Sinn). For Weber, the objectivity of science cannot be reduced to abstractgeneral laws, it must take account of the subjective factors such as presuppositions,value judgments, and the role of intuition as they are all related to issues of meaningand significance in the scientific enterprise. In sum, only a hairline separates faithand science not only because science contains an extra-scientific, semireligiousdimension within it, but also because the affirmation or rejection of the value ofscientific knowledge is an act of faith:

Only on the assumption of belief in the validity of values is the attempt to espousevalue-judgment meaningful. However, to judge the validity of such values is a matter offaith. (OSS, 55)

Weber wrote these words in the first extended discussion of the methodology of thesocial science that he undertook in 1904. He uttered the following words, detailingthe hairline difference between faith and science, in the last public lecture that hedelivered before his death:

All scientific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method are valid; these arethe general foundations of our orientation in the world; and, at least for our specialquestion, these presuppositions are the least problematic aspect of science. Sciencefurther presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense thatit is “worth being known.” In this, obviously, are contained all our problems. For thispresupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only be interpreted withreference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or accept according to our ultimate position towards life. (SV, 143)


For Weber, the acceptance of the value of scientific knowledge is to judge the validityof the value—and as is the case with the judgment of all values, this judgment is amatter of faith, not science. Furthermore, the employment of scientific knowledgetoward a chosen end is something that cannot be decided on purely rational or scientific grounds. One must accept or reject the use of science toward particularends according to one’s “ultimate position towards life.” In other words, both theacceptance of the value of science and the employment of science toward a particu-lar end are matters of faith that cannot be justified in purely rational terms. GivenWeber’s description of scientific knowledge and the presuppositions and value-ideason which it is based, it can be surmised:

Rational scientific inquiry is made possible by a suprarational, faithful affirmationof the following presuppositions and value-ideas:

(a) Scientific truth about empirical reality is real.(b) Scientific truth about empirical reality can be known.(c) Scientific truth about empirical reality is worth knowing.

Given the transcendental presupposition of cultural science, the followingadjustments have to be made to the above summary:

(a) Human beings invest meaning in the world.(b) The meaning invested by human beings can be known.(c) The meaning invested by human beings is worth knowing.

2.2 The Empirical Dimension of Faith

For Weber, the hairline separating faith from science is not just the result of the factthat scientific inquiry contains a suprarational “moral and semi-religious” dimen-sion. It is also the case that faith in the validity of religious values and ideas invariablygives birth to “semi-empirical” factors that can be investigated scientifically. In otherwords, just as empirical science contains nonempirical factors that can only beaccounted for in terms of faith, religious faith contains elements that find theirexpression in the form of concrete, empirical reality. Weber notes:

The belief which we all have in some form or other, in the meta-empirical validity ofultimate and final values, in which the meaning of our existence is rooted, is notincompatible with the incessant changefulness of the concrete viewpoints from whichempirical reality gets its significance. Both these views are, on the contrary, in harmonywith each other. (OSS, 111)

The harmony between meta-empirical validity of final values and the constantchange of empirical reality is accounted for in terms of the culture constructed byhuman beings. Meta-empirical faith in nonempirical, nonscientific presuppositionsand value judgments finds its expression in concrete and empirical terms in theform of human culture—whether one is referring to the religious or the scientific


dimension of culture. For Weber, the very definition of culture points to the fact thatculture is ultimately constructed from the perspective of meta-empirical, nonscien-tific factors such as meaning and significance: “ ‘Culture’ is a finite segment of themeaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confermeaning and significance” (OSS, 81). But at the same time, this very definition ofculture makes it plain that it is no less the case that culture finds its expression in theform of concrete, empirical reality within the bounds of history. For Weber, mattersrelated to belief in the validity of ultimate and final values cannot be divorced fromconcrete, empirical reality:

Life with its irrational reality and its store of possible meanings is inexhaustible. Theconcrete form in which value-relevance occurs remains perpetually in flux, ever subjectto change in the dimly seen future of human culture. The light which emanates fromthose highest evaluative ideas always falls on an ever changing finite segment of the vastchaotic stream of events, which flows away through time. (OSS, 111)

Issues related to meaning, significance, and faith express themselves in a variety ofconcrete forms that become the source of data for the cultural scientist to observeand analyze. Even though it is usually assumed that matters of religious faith dealalmost exclusively with otherworldly concerns and spiritual/metaphysical interpreta-tions of the universe, Weber posits that this is an incomplete description of religiousfaith. He argues that however much religious teachings may be concerned withmythological world images and concerns for otherworldly salvation, religious behav-ior itself is very much directed toward the material world and the here and now:

The most elementary forms of behavior motivated by religious or magical factors areoriented to this world. “That it may go well with thee . . . and that thou mayest prolongthy days upon the earth” (Deut. 4:40) expresses the reason for the performance ofactions enjoined by religion or magic . . . religious or magical behavior or thinking mustnot be set apart from the range of everyday purposive conduct, particularly since eventhe ends of the religious and magical actions are predominantly economic. (SR, 1)

Health, wealth, and a productive life are all matters concerned with this world, andthe most elementary forms of religious behavior seek to secure these worldly goodsfor the actor. Not only are the “most elementary forms” of religious behaviororiented toward this world, the most advanced forms of religious behavior, are alsoconcerned with attaining religious goods in this world. Weber notes that, unlike thelayperson, the religious virtuoso is not primarily concerned with material goods likehealth, wealth, and long life in this world. The virtuoso is more concerned with expe-riencing union, ecstasy, Nirvana, annihilation, in short, some manifestation of salva-tion. While the goal appears to be otherworldly for the virtuoso, the ends of hisreligious commitment are this-worldly. The virtuoso seeks to attain the goal in thehere and now of this world, not in the hereafter of another world. Weber notes thatthis is the case from the perspective of the actors themselves:

Psychologically considered, man in quest of salvation has been primarily preoccupied by attitudes of the here and now . . . for the devout the sacred value, first and above all,


has been a psychological state in the here and now. Primarily this state consists in theemotional attitude per se, which was directly called forth by the specifically religious (or magical) act, by methodical asceticism, or by contemplation. (SPWR, 278)

There is a significant difference between the layperson and the religious virtuoso.The layperson seeks to attain worldly goods while the virtuoso seeks to attain spiri-tual goods. But in the final analysis, there is no difference between the two becauseboth of them seek to attain their goal in the here and now of this world. To thedegree that religious behavior concerns itself with the attainment of goods in thisworld and affects the behavior and attitude of its adherents accordingly—behaviorthat can be observed and analyzed by the cultural scientist—religious faith has anempirical dimension that is amenable to scientific inquiry.

Religious behavior is not the only source of empirical data that provides insightinto religious faith. The manner in which human beings articulate and express theirunderstanding of the universe and of the human being’s place in it is a second sourceof empirical data related to matters of faith. Weber notes that from the earliest periodin human history, the concrete, material world of nature that human beingsencounter and experience has never been considered to be the complete manifesta-tion of reality. A spirit, soul, apparition, or some other numinous entity was thoughtto lie behind the phenomenon that is experienced in the world of nature. Even in itsmost primitive form, religious behavior leads to the “displacement of naturalism”because of the notion that a numinous entity is “concealed ‘behind’ and responsiblefor the activity” of natural objects and phenomena (SR, 3). This supra-natural numinous reality becomes the focus of human attention in their efforts to meet theirmaterial and ideal interests, because it is the spirit behind the object that has to bemanipulated, coaxed, and/or placated in order to attain the desired results:

Since it is assumed that behind real things and events there is something else, distinc-tive and spiritual, of which real events are only the symptoms or indeed the symbols,an effort must be made to influence, not the concrete things, but the spiritual powersthat express themselves through concrete things. (SR, 6 ff.)

A rational explanation/understanding of the reality behind or above the empiricalreality is the second source of the concrete form in which issues related to religiousfaith express themselves. This rational explanation/understanding of the realitybehind empirical reality manifests itself in the form of world images that have beenexpressed in the form of myths, legends, stories, and scientific theories that humancultures have articulated during the course of history.

In the most general sense, “rational” means “systematic arrangement” (SPWR,293) of the constantly changing empirical reality that appears to be disordered, interms of general, abstract concepts. A rationalized world image emerges as a result ofthe human attempt to systematically arrange the discrete, diverse, and often diver-gent natural experiences and phenomena into a comprehensible totality. In relation-ship to the world image, rationalization refers to “an increasing theoretical masteryof reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts” (SPWR, 293).Here, attention to the concrete material reality orients human attention toward


theoretical and abstract concepts. The rationalization of the world image is relatedto, but not the same thing as, the rationalization of human behavior. The latter refersto the determination of proper behavior or action in order to achieve desired results,and seeks to distinguish between a limited set of “valid” norms from amongst analmost infinite number of actions that human beings are capable of. Rationalizationin this case refers to “the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practicalend by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means” (SPWR,293). The manner in which human beings rationalize their worldly behavior, and themanner in which they articulate a rationalized understanding of the universe andthe human being’s place in it are two examples of the concrete form that belief inreligious values and ideas expresses itself.

Besides and beyond rationalizing their worldview and their worldly behavior,there is a third example of the empirical dimension of religious faith. The fact thathuman existence is uncertain and precarious is obvious, as is the fact that certainhuman beings enjoy good fortune and others suffer from bad fortune. Weber notesthat human beings have to account for the precarious and uncertain nature of theirexistence conceptually, safeguard this existence practically, and also account for thevarying fortunes that different human beings are subject to in life. At times of suffer-ing and misfortune, and by those suffering from such travails, the gap between the“what is” and “what ought to be” has to be bridged. The universally observed “prob-lem of unjust suffering” (RRW, 353) has to be accounted for rationally in order tomake such suffering bearable. At times of good fortune and for those experiencinggood fortune, the “what is” is not sufficient in itself, it has to be legitimized: “Thefortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needsto know that he has a right to his good fortune” (SPWR, 271). The attempt to legit-imize the “what is” by the fortunate and the attempt to account for it by the lessfortunate evidences the importance of meaning. For Weber, the manner in whichmeaning is attached to either suffering or good fortune is of great significance in thedevelopment of human thought. Speaking of the common theme that underlies allreligious thought, Weber notes:

Behind them all always lies a stand towards something in the actual world which isexperienced as specifically “senseless.” Thus, the demand has been implied: that theworld order in its totality is, could, and should somehow be a meaningful “cosmos.”(SPWR, 281)

The formulation of a theodicy that offers a rational explanation for the contradictionbetween the claim of a meaningful existence and an apparently meaningless empiri-cal reality is another example of the concrete form that religious faith in ultimate values can take. In essence, theodicy is the rationalized explication of the fundamen-tal religious “presupposition that the course of the world be somehow meaningful,at least in so far as it touches upon the interests of men” (RRW, 353). Theodicy offersa rational explanation for the suffering encountered in the world with reference to arationalized image of the world, underpinned by the presupposition that human existence is meaningful. It goes on to posit ultimate salvation (or deliverance fromevery form of suffering) for those who behave according to a particular rationalized


code of ethics. Given what Weber has said about the elements that make up religiousfaith, the following summary can be offered.

Religious faith is based on the suprarational affirmation of the presuppositionsand value-ideas that:

(a) The cosmos and human existence in the cosmos is meaningful.(b) Salvation from suffering (i.e., meaninglessness) can be had.(c) Salvation from suffering (i.e., meaninglessness) is worth having.

Weber argues that the need for a rationalized understanding of human fate and suffering in the world furthers the process of the abstraction of human thought. Theattempt to forge a meaningful cosmos, at the level of intellectual–theoretical andpractical–ethical planes, out of the chaotic empirical reality that confronts thehuman senses is “the core of genuine religious rationalism” (SPWR, 281). The impli-cation of the attempt to find meaning when the concrete, empirical reality is experi-enced as being devoid of meaning is far reaching. Speaking of the attempt to accountfor the discrepancy between the “what is” and “what ought to be,” Parsons notes:

[T]he search for grounds of meaning which can resolve the discrepancies must lead tocontinually more “ultimate” reference points which are progressively further removedfrom the levels of common sense experience on which the discrepancies originally arise.(SR, lvii f.)

Just as the human encounter with the natural world initiates the process of abstrac-tion from the natural world, the human attempt to explain the concrete, socio-historical condition of individuals and societies orients human attention toward asupra-sensual, supra-empirical realm that lies behind or above the realm of concreteexperience. The meaning of human existence (or the ultimate reference point) is notto be found in the realm of concrete experience but in the realm that lies behind orabove it. Weber posits that the search for the meaning of human existence is directlyrelated to the articulation of a rationalized and abstracted world image: “The needfor ethical interpretation of the ‘meaning’ of the distribution of fortunes among menincreased with the growing rationality of conceptions of the world” (SPWR, 275).A more rationalized conception of the world leads to a more acute awareness ofthe problem of meaning and the problematic of salvation. Just as one cannot sepa-rate the material and ideal interests of human beings from their rationalized worldimage, the manner in which human beings seek to attach meaning to human exis-tence cannot be separated from the rationalized world image. The rational worldlybehavior that human beings engage in (to attain “religious” goods), the rationalizedworld image that they articulate (to express “religious” meaning), and the rationalattempt to formulate a theodicy (to express the ultimate “religious” value of salvation)provide the cultural scientist with sources of empirical data that can be used in thestudy and analysis of religious faith.

Weber’s inquiry into the sociology of religion is underpinned by the presupposi-tion that a scientist can get an insight into the subjective faith of an actor by study-ing certain empirical factors. To begin with, the most empirical of all factors is the


practical–ethical behavior that the actor engages in while pursuing his/her materialinterests. This behavior, for its part, takes place within certain parameters thatare shaped by a rationalized world image that the actor carries with him/herself allthe time (whether consciously or subconsciously). Weber posits that there is a reflex-ive relationship between material interests and world image. The reflexive nature ofthis relationship is illustrated by Weber in one of his better-known quotes:

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have like switchmen,determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.(SPWR, 280)

For Weber, a disciplined scientific inquiry into cultural phenomena needs to takeaccount of this reflexive relationship between human behavior in the world andhuman ideas about the world. But an inquiry into the behavioral patterns and worldimages of the actor is not an end in itself; it is a means toward understanding some-thing more fundamental. Weber posits that meaningful scientific inquiry requiresthat the study of these empirical factors take place with reference to the psychologi-cal, subjective significance or meaning (Sinn) that these factors have for the subjectunder study (SR, 1). The fact that an understanding of significance and meaning(Sinn) is the object of all scientific study of human culture is implicit in the very definition of culture. As noted above, Weber defines culture as “a finite segment ofthe meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beingsconfer meaning and significance” (OSS, 81). For Weber, the study of human behav-ior in the world, human ideas about the world, and the cultural institutions thatresult from such behavior and ideas turns out to be a form of psychological analysis,insofar as this analysis attempts to understand the meaning and significance (Sinn)that particular actions, ideas, and institutions have for the actor. Weber’s followingobservation, while specifically referring to the economic aspect of culture, applies tothe study of human culture in general as well:

Indeed, the partly brilliant attempts which have been made hitherto to interpret economic phenomena psychologically show in any case that the procedure does notbegin with the analysis of psychological qualities, moving then to the analysis of socialinstitutions, but that, on the contrary, insight into the psychological preconditions andconsequences of institutions presupposes a precise knowledge of the latter and thescientific analysis of their structure. (OSS, 88)

For Weber, “a precise knowledge” of the facts related to the “psychological precondi-tions and consequences” of the institutions under conditions is a fundamental prerequisite to the understanding of the value (i.e., meaning) invested/conferredupon these institutions by the human actors. In short, it is the goal of the culturalsciences to undertake a scientific analysis of the facts of particular institutions inorder to come to an understanding of the value (i.e., meaning) invested in these insti-tutions by the actors themselves.

Weber emphasizes the fact that while the goal of the cultural sciences is to under-stand a subjective value (i.e., meaning), the means of reaching the goal is the study


of objective facts. According to Weber, an attempt to understand the psychologicalsignificance of a particular act or institution should not begin psychological analysisper se, but from precise knowledge and scientific analysis of the act/institution underconsideration. In other words, an understanding of the psychological significanceand meaning of particular acts, ideas, and institutions cannot be deduced from pre-established a priori laws or from a purely empathetic understanding of the investiga-tor. Rather, this understanding results from a study of concrete empirical factscombined with the ability of the scientist/student to understand the possible meaning and significance that the phenomena may have for the actor:

Social-psychological research involves the study of various very disparate individualtypes of cultural elements with reference to their interpretability by our empatheticunderstanding. Through social-psychological research, with the knowledge of individ-ual institutions as a point of departure, we will learn increasingly how to understandinstitutions in a psychological way. We will not however deduce the institutions from psychological laws or explain them by elementary psychological phenomena.(OSS, 89)

Hennis discerns a spiritualist dimension in Weber’s methodology insofar as thismethodology tries to uncover the psychological meaning and significance that particular acts, ideas, and institutions have in particular cultural settings:

[O]ne can . . . say that Weber’s sociology, as a sociology of Verstehen which seeks tounderstand and explain every action and behavior, must necessarily be “spiritualist” in nature. “Rational action” of a purposively rational type is to a certain extent only theunambiguous, standardized unit of measurement with whose aid one can bring orderto infinitely more important human and historical “deviations.” (Hennis, 1998, 100)

Weber’s sociology, insofar as it is a sociology of Verstehen, is possible only if the inves-tigator is able to overcome the fact/value dichotomy during the course of his/herinvestigation. On the one hand, the investigator must recognize and accept the factthat Sinn (a subjective value) is expressed in a variety of empirical forms (or asobjective facts). This means that the investigator must acknowledge and accept thefact that a scientific understanding of subjective value conferred by the actor is possi-ble only through the investigator’s precise and detailed knowledge of objective facts.On the other hand, the investigator needs to be cognizant of his/her own role/position in the investigation. Even though the investigation seeks to study objectivefacts, it is taking place from the perspective of the investigator’s own subjective valueideas. For Weber, the scientific analysis of objective cultural facts is meaningful andpossible only from the perspective of the investigator’s subjective value-ideas:

To be sure, without the investigator’s evaluative ideas, there would be no principle ofselection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality. Justas without the investigator’s conviction regarding the significance of particular culturalfacts, every attempt to analyze concrete reality is absolutely meaningless, so the direc-tion of his personal belief, the refraction of values in the prism of his mind, gives direction to his work. (OSS, 82)


While the goal of the cultural sciences is the study of objective cultural phenomena,this study of cultural objects always and everywhere is possible only because ofsubjective interest in the phenomena on the part of the investigator. Consequently,the objective study of facts by the cultural sciences is possible only because of subjec-tive meaning/value attached to particular facts by the investigator:

[C]ultural science in our sense involves “subjective” presuppositions insofar as itconcerns itself only with those elements of reality which have some relationship,however indirect, to events to which we attach cultural significance. (OSS, 82)

While Weber himself explicitly stated that only a “hair-line . . . separates sciencefrom faith” (OSS, 110), the foregoing discussion evidences that even though a distance remains between the two, this separation has been bridged over by Weber’sreflections on the methodology and definition of the cultural sciences. Suprarationalfaithful affirmations of particular values and ideas are made meaningful, and scien-tific inquiry is made possible by the exact same confluence of factors: the fact thatvalue judgments and issues of meaning are meaningful only if they are expressed ina form that has empirical content. For Weber, the relationship between Sinn andempirical facts, is characterized by a reflexivity that cannot be reduced to linearcausality.6 Weber’s approach recognizes an intimate relationship between belief inultimate values and empirical facts, and attempts to understand the former in lightof the latter without reducing them to the latter. Given Weber’s definition of scienceand culture, this attempt does not make any rational sense in the absence of anempirical dimension of faith and belief that can be observed by the scientist. Just asone cannot understand science and scientific inquiry in the absence of extrascientific, suprarational factors of a moral and semireligious type that underpinscientific inquiry, one cannot understand issues of meaning, significance, and faithin the absence of concrete factors of a semi-empirical type in which such faithexpresses itself. Consequently, the close proximity of faith and science can be demon-strated from two different, but intimately related, perspectives. First, the presence ofextra-scientific presuppositions within science and the suprarational affirmations ofthese presuppositions on the part of the scientist demonstrate that faith claims are an integral part of scientific rationalism. Second, the fact that the faith claims of reli-gion inevitably manifest themselves in rationalized form at both the theoretical and practical levels demonstrates that faith has an empirical dimension that is amenableto scientific inquiry.

2.3 Weber the Person on Religion and Science

The preceding discussion suggests that one cannot divorce the practice of sciencecarried out by a scientist in his/her professional life from an act of faith on the partof the scientist in his/her private life. This should be as true of Weber as of any otherscientist. Weber’s reflections on the methodology of the social sciences show thatWeber the practicing social scientist was acutely aware of the fact that any commit-ment to the scientific enterprise was the result of a faith in science that could not bejustified scientifically. As noted above, Weber asserts that scientific truth is of no


value to the one who does not accept its validity, and the acceptance of its validity isthe result of certain cultural values that cannot be explained in scientific terms or interms of human nature. On a more personal level, Weber was just as acutely awareof the fact that this commitment to the value of scientific truth made certaindemands upon him that required the unconditional sacrifice of all other convictions.Reflecting on his own vocation as a scientist, Weber notes:

Whether . . . science is a worthwhile “vocation” for somebody, and whether scienceitself has an objectively valuable “vocation” are again value judgments about whichnothing can be said in the lecture-room. To affirm the value of science is a presupposi-tion for teaching here. I personally by my very work answer in the affirmative, andI also do so from precisely the standpoint that hates intellectualism as the worstdevil . . . . (SV, 152)

While Weber the teacher could not teach or advocate that scientific inquiry is a vocation worth pursuing in the classroom, he personally affirmed the value of scienceby his very practice of it—and he made the affirmation in the most passionate terms.The affirmation of science as a vocation worth pursuing requires Weber to bridgethe fact/value dichotomy at a very practical level—in fact, his affirmation is notpossible without bridging the dichotomy. He affirmed the value of science becausehe acknowledged and accepted the presupposition that science is a unique source ofknowledge about empirical reality and that this knowledge is worth having. At thesame time, Weber is equally aware of the fact that the very vocation that he iscommitted to contains within it the possibility of giving rise to a form of intellectu-alism, which is the worst of all devils. Weber’s understanding of and commitment tothe value of science is matched by an awareness of and loathing for the problematicthat scientific intellectualism has given rise to.

The simultaneous appreciation of the value and limitations of science on Weber’spart produces a tension in his thought that resonates throughout his work. Wolinnotes that Weber’s scholarship “issues from the frustration of a consciousness thatknows its deepest values are owed to religion but that its vocational commitments areto the enemy” (Wolin, 1981, 421). In making this observation, Wolin is implyingthat Weber’s consciousness and scholarship are specific illustrations of a generalobservation made by Nietzsche that a scientist’s faith in the value in science is a suprarational assertion that cannot be validated scientifically:

But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysicalfaith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we seekers after knowledge today,we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith thatis thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, thatGod is the truth, that truth is divine. (Nietzsche, 1974, 283)

Weber’s affirmation of the value of scientific truth is the expression of an extra scientific, metaphysical faith. While Weber’s personal affirmation of science as a vocation worth pursuing is an act of faith in science, scientific rationality in his dayand age has undermined the validity of all faith claims. But Weber continues toaffirm his faith in science in spite of the fact that the progress of science contributes


to the undermining of all faith claims. Weber has to make this leap of faith in orderto invest his work with meaning and significance in an age of disenchantment. It appears that Weber’s continued affirmation of the value of science in an age of disenchantment evidences that he himself is making a “sacrifice of the intellect.” Scientific inquiry has laid bare the fact that the world and everything in it is devoid of meaning; Weber’s conscious choice of pursuing the vocation of science chal-lenges this scientific position. The implications in this incongruity are far reaching.

The fact that the affirmation of the value of science, in the form of acknowledg-ing it to be a vocation worth pursuing, amounts to a leap of faith is barely concealedin Weber’s work. He acknowledges that religious thought and certain philosophicalclaims presuppose that “the world must have meaning, and the question is how tointerpret this meaning so that it is intellectually conceivable” (SV, 153). Then Webergoes on to detail this point by noting:

It is the same as with Kant’s epistemology. He took for his point of departure the presupposition: “Scientific truth exists and it is valid,” and then asked: “Under which presuppositions of thought is truth possible and meaningful?” The modern aestheticians . . . proceed from the presupposition that “works of art exist,” and thenask: “How is their existence meaningful and possible?” (SV, 154)

Weber, no less than Kant, affirms the presupposition that “scientific truth exists andit is valid.” According to his description, this presupposition is an “essentially reli-gious and philosophical presupposition” (SV, 154). Furthermore, acceptance of thisreligious/philosophical presupposition or this leap of faith cannot/should not bedivorced from the question: “How is the existence of this truth meaningful andpossible?” (SV, 154). Weber’s writing on the methodology of the social sciencesexplores these very questions. By pursuing his vocation as a scientist and ponderingover the question of “How is scientific truth possible?” and “What is the meaning ofscientific truth?” in his methodological writings, Weber affirms the presuppositionthat scientific truth exists and is worth pursuing. In light of Weber’s own expositionof the issue, this essentially amounts to a “religious and philosophical” affirmation inthe value of science.

In making the affirmation that he personally values the pursuit of science as avocation, Weber is making an extrascientific affirmation without which his pursuit ofthe vocation would not be possible. The following observation by Wolin on Weber’smethodological work points to the extra-scientific dimension of Weber’s affirmation:

The methodologist seizes the opportunity to show the researcher that science cannotflourish without “evaluative ideas” for it is these that nourish notions of what is “signif-icant” and hence worthy of inquiry. “Significance” becomes the crucial concept inWeber’s politics of knowledge. It symbolizes the moment of freedom for the socialscientist when he registers his affirmations, when he exchanges the settled routines ofthe inquiry for the risks of action. It is akin to a form of momentary and secular salva-tion for it creates meaning in an otherwise meaningless world. (Wolin, 1981, 419)

The comments by Wolin evidence that it is not only Weber’s consciousness that isultimately indebted to religious values, but also that religious values provide the


central axis around which his methodology of the social sciences is built—there canbe no science without a faithful affirmation of science. In short, Weber the scientist has to offer a “sacrifice of the intellect” in the form of affirming the value of sciencein a disenchanted age in order to experience a “form of momentary and secular salvation . . .”

The observations on Weber’s part regarding the intimate proximity of faith andscience—and the reasoning behind them—need to be balanced with his equallyforceful assertion that science cannot be reduced to a matter of faith. This is evidentin the very definition of scientific knowledge because science is a unique avenue toknowledge about empirical reality, which provides knowledge about empirical real-ity that faith alone cannot give. On the one hand, Weber’s methodology describeshow presuppositions and evaluative ideas that together go into making decisionsabout matters of significance are central elements of any genuine, objective scientificinquiry—thus placing science and faith in intimate proximity. On the other hand,Weber emphasizes that science must remain free of value considerations in the sensethat science should not be reduced to presuppositions and evaluative ideas that havebeen sanctified by the claims of having reached the level of unquestioned scientificobjectivity. This makes the presuppositions and evaluative ideas of science immunefrom empirical critique and makes science a value-laden enterprise. Löwith summa-rizes Weber’s position on the simultaneous intimate proximity of science and faithand its value-free character in these words:

It is a “very fine line indeed ” which separates science from belief in ultimate values.Indeed scientific judgment is never completely to be split off from evaluative assess-ment; it is simply necessary to maintain the distinction between the two. What can andmust be done, if the cause of scientific objectivity is to be served, is to highlight andmake accountable precisely those factors which are not scientifically demonstrable butwhich are none the less relevant to science. (Löwith, 1989, 146)

The intimate proximity of faith and science has far-reaching implications for the atti-tude that individuals adopt toward the modern disenchanted condition. Looking atthe responses of two groups of people in the disenchanted world, the religiousbeliever and the modern intellectual, Weber argues that response of the modern,secular intellectual is less dignified than the response of the religious believer. Henotes that in a disenchanted world, there is a “need of some modern intellectuals tofurnish their souls” with something religious, holy, and sacred (SV, 154). In order tofill this need, they try to construct new religions in the absence of genuine prophecy.For Weber, such an attempt is predestined to failure because it is a betrayal of bothreligion and science. And the results of such an attempt are bound to be monstrous:

If one tries intellectually to construe new religions without a new and genuineprophecy, then, in an inner sense, something similar will result, but with still worseeffects. And academic prophecy, finally, will create only fanatical sects but never agenuine community. (SV, 155)


The established religions of the traditional church offer a much better, and intellectuallymore sound, alternative to religions based on academic prophecy:

To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must say: may herather return silently, without the usual publicity build-up of renegades, but simply andplainly. The arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for him.After all, they do not make it hard for him. One way or another he has to bring his“intellectual sacrifice”—that is inevitable. If he can really do it, we shall not rebukehim. For such an intellectual sacrifice in favor of an unconditional religious devotion isethically quite different a matter than the evasion of the plain duty of intellectualintegrity, which sets in if one lacks the courage to clarify one’s own ultimate standpointand rather facilitates this duty by feeble relative judgments. (SV, 155)

For Weber, making the intellectual sacrifice and returning to the old churches is anethically superior response to the disenchanted fate of the times than intellectual andscientific pursuits that do not have the courage to “clarify one’s own ultimate stand-point.” The highest value of intellectual and scientific inquiry is plain “intellectualintegrity”—and those who try to invest the world with rational/scientific meaningand significance grossly offend this integrity by their futile attempts, because no suchmeaning and significance can ever be had. It is better to make the intellectual sacri-fice and return to the church (masjid, synagogue, or temple) rather than engage inintellectually dishonest and ultimately futile pursuits:

In my eyes, such religious return stands higher than the academic prophecy, which doesnot clearly realize that in the lecture-rooms of the university no other virtue holds butplain intellectual integrity. (SV, 155 ff )

The ethical soundness of the religious return in the face of the fate of our times,when compared to academic prophecy is further detailed by Weber in a personalletter to Ferdinand Tönnies. Weber’s characterization of himself as being “religiouslyunmusical” is the most well-known phrase from this correspondence and this can beinterpreted to be a reflection of his Enlightenment mindset. But looking at whatWeber said prior to describing himself as being “religiously unmusical” and what hesays afterward, shows that this is a gross misreading of Weber’s position. Weber notes:

It goes without saying that religions must clash with scientific truth insofar as theyassert empirical facts or the causal impact on them of something supernatural.However, when I studied modern Catholic literature in Rome a few years ago, I becameconvinced how hopeless it is to think that there are any scientific results that thischurch cannot digest. The steady and slow impact of the practical consequences of ourview of nature and history may make these ecclesiastical powers wither away . . . but noanti-clericalism based on “metaphysical” naturalism can accomplish this. I could notparticipate in such anti-clericalism. (Schluchter, 1979, 82 fn)

In drawing a causal link between empirical fact and supernatural causes, religion clasheswith science but remains internally consistent with its own principles. While drawingthe link between empirical reality and supernatural causes is scientifically unsound, itis ethically sound insofar as it does not violate religion’s own self-understanding and


self-definition. But when modern intellectuals use science to construct naturalisticmetaphysical systems, not only do they clash with religion by offering a rival meta-physical system, but they also violate some of the most fundamental principles ofscientific inquiry. In constructing such systems, the modern intellectuals presenttheir own personal, relative judgments in the form of scientific truth, withoutattending to the rigorous scientific responsibility of intellectual integrity that requiresa careful and rational explication of the scientist’s own standpoint and presupposi-tions. By presenting their own personal judgments in the form of scientific truth, the modern intellectuals are guilty of an ethical transgression because they violate science’s own self-understanding and self-definition. This ethical transgression on thepart of modern intellectuals unnecessarily aggravates the clash between religion andscience and takes the form of a dispute between two rival parties. For Weber, whilereligion and science must ultimately clash, Weber the scientist will not become a party in the dispute.

After making the aforementioned observation, Weber becomes self-reflective and offers an evaluation of his own state of mind regarding his personal fate in a disenchanted world:

It is true that I am absolutely unmusical in matters religious and that I have neither theneed nor the ability to erect any religious edifices within me—that is simply impossi-ble for me, and I reject it. But after examining myself carefully I must say that I amneither anti-religious nor irreligious. In this regard too I consider myself a cripple, astunted man whose fate it is to admit honestly that he must put up with this state ofaffairs (so as not to fall for some romantic swindle). I am like a tree stump from whichnew shoots can sometimes grow, but I must not pretend to be a grown tree.(Schluchter, 1979, 82 fn)

Describing himself as being religiously unmusical and at the same time being“neither anti-religious nor irreligious” can be seen as being a reflection of Weber’sEnlightenment consciousness. But, by recognizing that he can be no more than thestump of a tree “from which new shoots can grow” but never a “grown tree,” Weber’spost-Enlightenment consciousness manifests itself in the form of a conscious real-ization of the limitations of rational, scientific inquiry. Weber acknowledges the factthat he cannot produce scientific value/meaning, or a naturalistic metaphysicalsystem, to fill the vacuum that is the result of being religiously unmusical. In starkcontrast, Enlightenment thought actively strove (and its present-day proponents stillstrive) to produce a variety of rational metaphysical systems to fill the vacuum thathad been created by the rational critique of religion. In terms of evaluating others,there are significant implications of a consciousness that is simultaneously religiouslyunmusical but also aware of its own limitations:

From this follows quite a bit: For you a theologian of liberal persuasion (whetherCatholic or Protestant) is necessarily most abhorrent as the typical representative of a halfway position; for me he is in human terms infinitely more valuable and interesting . . . than the intellectual (and basically cheap) pharisaism of naturalism,which is intolerably fashionable and in which there is much less life than in thereligious position. (Schluchter, 1979, 82 fn)


Comparatively speaking, Weber has more respect for theologians who are engaged inan attempt to bring religion into conversation with science than with modern intel-lectuals who attempt to construct new religions with the aid of academic prophecy.The theologians are “infinitely more valuable and interesting” as human beings thanthe religiously unmusical individuals who try to fashion naturalistic philosophies andmetaphysics on the back of scientific findings.7 The latter are a pretentious lot whoimagine that they can become fully grown trees, whereas in fact they can be nothingmore than stumps from which (maybe) “new shoots can sometimes grow.” In otherwords, while he finds it admirable that there are no scientific results that the “churchcannot digest,” he finds “the intellectual . . . pharisaism of naturalism” of the modernintellectuals to be abhorrent. Furthermore, as problematic as the modern theologicalattempt to bridge the gap between science and religion may be, for Weber, thisattempt still has greater potential to nurture life than (pseudo)scientific naturalism.

The foregoing analysis of Weber’s work on the issue of the hairline dividing faithand science and the comments of Wolin and Löwith on this aspect of Weber’s worksuggest that Weber’s position on the issue is a departure from the Enlightenment under-standing of the relationship between religion and science. In line with Enlightenmentthought, Weber recognizes that there is an obvious difference between religious faithand scientific knowledge. Religious belief ultimately depends on the “possession” offaith or other holy states that, properly speaking, do not represent “knowledge” (SV,154). In order to genuinely possess faith, “the devout reaches the point where theAugustinian sentence holds: credo non quod, sed quia absurdum est” (SV, 154).According to Weber, religious faith requires a conscious sacrifice of the intellect as abasic prerequisite for the possession of faith. This sacrifice of the intellect is some-thing that cannot be justified on scientific grounds. In making the sacrifice of theintellect a fundamental prerequisite of faith, religion has set itself over and againstscience/rationality:

The capacity for the accomplishment of religious virtuosos—the “intellectual sacrifice”—is the decisive characteristic of the positively religious man. That this is so is shown by the fact that in spite of (or rather in consequence) of theology (whichunveils it) the tension between the value-spheres of “science” and the sphere of “theholy” is unbridgeable. (SV, 154)

The fact that there is an unbridgeable divide between the value spheres of “science”and “the holy” evidences that a difference between faith and science does exist. Butit is only by conflating faith with “the holy” that a claim can be made that anunbridgeable divide exists between faith and science. The fact that faith cannot beconflated with the holy is evidenced by what Weber has already said regarding beliefin ultimate values and the manner in which scientific inquiry is itself based onsuch a belief and makes such beliefs the object of its inquiry. On the one hand, theholy resides beyond the domain of scientific inquiry that requires faith to bepossessed. On the other hand, science itself is based on a faith commitment (andalso studies such commitments). These two points taken together suggest that,according to Weber, faith is common to both science and the holy. For Weber, reli-gious faith seeks to give the believer possession of the holy (i.e., salvation) in return


for a sacrifice of the intellect, and scientific faith seeks to provide a unique form ofknowledge of empirical reality by requiring a disciplining of the intellect. But asnoted earlier, the difference between the two is not as stark as Weber thought. Thepursuit of scientific knowledge in a disenchanted age also requires a sacrifice of theintellect because the disenchanted intellect posits that there is no such thing as mean-ing in the cosmos, while the pursuit of science as a vocation requires an intellectualrejection of this claim. Consequently, while the ends of religion and science arevery different, the means of attaining the ends are exactly the same. The meansexpress themselves in the form of a faithful affirmation of the respective presupposi-tions on which religion and science are based and a faithful affirmation that thegoods (i.e., values) offered by the two are worth having. Furthermore, acting inaccordance with these faithful affirmations requires a sacrifice of the intellect irre-spective of whether one wants to attain the ends of religion (salvation) or the ends ofscience (knowledge).

By examining a life that is lived in and shaped by the pursuit of the goodsoffered by either science or religion, one can see that not only is there a close proximity between faith and science, but also that the two are intimately related.A life lived in the pursuit of scientific goods provides the scientists with the empiri-cal data that he/she can use to investigate the most subjective of categories—Sinn. Atthe same time, this pursuit reveals to the investigator that he/she cannot have thesegoods in the absence of an extra-scientific, suprarational faith in the value of scien-tific knowledge. The fact that Weber’s life was shaped by this faith is obvious enoughfrom even a cursory glance at his biography. In short, it is not only at a theoreticaland methodological level that Weber sees only a hairline separating faith fromscience, but also the very life he lived as an individual who had chosen science as avocation provides the most compelling empirical evidence of the fact that faith andscience stand in intimate proximity.

Beginning with his earliest work on the methodology of the social sciences, continuing throughout his life, and culminating in the last public lectures that hedelivered in his life, Weber’s stance on the relationship between religion and sciencecannot be mistaken for a simplistic Enlightenment statement on the issue. Weber’swork demonstrates a much more sophisticated understanding of the relationshipbetween religion and science than the (non)relationship posited by Enlightenmentthought. On three important points Weber’s work reflects a break from Enlightenmentthought on the issue of the relationship between religion and science:

(a) Only a hairline separates faith and science.(b) Scientific knowledge and religious belief are made possible by a suprarational

faithful affirmation of the presuppositions and value-ideas underpinningeach.

(c) Individuals attempting to bridge the gap between religion and science are more worthy of respect than those attempting to construct naturalistic,“scientific” metaphysics that seeks to replace religion.

In light of the foregoing discussion, the following can be stated with confidence:While there is a clear difference between religion and science as far as Weber is


concerned, his work cannot be categorized as a “vitriolic attack on religion”(Wittenberg, 1989, 118) by any stretch of the imagination. And contrary to theimplication by omission made by Casanova, Weber’s work contains resources thatcan be utilized to initiate/advance the rapprochement between religion and science.Weber notes that while science cannot ultimately decide issues of meaning, signifi-cance, and value, it does have something to offer to those who discuss such issues inan intelligent and disciplined manner. This point can be illustrated by returning tothe question posed by Tolstoy that was cited at the beginning of this chapter andWeber’s response to the question. Weber quotes Tolstoy as saying: “Science is mean-ingless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important forus: ‘what shall we do and how shall we live?’ ” (SV, 143). He then goes to give hisown evaluation of Tolstoy’s observation in these words:

That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable. The only question thatremains is the sense in which science gives “no” answer, and whether or not sciencemight yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly. (SV, 143)

By saying that while science cannot give an answer to questions of ultimate meaningand value, but may still be of use to those “who put the question correctly,” Weberis establishing a bridge over the hairline that separates science from faith. In build-ing a bridge over the two, he is establishing a relationship between faith and science,without conflating them. This point can be further illustrated by discussing ingreater detail certain issues that have been mentioned in passing in the foregoingpages. It has been noted that Sinn is the crucial category that provides the culturalsciences with the subject matter that is to be investigated. It has been mentioned inpassing that Weber’s understanding of Sinn and the manner in which it is investi-gated by the scientist bridges the fact/value dichotomy. In the context of that discus-sion, it was implied that Weber also bridges the subject/object dichotomy. A closerlook at the manner in which Weber’s methodology bridges the fact/value andsubject/object dichotomies reveals that it is precisely the bridging of thesedichotomies that allows a bridge to be established over the hairline separating sciencefrom faith.


CHAPTER 3

THE VALUE OF SCIENCE IN A DISENCHANTED AGE:BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY

As noted in chapter 1, Weber posits that the notion of “progress” has put an indelible“imprint of meaninglessness” on modern life because death becomes meaningless ina cosmos that is itself bereft of meaning and in the pursuit of modern cultural goodsto which no meaning can be attached. For Weber, progress is closely identified withthe continued rationalization of science, both in its technical and theoretical aspects.Consequently, the progress of science contributes to the increasing meaninglessnessof modern human existence by progressively disenchanting the world even more andthereby making death that much more meaningless. In short, the progress of scienceis directly proportional to the intensification of meaninglessness. It is against thisbackground that Weber asks the apparently paradoxical question:

Has “progress” as such a recognizable meaning that goes beyond the technical, so thatto serve it is a meaningful vocation? . . . To raise this question is to ask for the vocationof science within the total life of humanity. What is the value of science? (SV, 140)

Weber the scientist is aware of the fact that his work is contributing to the ongoingprogress of science. While contribution to the progress of science has recognizabletechnical significance, Weber asks the broader question of the relationship of theprogress of science to a “meaningful vocation.” In posing the question in these terms,he is interested in exploring the vocation of science as it relates to the “total life ofhumanity,” not just as it relates to him as an individual. Weber wants to know ifpursuing scientific inquiry can go beyond merely technical and practical contribu-tions to human society and make a more meaningful contribution to the total life ofhumanity. Weber’s concern can be restated in these terms: In an age of disenchantedmeaninglessness, can the scientific study of empirical facts make a meaningfulcontribution to human concerns about values? This question became especially acutein Weber’s immediate intellectual milieu when two competing groups staked polaropposite claims regarding the relationship between science and values.1 Dubbed theWerturteilsstreit (the battle of value-relevance), it pitted the proponents ofWertfreiheit (value-freedom) against the proponents of Wertbeziehung (value-relevance).2 The former argued that science could not be science until and unless itwas purged of all value concerns and value-ideas. The latter argued that science was

inevitably tied to value-ideas and that it could pass judgment on the validity (or inva-lidity) of such ideas. In light of the discussion in the previous chapter, it is obviousthat Weber would reject both of these two extreme positions. Weber’s positivestatement of his position on the relationship between science and values emergeswhen looking at his exposition of the value of science in an age of disenchantedmeaninglessness.

In light of the direct relationship between progress and science and betweenprogress and meaninglessness, the answer to the question “What is the value of science?”in the total life of humanity appears to be: “Science has no value.” Science can haveno value because science is simultaneously the result of and the catalyst for “progress,”and “progress” does not have any “recognizable meaning” beyond “the purely practi-cal and technical” (SV, 139). This leads to the conclusion that science cannot beassigned a vocation within the total life of humanity. Consequently, the scientificstudy of empirical facts is of no practical relevance to the ultimate value concerns ofhumanity. Weber defers to Tolstoy’s judgment on this issue—but then goes on toproblematize the conclusion by asking a more nuanced question. Weber acknowl-edges the limitation of the value of science when he agrees with Tolstoy that; “Scienceis meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question impor-tant for us: ‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’ ” (SV, 143). Knowledge ofempirical facts offered by science cannot in any way answer the most important valueconcerns that human beings have. As noted in chapter 1, Weber rejects any and allclaims that science can be used to construct values, provide definitive answers tovalue concerns, or construct a Weltanschauung. But Weber goes on to qualify hisagreement with Tolstoy in these words:

That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable. The only question thatremains is the sense in which science gives “no” answer, and whether or not sciencemight yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly. (SV, 143)

In order to appreciate the value of science in this regard, Weber argues that oneshould have a clear understanding of its limitations. For Weber, there is a reflexiverelationship between understanding the value of science and understanding itslimitations. A distorted understanding of its limitations leads to a distorted under-standing of its value. The individuals who try to construct naturalistic metaphysicson the back of scientific findings, invest science with a value that cannot be possiblyattached to it. They overestimate the value of science because of the fact that they donot understand the limitations of science. Conversely, a distorted understanding ofthe limitations of science leads to a distorted understanding of its value. The indi-viduals who agree with Tolstoy that science cannot answer the only question that isreally important to us, and then carry on the discussion of issues related to meaningwithout any reference to science, do so precisely because they do not understand thevalue of science. For Weber, while it cannot provide a direct answer to the only ques-tion that is meaningful to us, “science might yet be of some use to the one who putsthe question correctly” (SV, 143):

The general force of Weber’s argument may be understood as follows: social science canmake only an indirect contribution to public ethical and political debates by addressing


a series of questions which are not addressed by other “voices”—politicians, philoso-phers, moralists, etc. Paradoxically, as a precondition for making any contribution at allwe have to start from the recognition of the limits of science and critical reflection isgeneral and of the relative weakness of the power base from which the specialistoperates. (Scott, 1995, 69 ff.)

The fact that Weber considers scientific truth to be a singularly unique source of knowl-edge (OSS, 111) is directly related to science’s unique contribution to the discussions ofvalue and meaning. Consequently, an understanding of science’s indirect contributionto debates surrounding value and meaning should be developed in light of an under-standing of the uniqueness of the scientific way of knowing and the unique contribu-tion that this way of knowing can make to discussions about meaning and significance.

The following pages explore the possible contributions that scientific analysis ofempirical facts can make to questions of value and meaning. The question “What isthe value of science?” is explored in terms of the manner in which science can mean-ingfully contribute to discussions about the following issues:

(a) practical rationalization and the disenchanted “struggle of the gods”;(b) theoretical rationalization and the disenchanted world image;(c) the significance of meaning in an age of disenchanted meaninglessness.

On each of these three accounts, Weber’s methodology of the social sciences explicitlybridges the fact/value dichotomy. It is only by bridging this dichotomy that the culturalsciences have a subject matter that can be studied, that is, meaning (Sinn). For thecultural sciences, the penultimate “fact” that is to be investigated is meaning (Sinn). Thisis evidenced by Weber’s definition of “culture” as “a finite segment of the meaninglessinfinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning andsignificance” (OSS, 81). It is the “value”-conferring capacity of human beings and notsome abstract universal law or innate characteristic of human nature that provides thecultural sciences with the “facts” that become the subject matter of scientific inquiry.Weber’s description of the transcendental presupposition of the cultural sciences takentogether with his description of the fundamental character of the social/cultural sciencesdetails this point further. The transcendental presupposition of the cultural sciences isthat “we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberateattitude towards the world and to lend it significance” (OSS, 81). The only type ofscience that Weber the social/cultural scientist is interested in “is an empirical science ofconcrete reality” (OSS, 72). In sum, the value-conferring capacity of cultural beingsbrings into existence the facts of “concrete reality” that are investigated by Weber’s typeof “empirical science.” The description of the way in which Weber relates the value-conferring capacity of human beings to the study of concrete fact by empirical scienceproves to be critical in adequately valuating the value of science in a disenchanted milieuor understanding science’s vocation in an era of meaninglessness.

3.1 Science: A Uniquely Modern Way of Knowing

Before addressing the question “What is the value of science?,” the question “Whatis science?” needs to be addressed in more precise terms. This will highlight the uniqueness

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 67

of scientific knowledge, among others ways of knowing, and thereby inform thesubsequent discussion on science’s contribution to issues of value and meaning.Human beings have been pursuing their material and ideal needs and constructingworld images since the earliest periods of known history. While the pursuit of inter-ests and the construction of images have been universal traits of human history, thespecific manner in which human beings, at a particular point and place in history,have carried out these tasks has been almost infinitely varied. The variation has beendetermined by a complex admixture of magic (in a multitude of forms), religion (ina multitude of [sometimes contradicting] forms), and rationality (in a variety offorms). For Weber, science is the uniquely modern rational means by which modernscarry out the universal tasks of the pursuit of interests and the construction of worldimage. The modern scientific means toward achieving universally desired ends is self-consciously divorced from magic and religion. For Weber, the difference between thescientific means and the religious and magical means is not that the former is “rational”and the latter are “irrational.” It is only dilettantes and pseudo-philosophers/scientistswho distinguish science from religion and magic in such terms. Weber notes:

Magic, . . ., has been just as systematically “rationalized” as physics. The earliestintentionally rational therapy involved almost the complete rejection of the cure ofempirical symptoms by empirically tested herbs and potions in favor of the exorcism of(what was thought to be) the “real” (magical, daemonic) cause of the ailment. Formally,it had exactly the same highly rational structure as many of the most importantdevelopments in modern therapy. (MEN, 34)

For Weber, the difference between science and other forms of rationalization is notthat science is “rational” and the others “irrational”; it is not even the case thatscience is “more rational” and the others are “less rational.” Weber argues that thedifference lies in the particular tools and methods on which scientific rationalism isbased. In contradistinction to magic and religion, science is unique in that it is char-acterized by “the provision of concepts and judgments which are neither empiricalreality nor reproductions of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering in a validmanner” (OSS, 111). The two tools that science employs to order empirical realityin “a valid manner” are (a) the concept and (b) the rational experiment. The conceptis an artificial abstraction from empirical reality that is neither equivalent to thegrounds from which it is abstracted nor a reproduction of those grounds. While thediscovery of the concept as an analytical tool can be traced back to Socrates and hisdisciples Plato and Aristotle, the Greeks were not the only ones

in the world to discover it. In India one finds the beginnings of a logic that is quitesimilar to that of Aristotle’s. But nowhere else do we find this realization of the signifi-cance of the concept. In Greece, for the first time, appeared a handy means by whichone could put the logical screws upon somebody so that he could not come out withoutadmitting either that he knew nothing or that this and nothing else was truth. (SV, 141)

The concept played the role of “putting the logical screws” on the thought process ofan individual so that the individual was forced to discipline his/her thinking process.Just as the concept allowed for a degree of disciplined ordering, expression, and


critical analysis of human thought that had not been hitherto possible, the rationalexperiment made a disciplined ordering, observation, and critical analysis of empir-ical reality that had not been hitherto possible. According to Weber, the principleduse of the rational experiment as a means of studying empirical reality appearedduring the Renaissance and coincided with the rediscovery of the Hellenic spirit.Weber describes the significance and the origins of the rational experiment in thesewords:

The experiment is a means of reliably controlling experience. Without it, present-dayempirical science would be impossible. There were experiments earlier; for instance, inIndia physiological experiments were made in the service of ascetic yoga technique; inHellenic antiquity, mathematical experiments were made for the purpose of wartechnology; and in the Middle Ages, for purposes of mining. But to raise the experimentto a principle of research was the achievement of the Renaissance. They were the greatinnovators in art, who were the pioneers of experiment. (SV, 141)

Having its origin in the field of art, especially painting and music, the rational exper-iment entered the field of science through the work of Galileo and Bacon (SV, 141 ff.).Even though the precursors of the concept and the rational experiment are to befound in non-Western societies, according to Weber, it is in the West that they weredeveloped with the greatest degree of internal consistency and used as a matter ofprinciple. Consequently, modern science developed in the West and not anywhereelse. Using the concept to discipline abstract thought and the rational experiment todiscipline observation of empirical reality, modern science provides a unique meansof acquiring knowledge that cannot be had from any other source.

The fact that science provides a unique means of acquiring knowledge about empir-ical reality can be demonstrated by looking at the presuppositions that invest meaningin the concept and the experiment. The fundamental presupposition of science thatunderlies the use of the concept and of the experiment as a means of obtaining knowl-edge is “the existence of unconditionally valid type of knowledge . . . i.e., the analyti-cal ordering of . . . reality” (OSS, 63). The “analytical ordering of reality” is to bedistinguished from “empirical reality” and/or “reproduction” of empirical reality inlight of the fact that “[i]t is not the ‘actual’ interconnections of ‘things’ but the concep-tual interconnections of problems which define the scope of the various sciences” (OSS,69). The fact that the goal of the sciences is to posit the “conceptual interconnectionsof problems” and not the “ ‘actual’ interconnection of ‘things’ ” has far-reaching impli-cations. The acceptance of the conceptual interconnections of problems as being a validsource of knowledge about empirical reality requires the acceptance of the presupposi-tion that, while the concept is neither a derivative nor a reproduction of empirical real-ity, it nonetheless provides access to knowledge about empirical reality. In the finalanalysis, the acceptance of this presupposition cannot be justified in scientific terms: itsacceptance (or rejection) is a matter of extra-scientific factors—it is a matter of faith.Even though it has been cited before, the following observation by Weber is worthrepeating in light of the discussion that has taken place since it was cited earlier:

The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truthis of no value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific truth


is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man’s original nature.(OSS, 110)

While an individual is free to reject the value of scientific truth, he/she should keepin mind that he/she “will seek in vain for some other truth to take the place of sciencein just those respects in which it is unique” (OSS, 111). While the acceptance orrejection of science is a matter of faith, acknowledging its uniqueness and utility ispractically inevitable for us moderns:

Science today is a “vocation” organized in special disciplines in the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of seers andprophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does it partake of the contem-plation of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe. This, to be sure,is the inescapable condition of our historical situation. We cannot evade it so long aswe remain true to ourselves. (SV, 152)

The fruits of science can only be attained in a manner that is decisively different fromthe manner in which the sages and philosophers of old attained their knowledge. Asmoderns, remaining true to ourselves requires that we remain conscious of ourhistorical situation and recognize the value and uniqueness of scientific knowledge.For Weber, the vocation of science aims at providing self-clarification and establish-ing relations between already known facts with the aid of special tools and methodsof analysis, of which the abstract concept and the controlled experiment areexamples. In addition to these tools and methods, there is an additional element thatis as much a part of scientific inquiry as the concept and the experiment, the inter-ests and values of the scientist undertaking the inquiry.

In very explicit terms, Weber asserts that there is a subjective dimension to thescientific enterprise insofar as the problem or question to be investigated is decisivelyshaped by “motives and values” of the investigator:

[I]n [the] social sciences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actual-ity always given by practical “questions.” Hence the very recognition of the existence ofa scientific problem coincides, personally, with the possession of specifically orientedmotives and values. (OSS, 61)

If an investigator self-consciously interrogates him/herself and asks why he/she choseto pursue the investigation of this particular issue and not some other, the investiga-tor would discover that the selection of the object of investigation is the result of theinvestigator’s concern with a perceived problem in ones own culture. Weber notesthat, if they want to be honest with themselves, scientists (especially cultural scien-tists) cannot but reach this conclusion. He asserts that the investigators have toacknowledge that they are pursuing a particular question and not some other“because certain concrete situations seem to be incompatible with, or seem tothreaten, the realization of certain ideal values in which they believe” (OSS, 61). Inshort, the “facts” that the cultural scientist chooses to investigate are determined bythe “fact” that the investigator feels that “certain concrete situations” appear to chal-lenge or undermine certain values that he/she holds dear. It is a subjective cultural


concern of the investigator that initiates objective scientific analysis. Once the inves-tigation has started, the investigator should set his/her subjective concerns aside. Thegoal of the investigation is not to affirm or repudiate the investigator’s own culturalvalues because, as a matter of principle, science cannot perform this function. Theonly thing that scientific inquiry can do is provide the conceptual tools that makepossible a degree and type of clarity about cultural values that cannot be had fromany other source. Once the investigator makes the choice to investigate a particularcultural problem, science provides the objective tools and methods of analysis thatmust be strictly adhered to by the individual doing the investigation. Once theprocess of scientific inquiry begins, the tools and methods offered by science—the abstract concept and the controlled experiment—make weighty demands on theinvestigator to keep his/her subjective tendencies out of the process of analysis as itunfolds. It is only by observing strictly objective criteria, during the course of inves-tigating problems identified as such because of subjective concerns, that scientistscan obtain the fruits of “self-clarification” and knowledge of “the conceptual intercon-nection of problems.”

Besides describing the epistemological uniqueness and value of science, Weberacknowledges the fact that science could be, and has been, valued in different waysin different cultural settings. Beginning with Plato’s analogy of the cave in which “thesun . . . is the truth of science, which alone seizes not upon illusions and shadows,but upon the true being” (SV, 140), science had been valued differently in differenthistorical periods. Detailing Weber’s insights on the topics, Schluchter notes:

Science has been regarded successively as an avenue to true being (in Greek philoso-phy), to true art (in the Renaissance), to true nature (in the period of the emergence ofnatural science), to the true God (under the influence of Protestantism andPuritanism), and finally to true happiness (in the nineteenth century). (Schluchter,1989, 270)

But as Schluchter goes on to note, all of these claims about the value and meaningof science turned to be illusions by the beginning of the twentieth century. InWeber’s immediate cultural environment in the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies, the value of science had become highly dubitable on two differentaccounts. First, the attempt to value science as a way to happiness and/or meaninghad proven to be an illusion. Weber noted that no educated individual “aside froma few big children in university chairs or editorial offices” (SV, 143) really believedthat science could lead to meaning and happiness, because the mature individualsknew the limitations of science—it could only provide conceptual knowledge aboutempirical reality and nothing more. Second, many of the youth in Weber’s dayviewed science as a power hostile to human life that had to be fought as a matter ofprinciple in order to experience the vitality of life. In contrast to the sun and the wayto true being, science had come to be viewed as

an unreal realm of artificial abstractions, which with their bony hands seek to grasp theblood-and-the-sap of true life without ever catching up with it. But here in life, in whatfor Plato was the play of the shadows on the walls of the cave, genuine reality is pulsat-ing; and the rest are derivatives of life, lifeless ghosts, and nothing else. (SV, 141)


The youthful critics saw science divorced from all concerns about values, meaning,and the “blood-and-the-sap of true life.” For Weber, while “a few big children” inuniversity chairs and editorial offices grossly overestimated the value of sciencebecause they could not appreciate its limits, the youthful critics of science underes-timated its capacities and therefore did not appreciate its value.3

Weber’s appreciation of science was very much informed by a consciousknowledge of its limitations. As noted above, Weber is aware of the fact that sciencecannot give an answer to the one and only question that really matters to all humanbeings: “What shall we do and how shall we live?” But he also goes on to note thatscience may nonetheless be a unique and most valuable source of knowledge for theindividual who poses the question correctly. Weber posits that science is of value onthree different accounts. First, it “contributes to the technology of controlling life bycalculating external objects as well as man’s activities” (SV, 150). In this capacity, itplays the role of “the greengrocer of the American boy” (SV, 150). But science goesbeyond the functions of the greengrocer by providing the “methods of thinking, thetools and the training for thought” (SV, 150 ff.). Even though this second function“amounts to no more than the means for procuring vegetables” (SV, 151), it is avaluable function nonetheless. Beyond these two functions, there is a third functionof science in providing “clarity” where it is already “presupposed that we ourselvespossess clarity” (SV, 151). In light of the discussion above regarding the question“What is science?” it is Weber’s position that science possesses clarity about its ownidentity and characteristics. Being thus clear about its own origins and definingcharacteristics, science is in a position to provide a degree of clarity to those who posethe question “What shall we do and how shall we live?” properly.4 Science providesa particular type and degree of clarity with respect to practical rationalization,theoretical rationalization, and the significance of meaning. Even though the natureand scope of clarity differs in each of the three cases, science provides a service ineach of the three cases that cannot be availed from any other source. The followingdiscussion takes up each of the three cases separately and discusses the issue ofscience’s clarifying role in greater detail.

3.2 Practical Rationalization and the Value of Science

Any discussion of practical rationalization in the modern period has to take intoaccount the division of practical life across a variety of differentiated, autonomousvalue spheres. As noted in chapter 1, the economic, political, esthetic, and eroticworldly spheres are all defined in terms of their own particular immanent values thatcan be neither subsumed under any meta-value nor reconciled with each other.Weber uses theological language and imagery to describe the fundamental irreconcil-ability of the different value spheres by referring to this disenchanted autonomy ofthe value spheres as disenchanted polytheism or the struggle of the gods. The modernpursuit of material and ideal interests in the modern world takes as its point of departure

the one fundamental fact, that so long a life remains immanent and is interpreted in itsown terms, it knows only of an unceasing struggle of these gods with one another. Orspeaking directly, the ultimately possible attitudes towards life are irreconcilable, andhence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. (SV, 152)


While science cannot bring this struggle of the gods “to a final conclusion,” it canhelp the mortals who are living amidst this struggle to make more informed (andtherefore more responsible) decisions regarding the possible courses of actionthat one can pursue after he/she has decided to serve a particular god. For Weber, avalue (or a god) is an end that can be pursued (worshipped) by a variety of means.While science cannot pass judgment regarding what value (or god) one shouldpursue (worship), it has something uniquely valuable to offer regarding the meansthat are chosen to pursue the end. Weber posits that science can provide a valuableservice in shaping human behavior that is “oriented primarily in terms of the cate-gories ‘end’ and ‘means’ ” because the “question of the appropriateness of the meansfor achieving a given end is undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis” (OSS, 52).

At a given time, with a given value as the desired end, and within particularconditions/limitations, science can offer clarity regarding the course of action onechooses to pursue a particular value. This is due to the fact that there are always anumber of different courses of action (means) that can be chosen to pursue a particu-lar end (value). Weber notes that while each end is “bound to certain indispensablemeans,” making a choice among the means needs to take into account the fact thatthe pursuit of an end brings with it the “inevitability of certain, not directly desiredrepercussions” (MEN, 21). In light of these factors accompanying any chosen courseof action, science can judge the appropriateness of the means chosen and theinevitable undesired consequences that one will have to face as one pursues a desiredend. On the first point, science can help one “estimate the chances of attaining acertain end by certain available means” (OSS, 53). One is free to select any value thathe/she desires at a given time and he/she could also choose from amongst numerousdifferent means to attain the value. But all the means would not be equally efficient:some may be theoretically possible but not practically feasible due to particularcultural circumstances. It may even be the case that “it is absolutely impossible torealize the object of preference, even in a remotely approximate way, because nomeans of carrying it out can be discovered” (MEN, 21). Science is of value insofaras it has the ability to pass judgment on the appropriateness or inappropriateness ofthe means available to attain a desired end. By passing judgment on the meansavailable, science can

indirectly criticize the setting of the end itself as practically meaningful (on the basis ofthe existing historical situation) or as meaningless with reference to existing conditions.(OSS, 53)

In addition to helping determine the possibility of a particular means being morepractical than the others, science can determine

the consequences which the application of the means to be used will produce inaddition to the eventual achievement of the proposed end, as a result of the inter-dependence of all events. (OSS, 53)

Any given course of action brings with it certain costs. It may very well be the casethat, in pursuing a particular end, one is required to expend energies and resources


that he/she might deem better spent in the pursuit of a different end. The secondcontribution of science is the determination of the consequences, or costs, that onewill incur by following a particular course of action. The attainment of the end is thedesired consequence of the action and the costs are the undesirable consequences.Science can help the individual to identify “the probable appearance of undesiredrepercussions which might directly or indirectly render the realization [of the end]undesirable” (MEN, 21). By helping one to calculate the undesired consequences ofa chosen course of action, science can “provide the acting person with the ability toweigh and compare the undesirable as over against the desirable consequences of hisaction” (OSS, 53). In order for a person to act “with a sense of responsibility” (OSS, 53),he/she has to take great pains to avail him/herself of this particularly (and uniquely)valuable service of science. Weber notes that the value of science vis-à-vis the courseof action chosen by individuals to pursue material and ideal interests is the fact thatscience lends clarity to

(1) the indispensable means, and (2) the inevitable repercussions, and (3) the thusconditioned competition of numerous possible evaluations in their practical consequences,are all that an empirical science can demonstrate with the means at its disposal. (MEN, 18)

At the conclusion of the discussion regarding the value of science in terms of deter-mining a particular course of action, Weber touches upon the limitations of sciencein this regard. As noted earlier, for Weber, autonomization of the different valuespheres (i.e., the struggle of the gods) is a defining characteristic of modern times.But an individual cannot live in perpetual conflict and “it is necessary to make achoice” (SV, 152) on how to live his/her life in the midst of this struggle. In theprocess of either making a choice among the different values, or choosing a particu-lar course of action from among a number of possible courses to pursue a particularvalue, the individual cannot mechanically tally the pros and cons and then declarehis/her choice to be “scientific”:

Nothing is ever gained in any scientific sense whatever by “on the one hand” and“on the other,” by seven reasons “for” and six “against” a certain event . . . and byweighing them off against one another in cameralistic fashion or like modern Chineseadministrative memoranda. (MEN, 24)

While scientific analysis can make valuable contributions in terms of clarifying themeans that one can adopt to pursue the chosen value, no amount of scientific calcu-lation can offer an “objective” answer regarding the most appropriate means toemploy to pursue a chosen end. Weber notes that it is sometimes asserted that scien-tific analysis can determine the middle course between two extremes, and that thismiddle course is the most “objective” (and therefore the most scientifically valid)choice. He characterizes this type of thought process as an attempt to “theoreticallydelude itself about the profound seriousness of [the] situation or practically shirk itsconsequences” (OSS, 57). Commenting on the attempt to establish a “scientificallyobjective” middle course, Weber goes on to note:

But this has nothing whatsoever to do with scientific “objectivity.” Scientifically the“middle course” is not truer even by a hair’s breadth, than the most extreme party ideals


of the right or left. Nowhere are the interests of science more poorly served in the longrun than in those situations where one refuses to see uncomfortable facts and the real-ities of life in all their starkness. The Archiv will struggle relentlessly against the severeself-deception which asserts that through the synthesis of several party points of view,or by following a line between them, practical norms of scientific validity can be arrivedat. (OSS, 57 ff.)

The forceful tone of Weber’s writing speaks for itself. In this context, he states thatan attempt to calibrate a “middle way” and label it as being “scientifically objective”is more damaging to the cause of science than the attempts by various circles todemonstrate that the validity of their party dogmas can be demonstrated scientifi-cally. Scientific analysis can make the individual aware of certain facts that will helphim/her make an informed and responsible decision about a particular course ofaction, it cannot, however, make the decision for the actor.

Along with the fact that no particular course of action can be labeled as beingmore “scientifically objective” than an alternative course of action, no amount ofscientific analysis can decide whether or not a particular end is worth pursuing giventhe means that are available. Weber states in categorical terms: “[I]t can never be the taskof an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives forimmediate practical activity can be derived” (OSS, 52). Like the empirical naturalsciences, the empirical social/cultural sciences strive to provide a valid analyticalordering of reality and nothing more. They do not strive any further because they arenot capable of delivering anything more. Consequently, the individual should notlook to science to play a role greater than can be expected of it in order to escapehis/her own responsibility in making a choice:

The social sciences, which are strictly empirical sciences, are the least fitted to presumeto save the individual the difficulty of making a choice, and they therefore should notcreate the impression that they can do so. (MEN, 19)

In short, while a scientific analysis of a particular course of action is possible (andWeber would add indispensable) if we are to act responsibly, a scientific choice of acourse of action is impossible. In the end, the responsibility of the choice belongs tothe individual alone.

For Weber, it is of utmost importance that this limitation of science at the levelof practical rationalization be clearly recognized and appreciated. This is due to thefact that many moderns are unwilling or unable to make the choice themselves andattempt to conscript science for this purpose. Afterward they present their ownpersonal choice as a “scientifically objective” course of action. Such (mis)use ofscience amounts to an abdication of responsibility that is the product of complacencyand/or immaturity on the part of the moderns. Weber describes the predicament ofthe moderns in the midst of the irreconcilable clash of value spheres in moderntimes:

They avoid the choice between “God” and the “Devil” and their own ultimate decisionas to which of the conflicting values will be dominated by the one, and which by theother. The fruit of the tree of knowledge, which is distasteful to the complacent but


which is, nonetheless, inescapable, consists in the insight that every single importantactivity and ultimately life as a whole, if it is not to be permitted to run on as an eventin nature but is instead to be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisionsthrough which the soul—as in Plato—chooses its own fate. (MEN, 18)

While the complacent ardently desire it to be otherwise, the disenchanted moderncondition makes it ever more clear that science cannot choose, only “the soul” of aman/woman is capable of making the choice. Even though many moderns have turnedto science in the hope of escaping from the responsibility of making a choice regarding“ultimate decisions,” by appealing to “scientific objectivity,” Weber argues that this isan act of intellectual cowardice. Those who ask science to make such decisions for themare asking of science far more than it can deliver. Weber notes that in terms of practi-cal rationalization, the value of science rests on the fact that it can make the individual

realize that all action and naturally, according to the circumstances, inaction imply intheir consequences the espousal of certain values—and herewith—what is today sowillingly overlooked—the rejection of certain others. The act of choice itself is his ownresponsibility. (OSS, 53)

At the level of practical rationalization, science provides clarity regarding the optionsthat one has as he/she pursues a particular end. At the same time, science makes itabsolutely clear that the act of choosing belongs to the individual alone. In short,since science is a unique source of knowledge, it is uniquely positioned to help anindividual wanting to act responsibly. Knowledge of facts provided by scientificanalysis helps the individual make a more responsible decision regarding a particularvalue than would be the case if the actor did not take the scientific analysis of factsinto consideration.

3.3 Theoretical Rationalization and the Value of Science

Having looked at the value of science in terms of practical rationalization, thediscussion now turns to the value of science in terms of theoretical rationalization.As noted in chapter 1, the disenchanted world image produces a view of the cosmosin which the cosmos and everything in it is considered to be governed by the laws ofnatural causality. A view of the universe that is understood in terms of its own imma-nent laws of causality cannot be viewed as having any intrinsic meaning. Knowledgeof the laws governing the universe cannot be considered as being synonymous witha meaningful interpretation of the cosmos. While science has something to say aboutthe former, it has to remain silent about the latter. Referring to the “fate of an epochwhich has eaten from the tree of knowledge” (OSS, 57), Weber notes:

It must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the productsof increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us mostforcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just assacred to others as ours are to us. (OSS, 57)

Just as there is a struggle of the gods at the level of practical rationalization, there isa struggle of the gods at the level of “general views of life and the universe,” that is,


world image. As we have seen in terms of practical rationalization, while scienceoffers a limited (but exceedingly and uniquely important) service during thedecision-making process, the choice of the god that one decides to serve is ultimatelythe responsibility of the individual. The choice can be informed by science but underno circumstances can it be called a “scientific” choice. The relationship of science tomatters of theoretical rationalization is similar. While empirical knowledge about theuniverse is all that science can offer us, perpetually “increasing empirical knowledge”can never lead to a coherent and meaningful interpretation of the universe. In spiteof the inability of science to present a coherent and meaningful interpretation of theuniverse, it can offer valuable assistance in terms of lending clarity and cogency tothe decision-making process that culminates in articulating a meaningful under-standing of the universe. At the level of practical rationalization, the primarycontribution of science was determining the feasibility of a chosen end in light of theavailable means, making apparent the undesired consequences that inevitably accom-pany the pursuit of the chosen end and laying bare the ultimate value that is beingserved in the pursuit of the chosen end. At the level of theoretical rationalization, theprimary contribution of science is providing clarity regarding the internal logicalconsistency of the chosen world image and laying bare the inevitably present butusually hidden presuppositions and tensions in the world image.

The value of science at the level of theoretical rationalization is of direct practicalimport because commitment to a particular world image inevitably determines theparameters within which decisions about a course of action are made. Weber notesthat one observes a great deal of disagreement in a society regarding matters of socialpolicy (or other collective pursuits). He posits that many of the disagreementsregarding the means to be used to pursue a given end are usually rooted in the factthat it is presupposed that both parties have come to an agreement upon the ends (orultimate value). But very often this is not the case because the ends themselves areunderstood in terms of differing world-images that are implicitly informing theconflicting positions taken by the parties in the debate. Speaking of the disagreementon a particular issue of social policy, he notes: “[T]he conflict occurs not merely, aswe are too easily inclined to believe today, between ‘class interests’ but betweengeneral views of life and the universe as well” (OSS, 56). For Weber, the explicitdisagreements regarding matters of practical rationalization are often the reflectionof implicit disagreements regarding matters of theoretical rationalization. During thecourse of the debate, it is the “practical” matters and differences that are almostalways aired, with the “theoretical” assumptions going largely unstated. An intelli-gent discussion as well as an adequate resolution of debates concerning “practical”matters require that the “theoretical” assumptions also be addressed. Scientificinquiry can offer a unique and valuable service in this regard also.

Weber notes that investigating matters related to theoretical rationalizationrequires the use of more generalized and therefore more abstract concepts and“experiments” than the investigation of practical behavior:

One thing is certain under all circumstances, namely, the more “general” the probleminvolved, i.e., in this case, the broader its cultural significance, the less subject it is to asingle unambiguous answer on the basis of the data of empirical sciences and the


greater the role played by value-ideas (Wertideen) and the ultimate and highest personalaxioms of belief. (OSS, 56)

Because the cultural significance of the world image is broader than that of practicalbehavior, the role of value-ideas (Wertideen) is greater in its construction. The degreeof abstraction in expressing and judging a world image is greater than that of express-ing and judging a course of action. Even though the level of analysis is more generaland abstract, science does have the capacity to evaluate the most general of all valuejudgments, the construction of a world image. Even though it is more abstract(and therefore a more “difficult” exercise), its importance cannot be discountedbecause the choice of practical ends is related to ultimate values in the broadest senseof the term, which are (consciously or unconsciously) expressed in a world image.Among the functions that a scientific evaluation of value judgments can play is this:

The elaboration and explication of the ultimate, internally “consistent” value-axioms,from which the divergent attitudes are derived . . . This procedure is essentially anoperation which begins with concrete particular evaluations and analyzes theirmeanings and then moves to the more general level of irreducible evaluations. It doesnot use the techniques of an empirical discipline and it produces no new knowledge offacts. Its “validity” is similar to that of logic. (MEN, 20)

A world image is the systematic presentation of value-axioms that present “a generalview of life and the universe as well.” While the evaluation of a world image (orvalue-axioms) cannot be considered an “empirical” undertaking, it utilizes empiricaldata to pass judgments “similar to that of logic” on the validity to proposed worldimage. At this level, the clarity offered by scientific analysis of the world image judgesthe internal logical consistency of the world image.

In undertaking a critical evaluation of the value-axioms on which a world imageis constructed, science takes a skeptical stance toward the fundamental presupposi-tions that the proponents of the world image take for granted. In adopting this criticalstance, science offers an invaluable service by providing a perspective on the matterthat cannot be had otherwise. Weber notes that “[f ]undamental doubt is the fatherof knowledge” and such doubt is not possible without standing “outside the conven-tions and presuppositions” of the perspective from which knowledge claims are beingmade (MEN, 7). Standing outside the conventions lays bare the problems andtensions that escape the notice of those who are the advocates of a given knowledgeclaim and have taken the conventions/presuppositions as being self-evident. Weberargues that it is the fundamental and basic function of science to investigate all thatis usually taken for granted: “The specific function of science, it seems to me, is . . .to ask questions about these things which convention makes self-evident” (MEN, 13).This “specific function” of science is directly related to the “primary task” of theteacher of science:

The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize “inconvenient”facts—I mean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions. And for every partyopinion there are facts that are extremely inconvenient, for my own opinion no less thanfor others. I believe the teacher accomplishes more than a mere intellectual task if hecompels his audience to accustom itself to the existence of such facts. (SV, 147)


By asking questions about those things that convention makes self-evident andbringing “inconvenient” facts to the surface, science forces the advocates of aknowledge claim/world image to either modify or otherwise better elaborate their posi-tions. Such an exercise is of great value for both the proponents and their opponents.For the proponent it leads to greater self-clarification and better self-understanding.For the opponents it leads to a better understanding of the differences with the otherparty. In the former case, the heightened self-understanding contributes to animproved ethic of responsibility and in the latter case, a better understanding of thedifferences leads to a more productive and fruitful conversation among the partiesinvolved:

The real significance of a discussion of evaluations lies in its contribution to theunderstanding of what one’s opponent—or one’s self—really means—i.e., in under-standing the evaluations which really and not merely allegedly separate the discussantsand consequently in enabling one to take up a position with reference to this value.(MEN, 14)

While the task of analyzing a world image is more abstract than the task of analyz-ing a course of action, science does have the ability to analyze the “value-ideas” and“axioms of belief ” that go into making up a world image. Using the conceptual toolsat its disposal, science has the ability to judge whether or not a given world image isinternally consistent. Furthermore, if a particular world image is judged to be inter-nally inconsistent, science can suggest the modifications that will have to be made inorder to make it consistent. On a macro level, a particular world image attempts torespond to at least one, and usually all of the three questions below:

(a) does a concrete event occur thus and so or otherwise, or (b) why do the concrete eventsin question occur thus and so and not otherwise, or (c) does a given event ordinarily succeedanother one according to a certain law and with what degree of probability. (MEN, 19)

A perfectly consistent world image is one that can answer all of these three issues andwithstand external criticism regarding the consistency of its claims at the same time.In judging the consistency of a given world image, science not only renders a valu-able service to both the proponents and opponents of the image, but it also performsa function that can be demanded of it:

It can be shown strictly “scientifically” that this conception of [a given] ideal is the onlyinternally consistent one and cannot be refuted by external “facts.” I think that a serviceis thereby rendered to the proponents as well as the opponents [of the ideal]—onewhich they can rightly demand of science. (MEN, 24)

In light of the discussion on theodicy in the previous chapter, this particular func-tion of science presents itself as a means of judging the validity of the claims of aparticular world image to have bridged the gap between the “what is” and “whatought to be.” An internally consistent ideal that cannot be refuted by external factsis one that can fully account for the empirical “what is” in terms of the ideal of “whatought to be.” In judging the internal consistency of a particular world image,


the investigator has to take an additional step of abstraction from that required tojudge the feasibility of a proposed program of action. Even though no world imagecan claim the status of being “scientifically objective,” science does have the ability tojudge the internal consistency of a particular world image—leaving it entirely up to theindividual to decide whether or not to accept a particular world image as one’s own.

3.4 Meaning and Knowledge: Bridging the Fact/Value Dichotomy

At the level of practical rationalization, science can judge the feasibility and theundesired consequences related to a given course of action. At the level of theoreti-cal rationalization, science can judge the internal consistency of the value-axioms onwhich a given view of the universe is based. In both cases, the value of science is theprovision of clarity regarding one’s actions and beliefs—a type of clarity that cannotbe had from any other source. While science has a specific value in terms of practi-cal rationalization and a related but different value in terms of theoretical rationali-zation, the two values taken together produce a third value that is related to the othertwo but is unique in its own terms. Stated in formal terms, this value is

The deduction of “implications” (for those accepting certain value-judgements) whichfollow from certain irreducible value-axioms, when the practical evaluation of factualsituations is based on these axioms alone. This deduction depends on one hand, onlogic, and on the other, on empirical observation for the completest possible casuisticanalyses of all such empirical situations as are in principle subject to practicalevaluation. (MEN, 20)

Stated in somewhat less formal terms, the clarity that science provides into one’sactions and world image leads to a better understanding of the meaning (i.e., “thededuction of ‘implications’ ”) that the course of action has for the actor who acts onthe basis of “certain value-judgments.” Science provides the tools of “empirical obser-vation” that can evaluate the feasibility of a proposed course of action. At the sametime, science provides the tool of “logic” that can evaluate the system of “irreduciblevalue-axioms” (the world image) that determines the parameters within whichthe course of action is to be carried out. By providing the tools that allow one to gainbetter clarity regarding one’s actions and one’s view of the world, science makes itpossible for the individual to gain a better understanding and give a more coherentaccount of the meaning of his/her own action and his/her own image of the world.

Science can offer nothing for the moderns in terms of a direct answer to thequestion “What shall we do and how shall we live?” For Tolstoy, the one who posedthis question, and for Weber, the one who used it as the axis around which his mostwell-known public lecture revolved, this is “the only question important for us.”Weber states in explicit terms that science has nothing to say about “truly ‘ultimate’problems” and that “the limits of science” have been reached at the point when suchproblems arise (SV, 151). The resolution of these ultimate problems ultimately restsupon the choices/decisions that human beings make, and the choices/decisions madeto resolve these problems cannot be labeled as “scientific” by any stretch of theimagination. After talking of the limits of science regarding “ultimate problems,”Weber goes on to summarize the value of science regarding the thought process that


goes into the attempt to resolve these problems. From a scientific point of view, thefollowing issues can be resolved in principle:

In terms of its meaning, such and such a practical stance can be derived with internalconsistency, and hence integrity, from this or that ultimate weltanschaulishe position.Perhaps it can only be derived from one such fundamental position, or maybe fromseveral, but it cannot be derived from these or those other positions. Figurativelyspeaking, you serve this god or you offend the other god when you decide to adhere tothis position. And if you remain faithful to yourself, you will necessarily come to certainfinal conclusions that subjectively make sense. This much, in principle at least, can beaccomplished. (SV, 151)

On the one hand, science cannot judge the value of a particular world image, aspecific course of action, or the meaning attached to either of the two. But on theother hand, it can judge the internal consistency of the relationship that is positedbetween a particular course of action and a particular world image, and by extensionjudge the validity of the meaning that is attached to the chosen world image and/orcourse of action. If scientific inquiry and teaching is done in a competent and consis-tent manner, then science “can force the individual, or at least . . . help him, to givean account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct” (SV, 152). The value of science,with respect to meaning, is such that it can force (or assist) the individual to give anaccount of the ultimate meaning of his/her own conduct and values in a unique formthat makes the value claims of the proponent amenable to rational, scientific analysis,and criticism. This is a function that only science can play.

For Weber, the relationship between science and meaning is not merely the factthat science is a means of getting unique insight into meaning. Meaning in turnoffers something unique to science, something that science cannot get from anyother source. From Weber’s perspective, the cultural sciences as such would not evenbe possible without meaning. This is obvious in light of Weber’s very definition of“culture.” He notes: “ ‘Culture’ is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of theworld process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance”(OSS, 81). A given cultural phenomenon, at a given time in history cannot beunderstood and/or studied apart from the manner in which human beings living inthat culture “confer meaning and significance” to the finite segment of reality,thereby giving rise to observable actions, institutions, and rationalized expressions ofideas. For its part, the study of phenomena generated by meaning is not possiblewithout an investigator who finds the scientific study of these phenomena to bemeaningful. Meaning is the origin (or root) of both the empirical reality studied bythe investigator and the reason initiating the scientific study of empirical reality.Weber describes the relationship between meaning and cultural phenomena andmeaning and the scientific investigation of such phenomena in these words:

The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding acertain culture or any “culture” in general to be valuable but rather in the fact that weare cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitudetowards the world and to lend it significance. Whatever this significance may be, it willlead us to judge certain phenomena of human existence in its light and to respond tothem as being (positively or negatively) meaningful. Whatever may be the content of


this attitude—these phenomena have cultural significance for us and on this signifi-cance alone rests its scientific interest. (OSS, 81)

For Weber, the manner in which cultural beings confer meaning on the world andthe reasons that cultural beings undertake an investigation of meaning was/is not theresult of any universal laws or some immutable human nature. It is only because of,and to the degree that, humans confer meaning and significance on a finite segmentof empirical reality that the study of this reality is scientifically possible.

Now we are in a position to directly answer the question, “What is the value ofscience?” in an era of disenchanted meaninglessness. The answer is that science givesunique insight into and lends unique clarity to issues related to meaning (Sinn).Given the fact that meaning is simultaneously the source of the empirical reality thatthe scientist investigates and also the reason that the scientist undertakes the investi-gation, we see that Weber’s insights into the methodology of the social sciencesbridge the fact/value dichotomy. If we identify “meaning” as the answer to the ques-tion, “What does science study?” then we can describe the dynamics during thecourse of a scientific investigation in the following words.

From the perspective of the scientist, meaning is a fact in empirical reality thathe/she has selected for the purpose of scientific investigation. At the same time, fromthe perspective of the actor, meaning is a value that he/she has conferred on theworld, giving rise to the empirical reality that the scientist is investigating. But thisis only one-half of the picture. While meaning is a fact in the world that is beinginvestigated by the scientist, the reason he/she is investigating this particular fact andnot some other is because its scientific explication will help the scientist get greaterinsight and clarity into a particular value that he/she holds dear. Similarly, whilemeaning is a value that the actor has conferred on the world, it is simultaneously afact that helps him/her make sense of the chaotic surroundings. Consequently,meaning (Sinn) cannot be called a “fact” or a “value” in any absolute sense. Thatwhich makes human culture possible and all human cultural activities possible—thecultural activity of scientific investigation no less than any other cultural activity—issimultaneously a fact and a value.5

As noted in the concluding section of chapter 1, Wolin’s characterization of themodern predicament in light of Weber’s analysis may very well be on the mark:

Meaninglessness was no longer an aesthetic experience of the few, but a contagion.Having undermined religious, moral and political beliefs, the forces of rationalizationhad finally exposed the meaning of meaninglessness to be power without right.(Wolin, 1981, 422)

But this characterization cannot be considered in isolation from the centrality ofmeaning in Weber’s methodology of the social/cultural sciences. The view of ration-alization as having “exposed the meaning of meaninglessness to be power withoutright” as being the terminating point of Weber’s sociology has to be balanced by anunderstanding of his rationalization of the methodology of the social sciences thatleads to a sharpened awareness of the significance of meaning. The progressiverationalization of the methodology of the natural sciences followed by the culturalsciences has established not only the logical efficacy of the concept of meaning, but


also its categorical indispensability. In other words, the increasing self-awarenessengendered by a critical reflection on the methodology that underpins scientificinquiry reveals that meaning is at the very center of the inquiry. Weber’s methodol-ogy of the social/cultural sciences posits the categorical indispensability of that whichWeber’s historical sociology demonstrates to have become superfluous, that is, mean-ing (Sinn). While Weber himself never stated the matter as such, in the context ofthe present discussion, it can be asserted that the penultimate value of science in anage of disenchanted meaninglessness is the discovery that meaning is not only anempirical fact in human culture, but also a value that makes all cultural activity(including scientific inquiry) possible.6

The manner in which Weber responds to the questions “What is the value ofscience?” and “What does science study?” makes it clear that his valuation anddefinition of science are very different from the Enlightenment valuation and defi-nition. Kaye describes Weber’s break from the Enlightenment tradition on theseissues in these words:

Weber’s project is . . . to explore the origins and manifestations of Western rationalityand, above all, to confront the internal and external tensions increasingly experiencedin our rationalized and disenchanted culture in order to preserve the possibility ofliving a life truly worthy of man: a life of conscious, responsible devotion to, andpreservation of “the spiritual and moral excellence of humanity.” It is with meaning,not order that Weber is ultimately concerned. (Kaye, 1992, 47)

Whereas Enlightenment thought valued scientific inquiry for its ability to lead to adiscovery of the laws of a preexisting rational order, Weber’s methodology valuesscience for its ability to help the investigator understand the meaning of particularcultural phenomena. Chowers offers a more detailed discussion regarding Weber’sconcern with meaning, and shows this concern to be multidimensional. Accordingto Chowers, Weber’s anthropology can be summed up in the following words:“human beings have the internal necessity, as well as the capacity, to interpret their livesand the cosmos as a whole in a meaningful way” (Chowers, 1995, 127). The universalimpetus toward rationalization, in the sense of seeking internal logical consistency ofboth ideas and action (RRW, 324), evidences that human beings have a need for andthe ability to interpret themselves and their world in a meaningful way. Chowersargues that Weber’s sociology of religion is based on the presupposition that humanbeings have a need for a meaningful interpretation of the world:

[U]nderlying Weber’s project, particularly in his sociology of religion, are some essen-tialist convictions about human beings, the most important of which is a vision ofhumans as homo-hermeneut, beings that require a meaningful existence. (Chowers,1995, 124)

Even though one may take issue with Chowers regarding the characterization of thisbeing an “essentialist conviction” of Weber’s, the fact that Weber sees the humanbeings as “homo-hermeneut, beings that require a meaningful existence” can be fullysubstantiated with reference to Weber’s work. While Weber’s anthropology shows the


human being to be a homo-hermeneut, Weber’s analysis of modern culture shows agrave deficit of meaning in the modern world:

The crisis of modern culture is multi-faceted, but is primarily the result of the impov-erishment of the sources of meaning, which came about with the disenchantment andrationalization of the world. (Chowers, 1995, 130)

It is in light of these observations by Chowers of the human need for meaning andthe absence of meaning in modern culture that the claim that “it is with meaning,not order, that Weber is ultimately concerned” (Kaye, 1992, 47) presents itself withfull force.

Weber’s understanding of science shows scientific inquiry to be composed of avariety of elements, including but not limited to observation of empirical reality bymeans of abstract constructs and general laws. But one cannot conduct scientificinquiry with the aid of these elements alone. A study of empirical reality from theperspective of general laws and abstract concepts might lead to a naturalistic under-standing of order in the universe, but nothing more. In the end, the significance ofmeaning must be brought into play for meaningful scientific inquiry—meaning onthe part of the investigator explaining why he/she is investigating the meaningconferred by this particular actor in this particular activity/institution and not someother. Given the fact that this cultural scientific inquiry is being carried out in adisenchanted, meaningless cultural setting creates a paradox for the culturalscientist—a paradox that is symptomatic of a larger malaise:

The cultural scientist exemplifies the modern paradox of meaning: an investigator ofthe disenchantment of the world and of the objectification and rationalization of socialorganizations, he is nevertheless the prototype of the Occidental self because of hisheightened quest for meaning. By studying how meaning flees from the world, both inthe natural and social realms, Weber grappled with what he thought was the mostcrucial question of his age, while at the same time inquiring into the foundations andprospects of his own vocation. (Chowers, 1995, 137)

In studying the natural and cultural world around him, Weber detailed the mannerin which meaning had been expunged from the modern world by rationalized inves-tigation. By investigating the foundations and prospects of his own vocation, in theform of critical analysis/explication of the methodology of the social sciences, Weberdiscovered/detailed the manner in which meaning lies at the very heart of scientificinquiry. Whereas the modern rationalized means of political organization, economicactivity, and scientific investigation cause meaning to die at the very roots (seechapter 1), meaning is the fons vitae from which modern science (as understood andpracticed by Weber) receives its very sustenance.

The fact that Weber’s understanding of science was centrally concerned with thesignificance of meaning rather than the study of order, thereby breaking with theestablished understanding of science and social science, was recognized by some ofhis contemporaries writing more than six decades before Kaye and Chowers.Landshut notes that Weber’s “scientific work essentially falls into two parts: a seriesof epistemological studies dealing with the methods of the social sciences, and a


series of sociological and historical studies” (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 101). On bothaccounts, the “inner tendency” of the “scientific work springs from a living questionwithin man himself as being in pursuit of understanding . . .” (Landshut, 1989[1930], 110). By tracing scientific inquiry to roots in the “living question withinman himself ” Weber

breaks with the traditional motive of the social sciences, their explicit or implicitconcern with salus publica, [although] scientific understanding remains in its own wayorganically connected with the decisive human question in his work. Max Weberreturns the secret and aporia of life the more decisively to the sphere of personalexistence . . . . (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 110)

The pursuit of understanding on the part of the investigator springs from the depthsof the investigator’s own personal experience (or “soul”) that makes such a pursuitmeaningful. Something in the scientist’s soul is disturbed by the fact that somethingin the surrounding culture is challenging or undermining the scientist’s own under-standing of “decisive human question[s].” The goal of the investigation itself leadsthe investigator to probe the inner world of an actor and attempt to understand themanner in which the actor meaningfully understood the world and meaningfullyacted in the world. But this is not the end of the investigation. Equipped with thisunderstanding of the “other,” the scientist turns his/her gaze inward to gain a betterunderstanding of his/her own inner world. In short, the scientist undertakes an inves-tigation of the way individuals in a different cultural setting understood/conferredmeaning in/on the world, so that the investigator can gain greater insight and clar-ity into an understanding of meaning in his/her own cultural condition.

Not unlike Landshut’s evaluation, Rickert also sees Weber blazing a new trail inhis writings on the methodology of the social sciences. Rickert notes that in theoryWeber argued for the strict separation of subjective contemplation and the pursuitof objective knowledge. All the while that Weber was arguing for such a separation,his own practice of science demonstrated that an integration of the two was indeedpossible. The same Weber who was engaged in intense contemplation about themeaning and significance of the cultural sciences as a methodologist of the socialsciences was also engaged in specialized research of specialized subjects as a socialscientist in the pursuit of specialized knowledge. Rickert sums up Weber’s achieve-ment in these words:

Weber did not wish to be a philosopher, and as a “specialist” he was indeed not one.Nevertheless, quite apart from his teachings on methodology, he is of great importanceto philosophy. His person with its double talent represents the most interesting prob-lem for philosophy in its pursuit of unity. He did not solve the problem, but anyonewho considers him can learn that the ancient question of the relation of the vitacontemplativa to the vita activa is also the most modern question imaginable. (Rickert,1989 [1926], 85 ff.)

Rickert notes that Weber the scientist and methodologist is perfectly justified in stat-ing that science cannot yield truth (or vision of the Platonic sun). But by acknowl-edging that science can provide a degree and type of clarity about truth claims that


cannot be had from any other source, “Weber himself is closer to what he seems tobe opposing than he was aware” (Rickert, 1989 [1926], 83) regarding the ability ofscientific analysis of empirical fact to provide insight into issues of meaning andsignificance. In other words, while Weber firmly asserts that there is a gap betweenfact and value from a scientific perspective because science cannot pass a judgmenton the meaningfulness of a value claim, Weber’s scientific methodology establishes arelationship between fact and value on two different accounts. First, an understand-ing of value commitments (whether practical or theoretical) on the part of the actorexpress themselves in the form of empirical facts. At this level, science has the poten-tial to provide the actor with a degree of clarity regarding his/her value commitmentsthat cannot be had from any other source. Second, in carrying out cultural scientificanalysis, the investigator takes meaning and significance to be a fact that is studied,but from the perspective of his/her own particular value position that has made thescientific/factual inquiry meaningful. At this level, the investigator gains a betterunderstanding of his/her own value commitments as a result of the scientific/factualinquiry into meaning invested in particular cultural phenomena by the actors.

By putting forth the argument that only a hairline separates faith from science,and supporting this assertion by a careful exposition of the methodology of the socialsciences, Weber breaks the Enlightenment tradition that saw an unbridgeable dividebetween faith and science. In presenting a self-conscious and self-critical account ofwhat is at the center of social/cultural scientific inquiry, Weber is led to the conclu-sion that in the end it is meaning (Sinn). In reaching this conclusion, Weber bridgesthe fact/value dichotomy at both the methodological and practical levels. The pres-ent chapter began by posing the question, “What is the value of science?” in an ageof disenchanted meaninglessness. This is a question that Weber posed himself. ForWeber, science can indeed make a meaningful contribution to the total life ofhumanity. Science’s contribution does not lie in the fact that it can offer a directanswer to the only question that really matters to human beings/humanity, “Whatshall we do and how shall we live?” because science cannot give a direct answer toany question about meaning and value. The contribution of science, or its vocationin a disenchanted era, is that it can serve as a unique means of accessing knowledgeabout the importance and possibility of meaning in an era of disenchanted mean-inglessness. The vocation of science in the era of disenchanted meaningless is not tofurnish the moderns with meaning but to make them conscious of the indispens-ability of meaning in human life and culture. (This point is discussed in greater detailin chapter 5.) Additionally, science can provide the moderns with knowledge ofempirical facts that lends clarity to their understanding and discussion of meaning.The discussion regarding the relationship between fact and value can be summarizedas such:

(a) At the level of practical rationalization, scientific knowledge can provideclarity regarding the range of options available for a course of action, given aparticular goal/value. Additionally, scientific knowledge can provide clarityregarding the feasibility, costs, and possible unintended consequences of thechosen course of action undertaken to achieve a particular goal/value.


(b) At the level of theoretical rationalization, scientific knowledge can provideclarity regarding the internal, logical consistency of a particular world imageand logical validity of claims made with reference to a particular worldview.Additionally, scientific knowledge can provide clarity regarding the possibilityof attaining particular values within the framework of a particular world image.

(c) In terms of the significance of meaning, the methodology of the socialsciences shows meaning to be categorically indispensable in order for the verypossibility of real scientific inquiry.

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Weber’s work bridges the fact/valuedichotomy at both the methodological and the practical levels. It is by bridgingthis dichotomy that the study of meaning (Sinn) is made possible and with it the verydefinition of culture and the very possibility of the cultural sciences. This is a notableachievement in itself, but it is only a part of the picture. The fact that meaning canbe viewed as both a fact and a value in Weber’s methodology suggests that Weber ischallenging the notion that an unbridgeable divide separates subject from object.A look at the manner in which Weber formulates his position on how “objectivelyvalid” scientific knowledge is attained in the cultural sciences reveals that he doesindeed bridge the subject/object dichotomy. In other words, Weber’s methodologybridges the fact/value dichotomy in response to the question: “What do the culturalsciences study?” His methodology also bridges the subject/object dichotomy inresponse to the question: “How do the cultural sciences arrive at an ‘objectively valid’account of meaning?” The following chapter focuses on this question.



CHAPTER 4

THE CONSTITUTIVE COMPONENTS OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY:BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY

Weber notes that the cultural sciences investigate and provide “knowledge of realitywith respect to its cultural significance” (OSS, 75). In other words, meaning (Sinn)is the “what?” that the cultural sciences study. But keeping in mind that meaningcannot be characterized as either a “fact” or a “value” in some absolutely “objective”sense, the question emerges regarding the “objective” character of knowledgeprovided by the scientific investigation of meaningful cultural phenomena. Weberdescribes the presupposition implicit in this question in these terms:

When we distinguished in principle between “value-judgment” and “empirical knowl-edge,” we presupposed the existence of an unconditional valid type of knowledge in thesocial sciences, i.e., the analytical order of empirical social reality. (OSS, 63)

Even though meaning (Sinn) is simultaneously a fact and a value, Weber posits thata distinction can be drawn between the two different aspects and that scientificinquiry requires an “objective” distinction between the two. This claim is itself basedon the presupposition that there exists an “unconditional valid type” of knowledgeby means of which this distinction can be drawn. Speaking of this presupposition,Weber notes: “This presupposition now becomes our problem in the sense that wemust discuss the meaning of objectively ‘valid’ truth in the social sciences” (OSS, 63).In other words, how do we arrive at objectively valid scientific knowledge (or“truth”)? The manner in which Weber investigates and eventually resolves thisquestion parallels and complements the manner in which he investigates and resolvesthe question: What does scientific inquiry investigate?

The significance of Weber’s work in this regard is best illustrated by juxtaposing hisposition with other positions on the same issue. In Weber’s immediate intellectualmilieu there were two major schools of thought locked in a heated debate on thequestion of “How do we arrive at objectively valid scientific knowledge?” Proponents ofthe historicist method argued that scientific truth expressed itself in the form of objec-tive scientific laws that governed (and therefore explained) the development of cultureand the behavior of cultural beings. For this school, the goal of all scientific inquiry wasto offer a causal explanation of observed cultural phenomena in the form of objectivelaws. From this perspective, valid scientific knowledge became such only if it was free

of any and all subjective elements. In contrast, proponents of the Verstehen methodargued that scientifically valid truth expressed itself in the form of normative culturalvalues that governed (and therefore explained) the development of human culture sincethe beginning of time. For this school, the goal of all scientific inquiry was to offer aninterpretive understanding of cultural phenomena by means of subjective empathy.From this perspective, valid scientific knowledge became such only if it was free of anyand all objective elements. Subsequent history called the debate between these twoschools on this particular issue the Methodenstreit (the battle of the methods). Weber’sown exposition of a methodology that arrives at “scientific truth” emerged in the midstof this debate. In contrast to both positions, Weber argued that scientifically valid truthis expressed in the form of an objectively possible hypothesis—the validity of whichcan be established only after it is subject to further scientific analysis. From Weber’sperspective, the goal of all scientific inquiry is to offer imputations about empiricalphenomena by means of causal interpretation of such phenomena in a form that makesthese imputations amenable to validation (or invalidation) by future empirical experi-ence. For Weber, all objectively valid knowledge (i.e., scientific truth) is arrived at withthe aid of certain subjective and objective elements, but at the same time, it must befree of other types of subjective and objective elements. In identifying imputation asthe penultimate manifestation of scientific knowledge, Weber explicitly bridges thesubject/object dichotomy, complementing the bridging of the fact/value dichotomy byidentifying Sinn as being the penultimate object of social scientific inquiry. The discus-sion of Sinn in Weber’s methodology contains implicit pointers that moves are beingmade toward overcoming the subject/object dichotomy—it is in the form of the impu-tation that the dichotomy is explicitly bridged. The present chapter follows the point-ers already discussed in the previous chapter and details the manner in which Weber’sovercoming of the fact/value dichotomy is complemented by his overcoming of thesubject/object dichotomy. Because of the contextual relevance of the Methodenstreit tothe emergence of Weber’s position, the present chapter begins by discussing some ofthe major themes and issues in the debate. Then it goes on to describe Weber’s critique(and selective appropriation) of the methodologies of the historicist method and theVerstehen method. This exposition of the “how?” of scientific inquiry complementsWeber’s exposition of the “what?” of scientific inquiry and provides further evidence tosubstantiate Weber’s observation that only a “hair-line . . . separates science from faith.”

4.1 The Methodenstreit: The Issues and Parties

In the most general terms, the “battle of the methods” revolved around the question:“Can a discipline whose methods illuminate the physical and biological world beapplied to the sphere of human action?” (Diggins, 1996, 114). The Methodenstreitwas reflective of an effort to establish the epistemological foundations of the culturalsciences and this effort took place in the midst of a neo-Kantian reaction to Hegelianmetaphysics in the last decades of the nineteenth century in Germany:

Weber’s neo-Kantian contemporaries, reacting to a lofty Hegelian metaphysics thatmade no effort to assimilate natural science, sought to find ways to use philosophy inorder to have access to truths about history, society, and culture . . . This “battle”


reflected an intense German will to know and a deep desire to understand what it isone understands when something is said to be understood. (Diggins, 1996, 114)

While the battle itself was about “science,” it was concerned with fundamentalphilosophical issues. The question “what is it that one understands when somethingis said to be understood?” and the question of “how does one arrive at even making aclaim of having understood something?” are philosophical questions. Consequently, adiscussion of philosophical issues played a critical role in the manner in which theMethodenstreit unfolded. For his part, Weber was a leading participant in the method-ological and philosophical debates raging during his time. Weber began to add hisvoice to the debate in 1903 with the publication of his first methodological worktitled “Roscher’s ‘Historical Method.’ ” His contributions to the debate continueduntil the last years of his life with the publication of “The Meaning of ‘EthicalNeutrality’ in Sociology and Economics” in 1917. Oakes notes that theMethodenstreit “took place in German academic social science during the two decadesbefore WWI” and that it was during this time period that the crisis regarding “thefoundation of the sociocultural sciences” reached its peak (RK, 17). Consequently,Weber’s contributions spanned the most intense and critical period of the debate andthese contributions were made during his most productive and mature years ofscholarly output.

The battle of the methods had two distinct but related aspects because of the twodifferent but related tasks facing the practitioners of the social and cultural sciences.On the one hand they had to establish the scientific status of social/cultural sciencesby demonstrating that there was some fundamental type of similarity between thesocial/cultural sciences and the natural/physical sciences. On the other hand theyhad to establish the independent identity of the social/cultural sciences from thenatural/physical sciences by demonstrating that there was something fundamentallyunique about the former that set them apart from the latter. In other words, thefounding fathers of the modern social/cultural sciences in the late nineteenth centuryhad to “establish both the scientific status and the methodological autonomy of thesociocultural disciplines” (Ciaffa, 1998, 41). There was no doubt among the social/cultural scientists that these disciplines aimed for (and actually attained) objectivelyvalid knowledge (or scientific truth) just like the natural/physical sciences. But at thesame time, there was a general sense among some of the leading cultural/social scien-tists that these particular disciplines either offered a unique type of knowledge, orarrived at it in a unique way that set the social/cultural sciences apart fromnatural/physical sciences. In retrospect, the Methodenstreit can be seen as an effort onthe part of a group of social/cultural scientists to articulate this vague, general sensewith greater clarity and precision.

Prior to Weber’s entry into the discussion, two polarized positions characterizedthe methodological self-understanding of the cultural sciences.1 Truzzi has used theterms “positivistic-naturalistic” and “humanistic-culturalistic” to describe the twopositions (Truzzi, 1974, 2). Generally speaking, the former position was that of thehistoricist method and posited that at the very basic methodological level there wasno difference between the sociocultural sciences and the natural sciences. The factthat there was no difference at the methodological level was directly related to the

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 91

fact that there is no fundamental difference between facts in the natural world andfacts in the cultural world:

The same sorts of reasoning, method, and explanatory role were seen to characterize thesocial and the natural sciences. Social facts, like physical facts, were said to be equallyreal, equally empirical, and equally measurable, and it was believed that their study wouldultimately generate the same kind of law-like propositions and explanatory coveragebelieved to be present in the natural sciences. (Truzzi, 1974, 1)

From the positivistic-naturalistic position, events in the domain of human culturecould be analyzed and explained from the perspective of abstract, universal laws andit was the goal of cultural scientific inquiry to discover these causal laws and toexplain cultural events in terms of these laws. In sum, this position was premised ontwo presuppositions: (a) that there was no fundamental difference between naturalphenomena and cultural phenomena and (b) the methodological approach andconceptual tools used to analyze the cultural phenomena could/should have the same“objective” character as those used to analyze natural/physical phenomena. In bothcases, “objective” abstract, universal laws were accorded explanatory and causal valuein the scientific understanding of the phenomena under consideration.

Some of the leading historians and economists of Weber’s day were notable advo-cates of the positivistic-naturalistic position. Even if they did not state the matter insuch explicit terms, advocates of this position argued that “the methods of thenatural sciences, especially the search for empirical regularities, should be extendedto the social and cultural studies as well” (Ringer, 1997, 20). A study of these empir-ical regularities would lead to the discovery of laws governing human behavior, soci-ety, and culture. This in turn would make possible a causal explanation of all theobjects of cultural scientific inquiry in terms of these laws. It is not difficult to seehow this position could come to not only accord explanatory value to abstract,universal laws, but also attribute causality to these laws—as was the case in the natu-ral and physical sciences. Knies, a leading economist and historian of economics, wasa major advocate of this position whom Weber directly engaged in theMethodenstreit. Knies and the other advocates of this position “believed that rela-tionship between [cultural] events could only be based upon the natural necessity ofdeterministic laws” (Ringer, 1997, 25).

In contrast to the objectivist position, the humanistic-culturalistic camp positedthat there was a fundamental, basic difference between natural phenomena andcultural phenomena. Social and cultural phenomena are

meaningful forms of activity not only to the scientist–observer but to thesubjects–actors themselves; and these meaningful elements in action . . . accountgreatly for the variations one observes in [human] behavior. (Truzzi, 1974, 1)

Since the subject matter of the cultural sciences—cultural phenomena—carry anirreducible element of meaningfulness for both the actor and the observer, the ulti-mate goal of the cultural sciences is to understand and interpret this meaningfulness.It is the presence of the element of meaningfulness that distinguishes the culturalrealm from the natural realm. Because there is something in cultural phenomena that


is absent in natural phenomena (i.e., meaning), the study of cultural phenomenarequires the utilization of an approach/tool for which there is no need in the naturalsciences. For the early proponents of the humanistic-culturalistic camp, understand-ing and interpretation of meaning were to be achieved “not through the methods ofthe natural sciences but only by means of empathetic identification with the valuesand meanings examined in the minds of the social actors” (Truzzi, 174, 9). Theproponents of this position posited that the “values and meanings . . . in the mindsof the actors” could be scientifically understood and interpreted by the subjectiveempathetic feelings of the investigator. It was by means of his/her subjective empa-thetic feelings that the investigator was able to understand and interpret the mean-ing and significance that the cultural event/institution under study had for the actorand offer a scientifically “objective” account of this meaning.

In Weber’s immediate intellectual milieu, Dilthey’s work was among the mostinfluential and widely recognized example of the humanistic-culturalistic position.His position was based on a clear and unambiguous distinction between Natur(nature) and Geist (spirit). For Dilthey, the domain of Geist, not Natur, was theproper subject of inquiry for the cultural scientist seeking to understand and inter-pret human behavior/institutions:

While human beings as psychophysical or biological entities are part of nature, Diltheyheld, practitioners of the interpretive disciplines deal essentially with the human mindand spirit (Geist), as it has expressed itself in the historical world. (Ringer, 1997, 26 ff.)

Dilthey’s identification of Geist as the proper domain of study for the cultural scien-tist can be better appreciated when it is understood that for him human existenceinsofar as it is uniquely human lies apart from Natur in the realm of Geist. A culturalscientist, like the natural scientist, has to focus his/her attention on a particular setof available data that will be subject to scientific inquiry. In stark contrast to thenatural scientist, the meaningfulness of the subject of inquiry to the cultural scien-tist’s own concerns is the determining factor in making the choice. For Dilthey, thevery act of choosing the subject of inquiry by the cultural scientist demonstrates thefact that a common Geist links the investigator to that which is being investigated.The act of selection

is made in terms of meaningful social types ultimately based on a psychic unity ofmankind which allows the understanding of the past and unknown in terms of thepresent and known. (Truzzi, 1974, 9)

Not only does the “psychic unity of mankind” allow the investigator to make ameaningful selection, but it also allows him/her to understand the phenomenonunder investigation. Because of the psychic unity of humanity, Dilthey posited thatthe human mind has the capacity of empathetic understanding and this capacitycould be utilized in the interpretation of historical phenomena. With the aid of avariety of cultural artifacts, an individual could reconstruct a portion of the histori-cal world or reenact a particular historical episode. The fact that human beings canlearn other languages means that they have access to historical eras and events ofcultures different from their own. All historical events and institutions have been the


result of particular motives and intentions so much so that “human purposes andvalues are realized in the network of meanings and intellectual influences that makeup the historical world” (Ringer, 1997, 29).

To the extent that an investigator is capable of empathy, he/she is capable ofunderstanding the particular motive, intention, and/or meaning of a reconstructedcultural or historical event. The fact that all human beings “live in a historicalworld of inherited meaning” (Ringer, 1997, 28) means that they are all capable ofempathizing with the events and peoples of the past from whom they have inheritedtheir own historical situation. When this empathizing or experiencing is done for thepurposes of understanding a historical event, it is called Verstehen (understanding).For Dilthey, the Geisteswissenschaften (the human/cultural sciences) are qualitativelydifferent from the Naturwissenschaften (the natural sciences) because the former bothbegin with and culminate in the investigator’s empathetic Verstehen of the objectunder investigation. For Dilthey, Verstehen is not even a possibility when studyingnatural objects because there is nothing in the natural/physical world with which aninvestigator can empathize.

The difference between the objectivism of the historicist method and subjectivismof the Verstehen method can be looked at from two different perspectives. First, thetwo positions differed regarding the nature of the object of scientific inquiry. For thehistoricist method there was no qualitative difference between natural phenomenaand cultural phenomena. From the Verstehen perspective, there was a qualitativedifference between cultural and natural phenomena—cultural phenomena had aunique quality (i.e., meaning) that was missing from natural phenomena. Second,the two positions differed regarding the definition of the “objectively valid” knowl-edge that the investigator was striving to acquire. For the historicist position, objec-tively valid scientific knowledge came in the form of abstract, universal laws thatcould be used to offer a causal explanation of the phenomena under study. For theVerstehen method, scientific truth was obtained by means of subjective empatheticfeelings that could be used to offer an “objective” interpretive understanding of thephenomena under study. Depending on what position one took, the intrusionof either objective factors or subjective factors compromised the objective validity ofscientific truth. For the historicist method, scientific inquiry had to be purged of allsubjective factors (i.e., the investigator’s prejudices, concerns, interpretations, etc.) inthe pursuit of scientific knowledge. Proponents of the Verstehen method argued thatthe use of any objective factors such as universal, abstract concepts, during the courseof scientific inquiry compromised the scientific integrity of the Geisteswissenschaften.Prior to Weber, a number of attempts were made to mediate between these twopoles. While these attempts are valuable in and of themselves, they are of special rele-vance to the present discussion because of their direct role in Weber’s own contribu-tion to the Methodenstreit.

At the time that Weber began to make his own contribution to formulating amediating position, a group of scholars broadly categorized as neo-Kantians hadalready begun to make initial moves in this direction. One of the most prominentthinkers among the neo-Kantians was Windelband, who gave a speech in 1894 titled“History and the Natural Sciences” that proved to be very influential. He posited thatrather than focus on the phenomena that is being studied by the natural and cultural


sciences, a distinction should be made on the basis of the type of knowledge that thedifferent sciences seek to attain (Ringer, 1997, 32). For Windelband, while the naturalsciences “pursue ‘nomothetic’ knowledge of the general in the form of invariant‘laws’,” the sociocultural sciences aim at attaining “ ‘idiographic’ knowledge ofsingular patterns or events” (Ringer, 1997, 32). The reason why different modes ofinquiry are needed to approach natural and cultural phenomena is the fact that

for the purposes of scientific analysis, any given lump of coal would be consideredinterchangeable with other individuals of its type, whereas Goethe would not be simi-larly interchangeable with other poets or historical figures of his age. (Ciaffa, 1998, 53)

Goethe, or any aspect of culture for that matter, is deemed worthy of study becauseit has come to be “regarded as significant from the standpoint of cultural values”(Ciaffa, 1998, 53). A lump of coal, or any aspect of the natural or physical world isdeemed worthy of study because of its universal and immutable characteristics. Thenatural and physical science aim at acquiring nomothetic knowledge, while culturalsciences aim at acquiring idiographic knowledge.

In making this distinction, Windelband was stating in explicit and formal termswhat was already implicitly present in the positions of the historicist and the Verstehenmethods. He went on to note that “the same set of phenomena can be studied in boththe nomothetic and the idiographic mode, and that the borderline between the twoapproaches in not absolute” (Ringer, 1997, 32). Building upon this insight, heposited that even though in the final analysis the understanding of historical andcultural phenomena can be gained only by means of tact, intuition, and personalinsight, the investigator must employ nomothetic tools when studying culturalphenomena in their particularity. The acknowledgment by the neo-Kantians that thecultural sciences needed to employ general, abstract (i.e., “objective”) concepts inorder to arrive at an understanding of the particular brought the historicist andVerstehen positions closer together.

The rapprochement of the two poles was advanced further by one of Windelband’syounger protégés in the neo-Kantian school, Rickert. Rickert noted that, from theperspective of logic, there is no difference between empirical reality in the naturalworld and the cultural world, insofar as this empirical reality is amenable to scien-tific investigation. In both the cases, empirical reality present to itself to the observeras an “immeasurable” and “illimitable manifold” (Ciaffa, 1997, 46) of which only aselected portion can be chosen as an object of investigation. Not only does reality ingeneral possess this characteristic, but any chosen segment of reality is also character-ized thus, as is a chosen segment of the segment and a chosen segment of thatsegment, ad infinitum. This leads to the conclusion of the “inexhaustibility of empir-ical reality for the knowing and perceiving subject” (Ciaffa, 1997, 47). Bruun summa-rizes Rickert’s understanding of the problem and he responds in these words:

Since immediate reality is infinite in its multiplicity, any science has to select its subjectmatter from it. The objectivity of the scientific results therefore cannot reside in theircorrespondence with the material on which they are based, since this material is alwaysthe result of a prior selection and processing; instead the objectivity of the resultmust depend on the objectivity of the criteria of this prior selection. Since the criteria of


selection in the historical, “cultural” sciences are cultural values, we need a demonstrationof the empirical objectivity of these values; Rickert carries out this demonstration byestablishing empirically that the cultural values in question are normatively general.(Bruun, 1972, 131 ff.)

For Rickert, logically speaking, there can be no such thing as knowledge of theuniversal, or universally valid general laws, because empirical reality can only becaptured and studied in its particularity. He noted that “cultural values” inevitablyand invariably determine which finite segment of the infinite flux of empirical real-ity is selected for observation by the investigator. For Rickert, the objectivity of scien-tific knowledge was based on the fact that “objectively valid” cultural values providedthe criteria for selection. Since the criteria for selection were objectively valid, theyassured the objectivity of the knowledge claims resulting from an inquiry based onthem. While Windelband’s work established the need for general laws in the studyof the particular, Rickert’s work established the fact that even in the study of the mostuniversal, the investigator is actually studying a particular segment of the universal—the selection of which is invariably determined by the cultural values of theinvestigator. In short, Windelband and Rickert contributed to the closing of the gapbetween the objectivism of the historicist method and the subjectivism of theVerstehen method from different sides.

4.2 A Logical Flaw in the Methodenstreit

Even though his predecessors and some of his colleagues had closed the gap betweenthe opposing positions, it is Weber’s unique contributions to the debate that bridgesthe divide between the historicist and the Verstehen methods. Weber’s methodologyof scientific inquiry synthesizes particular elements from the two positions, aftersubjecting both positions to critical logical and methodological analysis.2 SinceWeber’s methodology develops as a result of a critical conversation with the othertwo positions, a look at Weber’s particular objections to the two positions serves as agood preface to describing his own. Weber notes that the two parties in the debatehave not recognized the limitations of their favored approach and as a result theyhave not been able to appreciate the value inherent in the other approach. Theinability of the historicist position to recognize the limitations of abstract, universallaws and the lack of appreciation of the interpretive role of the investigator, compro-mises the validity of scientific knowledge. Conversely, the inability of the proponentsof the Verstehen method to recognize the limitations of intuitive empathy and theirlack of appreciation of the role of general, abstract concepts in scientific inquirycompromises the integrity of scientific truth. In short, both the objectivism of thehistoricist method and the subjectivism of the Verstehen method are obstacles toscientific truth, but for different reasons.

Weber “acknowledges an irreducible interpretive element in the socioculturalsciences” (Ciaffa, 1998, 43). But he criticizes the account offered by the proponentsof the Verstehen method of the role played by intuition and empathy in the inter-pretation of cultural phenomena. Speaking of intuitional feelings instigated by


empathy, Weber notes:

On the whole their theoretical value for science decreases as their aesthetic charmincreases. Under certain circumstances they can have significant “heuristic” value.Under other circumstances, however, they can constitute an obstacle to empiricalknowledge. This is because they obscure the awareness that the “intuition” is consti-tuted by the emotional content of the observer, not by those of the “epoch”described . . . . (RK, 180)

Knowledge based on “intuitions” remains suspect because there is no way ofdetermining the source of the intuitions—are they evaluations that the observer ismaking of the object, or are they feelings that the object is rousing in the observer?Furthermore, the use of empathy to approach an object of study has the risk of makingthe observer completely lose sight of the goal of scientific research. The empatheticapproach aims to attain a “formula which reproduces the ‘synthesis of feeling’ ”between the observer and object of study (RK, 180). And the result of this “synthesis”is expressed in terms of the “total character” of the object that was observed/experi-enced and this total characterization takes the place of scientific analysis. This synthe-sis should not be mistaken for scientific analysis because there is no way to test thevalidity of the knowledge claims that are based on such a synthesis. This point, by itself,renders knowledge claims generated by empathetic feelings to be scientifically invalid.The undisciplined use of intuitive empathy in the Verstehen method obscures anddiminishes the positive role of subjective factors in scientific inquiry:

Subjective, emotional “interpretation” in this form does not constitute empirical,historical knowledge of real relations (causal relations). Nor does it constitute thatwhich it otherwise could be: interpretation based on values. (RK, 181)

Weber notes that while the intuitions of the investigator play a critical role ingenerating scientific knowledge, subjective factors cannot be the sole source of“valid” scientific knowledge (RK, 180). In line with the Verstehen method, Webernotes: “Every type of purely direct concrete description bears the mark of artisticportrayal. ‘Each sees what is in his own heart.’ ” (OSS, 107). But such an “artisticportrayal” of empirical reality does not and cannot be classified as “scientific truth” or“objectively valid scientific knowledge” of empirical reality. This is because from Weber’sperspective: “Valid judgments always presuppose the logical analysis of what isconcretely and immediately perceived, that is, the use of concepts” (OSS, 107). Thefailure of the Verstehen method to allow (or account) for the presence of “objective”concepts in scientific inquiry, knowledge, and judgment compromised the integrityof scientific truth. For Weber it is only with the aid of “objective” concepts that scien-tific claims can be subjected to critical analysis.

Whereas one group of cultural scientists erred in the direction of defining thecultural sciences in particular and subjective terms, the other group erred in thedirection of defining them in excessively general and objective terms. The historicistmethod worked on the assumption that social scientific inquiry could lead to thediscovery of universal laws governing social and cultural development and that theselaws could be used to give the causal explanation of all cultural phenomena. Thisposition was based on the assumption that detailed and persistent observation of


empirical reality would lead to the discovery of certain regularities and patterns.These patterns and regularities could in turn be correlated with certain culturalphenomena—thereby leading to the discovery of the “cause” of such phenomena.And “with the progressive completeness of observation, these correlations will even-tually be elevated to the logical status of ‘natural law’ ” (RK, 63). Subsequently,causality would be ascribed to these laws, in the sense that empirical reality would beconsidered as an effect that was caused by the impact of these laws on reality. Interms of their scientific value, Weber has the same view regarding the utility of“objective” general laws as he has of “subjective” intuitive feelings.

Weber characterized the objectivist tendency in the cultural sciences as theattempt to “construct a closed system of concepts, in which reality is synthesized insome sort of permanently and universally valid classification and from which it can bededuced” (OSS, 84). This attempt is based on the premise that cultural realityunfolds during the course of history according to universally valid abstract(i.e., “objective”) laws that can be derived from a study of the particulars of history.This premise itself has been borrowed from the natural sciences because in its origin

the rational analysis of society [by the cultural sciences] arose in close connection withthe modern development of natural science, so it remained related to it in its wholemethod of approach. (OSS, 85)

But a particular cultural phenomenon cannot be explained in terms of universallyvalid, abstract laws any more than it can be understood by the subjective, intuitivefeelings. As is the case with the subjective mode of studying cultural phenomena,there is no “necessary logical relationship” between universal abstract laws andparticular cultural phenomena (OSS, 77). The belief in this necessary logical rela-tionship is part of the intellectual heritage that has been inherited by the individualspositing it.

In the natural sciences, the practical evaluative attitude toward what was immediatelyand technically useful was closely associated from the very first with the hope, takenover as a heritage of antiquity and further elaborated, of attaining purely “objective”(i.e. independent of all individual contingencies) monistic knowledge of the totality ofreality in a conceptual system of metaphysical validity and mathematical form. It wasthought that this hope could be realized by the method of generalizing abstraction andthe formulation of laws based on empirical analysis. (OSS, 85)

This hope, attitude, and method of studying empirical reality flowed from the natu-ral sciences into the cultural sciences but, for Weber, it is based on a simple and obvi-ous logical mistake. Since empirical reality is an immeasurable and infinite manifold,any “law” based on observation of this reality is the result of observing only a partic-ular segment of empirical reality. Logically speaking, there is no necessary correlationbetween a “law” derived from the observation of the particular segment and otherparts of reality that have not been observed. The positing of this correlation is anact of interpretation. As a matter of fact, even the claim that the observed part ofempirical reality behaves according to a particular “law” is an act of interpretation.Consequently, any attempt to deduce universally valid laws based on knowledge


claims about a particular segment of the universal will remain incomplete, and anyclaim that even the particular segment of observed reality will always behave accordingto a particular “law” cannot be falsified. For Weber, the objectivism of the historicistapproach prevents them from noticing the fact that an interpretive act on the part ofthe investigator is inherently a part of all scientific inquiry. To link a “law” with anevent in empirical reality (either as a “cause” of reality, or as being derived from reality)is fundamentally an interpretive act. The role played by the investigator’s subjectiveinterpretation in scientific inquiry and judgment remains hidden in the historicistmethodology.

Just as there is a fundamental difference between subjective, intuitive interpretationand scientific knowledge of cultural phenomena, there is a fundamental differencebetween objective, abstract generalizations and scientific knowledge of empirical,cultural reality. Weber notes: “The ‘abstract’-theoretical method even today showsunmediated and ostensibly irreconcilable cleavage from empirical-historical research”(OSS, 87). He posits that any theory explaining the great variety of historical andcultural phenomena in terms of “true” or “essential” abstractions, or universal laws,is the result of “naturalistic prejudices” that have influenced the cultural sciences:

Nothing . . . is more dangerous than the confusion of theory and history stemmingfrom naturalistic prejudices. This confusion expresses itself firstly in the belief that the“true” content and the essence of historical reality is portrayed in such theoreticalconstructs or secondly, in the use of these constructs as a procrustean bed into whichhistory is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization of such “ideas” as real “forces”and as a “true” reality which operates behind the passage of events and which worksitself out in history. (OSS, 94)

Even though there is a “fundamental methodological distinction” between knowledgeof abstract laws and knowledge of historical/cultural phenomena,

the construction of a system of abstract and therefore purely formal propositionsanalogous to those of the natural sciences, is the only means of analyzing and intellec-tually mastering the complexity of social life. (OSS, 87)

In short, while abstract laws and generalities “may have extraordinary heuristic value”in the scientific analysis of cultural phenomena, they cannot be accorded “causalstatus” (RK, 63). It is worth noting that Weber uses the exact same terms to describethe constraints of personal intuitive feelings and universal, abstract laws in thepursuit of scientific knowledge of empirical reality—during the course of scientificinquiry they can be employed only as heuristic devices but not accorded interpretivevalue in the former case or causal status in the latter case.

Weber criticizes the use of intuitive empathy by the Verstehen method and the useof abstract laws by the historicist method in very strong terms. But his critique islimited to the manner in which their respective partisans employ these devices andnot a rejection of the devices themselves. If anything, Weber has a sharply heightenedsense of the constructive role that personal intuition and abstract laws play in shap-ing scientific knowledge, inquiry, and judgment. Weber’s appreciation of the place of


intuition in scientific inquiry has already been detailed in chapter 2 (section 2.1)—Weber observes that there is no genuine discovery/breakthrough in science in theabsence of intuitive inspiration. Weber’s appreciation of the place of the abstractconcept in scientific inquiry has been detailed in chapter 3 (section 3.1)—Weberobserves that abstract, general concepts and the controlled experiment define thevery character of science. In sum, it is neither personal empathy/intuition norabstract laws/concepts that Weber criticizes. He criticizes the manner in which theyare understood and employed by their respective partisans in the Methodenstreit.

Weber traces the objectivism of historicism and the subjectivism of the Verstehenmethod to a common mistake made by both positions—a naturalistic understandingof science. As noted above, Weber identifies “naturalistic prejudices” as the root causeof the claim that there is an inherent and immanent link between abstract laws andempirical reality. Weber’s assertion that the Verstehen method is also based on anaturalistic understanding of science appears to be counterintuitive. But a closer lookat the issue reveals that the subjectivism of the Verstehen method and objectivism ofthe historicist method are indeed different sides of the same coin—a naturalisticerror in the understanding of science. Weber uses the term “psychologism” (RK, 167)to describe the position that human emotions such as empathy and intuition can beaccorded interpretive value. This position rejects the use of abstract concepts inthe study of history and culture because of its “objective” character. Such concepts“have only a general, therefore abstract, nature” and as “a consequence of the neces-sarily abstract character of concepts” concrete objects cannot be subsumed underthem (RK, 167). Since the purpose of the cultural sciences is to attain knowledge ofthe concrete and particular, for the Verstehen position, it logically follows that thesedisciplines have to dispense with the use of abstract, general concepts and rely on“a series of ‘intuitions’ ” (RK, 167). Weber posits that this type of psychologisticaffirmation of intuition and critique of abstract concepts is “the consequenceof . . . naturalistic errors” (RK, 167). These errors can be summarized in these terms:

(a) Conflated understanding of two different types of concept;(b) conflated understanding of two different types of intuitions; and(c) not recognizing the gap between experience and knowledge claims about

experience.

Weber notes that the Verstehen method makes a distinction between an abstractconcept and an intuition. An intuition provides direct and immediate knowledge ofa particular, concrete object, while a concept establishes abstract, general relationsamong concrete objects. The naturalistic error begins with positing that “onlyrelational concepts of absolute precision, that is those which can be expressed in termsof causal equivalence, are genuine ‘concepts’ ” (RK, 168). Weber notes that “evenphysics employs concepts which fail to satisfy this condition” (RK, 168). The fact thateven physics employs concepts that are not concepts according to the naturalisticunderstanding of science evidences that there are other types of concepts than theone type allowed by the naturalistic definition. According to Weber, there are twotypes of concepts because concepts can have two different types of relationship withobjects. On the one hand, abstract concepts cannot subsume concrete objects


because concrete objects are an illimitable manifold and the concept can onlysubsume a part of the infinite manifold. In this case, the concrete object is “more”than the abstract concept (RK, 167). On the other hand, abstract concepts transcendconcrete objects because they can establish relations between objects—relationshipsthat are not “given” in empirical reality. In its capacity to establish relations betweenobjects, the abstract concept is “more” than the object. For Weber, naturalism conflatesthese two definitions of the concept by declaring that only the relational concept is“genuine” and that any concept that does not fit this definition is not a concept bydefinition.

Both the Verstehen method and the historicist method accept this conflated,naturalistic definition of the concept, the former categorically rejecting its scientificvalue because it is “less” than empirical reality and the latter attributing all explana-tory and causal value to it because it is “more” than empirical reality. In both thecases, the scientific value and the corresponding limitation of the concept have notbeen properly appreciated. The Verstehen position fails to see that the abstractconcept can offer them something that concrete experience cannot—the ability toposit relations among objects. It also fails to see that it itself uses abstract concepts inits methodology—the “concept” that is not considered as such by the naturalisticdefinition of the term. Given its capacity to establish relations between concreteobjects, the abstract concept also makes logical critique in the cultural sciencespossible because “logic concerns (only) general concepts and their definitions” (RK,167). For Weber, the use of the abstract concept in scientific inquiry makes thecultural sciences real sciences insofar as it makes logical critique of scientificknowledge claims possible. Such a critique is precluded in the Verstehen understand-ing of science because for this position all genuine scientific knowledge is a productof particular, subjective intuitions that are, by definition, immune from logical,analytical critique.

The historicist method for its part fails to see the limitations of the abstract concept.It cannot be considered universally valid in the sense of offering an exhaustive (andeternal) description of empirical reality because it has been abstracted from theobservation of a particular segment of reality observed under particular conditions,during a particular period of time. Consequently, while the abstraction can establishrelations among the particular objects of reality from which it has been abstracted, itcannot subsume or account for all empirical reality. By failing to recognize that theconcept is less than the empirical reality that it describes, the historicist method rulesout the possibility of empirical reality having the ability to modify the abstractconcept. If a part of empirical reality does not conform to the abstract concept, thatpart of empirical reality is labeled as an anomaly that will eventually come to beaccounted for with the passage of time—with the assumption always being that theconcept will subsume the anomaly. Weber’s valuation of the abstract concepts sees itas a valuable heuristic tool for scientific analysis that concrete experience does notafford, but with the reservation that the abstract relation is only a heuristic tool andnot a universally valid generalization. As is detailed a little later, Weber sees not onlythe possibility of empirical reality modifying the conceptual apparatus constructedby scientists, but he also claims that this is an inevitability if science is to continue toadvance.


For Weber, the conflated understanding of the concept by proponents of theVerstehen method deprives scientific knowledge of its conceptual content. And theconflated understanding of the concept by the historicist method equates conceptualknowledge with empirical reality. In both cases, the objective validity of scientificknowledge is undermined, because for Weber objective scientific knowledge isneither a copy nor a reproduction of empirical reality (contra the historicist method),but it is rather a conceptual ordering of empirical reality in a valid manner (contrathe Verstehen method). In other words, Weber’s very definition of “scientific knowl-edge” depends on (or is the result of ) his correction of the naturalistic (i.e., conflated)definition of “concept.” His affirmation corrects the conflated understanding of“concept” on the part of the Verstehen method and affirms its value as heuristicdevice. At the same time, his reservation corrects the conflated understanding of thehistoricist method and sees the concept as something that is derived from empiricalreality but not as something that reproduces empirical reality or (even less) subsumes it.

With regard to intuition, the principles of the debate are the same but thepositions of the parties are different. The proponents of Verstehen accept the role ofintuition in scientific inquiry and the historicist position rejects it—but both basetheir respective positions on a naturalistic understanding of intuition. Such anunderstanding posits that “ ‘concepts of objects’ are not ‘concepts,’ but rather ‘intu-itions’ ” (RK, 168). Weber argues that this position fails to take into account the factthat there are two different modes of intuiting:

The intuitive self-evidence of mathematical propositions is quite different from the“intuitability” of the multiplicities of “experience,” immediately given “in” us and“external to” us, experienced and accessible to experience. (RK, 168)

The manner in which 2 � 2 � 4 is “intuited” is different from the manner in whichobjects in the world (experience external to us) and feelings/emotions (experiencesimmediately given in us) are “intuited.” The intuition of experience “is a thoroughlysynthetic construct” because its intuited unity “is constituted by the selection of thoseaspects which are essential from the point of view of specific theoretical goals”(RK, 168). The intuition of synthetic constructs whose composition is determinedby preexisting criteria is not the same thing as the intuition of mathematical propo-sitions. To the degree that the synthetic construct is a product of thought, theconstruct has a conceptual (or logical) relation to empirical reality as opposed to anactual (or necessary) relation. Consequently, this “intuited” synthetic construct

is a “concept,” at least if this expression is not artificially restricted to denote only onepart of that conceptual apparatus which is articulated in a language and produced bythe discursive analysis of the empirically given. (RK, 169)

The naturalistic understanding of intuition does not recognize the fact that there is aqualitative difference between the way that mathematical propositions are intuited andsynthetic constructs are intuitively applied to experience (or derived from experience).The Verstehen method considers all intuitions to be of the mathematical propositiontype. Consequently, they consider the interpretive understanding produced by suchintuitions to be as self-evidently valid as mathematical propositions. Weber argues


that if human beings were capable of such a direct intuitive grasp and understandingof empirical reality, then they would have no need for scientific knowledge at all. Thehistoricist method considers all intuitions to be of the synthetic construct type andtherefore invalid. Consequently, they deny any relation between intuition and objec-tively valid scientific knowledge. Weber’s critique shows this position overlooks (ornegates) the fact that all synthesis is rooted in the “interpretive imagination”(RK, 156) of the investigator. When numerous observations of empirical phenomenaare “synthesized” to produce a “law” that supposedly applies to all of them (and allothers of their kind that have not been observed), such a synthesis invariably springsfrom the investigator’s personal intuition. Similarly, any synthesis of an already knownlaw with an observed phenomenon in empirical reality that results in a causal expla-nation of the observed phenomenon is also a “synthetic construct” springing from theinterpretive imagination of the investigator. Weber breaks with the conflated, natura-listic definition of “intuition” and recognizes the two types of intuitions. This recon-structed understanding of intuition allows Weber to recognize the scientificlimitations of intuition that the subjectivism of the Verstehen method overlooks andappreciate the scientific value of intuition that the objectivism of the historicistmethod obscures.

A conflated understanding of concept and intuition by both the historicist andVerstehen methods leads to penultimate conflated understanding of naturalisticscience—a conflated understanding of causality. The historicist method located the“cause” of all phenomena (both natural and cultural) in the immanent link betweenabstract concepts (in the form of universally valid law) and concrete experience.For this position, abstract, universal law plays a dual role. On the one hand, it offersan objectively valid description of empirical reality, and on the other hand, it offersa causal explanation of empirical reality. The Verstehen method located the “cause” ofcultural phenomena in the immanent link between personal intuition and concreteexperience. For this position, empathetic intuition plays a dual role. On the onehand, it makes direct and unmediated encounter with concrete experience possible,and on the other hand, it facilitates an objectively valid interpretive understandingof concrete experience. The naturalistic understanding of causality is the cause of afundamental mistake made by both the historicist and Verstehen methods. Thismistake results in both perspectives keeping a fundamental and irreducible elementof scientific inquiry “in petto” (or hidden from observation, and thereby from analysisand criticism). Given what has been said above about the role of the “interpretiveimagination” in scientific inquiry, the historicist method fails to appreciate the fact thatthere is no direct naturalistic/mechanistic relation between law and concrete experi-ence. The relation between the two invariably and inherently contains an interpre-tive element that the investigator contributes to the inquiry. This interpretive elementis not to be found either in the phenomenon that is being observed or in the lawthat is being used to account for the phenomenon. The naturalistic/mechanisticunderstanding of causality on the part of the historicist method keeps the role of theinterpretive imagination of the investigator in scientific inquiry “in petto.” Similarly,given what has been said above about the abstract concept, the Verstehen method failsto appreciate the fact that there is no direct naturalistic/ mechanistic link betweenintuition and concrete experience. The relation between the two is invariably and


inherently mediated by abstract concepts that are used by the investigator to describeand interpret the phenomenon. Such concepts are found neither in the investigator’spersonal intuition nor in the phenomenon that is being observed—but the role ofabstract concept remains “in petto” in the Verstehen method. For Weber, wheneveran element of scientific inquiry that leads up to the production of scientific knowl-edge is kept in petto, the objective validity of the knowledge that is produced iscompromised.

Weber argues that an elementary analysis of even the most basic knowledge claimsabout empirical reality demonstrates that abstract concepts and the interpretiveimagination come into play in the construction of a knowledge claim. It is oftenassumed that the simplest of claims about the most obvious and self-evident facts inempirical reality are devoid of interpretive elements or logical/analytical problems.Such an assumption is based on the presupposition that direct experience of empiri-cal reality combined with the soundness of one’s mind are sufficient in makingvalid judgments and statements about empirical reality. But Weber notes that any“existential proposition, ” even one as simple as “Peter takes a walk,” presupposes“logical operations as soon as it constitutes a ‘proposition’ the ‘validity’ of which . . . isto be established” (RK, 169). To begin with the statement “Peter takes a walk” is notthe expression of some self-evident truth that is given in experience; it is the expres-sion of an interpretive judgment offered by an individual after observing a “fact” inempirical reality. In addition to the experience of empirical reality and the soundnessof one’s mind, Weber identifies “logical operations” as essential components of themost elementary judgments about empirical reality. This is the case not only forstatements about empirical reality but also for “the reflective analysis of one’s ownaction” (LCS, 177). Such an analysis apparently does not contain any logical opera-tions and does not present any analytical problems “since one’s action is directlygiven in experience and—assuming mental ‘health’—is ‘understandable’ withoutfurther ado and hence is naturally ‘reproducible’ in memory directly” (LCS, 177).Weber goes on to note:

Very simple reflections show that it is not, however, so, and that the “valid” answer tothe question: why did I act that way, constitutes a categorically formed construct whichis to be raised to the level of demonstrable judgment only by the use of abstractions.This is true even though the “demonstration” is in fact here conducted in the mind ofthe “acting person” himself. (LCS, 177)

Abstract concepts are needed in order to reflect upon and analyze all experience,including the experience “given in” ourselves (i.e., our own decisions, judgmentsabout our own actions). This is no less the case in relation to knowledge claims“outside” ourselves about events of cultural significance. Weber notes:

Reflective knowledge, even of one’s own experience, is nowhere and never a literally“repeated experience” or a simple “photograph” of what was experienced; the “experi-ence,” when it is made into an “object,” acquires perspectives and interrelationshipswhich were not “known” in the experience itself. The idea formed in later reflection, ofone’s own past action is no different in this respect from the idea so formed of a past


concrete natural event in the external world, which had been experienced by one’s selfor which was reported by someone else. (LCS, 178)

In the absence of abstraction, there can be no claims about empirical reality that canbe subjected to critique and analysis for the purpose of verification/falsification. Thisis the case not only for knowledge claims about the most simple and immediateclaims about empirical reality but also for the most complex and distant aspects ofempirical reality:

the causal analysis of personal action proceeds logically in exactly the same way as thecausal analysis of the “historical significance” of the Battle of Marathon, i.e. by isola-tion, generalization, and the construction of judgments of possibility. (LCS, 177)

In short, knowledge claims about even the most immediate of all experience, theexperience of our own feelings, contains logical operations that are made possible byabstract, “objective” concepts. Similarly, knowledge claims about the most basic or“self-evident” truths about empirical reality are inevitably and irreducibly interpretivejudgments whose truth value is never a given. Weber’s reflections on the constituentelements of scientific inquiry lay bare a particular element that the historicist positionapproach keeps in petto (i.e., the interpretive imagination of the investigator or indi-vidual making the knowledge claim). At the same time, it lays bare another elementthat the Verstehen method keeps in petto (i.e., the abstract concept that the investiga-tor employs to analyze and organize his/her experience). For Weber, the three essen-tial elements that go into producing “valid” scientific knowledge are: (a) experiencein/of empirical reality (b) isolation and generalization of elements from that experi-ence, and (c) making interpretive judgments about the experience. In identifying thethree elements as being irreducible components of scientific knowledge claims,Weber is breaking from the objectivism of the historicist method and the subjectivismof the Verstehen method—while at the same time incorporating objective and subjec-tive elements in his own method of scientific inquiry. A closer look at Weber’sdescription of the components of scientific inquiry reveals that he not only incorpo-rates objective and subjective elements from the other two positions but also transformsthem and makes them more meaningful.

4.3 Imputation and Ideal Type: Bridging the Subject/Object Dichotomy

Having recognized both the limitations and the value of the subjectivist and objec-tivist understandings of science and causality, Weber offers his own syntheticconstruct as an alternative. He posits that in the cultural sciences causality cannot beattributed to either abstract universal laws or understood purely in terms of subjec-tive intuitions. For Weber, a genuinely scientific account of causality in the culturalsciences contains both subjective and objective elements but is reducible to neither—and this account comes in the form of an “imputation.” Weber notes:

Where the individuality of a phenomenon is concerned, the question of causality is nota question of laws [or intuitions] but of concrete causal relationships; it is not a questionof the subsumption of the event under some general rubric as a representative case but


of its imputation as a consequence of some constellation. It is in brief a question ofimputation. (OSS, 78 ff.)

For Weber, a scientific account of the “cause” of a particular phenomenon must bepresented in the form of an “imputation” if the knowledge claim is to be accordedthe status of “objectively valid knowledge.” A closer look at the process that leads upto the making of an imputation and its contents reveals that the phrase “objectivelyvalid knowledge” has a very specific meaning. From the perspective of the historicistmethod, such knowledge comes in the form of an absolutely certain causal explana-tion. This causal explanation is arrived at (and expressed in the form of ) universal,abstract laws (that are themselves absolutely certain). From the perspective of theVerstehen method, “objectively valid” knowledge comes in the form of infallibleinterpretive understanding of cultural phenomena. This interpretive understandingis arrived at (and expressed in the form of ) subjective, intuitive empathy (which isitself indubitable and infallible). In both cases, the “validity” of scientific knowledgeis practically synonymous with “certainty.” In contrast to these two positions, Webersees objectively valid knowledge as being expressed in the form of an “objectivelypossible hypothesis.” This hypothesis is expressed in the form of an imputation thatis arrived at by means of causal interpretation (as it is actually a causal interpretationitself ). For Weber, the “validity” of a scientific knowledge claim does not dependupon its “certainty” but rather on its “possibility.”

A look at the process that leads up to the imputing of an imputation reveals thatit consists of both objective elements and subjective elements. Two elements makeup the objective side of the imputation: (a) already known and accepted nomologi-cal regularities (i.e., “laws”) and (b) “ideal-types” constructed by the investigator.Two elements make up the subjective side of the imputation: (a) the cultural valuesof the investigator that initiates and provides orientation to his/her investigation and(b) the investigator’s own interpretive imagination that he/she continuously employs inthe selection and synthesis of data during the course of the investigation. All of theelements are simultaneously present in the investigation. Their interplay is character-ized by tension-filled but mutually enriching relations (that are constantly shifting).The following discussion describes the relations of the four elements in greater detail.

The fact that subjective and objective factors come into play at the beginning andduring the course of the scientific investigation was partially addressed in chapter 3.The object that is chosen to be studied is chosen because it has been deemed signifi-cant due to its relationship with “the cultural values with which we [as investigators]approach reality” (OSS, 78). But the investigation of social reality itself takes placewith the aid of abstract general laws:

[T]he construction of a system of abstract and therefore purely formal propositionsanalogous to those of the exact natural sciences, is the only means of analyzing andintellectually mastering the complexity of social life. (OSS, 87)

In other words, while subjective factors are dominant in the selection of the objectof inquiry, objective elements are dominant in the manner in which the investigatorcarries out his/her investigation. Not only are subjective and objective elements


present at the beginning and during the course of the scientific investigation, butthey are also present at the very end of the investigation when the investigatorpresents his/her conclusions.

The conclusions are presented in the form of an imputation—the investigator’s ownhypothesis regarding the cause of the phenomenon under study. In the investigator’smaking of an imputation, or offering a causal interpretation for the phenomenonunder study, Weber sees a dynamic interaction between objective and subjectiveelements:

Wherever the causal explanation of a “cultural phenomenon”—an “historical individ-ual” is under consideration, the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investi-gation but only a means. It facilitates and renders possible the causal imputation of theirconcrete causes of those components of a phenomenon the individuality of which isculturally significant [from the evaluative viewpoint of the investigator]. (OSS, 79)

While a valid imputation is not possible without the aid of general abstract (objective)“laws,” such “laws” are not in and of themselves sufficient to arrive at an imputation.Weber details the role of personal intuition of the investigator (i.e., the “subjective”element) in a causal imputation in these words:

The extent to which the historian (in the widest sense of the word) can perform thisimputation in a reasonably certain manner with his imagination sharpened by personalexperience and trained in analytic methods and the extent to which he must have recourseto the aid of special disciplines which make it possible, varies with the individual case.Everywhere, however, . . . the more certain and the more comprehensive our generalknowledge the greater is the certainty of imputation. (OSS, 79 ff.)

For Weber, the investigator’s own imagination, personal experience, and training inthe area of specialty are as much a part of the imputation as “the knowledge ofrecurrent causal sequences” (ie., “laws”).

The causal imputation offered by the investigator utilizes abstract laws and personalintuitions, but the imputation itself cannot be categorized as either a “law” or an“intuition.” In other words, while both subjective and objective elements arein an imputation, these elements differ from “intuition” as understood by the Verstehenmethod and “law” as understood by the historicist method. The subjective elementin an imputation is to be distinguished from a subjective intuition by the fact thatit is determined by factors beyond those immediately present at the time whenthe imputation is made at the end of the investigation. Weber notes that during thecourse of scientific analysis,

an exhaustive causal investigation of any phenomenon in its full reality is not onlypractically impossible—it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which areto be imputed in the individual case, the “essential” features of an event. (OSS, 78)

At the end of the investigation, the investigator imputes only those causes to theevent that account for the “essential” features of the event. The question naturallyarises: How does one distinguish between the “essential” and “non-essential” features


of an event? Weber posits that this issue, which is so crucial at the end of an investi-gation when a causal imputation has to be offered, is determined by the conditionspresent at the very beginning of the investigation:

When we require from the historian and social research worker as an elementarypresupposition that they distinguish the important from the trivial and that he shouldhave the necessary “point of view” for this distinction, we mean that they must under-stand how to relate the events of the real world consciously or unconsciously to univer-sal “cultural values” and to select out of those relationships which are significant for us.(OSS, 82)

The “point of view” from which the investigator begins his/her investigation deter-mines the parameters within which the causal imputation is made at the end of theinvestigation. In contrast to the historicist method, the investigation does notprovide a universally and eternally exhaustive causal explanation of the phenomenonunder consideration. The causal interpretation that is offered is valid only underparticular historical conditions and circumstances and in light of particular culturalvalues. In contrast to the Verstehen claim that intuitive empathy provides an objec-tively valid understanding of the phenomenon, the subjective element in Weber’scausal imputation limits the explanation of the phenomenon to only that segment ofempirical reality that has been deemed meaningful or “essential” from the perspec-tive of a particular “point of view.”

The cultural values and historical conditions shaping/initiating the investigationhave to be clearly stated and acknowledged by the investigator. These factors willdetermine the character and definition of the conceptual apparatus that he/shedesigns/adopts in order to carry out the investigation. This conceptual apparatus forits part will not be “subjective” in the same sense that the “point of view” is/wassubjective—the apparatus will have an “objective” character to it that is missing fromthe “point of view.” It is this apparatus that will impart an “objective” character tothe investigation (or knowledge claim):

There is no absolutely “objective” scientific analysis of culture [or] of “social phenom-ena” independent of special and “one-sided” viewpoints according to which—expresslyor tacitly, consciously or unconsciously—they are selected, analyzed and organized forexpository purposes. (OSS, 72)

The study of all cultural and social phenomena takes place from the perspective of aparticular point of view but the study itself takes place with the aid of objectiveconceptual apparatus. This apparatus manifests itself in the form of “ ‘one sided’viewpoints,” according to which particular segments of cultural and social phenom-ena are “selected, analyzed, and organized for expository purposes.” In sum,the subjective dimension of a causal imputation expresses itself in an objective form(i.e., expressly stated “ ‘one-sided’ viewpoints”) that can be subject to critique,analysis, and correction.

Just as the subjective element in Weber’s causal imputation is very different fromthe subjective character of the causality of the subjectivists, Weber distinguishes theobjective element in an imputation from the “law” of the objectivists. Weber notes


that “laws” cannot be of any value in terms of offering a causal explanation of anempirical phenomenon:

Even with the widest imaginable knowledge of “laws,” we are helpless in the face of thequestion: how is the causal explanation of an individual fact possible—since thedescription of even the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive? The number andtype of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there isnothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone meriting attention.(OSS, 78)

He notes that in offering a causal imputation, the investigator is

not concerned with “laws” in the narrower exact natural science sense, but withadequate causal relationships expressed in rules and with the application of the categoryof “objective possibility.” (OSS, 80)

In the place of the “laws” of the historicist method (which are valuable only as heuristicdevices for Weber), causal interpretation (i.e., an imputation) of an individual,culturally significant fact is offered in terms of “adequate causal relationshipsexpressed in rules and with the application of the category of ‘objective possibility’.” Inoffering a causal imputation in the form of rules that differ from laws, the investigatoremploys certain “objective” conceptual apparatuses and rational constructions.Weber describes the conceptual apparatuses and rational constructions and theirrelationship to an imputation in these words:

For purposes of the causal imputation of empirical events, we need the rational,empirical-technical and logical constructions, which help us to answer the question asto what a behavior pattern or thought pattern (i.e. philosophical system) would belike if it possessed completely rational, empirical, and logical “correctness” and“consistency.” (MEN, 42)

Weber calls the “rational, empirical-technical and logical constructions” employed tooffer a causal imputation “ideal types” (MEN, 42). He defines the “ideal type” as “amental construct for the scrutiny and systematic characterization of individual concretepatterns which are significant in their uniqueness” (OSS, 100).

Given the fact that the “ideal type” is virtually synonymous with Weber’s method-ology, it would not be out of place to offer the following (self-reflective) observation.In terms of reference to secondary literature, this part of the discussion is by far themost poor. The reason for this is simple—there is no substantive discussion of“imputation” in the secondary literature and this fact evidences the fundamentalmisunderstanding of the place of the ideal type in Weber’s methodology. The pagesand decades of tortured debate on this topic are not unrelated to the fact that Weberscholarship has not recognized the fact that the ideal type is a means to an end, notan end in itself. In other words, the total disregard for the place of imputation inWeber’s methodology is directly related to the misunderstanding of the character androle of the ideal type. This points to huge lacunae in Weber scholarship on twoaccounts: (a) for Weber, causal interpretation in the cultural sciences can only be


expressed in the form of an “imputation” and (b) the ideal-type is a conceptual tool(a means) that aids the making of an imputation (an end).

Consequently, the value and character of the ideal-type cannot be appreciated andunderstood without reference to the “ends” for which it is to be employed, that is,the making of an imputation. In Weber scholarship, the ideal-type appears as afreestanding, independent entity that has been accorded a methodological autonomy(or value) all its own. The following discussion provides clear evidence from Weber’sown writing that the ideal-type is a means to be used for the ultimate end in thecultural sciences, the making of an imputation. The fact that Weber scholarship haspractically divorced the “means” (i.e., the ideal-type) in Weber’s methodology fromthe “ends” (imputation) is symptomatic of a larger lacuna in Weber scholarship (tobe detailed in the next chapter), which in turn is a reflection of the modern culturalcondition (meaninglessness and disenchantment). Since there can be no genuinelyscientific analysis of “ends” divorced from “means” or understanding of “means”without taking “ends” into account, the discussion and understanding of ideal-typesdivorced from imputation is bound to be flawed.3

Now back to the discussion of the character and role of the ideal-type in Weber’smethodology. For Weber, the ideal-type is one of the “objective” elements in scientificinquiry but its “objective” character is fundamentally different from the “objectivelaws” as this latter term is defined by the historicist method. The ideal-type construc-tion is “objective” in a very specific sense because an irreducible subjective element isinherent in it. Weber notes that if an investigator attempts to study “Christianity” inthe Middle Ages, the investigation cannot even begin without an adequate definition of“Christianity” (or the “Middle Ages” for that matter). Weber notes that “Christianity” is

a combination of articles of faith, norms from church law and custom, maxims ofconduct, and countless concrete interrelationships which we have fused into an “idea.”It is a synthesis which we could not succeed in attaining with consistency without theapplication of ideal-type concepts. (OSS, 96)

Out of the “countless concrete relationships” that can be labeled “Christianity” (or the“Middle Ages”), the investigator has to explicitly identify the particular constellation ofrelationships that mean “Christianity” from his/her perspective. He/she can choose analready existing constellation that has been described as “Christianity” or offer anentirely new one. Whatever the case may be, the precise identity of the “Christianity”that the investigator seeks to study can only be expressed in the form of an ideal-type.It will obviously not be a copy of “Christianity” as an empirical phenomenon or adirect copy of such phenomena—the definition will be an abstract concept derivedfrom empirical reality, which will be used to conceptually master that reality. Webernotes that the investigator has a great deal of freedom when constructing the ideal-type:

For the purposes of characterizing a specific type of attitude, the investigator mayconstruct either an ideal-type which is identical with his own personal ethical norms,and in this sense objectively “correct,” or one which ethically is thoroughly in conflictwith his own normative attitudes; and he may then compare the behavior of the peoplebeing investigated with it. Or else he may construct an ideal-typical attitude of whichhe has neither positive nor negative evaluations. (MEN, 43)


This description of the manner in which the ideal-type is constructed reveals the“subjective” element in it. The “objective” character of the ideal-type is described byWeber in these words:

Whatever the content of the ideal-type, be it an ethical, a legal, an aesthetic, or areligious norm, or a technical, an economic, or a cultural maxim or any other type ofvaluation in the most rational form possible, it has only one function in an empiricalinvestigation. Its function is the comparison with empirical reality in order to establishits divergences or similarities, to describe them with the most unambiguously intelligibleconcepts, and to understand and explain them causally. (MEN, 43)

In other words, while the content of the ideal-type is largely determined by subjec-tive judgments on the part of the investigator, the manner in which the ideal-type isemployed in the investigation has to meet certain objective criteria. Weber notes:

In the method of investigation, the guiding “point of view” is of great importance forthe construction of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. In themode of their use, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of ourthought just as much here as elsewhere. (OSS, 84)

Weber describes the value and limitations of viewing empirical reality through theprism of ideal-types in these words:

All expositions of the “essence” of Christianity are ideal types enjoying only a necessar-ily very relative and problematic validity when they are intended to be regarded as thehistorical portrayal of empirically existing facts. On the other hand, such presentationsare of great value when they are used as conceptual instruments for comparison withand the measurement of reality. They are indispensable for this purpose. (OSS, 97)

Weber notes that there is an inherent danger in confusing (or conflating) the ideal-typewith empirical reality. This usually happens under the influence of a naturalisticconception of science or empirical reality where empirical reality is viewed as the effectof supra-empirical causes (i.e., “laws”). Weber notes that complications emergeduring the course of scientific inquiry that reintroduce “the naturalistic prejudicethat the goal of the social sciences must be the reduction of reality to ‘laws’ ” (OSS,101). For Weber, “laws” are nothing more than ideal-types that conceptuallyexpress “developmental sequences” that have been abstracted from empirical reality.He notes:

Developmental sequences too can be constructed into ideal types and these constructscan have quite considerable heuristic value. But this quite particularly gives rise to thedanger that the ideal type and reality will be confused with one another. (OSS, 101)

Weber carefully distinguishes between the two different senses of “ideal”—becausethis very confusion is the root cause of conflating the “ideal” (i.e., ideal-type) withthe “real” (i.e., empirical reality). In the term, “ideal-type,” the word “ideal” does notrefer to “a ‘model’ or what ‘ought’ to exist” (OSS, 92). He uses the word “ideal” in a


strictly logical sense in which constructing an ideal-type is

a matter of constructing relationships which our imagination accepts as plausiblymotivated and hence as “objectively possible” and which appear as adequate from thenomological standpoint. (OSS, 92)

This description of the ideal-type identifies both the subjective and objective elementsin the construct. Weber sees an intimate relationship between the ideal-type, theempirical reality that it is derived from (and helps to interpret), and the causalimputation that is offered with its aid. He notes:

An ideal-type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of viewand by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occa-sionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to thoseone-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild ).In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gendankenbild ) cannot be foundempirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. (OSS, 90)

The ideal-type is a purely abstract concept that cannot be found anywhere in empiricalreality, but it plays two critical roles in facilitating the scientific analysis of empiricalreality. It is

indispensable for heuristic as well as expository purposes. The ideal-typical concept willhelp to develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no “hypothesis” but it offersguidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aimsto give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. (OSS, 90)

In sum, the ideal-type: (a) is not “real” but facilitates the conceptually coherent analy-sis of empirical reality in its capacity as a heuristic device and (b) guides the forma-tion and articulation of the imputational hypothesis.

In its dual role, the ideal-type provides the objective criteria against which thesubjective element (personal experience and imagination of the investigator) inthe research program will be judged. Describing the objective delimiting role of theideal-type, Weber notes:

It is a conceptual construct (Gedankenbild ) which is neither historical reality nor eventhe “true” reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situationor action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideallimiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed forthe explication of certain of its significant components. Such concepts are constructsin terms of which we formulate relationships by the application of the category ofobjective possibility. By means of this category, the adequacy of our imagination,oriented and disciplined by reality, is judged. (OSS, 93)

While the ideal-type plays a delimiting role in judging the adequacy of the investiga-tor’s imagination and personal experience, the ideal-type cannot be accorded objec-tive (normative) status because it itself is limited by empirical factors. This is due tothe fact that the passage of time inevitably brings with it the shifting of evaluative


positions and this shift in evaluative positions changes the investigator’s relationshipwith empirical reality. The change in relationship renders certain conceptual appara-tuses and methodological approaches obsolete and requires the construction of newconcepts and employment of new methods. Weber notes:

It should be understood that since really definitive historical concepts are not in generalto be thought of as an ultimate end in view of the inevitable shift of the guiding value-ideas, the construction of sharp and unambiguous concepts relevant to the concreteindividual viewpoint which directs our interest in any given time, affords the possibilityof clearly realizing the limits of their validity. (OSS, 107)

Consequently, the ideal-type both limits human imagination and empirical reality,and is limited by human imagination and empirical reality. In sum, empirical realityhas the capacity to (and invariably eventually does) modify the conceptual andmethodological apparatus of scientific inquiry. It is only because this is the case(and only in such cases) that science is able to discover “new” dimensions, aspects,and meanings in/of empirical reality.

Unlike the historicist and Verstehen methods, for Weber, “objectively valid”scientific knowledge is not to be equated with “objectively certain” knowledge. Fromthe historicist perspective, all scientifically valid knowledge comes in the form alogically certain proposition—that is, “x (particular phenomenon) is the effect ofy (universal law)” or “y (universal law) will invariably cause x (particularphenomenon).” From the Verstehen perspective, all scientific valid knowledge comesin the form of an absolutely certain interpretive act—that is, “x (empirical fact) meansy (cultural value)” or “y (cultural value) invariably produces x (empirical fact).”In stark contrast, Weber’s causal interpretation expressed in the form of an imputationoffers “objectively possible” knowledge, not “objectively certain” knowledge. InWeber’s methodology, the “validity” of scientific knowledge is not to be equated with“certainty” but with “possibility.” In contradistinction to the causal explanation ofthe historicist method and the interpretive understanding of the Verstehen method,Weber’s imputation via causal interpretation can be expressed in the followingmanner: “In light of known ‘laws’ (x), if the observed phenomena has the followingproperties (y) then it probably means (z).” Or “In light of known ‘laws’ (x), if theobserved phenomena has the properties (y) then (z) will be the probable result.”Weber notes that an imputation as “the judgment of objective possibility . . . iscapable of a whole range of degrees of certainty” (LCS, 181). The confidence withwhich an imputation will be offered (and accepted) will inevitably be determined bythe established (known) track record of the objective elements (the performance ofknown “laws” and the ideal-types in previous inquiry) used in the construction ofthe imputation and the subjective strengths (interpretive imagination, etc.) of theindividual offering the imputation. Weber describes the elements and dynamics thatgo into constructing imputations or “judgments of possibility” in these words:

[T]here can be no doubt that it is a matter of isolation and generalization. This meansthat we do decompose the “given” into “components” [so] that every one of them isfitted into an “empirical rule”; hence, that it can be determined what effect each of


them, with others present as “conditions,” “could be expected” to have, in accordancewith an empirical rule. A judgment of “possibility” in the sense in which the expressionis used here, means, then, the continuous reference to “empirical rules” (Erfahrungsreglen).The category “possibility” is thus not used in its negative form . . . Rather, to thecontrary, it signifies here the reference to a positive knowledge of the “laws of events,”to our “nomological” knowledge . . . . (LCS, 173 ff.)

While it is offered as “possibility” when it is constructed, the validity of the imputa-tion is to be judged by empirical reality. If further observations of empiricalphenomena actually conform to the “possibility” that was imputed in the imputa-tion, then the tools, methods, and value ideas informing the imputation are affirmed.If the converse is the case, then these very things have to be reevaluated. In short, theimputation is an objectively possible hypothesis that is amenable to further empiri-cal (or inductive) tests. If the tests affirm the hypothesis, then it can be used to affirm(or construct) deductive “laws” for the further study of empirical reality.4

Weber’s exposition of the interplay of empirical reality and the conceptualapparatus of science (including the “subjective” input of the investigator) in theproduction of scientific knowledge reveals a reflexive relationship between the subjectcarrying out the inquiry (i.e., science) and the object of the inquiry (i.e., empiricalreality). Weber notes that the history of the development of the cultural sciencesshows itself to be a process of constant construction and reconstruction of theconceptual apparatus employed by science to apprehend and comprehend empiricalreality:

This process shows that in the cultural sciences concept-construction depends on thesetting of the problem, and the latter varies with the content of culture itself. Therelationship between concept and reality in the cultural sciences involves the transitori-ness of all such syntheses. The great attempts at theory-construction in our science werealways useful for revealing the limit of the significance of those points of view whichprovided their foundations. The greatest advances in the sphere of the social sciencesare substantively tied up with the shift in practical cultural problems and take the guiseof a critique of concept-construction. Adherence to the purpose of this critique andtherewith the investigation of the principles of syntheses in the social sciences shall beamong the primary tasks of our journal. (OSS, 105 ff.)

Insofar as empirical reality has the capacity to challenge and undermine the conceptsconstructed to understand it, and abstract concepts have the ability to provideknowledge about empirical reality that cannot be had from anywhere else, it is“among the primary tasks” of Weber’s journal (and scholarship) to critique any onto-logical distinction that is made between subject and object.

In contrast to the naturalistic understanding of causality where the conceptualapparatus and interpretive dynamics leading up to the claims of causality remainhidden and the subject/object dichotomy remains intact, causal imputation clearlydisplays the logical operations that lead up to its claims of causal interpretation.Because of the conflated understanding of causality on the part of the historicistand Verstehen methods, both approaches cannot adequately account for a veryimportant (and maybe all important) type of knowledge—problematic knowledge.Weber describes problematic knowledge, and the manner that it is dealt with


by naturalistic science in these words:

Those elements in each individual event which are left unaccounted for by the selectionof their elements subsumable under the “law” [or “intuition”] are considered scientifi-cally unintegrated residues which will be taken care of in the further perfection of thesystem of “laws” [or the further perfection of “intuitions”]. Alternatively they will beviewed as “accidental” and therefore scientifically unimportant because they do not fitinto the structure of “law” [or “intuition”] . . . . (OSS, 73)

By taking the position that problematic knowledge will be dealt with in the futureby the perfection of existing knowledge, or that problematic knowledge is scientifi-cally unimportant, naturalism directly obstructs the “discovery of the problematiccharacter of that standpoint” from which the knowledge claim has been made(OSS, 85). This makes naturalism immune to external, empirical criticism anddirectly blocks the further development of the scientific enterprise. The possibilitythat it is not the “problematic knowledge” that is problematic but rather the concep-tual apparatus or the value position being used to analyze the knowledge is a logicalimpossibility from the perspective of the historicist method and the Verstehenmethod, respectively. In stark contrast, the imputational standpoint sees problem-atic knowledge as having the ability and the right to make a demand on scienceto critically evaluate its own conceptual tools, research methods, and/or valueorientations.

Given the fact that scientific knowledge is by definition that which is liable tooutside (objective) critique the conflated understanding of causality cannot be thebasis of scientific knowledge because

the logical structure of knowledge is manifested only when it is problematic and itsempirical validity must be demonstrated in a concrete case. It is only a demonstrationwhich unconditionally requires the (relative) precision of concepts. (RK, 170)

Both the causal explanation offered by historicist science via universal laws andthe interpretive understanding offered by the Verstehen method via intuitive empa-thy see a linear, unidirectional relationship between objectively valid scientificknowledge (i.e., the subject) and empirical reality (i.e., the object). Objectively validscientific knowledge (in the form of universal laws or intuitive empathy) has theauthority to pass judgment on concrete experience and to shape the human under-standing of concrete experience. But in the naturalistic understanding of science,concrete experience in/of empirical reality does not have the capacity to modify thescientific framework through which that experience is being viewed and understood.Weber’s view of causal imputation rejects this linear, unidirectional relationshipbetween scientific inquiry (i.e., the subject) and concrete experience (i.e., the object).For Weber, concrete experience has the ability to correct and modify the tools, meth-ods, and value-ideas of scientific inquiry, just as much as, if not more than, scientificinquiry has the capacity to correct and modify human understanding of concreteexperience. In Weber’s exposition of the methodology of scientific inquiry, thedistinction between the inquiring subject (i.e., science) and the investigated object(i.e., empirical reality) is not absolute. This is obvious in light of Weber’s understanding


of the place of problematic knowledge in scientific inquiry. For Weber, problematicknowledge may (in some cases) indeed be scientifically unimportant, but moreimportantly (in other cases) it may be evidence of the fact that the “scientific” tools,method, and value-ideas that are being used to study empirical reality are in need ofrevision. Weber posits that it is novel, unexpected, and inexplicable experiences inempirical reality that guarantee the progress and growth of the cultural sciences:

The intellectual apparatus which the past has developed through the analysis, or moretruthfully, the analytical rearrangement of the immediately given reality, and throughwhich the latter’s integration by concepts which correspond to the state of its knowl-edge and the focus of its interest, is in constant tension with the new knowledge whichwe can and desire to wrest from reality. The progress of cultural science occurs throughthis conflict. Its result is the perpetual reconstruction of those concepts through whichwe seek to comprehend reality. (OSS, 105)

It is only by bridging the subject/object dichotomy that Weber can posit a reflexiverelationship between the “intellectual apparatus” of scientific inquiry, the empiricalreality that is studied and the culturally informed point of view from which this realityis studied. Weber describes the reflexive and dynamic relationship between thesecomponents of scientific inquiry with reference to the value of the ideal-type:

It serves as a harbor until one has learned to navigate safely in the vast sea of empiricalfacts. The coming of age of science in fact always implies the transcendence of the ideal-type, insofar as it was thought of as possessing empirical validity or as a class concept(Gattungsbegriff ) . . . there are sciences to which eternal youth is granted, and thehistorical disciplines are among them—all those to which the eternally onward flowingstream of culture perpetually brings new problems. At the very heart of their task liesnot only the transciency of all ideal types but also at the same time the inevitability ofnew ones. (OSS, 104)

The “eternally onward flowing stream of culture” constantly poses a challenge to theestablished “scientific” understanding and appreciation of culture by bringing to lightnew problems and contentions that have to be addressed. As new conditions pose newchallenges, they naturally demand the reevaluation of existing “objective” knowledgeclaims and “scientific” modes of inquiry. Weber notes that all scientific concepts andhypotheses are human constructions by the human mind. There is no reason whatso-ever to raise such historically and culturally determined constructions (or experiences)to the status of objectively valid, eternally universal truths. If anything, empirical real-ity and the human encounter with empirical reality (i.e., the objects of scientificinquiry) require not only a constant revaluation of these synthetic constructs, but alsothe reshaping of the foundations on which they are constructed (i.e., the subjectivestandpoint from which all scientific inquiry begins). In other words, scientific inquirydoes not merely study “objects out there” in the empirical world. All such study of“objects out there” is merely a means to an end—the critical valuation of the “subject”(i.e., science and the tools and methods it uses) that is doing the studying.

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Weber’s methodology bridges thesubject/object dichotomy on three different but related accounts. First, Weber


demonstrates that all scientific inquiry is composed of subjective elements (culturalvalues initiating and shaping the inquiry, the interpretive imagination of the investi-gator) and objective elements (known nomological regularities or “laws” and ideal-types).5 Second, Weber notes that all scientific truth or “objectively valid knowledge”is expressed in the form of an imputation that is “objective” in a very specific sense(it can be subject to critical scientific analysis) and also “subjective” in a very specificsense (it is a hypothesis—maybe even a work of art—constructed in the investiga-tor’s personal imagination).6 Third, scientific inquiry is an exercise in not merelyunderstanding, interpreting, explaining “objective” phenomena “out there.” In theend, the result of all such study is to produce better understanding and clarificationof the “subject” that is studying the “object” so that the “subject” (i.e., science) canmodify, refine, and revise its own tools, methods, and value-ideas.7

As was the case in the bridging of the fact/value dichotomy, the subject/objectdichotomy is not bridged by conflating the identity of the two elements, but bypositing (or imputing) a dynamic, reflexive relationship, between them. In imputingsuch a relationship, Weber simultaneously affirms the distinction and identity of thesubject and the object. The imputation of a relationship between the subject and theobject complements the imputation of a relationship between fact and value—andboth of these imputed relationships can, in turn, be used to impute the presence ofa bridge over the hairline that separates faith from science (identified in chapter 2).A reading of Weber that sees him positing only a hairline separation between faithand science and imputing a relationship between fact/value and subject/objectevidences the fact that Weber has significantly departed from Enlightenmentthought. In seeing Weber’s work as a departure from Enlightenment thought, novelpossibilities emerge regarding the significance of Weber’s work in the postmodernsetting. The next chapter explores these possibilities.



CHAPTER 5

DISENCHANTING DISENCHANTMENT: BRIDGING THE

SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY

Having looked at the “what?” and the “how?” of scientific inquiry, the discussionnow turns to the “why?”; more specifically to “why does a scientist undertake a scien-tific investigation of culture?” An exploration of the “why?” of scientific inquiry, asWeber understood the answer to this question, reveals that his scientifically validanswer to this question has an irreducible religious element in it. At the very end ofhis life, Weber wrote an “introduction” that was to be put at the beginning of hiscollected essays on the sociology of religion. In this “introduction,” he explicitlystates the value-idea that informed the trajectory of his scientific inquiry:

Any child of modern European culture will, unavoidably and justifiably, addressuniversal–historical themes with a particular question in mind: What combination ofcircumstances called forth the broad range of ideas and cultural forces that on the onehand arose in the West, and only in the West, and on the other hand stood—at leastas we like to imagine—in a line of historical development endowed in all civilizationswith significance and validity? (PESC, 149)

For Weber, two things are a given: (a) modern culture is characterized by a uniquely“developed” manifestation of a “broad range of ideas and cultural forces” and (b) an“underdeveloped” manifestation of these very same ideas and cultural forces is to befound in every human culture known to historians. The two givens taken togethermean that the completely disenchanted character of modern culture represents theactualization of a potential that is present in all known cultures—where all knowncultures had experienced only partial disenchantment. In his broad range of studiesrelated to “universal–historical themes,” Weber had one “particular question inmind.” Weber’s lifetime inquiry sought to identify those factors in modern Westernhistory that “caused” the universally latent potential of complete disenchantment ofculture to actualize itself in a particular (i.e., Weber’s own) historical–cultural situation.

The question emerges as to why Weber would spend his entire mature academiccareer investigating this particular subject, not some other. For Weber, an investigatortakes up the investigation of a particular subject because he/she seeks to better under-stand the factors that are challenging or undermining a particular value-commitmentthat he/she has (see section 2.1). Weber the scientist undertakes a scientific investigation

of the “causes” of disenchantment because Weber the human being is troubled bythe fact that disenchantment is challenging and undermining certain value-commitments that he considers worth having and affirming. Kalberg identifies thevalue-commitments that Weber felt were threatened by the unique modern manifes-tation of the universal–historical process of intellectualization and rationalization:

Weber viewed the political, economic and religious context out of which compassion,ethical action, and a reflective individualism had arisen in the West as having largelydisappeared, hence endangering their viability, answers to these queries becameespecially urgent. Would ethical values continue to orient human action? (PESC, lxiv)

For Kalberg, the immediacy of Weber’s concern with the effects of disenchantmenton the individual psyche and the place of ethical values in modern society “served tocall forth the Herculean motivations required” to undertake his study of the sociologyof religion (PESC, lxiv). In short, Weber was, as any intelligent and self-reflective“child” of modern culture would be, deeply concerned with the problematic thatdisenchantment was engendering. More so than almost any other “child” of modernculture, Weber sought to gain an “objective” and “scientific” understanding of disen-chantment by studying empirical reality—with the hope that this understandingwould prove to be meaningful in the attempt to remedy the problematic.

The foregoing suggests that Weber’s scholarship contains valuable resources if oneis committed to the value-idea that disenchantment needs to be disenchanted. Thiswould be naturally the case, given the fact that Weber had consciously recognized theproblematic nature of disenchantment long before it became academically fashionableto do so. With this as the background, the discussion now turns to the value ofWeber’s work in the postmodern period.1 The discussion in the previous threechapters offered a reading of Weber’s work that shows Weber to be simultaneouslycritiquing and correcting the disenchanting dichotomies of faith vs. science, fact vs.value, and subject vs. object. Viewing Weber’s methodology as breaking withEnlightenment dichotomies and establishing bridges opens up possibilities of investingWeber’s work with a value that cannot be invested in it if Weber is viewed as “a childof the Enlightenment born too late” (Wittenberg, 1989, 119). This can be illustratedby looking at two recent valuations of Weber’s work. Hekman (1994) and Gane(2001) note that the current resurgence of interest in Weber is in large part due to thefact that aspects of his thought can be appropriated in articulating a critique of themodern episteme (Hekman) and modern culture (Gane). But both of them go on tonote that the value of Weber’s work is limited to articulating a critique of the moderndisenchanted condition. For both of them, the value of Weber’s work does not extendto making a meaningful contribution to articulating a viable alternative to contem-porary disenchantment, because in the final analysis, they see Weber remainingcommitted to Enlightenment thought. In other words, they value Weber’s work onlyinsofar as it provides a useful description of the process of disenchantment, but theysee no value in Weber’s work in their task of articulating an alternative to disenchant-ment. A closer look at their work reveals that limiting the value of Weber’s work foronly a critique of the modern condition is not unrelated to Hekman’s and Gane’svaluation of Weber as being essentially an Enlightenment thinker.


Hekman notes that Weber “perceived that the positivist definition of scienceexcludes the social sciences” and he “brilliantly restructured the positivist program andrevealed the errors with regard to the social sciences” (Hekman, 1994, 268). Inrestructuring the positivist program, Weber created a space for the social scienceswithin the modern episteme. Hekman sees significant value in Weber’ work insofar asit critiques the positivist paradigm but she has strong reservations regarding the valueof Weber’s work in terms of offering a viable postmodern alternative to the modernepisteme. She posits that Weber’s critique of the positivist paradigm is done entirelywithin the categories of Enlightenment thought, and, as a result, Weber remainsfundamentally committed to the positivist paradigm. The evidence she offers for thisvaluation is that Weber remains committed to the fundamental Enlightenmentdichotomies:

Following the positivists Weber adheres to two key dichotomies of the modern episteme:subject/object and fact/value. His adherence to these two dichotomies structures hisphilosophy of social science as well as his ethics. (Hekman, 1994, 268)

She goes on to note “[b]ecause of Weber’s adherence to the central dichotomies ofEnlightenment thought he has no option but to accept the ‘iron cage’ of which hewrites” (Hekman, 1994, 269). For Hekman, the value of Weber’s work lies in the factthat “Weber can be seen as representing the last gasp of the modern episteme and,hence, pointing the way out of it” (Hekman, 1994, 268).

Gane’s valuation of Weber’s work is similar to that of Hekman. He argues thatwhile Weber’s work can be valued from a variety of different perspectives, his workhas the most to offer in terms of his theory and critique of modernity (i.e.,Weber’s disenchantment thesis). Speaking of Weber’s theory of modernity, Ganenotes:

This theory remains of great contemporary significance for it views the development andtrajectory of Western rationalism with a degree of pessimism, and connects the processof rationalization (the “secularization, intellectualization, and the systematization of theeveryday world”) to the loss of authentic meaning in modern life. (Gane, 2002, 2)

The fact that Weber’s work contains a theory and critique of modernity evidences that

there exists an implicit dialogue between postmodern theory and Weber, oneconcerning the trajectory of Western culture, and, more specifically, the cultural crisisthat has resulted from the rationalization and disenchantment of the world. (Gane,2001, 4)

For Gane, the dialogue between postmodern theory and Weber ends when thecritique of modernity concludes and the articulation of postmodern alternativesbegins. Like Hekman, Gane sees inherent limitations in Weber’s work that precludethe possibility of Weber making any meaningful contribution to the articulation ofa postmodern alternative to the modern condition. For Gane, limitations inherent inWeber’s work are due to the fact that he continues to work with and remain

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 121

committed to the modern order:

Weber’s work is distinctly modern in orientation, seeking not only to establish objectivehistorical facts that may be used to inform responsible value-judgments, but to placelimits on the development and uses of instrumental reason. Weber remains critical ofthe nature and trajectory of modernity, while at the same time working within andagainst the limits of this order. (Gane, 2002, 154)

While Weber’s response to the disenchantment and intellectualization of the worldis articulated from “within and against the limits” of modern culture, the

postmodern response to the rationalization and disenchantment of the world seeks,by contrast, not to work within the limits of modern reason but to transgressprecisely these limits through exposition of form of difference and otherness. (Gane,2002, 154)

Like Hekman, Gane notes that there is value in Weber’s work insofar as it canbe appropriated to critique the modern condition. But neither Hekman nor Ganesee anything of significant value in Weber’s work when it comes to articulating aviable postmodern alternative, because for both of them, Weber thought remainstrapped inside the modern/Enlightenment paradigm. The evidence presented inchapter 2 illustrates the fact that Weber’s work challenges the Enlightenment under-standing of the (non)relation between faith and science. The evidence presentedin chapters 3 and 4 establishes the fact that Weber’s methodology of the socialsciences bridges the fact/value and subject/object dichotomies. In light of theevidence presented in the previous three chapters, it can be asserted with confidencethat Weber’s work is not trapped inside the dichotomies of the Enlightenment, asHekman and Gane (among many others) have asserted. In the context of the presentdiscussion, this value presents itself in the form of valuing Weber’s work not just asa critique of the modern condition, but also as a resource that can positivelycontribute to formulating a viable postmodern alternative to the modern disen-chanted condition.

The present discussion begins by reviewing the analysis of Weber’s methodologyof the social sciences offered by Alexander (1983), Ringer (1997), and Ciaffa (1998).In contrast to Gane and Hekman, all three of these thinkers see Weber’s methodologybreaking out of the dichotomous logic of Enlightenment thought and formulating arelational logic. After detailing this point with reference to the works of Alexander,Ringer, and Ciaffa, the discussion returns to its origin—the concluding pages of“ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy.” The intent of this return to thebeginning in the concluding chapter is to glean some insights into Weber’s own viewregarding the fate of his work in a disenchanted age, from the perspective of his ownwork. Weber recognized the fact that his work would inevitably fall victim to theprocess of disenchantment (i.e., loss of meaning and significance) as it is subject toand used for rationalized, intellectualized inquiry. But in the end he held out thehope that his work, while being an expression and investigation of scientific ration-ality, would come to be valued in a uniquely modern, scientific way. Namely, that hisscientific work would contribute to the investing of meaning and significance into


human life and the human intellect in the not too distant future by paving the wayfor the disenchanting of disenchantment.

5.1 The Relational Character of Weber’s Methodology: Some Recent Valuations

The discussion in the previous two chapters presented the evidence to support theclaim that Weber’s methodology establishes a bridge over the hairline that separatesfaith from science by bridging the fact/value and subject/object dichotomies. Thesignificance of this achievement can be better appreciated by putting his insightsabout the methodology of scientific inquiry into comparative and historical perspec-tive. This perspective in its turn has to be viewed in relation to the value-orientationthat informed Weber’s scientific inquiry in the first place. Whereas a number ofWeber scholars have described how Weber’s methodology bridges one or the other ofthe aforementioned dichotomies, the fact that he has bridged more than one of thedichotomies is often overlooked. This seriously detracts from appreciating the signif-icance of Weber’s achievement because there is an intimate relationship between thebridging of the three dichotomies as one is rooted in (or leads to) the bridging of theother two. Some scholars, who have studied Weber’s methodology of the socialsciences, anticipate the direction that the discussion presently takes. Alexander(1983) focuses his attention on the fact that Weber’s methodology bridges the mate-rialist vs. idealist dichotomy, Ringer (1997) on the bridging of the object vs. subjectdichotomy, and Ciaffa (1998) on the bridging of the fact vs. value dichotomy. Thediscussion builds upon the insights of these three scholars by bringing their respec-tive insights into relation with each other, thereby preparing the groundwork forreturning back to viewing Weber’s work from the perspective of the value-orientationthat shaped his scientific inquiry.

Alexander summarizes Weber’s achievement in these words:

In the mature sociology that began after the breakdown period, Weber achieved atheoretical synthesis never before achieved, indeed, never even attempted by the otherfounders of classical sociology [i.e., Marx and Durkheim]. He converted the idealistand materialist traditions into analytic strands of a more inclusive multidimensionalorder, so that instead of choosing between them he would devote his sociology to estab-lishing the nature of their interrelations. (Alexander, 1982, III, 126)

Looking at the issue from the point of view of the logic and methodology of thesocial sciences, the scientific study culture was dominated by either one of twoone-dimensional theories in Weber’s immediate intellectual milieu. These one-dimensional theories expressed themselves in the form of the materialism of Marxianmethodology and the idealism of Durkheimian methodology. For Alexander, Marx’swork is characterized by an overemphasis on the material factors in the formation ofculture and society, while Durkheim’s work is characterized by an overemphasis onthe ideal factors. Alexander notes that while both Marx and Durkheim makeinvaluable contributions to the advancement of the scientific study of culture, theirrespective works suffer from a serious shortcoming because of this one-dimensionalcharacter. He goes on to describe the fate of the pioneering insights of Marx


and Durkheim:

The most important students of Marx, . . ., can be seen as moving toward“Durkheimian” propositions at every turn. Durkheim’s students . . . moved in exactlythe opposite direction. They embraced, partially and inconsistently to be sure, the kindof materialist notions associated with Marx. (Alexander, 1982, II, 370)

The fact that neither Marxian materialism nor Durkheimian idealism provides asufficiently adequate model for the study of society and culture is clearly evidencedby the “history of equivocation and revision in the idealist and materialist traditionsof classical sociology” (Alexander, 1982, II, 370). For Alexander, the work of Weberhas to be viewed from the perspective of this impasse at the level of the theoreticallogic underpinning the dominant approaches in the study of the social/culturalsciences. Alexander goes on to note that in the place of the established, materialist,and idealist modes of inquiry,

[w]e would do well . . . to seek a theoretical mode that starts from a multidimensionalpremise. Only such a more inclusive theory, it would seem, can produce a trulysatisfactory explanation of the complexity of social life. The classical proponent of thiseffort of integration was Max Weber. (Alexander, 1982, II, 370)

Alexander argues that a close study of Weber’s early work, produced between 1889and 1897, reveals that

Weber has initiated in his early writings an extraordinarily significant break with theone-dimensional traditions of sociological thought, a rupture that may even, in Hegel’slanguage, be called “world historical.” (Alexander, 1982, III, 16)

While there were some proponents of the idealist position who were trying toincorporate elements of the materialist position into their work, and there were someproponents of the materialist position trying to incorporate elements of the idealistposition, there was no one like Weber. Consequently the “theoretical synthesis”achieved by Weber in his mature writings was not so much a novel development inhis thought, as it was the conscious articulation and systematization of an approachthat he had already adopted in his earliest work. Even when Weber was writing onthe history of law and economics prior to his nervous breakdown, his approach to thesubject was characterized by a “dual attitude of incorporation and critique”(Alexander, 1982, III, 6) of the materialist and idealist strands in the study of societyand culture. Alexander notes:

It would not be entirely inappropriate to see the early Weber—in terms of theoreticallogic, not actual history—as a “Durkheimian revisionist” awkwardly coupling power-ful norms with efficacious interests . . . Yet an analogy with Marxist revisionism wouldbe even more to the point . . . To escape his inheritance from the German Idealisttradition, Weber embraced instrumental kinds of theorizing, both in their Realpolitikand Marxian forms. (Alexander, 1982, III, 17)


Alexander offers this evaluation of Weber’s work by looking at the character ofWeber’s early writings, not Weber’s explicit statements on the methodology of thesocial sciences. Prior to his nervous breakdown in 1897, Weber did not produce anexplicit statement on the theory or methodology of the social sciences. But in theimmediate aftermath of his recovery from the breakdown (beginning in 1902),Weber produced explicit statements outlining the salient characters of his methodol-ogy of the social sciences.

The “first essays of [Weber’s] maturity” are concerned with issues of the logic andmethodology of the social and cultural sciences (Alexander, 1982, III, 23). Weberundertakes a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the cultural and socialsciences with full awareness of and in response to the fact that “[r]adical shifts” havetaken place “in the points of view which constitute any item as an object of investi-gation” (RK, 15). Even though these developments (in the form of “radical shifts”)have taken place outside the domain of the cultural and social sciences (i.e., in theareas of philosophy and logic), they have a direct bearing on the manner in whichscientific investigation of culture is to be carried out. This is due to the fact that thesedevelopments “require a revision of the logic of scientific research that has hithertoprevailed within the discipline” (RK, 15). It is under these conditions, and in thistime period (i.e., 1902–1905) that

Weber is better able to articulate his alternative to the idealist and materialist traditionsfrom which he has broken . . . Weber achieves in his later works the first truly syntheticstrand of sociological theory, a multidimensional analysis in which he is fundamentallyreconstructing idealist and materialist theory rather than simply “drawing upon” them.(Alexander, 1982, III, 23)

Whereas Alexander looks at Weber’s achievement from the perspective of theoreticallogic in the area of sociology and producing “the first truly synthetic strand ofsociological inquiry,” Ringer offers a historical valuation of Weber’s achievementfrom the perspective of Weber’s own cultural and intellectual milieu. Even thoughAlexander and Ringer are evaluating Weber from two different perspectives, theconclusions they reach are very similar. While Alexander sees Weber “fundamentallyreconstructing idealist and materialist theory rather than simply ‘drawing upon’them,” Ringer notes:

One way to appreciate Max Weber’s extraordinary achievement as a methodologist ofthe cultural and social sciences is to understand him historically, in relation to his ownintellectual field. Seen in that way, Weber perfectly typifies the clarifying critic whorestates, rationalizes, and thus partly transcends the assumptions of his own culture.(Ringer, 1997, 168)

As a clarifying critic, Weber’s originality and genius “must be conceived as the criti-cal revision of an intellectual heritage, rather than the ‘creation’ of a ‘new idea’—orthe linear continuation of an established tradition” (Ringer, 1997, 169). Weber’sintellectual and cultural milieu was largely defined by the critical idealism of the neo-Kantian school, and by the materialist interpretation of history of the historicist


method. Weber’s attitude toward both positions was one of critical appropriation andintegration of selected aspects of both positions. Ringer notes that while Weber “tookMarx very seriously” on a number of different levels, he

flatly rejected the notion that all causal connections in history can “ultimately” betraced back to economic conditions, however defined, or that all historical processes areessentially unidirectional. (Ringer, 1997, 151)

Ringer goes on to argue that Weber’s “rejection” of historical materialism “should notbe overinterpreted to mean that Weber championed the primacy of ‘spiritual’ forces,historical ‘idealism,’ or the creative role of ‘great men’ in history” (Ringer, 1997,151)—that is, idealism in its various forms. Ringer supports this contention by notingthe fact that Weber does not consider “ideas” or “spirit” as being the determinants ofhistorical developments. He does this by quoting an oft cited passage from Weber’swork, and noting that this passage “should be read quite literally” (Ringer, 1997, 153):

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet veryfrequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen,determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.(SPWR, 280)

If this passage is read literally, it is clear that Weber’s “rejection” of the materialistinterpretation of history does not mean that he has embraced the idealist position.This passage simultaneously rejects the materialist and idealist positions, whileembracing important elements from both and positing a reflexive relationshipbetween the two. It is Weber’s ability to both critique and clarify the prevalent oppos-ing tendencies in his intellectual and cultural milieu that allows him to articulate aposition that integrates the materialist and idealist positions. Ringer describes theimplications of Weber’s synthesis of the idealist and materialist positions in thesewords:

One of Max Weber’s greatest achievements was his integration of two divergentperspectives that have divided theorists and practitioners of the historical, social, andcultural sciences since the nineteenth century. (Ringer, 1997, 1)

In more specific terms, the integration was of “two lines of analysis [which] may becalled the ‘interpretive’ and the ‘explanatory’ approaches” (Ringer, 1997, 1). Weber’sinsights made it possible to integrate intuitive interpretive understanding advocatedby the proponents of the Verstehen method with causal explanation advocated by theproponents of the historicist method. While Weber’s achievement was a response tothe conditions and crises that were characteristic of his own intellectual milieu,Ringer posits that the value of this achievement becomes even more significant inlight of the fact that it contains valuable resources that can address many contemporaryproblematics:

Weber may help us to navigate the maelstrom of multiple definitions, thoughtless ordeliberate conflations, and irrelevant factual claims that have accumulated around the


false antitheses of “interpretation” and “explanation,” the “humanities” (or “culturalsciences”) and the “social sciences,” the “objective” and “subjective.” (Ringer, 1997, 174)

Weber’s work contains resources that can do more than just “help us navigate themaelstrom of multiple definitions” surrounding the interpretation/explanation,social/cultural and subject/object dichotomies. Ciaffa details the implications ofWeber’s synthesis on the fact/value dichotomy. For Ciaffa, the fact that Weber is ableto simultaneously critique and appropriate the idealism of his neo-Kantian teachersand the positivism of his historicist colleagues makes it possible for him to bridge thefact/value dichotomy. The neo-Kantians posited that the social and cultural sciencesare “to be methodologically distinguished from the natural sciences by virtue of thefact [that they] are uniquely and essentially ‘value relevant’ ” (Ciaffa, 1998, 22). Thepositivists on the other hand argued that, in order for the social and cultural sciencesto attain the status of “science,” they must remain dedicated to the study of facts andremain completely and unambiguously free of the influence of any nonscientificvalues. Ciaffa notes that the proponents of value-freedom posit that

extrascientific values, even those that embody our most basic beliefs about what is just,moral, etc . . . need not and should not influence the procedures whereby scientifictheories are formed and assessed. (Ciaffa, 1998, 20)

Ciaffa goes on to note that Weber’s position regarding the issues of value-relevanceand value-freedom is shaped by and in response to

an ostensible conflict between its two principal theses, with one thesis accordingcultural values an essential function in the logic of social scientific inquiry, and theother asserting that the social sciences must remain value-free as regards social issues.(Ciaffa, 1998, 23)

While almost all of his contemporaries were decisively coming down on the side ofeither value-freedom or value-relevance, Weber formulated a methodological posi-tion that integrated these opposing strands. Ciaffa notes, “Weber refuses to concedeany conflict between his two most basic methodological theses, and repeatedlyasserts that social science is both value-free and value-related ” (Ciaffa, 1998, 23).Ciaffa sees Weber advocating value-freedom at the practical level, and value-relevance at the methodological level. At the practical level, the social and culturalsciences cannot and should not “validate moral and political claims” (Ciaffa, 1998,14)—or any other value-judgments for that matter (see chapter 3). But at the levelof methodology, Weber acknowledges, accepts, and conceptually delimits “theinfluence of shifting sociocultural values on the social sciences” (Ciaffa, 1998, 14).Weber’s position simultaneously bridges and dissolves the “[s]tandard appeals to thefact/value distinction” (Ciaffa, 1998, 21). What makes Weber’s achievement evenmore significant in this regard is the fact that his position “implies neither a collapseof scientific objectivity in the methodological spheres, nor a capitulation to irra-tionalism in the domain of practical reflection” (Ciaffa, 1998, 157). For Ciaffa, it isimportant to keep this in mind when engaging with Weber’s work so that one doesnot interpret Weber in a way that is a reflection of one’s own misreading, rather than


the position being advocated by Weber. Ciaffa notes that there is more than enoughevidence in

the body of Weber’s methodological work [that] is adequate to counteract the moreorthodox readings of Weber as (1) an advocate of the positivist ideal of value-freedom,and (2) a blatant ethical noncognitivist [i.e. idealist]. (Ciaffa, 1998, 157)

After noting that he has “interpreted Weber’s work ‘selectively,’ in accordance withmy own interests and interests of the present intellectual milieu” (Ciaffa, 1998, 158),he goes on to note that the manner in which Weber navigates the positivist/idealistdivide holds great potential for shedding light on contemporary debates:

I would hope that [Weber] might also appreciate my attempt to bring his work intodialogue with contemporary reflection on the metascientific issues that concerned himmost, and that he might further concur . . . that his work has much more to offercontemporary discussions than has been recognized thus far. In my view, this isespecially true with regard to two philosophical fronts that continue to take shape oneither side of neonormativist critical theory—i.e., those that represent the lingeringpositivist challenge, on the one hand, and the historicist challenge of “postmodern”thought, on the other. (Ciaffa, 1998, 158)

In his own way, Ciaffa is affirming the valuation of Weber’s work offered by Ringerand Alexander before him. The common theme running through the reading ofWeber by these three scholars is that they interpret his work as breaking from theestablished dichotomies of idealism/materialism (Alexander), subject/object(Ringer), and fact/value (Ciaffa). Both in theory (in his writings on the methodol-ogy of the social sciences) and in practice, Weber employed a relational methodologythat viewed idealism/materialism, fact/value, and subject/object as two intimately(and ultimately) related poles at the end of a spectrum, not as mutually exclusivepoles at the end of a dichotomy. In light of these relational valuations of Weber, twoexplanations can be offered for the fact that Weber’s work has been almost alwaysinterpreted as the expression of Enlightenment dichotomies. First, there is that factthat Weber expressed his ideas and the value-positions in the language of “dichoto-mous logic that informs, or deforms, much of the later work” (Alexander, 1983, III,129). Not being a philosopher or logician himself, he had to employ the languageand terms provided to him by the specialists in these disciplines. Consequently, helacked the specialists’ technical language in which to express the relational logic onwhich his methodology of the social sciences is based. Second, and perhaps moreimportant, the individuals interpreting Weber’s work have done so from a particularperspective and it is this perspective that deforms Weber’s work.

A relational reading of Weber (in contrast to dichotomous reading) makes itpossible to see Weber’s work as a valuable resource for not only critiquing certainaspects of the modern disenchanted condition, but also for articulating a postmod-ern2 alternative. Given Weber’s stance in the value-freedom/value-relevance debate inthe Werturteilsstreit and the subject/object debate in the Methodenstreit, it is safe tosay that any Weberian postmodern alternative will not be a negation of the modernbut a critical appropriation of certain aspects of the modern. Given the fact that


Weber’s work contains rich possibilities for contributing to a postmodern alternative,the question emerges as to why this potential was not recognized earlier—and whyit remains largely unappreciated even now. The concrete evidence for the postmodernvalue of Weber’s work can be demonstrated by looking at this issue from theperspective of Weber’s own writings. This perspective will reveal that it is difficult toproduce another causal explanation for the fate that has befallen Weber’s work, ofequal or better explanatory power than the description given by Weber himself.

5.2 Two Possibilities of Progress: Disenchantment and Self-Awareness

The relational reading of Weber’s methodology presented in the previous threechapters began with the beginning of the concluding section of Weber’s essay titled,“ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy.” He began his conclusion bynoting that the whole purpose of the preceding discussion was to identify and delin-eate “the course of the hair-line which separates science from faith” (OSS, 112).Weber goes on to describe the fate of the cultural sciences in an era where faith andscience come to be viewed as being separated by an unbridgeable abyss rather than ahairline. In offering this description in the final paragraph of “ ‘Objectivity’ in SocialScience and Social Policy,” Weber is describing the fate of his own scholarly achieve-ments as much as he is offering a description of the cultural sciences in general:

All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization, once it is orientedtowards a given subject matter through particular setting of problems and hasestablished its methodological principles, will consider the analysis of the data as an endin itself. It will discontinue assessing the value of the individual facts in terms of theirrelationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed, it will lose its awareness of its ultimaterootedness in the value-ideas in general. (OSS, 112)

Given Weber’s description of disenchantment as the fate of the times, it is not at allsurprising that, “in an age of specialization,” the cultural sciences will eventually cometo “consider the analysis of data as an end in itself ” and will “discontinue assessing thevalue of individual facts in terms of the relationship to ultimate value-ideas.” This “ageof specialization” is a specific expression of the disenchantment of modern culture andboth are characterized by the loss of “awareness of . . . ultimate rootedness in . . .value-ideas in general”—that is, the loss of meaning and significance. As detailed inchapter 1, the progress of scientific rationality makes it inevitable that facts becomedivorced from value-ideas and come to be rationally analyzed in their own immanentterms. The divorce of facts from values is only the most overarching manifestation ofa process where the progress of scientific rationality makes the emergence, differenti-ation, and drive toward rationalized autonomy of different value spheres inevitable.The cultural sciences are a victim of disenchantment no less than other aspects ofmodern culture—and Weber’s particular contribution to these sciences is no less thanany other scholar’s contribution. Disenchantment in this context means not only thedivorce of fact from value, but the further divorce of particular facts from the generalbody of facts. After noting that cultural science will eventually “lose its awareness ofits ultimate rootedness in value-ideas,” Weber goes on to note that “it is well that


it should be so” (OSS, 112). This sense of resignation on Weber’s part is not so mucha value judgment as a description of the relationship between “progress” and theimpulse toward fragmentation, differentiation, and rationalized autonomy.

Even though up till this point “progress” has been identified with specialization,differentiation, and the demise of meaning and significance, a closer look at Weber’swork reveals that there is a very different possibility inherent in the process of“progress”—that is, increased self-awareness and capacity for communication. Beforedetailing this point further, it would be most helpful to look at what “progress” doesnot mean for Weber. In very strong terms, Weber asserts that it is obviously clear andscientifically demonstrable that “progress” does not mean knowing “more” or know-ing “better” than the individuals and epochs that have not experienced “progress.”The following passage is worth quoting at length because it spells out Weber’sposition on this issue clearly. Talking about the meaning of scientific progress andhow it should be understood, Weber addresses his audience directly:

Does it mean that we, today, for instance, everyone sitting in this hall, have greaterknowledge of the conditions of life under which we exist than has an American Indianor a Hottentot? Hardly. Unless he is a physicist, one who rides on the streetcar has noidea how the car happened to get into motion. And he does not need to know . . .The savage knows incomparably more about his tool. When we spend money todayI bet that even if there are colleagues in political economy here in the hall, almost everyone of them will hold a different answer in readiness to the question: How does ithappen that one can buy something for money—sometimes more and sometimes less?The savage knows what he does in order to get his daily food and which institutionsserve him in this pursuit. The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not,therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under whichone lives. (SV, 139)

Weber’s assertion that “progress” does not imply knowing more or knowing betterprovides the background against which his value-neutral description of “progress” isformulated. He provides the means of understanding “progress” and its relationshipto fragmentation and differentiation in the context of his discussion on ethicalneutrality, where he offers a value-neutral description of progress.

One can naturally use the term “progress” in an absolutely non evaluative way if oneidentifies it with the “continuation” of some concrete process of change viewed inisolation. (MEN, 27)

Weber goes on to detail the nonevaluative description of “progress” insofar as one canspeak of the progress “in the ‘scope’ or ‘capacity’ of a concrete ‘mind’ or . . . of an‘epoch’ ” (MEN, 27):

In the sphere of the emotional, affective content of our own subjective behavior, thequantitative increase and . . . the qualitative diversification of the possible modes ofresponse can be designated as the progress of psychic “differentiation” without referenceto any evaluations. (MEN, 27)

Without passing any value judgments as to whether it is a good thing or a bad thing,progress as psychic differentiation refers to the “quantitative increase and qualitative


diversification of the possible modes of response” of an individual, society, culture,epoch, and so on, as it reacts to the varying challenges and opportunities that itscultural environment presents. Weber uses the term “progressive differentiation” todescribe this particular manifestation of “progress” and notes that “undoubtedly sucha ‘progressive differentiation’ does exist” (MEN, 28). But Weber cautions that whileincreased responsiveness is indicative of progressive differentiation, it should not beconfused or conflated with it:

An increased responsiveness to nuances—due sometimes to the increased rationalizationand intellectualization of life and sometimes to the increase in the amount of impor-tance which the individual attributes to all his actions (even the least significant)—canvery often lead to the illusion of progressive differentiation. This responsiveness can, ofcourse, either indicate or promote this progressive differentiation . . . Be that as it may,[progressive differentiation] exists, and whether one designates progressive differentia-tion as “progress” is a matter of terminological convenience. (MEN, 28)

Up till this point, Weber has made the case for the existence of progressive differen-tiation, that is, the “quantitative and qualitative diversification of the possible modesof response,” from a scientific, rational perspective. The ability for increased respon-siveness evidences a more developed and differentiated psyche (MEN, 27). Thisnuanced description of a more developed psyche has to be carefully distinguishedfrom, and purged of any value judgments. Weber notes that when speaking of“progress” one must not attach any value judgments to it:

But as to whether one should evaluate it as “progress” in the sense of an increase in“inner richness” cannot be decided by any empirical discipline. The empiricaldisciplines have nothing at all to say about whether the various possibilities in thesphere of feeling which have just emerged or which have been recently raised to thelevel of consciousness and the new “tensions” and “problems” which are often associ-ated with them are to be evaluated in one way or another. (MEN, 28)

Even though one cannot speak of the value of “progress” or “progressive differentia-tion” in a judgmental and normative sense, one can speak of it in an intellectualistsense. Weber notes:

In the sphere of the evaluation of subjective experience, “progressive differentiation” is tobe identified with an increase in “value” only in the intellectualist sense of an increase inself-awareness or of an increasing capacity for expression and communication. (MEN, 28)

The fact that one can only speak of the value of “progress” in an intellectualist sensemeans that practically speaking, “increase in self-awareness or . . . an increasing capac-ity of expression and communication” is a possibility but not a necessity that could bethe result of “progress.” Even though Weber is speaking in a slightly different context,the point that he makes in the following passage is relevant to the relationshipbetween progressive differentiation and increased self-awareness/self-expression:

[N]ot every “progressive” step in the use of “correct” means is achieved by “progress” insubjective rationality. An increase in subjectively rational conduct can lead toobjectively more “efficient” conduct but it is not inevitable. (MEN, 35)


Just as the “progress” of subjective rationality makes more efficient conduct possiblewithout necessitating it, progressive differentiation makes increased self-awarenessand capacity for self-expression possible but does not necessitate it. Consequently,increased self-awareness and self-expression are possibilities inherent in progressivedifferentiation. These possibilities have to be considered (and accounted for) along-side the possibilities of disenchantment and the loss of meaning that are also inherentin the progress of scientific rationality. In sum, the two possibilities of progress anddifferentiation are:

(a) increasing disenchantment;(b) increasing self-awareness and capacity for self-expression.

Which of the two possibilities actually obtains in a particular case depends on thevalue-ideas informing the action of the actor and the historical/cultural conditionsshaping the actor’s environment.

Weber goes on to note that the latent potential for increased self-awareness andself-expression in the aftermath of progressive differentiation is actualized as a resultof the shift in the cultural standpoint from which (or in which) scientific inquiry istaking place. After noting that the cultural sciences are fated to lose the “awarenessof [their] ultimate rootedness in value-ideas” thereby bringing the process of progres-sive differentiation to its culmination in the form of disenchantment, and thensaying that “it is well that should be so”—because this is the inescapable fate in theage of disenchantment—Weber goes on to note:

But there comes a moment when the atmosphere changes. The significance ofunreflectively utilized viewpoints becomes uncertain and the road is lost in the twilight.The light of the great cultural problems moves on. Then science too prepares to changeits standpoint and its analytical apparatus. (OSS, 112)

A change in the “atmosphere,” that is, the cultural and historical circumstances inwhich scientific inquiry is taking place, can initiate a reevaluation of the “unreflec-tively utilized viewpoints” that had been determining the character and trajectory ofthe inquiry. Even though “the road is lost in the twilight” of specialized, intellectu-alized, differentiated inquiry, Weber argues that science has an internal need andlogic all its own that causes it to eventually revolt against such a tendency, becausescientific inquiry is ultimately led out of the twilight by the “light of the greatcultural problems.” It is important to recall that, for Weber, science is not somethingthat merely shapes our study of empirical reality; science is something that remainsopen to empirical reality and is shaped by it (see section 4.3). The encounter withnovel cultural problems impels science to free itself from being subject to and usedfor meaningless specialized, intellectualized, and rationalized inquiry that is divorcedfrom concerns about ultimate value-ideas, and “change its standpoint” and “analyti-cal apparatus.” At this point, science revolts against progress as disenchantment,engages in critical self-reflection, and makes progress in the form of increased self-awareness and self-expression. Weber ends the discussion on the editorial line to beadopted by one of the most well-known journals in the history of the social sciences


in a most “unscientific” or “irrational” way—affirming his own “rational,” “scientific”observation about empirical reality by citing a quatrain from the greatest German poet:

[Science] follows those stars which alone are able to give meaning and direction toits labors:

. . . der neue Trieb erwacht,Ich eile fort, ihr ewiges Licht zu trinken,Vor mir den Tag und under mir die Nacht,Den Himmel uber mir unter mir die Wellen.3 (OSS, 112)

In sum, Weber is arguing that science will eventually follow that path which is ableto invest scientific inquiry with meaning, significance, and value. This is somethingthat specialized, intellectualized, rationalized inquiry simply cannot do.Consequently, the investing of such meaning, significance, and value will come fromcultural standpoints that are outside (or seek to stand outside) the disenchantedworldview. But such standpoints will have to be able to accept and integrate scienceinto their worldview on science’s own terms. In other words, while science will followthat path which is able to invest it with meaning, significance, and value, it is equallythe case that science will follow only that path (or be amenable with that culturalstandpoint) which has the capacity to embrace scientific rationality on two different(but related) accounts. First, the path (or cultural standpoint) will have to affirm thevalidity, value, and uniqueness of scientific knowledge. Second, the path will have toaccept the value and validity of rational and scientific inquiry/evaluation of its ownunderstanding of meaning, significance, and value judgments.

Establishing such a relationship between science and cultural standpoints will notbe the result of specialized, intellectualized, rationalized inquiry—it will be the resultof the work of an artist. For Weber, the artist who is able to breathe new life into thecultural sciences in the disenchanted age will be someone who is able to relate thealready known facts of science, with already known values of culture. Weber notesthat “genuine artistry . . . manifests itself through its ability to produce newknowledge by interpreting known facts according to known viewpoints” (OSS, 112).This means that the individual will be able to establish a relationship between scienceas a fact (and study of facts) with already known value-ideas (and the source of value-ideas). The latter will obviously belong to extra-scientific spheres. The genuineartistry of the artist rests in the fact that he/she is able to establish a mutually enrich-ing relationship between two poles that everyone else interprets as being two ends ofa mutually exclusive dichotomy—in other words, the artist sees relational dualitywhere others see irreconcilable dichotomies. Establishing this relationship betweenthe two poles in the aftermath of progressive differentiation means that both polesin the relationship gain greater self-awareness of their respective scope and limitation.It also means that both are able to express themselves more coherently and rationallywhen clarifying their own positions regarding their scope and limitations, as well asany concerns they may have regarding the claims of the other pole. The possibilityof progressive differentiation leading to heightened self-awareness and self-expressionrepresents an alternative to progressive differentiation leading to disenchantment andmeaninglessness.4 The following section explores the “progress” of Weber studies


with a view to determining which of the two possibilities of “progress” has actuallyobtained with respect to Weber’s scholarship.

5.3 The “Progress” of Weber Scholarship: From Disenchantment to Self-Awareness

Given the possibility of progress as disenchantment and meaninglessness and progressas heightened self-awareness and self-expression, the discussion now turns back to avaluation of Weber’s work. How can one view the “progress” in Weber studies sinceWeber’s death in 1920? The fact that Weber’s own scholarship has experienced“progress” cum fragmentation and differentiation is obvious from even a cursory glanceat the development of Weber studies after Weber’s death. Developments in the studyand analysis of Weber’s work have been characterized by progressive fragmentation,beginning with the divorce between the fact of his scholarly output and the values thatinformed it (i.e., the deep angst about disenchantment as a problematic). Beyond thedivorce of fact from value, the particular facts of his scholarship (understood as differ-ent subject areas of study in the present context) have been divided into two broad,mutually exclusive categories: the sociology of culture and the methodology of thesocial sciences. This dichotomous reading of Weber’s corpus has been further exacer-bated by a further subdivision of his sociology and methodology. His sociology ofculture has been divided into the sociology of religion, sociology of music, sociology ofpolitics, sociology of law, and so on and so forth. His methodology of the socialsciences has been subdivided into the categories of value-freedom/relevance, conceptformation, ideal types, and so on and so forth. The sheer scope and breadth of Weber’sscholarly output is such that some scholars have considered it a major undertaking toidentify a unifying theme in one collection of his work—for example, Tenbruk lookingfor thematic unity in Weber’s Economy and Society (Tenbruk, 1980). Others have writ-ten major works with the explicit intention of bringing thematic coherence to Weber’scorpus—for example, Bendix (1962). Bendix’s undertaking is more daunting than thatof Tenbruk because his explicit intention “has been to make Weber’s sociological workmore accessible and more thematically coherent than it is either in the original or intranslation” (Bendix, 1962, ix). Bendix’s undertaking is quite daunting indeed giventhe fact that (at least in his own mind) he brings thematic coherence to Weber’s workwhere even Weber failed to do so. But like Tenbruk, Bendix consciously focuses hisattention on one aspect of Weber’s corpus, that is, Weber’s sociological work, and quitedeliberately leaves aside the methodological writings. And neither of them meaning-fully or coherently address Weber’s value-orientation that shaped his scientific study ofsociological facts—that is, Weber’s profound personal concern with the disenchant-ment of modern culture and its implications. The examples of Tenbruk and Bendix5

are cited here only to illustrate the fact that “progress” in the area of Weber studies hasbeen characterized by the fragmentation and differentiation of different aspects ofWeber’s scholarship no less than the fragmentation and differentiation of other areas ofmodern culture.

Even though the dominant voices in Weber scholarship have seen Weber’s workto be fraught with dichotomies and ambiguities, the valuations offered by Alexander,Ringer, and Ciaffa show Weber to be an artist par excellence who is masterfully


establishing relationships between already known facts and already known viewpoints. The work of these three Weber scholars provides the building blocks that canbe used to construct a more coherent and meaningful interpretation of Weber’s work.Each of the three thinkers focuses on one aspect of Weber’s artistry—Alexander onthe idealist/realist part, Ringer on the subject/object part, and Ciaffa on thefact/value part. While the particular relational reading of Weber offered by each ofthe three is valuable in and of itself, its true significance is highlighted only when itis read in relation with the other two readings. Weber’s positing of a relationaldynamic between subject and object instead of a dichotomy is dependent on (orresults in) his positing a similar relationship between fact and value. Both of theserelationships, in turn, are dependent on (or result in) his positing a relationaldynamic between the materialist and idealist poles.

While the progressive differentiation of Weber studies since his death has ledmostly to the excessive intellectualization and rationalization of his scholarly legacy,it has also created the possibility of a deeper understanding of the meaning andsignificance of his work as well as a more “rational” (i.e., systematic) expression ofthis deeper understanding. This is evidenced by the fact that the readings of Weberoffered by Alexander, Ringer, and Ciaffa explicitly posit a relational understandingof Weber’s corpus, in response to interpretations that see Weber’s corpus as beinga polyglot of differentiated, unrelated, specialized studies. These three thinkersproduce their reading of Weber not just by directly engaging with Weber’s text, butby engaging with Weber’s texts in light of (or in response to) the earlier differenti-ated and specialized studies/interpretations of Weber. In other words, the progressivedifferentiation of Weber’s intellectual legacy has created the conditions and openedthe possibility of uncovering/appreciating an alternative post-Enlightenment,relational reading of Weber’s work to replace the predominant Enlightenment,dichotomous reading that has been in vogue in Weber studies. But this is only apossibility and nothing more. The actualization of this possibility depends uponapproaching Weber’s work from a value-position outside of his work that investssignificance and value in the work that cannot be invested in it from the perspectiveof specialized, rationalized, intellectualized study. At the same time, given the detailsdiscussed in chapter 3 (especially section 3.4), it is also necessary that the value-position from which Weber’s work is being valued is itself amenable to having it ownsignificance and value-ideas being clarified by Weber’s insights on the character anddynamics of scientific rationality. What Weber said for science in general is as appli-cable to the future fate of his own work: “It follows those stars which alone are ableto give meaning and direction to its labors” (OSS, 112). Weber’s work cannot bevalued and appreciated from within the sphere of his own corpus—for Weber, valueor meaning cannot be attached to any element from the perspective of its ownimminent value sphere. For the very same reasons, no meaning or significance canbe attached to Weber’s work from the perspective of scientific rationality. If Weber’swork is to have any significance and value, it will have to be invested into his workfrom the perspective of the great cultural questions and quandaries facing contem-porary culture.

The uncovering and appreciation of the relational character of Weber’s approachshould not be considered a novel discovery of latter-day Weber scholarship. Even


though it has been recognized by only a few, this possibility was recognized inWeber’s own day and has had its proponents since his day. For example, Landshutsees Weber’s scholarship being a watershed event in the “progress” of intellectualhistory—“progress” in both the differentiating and disenchanting sense of the word,and progress in the heightening of self-awareness and self-expression sense of theword. In an essay titled “Max Weber’s Significance for Intellectual History” writtenin 1930, Landshut described the differentiating and disenchanting character ofWeber’s work by looking at the personality of Weber as being the scientific investi-gator par excellence, which in turn is symptomatic of the disenchanted age:

It appears that Max Weber himself is the prototype of the complete emptying of allhuman spontaneity from objective work, of the complete separation of person andthing, by virtue of which any work must become a mechanical, subordinate function,and the specialist himself a technical specialist; this division appears to reproduce thesame soul-destroying misery of the professional and private life that permeatesthe whole of contemporary society. (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 100)

This aspect of Weber’s work demonstrates his contribution to the “progress” ofintellectual history in the sense of contributing to the process of differentiation,intellectualization, rationalization and so on (i.e., to the process of disenchantment).But Landshut goes on to qualify this valuation of Weber and Weber’s work:

Yet where this self-abnegation is carried out with such clear awareness and by someonewith such a sovereign mastery of world facts as the scientist Max Weber, the questionarises whether this division might not be founded in a yet higher unity. What is more,if this holds true for Weber’s personal life, it also applies to science’s experience of the problemsof the age, for his life is taken to represent, as a scientific existence, the practical manifesta-tion of the self-awareness of the times. (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 100 ff.)

When interpreted from an intellectualist and rationalized perspective, modernscience in general and Weber’s scholarly legacy in particular appear to be engagedonly in the study of discrete particulars and practically divorced from the “prob-lems of the age.” But Landshut sees Weber’s (and modern science’s) obsession withthe study of the particular as a means toward a larger end, that is, “the practicalmanifestation of the self-awareness of the times.” This aspect of Weber’s workevidences his contribution to the “progress” of intellectual history in the sense ofcontributing to the heightening of self-awareness and self-expression by identify-ing and clarifying the most pressing issues (i.e., cultural value-ideas) that the disen-chantment of the world brings to the fore for the moderns. Landshut goes on todetail this point:

It is evident . . . both from the logical–methodological problems and the historical–sociological ones, that the inner tendency of Max Weber’s scientific work springs froma living question within man himself as being in pursuit of understanding, for itdemonstrates man’s questioning nature to be precisely that by its exposure to the lackof binding power exercised by the public sphere. (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 110)

By following the “inner tendency” of his scientific work, and his calling (i.e., vocation)to be a scientist, Weber comes to the point, and brings intellectual history to the point


where “[t]he disenchantment of the world puts the ‘groundlessness’ of free existence,in all its mysteriousness, at the center of debate” (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 110).

Weber’s scholarship makes the discussion of “actual problems of our humanexistence” (Löwith, 1982, 25) a subject of meaningful scientific, rational discourse inan era where scientific rationality is divesting everything of meaning. The followingobservation by Löwith, originally offered in 1932, highlights the centrality ofultimate value-concerns and meaning in Weber’s rational, scientific investigations:

In his treatment of the “objectivity” of knowledge in the social sciences Weber wasconcerned first of all to raise the question “what is the meaning and purpose of a scien-tific critique of ideals and value judgments?” And he carried out this inquiry, too, in a“rational” manner, with reference to a responsible relation between means and ends.(Löwth, 1982, 106)

For Landshut, Weber’s work uncovers, underscores, and highlights the importance ofthe “religious” question of human existence “in all its mysteriousness,” no less than(or as a result of ) the exposition of the fact and reasons behind the disenchantmentof the world by scientific rationality. For Löwith, Weber’s scientifically “objective”and “rational” investigations lay bare the fact that issues of “ultimate principles andthe orientations based upon them” have to be meaningfully addressed and redressedbecause genuine scientific inquiry cannot take place in the absence of a value-stanceregarding the “alpha and omega of a basic conception of what is truly real and there-fore really worth knowing” (Löwth, 1982, 106).

5.4 Weber and the Disenchanting of Disenchantment

Thus far the discussion of Weber has contrasted his description of the process ofdisenchantment (chapter 1) with the principles of his methodology of the socialsciences (chapters 2–4). This contrast has revealed that Weber’s methodology is basedon a relational logic that transforms dichotomies into relational dualities, therebymaking possible meaningful scientific inquiry and scientific inquiry meaningful. Theprocess of disenchantment, for its part affirms disenchanting dichotomies andthereby forestalls the possibility of meaningful scientific inquiry. An assumption thatcan be easily made in light of this contrast is that Weber’s scientific methodologycontains resources that can be utilized to at least arrest the process of the scientificdisenchantment of human culture—and maybe even reverse the process. In otherwords, Weber’s insights contain resources that can be appropriated to challenge the“fate of our times” by at least beginning the process of rationally disenchantingthe disenchantment of the world. With this assumption as the value-idea guiding theinquiry, the discussion turns to exploring this possibility. In the exploration of thispossibility, a number of Weber’s positions that have been discussed previously arediscussed again—the difference being that when they were mentioned previously,they were mentioned in relation to a variety of different issues, whereas now they aredetailed in direct relation to each other. In Weber’s words, the following discussionattempts to “produce new knowledge [about Weber’s work] by interpreting alreadyknown facts [that have been detailed in previous chapters] according to known view-points [that have been established as a result of the foregoing discussions]” (OSS, 112).


The facts of the central role of causal imputation, human beings investing meaningin the world, and suprarational affirmation of the suprarational presuppositions ofscience in Weber’s methodology are interpreted in light of Weber’s concern withdisenchantment as “fate of our times.”

As noted in section 1.1, Weber posits that “[s]cientific progress is a fraction, themost important fraction” of the process of disenchantment that has been unfoldingover many millennia (SV, 138). The conceptual and methodological tools of scientificinquiry push the tension inherent between religious rationalism and scientific ration-alism to a breaking point—and eventually beyond the breaking point. The breakoccurs with the scientific postulate of a “cosmos of natural causality” that negates thereligious conception of a “cosmos of ethical, compensatory causality” (RRW, 355).A disenchanted image of the cosmos (and of the human being’s place in the cosmos)is made practically inevitable by the claim that the cosmos functions according toimminent, inner-worldly causal mechanisms (i.e., laws) that can be discovered andunderstood by means of rational, scientific investigation. Weber notes:

The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge definitely comes to the forewherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked to the disenchantmentof the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism. (RRW, 350)

Weber’s reflections on the methodology of the social sciences reveal that there is nosuch thing as a “causal mechanism” in the cosmos—there are no “laws” that mecha-nistically or deterministically govern the cosmos or the behavior of anything in thecosmos. As detailed in section 4.2, Weber uses the work of the leading logicians ofthe day to critique the naturalistic understanding of causality. For Weber, it makesno sense to speak of laws “causing” observable, empirical phenomena either in thenatural world or in the cultural world, as the objectivists of his day were wont to do.As detailed in section 4.3, Weber’s methodology is based on an understanding ofcausality that uses the concept of “laws” as a heuristic device that facilitates concep-tual mastery of particular recurring patterns that are observed in empirical reality.These “laws” are used as heuristic devices, and nothing more in order to facilitate a“causal imputation” that in its turn affirms or produces objectively valid scientificknowledge about empirical reality.

In the face of Weber’s account of causal imputation and the evidence he brings tobear in the formulation and justification of this alternative understanding of “causal-ity,” it is exceedingly difficult to continue to posit the efficacy of “natural causality” and“causal mechanism” in any rationally coherent or scientifically meaningful manner.Weber’s notion of causal imputation has disenchanted disenchantment by demon-strating that the fundamental premise on which disenchantment is based (i.e., theclaim of “natural causality”) is not rationally tenable from the perspective of the logicunderpinning scientific inquiry. While causal imputation does not validate the reli-gious alternative of “ethical, compensatory causality,” this does not in any way detractfrom the fact that it invalidates the “scientific” notion of “natural causality.” In short,the self-conscious and self-critical understanding and explanation of empirical eventsfrom the perspective of Weber’s methodology of the cultural/social sciences directlychallenges the disenchanting effects of the intellectualized notion of “natural causality.”


Weber’s methodology disenchants disenchantment on another level—by directlychallenging the claim that “meaning” (Sinn) does not exist. Disenchanting scientificrationalism concerns itself with the study and discovery of a preexisting rationalorder that determines the parameters within which the cosmos (and everything in it)functions. Ostensibly, the discovery of “causal laws” is the means that will ultimatelylead to a full and comprehensive understanding of the “order” in/of the cosmos andeverything in it. As detailed in section 1.3, Weber notes that a world image producedby scientific rationality negates the religious claim that “the world as a cosmos mustsatisfy the demands of a religious ethic or evince some ‘meaning’ ” (RRW, 355). Asa matter of principle, scientific rationality has negated any religious, philosophical,and metaphysical “approach which in any way asks for a ‘meaning’ of inner-worldlyoccurrences” (RRW, 351). Along with negating any nonscientific attempt to investmeaning in the world, scientific rationality is unable to invest any scientific meaningin the world because the concept of “natural causality” forestalls any such attempt.“In the name of ‘intellectual integrity’ ” (SV, 355), science can neither invest anymeaning in the world, nor affirm any nonscientific investment of meaning in theworld—thereby disenchanting the world. Disenchantment of the world is theparallel process of increased intellectualization and rationalization on the one hand,and loss of meaning on the other.

In stark contrast, meaning (Sinn) is the alpha and the omega of Weber’s method-ology. This is the second point on which Weber disenchants disenchantment. Asdetailed in section 3.4, the beginning of Weber’s social science is the study of some-thing called “culture,” and according to Weber “culture” is “a finite segment of themeaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confermeaning and significance” (OSS, 81). While Weber’s methodology locates its rootsin a dimension of empirical reality that is held to be meaningful by human beings,the omega of the methodology is “the transcendental presupposition of everycultural science” that “we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the willto take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance” (OSS, 81).If there is no such thing as meaning, as posited by disenchanting scientific rational-ism, then there is no such thing as cultural/social science (as understood by Weber).Weber’s methodology of the cultural/social sciences does not offer a religious ormetaphysical proposition that “the world is inherently meaningful.” But it makes anempirical observation that all human beings, in all places, at all times have “investedmeaning in the world”—the cultural scientist undertaking scientific inquiry in anage of disenchanted meaninglessness no less than any other human being carryingout any other cultural activity at any other time in history.

Consequently, meaning is as much (if not more) a part and parcel of empiricalreality as the heavenly bodies (studied by the astronomers), the chemicals (studiedby the chemists), the birds and bees (studied by the biologists), and so on and soforth. From Weber’s perspective, in the absence of meaning, there is no such thingas “cultural science,” or any other “science” for that matter. The only reason scientistshave engaged in the study of heavenly bodies, chemicals, birds and bees, and so onis because these elements constitute a tiny segment of “a finite segment of themeaningless infinity of the world process . . . on which human beings confer[ed]meaning and significance” (OSS, 81). For Weber, the discernment of recurring


patterns (i.e., “laws” or “rational order”) is a heuristic tool to be used in theunderstanding and explication of meaning and significance. The ends of scientificrationalism (the discovery of “laws”) are a means toward an end for Weber. In sum,the rationalistic understanding of “rational order” and “natural causality,” character-izing the natural sciences, makes the “belief that there is any such a thing as‘meaning’ in the universe die out at its very roots” (SV, 142). But, as detailedin section 3.5, that which the natural sciences cause to die at its very root (i.e.,meaning) is the ground in which Weber’s social/cultural sciences are rooted. Inreturn, the definition of “culture” and the “transcendental presupposition” ofWeber’s social/cultural sciences nourish and enrich (as they study and explicate)the ground in which they are rooted. As noted in section 2.1, the definition of“culture” and the “transcendental presupposition” of the social/cultural scienceprovide the fundamental presuppositions and value-ideas of social/cultural scientificinquiry:

(a) Human beings invest meaning in the world.(b) Meaning can be known.(c) Meaning is worth knowing.

As detailed in section 3.4, establishing a direct relationship between the meaningful-ness of meaning and science is among the most significant values of Weber’s “ration-alized” understanding of science in an age of disenchanting rationalization.

Besides offering causal imputation and meaning as a means to disenchant disen-chantment, Weber’s methodology challenges the intellectualized conception of“rational certainty,” thereby further disenchanting disenchantment. Weber notes thatdue to the fact that science has created a “cosmos of natural causality,” it has been“unable to answer with certainty the question of its own ultimate presuppositions”(RRW, 355). As noted at the end of section 2.1, the three fundamental presupposi-tions on which all scientific inquiry is based are that

(a) Scientific knowledge/truth is real.(b) Scientific knowledge/truth can be known.(c) Scientific knowledge/truth is worth knowing.

Even though “rational certainty” is the standard by which scientific rationalismmeasures and values everything else, it is incapable of establishing or demonstratingthe validity of any of the aforementioned presuppositions in a “rationally certain”manner. The inability of scientific rationalism to rationally account for the “ground”(i.e., the presuppositions and value-ideas) on which it is based is perhaps the great-est and most telling of its failures. But, where scientific rationalism fails Weber’smethodology offers a rationally coherent account of these presuppositions. Asdetailed in section 2.1, Weber posits that “no science can prove its fundamentalvalue” (SV, 153) to the individual who rejects the presuppositions on which scienceis based. But this is not a unique anomaly in the case of science because not onlyis science incapable of proving its own fundamental value, it is incapable of provingthe worth of any fundamental value. For Weber, the positive affirmation (or negative


rejection) of any and all values is a matter of faith, not rational certainty:

Only on the assumption of belief in the validity of values is the attempt to espousevalue-judgments meaningful. However, to judge the validity of such values is a matterof faith. (OSS, 55)

For Weber, the pursuit of science, as a human activity, requires a faithful (i.e., supra-rational) affirmation of the presuppositions and value-ideas on which it is based, justas the activity of religion requires a faithful (i.e., suprarational) affirmation of thepresuppositions and value-ideas on which religion is based. Weber does note thatreligion has a longer list of presuppositions that need to be faithfully affirmedthan does science and he also notes that in the end, religion ultimately demands asacrifice of the intellect (SV, 154). In spite of these differences, which may not be aspronounced as Weber thought, Weber has established the fact that the rationalpursuit of scientific knowledge requires a suprarational affirmation of the presuppo-sitions on which the activity of science is based and the extra-scientific affirmationof its value-ideas. In other words, Weber demonstrates that scientific inquiry is nota self-generating activity but rather a cultural good that is generated by a suprara-tional affirmation of certain presuppositions—as is the case with any and all culturalgoods and human activities. In rationally demonstrating that the very possibility ofscience as a human activity is rooted in suprarational affirmation, Weber’s method-ology further disenchants the disenchanting rationalism that has consistently usedrationality to disenchant everything else.

Weber’s rationalization of the methodology of the social/cultural sciences does toscientific rationalism what scientific rationalism had done to religious rationalism,and what religious rationalism had earlier done to the enchanted symbiosis—it hasrevealed to be “profane,” that which had been considered “sacred.” Scientific ration-alism has considered natural causality, rational order, and rational certainty as“sacred” principles—the principles by which everything else could and would bequestioned, scrutinized, and judged while being beyond question and scrutiny them-selves. Weber’s rational reflection on these “sacred” principles reveals them to be“profane”—human constructions raised to the level of “heavenly” authority, fromwhere they sit in judgment on any, every, and all things. Speaking in reference to thesocial psychology of world religions, Weber notes:

The various great ways of leading rational and methodical life have been characterizedby irrational presuppositions, which have been accepted simply as “given” and whichhave been incorporated into such ways of life. (SPWR, 281)

Weber’s keen insight into the methodology of the social sciences reveals that this isas true of science as for any religion insofar as science has been embraced as one ofthe “great ways of leading rational and methodical life.” Weber’s methodologydisenchants the key concepts on which disenchanting scientific rationalism rests bylaying bare the “irrational presuppositions which have been accepted simply as‘given’ ” by scientific rationalism. Weber’s methodology replaces the principles ofdisenchanting scientific rationalism in which the “irrational presuppositions” remainhidden, with principles in which the suprarational aspect of scientific rationality


are clearly displayed:

(a) Natural/mechanistic causality as science’s explanatory device is replaced bycausal interpretation (i.e., imputation).

(b) Preexistent rational/mechanical order of the world as the object of scientificinquiry is replaced by scientific exploration of humanly constructed meaningand significance in the world.

(c) Rational certainty as goal and characteristic of scientific inquiry is replaced byobjectively possible, suprarational affirmation of the presuppositions andvalue-ideas on which science is based.

The fact that Weber’s methodology of (social) scientific inquiry disenchantsdisenchanting scientific rationalism is clear enough. But the disenchanting effects ofWeber’s methodology on scientific rationalism do not herald a return to the religiousrationalism that was disenchanted by scientific rationalism at an earlier stage in therationalization process. Weber’s understanding of imputation, meaning, and suprara-tional affirmation of presuppositions should not (and cannot) be mistaken forproviding the means that make it possible to articulate a faithful assertion of themeaning of the world of pre-disenchantment religious rationalism. But the fact thatWeber’s methodology does not (and cannot) affirm the validity of religious rational-ism, after having disenchanted scientific rationalism, does not in any way detractfrom the fact that Weber’s methodology of (social) scientific inquiry rationallydisenchants “the most important” part of the intellectualizing and rationalizingprocess that has been in progress for millennia.

Weber’s methodology of the social/cultural sciences is not the only resource inWeber’s legacy that contains resources that can be appropriated to disenchant disen-chantment. It must be emphasized here that Weber’s insights into the methodologyof the social sciences are not the products of disembodied, abstract reflection—theyare the products of reflections on a vocational commitment to the praxis of science.Consequently, Weber’s achievements as a methodologist of the social sciences cannotbe divorced from his vocational praxis of science. This means that Weber’s vocationalpraxis contains additional resources that can be appropriated to disenchantdisenchantment. Chapter 1 noted that even though they are related, the effects ofdisenchantment are different at the level of practical rationalization than they are atthe level of theoretical rationalization. The foregoing discussion has described aspectsof Weber’s legacy that disenchant disenchantment at the theoretical level. Thediscussion now turns to the practical level, because it is with respect to this level thatWeber’s vocational praxis is of special value in disenchanting disenchantment.

As noted in section 1.2, the effects of disenchantment at the level of practicalrationalization manifest themselves as a “struggle of the gods.” At this level, thepenultimate values (the “gods”) of the various worldly spheres are locked in a cease-less and intractable struggle with the penultimate religious ethic (i.e., universalbrotherhood). Impersonal bureaucracy and claim to the monopoly on legitimateviolence of the political sphere, and impersonal money and the competition of inter-ests of the economic sphere undermine the claims of both the universality and thebrotherhood of the religious ethic. The irrational escape (i.e., salvation) from the


routines of everyday life offered by an artificially created cosmos of the estheticsphere and the intense irrational experience of erotic love offered by the erotic spherechallenge and undermine the religious understanding of brotherhood and salvation.Just as the struggle between the penultimate values of the worldly spheres and thereligious ethic is intractable and inevitable, the struggle between the different worldlyvalues is also intractable and inevitable. There is no way to rationally reconcilethe conflict that is (and has forever been) raging between the different values of theworldly spheres. The ethic of universal brotherhood mediated the struggle betweenthe different worldly spheres and kept the peace among them (so to speak) at one timein history. But with the progressive rationalization of the inner logic of each of thedifferent value spheres and the progression of differentiation to rationalized auton-omy, even the illusion of peace among the spheres has been shattered. In short,disenchantment of the world at the level of practical rationalization presents itself inthe form of the intractable and inevitable “struggle of the gods.”

Weber seems to be resigned to this state of affairs and does not see much hope ofthis struggle ever being resolved meaningfully. It is difficult to find evidence inWeber’s scholarly corpus that would allow for the inference that he feels otherwise.In spite of this apparent poverty, there is a richness and wealth in Weber’s life thatobviously and clearly demonstrates that a “struggle of the gods” can be resolvedmeaningfully. Weber the practicing social/cultural scientist passionately pursued hisvocation in the midst of raging struggles regarding the very meaning of “science” and“cultural science.” In these struggles, the partisans of particular “gods” battled witheach other to establish the supremacy of their own “god” over all other competitors.As detailed in chapter 3, in the Werturteilsstreit (the battle of value-relevance) the“god” of facts battled the “god” of values. The battle among these two “gods” becameeven more convoluted when it gave birth to other “gods,” in the form of mediatingpositions between the two extremes that in turn had their own proponents who wereas passionately committed to their “gods” as anyone else. As detailed in chapter 4, inthe Methodenstreit (the battle of the methods), the “god” of subjectivism battled the“god” of objectivism—a battle that became even more convoluted with the birth ofother “gods” as a consequence of the original battle. By the time Weber arrived on thescene, “gods” of every hue and color, size and shape, were populating the battlefield—a battlefield on which peace had to be established first if any meaningful (scientific)activity was to take place. Weber’s success in navigating this battlefield and estab-lishing peace (at least at the personal level) speaks for itself. If the valuations offeredby Alexander, Ringer, and Ciaffa (among others) are correct, then Weber’s method-ology is still ahead of many of the latest trends in contemporary scholarly circleswhen it comes to resolving the struggles between the “gods” of fact and value and the“gods” of subjectivism and objectivism. Even though Weber’s work does not resolvethe particular struggle of the gods of the worldly spheres, his success in resolving thestruggle of gods in the sphere of the methodology of the social/cultural sciencesdemonstrates that a “struggle of the gods” is not inherently intractable—such a strugglecan be resolved meaningfully and fruitfully.

The defining character of the manner in which Weber navigated the battlefieldof both the Weruteilsstreit and the Methodenstreit is establishing relations (bridges)where others see only dualisms (dichotomies). Weber’s incomparable success in


the different battles in the area of the methodology of the social/cultural sciencescan be traced to a commitment to two ideals that are outside (but related) to thebattlefield:

(a) A vocational commitment to science as praxis.(b) An absolute, unflinching commitment to intellectual integrity.

The following observation by Weber sums up the relation of his commitment tothese two ideals and his success in the area of methodology:

Only by laying bare and solving substantive problems can sciences be established andtheir methods developed. On the other hand, purely epistemological and methodolog-ical reflections have never played the crucial role in such developments. Such discus-sion can become important for the enterprise of science only when, as a result ofconsiderable shifts of the “viewpoint” from which a datum becomes the object of analy-sis, the idea emerges that the new “viewpoint” also requires a revision of the logicalforms in which the “enterprise” has heretofore operated, and when, accordingly, uncer-tainty about the “nature” of one’s work arises. (LCS, 116)

For Weber, the praxis of science has to precede any fruitful reflection on the methodsof science. But when the conditions so demand, critical reflections on the methodsof science should be done so thoroughly and completely that they should not shrinkfrom the possibility of having to revise the “logical forms” of the “enterprise”—evenif this revision means the reformulation of the very “nature” of the work. Weberconsciously acknowledges that it is the emergence of new “viewpoints” in the culturalmilieu of the scientist that create the conditions that put into question, and requirethe refashioning of, the accepted “logical forms” of science’s methodology. Weber themethodologist did not flinch from revising the “logical forms” of science’s method-ology, so much so that it put into question the central tenets of natural causality,preexisting rational order and rational certainty on which scientific rationalism hadbeen resting in his day—Weber’s methodology of the social sciences does indeedreformulate the very “nature” of science.

Explicitly, there is scant evidence in Weber’s writings that he felt the “struggle ofthe gods” of the worldly spheres could ever be resolved or that the highest values ofthe worldly spheres could come to peace with the penultimate religious ethical valueof universal brotherhood. Nonetheless, Weber’s life does explicitly evidence that a“struggle of the gods” can indeed be resolved in the form of a life informed by anuncompromising commitment to an ethical ideal (absolute intellectual honesty/integrity in Weber’s case) that guides a vocational commitment to a consciouslychosen praxis (science in Weber’s case). Consequently, if there is “struggle of thegods” that appears to be intractable, this does not mean that it cannot be resolvedbecause there is some immutable, universal, absolute “law” that forestalls the possi-bility of its resolution. Given adequate cultural conditions, a commitment to certainvalue-ideas (i.e., that the struggle can and should be resolved) and the requisiteknowledge required for the resolution, the struggle can indeed be resolved.

Earlier in the discussion, it was noted that Weber’s achievements in bridging theidealist/materialist, subject/object, and fact/value dichotomies can be adequately


appreciated when it is understood that each of the bridges is related to and dependson the other two. Similarly, the significance of Weber’s resolution of the fact/valueand subject/object “struggle of the gods” becomes meaningful only in light of the factthat this resolution is rooted in (or leads to) the resolution of the struggle betweenthe “god of science” and the “god of faith.” For Weber, “the only purpose” of thewhole discussion detailing the relational character/dynamics of subject/object andfact/value “was to trace the course of the hair-line which separates science from faith”(OSS, 110). Another way of stating this position is that the “god of science” is notlocked in an inevitable and intractable struggle to the death with the “god of faith”—the two of them lie in such close proximity and are so intimately related to each otherthat it appears that the debilitation of one would mean the debilitation of the other.It is only when a harmonious relationship is established between the “god of science”and the “god of faith” that meaningful scientific knowledge can be attained. Withoutthe resolution of the struggle between subject/object, imputation (as understoodby Weber) is logically and methodologically impossible. Without the resolution ofthe struggle between fact/value, meaning (as understood by Weber) is logically andmethodologically impossible. Without a resolution of the struggle between the“god of science” and the “god of faith,” “the meaning of the quest” for scientificknowledge (OSS, 110) cannot be articulated in rational, coherent, logical terms—thereby forestalling the possibility of the rational (i.e., self-conscious, self-critical)pursuit of meaningful, scientific knowledge. In establishing a relation betweenthe “god of science” and the “god of faith,” Weber’s rational reflections onmethodology and rational practice of science further disenchants the disenchantingrationalism that was premised on (and deepened) the divide between faith andscience.

It would be worth pausing and examining the manner in which Weber resolvesthe struggle between the “god of science” and the “god of faith.” This with a view togleaning some hints on if (or how) the struggle between the different “gods” of theother worldly spheres—politics, economics, esthetic, and erotic—might be resolved.This in turn might be a prelude to (or result of ) resolving the struggle between the“god of the world” and the “god of heavens.” Weber’s rational inquiry into thecharacter of the rationality of scientific rationalism revealed “irrational presupposi-tions” that had been accepted “simply as ‘given’ ” by the proponents of scientificrationalism. But when these “givens” were subject to critical, rational inquiry, it wasrevealed that there was something most “non-rational” about them. This in turnmeant that rational scientific inquiry is built on the bedrock of suprarational, extra-scientific grounds—this is the key insight that allows Weber to resolve the strugglebetween the “god of science” and the “god of faith.” A research program taking thisapproach as its model will have to look at the rationality of the disenchanted politi-cal, economic, esthetic, and erotic spheres and investigate whether or not there areany “irrational presuppositions” that have been simply taken as “givens” at the rootof the respective rationalities of the different worldly spheres. Here it must be keptin mind that if “irrational presuppositions” are identified, they will be “irrational”only from the point of view of the rationalism of the particular sphere that is underconsideration. Building on the model that Weber offers for laying bare the scientifi-cally irrational presuppositions and unscientific value-ideas that are hidden in the


claims of scientific rationalism, a taking forward of Weber’s project would seek touncover:

(a) politically irrational presuppositions and extra-political value-ideas in theroots of political rationalism;6

(b) economically irrational presuppositions and extra-economic value-ideas inthe roots of economic rationalism;

(c) esthetically irrational presuppositions and extra-esthetic value-ideas in theroots of esthetic rationalism;

(d) erotically irrational presuppositions and extra-erotic value-ideas in the rootsof erotic rationalism.

If any irrationalities and “extras” are discovered in the different rational spheres andthey are rationally explicated, then novel possibilities would emerge regarding therelationship of the different worldly spheres to each other—and their relationship tothe religious ethic.7 The discovery of the irrationality present in a rationalized struc-ture (whether theoretical or practical) is the beginning point of self-awareness andcapacity for enhanced self-expression—as well as the beginning point of disenchant-ment. Weber’s methodology concretely demonstrates how a rationalized structurecan be disenchanted (he has done this with the worldly intellectual sphere) andopens the way for disenchanting the other disenchanted worldly spheres. Theincreased self-awareness and capacity for self-expression that also results from increasedrationalization opens up the possibility of seeing and giving voice to new relationsand possibilities that were not deemed possible prior to disenchantment. Consequently,disenchantment does not have to be the great tragedy of modern culture, it could bethe prelude to new mutually enriching relations and new cultural possibilities.

Weber’s reflections on the methodology of (social) scientific inquiry disenchantdisenchantment at the level of theoretical rationalization and his praxis ofscience disenchants disenchantment at the level of practical rationalization—the twobeing distinct, but related aspects of his scholarly endeavors. Using the phrase thatAlexander borrowed from Hegel, Weber’s achievement can justifiably be called“world historical” in this regard—but this is still not the complete picture. Thischapter began with identifying the value-idea that shaped the orientation of Weber’sscientific pursuits (both methodological and practical)—a desire to understand the“causes” that led to the complete disenchantment of culture only in the modernWest, even though partial disenchantment can be found in every human cultureknown to historians. It was also noted, in line with Weber’s own methodologicalreflections and Kalberg’s observation, that Weber sought to explore this issue becausehe was deeply concerned with the problematic that disenchantment had given birthto. Weber, as a conscientious human being, noticed disenchantment endangering theviability of “compassion, ethical action, and reflective individualism” (PESC, lxiv) inthe world. The implicit assumption in Weber’s pursuit of scientific knowledge thatbridges the two aforementioned premises, is that acquiring scientific understandingof the causes of disenchantment will make it possible to redress the problematic thatdisenchantment has given birth to. It is difficult to imagine Weber genuinely consid-ering his vocation to be a meaningful vocation in the absence of this assumption.


Weber’s decision to carry on with his scientific project in the face of continuingdisenchantment, with the hope that his efforts would contribute to redressing theproblematic of disenchantment is the most forceful and compelling evidence ofWeber disenchanting disenchantment. In short, Weber’s personal stand in the face of“the fate of our times” (i.e., disenchantment) and his continuing quest for a mean-ingful life in the face of disenchanting meaninglessness evidences that for Weberthere is a real possibility of salvation from the disenchanted condition. In the absenceof this hypothesis, Weber’s lifelong labor appears to be a completely irrational andmeaningless enterprise.

Weber notes that the “two highest conceptions of sublimated religious doctrinesof salvation are ‘rebirth’ and ‘redemption’ ” (SPWR, 279). He notes that in the pastreligious revivals have resulted from the efforts of intellectual strata working to“sublimate the possession of sacred values into a belief in ‘redemption’ ” (SPWR,280). He goes on to posit that while in very general terms “redemption” has meantliberation from all sorts of suffering in the world, it

attained a specific significance only where it expressed a systematic and rationalized“image of the world” and represented a stand in the face of the world. For meaning aswell as the intended and actual psychological quality of redemption has depended uponsuch a world image and such a stand. (SPWR, 280)

For Weber, beyond the commonly understood meaning of “redemption,” it means“a stand in the face of the world”—a claim that the world and the human conditionin it does not have to be as it actually is, it could be otherwise. This stand is a protestagainst the empirically existent human condition in the world and a hope/claim thata better condition is possible. But even the theoretical possibility of such a stand, tosay nothing of its practicality, depends on the theoretical image that the individualaccepts as being “real.” In other words, the kind of practical stand that one can take(i.e., what one can protest against or hope for) depends upon the theoretical image ofthe world that one has: “ ‘From what’ and ‘for what’ one wished to be redeemed and,let us not forget, could be redeemed, depended upon one’s image of the world”(SPWR, 280). From this perspective, an intellectual who formulates a theoreticalworld image that offers novel possibilities of human existence in the world—thatintellectual is fulfilling the most basic prerequisite for the beginning of a “religiousrevival.”

The fact that Weber has offered a new world image is clear enough. The “world”that Weber the scientist devoted his life to studying is very different from the “world”of mechanistic naturalism studied by the proponents of Enlightenment, scientificrationalism. As noted previously, Weber’s world image, though a critique and correctionof the rationalistic world image, does not herald a return to the pre-disenchantedreligious world image. But just as his world image incorporates modified aspects fromthe world image of scientific rationalism, it also incorporates modified aspects fromthe world image of religious rationalism. It is obvious enough that Weber himself doesnot point the way to “redemption.” But the world image that emerges as a result ofhis methodological reflections (a world understood and shaped by causal imputation,historically constructed meaning, and suprarational affirmation of presuppositions andvalue-ideas) offers the parameters within which any meaningful quest for redemption


will have to take place in the era of disenchantment. In sum, the theoretical worldimage offered by Weber allows for the possibility of redemption from disenchant-ment. It makes redemption from the process of rationalization a rationally viable, liveoption, not merely a theoretical (or mystical) possibility. In making redemption a liveoption, Weber’s legacy firmly affirms the following three presuppositions:

(a) The meaningfulness of scientific inquiry of meaning evidences that salvation(from meaningless disenchantment) is real.

(b) Salvation (from disenchantment) can be attained.(c) Salvation (from disenchantment) is worth attaining.

The careful reader will have recognized that Weber is affirming (in a modified form)the basic presuppositions that lie at the root of all religious rationalism (as noted insection 2.2).

It has been often noted that Weber’s reflections on the possibilities for/of humanculture in the aftermath of disenchantment are characterized by a resigned pathosthat does not see a realistic possibility of a rationally viable alternative. The conclud-ing remarks that Weber makes at the end of three of his more well-known worksprovide support for the claim that Weber had a sense of tragic resignation about thefuture prospects of culture. At the conclusion of Politics as a Vocation, Weber quotesa sonnet from Shakespeare that celebrates the onset of summer because it promisesto be the time when the hopes of spring are fulfilled. But looking to the future,dispassionately, in light of the hopes attached to it by many of his contemporariesof all intellectual and political stripes, Weber notes: “Not summer’s bloom lies aheadof us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which groupmay triumph externally now” (PV, 128).

Weber expresses his sense of tragic resignation in even more dramatic and explicitlyreligious terms at the conclusion of Science as a Vocation. He concludes his presenta-tion by quoting a passage from the Hebrew Bible in which the end of the night andthe approaching of dawn symbolizes the deliverance from exile and the promise of anew beginning. For Weber, this passage represents the millennia-old hopes and aspi-rations of a people for the emergence of “new prophets and saviors” because thesecharismatically endowed persons would usher in a new dawn and the end of thenight—he goes on to note that “we are shaken” when we realize the fate of the peoplewho have been waiting for the new dawn for more than two millennia. Weberreminds those hoping to be delivered from the modern disenchanted condition bynew prophets and saviors that the first disenchanted people in history (the Israelites)have been waiting for saviors and prophets for more than two millennia. Plain intel-lectual integrity compels Weber to point out to the newest (and most completely)disenchanted peoples that they should not expect their wait to be any shorter thanthat of the first disenchanted people. Speaking to the moderns waiting to be deliveredfrom the exile of disenchantment by a charismatic leader, Weber states:

Integrity, however, compels us to state that for the many who today tarry for newprophets and saviors, the situation is the same as resounds in the beautiful Edomitewatchman’s song of the period of exile that has been included among Isaiah’s oracles: He calleth to me out of Seir, Watchman, what of the night? The watchman said,


The morning cometh, and also the night: if ye will enquire, enquire ye: return,come. (SV, 156)

In the concluding pages of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weberintegrates sociological, religious, and historic themes to express the same sense oftragic resignation about the future prospects of human culture. He notes that in thepast “the concern for material goods” was nothing more than a “lightweight coat”that the saint could cast off at will. But “fate” would have it that a “steel-hard casing”has been forged out of this lightweight coat with the passage of time (PESC, 123)—a casing in which the totality of modern culture is trapped and which cannotbe thrown off. In nonmetaphorical term, “material goods [have] acquired an increas-ing and, in the end, inescapable power over people—as never before in history”(PESC, 124). Looking to the future of human culture, Weber sees a number ofpossibilities—each of which are objectively possible. But the tone and content of hisdescription leave little doubt regarding the one possibility that Weber feels willactually obtain:

No one any longer knows who will live in this steel-hard casing and whether entirelynew prophets or a might rebirth of ancient ideals will stand at the end of this prodi-gious development. Or, however, if neither, whether a mechanized ossification, embel-lished with a sort of rigidly compelled sense of self-importance, will arise. Then, indeed,if ossification appears, the saying might be true for the “last humans” in this long civi-lizational development: Narrow specialists without mind, pleasure seekers withoutheart; in its conceit, this nothingness imagines it has climbed to a level of humanitynever before attained. (PESC, 124)

In light of the way that Weber concludes his discussion in Politics as a Vocation,Science as a Vocation and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, one canvery well conclude that Weber’s work does not have any resources that allow one tobe hopeful about the future. There is nothing that Weber the sociologist of culturehas to offer those who wish to challenge the “fate of our times”—the only advice thatWeber has to offer in the midst of meaningless disenchantment is that we all “set towork and ‘the demands of the day,’ in human relations as well as in our vocation”(SV, 156). Even though there is a degree of accuracy in this reading of Weber, it isobviously an incomplete reading—given what Weber the methodologist of the socialsciences has written.

The tone of Weber’s conclusion in “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and SocialPolicy” is markedly different from the attitude of resigned pathos of Weber the soci-ologist of culture. In the concluding paragraph of his most comprehensive piece onthe methodology of the social sciences, Weber asserts that science will not only rebelagainst disenchanting rationalization, but it will also not be content with beingmerely an instrument of disenchanting rationalization. On the contrary, science willfollow “those stars which alone are able to give meaning and direction to its labors”(OSS, 112). Furthermore, science will make possible a better self-understanding andenhance the capacity for self-expression of the “stars” that are able to invest its laborwith meaning and direction. In the concluding pages of this article, there is a senseof the inevitability that science will eventually rebel against disenchantment and


point the way out of it—the internal logic of scientific rationality shows this to bean inevitability. In other words, the conclusion envisions a different fate for science(and by extension culture) inevitably emerging than the disenchanted “fate of ourtimes.” Whereas Weber the sociologist of culture documents the manner in whichscientific rationalism has been the most important of all the factors that caused thedisenchantment of modern culture, Weber the methodologist shows scientificrationality to be the most important of all factors causing the disenchantment ofdisenchantment—and opening up a new horizon of cultural possibilities in thefuture.

In Religious Rejections of the World and Their Direction, Weber details how theemergence of a particular kind of religious actor in human culture initiated theprocess of disenchantment. This actor was an intellectual whose rational (and ration-alizing) reflection on the character and teachings of religion revealed a gap betweenthe “religious” and the “worldly.” The differentiation of the two spheres is takenfurther by subsequent rationalization and the “economic,” “political,” “esthetic,” and“erotic” spheres gradually differentiating themselves from the “religious” and fromeach other. In sum, the complete disenchantment of culture can be seen as theunintended consequence of a particular type of religiosity. Conversely, the evidencepresented in this book shows Weber to be a particular kind of modern intellectualwhose work contains the resources to disenchant disenchantment. Weber’s rational(and rationalizing) reflection on the character and methodology of scientific inquiryreveals a fundamental and irreducible bridge between the “religious” and the“worldly.” It is in this capacity of disenchanting disenchantment and establishing abridge between the “religious” and the “worldly” that Weber is perhaps best embodyingthe “vocation of science” in an age of disenchanted meaninglessness—articulating analternative to the “fate of our times” other than the one dictated by the prevalentrationalized structures and world images.

The sole purpose of the above discussion has been to demonstrate that only ahairline separates Weber’s science from faith concerns and to make explicit themeaning of Weber’s quest for objectively valid scientific knowledge. Weber’s observationabout modern culture in general is no less true of his own legacy:

For certain, even with the best will, the modern person seems generally unable to imag-ine how large a significance those components of our consciousness rooted in religiousbelief have actually had upon culture . . . and the organization of life. (PESC, 125)

It can be justifiably said that modern scholarship is “generally unable to imagine” theprofound significance that “components of [Weber’s] consciousness rooted in reli-gious belief” had upon the spirit of his scholarship and the ethics of his vocationalcommitment to science. Weber was no philosopher, economist, historian, lawyer—inthe intellectualized and rationalized sense of the terms. Even more obviously andcertainly he was no theologian—in the intellectualized and rationalized sense of theword. Weber’s reflections on the methodology of (social) scientific inquiry and hisvocational commitment to science offer no answer whatsoever to the only questionthat really matters to us—the only question that has really mattered to all humanbeings, in all places, at all times: “What shall we do? And how shall we live?” But in


light of the foregoing discussion, it can be stated with confidence that Weber’s legacyis a uniquely valuable resource of knowledge for those who pose the questioncorrectly.

The uniqueness of Weber’s contribution to this discussion can be illustrated bysumming up the foregoing discussion in the form of a “syllogism.” The discussion inthis and the previous three chapters has revolved around the issues of the relation-ship between the religion and science—in one form or another. Weber’s work showsthat religion and science are different interpretations of the exact same “syllogism.”The presuppositions and value-ideas that religious and scientific rationality share canbe summed up thus:

(a) Meaning is real.(b) Meaning can be had.(c) Meaning is worth having.

The religious interpretation of this “syllogism” is:

(a) The universe is inherently meaningful (according to a revealed world-image).(b) One can live a meaningful life (by following the discipline of a religious ethic).(c) A meaningful life is worth living (because it leads to the possibility of

redemption from a worldly condition one finds intolerable).

The scientific interpretation of this “syllogism” is:

(a) Human beings confer meaning on the universe (according to the observedbehavior of all human beings, in all places, at all times).

(b) This meaning can be understood (by following the discipline of scientificinquiry).

(c) This meaning is worth understanding (because it leads to the possibility ofredemption from a cultural condition one finds intolerable).

Given what Weber has said about the faith/science, fact/value, and subject/objectdichotomies, it is safe to say that one cannot intelligently talk about the “religious”without reference to the “scientific” and one cannot rationally talk about the “scien-tific” without reference to the “religious.” Weber’s contribution to the progress ofscientific rationality leads to a greater self-awareness and capacity for self-expressionon the part of science. After Weber’s analysis, aspects of scientific rationality that hadremained (or were kept) hidden are brought into the open. Weber’s analysis showsscientific rationality to have much more in common with religious rationality thanwas previously believed. Not only does Weber’s work lay bare this commonality, italso opens up the possibility of a mutually enriching conversation between the two.It should be kept in mind that Weber expressed admiration for individuals strugglingto promote such a conversation and contempt for those attempting to replace reli-gion with (social) scientific metaphysics (see Section 2.3). Consequently, the takingforward of this conversation using the resources in Weber’s scholarship meansremaining true to Weber’s spirit.


As was the case in Weber’s day, many are hearkening and yearning for a“re-enchantment” of the world today. Whether they are the pseudo-prophets in thechurches (or masjids, synagogues, temples) or “big children” occupying academicchairs in the universities, from Weber’s perspective, these individuals do not measureup to “the demands of the day.” There is nothing in Weber’s work that provides anyevidence for the presence of supernatural charisma in the world. Because enchant-ment requires the presence of the supernatural in the natural world, one cannot talkabout re-enchantment being a Weberian possibility. But Weber does conclusivelydemonstrate the presence of the suprarational element in all rationality—scientificrationality no less than any other rationality. In other words Weber’s corpus providesthe evidence for the reality of the suprarational, not the supernatural. The ultimatevalue in Weberian methodology is “plain intellectual integrity”—this is the one andall important value that is the life-blood of genuine scientific inquiry. This valuerequires two things: (a) that the hope for re-enchantment be abandoned and (b) thesuprarational elements in scientific rationality be recognized, embraced, and accountedfor. In making these demands the Weberian corpus asks us to look at the enchantment/disenchantment dialectic from a new perspective and in return this corpus opens upnew intellectual and cultural horizons only obscurely perceived previously.


ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

1. The term “modern” is used in a very general historico-epistemological sense. It refers to aspecific historical claim that there exists universally valid, rational reason that is uniquelycapable of providing an exhaustive, objective, and universally valid description of all ofreality (Hekman, 1994, 282 ff.). The modern era is characterized by “the practical univer-salization of reason . . . the thoroughgoing rationalization and intellectualization of all theaction and the symbolic systems of society” (Markus, 1992, 32). The term “postmodern”is also used in a very general historico-epistemological sense, in contradistinction to the“modern.” It refers to that historical claim, which challenges the universality and theuniversalization of the modernist understanding of reason. In the place of a universal,objectively valid, rational metanarrative “postmodernism is that which works to expose andtransgress the limits of the modern order through the aporetic resuscitation of forms ofdifference or otherness which are repressed by, or concealed within, this [i.e. modern]order” (Gane, 2002, 10). The term “fragmentation of reason” and the demise of its innerunity/coherence (Markus, 1992, 32) describes the postmodern position vis-à-vis thecontemporary situation in which the modernist view of reason finds itself.

2. Given what Weber has said about modern science, economics, and politics it is a patentmisinterpretation of Weber to claim that Weber sees a linear and necessary developmentfrom the enchanted to the religious to the disenchanted cultural conditions. For Weber,modern science, economics, or politics are neither the products of any immutable characterpresent in human nature nor any unalterable, immutable, universal “laws” that necessitateand dictate an unalterable course of historical development. Specific citations from Weber’swork on this account are presented in the forthcoming pages.

3. The terms “practical rationalization,” “theoretical rationalization,” and “rationality,” asthey are used in the present discussion, call for some comment. Kaye (1992, 53) uses theterms “practical rationalization” and “theoretical rationalization” to describe what Webercalls the rationalization of the “practical–ethical attitude” and the “intellectual–theoretical”attitude (RRW, 324). Weber posits that “rationality, in the sense of logical or teleological‘consistency’ . . . has and always has had power over man, however limited and unstablethis power is and has been in the face of other forces of historical life” (RRW, 324). Whilethe degree and manner in which this power has exercised its influence in human affairsduring the course of history has been infinitely varied, the fact of its exercise and influenceis a universal given for Weber. The fundamental characteristic of rationality is the “imper-ative for consistency” (RRW, 324). The quest and urge for consistency has expressed itselfin almost infinitely diverse ways and in almost infinitely diverse areas. Practical rationali-zation refers to following the imperative of consistency in the manner in which humanbeings behave and act in the world, as they attempt to procure their material and idealinterests—Weber calls this the “practical–ethical attitude” (RRW, 324). But human beingsdon’t behave any which way they please, their behavior is itself shaped by a rationalized

understanding of the world, which makes certain modes of behavior possible, otherspossible but undesirable, still others possible and desirable and perhaps some seeminglyimpossible but most desirable. Theoretical rationalization refers to following the imperativeof consistency at the level of rationally conceptualizing the image of the world and thehuman being’s place in it—Weber calls this the “intellectual–theoretical attitude” (RRW,324). In short the term “practical rationalization” refers to the manner in which rationalityhas shaped the practical–ethical behavior of human beings in the world. And “theoreticalrationalization” refers to the manner in which rationality has shaped the theoretical–intellectual concepts and conceptual systems that human beings have articulated duringthe course of history to describe their understanding of the world and the human being’splace in it.

4. The term “brotherhood” should be understood in the context in which Weber used it, notin the gender-specific sense in which it is expressed. In its Weberian context the term canbe understood to be referring to “human solidarity.” The gender-specific sense in which theconcept of “human solidarity” (and its opposite) is expressed, is retained only for practicalpurposes and not as the expression of a value judgment.

5. This is the first point of a parallel between Weber’s view on science and politics. For Weberthe religion vs. science divide presents itself on two levels: (a) science negates the religiousclaim that the universe is inherently meaningful and (b) science posits a “battle of the gods”at the level of ethics in the place of religious claim of universal brotherhood as the integra-tive ethic. Another interpretation of the disenchantment thesis can be that it posits anunbridgeable divide between religion and politics. For Weber the teachings of “religion”stand in irreconcilable tension with the demands of “politics” on two different but relatedaccounts. He illustrates these differences by referring to the Gospels, more specifically tothe Sermon on the Mount. First, Weber notes:

By the Sermon on the Mount we mean the absolute ethic of the gospel, which is amore serious matter than those who are fond of quoting these commandmentstoday believe. This ethic is no joking matter . . . it is not a cab, which one can havestopped at one’s pleasure; it is all or nothing. This is precisely the meaning of thegospel, if trivialities are not to result. Hence, for instance, it was said of the wealthyyoung man, “he went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions.” The evangelistcommandment, however, is unconditional and unambiguous: give what thouhast—absolutely everything. The politician will say this is a socially senseless impo-sition as long as it is not carried out everywhere. Thus the politician upholds taxa-tion, confiscatory taxation, outright confiscation; in a word compulsion andregulation for all. (PV, 119)

Since politics is a cultural activity in the world, of the world, and for the world, it usesworldly means in the pursuit of its worldly values. Since religion’s ultimate value is not ofthis world or for this world, it asks it adherents to sever all connections with the materialgoods of this world in the pursuit of otherworldly salvation. Second,

Or, take the example, “turn the other cheek”: This command is unconditionaland does not question the source of the other’s authority to strike. Except for asaint it is an ethic of indignity. This is it: one must be saintly in everything; atleast in intention, one must live like Jesus, the apostles, St. Francis, and their like.Then this ethic makes sense, and expresses a kind of dignity; otherwise, it does not.For if it is said, in line with the acosmic ethic of love, “Resist not him that isevil with force,” for the politician the reverse proposition holds, “thou shalt resistevil by force,” or else you are responsible for the evil winning out. He who wishesto follow the ethic of the gospel should abstain from strikes, for strikes meancompulsion . . . (PV, 119 ff.)

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Whereas nonresistance (i.e., love) is the most noble religious ideal in the world, the use offorce and compulsion is the indispensable means for carrying out political activity. Webersums up the two differences between “religion” and “politics” in these words:

The position of the Gospels is absolutely unambiguous on the decisive points. Theyare in opposition not just to war, of which they make no specific mention, but ulti-mately to each and every law of the social world, if this seeks to be a place of worldly“culture”, one devoted to beauty, dignity, honor and greatness of man as a creatureof this earth. (BTL, 78)

Rationalized religious behavior and rationalized political behavior, naturally contradicteach other. If one wants to be truly “religious” (in contrast to being “trivially” religious)then one must follow the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount in every respect—the imper-ative of inner consistency demands this—renounce all violence and give up all worldlypossessions. But from the political perspective this is clearly “undignified” behavior—politics has its own inner logic and its imperative for inner consistency requires that the“dignity . . . of man as a creature of this earth” be upheld by all means necessary, includingthe use of violence.

If this is all that Weber has to say on the matter, then there is indeed an unbridgeabledivide between religion and politics. But a more considered reading of Weber’s work revealsthat his work contains the resources to bridge this divide, just as it contains the resourcesto bridge the religion vs. science divide.

6. Even though Hume died almost a century before Weber’s birth, his views on the (non) rela-tionship of religion and science marks “the completion of a paradigm shift” (Preus, 1987,xiv) in modern thought. This paradigm shift exercised great influence in Weber’s day, andcontinues to do so even today. Preus notes:

Hume produced a thoroughgoing naturalistic critique of all available theologicalexplanations of religion, whether rationalistic or revelational. But only because hepursued the logical consequences of his critique in his Natural History of Religion(1757) can we claim for him the achievement of a paradigmatic moment. ForHume not only undercut all appeals to supernatural causes of religion, but went onto propose alternative paths of explanation of the available data—paths hat are stilltraveled by scholars of religion. (Preus, 1987, xv)

7. The critique of Weber offered by Wittenberg and Casanova as being an advocate/exampleof Enlightenment thought is intended to be illustrative not comprehensive. There are manyothers who view Weber’s work as an exemplary expression of Enlightenment thought. Fora Thomist critique of Weber in this regard, see Midgley (1983). For a critique from theposition of “radical orthodoxy,” see Milbank (1998, 75–143). Even though he is referringto only one of Weber’s works, the absoluteness of Barbalett’s verdict suggests that he mightjust as well be speaking of Weber’s scholarship in general: “Max Weber’s The ProtestantSpirit and the Spirit of Capitalism is a manual of Cartesian principles concerning rational-ity, emotion, and the opposition between them” (Barbalett, 2000, 349).

Chapter 2

1. Recent Weber scholarship has uncovered a strong influence of Nietzsche’s thought onWeber’s work that went largely unnoticed by earlier Weber scholarship. This influence hasbeen documented and commented upon by, among others, David Owen in “Autonomyand ‘Inner Distance’: A Trace of Nietzsche in Weber” in History of the Human Sciences,1991, 4/1: 79–91. Tracy Strong has put forward the argument that Weber consciouslystructured the essay “The Social Psychology of World Religions” along the same lines as

ENDNOTES / 155

Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. Besides the resemblance in the structure of theessay, Weber echoes key aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of modernity, but does stop short ofcalling the entire ethical enterprise into question, as Nietzsche does. See, “ ‘What Have Weto Do with Morals?’ Nietzsche and Weber on History and Ethics” in History of the HumanSciences, 1992, 5/3: 9–18. In putting forth the argument that there is a direct link betweenthese two works, Strong is concurring with an earlier observation offered by WilhelmHennis. Hennis has also proposed that while Nietzsche is not explicitly mentioned byWeber in his essay on the social psychology of world religions, the whole essay is “an analy-sis of the role that according to Nietzsche, affliction played in the formation of salvationreligions” (Hennis, 1988, 152). Hennis goes on to note that “the parallels betweenNietzches’ ‘brilliant essay’ (as Weber called the third section of On the Genealogy ofMorals) and his own essays are so striking that, once indicated, they cannot escape ournotice” (Hennis, 1988, 155).

2. For Weber it is not only science that stands in close proximity to faith, in even strongerterms he posits that there can be no such thing as politics in the absence of faith:

. . . the serving of a cause must not be absent if action is to have inner strength.Exactly what the cause, in the service of which the politician strives for power anduses power, looks like is a matter faith. The politician may serve national, humani-tarian, social, ethical, cultural, worldly, or religious ends. The politician may besustained by a strong belief in “progress”—no matter in which sense—or he maycoolly reject this kind of belief. He may claim to stand in the service of an “idea” or,rejecting this in principle, he may want to serve external ends of everyday life.However, some kind of faith must always exist. Otherwise it is absolutely true thatthe curse of the creature’s worthlessness overshadows even the externally strongestpolitical successes. (PV, 117)

Whatever their other differences maybe (and there are many) and however profound thesedifference may be (and they are very profound) politics and religion share one thing incommon—faith. Weber notes that the goods that politics has to offer cannot be had in theabsence of faith, even more significantly there can no cultural activity called “politics” inthe absence of faith. The implications of this observation by Weber are far reaching and areexplored further in the following pages of the chapter.

3. Shils describes the occasion and intent behind the writing of this piece:

The essay on “Objectivity” had its immediate origins in [Weber’s] desire to clarifythe implications of a very concrete problem. Weber, together with Werner Sombartand Edgar Jaffe, was assuming the editorship of Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft undSozialpolitik which was, from his assumption of editorial responsibility in 1904until its suspension in 1933, probably the greatest periodical publication in thefield of the social sciences in any language. He wished to make explicit the stan-dards which the editors would apply and to which they would expect their contrib-utors would conform. In doing so, his powerful mind, which strove restlessly forclarity at levels where his contemporaries were satisfied with ambiguities andcliches, drove through to the fundamental problems of the relationship betweengeneral sociological concepts and propositions on the one hand, and concretehistorical reality on the other. Another problem which was to engage him until hisdeath—the problem of the relationship between evaluative standpoints or norma-tive judgments and empirical knowledge—received its first full statement in thisessay. (OSS, iii ff.)

According to Shils this essay is both a reflection and a statement of Weber’s deep concernfor logical and methodological clarity. At the same time it is the “first full statement” that

156 / ENDNOTES

Weber produced on a problem that would “engage him until his death”—i.e., the place ofvalue judgments in the scientific enterprise.

4. Weber appears to be saying that science is not made with the “head” alone—something inaddition to cool, detached objectivity is needed in order to sustain, nourish, and cultivatethe vocation of science. In quite explicit terms Weber notes that “Surely, politics is madewith the head, but it is certainly not made with the head alone” (PV, 127). He details thispoint at another place in his lecture:

Politics is made with the head, not with other parts of the body or soul. And yetdevotion to politics, if it is not to be frivolous intellectual play but rather genuinelyhuman conduct, can be born and nourished from passion alone. (PV, 115).

Given what Weber has to say about the maxim that “from good comes only good; but fromevil only evil follows” it appears that any “success” in the field of politics is the result of“destinies hidden from us, and besides ‘gifts.’ ” Speaking of this maxim, coined by a closefriend of his who was also a well-known politician, Weber notes:

But it is rather astonishing that such a thesis could come to light two thousand fivehundred years after the Upanishads. Not only the whole course of world history, butevery frank examination of everyday experience points to the very opposite. Thedevelopment of religions all over the world is determined by the fact that the veryopposite is true . . . This problem—the experience of irrationality of the world—hasbeen the driving force of all religious evolution. The Indian karma, Persian dualism,the doctrine of original sin, predestination, deus absconditus, all these have grownout of this experience. Also the early Christians knew full well the world is governedby demons and that he who lets himself in for politics, that is, for power and forceas means, contracts with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true that goodcan follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true.Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant. (PV, 122 ff.)

5. The account of “value-free” science offered by Löwith is to be contrasted with that offeredby Wolf, insofar as this distinction has a bearing on the present discussion as it unfolds inthe following chapters. Wolf interprets Weber’s notion of the value-freedom of science inthese words:

While on the one hand Weber’s insistence upon the “value-freedom of science” hadcertainly established a separation between the worlds of belief and knowledge, of thesystematic and the operational, he sought on the other hand time and again toachieve a new synthesis in the concept of fate, to suffuse these separate domainswith the common glow of the supra-rational vital energy which derived its powerfrom a divinely inspired existentiality. (Wolf, 1989, 123)

Wolf ’s interpretation of Weber’s notion of “value-free” science sees it as implying an empir-ical divide between “the worlds of belief and knowledge, of the systematic and the opera-tional.” Löwith’s more considered and accurate interpretation sees the notion of“value-free” science implying a conceptual distinction between faith and science thatcannot be reduced (or raised) to the level of empirical reality. Most of Weber scholarshiphas tended to agree with Wolf on this issue, but a review of Weber’s own writings clearlyevidences that Löwith’s interpretation is much closer to Weber’s own position in that hesees the difference in conceptual terms, not in empirical terms. The evidence from Weber’sown work to support Löwith’s assessment is presented in the next chapter.

6. Scholars looking at Weber’s work have questioned whether Weber succeeds in his attemptto stay clear of linear causality. After quoting Weber as saying “Thus far the continuumof European culture has known neither completed cyclical movements nor an unambiguously

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oriented ‘unilinear development,’ ” Gerth and Mills assert that they “nevertheless feeljustified in holding that a unilinear construction is clearly implied in Weber’s idea of thebureaucratic trend” (FMW, 51). Mitzman’s position is similar to that of Gerth and Mills.Referring to Weber, Mitzman notes: “for all his theoretical emphasis on plural causation,Weber later came very close to what amounted to a transposition of Marx’s monisticexplanation from the economic to the political realm” (Mitzman, 1970, 183 ff.). Mitzmanidentifies the bureaucracy as being at the base of the Weberian superstructure, in the placeof the economic base of the Marxian superstructure. Turner is also of the opinion that acertain interpretation of the concept of “elective affinity” comes “very close to a Marxistview that beliefs are socially constructed in terms of dominant economic interests”(Turner, 1992, 45). For a recent spirited defense of Weber’s “principled commitment tomulticausality” and his work exemplifying “radically multicausal analyses” see Kalberg,1994. Kalberg argues: “Weber’s historicist stress upon individual constellations and thedynamics of historical contingency, as well as his refusal to view ‘abstract uniformities,’including even ideal types, as other than heuristic concepts indicates a deep commitmentto a broadly multicausal methodology, as does his explicit rejection of all theories ofuniversal stages and laws” (Kalberg, 1994, 52). Ringer (1997) has offered an excellentexplication of the issues that are so often confused when this aspect of Weber’s work isdiscussed. The term “singular causal analysis” refers to the “what” of Weber’s object ofstudy. For example in PESC, Weber is offering a causal analysis of one particular culturalphenomenon at one particular time in history—capitalism in modern Western Europe.In order to study this particularity he employs a “multicausal methodology” and offers a“multicausal analysis” for the purposes of comparison and contrast so that he can isolatea particular “cause” that he can offer as a causal interpretation for this particular culturalphenomenon. While Weber engages in multicausal analysis to offer a scientific account ofa particular cultural phenomenon, the Verstehen method and the Historical Schoolendeavored to identify a single cause that could be used to give a scientific account ofmultiple phenomena in empirical reality—and perhaps of all phenomena in empiricalreality. This issue is detailed in chapter 4.

7. The words that Weber uses to critique Weltanschauugs—politicians are almost the same asthe words that he uses to critique Weltanschauugs—scientists. And the words that he usesto complement those attempting to bridge the religion vs. science divide are strikinglysimilar to the words he uses to complement those attempting to bridge the divide betweenspiritual values and politics:

If in these times, which, in your opinion, are not times of “sterile” excitation—excitation is not, after all, genuine passion—if now suddenly the Weltanschauungs—politicians crop up en masse and pass the watchword, “The world is stupid and notbase, not I,” “The responsibility for the consequences does not fall upon me butupon the others whom I serve and whose stupidity or baselessness I shall eradicate,”then I declare frankly that I would first inquire into the degree of inner poise back-ing this ethic of ultimate ends. I am under the impression that in nine out of tencases I deal with windbags who do not fully realize what they take upon themselvesbut who intoxicate themselves with romantic sensations. From a human point ofview this is not very interesting to me, nor does it move me profoundly. However,it is immensely moving when a mature man—no matter whether old or young inyears—is aware of a responsibility of the consequences of his conduct and reallyfeels such responsibility with heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic ofresponsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says’: “Here I stand;I can do no other.” There is something genuinely human and moving. And everyone of us who is not spiritually dead must realize the possibility of finding himselfat some time in that position. (PV, 127)

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Chapter 3

1. Weber asks the very same question with respect to politics. His lecture “Politics as aVocation” revolves around “the general question of what politics as a vocation means andwhat it can mean” (PV, 77). After providing the requisite definitions, identifying the actors,delineating the roles and tracing the historical development of all that he considers mostrelevant to his discussion of politics, Weber begins the concluding part of his lecture byposing the following question: “What calling can politics fulfill quite independently of itsgoals within the total ethical economy of human conduct—which is, so to speak, theethical locus where politics is at home?” (PV, 117). In other words, after having examinedpolitics as a “fact” in/of human culture, Weber turns his attention to the “value” of politicsin the total life of humanity—and what contribution can the factual/scientific study ofpolitics make to the human understanding of values.

2. For a detailed description of the dates, parties, and positions in the Wertulteilsstreit, seeCiaffa (1998). Ciaffa offers an excellent descriptive and critical analysis of the debate. Hisanalysis of the debate is not merely of historical interest—he demonstrates the relevance ofthis debate to late twentieth-century discussions on the relationship of values to scientificinquiry.

3. Any discussion of the value of science has to take into account the unique characteristicsof science that set it apart from other cultural activities. Weber has identified the abstractconcept and the controlled experiment as the “means” unique to science. Similarly, anydiscussion of the value of politics has to begin with an understanding of the uniqueness ofpolitics as a cultural activity. For Weber this uniqueness can only be defined in terms of“the specific means peculiar to it”—and in the case of “every political association” this is“the use of physical force” (PV, 78). Every human culture, at all times in history has knowna “political association” of some type or another. In the modern cultural condition, thenation-state has become the “political association” par excellence. Weber notes:

Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state—nobodysays that—but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation betweenthe state and violence is an especially intimate one. In the past, the most variedinstitutions—beginning with the sib—have known the use of physical force as quitenormal. Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a giventerritory. Note that “territory” is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically,at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutionsor to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is consid-ered the sole source of the “right” to use violence. Hence, “politics” for us meansstriving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power amongstates or among groups within a state. (PV, 78)

In other words while science can be considered to lay claim to a monopoly on the legiti-mate use of rationality the nation-state lays claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use ofviolence.

4. For Weber politics has nothing whatsoever to say about the ends (or values) towards whichthe means available to nation-state are to be employed—the state is solely concerned withexercising power/violence. Weber notes:

The developments of the past few decades, and especially the unprecedented eventsto which we are now witness, have heightened the prestige of the state tremen-dously. Of all the various associations, it alone is accorded “legitimate” power overlife, death, and liberty. Its agencies use these powers against external enemies in

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wartime and against internal resistance in both war and peace. In peacetime, it isthe greatest entrepreneur in economic life and the most powerful collector oftributes from the citizenry; and in time of war, it disposes of unlimited power overall available economic goods. Its modern rationalized form of organization has madeachievements possible in many spheres which could not have been approximated byany other sort of social organization. It is almost inevitable that people shouldconclude that it represents the “ultimate” value—especially in the political sphere—and that all social actions should be evaluated in terms of their relations to its inter-ests. This is an inadmissible deduction of a value-judgment from a statement of fact,even if we disregard, for the time being, the ambiguity of the conclusions drawnfrom that value-judgment. (MEN, 46)

5. While the bridging of the fact/value dichotomy in Weber’s writing on the methodologyof scientific inquiry yields (or requires) the concept of “meaning,” the bridging of thisdichotomy in his writing on politics yields (or requires) the concept of “legitimacy.” He notes:

Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of mendominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to belegitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authorityclaimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey? Upon what innerjustifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?. (PV, 78)

In short, the exercise of power/violence requires that those exercising it and those subjectto it accept it as being “legitimate.” After highlighting the place of legitimacy in politics,Weber begins to look for its source:

It is understood that, in reality, obedience is determined by highly robust motivesof fear and hope—fear of the vengeance of magical powers or of the power-holder,hope for reward in this world or in the beyond—and besides all this, by interestsof the most varied sort . . . However, in asking for the “legitimations” of thisobedience, one meets with these three “pure” types: “traditional,” “charismatic,”and “legal.”

These conceptions of legitimacy and their inner justification are of very greatsignificance for the structure of domination. (PV, 79)

He goes on to note that “legitimacy” is composed of not only “inner” values/justificationsbut also “outer” facts/material goods:

Organized domination, which calls for continuous administration, requires thathuman conduct be conditioned to obedience towards those masters who claim to bebearers of legitimate power. On the other hand, by virtue of this obedience, organ-ized domination requires the control of those material goods which in a given caseare necessary for the use of physical violence. Thus, organized domination requirescontrol of the personal executive staff and the material implements of administration.

The administrative staff, which externally represents the organization of politicaldomination, is, of course, like any other organization, bound by obedience to thepower-holder and not alone by the concept of legitimacy, of which we have justspoken. There are two other means, both of which appeal to personal interests:material reward and social honor. (PV, 80)

Not unlike Weber’s concept of “meaning,” the concept of “legitimacy” is simultaneously afact and a value—depending on the perspective from which the concept is viewed, andconditions under which it is viewed.

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6. Weber’s study of politics reveals that not only is legitimacy a fact in all politics, it issimultaneously a value that makes all political activity possible. The crisis of legitimacy inmodern politics rests on the fact that the fact of power and domination is raised to the levelof the highest value—after the modern state has expropriated all and any means by whichits claim could be challenged:

Everywhere the development of the modern state is initiated through the action ofthe prince. He paves the way for the expropriation of the autonomous and “private”bearers of executive power who stand beside him, of those who in their own rightpossess the means of administration, warfare, and financial organization, as well aspolitically usable goods of all sorts. The whole process is a complete parallel with thedevelopment of the capitalist enterprise through gradual expropriation of theindependent producers. In the end, the modern state controls the total means ofpolitical organization, which actually come together under a single head. No singleofficial personally owns the money he pays out, or the buildings, stores, tools andwar machines he controls. (PV, 82)

But in making the “fact” of power and violence the ultimate “value,” modern politics hasput the very issue of legitimacy into question. Just as modern science has rejected any andall claims of any “meaning” in the universe besides its pursuit of rationalized knowledge, themodern state has rejected any and all claims of legitimacy in the world besides the legitimacythat it holds. But neither modern science nor modern politics can provide an adequateaccount of the grounds on which their own claims stand. In his analysis of political trendsin which he was a participant/observer Weber is able to discern developments in modernpolitics that seem to be the first steps towards challenging this totalitarian claim:

In the contemporary “state”—and this is essential for the concept of state—the“separation” of the administrative staff, of the administrative officials, and ofthe workers from the material means of administrative organization is completed.Here the most modern development begins, and we see with our own eyes theattempt to inaugurate the expropriation of this expropriation of the political means,and therewith of political power. (PV, 82)

The value of Weber’s scientific investigation of politics in an age of disenchanted meaning-lessness appears to be that Weber’s investigation establishes the categorical indispensability ofa concept that modern politics renders/considers completely irrelevant—that is, of legitimacy.

Chapter 4

1. For a general description of the intellectual climate and context in which Weber articulatedhis position on the methodology of the sociocultural sciences see Alexander, 1983, vol. 3,4–10. For a detailed description of both the context and Weber’s intellectual antecedents,see Ringer, 1997, 7–62 and Ciaffa, 1998, 40–56.

2. For an excellent description of the manner in which Weber’s methodology attempts tosimultaneously critique and affirm aspects of the objectivist and subjectivist positions, seeHekman, 1994. While Hekman offers an excellent descriptive analysis, her critique ofWeber’s methodology is colored by her commitments to certain postmodern positions,especially that of Foucault.

3. In the secondary reading I came across only two indirect references to the relationshipbetween ideal type and imputation. First Ringer:

In any case, one cannot understand Weber’s doctrine of ideal types apart from hisbroader vision of causal analysis and interpretation. For Weber and for us, in sum,

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ideal types make sense only to the extent that they permit discriminations andcounterfactual “comparisons” involved in the construction of adequate interpreta-tions or explanations. (Ringer, 1997, 5)

Ringer goes on to devote an entire chapter detailing this point. Second Kalberg has anentire chapter titled “Ideal Types as Hypothesis-Forming Models” (Kalberg, 1994,92–142). He notes that Weber continuously constructs ideal-types throughout Economyand Society “to offer causal explanation of unique cases and developments” (Kalberg, 1994,92). But in both cases, neither of the two authors go beyond these observations to explorethe methodological significance and meaning of the relationship between ideal type and“causal analysis and interpretation” or “causal explanation.” It is only by explicitly recog-nizing the fact that the ideal type is a means to an end that the true significance of Weber’smethodology can be appreciated—for Weber the ideal type is a means and the imputationis the end. By identifying the imputation as the form in which a scientific hypothesis isoffered, Weber is identifying a third mode of scientific inquiry besides induction anddeduction. It is obviously the case that Weber accepts and employs the inductive anddeductive modes of inquiry in his methodology and practice of science—the degree towhich he employs the two has been recognized and debated in agonizing detail in Weberscholarship. But Weber’s genius and originality lies in recognizing and employing a thirdmode of scientific inquiry, imputation—and accounting for it in his methodology. The realsignificance of this “discovery” by Weber becomes clear when it is demonstrated that hismethodology makes possible not only the “unification of the cultural and social sciences,”(as demonstrated by Ringer) it contains all the resources to unify the natural/physicalsciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the social/cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften).

4. Huff sees a remarkable similarity between Weber’s notion of imputation and C.S. Peirce’snotion of abduction, see Peirce (1955). Huff notes that schematically speaking an imputa-tion is very similar to an abduction. In both cases, scientific knowledge of empirical realityis the product of a reasoning process that passes through these stages:

[G]iven some puzzling (actions or) events, these events would make sense if theywere part of a hypothetical constellation of processes characterized by propertiesa,b,c. If such hypothetical processes (and their properties) did obtain then thepuzzling (actions or) events would follow “as a matter of course.” (Huff, 1984, 68)

This observation by Huff, made in passing in the concluding pages of his survey of Weber’smethodology, contains an insight that needs to be explored in greater depth if the latentpotential in Weber’s methodological writings is to be truly appreciated. Not only is Weber’snotion of imputation remarkably similar to Peirce’s notion of abduction, Weber’s entireexplication of the methodology of scientific inquiry is remarkably similar to Peirce’s.A comparative study of the two thinkers, with respect to a common issue will reveal that atthe beginning of the twentieth century both of them resolved some of the most difficultand seemingly intractable problems in the area of the methodology of scientific inquiry—the unification of the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften being among themost prominent. If a resolution continues to elude the scholarly community at the dawnof the twenty-first century, it demonstrates the degree of self-understanding and self-knowledge characteristic of this community far more than it evidences the difficulty of the“problem.”

5. Just as all scientific inquiry is composed on subjective and objective elements, Weber’sdescription of politics suggests that all political activity is also made up of subjective andobjective elements. He notes:

One can say that three pre-eminent qualities are decisive for the politician: passion,a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion.

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This means passion in the sense of matter-of-factness, of passionate devotion to a“cause,” to the god or demon who is its overlord. It is not passion in the sense of thatinner bearing which my late friend, George Simmel, used to designate as “sterileexcitation,” . . . It is an excitation that plays so great a part with our intellectuals inthis carnival we decorate with the proud name of “revolution.” It is a “romanticismof the intellectually interesting,” running into emptiness devoid of all feeling ofobjective responsibility.

To be sure, mere passion, however genuinely felt, is not enough. It does not makea politician, unless passion as devotion to a “cause” also make responsibility to thiscause the guiding star of action. And for this, a sense of proportion is needed. Thisis the decisive psychological quality of the politician: his ability to let realities workupon him with inner concentration and calmness. Hence his distance to things andmen. “Lack of distance” per se is one of the deadly sins of every politician. It is oneof those qualities the breeding of which will condemn the progeny of our intellectu-als to political incapacity. (PV, 115)

Weber notes that the “passionate devotion” (a subjective state) has to be complementedby a sense of “matter-of-factness” (objective distance) in order to give rise to a genuine“political personality.” A purely subjective pursuit of power, without maintaining objectivedistance can only lead to disaster. Speaking of the politician, Weber notes:

He works with striving for power as an unavoidable means. Therefore, “powerinstincts,” as is usually said, belongs indeed to his normal qualities. The sin againstthe lofty spirit of his vocation, however, begins where this striving for power ceasesto be objective and becomes purely personal self-intoxication, instead of exclusivelyentering the service of “the cause.” For ultimately there are only two kinds of deadlysins in the field of politics: lack of objectivity and—often but not always identicalwith it—irresponsibility. Vanity, the need personally to stand in the foreground asclearly as possible, strongly tempts the politicians to commit one or both of thesesins . . . Although, or rather just because, power is the unavoidable means, andstriving for power is one of the driving forces of all politics, there is no more harmfuldistortion of political force than the parvenu-like braggart with power, and the vainself-reflection in the feeling of power, and in general every worship of power per se.The mere “power politician” may get strong effects, but actually his work leadsnowhere and is senseless. (Among us, too, an ardently promoted cult seeks to glorifyhim.) In this, the critics of “power politics” are absolutely right. From the suddeninner collapse of typical representatives of this mentality, we can see what innerweakness and impotence hides behind this boastful but entirely empty gesture. It isa product of a shoddy and superficially blasé attitude towards the meaning ofhuman conduct: and it has no relation whatsoever to the knowledge of the tragedywith which all human action, but especially political action, is truly interwoven.(PV, 116 ff.)

6. In Weber’s methodology of (social) scientific inquiry, an imputation represents an objec-tively possible hypothesis about empirical reality. As already noted it is “objective” and“subjective” in a very specific sense—and an ideal-type which is itself an “imputation” ofsorts plays a critical role in its formulation. In sum an imputation is the result (or maybethe cause) of bridging the subject/object dichotomy in the methodology of scientificinquiry. At the political level, it appears that “ethics” is the result (or maybe the cause) ofbridging the subject/object dichotomy. Weber makes a distinction between the “ethics ofabsolute ends” and the “ethics of responsibility” and he also makes a distinction betweentwo types of political actors: the political leader in charge of the political organization andthe official or bureaucrat responsible for the day-to-day running of the organization.

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Because their roles are quite different the ethical demands that “politics” places on the twogroups appear to be quite different:

According to his proper vocation, the genuine official . . . will not engage inpolitics. Rather, he should engage in impartial “administration.” This also holds forthe so-called “political” administrator, at least officially, in so far as the raison d’etat,that is, the vital interests of the ruling order, are not in question. Sine ira et studio,“without scorn and bias,” he shall administer his office. Hence, he shall not doprecisely what the politician, the leader as well as his following, must always andnecessarily do, namely, fight.

To take a stand, to be passionate—ira et stadium—is the politician’s element, andabove all the element of the political leader. His conduct is subject to quite adifferent, indeed, exactly the opposite principle of responsibility from that of thecivil servant. The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute consci-entiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with hisown conviction. This holds even if the order appears to him wrong and if, despitethe civil servant’s remonstrances, the authority insists on the order. Without thismoral discipline and self-denial, in the highest sense, the apparatus would fall topieces. The honor of the political leader, of the leading statesman, however, liesprecisely in an exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, a responsibility hecannot and must not reject or transfer. (PV, 95)

It appears that the political leader is called upon to practice the “ethic of ultimate ends”and the political official is called upon to practice the “ethic of responsibility.” But Weberhimself clarifies this point toward the end of his lecture:

Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent meansand following an ethic of responsibility endangers the “salvation of the soul.” If,however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pureethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be damaged and discredited for genera-tions, because responsibility for consequences is lacking, and two diabolic forceswhich enter the play remain unknown to the actor. These are inexorable andproduce consequences for his action and even for his inner self, to which he musthelplessly submit, unless he perceives them. (PV, 126)

Here Weber is explicitly stating that if a political leader categorically dispenses with the“ethic of responsibility” his action will be disastrous not only in political terms but also inpersonal terms. In the absence of an “inner distance” and cool sense of detachment,the political leader will not have the ability to distinguish between his/her own vain, impul-sive desires and the needs/interests of the “cause” that he/she is serving. Conversely, in theabsence of remarkable degree of inner strength and passionate commitment to his/herprofession (i.e., commitment to an “ethic of absolute ends”) the political official or bureau-crat will simply not have the ability to “execute conscientiously the order of the superiorauthorities” as if it “agreed with his own conviction.” In other words, a genuine attitude ofsine era et studio can only be cultivated in the presence of passionate commitment, and theclaim ira et stadium is meaningful only when it is uttered by an individual capable of aremarkable degree of self-detachment. Ethically irresponsible action will almost inevitablyresult from the decisions made by political officials lacking passionate commitment to theirprofessions and political leaders lacking objective detachment from their calling.

7. Weber notes that “feeling of power” is one of the “inner enjoyments” that a career inpolitics offers. Because this “feeling of power” is a cultural good that cannot be acquiredfrom any other human activity (PV, 114 ff.), all those wishing to possess it must engage inpolitics. This insight combined with description of ethically responsible political action

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suggests that political activity is not merely about the exercise of power “out there” in theworld, it is simultaneously (and perhaps more importantly) an exercise of power over one’sself—in the form of self-control and self-discipline. The ability to control and “dominate”a variety of inner impulses that are part and parcel of the human personality is a funda-mental pre-requisite for any ethically responsible political action in the world. This is astrue for the political official as it is for the political leader. Weber’s reflections on politics asa vocation lays bare the fact that genuine politics is as much about self-control and self-discipline as it is about the domination and control of others:

The sentence: “The devil is old; grow old to understand him!” does not refer to agein terms of chronological years. I have never permitted myself to lose out in adiscussion through a reference to a date on a birth certificate; but the mere fact thatsomeone is twenty years of age and I am over fifty is no cause for me to thinkthat this alone is an achievement before which I am overawed. Age is not decisive;what is decisive is the trained relentlessness in viewing the realities of life, and theability to face such realities and to measure up to them inwardly. (PV, 126 ff.)

The vocation of politics provides a unique opportunity, among all other cultural activities,to come to know the ways of the “devil” and discipline oneself “inwardly” in a way thatone can get a perspective on the “realities of life” and gain the strength to “face such reali-ties” that is not possible otherwise.

Chapter 5

1. It is worth reiterating here the sense in which the terms “modern” and “postmodern” are tobe understood in the context of the present discussion with reference to what was stated inchapter 1. The term “modern” is used in a very general historico-epistemological sense. Itrefers to a specific historical claim that there exists a universally valid, rational reason thatis uniquely capable of providing an exhaustive, objective, and universally valid descriptionof all of reality (Hekman, 1994, 282 ff.). The modern era is characterized by “the practicaluniversalization of reason . . . the thoroughgoing rationalization and intellectualization ofall the action and the symbolic systems of society” (Markus, 1992, 32). The term “post-modern” is also used in a very general historic-epistemological sense, in contradistinctionto the “modern.” It refers to that historical claim, which challenges the universality and theuniversalization of the modernist understanding of reason. In the place of a universal,objectively valid, rational metanarrative, “postmodernism is that which works to exposeand transgress the limits of the modern order through the aporetic resuscitation of formsof difference or otherness which are repressed by, or concealed within, this [i.e., modern]order” (Gane, 2002, 10). The term “fragmentation of reason” and the demise of its innerunity/coherence (Markus, 1992, 32) describes the postmodern position vis-à-vis thecontemporary situation in which the modernist view of reason finds itself.

2. Once again it is worth emphasizing that by using the term “postmodern” I do not mean toidentify Weber, anachronistically, with more recent forms of European post-structuralism,deconstructionism, and other forms of contemporary postmodernism. I only mean tosuggest that Weber is profoundly conscious of the problems inherent in the Enlightenmentproject—and Weber is “postmodern” to the degree that he does all he can to consciouslyaddress these problems to the best of his ability given the resources and cultural conditionsin which he is living.

3. Faust, Act I, Scene II (Translated by Bayard-Taylor)

“The newborn impulse fires my mind,I hasten on, his beams eternal drinking,

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The Day before me and the Night behind.Above me Heaven unfurled, the floor of waves beneath me.”

4. In light of the discussion in this section, it is quite obvious that Weber’s understanding of“progress” is quite different from the definition/understanding that is often attributed tohim—for Weber it makes no sense whatsoever to talk about “progress” in universal,necessitarian, linear terms. While this point has been implicit in the foregoing discussion,this appears to be a good place to make it explicit—one can say the same thing aboutWeber’s understanding of “rationality” and the definition/understanding that is oftenattributed to him. For Weber it makes no sense whatsoever to talk about “rationality” inuniversal, necessatrarian, linear terms. In one of his endnotes in PESC he states:

Something is never “irrational” in itself but only from a particular “rational” vantagepoint. For the nonreligious person every religious way of organizing life is irrational;for the hedonist every ascetic organization of life is “irrational” even if it may be,measured against its ultimate values, a “rationalization.” If this essay wishes to makeany contribution at all, may it be to unveil the many-sidedness of a concept—the“rational”—that only appears to be straightforward and linear. (PESC, 170, fn. 10)

By citing a concrete example, Weber expresses the same point in even more pointed terms:

Magic, . . ., has been just as systematically “rationalized” as physics. The earliestintentionally rational therapy involved the almost complete rejection of the cure ofempirical symptoms by empirically tested herbs and potions in favor of the exorcismof (what was thought to be) the “real” (magical, daemonic) cause of the ailment.Formally, it had exactly the same highly rational structure as many of the mostimportant developments in modern therapy. (MEN, 34)

Consequently, any acceptance and affirmation of modern medicine (or modern physics)because it is “rational” and the rejection of magic because it is “irrational” evidences thelack of self-understanding and self-awareness on the part of the (modern) individualstaking such a position. For Weber magic is no more and no less “rational” than modernmedicine (or physics). Even though they are no different in terms of being more or less“rational,” magic and modern medicine (or physics) are different in terms of the goods (orends/values) that they promise to deliver. Therefore, the choice of one “rationality” and therejection of the other has more to do with the value that is placed in the goods (or thefruits) that one offers and the other does not.

5. The examples of Tenbruk and Bendix are cited only for illustrative purposes. Their read-ing of Weber is dualistic on two different, but related, counts: (a) divorcing his scholarshipon the sociology of culture from his work on the methodology of (social) scientific inquiryand (b) divorcing the value-orientation informing Weber’s pursuit of scientific knowledgefrom his scientific findings. This type of differentiated and fragmented reading of Weber isa defining characteristic of most Weber scholarship. This is not to suggest that there is novalue in such a differentiated and fragmented reading of Weber. If approached with aparticular value-orientation, this differentiated and fragmented reading of Weber canbecome a most valuable tool in gaining deeper insights into his scholarship. This point isdetailed shortly.

6. Even though the discussion of Weber’s views on politics has been carried out in a hasty (andperhaps harried) manner, the following can be offered as the starting point (or maybe theconclusion) of Weber’s analysis of the political sphere. For Weber the exercise of power,domination, and violence are the means that are specific to political activity—means thatdistinguish it from all other human cultural activities. As a human cultural activity, poli-tics, like all other human cultural activities, appears to be made possible by presuppositions

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and extra-political value-ideas that are outside its own sphere. If “politics” is understoodspecifically in terms of the means that are unique to it, then it is made possible by politi-cally irrational elements. Given the discussion in chapter 3, the nonpolitical elements inpolitical rationality can be summarized thus:

(a) Political legitimacy is real.(b) Political legitimacy can be had.(c) Political legitimacy is worth having.

The discussion in chapter 4 suggested that for Weber the exercise of power, violence, anddomination in the world “out there” must be accompanied by the highest regard for ethicsby the political actor. This regard for ethics should express itself in the form of passionatecommitment to a political cause (or task) complemented by self-control, self-disciplineand inner distance in the service of the cause (or task). In other words politics is as muchan exercise in self-mastery as it is an exercise in dominating others. For Weber politicalactivity divorced from self-mastery inevitably produces results that lead to the lossof control over what is “out there”—that over which one thought one had control.Combining what Weber has said about legitimacy, ethics, and the exercise of power, we candraw the following conclusion: If the political exercise of power (i.e., domination of others)is divorced from ethics (i.e., self-mastery and self-control), the legitimacy of any/allachievements attained by the exercise of violence/power will stand discredited. Oncelegitimacy is undermined then political activity, by definition, ceases to be real. Weber’sobservations at the conclusion of World War I and the terms on which it was concluded,poignantly summarize the relationship between “legitimacy” and “ethics” by challengingthe claim that an immediate “success” in the realm of politics evidences the “rightness”of the action. This claim is similar to that of a suitor who wins the hand of a maiden, andthen proceeds to conclude that this is evidence that he was “worthy” of her hand while hiscompetitor was not:

It is no different, of course, if after a victorious war the victor in undignified self-righteousness claims, “I have won because I was right.” Or, if somebody under thefrightfulness of war collapses psychologically, and instead of simply saying it was justtoo much, he feels the need to legitimizing his war weariness to himself by substi-tuting the feeling, “I could not bear it because I had to fight for a morally badcause.” And likewise with the defeated in war. Instead of searching like old womenfor the “guilty one” after the war—in a situation in which the structure of societyproduced the war—everyone with a manly and controlled attitude would tell theenemy, “We lost the war. You have won it. That is now all over. Now let us discusswhat conclusions must be drawn according to the objective interests came into playand what is the main thing view of the responsibility towards the future whichabove all burdens the victor.” Anything less is undignified and will become aboomerang. A nation forgives if its interests have been damaged, but no nationforgives if its honor has been offended, especially by a bigoted self-righteousness.Every new document that comes to light after decades revives the undignifiedlamentations, the hatred and scorn, instead of allowing the war at its end to beburied, at least morally. This is possible only through objectivity and chivalry andabove all only through dignity. But never is it possible through an “ethic,” which intruth signifies a lack of dignity on both sides. Instead of being concerned aboutwhat the politician is interested in, the future and the responsibility towards thefuture, this ethic is concerned about politically sterile questions of past guilt, if suchguilt exists at all. And it overlooks the unavoidable falsification of the whole prob-lem, through very material interests: namely, the victor’s interests in the greatestpossible moral and material gain; the hopes of the defeated to trade in advantages

ENDNOTES / 167

through confessions of guilt. If anything is “vulgar,” then, this is, and it is the resultof this fashion of exploiting “ethics” as a means of “being in the right.” (PV, 118).

There is very little doubt in Weber’s mind regarding the fate of the “peace” achieved byequating “legitimacy” with the ethical claim of “being in the right” and then proceedingto reap material benefits from this “ethical” claim. He notes that “when the period ofexhaustion will have passed, the peace will be discredited, not the war” (PV, 120). Less thantwo decades after Weber spoke these words the “peace” of Versailles stood completelydiscredited.

7. This approach toward “re-enchantment” would remain faithful to Weber’s methodology ofscientific inquiry and his sociological study of culture. Such an approach stands in sharpcontrast to the proposal offered by Gane (2002). After offering a positive valuation ofWeber’s critique of disenchanting rationalism, Gane turns to the postmodernism ofLyotard, Foucault, and Baudrillard for the possibilities of “re-enchanting” modern culturebecause he feels that Weber’s thought does not contain the resources to move towards“re-enchantment.” There are two significant shortcomings in Gane’s proposal. First, thepostmodernist project advocated by Gane at the beginning of the twenty-first century canbe critiqued on the same grounds that Weber critiqued the modernist project of a natura-listic metaphysics in the beginning of the twentieth century (see 2.3). In both a value-ladenWeltanschauung based on a patently unscientific metaphysics is presented in the garb of(social) science. In his reading of Lyotard, Gane senses the possibility that the aestheticsphere seems to “resist and perhaps even threaten the instrumental rationalism which isintrinsic to modern culture” (Gane, 2002, 10). Weber would see Gane’s identification ofthe aesthetic sphere and modern culture with certain “intrinsic” characteristics as unwar-ranted metaphysical claims that cannot be justified (social) scientifically. Gane goes on tooffer a rereading of Foucault’s “genealogical history” and shows it to be based on a “presen-tist metanarrative” that “conceals the value and direction of its own enterprise” (Gane,2002, 11). Gane acknowledges that these are the very characteristics of modern culture thatneed to be critiqued and transcended. This is a very peculiar proposal on Gane’s partbecause Weber critiques modern scientific rationalism precisely because it is a “presentistmetanarrative” that is unconscious of the value-ideas, presuppositions, and historical trajec-tory underpinning it. To offer Foucault’s vision as a response to the disenchantmenteffected by scientific rationalism is to offer a choice between “six of one and a half dozenof the other.” Finally, Gane turns to Baudillard’s work on symbolic exchange. What Ganefinds most appealing in Baudillard’s work is “that whereas Weber refuses to place faith inthe possibility of the re-enchantment of the world, Baudillard works to affirm this possi-bility” (Gane, 2002, 11). But at the same time Gane recognizes that Baudillard’s faith inthe possibility of “re-enchantment” appears to be based on an underestimation ofthe “capacity of Western culture to resist the threat of forms that are other to itself ”(Gane, 2002, 11). Perhaps more overtly than Lyotard and Foucault, Baudillard’s is aWeltanschauungs response to disenchantment as the “fate of our times,” a response thatsimply does not meet the “demands of the day.”

The second shortcoming in Gane’s proposal is the fact that the responses offered byLyotard, Foucault, and Baudillard are responses to particular manifestations of disen-chantment and are therefore partial, fragmented, and differentiated. What is more, itappears that the three responses are mutually antagonistic. This attempt at “re-enchantment”is characterized by the same fundamental problems that characterize disenchantment—meaninglessness at the level of theoretical rationalization and an irreconcilable “battle ofthe gods” at the level of practical rationalization. That much having been said, Gane hasmade a most valuable contribution to cultural criticism in general and Weber studies inparticular by attempting to discover the cultural “meaning” that informed Weber’s scien-tific study of culture and the possible cultural significance or “meaning” that Weber’s workmay still hold.

168 / ENDNOTES

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Alexander, J. 6, 123–5, 134–5

Barbour, I. 2Bendix, R. 2, 134Bruun, H.H. 96Buddha 34

Casanova, J. 1, 3, 37–8, 64Chowers, E. 4Ciaffa, J. 1, 6, 91, 95, 96, 127–9,

134–5

Dilthey, W. 93–4Durkheim 123–5

Francis 34Frued, S. 36

Gane, N. 1, 6, 120–2

Hegel 146Hekman, S. 1, 6, 120–2Hennis, W. 55Horowitz, A. 42Hume, D. 36

Jaffe 43Jesus 34

Kalberg, S. 120, 146Kant, I. 58Kaye, H. 83, 84Knies, K. 92

Landshut, S. 84–5, 136Lawrence, B. 1Löwith, K. 3, 4, 7, 59, 137

Maley, T. 42Marx, K. 123–5Mitzman, A. 2

Nietzsche, F. 42, 45, 57

Oakes, G. 91

Parsons, T. 53Plato 57, 71Polkinghorne, J. 2

Rickert, H. 85–6, 95–6Ringer, F. 1, 6, 92, 95, 125–7,

134–5

Schluchter, W. 1, 2, 3, 36, 37–8, 60, 71

Sombart, W. 43

Tenbruk, F. 134Tolstoy 41, 64, 66, 80Tönnies, F. 60 Truzzi 91, 92

Windelband, W. 94, 95–6Wittenberg 1, 2, 34–6,

37, 64Wolin, S. 34, 57, 58, 82

NAME INDEX


Absraction 52–3, 80, 101, 104Actions 73–5Anti-Religious Skepticism 33Archuv fur Sozialwissenschaft und

Sozialpolitik 43Art see value-spheres (aesthetic)Artist 133Asceticism 20, 25

Beliefs 45, 49Bureaucracy 23

Causal laws 91–3Causality 16, 29–31, 97–8, 103–5Charisma 9–10, 148–9Concept 68–9, 96–8, 100–2Conflation 100–5Consistency 78–80Cultural Values 47Culture

Definition 50and meaning 81–2and meaninglessness 32

Death 32Determinism 91–3Differentiation 15–16Disenchantment 9

“fate of times” 11–17meaning 16of modern culture 10, 33

Empathetic understanding 93–4, 97Enchantment 9, 33, 156Ethics

and empirical reality 50–1, 53–4and worldly spheres 17–28

Experiment 68–9Extra-Scientific 47–8, 58

Faith 13, 48, 62–3, 145empirical dimension 49–56and science 43–9, 59

Geist 93Geisteswissenschaften 94Gods 18–19, 72–3, 142–7

Hegelianism 90–1Heuristic devices 99Historicist method 89–90Homo-hermeneut 83–4

Ideal interests 54Ideal types 108–13Idealism 123–5Ideographic knowledge 95Immediate knowledge 100Imputation 90, 105–14, 138Inspiration 46Intellect 14Intellectual integrity 60Intellectual sacrifice 13–15, 60, 62Intellectualism 57Intellectualization 11–12Interpretive understanding 103Intuition 95–6, 102–3

Laws 48, 76, 98Logic 1, 101, 104Love 20–1

Magic 68Market 20

SUBJECT INDEX

Material interests 54Materialism 123–5Mathematics 102Meaning 15, 22, 30

and cultural science 43–4, 54, 139–40

and value of science 80–7Meaninglessness 34, 65Means/Ends 73–4Metaphysics 61–2Methodenstreit 90–6Money 20

Natur 93Naturalism 98–9, 102Naturwissenchaften 94Neo-Kantianism 90, 95Nomothetic knowledge 95

Objective possibility 89–96Objective validity 113–14Objectivity 43, 89–90

Politics 7Polytheism 27–8Presuppositions 12, 31, 43, 77–8, 89

of cultural science 44of scientific inquiry 58

Problematic knowledge 114–17Progress 65, 134–7

and self-awareness 130–2Prophecy 14, 17, 59Psychologism 100

Rationalismdefinition 11scientific and religious 28–9Scientific versus religious 14, 16

Rationalization 11of methodology of social

science 141–2practical 11, 17–28theoretical 11, 28–34, 52and value of science 72–80

ReligionAnd Enlightenment 36–7rapproachment with science 60–2, 152–6Versus rationalism 12, 15–16

Religious Ethic 19Responsibility 75–6

Salvation 52–3, 147–8Science

and clarity 72definition 41, 67–72faith dimension 56limitations 41

Scientific Rationalism 12, 18Secularization 37Sermon on Mount 18Social Policy 77Subjectivity

And cultural inquiry 70–1And scientific knowledge 97–8

Supra-rational 45

Theodicy 29–30, 52Theology

as a science 12–13

Validity 43, 49, 89–90, 105Value-freedom 47, 65Value-ideas 55, 65, 78, 129–30Value judgments 43Value-relevance 65Value-spheres

aesthetic 23–4economic 19–20, 34erotic 24–6political 21–3religious 18–26

Verstehen 55Vocation

of science 65Weber’s 57–8, 144–5

War 22World Image 51, 53–4, 76–8

176 / SUBJECT INDEX

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